INTRODUCTION TO PURVAMIMAMSA SYSTEM

Shripad Bhat

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FOREWORD

Indian culture is one of the richest and most diverse of its kind in the world as it has stimulated the growth and development of several philosophical systems and religious thoughts. This culture has exercised considerable influence over the spiritual life of the people all over the world.

The most ancient literature available are the Four Vedas - Rig, Yajur, Sama and Atharva Veda. They are noted as 'Apaurusheya', i.e., they were not written by man. It is not known when and where they were made. Veda Vyasa later divided them into four Vedas. The origin of it may be an unknown factor, but the known factor is its essence. The Vedas are rich in principles that guide the beings towards happiness and prosperity, which is a contribution to the Indian wisdom.

The school of Mimamsa has a definite place in Indian philosophy. It is one of the important sources of knowledge. Mimamsa is a science of interpretation of the sacrificial portion of the Veda. The whole purpose of Vedas is to engage human beings in rituals for creating good karma. The Purvamimamsa school was systematised by Jaimini.

Jaimini in Mimamsa Sutra, presents material activity and it's results as the whole of reality. His interpretations provide Philosophical justifications for the observance of Vedic rituals, to attain Moksha.

This book entitiled 'Introduction to Purvamimamsa system', is a good book to be read and enjoyed. It provides many facts about the Mimamsa system and it's history. Hope that this book be of great use to both the elderly and students.

In the Service of Lord Venkateswara

Executive Officer,

Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams,
Tirupati.

Preface

It gives me a great pleasure to publish a book on Purvamimasa which is in the form of an introduction. This system is one of the major systems in orthodox systems of Indian philosophy and contributed a lot to different branches of Indian wisdom. The main object of the Purvamimasa system is an investigation of the Dharma. Therefore it accepts the authority of the Vedas. According to Mimamsa, Veda is apaurusheya (non-human origin) and it is self authoritative. The sutras of Jaimini are considered as the tool of interpretation of Vedic sentences. Shabarabhashya, the commentary on the Jaimini sutras, became very popular since it does not explain merely the sutras but it gives full picture about the Mimamsa system. Kumarila, Prabhakara, Shalikanatha, Parthasarathi, Mandana Misra, Khanda Deva and so on have written a number of treatises which expands the horizon of this system. Many research works have been carried out and translations of several works came into existence in the twentieth century.

Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam has proposed to publish various books under 'Ancient Indian Culture Series' and Prof. Shrihari approached me to write a book on 'Purvamimamsa Darshana' with certain limitations. As per the requirement, an attempt is made here to write in simple language which may help to the common reader in understanding the subject. This consists of origin and development, a brief history,

differences between Kumarila and Prabhakara schools, contents, pramanas and some prameya topics.

I am thankful to Prof. Shrihari who assigned this work to me and gave guidance for the same. I am also thankful to Prof. P.G. Lalye who suggested my name for this work and encouraged me to complete the task. I also thank Mr. Rohit Karande who helped me in computerising the work. Finally, I express my thanks to those who helped me directly or indirectly to complete the book.

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Chapter 1

Origin and Development

The Mimamsa school of Indian philosophy got the unique place in the development of orthodox systems. Mimamsa is closely related to Veda. This is the only school of philosophy which strongly upholds the authority of the Vedas while the authority of the Vedas came into attack by heterodox systems. Mimamsakas claim that Veda is apaurusheya (non-human origin) and it is self authoritative. It provides the principles of Vedic Interpretation which are held in high esteem even in the present period. Since it discusses the Vedic sentences, it came to be known as Vakyashastra. While interpreting the Vedic sentences, it has explained ritualistic acts, developed its own philosophy, logic, psychology, linguistics and so on. Thus it has contributed a lot to the Indian wisdom. It also offers many maxims which serve as rules of guidance to the other branches of philosophy as well as to the all walks of Indian life even in the modern age. The Hindu law literature does not go beyond the limitations of maxims fixed by Mimamsa.

The Mimamsa school has definite place not only in Indian philosophy, but, it is considered as one of the important source of fourteen sources of vidyas (knowledge). The Yagnavalkya Smrti provides as -

पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः ।
वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥

[Purana, Nyaya, Mimamsa, Dharmashastra, Angas (six) and the Vedas (four)].

It is one of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy which accept the authority of the Vedas. They are said in groups like, Nyaya-Vaishesika; Sankhya-Yoga; Purvamimamsa and Uttaramimamsa. The Purvamimamsa school with which we have to deal was systematised by Jaimini and Uttaramimamsa which is popularly known as Vedanta by Badarayana. Among these the Purvamimamsa is also called Karmamimamsa or in short Mimamsa. (Since the object of desire to know, enquiry or investigation here is dharma or religious duty, it is also called Dharmamimamsa). Mimamsa is a science of interpretation of the sacrificial portion (karmakanda) of the Veda just as Vedanta is that of Gnanakanda. It is completely different from Kalpasutras which purely deal with the complicated procedure of the sacrificial rites and ceremonies and on the other hand from Nirukta which explains the Vedic words and their bearing on the Vedic texts. The Mimamsa, therefore, partakes the nature of both of them as it undertakes to interpret the Vedic words and describe the ceremonies in connection with them.

The word Mimamsa is derived from the root man, to know with the desiderative suffix san and means desire to know or an enquiry or investigation. The word Mimamsa goes very far into antiquity. Right from the Vedic period, the sannanta (ending with san) root Mimamsa is used either as a noun or a verb in the

combined sense of desire for knowledge and of discussion. In the Taittiriya Samhita (VII 5.7.1) it is said 'the expounders of Brahma discuss, whether (a day) should be omitted or not; on this, (they) say that it must be left out. Here, the word 'Mimamsante' is used in the sense of investigating a doubtful point and arriving at a conclusion thereon. In many other places similar doubtful points introduced by the words 'the expounders of Brahma say' are put forward without employing the word 'mimamsante' (T.S. 2.5.3.7). In the Tandyamahabrahmana (6.5.9) we read one should not discuss the merits of a Brahmana. In another passage of the same text, the form 'mimamseran' occurs (23.4.2). In the Kausitaki Brahmana the form 'mimamsante' occurs very frequently. For example, in one place (2.9) it is said, they investigate (the question) whether oblation should be offered to fire when the Sun rises or before the Sun rises'. After making remarks on each of the two alternatives, the conclusion is established that the oblation is to be offered before Sunrise. The word 'Mimamsa' occurs in the Kausitaki Brahmana (18.4) 'now begins the discussion of the paridhana (conclusion) itself'. In the Upanishads we frequently meet with the verb. In the Chandogya (5.11.1) it is said that several learned students like Prachinasala Aupamanyava came together and discussed the question, 'who is the self; what is Brahma?' In the Taittiriya Upanishad (2.8.1) occur the words 'this is the (result of) discussion over bliss'. From all these, it is clear that the verb 'Mimamsante' and the word

'Mimamsa' had from the ancient times to the times of Upanishads been employed to designate discussions of doubtful points in ritual or philosophy.

In the Nirukta (chap.7), there is an interesting discussion regarding the form of deities invoked at sacrifices and in mantras various views are put forward. This very subject is discussed in Purvamimamsa (9.1.6-10) where the authoritative conclusion seems to be that the deity in a sacrifice has no corporeal form. Panini (3.1.6) preserves a special sutra to explain such form as Mimamsante, bibhatsate etc. In the Baudhayana (1.4.10) and Vasistha (22.2) Dharmasutras we meet with the verb 'Mimamsante'. Some of the Dharmasutras contain purely Mimamsa rules and principles. The Gautama Dharma Sutra says (1.5) 'where there is a conflict of two texts of equal potency, there is an option'. Apastamba Dharmasutra (1.1.4.8) says, 'a positive Vedic text is more cogent than usage that leads to the inference (of the existence of Vedic text). This resembles the Jaimini Sutra (1.3.3) which says, 'when there is contradiction it is not to be accepted; when there is none, then there is inference'. In another place Apastamba (1.4.12.11) says, where an action is due to the finding of pleasure therefrom there is no Sastra. This is the same as Jaimini's teaching (4.12) which states, Purusartha is that in which there is a love of a man and that love is indicated by a certain object which is inseparably connected with it.

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Chapter 2

Brief History of Mimamsa

Jaimini

The Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini is the earliest available text of the Mimamsa school. However, the scattered references to the earlier Acaryas and their views taken by Jaimini are either for the support of his views or for refutation. It shows an evidence that many teachers of Mimamsa in different circles held divergent views on several topics of Mimamsa and several interpretations of Vedic sentences. Having seen all efforts of his predecessors Jaimini gave the final shape to the Mimamsa doctrine with the contribution of his own.

Regarding the personal history of Jaimini, we do not have any authentic source of information about his date and place of birth etc. Hardly anything is known about him beyond his name and the legend is that he was crushed to death by an elephant. In an account of semimythical nature, Jaimini is mentioned as a disciple of Parasara Vyasa. In another account of the same type it is stated that Vyasa son of Parasara, had four disciples, and Jaimini was one of them. He divided the Vedas into four and gave instructions in the Samaveda to Jaimini. Puranas declare that Vyasa, Parasara, also called Krsnadvaipayana, arranged the one Veda into four and imparted the Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda, and Atharvaveda respectively to Paila, Vaisampayana,

Jaimini and Sumantu. In the great epic Mahabharata, Sumantu, Jaimini, Vaisampayana and Paila are stated along with Suka (the son of Vyasa) to be the pupils of Vyasa. The name of Jaimini interestingly occurs in the passage of Asvalayanagrhasutra, such as "Sumantu-Jaimini-Paila- Sutra-Bhashya-Bharata-Mahabharata-Dharmacharyah" P.V. Kane opines that above passages make clear that several centuries before the Christian era Jaimini's name was an honoured name and connected with the Samaveda. Hopkins, however, observes that the Mahabharata refers to Jaimini only as an ancient sage and not as a philosopher.

There are a number of Vedic works associated with the name of Jaimini in ancient literature, viz. the Jaimini Samhita, Jaiminiya Brahmana and the Jaiminiya Upanishad all belonging to the Samaveda. He is also credited with a Srauta and a Grhyasutra and the name occurs in lists of doubtful authenticity in the Asvalayana and Sankhayana Grhyasutras. According to Kumarila, Jaimini, the author of the extent Sutras, wrote another work called Chandogyanuvada.

Garge opines that the two Sutras of Jaimini (1.3.19.; 1.3.21) can only furnish with a remote hint that he was familiar with the country of Mathura either as an inhabitant or neighbour, remote or adjacent. Further, he says, quoting Sabara Bhashya on JS 1.3.10 Jaimini is familiar with Mleccha words and next rejects this view by saying that this does not carry us very far as Mleccha speaking tribes cannot be definitely located as confined

only to the North-West, nor as an intermixture of Mleccha so improbable in the language of any other province farther to the east or south as to rule out the possibility of an acquaintance with Mleccha words on the part of its inhabitants.

Date of Jaimini

As regards the date of Jaimini, we are still in confusion. According to Dasgupta, Jaimini Sutras were probably written about 200 B.C. Radhakrishnan opines that the fourth century B.C. is the earliest period we can assign for Jaimini's work. Prof. Jacobi places the Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini between 300-200 B.C. on the assumption and the belief that Jaimini is post Paninian, a contemporary to Katyayana and prior to Patanjali. Mm. Kane, however, concludes that the lowest limit to which the extent PM. Sutra can be brought down is about 100 A.D. and the highest limit is about 300 B.C. But the same author has fixed the date of Purvamimamsa Sutras about 400 B.C. to 200 B.C. Garge came across with many evidences which prove that the extant JS falls into the earlier part of the Srautasutra literature i.e., circa 500 B.C.

The arrangement of Jaimini Sutras is as follows: Sutras are divided into 12 chapters, each chapter containing four padas except the third, sixth and tenth which contain eight padas each. Each pada contains several Adhikaranas (topics for discussion). There are roughly speaking 2745 sutras, 907 adhikaranas and 60

padas according to Madhava's reckoning. The word sutra means a thread or string. It is so called because the words are tied together as in a string to express the meaning. It helps one to remember easily. A pada originally means a part of anything. There is a rule, a chapter is divided into four parts, each part is called as pada. An adhikarana is a thesis or subject which forms part of its discussion. It consists of five parts viz., vishaya (the subject), vishaya (the doubt), purvapaksha (the prima facie view), uttarapaksha (the reply) and nirnaya (the decision).

The following charts show the details of the Jaimini Sutras

Chart A

Ch.	Adhikarana-s and the pada-s								
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth	Total
1	32	53	35	30					150
2	49	29	29	32					139
3	27	43	46	57	53	47	51	44	368
4	48	30	41	41					160
5	35	23	44	26					128
6	52	31	41	47	56	39	40	42	348
7	23	21	36	20					100
8	43	32	35	28					139
9	58	61	43	60					222
10	58	74	75	59	88	79	73	70	576
11	70	66	54	57					247
12	46	37	38	47					168
									2745

Chart B

Ch.	Adhikarana-s and the pada-s								
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth	Total
1	8	4	10	20					42
2	18	13	14	2					47
3	15	19	20	21	20	16	23	23	157
4	17	11	13	20	12				62
5	18	12	15	9					54
6	13	11	21	14	21	7	13	9	109
7	5	1	14	3					23
8	19	6	6	4					35
9	18	20	14	15					67
10	21	34	20	27	26	22	20	19	179
11	11	16	16	21					64
12	21	15	16	16					68
									907

It seems that the Sankarsakanda is very much neglected from early times. There is a conflict of views about its authorship. Nyayaparishuddhi of Venkatanatha states that Kasakrtsna was the author of the Sankarsakanda. It seems from Sabarabhashya that Sankarsakanda was looked upon by him as Jaimini's work. Sankaracharya quotes a sutra from Sankarsha, it holds that the Sankarsha was well known to Vedantasutra and it appears to convey that it was the work of Jaimini. Ramanuja also holds that Jaimini was the author of 16 chapters (comprising twelve called Purvamimamsa and the remaining four forming the Sankarsha).

In some works like the Bhashya of Ramanuja on Vedantasutra and the Prapanchahridaya the Mimamsastra is stated to be one whole containing twenty chapters and there was commentary called Krtakoti by Bodhayana on the whole of it. These twenty chapters are made up as 12 chapters ascribed to Jaimini, 4 chapters of Sankarshaka a, 4 chapters constituting the Vedantasutra. Sankaracarya refers to extent Purvamimamsa as Dvadashalaksani in his Bhasya on Vedantasutra 3.3.26. Many writers have mentioned the extant Purvamimamsa as Dvadashalaksani.

Predecessors of Jaimini

Although Purvamimamsa sutras of Jaimini is the earliest work available, there were several Acharyas of Purvamimamsa. Jaimini refers to eight Acharyas in his Sutras by name and refers to others by 'eke' (JS 9.3.4). These Acharyas, whether they had composed any work on the subject or not, but were undoubtedly great teachers of Mimamsa and held their views independently on the subject.

Divine origin

There is an unbroken tradition of teacher - disciple lineage which shows the divine origin of the Mimamsa.

Brahma instructed the Mimamsa to Prajapati, Prajapati to Indra, Indra to Agni, Agni to Vasistha, Vasistha to Parasara, Parasara to Krishnadvaipayana and Krishnadvaipayana to Jaimini; Jaimini having got

the instruction (upadesa) from Krishnadvaipayana, composed in his treatise.

Pre-Jaimini Mimamsakas

1. Badarayana - Jaimini refers to Badarayana in five places in 1.1.5; 5.2.19; 6.1.8; 10.8.4; 11.1.65 in connection with the views on purely Mimamsa topics. Jaimini agrees with Badarayana in all these places except only in one place (JS 10.8.44). The name of Badarayana is more familiar to us as the author of the Brahmasutras. But it is difficult to say on the basis of evidence of the views quoted in the JS that the author of the Brahmasutras and the other one referred to in JS is the same and one or both are different Acharyas. It may be said that the author of the Brahmasutras also may have been the teacher of Purvamimamsa.

2. Badari - Jaimini refers to him at four places (JS 3.1.3;6.1.27; 8.3.6; 9.2.33), mostly to refute his views except one place (JS 9.2.33) where he agrees with him. Badari refuted the view of Jaimini that the Sudra is not entitled to perform Vedic sacrifices. He argues that the Vedic text viz. 'Vasante Brahmano' etc., is only nimittartha (untingent); therefore all the castes should be entitled to perform sacrifices. (JS 6.1.27)

3. Atreya - Jaimini refers to him thrice (JS 4.3.18; 5.2.18; 6.1.26) and agrees with his views. Baudhayana Grhyasutra also refers one Atreya as a padakara. Mahabharata (13.173.3) refers to a sage of that name who was a teacher of Nirgunabrahmavidya.

4. Aitisayana - Jaimini refers to him thrice (JS 3.2.43; 3.4.24; 6.1.6). He is of the opinion (JS 6.1.6) that in order to use of the particular gender (i.e., masculine) on the injunction - 'Svargakamo Yajeta' only men are entitled to perform the sacrifice. Jaimini rejected it, but in other two places (JS 3.2.43; 3.4.24) both Jaimini and Aitisayana agree with each other.

5. Karsnajini - Jaimini refers to him twice (JS 4.3.17; 6.7.35). He holds that 'Sahasrasamvatsara' should be regarded as a functions for generations as it is impossible for a non identical with the author of the present Sutras. This view, however, may be accepted till to get sufficient evidences. It is also possible to say that he who was a Mimamsaka might have been a Vedantin too. It is corroborated by the references of the various Acharyas in both systems.

Apart from these, there were many more Acharyas of the Mimamsa, who lived and taught before the period of Jaimini and who have been mentioned in earlier works, although Jaimini does not make any reference to them. The name of Kasakrtsna and Apisali as teachers and perhaps founders of independent schools of Purvamimamsa are found in the Vyakarana Mahabhashya of Patanjali and in the Sutras of Panini. In fact these two teachers must have been very old and perhaps, were Grammarians too.

Post-Jaimini Mimamsakas

Sabara - As the scholars know, Sabara is the great Bhashyakara of Jaimini Sutras. His bhashya is the first

complete work on the Jaimini Sutras. He had preceded Sankara who referred to him in his commentary on the Vedanta (3.3.53). He has divided the book into adhikaranas. He has explained each adhikarana in a logical way. He has discussed the pros and cons and the author's view. Thus he has made his commentary perfect. Regarding his personal history, we are still in dark. It is learnt that his original name was Adityadeva which he changed to Sabara when he disguised himself as a forester for fear of Jaina persecution. The tradition of scholars says that he had six sons - the great Indian Astronomer Varahamihira from Brahmana wife, Raja Bhartrhari and the king Vikrama from the Kshatriya wife, the great Vaidya Harichandra and Sanku from his Vaisya wife and from the Sudra wife he had Amaru.

Sabarasvamin is well-known among scholars as a senior contemporary of the great 'Vikramaditya', the founder of the 'Samvat' era and therefore believed that he flourished in 57 B.C. Scholars, however, having seen his relation with Varahamihira, opine that he might have lived before 400 A.D. which is the probable date of Varahamihira. Quite a few facts gleaned from his bhasya may infer that he might have lived in Northern India. Nothing can be said regarding his personal history and other works.

Kumarila (7th century A.D.) - Kumarila Bhaa is known as Kumarila Svamin or Tutata Bhaa, one of the greatest scholars, particularly Mimamsakas that India has

produced. At the time of Kumarila, Buddhism had spread its influence all over the country as a great enemy of the Vedic ritualistic culture. Buddhist scholars were attacking Hindu religion, philosophy and culture vehemently. Therefore it was the need to refute their views for bringing about the downfall of Buddhism. This was an opportunity for Kumarila to write mainly against the different schools of Buddhism which existed during his time. His main object was to save the orthodox religion from the attack of the heterodox systems and to keep the old rituals of the Vedas alive. He wrote Slokavarttika, Tantravarttika, Tuptika, Brhattika and Madhyamaika. The Slokavarttika, which is a commentary to the end of third chapter. The Tuptika which is a short commentary on remaining chapters. The Brhattika and Madhyamaika are unfortunately not available to us. Slokavarttika of Kumarila occupies a unique place, not only in the history of Purvamimamsa, but in the whole Indian philosophy. This treatise is the most important part of Mimamsa, since it brought the status of independent system of philosophy.

The tradition says that Kumarila in disguise, learnt all the secrets of Buddhism from Buddhist monks and then defeated them in open challenge. He also defeated his own guru and committed a sin. For the expiation of this sin he came over to Prayaga where he burnt himself alive on the banks of Triveni. Sankaracarya met him when he was half-burnt and expressed his desire to bring Kumarila back to life which he did not

like (Vide Sankaradigvijaya VII). According to tradition, he is an avatara of Kumara or Kartikeya. He is often referred to as Bhaapada or simply Bhaa by later writers and his followers are called as Bhaas. His views are known as Bhaamata. Kumarila became so famous for his scholarship that he founded a school of his own and that is known as Bhaa school. He got large number of followers.

Prabhakara Mishra - Prabhakara Mishra (7th century A.D.) wrote two commentaries on the Bhashya of Sabara, one a large one called 'Brhati' and the other a more concise one called 'Laghvi', Brhati is a commentary, in which Prabhakara simply explained bhasya and nowhere criticized it as Kumarila done it in several places. Prabhakara became very famous and founded a school of his own in the system. His school came to be recognized as the Prabhakara school or the Guru school. He was according to ancient tradition, the pupil of Kumarila. Once there was a problem before Kumarila, like 'अत्र तु नोक्तं तत्रापि नोक्तम्, अतः पौनरुत्तयम्' Kumarila, as per the tradition, faced difficulties in solving this problem. Prabhakara, however, did not find any difficulty. He solved as 'अत्र तु नोक्तम्, तत्र अपिना उक्तम् अतः पौनरुत्तयम्' Having seen this, Kumarila became very happy and praised Prabhakara by heart as 'Guru'. From this event, Prabhakara came to be recognized as 'Guru' and his views are called as Gurumata. Both these two Mimamsakas became very prominent that they elipsed name and fame even of the Jaimini and

Sabara. Infact, these two became the founders of the two different schools of Purvamimamsa system in much more systematized system. Almost all the later Mimamsa literature came to be based on these two scholars, as well as entire system became monopolized by these two schools.

The Brhati of Prabhakara, which is also known as 'Nibandhana' and Laghvi is also called as 'Vivarana'.

Mandana Mishra - Mandana Mishra was great scholar of Purvamimamsa. According to Sankaradigvijaya, he had his traditional debate (sastrartha) with the great Sankaracharya who defeated and converted him to his own faith and renamed him as Suresvaracharya, the famous author of Varttikas. He was the follower of Bhatta school. He was also recognized as a profound scholar of the Advaita school of Vedanta.

His works on Mimamsa are :-

1) Vidhiviveka, where he discusses the import of the Vidhi-lin. It has a commentary called Nyayakanika written by Vachaspati Mishra I.

2) Bhavanaviveka - Here, the author discusses the topic of bhavana which is very important in Mimamsa.

3) Vibhramaviveka - It deals with the five types of khyatis.

4) Mimamsanukramanika - Adhikarana-wise this is written. This is very useful book for recapitulating all the topics of adhikaranas of Purvamimamsa.

5) Sphotasiddhi - It is learnt that it has been written in defence of the theory sphota against the Varnavadins.

As a Vedantin, he wrote Brahmasiddhi, Naiskarmyasiddhi and Varttikas on Sankarabhashya on the Brhadaranyaka and Taittiriya Upanishads.

Umbeka (700-750 A.D.) - Umbeka was a great Mimamsaka. He has been identified with Mandana Mishra and also with Bhavabhuti. However, there is no sufficient evidence to establish any equation between these two Mimamsakas. Umbeka wrote a commentary, namely Tatparyatika, on the Slokavarttika of Kumarila, extending upto the Sphotavada. He also wrote a commentary on the Bhavanaviveka of Mandana Misra.

Salikanatha Mishra (710-770 A.D.) - Salikanatha Mishra was one of the great Mimamsakas and is generally believed to be the direct disciple of Prabhakara. He wrote two commentaries on the works of Prabhakara, viz., Rjuvimala - panchika on Brhati and Dipasikha on Laghvi. His third work is Prakaranapanchika. Among these Prakaranapanchika is a very important work on Prabhakara school. It gives the views of the school on almost every topic.

Parthasarathi Mishra (circa 900 to 1100 A.D.) - He was the most important writer on Mimamsa after Kumarila and Prabhakara. He was very much devoted to Kumarila and explained entire Mimamsa Sastra as

per the views of Kumarila. He has written several important works. They are:

1. Nyayaratnamala - This is an independent treatise on certain important topics of Mimamsa, like adhyayanavidhi, svatah pramanya, vidhinirnaya, vyapti, nitya and kamya acts and various acts of angatva etc.

2. Tantraratna - This is although a commentary on Tuptika of Kumarila but it explains mostly the lines of Sabarabhashya.

3. Sastradipika - It is the most important work of Parthasarathi. This is written as adhikarana wise on Jaimini sutra which elucidates the views of Kumarila and criticized the view of Prabhakara from time to time.

4. Nyayaratnakara - This is the famous commentary on the Slokavarttika of Kumarila. It explains the views of the orthodox and heterodox schools very clearly before giving the authors criticism.

Murari Mishra II (circa 11-12th cent. A.D.) - Murari Mishra is well known for his distinct views and therefore मुरारेस्तृतीयः पन्थाः has become a proverb in Sanskrit. He was one of the greatest Mimamsakas who held different views on several topics of Mimamsa. He founded the third school of Mimamsa. He wrote two commentaries on Jaimini sutras viz: 1) *Tripadanitinayanam:* This is adhikarama wise commentary on adhyaya 1 padas 2 to 4. 2) *Ekadasadyadhikaranam:* It deals with the Tantra and Avapa which form the part of the first adhikarama of 11th adhyaya of the Jaimini sutras.

Bhavanatha Mishra (circa 11th cent. A.D.) - Bhavanatha Mishra also known as Bhavadeva Misra was a great advocate of the Prabhakara school. His only work Nyayaviveka is an independent commentary on Jaimini sutras.

Bhavadeva Bhatta (11th cent. A.D.) - Bhavadeva Bhatta alias Balavalabhibhujanga was a follower of Bhatta school. He wrote several treatises on Dharmasastra. He wrote a commentary on Tantravarttika, called Tautatitamatatilaka.

Somesvara Bhatta alias Ranaka (11th cent. A.D.) - Somesvara Bhatta was regarded as a rival of Parthasarathi Mishra. His only work Ranaka is a very important work on Tantravarttika. Another work Tantrasara is ascribed on him.

Paritosa Mishra (12th cent. A.D.) - Paritosa Mishra is the author of a commentary, named Ajita or Tantravarttikanibandhana on Tantravarttika.

Vedanta Desika (13th cent. A.D.) - Vedanta Desika was a follower of Visishtadvaita school. His works on Mimamsa are:

1) Mimamsa-paduka which is written in verse and extends upto the end of the Tarkapada.

2) Sesvara-mimamsa is a commentary in prose beyond the Tarkapada.

Madhavacharya (1297-1386 A.D.) - Madhavacharya occupies a unique place in the history of the revival of the Vedic culture in Medieval Period. He was the most

important figure of this period. He contributed to Mimamsa by writing Nyayamala in verse along with the Vistara in prose. This work is the gist of the adhikaranas in very easy language. This book came to be recognized as a standard book for beginners. He gives the views of both the schools of Mimamsa. His patron was Bukka Raya of Vijayanagaram.

Ramakrishna Bhatta (16th cent. A.D.) - Ramakrishna Bhatta was a great scholar of name and fame. He has given every detail of himself in the beginning of his commentary on the Sastradipika. His only work on Mimamsa is the Siddhantachandrika, a commentary on Sastradipika.

Annam Bhatta (17th cent. A.D.) - Annam Bhatta is well known for his small primer on Nyaya-Vaisesika, named Tarkasangraha and its dipika. On Mimamsa he wrote 1) Subodhini, a commentary on Tantravarttika. 2) Ranakaphakkikavyakhya, a commentary on the Nyayasudha of Somesvara also known as Ranakojjivini. 3) Ranakabhavanakarikavivarana in 54 verses.

Appayya Dixita (16th cent. A.D.) - Appayya Dixita was well known scholar of all branches of Sanskrit literature. He did not neglect any branch. He had been ascribed the authorship of over hundred works. His works on Mimamsa are:

1) Vidhirasayana, in verse with a commentary in prose, called Vivekasukhopayojani. This was written according o the views of Kumarila, 2) Upakrama-parakrama,

3) Vadanaksatravali, which is also called Vadanaksatramala, 4) Mayukhavali, a commentary on the Sastradipika, 5) Chitrapata and, 6) Dharmamimamsaparibhasha.

Narayana Bhatta (16th cent. A.D.) - Narayana was the great Mimamsaka. He was the follower of Bhatta school and had two works to his credit on Mimamsa; 1) Tantravarttikanibandhana, a commentary on the Tantravarttika 2) Manameyodaya.

Laugaksi Bhaskara (16th cent. A.D.) - Bhaskara of Laugaksi family flourished at the end of the 16th century. There is a difference of opinion regarding the priority and posteriority of Bhaskara and Apadeva, the author of Nyayaprakasa. The only work of Bhaskara on Mimamsa is Arthasangraha. This is very useful treatise for the beginners. It became very popular among the Sanskritists.

Visvesvara Bhatta alias Gagabhatta (17th cent. A.D.) - Gagabhatta was the son of Dinakara Bhatta and grandson of Ramakrishna Bhatta. Gaga was the pet name given by his father. He was the leading Mimamsaka of his time. He was the protege of great Maratha king Chhatrapati Shivaji. He wrote an independent work on Mimamsa sutras, named Bhattachintamani. His second work is Vrtti, called Kusumanjali, a commentary on the Jaimini Sutras. The third work which has great historical importance of Chhatrapati Shivaji. This work is in continuation of the Slokavarttika in verse.

Apadeva II (17th cent. A.D.) - Apadeva was the son of Anantadeva I, grandson of Apadeva I, and great grandson of Maharashtra Saint Ekanatha. He wrote Mimamsa Nyaya-Prakasa popularly known as Apadevi. This is a very popular text for the beginners. This book is quite interesting and helpful for understanding the topics of Mimamsa. Another work of Apadeva is Adhikaranachandrika which summarises the adhikaranas of Mimamsa.

Khandadeva Misra alias Shridharendra (17th cent.A.D.) - Khandadeva is illustrious writer on Mimamsa. His works are:

1) *Mimamsakaustubha:* It extends up to Balabaladhikara (3.3.7) only. It is very elaborate and its style appears to have been influenced by Navya-Nyaya, 2) *Bhattadipika:* This is the magnum opus of Khandadeva. It occupies the same place among the Sanskritists in the South which the Sastradipika does in the North. It is not so elaborate as the Kaustubha. 3) *Bhattarahasya:* It discusses the Sabdabodhaprakriya according to the Mimamsakas.

Krishna Yajva (18th cent. A.D.) - Krishna Yajva was the celebrated author of the Mimamsaparibhasha. This is an elementary primer which gives in short the entire contents of Mimamsa. Beside these, there are several other Mimamsakas flourished in twentieth century, viz., Panditaraja Pattabhiram Shastri, Swami Kevalanand

Saraswati who prepared Mimamsakosa, P.V. Kane who wrote, History of Dharmasastra, D.V. Garge who wrote citations in Sabarabhashya and so on.

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Chapter 3

Difference between Kumarila and Prabhakara schools

The Kumarila school and Prabhakara school hold different views on many philosophical problems in which principle differences are noted here.

1. Kumarila recognizes six means of cognitions (pramanas) viz., perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, presumption and non-apprehension. Prabhakara accepts only five and rejects the sixth means of cognition i.e. non-apprehension.

2. Kumarila recognizes five categories, viz., substance, quality, action, community, and non-apprehension. Prabhakara recognizes eight categories, viz., substance, quality, action, community, inherence, number potency and similarity.

3. Kumarila admits eleven substances, viz., earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, self, manas, darkness and sound (varna). Prabhakara admits nine substances and regards sound as a quality of ether and darkness as the absence of light.

4. Kumarila accepts action or movement as perceptible while Prabhakara regards it as inferable.

5. Kumarila admits higher and lower communities but Prabhakara admits the communities of substance, quality and action. He rejects the highest genus or beinghood (satta).

6. Kumarila rejects inherence as an independent category and regards it as identity. Prabhakara recognizes inherence as an independent category but he does not accept as one and eternal. Inherence is eternal in eternal substances and non-eternal in non eternal substances. There are many inherences.

7. Kumarila considers non-apprehension as an independent category and recognizes four kinds of non-apprehension viz., prior non-apprehension, posterior non-apprehension, mutual non-apprehension and absolute non-apprehension. Prabhakara rejects non-apprehension and identifies it with locus.

8. Kumarila rejects the categories of potency, number, and similarity recognized by Prabhakara.

9. Both accept the reality of permanent self (atman) different from the body, the sense organs manas and fleeting cognitions. Kumarila regards the self a selfilluminated or perceptible through manas, while Prabhakara does not accept it is an object of mental perception but as manifested as the knower in every act of perception of an object.

10. Kumarila states a cognition as an act of the self which is inferred from cognizedness (jnatata) produced by it in an object while Prabhakara says a cognition as an act of the self which manifests itself, its substrate, the self and an object (triputi pratyaksha).

11. Kumarila regards validity of knowledge as intrinsic (svatah pramanya) and invalidity of knowledge as

extrinsic (paratah pramanya), due to the knowledge of defects in its cause or that of a contradicting knowledge. Prabhakara states all knowledge is valid.

12. Kumarila regards the cognition of an object which was not apprehended before, which was free from contradiction and whose cause is free from defects as a means of valid knowledge (pramana). But Prabhakara regards apprehension (anubhuti) as a pramana which is different from recollection.

13. Kumarila regards an illusion as the apprehension of an object as different from it (viparitakhyati) while Prabhakara regards it as non-discrimination (vivekakhyati, akhyati) of the element of perception (e.g., 'this') and the element of recollection (e.g., 'silver') due to lapse of memory (smrtipramosa).

14. Kumarila advocates the doctrine of Abhihitanvaya as to the meaning of sentence, while Prabhakara advocates the doctrine of Anvitabhidhana.

15. Kumarila advocates the doctrine of Bhavana, a mental activity to produce a desired effect. But Prabhakara advocates the doctrine of Niyoga, a categorical imperative or an unconditional command which impels a person to act without any motive or thought of consequences.

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Chapter 4

Contents of Mimamsa

The following is the brief resume of the contents of twelve chapters.

I. The first chapter deals with the purpose of sastra which is the enquiry into what is dharma; dharma is defined as connection between the word and its sense is eternal; the authoritativeness of vidhi and arthavada, the latter forming part of a connected whole and therefore being authoritative only as expatiating upon the injunctive passages; the meaning of the mantras employed in the ritual is intended to be conveyed; the smrti rules like those on Asakasraddha are authoritative; in a conflict between sruti and smrti, the latter is to be discarded, but if there is no conflict then smrti may be inferred to be based on a lost sruti; meaning of certain words borrowed from Mlecchas is the same as is conventional among the latter; usages like the Holaka festival are authoritative; grammatically correct words are to be employed not apabhramsas like gavi for a cow; identity of words used in the Vedas and in popular language; the primary meaning of a word is akrti or generality; certain words like 'udbhid', 'agnihotra', and 'syena' are names (namadheya) of certain rites; such sentences as 'the sacrificer is the prastara or yupa' are arthavadas and not gunavidhis; when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a word, the rest of the context should be employed for determining the meaning.

II. The second chapter deals with the principal word in an injunction is the verb, which declares the results to be brought about; the performance of the acts enjoined in the Veda gives rise to an unseen potency (apurva); actions are either principal or subordinate actions; illustrations of subordinate and principal acts; the verbs occurring in mantras do not lay down injunctions as those in the brahmanas do; definition of Mantra and Brahmana; definition of Rk, Sama, Yajus; Nigadas are Yajus; how to determine what portion of a Yajus constitutes one sentence; each different verb (like juhoti), yajeta, dadati) denotes a distinct act, having a separate unseen potency; difference of acts on the ground of number, appellation (sanjañ), difference in deity; Agnihotra is prescribed as a life-long duty; Agnihotra and other rites prescribed in the several sakhas of the Veda are not so many distinct rites in each sakha.

III. The third chapter consists of the meaning of sesa; Sesa is that which subserves the purpose of the another; not only substances, guna and samskaras are sesa but even rites are also sesa to the result, the result to the agent and the agent to certain acts; in such sentences as 'he cleanses the cup' the singular stands for the plural; illustrations of sesa and sesa in (subordinate and principal); the primary meaning of a word is to be taken; means of linga, vakya, prakarana, sthana, samakhya; rule of decision in case of conflict between two of these principles; the prohibition of speaking

falsehood in Darsapurnmasa is a vidhi and not an anuvada; the prohibitions against killing or injuring a Brahmana are general and not restricted to the time of Darsapurnamasa; several examples of Vedic rules that are addressed to the agent and have no relation to the sacrificial act (such as wearing gold); the procedure to be followed for the substitute also; the hiring of rtviks is to be done by the sacrificer and not by adhvaryu and the samskaras such as shaving, paring the nails are also to be performed on him; only he who is learned in the Vedas is authorized to perform sacrifices.

IV. The fourth chapter deals with an enquiry into what is 'Kratvartha' (what is enjoined for the sacrificial act, is therefore obligatory and if unperformed or badly performed will cause defect in the sacrifice, if not obeyed); definition of purusartha; illustrations of both; the Prajapati vow 'one should not see the sun rising or setting' is purusartha; discussion of which out of two substances or actions is the prayojaka; illustrations of arthakarma and pratipatti karma; the sruti texts declaring the time, place and agent of certain actions are not arthavadas but niyamas (restrictive injunctions); what is the principal as opposed to the sesa so far described; the description of rewards with reference to substances, samskaras and subsidiary acts are merely arthavadas; the axim of Visvajit, viz., that all such rites as Visvajit for which no reward is proclaimed by the texts have heaven as their reward; Kamya rites have as their reward the object desired and not svarga; Vaisvanaresti performed on the birth of a son is for the benefit of the

son and not for the father and is to be performed after jatakarma on the full moon or new moon; the pindapitryajña is not an anga of the new moon ritual.

V. The fifth deals with krama; whether the order of the things mentioned in the texts as regards a rite is to be followed or there is a choice; the rule is that the order of he text is to be followed; various determining elements as to the order of doing things, such as sruti, artha, patha, sthana, mukhya and pravrtti; decision in case of the conflict of these.

VI. The sixth chapter deals with Adhikara, Svarga is not a dravya but is a state of bliss and is principal, while sacrifice is subsidiary to it and is a means of attaining it; he is authorized to perform sacrifice who desires svarga; only men (not deities nor lower animals) are authorized to perform sacrifice; both males and females can perform yaga; husband and wife are together authorized to perform yaga; but the wife has only a limited part in the yaga; sudra is not capable of performing yaga; persons devoid of a limb or suffereing from incurable disease cannot perform yaga; the rathakara, though not of the three castes, can consecrate fire on account of a special text and so the Nisada can perform the Raudra yaga; in a sacrificial session extending over a long period each person engaged in the sattra secures the reward; the rules about following and saluting the teacher apply only after upanayana and not before; the paying of the three debts is obligatory duties they are to be performed by all but

according to ability; there is no substitute in the case of the deity, the fire, the subsidiary acts, the mantras, nor for the sacrificer; in the case of sattras a substitute for acrificer is allowed; prayaschitas in case of total or partial breaking or spilling out or burning of substances; sattras can be performed only by Brahmanas; in the Visvajit one cannot give away one's parents, wife etc. but only that over which one has absolute ownership; a sovereign cannot give away the land, as it is common to all, nor horses nor sudra who servers as a duty; the word 'samvatsara' means a day in the case of sacrifices rescribed for a thousand samvatsaras; the oblations to be offered by the brahmacharin are offered in domestic fire and not in consecrated fire; the same is the case with the sacrifice of the chief who is a nisada; Daiva rites are to be performed in udagayana, bright fortnight and on auspicious days.

VII. This chapter discusses the principle of Atidesa (extended application). The details of the Darsapurnamasa are to be extended to all sacrifices such as Aindragna according to requirements; Atidesa may be brought into play by express words or by implication and inference; examples of the first, such as the extension of the procedure and details of Syena yaga to Isu yaga; Atidesa is indicated by the employment of the same technical term (nama) in other sacrifices, such as the employment of the word Agnihotra in Kundapayinamayana.

VIII. This chapter deals with the application of principle Atidesa to individual cases. The rule of guidance is

that those details and that part of the primary (prakrti) sacrifices such as Darsapurnamasa are to be extended, of which an indication (by words or sense) is conveyed by the injunctive passage of the modificatory (vikrti) sacrifices and by other passages subsidiary to them; the reward, the agent (desiring heaven), the restrictive rules (such as agnihotra for life) and the definite collocation of actions (such as Darsapurnamasa) are not extended by Atidesa; if there is doubt on account of different items, then it is the identity of havis that decides the matter; Darvihoma is an appellation and not a gunavidhi and is an appellation of both smarta rites like the Astakas and of Vedic rites.

IX. This chapter deals with the subject of uha; when applying the principle of Atidesa, certain alterations and adaptations are necessary in the case of mantras, samans and samskaras; the various details of the Agnihotra have Apurva as the motive of their performance; it is the result (apurva) of the sacrificial act that is principal and not the deity and therefore it is not the deity that is the moving spring of the details of a yaga; examples of uha; examples of the non-application of uha, for instance in the Jyotistoma, the Subrahmanya nigada has the words 'Hariva agaccha', which should not be modified by uha, when the same nigada is repeated in the Agnistut.

X. This chapter discusses badha and abhyuccaya; everything pertaining to the model (prakrti) yaga is not to be done in the modifications of it (vikrti), but the

technical appellations, the purificatory acts and materials (of the model yaga) may have to be omitted in the modifications if there is no purpose to be served by employing them; examples; the Arambhaniya isti is not to be performed in the Diksaniya rites, though performed in the model yaga; in the sattras such as Dvadasaha there is no choosing rtviks as in the Jyotistoma, nor is there engagement of services for a reward; the word 'sveta' in the passage 'Vayavyam svetamalabheta' conveys a white goat and not any other white animal; the cows that are the daksina in the Jyotistoma should be divided among the priests by the sacrificer himself; instances of addition (samuccaya); the diety must be addressed in the yaga by the appellation contained in the injunctive passage and not by a synonym (such as pavaka for agni); of several items mentioned in order, if only some are to be employed then those in the beginning are to be taken and not those mentioned last; in sattras (such as dvadasaha) there are many yajamanas and not one; the yajamanas themselves are the priests (rtviks) in sattras; difference between sattra and ahina, the former being enjoined in such words as 'asate', 'upayanti' and having many yajamanas, while in the latter the injunction is in the form 'yajeta' and the sacrificers are not many; it is not the whole animal that is one offering (havis), but its various limbs are the havis; discussion of pratisedha and paryudasa; meaning of the negative 'nan' it is either paryudasa, or it may be mere arthavada, or it may be a pratisedha.

XI. This chapter deals with tantra and avapa. That which is useful to many, though itself performed once, is called tantra, that which is useful to many only when repeated many times is called avapa; the principal items such as agneya etc. in the Darsapurnamasa have svarga as the fruit in their entirety and there is no separate reward for each; the different angas of a sacrifice serve a single purpose (viz., helping on the principal act) and hence have a single fruit; Kamya rites may be repeated as often as desired; those actions that are prescribed (such as pressing or beating the grains of rice) and have a seen result are to be repeated and continued until the result is accomplished, while those actions that have only an unseen result are not to be repeated; such angas as prayajas are to be performed only once; the Kapiñjala maxim viz., the plural stands for three in the absence of anything to the contrary; the time, place and the priests are to be the same in case of principal rites, Agneya and others; examples of arthakarma and pratipatti karma; adhana (consecration of fires in spring, summer, autumn according to caste) is to be done only once and not repeated with each isti, pasuyaga, somayaga etc.; the utensils of sacrifice are to be kept till the death of sacrificer, as the sacrificer is to be cremated with them (so this is the pratipattikarma of the utensils).

XII. This chapter deals with topic prasanga which means (the undesirable) possibility of certain items belonging to one act having to be employed or performed in another act. In the chapter about

Agnisomiyapasu, a pasupuro dasa is laid down, with reference to which a doubt arises whether the several angas of the pasuyaga are to be repeated with the purodasa also; the answer is no; when there is an aggregate of several contradictory dharmas, the majority is to be followed; if there are several things, each serving the same purpose (as rice and yava), then there is an option; there is an option as to the prayaschitas to be performed for doing something through mistake or heedlessness, but all prayaschitas prescribed on an occasion other than the above are to be performed together; the rules about not reciting the Vedas (anadhyaya) apply to the study of the Vedas and not to the repeating of Vedic texts in sacrifices; actions are to be performed after the mantras appropriate to them are repeated (as in 'ise tva' iti chinatti); there is no option as to hautra mantras; mere japa mantras not connected with any rite, mantras containing praises, blessings and applications or invocations are to be added up (there is no samucchaya and not vikalpa); in a sattra such purificatory acts as añjana are to be done by all sacrificers; only Brahmanas can officiate as priests.

Veda and its Classification

Mimamsakas declared that the Veda is apauruseya (nonhuman origin). The definition of such is 'अपौरुषेयं वाक्यं वेदः'. Both the words in the definition are significant. The word apauruseya excludes from the province of the Veda such a work as the Mahabharata, which is

known to be the work of a human being viz. Vyasa. The word Vakya is also necessary in the definition. Otherwise entities like the Soul, which are apauruseya would be the Veda. This Veda is of five kinds owing to its division into injunction (vidhi) sacrificial formula (mantra), name (namadheya), prohibition (nisedha) and explanatory passage (arthavada).

Vidhi (injunction) - This is that portion of the Veda, which makes known a matter unknown by any other means or injunction and that has a definite purpose. For example, the sentence 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकामः'. This sentence conveys the performance of the Agnihotra with a view to attain heaven. The said Agnihotra is a matter not known before. Neither perception, nor inference nor any other means of cognition, nor any injunction can give us any information about the Agnihotra. It is known only from this sentence from the Veda.

Guna Vidhi (secondary injunction) - Where a rite is established by some other means of proof, there, an injunction enjoins mearly accessary matter with reference to that sacrificial rite. Some times it so happens that an injunction lays down only the material with which a sacrifice is performed, the sacrifice itself having been enjoined by some other sentence. For example, the sentence 'दध्ना जुहोति'. Here, only a secondary matter, i.e., the material (curd) with which the sacrifice is to be performed is laid down. The sacrifice is enjoined by another sentence, viz., 'अग्निहोत्रं

जुहुयात्'. Therefore, the injunction in 'दध्ना जुहोति' is understood to prescribe only the curds with reference to the sacrifice which is enjoined in 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्'. The sentence 'दध्ना जुहोति' then yields the sense दध्ना होमं भावयेत्।

Visishtavidhi (Qualified injunction) - Where both sacrificial action and subsidiary matter are not established by any other means of proof there the injunction lays down something which is qualified. For example, the sentence सोमेन यजेत. One should sacrifice with Soma. Here the sacrifice and Soma have not been established by any other means of proof. However, a sacrifice qualified by Soma (material) is enjoined. Therefore the injunction in this sentence is known as Visishtavidhi. The meaning conveyed by this injunction is, 'One should accomplish one's desired object by means of a sacrifice possessing Soma for its material. This is understood by applying matvarthalaksana (indication of possession).

Four-fold Injunction - This Vidhi is again divided into four categories viz., utpatti vidhi (originative injunction), viniyogavidhi (applicatory injunction), adhikaravidhi (injunction of qualification) and lastly, prayogavidhi (injunction of performance).

1) Utpatti vidhi (injunction of origination) - The injunction of origination is the injunction which indicates merely the nature of action. For example, अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति 'He offers the Agnihotra'. However, this action is laid down with a view to the attainment of some desired

object. Therefore in interpreting this sentence the action is construed as the means or instrument of attaining the desired object. Thus 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति 'means 'अग्निहोत्रहोमेन इष्टं भावयेत्'.

2) Viniyogavidhi (injunction of application) - This injunction conveys the connection of a subsidiary with the principal action. It declares which is subordinate to which. For example, the sentence, 'दध्ना जुहोति'. He sacrifices with curds. Here, the injunction lays down the relation of curds whose subsidiary character is understood by the instrumental case. Thus, the sense of the sentence is 'One should effect the sacrifice with curds'.

There are six means of proof which have become helpers of this injunction. They are : sruti (direct statement), linga (mark or word-meaning), vakya (sentence or syntactical connection), prakarana (context or interdependence), sthana (position or order) and samakhya (name). This injunction assisted by these intimates the subsidiaries or the subsidiary relation with principle factor which takes the form of accomplished activity of the sacrificer who is engaged in the pursuit of highest goal and the other synonym of which is existence for the purpose of another. In all these means of proofs Sruti is the strongest which is not depending on any other means of proof.

1) *Sruti* (direct statement) - It is an independent sound. It is said to be its primary sense. Primary sense conveyed by a word without the help of any other

means is Sruti. It is directly heard and as soon as it is heard, a hearer understands its sense. It is of three kinds, viz., a) vidhatri (injunctive), b) abhidhatri (denotative) and c) viniyoktri (applicatory). The first is indicated by the verb in the form of optative. The second, abhidhatri is the scriptural passage that refers to rice-grains etc. while the third viniyoktri is one on hearing which you at once see the connection of the subsidiary and the principal. This is also further sub-divided into three kinds, viz., 1) Vibhaktikrupa (form of a case), 2) Ekabhidhanarupa (form of one denotative element) and 3) Ekapadarupa (form of one word). Among these, the first is indicated by an affix of a declension, as for instance, ब्रीहिभिर्यजेत 'One should perform a sacrifice with rice-grains'. Here, the instrument case shows that the rice-grains are part of the sacrifice. In the same one can apply the same principle in other cases. The ekabhidhanarupa is denoted by one word, for instance, पशुना यजेत, 'One should perform a sacrifice by an animal'. Here, पशुना shows that male animal will form a part of the sacrifice. This word shows gender and the number of the material used in the sacrifice. The word yajeta shows the bhavana (mental activity). The ekapadarupa is indicated by one pada (word) or sentence. The whole sentence, above cited, shows that the animal as described above is subsidiary in relation to the sacrifice which is the principal object as indicated by the verb.

2) *Linga* (power of words) - It is the power of words to point out something. It is said that the power of all

words is said to be the mark. The power is convention itself. Therefore it is distinguished from samakhya (name). In other words, it is the suggestive or the secondary sense of a word which can be inferred from another word or a sentence. For instance, 'बहिर्देवसदनं दामि', 'I cut grass, the seat of gods'. It becomes part to the cutting of Kusa-grass, though barhi is the generic term meaning grass, but not to cutting of the ulapa-grass and other kinds. It is of two kinds, viz., when the inferential sense can be inferred without the help of any other and secondly, when it is so inferred.

3) *Vakya* (sentence) - When the meaning of a word or a collection of words is gathered from the sentence in which it is used, the principle which governs it is called vakya (sentence). For instance, 'यस्य पर्णमयी जुहूर्भवति न स पापं श्लोकं श्रृणोति', 'One whose Ladle is made of Parna does not hear evil things'. Here 'पर्णमयी (made of wood) and जुहू (ladle) are two words used in their usual sense and it also appears that 'made of Parna wood' is subsidiary to the ladle. It follows, therefore, that the ladle can be made of any wood, then arises the question, why should there be a condition as to the ladle being made of a particular wood? The answer for this question is that one cannot achieve the invisible result of not hearing evil things without having the ladle made of parna wood. Thus, when the meaning of a word or a sentence is gathered from a whole sentence, it is called the principle of vakya (sentence).

4) *Prakarana* (context) - It means inter-dependence or mutual expectancy for compliment, just as in the

case of pre-sacrifices (prayajas). For instance, 'समिधो यजति', 'He sacrifices the sacrificial-sticks'. Here, fruit is not mentioned. The fruit of the action in performing a sacrifice with aid of समिद् can be known from the context in which it occurs. Since after the sense 'One should effect by means of the offering to the sacrificial sticks is apprehend, the expectancy as to what is to be helped (upakarya) in the form 'What?' In the sentence, 'दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत', 'One who is desirous of heaven should perform the new and full moon sacrifices', the expectancy is apprehend as to what would help in the form of 'How?' Thus, on account of the expectancy of both, the pre-sacrifices and others become subservient to new and full moon sacrifices. This prakarana is of two kinds, viz. mahaprakarana (great context) and avantara prakarana (intermediate context). When the context relates to the principal bhavana (creative energy), it is called as mahaprakarana. For instance, the pre-sacrifices and others are the parts of Darsapurnamasa sacrifices. In the avantara prakarna the context relates to the bhavana of the subordinate parts. For instance, abhikramana (right of stepping near) is a subordinate part of pre sacrifices and others.

5) *Sthana* (position) - Position is commonness of place. That is of two kinds, viz., पाठसादेश्य (commonness of place in the text) and अनुष्ठानसादेश्य (commonness of place in performance). Commonness of place in the text is also of two kinds, viz., यथासङ्ख्यपाठ (text according to number) and संनिधिपाठ (text in proximity).

Pathasadesya is the equality of place according to the text and is governed by the order given in a text. For instance, ऐन्द्राग्नमेकादशकपालं निर्वपेत्, 'One should offer cakes baked in eleven potsherds in honour of Indra and Agni.' 'वैश्वानरं द्वादशकपालं निर्वपेत्', 'One should offer the cakes baked in twelve potsherds in honour of Vaisvanara' etc., Accordingly under the principle of Pathasadesya, the first mantra will be recited with the first offer of the cake and second mantra will be repeated with the second offer and so on. But the reading in the modified sacrifice falling within two injunctions though governed by the model sacrifice, is regulated according to the principle of (text in proximity), i.e. by the text which is near to it, like amanasacrifices. Anusthanasadesya is the commonness of place according the performance. For instance, the details of the animal sacrifice are given in connection with the ceremonies to be performed on the day of fasting (aupavasathya). On that day the animal in honour of Agni and Soma is sacrificed. The principle of anusthanasadesya, therefore, governs it.

6) *Samakhya* (name) - Samakhya is a word understood in its literal or etymological sense. It is of two kinds, viz., Vaidiki (Vedic or belonging to the language of the Veda) and Laukiki (worldly or belonging to the language of the world). The hotr becomes subservient to the eating of the contents of the cup owing to the Vedic name in the word hotr camasa. The adhvaryu becomes subsidiary to the various things owing to worldly name in the word adhvaryava.

Two kinds of subsidiaries - The subsidiaries which are made subservient by the Viniyogavidhi (applicatory injunction) are of two kinds, viz., siddharupa (the form of accomplished things) and kriyarupa (the form of actions). The former consists of class, material, number etc. It has a visible effect. The second is of the form of action. It is of two kinds, it is either primary or secondary. These are called संनिपत्योपकारक (indirectly helping) and आराद्उपकारक (directly helping). The former conduces to the general result of the sacrifice through another intermediate step and the latter contributes to the general results immediately.

Sannipatyopakaraka (indirectly helping) - Indirectly helping actions which are enjoined with respect to the substance as the thrashing of the rice and sprinkling of water on it etc. They produce visible, invisible or both kinds of effects, viz., removal of husk, sprinkling of water has an invisible effect. While the offering of animal or cakes produces both kinds of effect, because, as far as the offering is concerned it has an invisible effect and as far as certain divinity to whom the offering is made is concerned it has a visible effect, i.e. the remembrance of the god.

Aradupakaraka (directly helping) - It consists of those actions which are enjoined without any reference to any substance or divinity. It leads directly to the ultimate result of the sacrifice. It is the essence of the sacrifice in, as much as it produces the transcendental result produced by the main sacrificial action in its totality.

3) *Prayogavidhi* (injunction of performance) - The injunction which conveys the speediness is the injunction of performance. It consists of the performance of the main action with all its subordinate details without causing any delay. For this purpose there is an order of details that constitute the performance of the main action. When the two things are being performed with delay, there can be no use of the expression of their having been performed together in the form. The absence of delay results when a fixed order is resorted. Thus the injunction that lays down the order of subsidiaries is the injunction of performance. Here, the order means a particular kind which takes the form of state of one thing being first and the other later or the relation of prior and posterior. It is of six kinds, viz.,

1) *Sruti* (direct statement) - It is the order determined by a direct text. It is of two kinds, viz., kevalakramapara (intimating mere order) and kramavisistapadarthapara (intimating things particularized by that order). Here, the example 'वेदं कृत्वा वेदिं करोति' 'Having prepared the grassbrush (vedah), he prepare alter (vedih) intimates the mere order. But the text, 'वषट्कर्तु प्रथमभक्षः', 'The first draught is for the vasat maker' intimates a matter qualified by order. This direct statement is strong consideration of other means of proof, since they obtain the status of authority to determine the order through the supposition of a direct statement.

2) *Arthakrama* (order by sense) - This is the order determined by the object. For instance, 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति, यवागूं पचति' 'He performs an Agnihotra and cooks yavagu. Though yavagu happens to be last in the above text, yet as its cooking is indispensable for the performance of Agnihotra, it will be cooked first.

3) *Pahakrama* (order by text) - When the order of the execution of things is governed by their order in the text, it is called Pahakrama. It is of two kinds. It is either governed by the text of the mantras or by the text of brahmanas. For instance, the offerings to Agni and Agnisoma are governed by the order of their respective presenting (yajya) and invoking (anuvakya) verses. The mantrapatha predominates over the brahmana texts.

4) *Sthanakrama* (order of position) - Position means presentation. When a thing is transposed from its proper place by reasons of its being preceded by another thing which is followed by another, this transposition of the order is called Sthanakrama. In the Jyotistoma there are three animal sacrifices, viz., Agnisomiya, Savaniya and Anubandhya in their order. But in the Sadyaskra which is the modified sacrifice of the Jyotistoma the Savaniya, Agnisomiya and Anubandhya animal sacrifices are performed, because after drinking of the Asvina cup the Savaniya animal sacrifice presents itself first.

5) *Mukhyakrama* (order by principal) - It is the sequence of subordinate parts according to the order

in the principal. In this, the order of details in the subordinate parts is governed by that of the principal of which the subsidiaries are the subordinate parts. For instance, when ghee is left after the prayaja (pre-sacrifice) offering, it will be first offered to Agni and then to Indra, because the agneya is prior to aindra oblations.

6) *Pravrttikrama* (order by procedure) - This is the order of a procedure which once begun will apply to others as well. For instance, in the Prajapatya sacrifice several animals are sacrificed. One can choose one animal at random and perform certain ceremonies on it. The order in which the ceremonies are performed on the first animal will govern the order of ceremonies on the rest of the animals.

4) *Adhikaravidhi* (injunction of qualification) - This is the injunction which intimates the right of the fruit to be produced by the action. For instance, 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत', 'One who desirous of heaven should perform a sacrifice'. This injunction creates a right in every person to perform a sacrifice, provided, he is desirous of heaven. This injunction lays down a sacrifice with a view to heaven, conveys that he is desirous of heaven becomes the enjoyer of the fruit to be produced by the sacrifice. In occasional condition, for instance, 'यस्याहिताग्नेरग्निगृहान् दहेत् सोऽग्नये क्षामवतेऽष्टाकपालं निर्वपेत्' 'The keeper of the fire (ahitagnih), whose house fire might burn, should offer a cake prepared in eight potsherds to the devouring (ksamavat) fire', this lays down an

action on an occasion (nimitta) like the burning by fire, states that ownership of the fruit in the form of the destruction of sin to be produced from that action. Similarly in the case of obligatory (nitya) rite, like 'अहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीत', 'Day by day one should wait upon the twilight', this intimates that the avoidance of sin to be produced from the waiting upon of the twilight, belongs to him who is pure and leads his life at the times enjoined.

The ownership or right of the fruit which belongs to him who is particularized by the qualification and that qualification which is found in injunctory sentences as a distinguishing attribute of the man. For instance, in the case of a rite is under taken with some specific desire, desire of the fruit is qualification. In the same way, in the case of an occasional rite, the determination of the occasion and in the case of an obligatory such as the waiting upon twilight, leading a life, pure and the times enjoined.

Mantra (sacred formula) - Sacred formulae are those, that call to memory, matters connected with sacrificial performance and their authority arises from their character of being the reminders of matters of that nature. Therefore their recitation should not be considered for the purpose of an unseen result. It should not be said that recitation of formulae is useless, because the visible fruit i.e., the recollection of matters is possible in other way also. For this, we have resort to

an injunction of restriction, viz., the reminding should be affected by sacred formulae alone.

There is a well known verse which gives another division of injunction

विधिरत्यन्तमप्राप्तौ नियमः पाक्षिके सति ।
तत्र चान्यत्र प्राप्तौ परिसंख्येति गीयते ॥

"A new injunction takes place in the case of something absolutely non-established. An injunction of restriction is found when a matter is not established as an alternative. When the establishment is there and elsewhere simultaneously it is declared to be an injunction of exclusion."

1) *Apurvavidhi* (a new injunction) - When a text lays down a new injunction for the attainment object which one cannot know by any other means, it is said as Apurvavidhi. For instance, 'यजेत स्वर्गकामः', 'One who is desirous of heaven, should perform sacrifice'. Here, in this injunction a new thing is laid down, viz., the attainment of heaven which is to be obtained by performing a sacrifice and it is known the this text only, not by any other means. It should be noted that the apurvavidhi mentioned here is the same as the vidhi or pradhanavidhi, because it enjoins a matter which was not known before. It enjoins a matter for the first time.

2) *Niyamavidhi* (restrictive injunction) - When an injunction lays down one of the modes for doing a thing out of many it is said to be a restrictive injunction

or the injunction which establishes a matter, which is not established in the alternative is an injunction of restrictive. For instance, 'व्रीहीनवहन्ति', He thrashes the rice-grains. Rice-grains thrashed by a pestle in a mortar to remove its husk. Husk can be removed from the rice-grains by many other means, for instance, by peeling it off from the rice-grains, but the particular mode, that of thrashing has been laid down by the text out of many other modes. This kind of restrictive text is called as niyama.

3) *Parisankhyavidhi* (injunction of exclusion) - When both alternatives are simultaneously established, the injunction which aims at another one (para) excluding one of them (itara) is the injunction of exclusion. For instance, 'पञ्चनखा भक्ष्याः', 'Five five-nailed animals should be eaten'. This sentence does not aim that laying down the eating of five five-nailed animals, because such eating is established by natural appetite. This injunction does not aim at restriction, because of the simultaneous obtainment and there is non-obtainment in alternative. Hence this injunction aims at laying down an abstention from the eating of animals other than the five five-nailed animals. Thus it becomes an injunction of exclusion.

It is of two kinds, viz., srauti (directly expressed) and laksaniki (implied). The first is directly stated by some text 'अत्र ह्येवावपन्ति', 'Here only they insert new words'. Here we have directly expressed of laudatory stanzas other than the Pavamana. The, 'Five five-nailed animals to be eaten' is an example of implied injunction of exclusion.

This Parisankhya has three defects as is said in the following verse

श्रुतार्थस्य परित्यागादश्रुतार्थप्रकल्पनात् ।
प्राप्रस्य बाधादित्येवं परिसंख्या त्रिदूषणा ॥

On account of abandonment of the eating of five five nailed animals which is directly stated (srutahani), on account of the supposition of the absention from the eating of animals other than five nailed animals which is not directly stated (asrutarthaprakalpana) and on account of the annulement of the eating of animals other than five nailed, which eating is established. Thus Parisankhya has three defects by reason of losing sight of the direct sense and putting an inferred interpretation of its own and rejecting that which is assumed. Among these first two are stationed in word and last one is stationed in sense.

Namadheya (name) - Namadheya is a proper noun but has a purpose in defining the matter enjoined by it. For instance, 'One who is desirous of cattle should sacrifice with Udbhid'. Here the word Udbhid is the name of sacrifice and by it defining of the matter to be enjoined is effected. It is four kinds or it is understood from four reasons: 1) from the fear of an indication of possession (मत्वर्थलक्षणाभयात्), 2) from the fear of split of sentence (वाक्यभेदभयात्), 3) from a scriptural passage declaratory of it (तत्प्रख्यशास्त्रात्) and 4) from comparison or representation with it (तद्व्यपदेशात्).

The first is a proper noun arising from the fear of an indication of possession. For instance, 'उद्भिदा यजेत

पशुकाम'. One who desirous of cattle should sacrifice with Udbhid. Here, Udbhid is the name of particular sacrifice and is, therefore, proper noun. If we resort to an indication of possession (मत्वर्थलक्षणा) then the text should be read as Udbhidvata instead of Udbhida and interpret as a sacrifice in which the Udbhid is used. It will be an attempt to convert a simple sentence into two compound sentences or one complex sentence. Then it will be a mistake which is called as Vakyabheda or split of sentence which is serious.

The second class of a noun arises from the fear of split of sentence. For instance, 'चित्रया जयेत पशुकाम' 'One who is desirous of cattle should perform Chitra sacrifice. It does not indicate the material used in the sacrifice as there is a passage. 'दक्षिमधुपयोधृतं धाना उदकं तण्डुलास्ततसंसृष्टं प्राजापत्यम्', 'curd, honey, milk, ghee, parched grain, water, rice are the mixed offering consecrated of Prajapati'. If one takes chitraya to mean as a subordinate action, then it would lead the mistake of split of sentence which should always be avoided. Therefore, the Chitra is, the name of the sacrifice and cannot be considered to be the subordinate materials used, for the fear of split of sentence.

Tatprakhya is the third class of noun. It is a conventional name given to a particular sacrifice, the description of which is given elsewhere in a separate treatise. For instance, "अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति", "He performs Agnihotra". Agnihotra is a name given to sacrifice

conventionally, the description of which is given elsewhere.

Tadvyapadesa is the name given to a sacrifice by reason of its comparison to another from which it derives it's name. For instance, "श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेत्", "One who desirous of practicing hostile magic should sacrifice with the Syena or falcon". Syena is the name of the sacrifice and it does not denote the material of the sacrifice. It is performed to destroy one's enemy is called after a hawk, because a sacrificer kills his enemy like a hawk which pounces upon the birds and kills them.

Nishedha (prohibition) - It is a negative precept just as vidhi (injunction) is a positive or affirmative precept. Prohibitory sentences have definite purpose, just because they effect men's turning away from actions which are cause of evils or undesirable effects. For instance, "न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्", "One should not eat poisoned meat". Thus, it is preventing a man from doing a thing which is injurious or disadvantageous to him. This is the nature of negative that it conveys the opposite of the sense of the word which is used along with it. For instance, 'a jar exists not', the negative which is used along with the word i.e., 'exists' conveys the non-existence of the jar, which is opposite to the existence of the jar. Similarly, the negative, used along with the optative, conveys the determent which is the

opposite of instigation, that forms the sense of optative. Thus, on hearing a prohibitory sentence one apprehends determent of the form of an activity favourable to abstention from prohibited actions in the form, "This removes me away". Therefore, in the place of a sentence of prohibition determent alone is the sense of the sentence.

It is of two kinds, viz., Paryudasa and Pratisedha. There is a famous verse, showing the difference between these two -

पर्युदासः स विज्ञेयो यत्र पूर्वपदेन नञ् ।
प्रतिषेधः स विज्ञेयो यत्रोत्तरपदेन नञ् ॥

"When the negative participle is connected with the purvapada (previous clause i.e. meaning of the root), it is Paryudasa and when negative participle is connected with the uttarapada (the last clause i.e. the verb) it is Pratisedha. For instance, नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्यम् - - - - तस्य व्रतम्।

"One should not see the rising Sun… This is a vow". When a man has taken a vow, then he is bound to observe the negative rule. This is the example of Paryudasa. This Paryudasa is of two kinds, viz., 1) Where a meaning of root is construed with negative participle as in just cited example.

2) Where a noun is construed with negative participle as in "यजतिषु ये यजामहं करोति नानुयाजेषु", "He utters 'ye yajamahe' in all sacrifices but not in after sacrifices".

Pratisedha is the negative precept of general applicability. For instance, "न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्", "One should not eat poisoned flesh". Thus it can be said that when the negative precept is of general applicability, it is Pratisedha, but when it is of special applicability it is Paryudasa.

Arthavada (explanatory passage) - An arthavada is a sentence which aims at either the praise or blame. It ultimately leads to a matter with a purpose by indication. It has no purpose or usefulness of its own sense and therefore, it conveys by indication the praise or blame of a matter to be enjoined. It is of two kinds, viz., complementary to injunction and complimentary to prohibition. For instance, "वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता - -", "Vayu is the swiftest deity" is complimentary to injunction "वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकामः", "One who is desirous of prosperity, should immolate a white animal in honour of Vayu". similarly, in the case of prohibition, "बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम्", "silver should not be given on the grass", he howled, since he howled, there to Rudra belongs the character of howler" which is complimentary to the prohibition, "सोऽरोदीत्, यदरोदीत् तद् रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम्". Again it is classified into three divisions, viz., Gunavada, Anuvada and Bhutarthavada. The following verse explains the three divisions of Arthavada.

विरोधे गुणवादः स्यादनुवादोऽवधारिते ।
भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानादर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ॥

On contradiction there is a state of quality and on comprehension it would be a repetition. When there is absence of both then the real state of affairs.

When the statement of the text is contradictory to the existing state of affair and means proof, then it is gunavada. For instance, "आदित्यो यूपः". "The sun is the sacrificial post". Here, the Sun cannot be a sacrificial post as it contradicts the sense of perception and against the real state of facts.

When the statement of the text which is keeping with the existing state of facts, then it is anuavada. For example, "अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम्", "Fire is an antidote of cold" Here, the fire is said to be a protector from cold. It is a fact that one can verify this by his senses. Therefore it is anuavada.

When a statement of a text which is neither against the state of facts nor is it in conformity with it is bhutarthavada. For example, "इन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुदयच्छत्", "Indra uplifted his thunderbolt against the existing facts nor is it provable by any means proof. Thus, it is a statement of facts which happened in the past and is called bhutarthavada.

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Chapter 5
Pramanas
(Means of valid cognitions)

Valid cognition has been classified by Mimamsakas into six, viz., pratyaksa (perception), anumana (inference), sabda (verbal cognition), upamana (analogy), arthapatti (presumption) and abhava (nonexistence).

Pratyaksa (sense-perception) - According to Jaimini, sense-perception is that cognition when there is a contact of the sense organs with their respective objectives. But Sabara says, that cognition by a person which appears when there is a contact of the sense organs is senseperception.

Sense-perception is not the means of knowing Dharma, because it is that cognition which arises when sense organs are in contact with the object cognized. Dharma, however, is something that is yet to come and it does not exist at the time of cognition. The perception is apprehending of an object that actually present and not one what is not present at the time of cognition. Therefore sense-perception is not a means of knowing Dharma.

Sense-perception is of two kinds, viz., nirvikalpaka, the non-determinate and savikalpaka, the determinate. Non-determinate is as follows - first of all, there is a cognition in the shape of mere observation in the abstract, which is undefined, similar to the cognition of the infant or the dumb, arising purely out of the object by itself and that time neither any specialization nor a generalization is recognized; what is cognized is only theobject, the substratum. The determinate cognition is such, if non-determination cognition is followed by fuller perception of the thing as having certain qualifications, such as; belonging to a certain community or universal bearing a certain name and so forth.

Anumana (inference) - As far as the inference is concerned, Mimamsakas say that when perception of one factor of a well recognized relationship leads to the cognition of other factor of that relationship, the latter is not in contact with the persons sense organs; this second cognition is what is called as anumana (inference). This is of two kinds, viz., based upon a directly perceived relationship and based upon a generalized relationship.

Among these, an example of former is that cognition of fire follows from the cognition of smoke. This is based upon the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire, directly perceived in kitchen. Next, an example of latter kind of inference is that when the Sun changes his position, we infer on the ground of our experience, that 'the sun is moving' in the case of Devadatta, it is only after the move that he changes his position. This experience leads to the generalized premises that 'whenever an object changes its position,

it moves' and it is on this generalized premise that the inference of the Sun's movement is based.

Sabda (verbal cognition) - Sabara defines as Sastra which means cognizing the object not in contact with the senses which follows from the verbal cognition. According to Kumarila, here in the definition, 'Sabda' stands for the Vedic or scriptural word and 'artha' for Dharma and Adharma which forms the subject matter of scripture. Kumarila divides this into two classes, viz., paurusheya (human origin) and apaurusheya (non-human origin). Under the first category, words are included all words uttered by trustworthy persons while in the Second category, words are included of the Veda. Both of them are valid, since only ground of the invalidity of a word lies in the fact of its emanating from an untrust worthy source and this ground is as absent in the words of the trustworthy persons and in that of the words of the Veda. It is a distinct means of cognition. Bauddhas and Vaisesikas have included the verbal cognition under inference. But Mimamsakas do not accept it, since it does not fulfill three conditions which are essential in inferential process and hence it is distinct from inference, like sense-perception.

Upamana (analogy) - Analogy also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance, the sight of the gayal brings about the remembrance of the cow as being similar to the gayal. To explain, being asked by the town people, like, 'what is gayal'? The forester answers that 'a gayal is just like

a cow' then it is commonly known as 'analogy'. This is to say that the observer already knows a certain object (the cow) then on going to the forest he sees another animal already known to him and afterwards there is a recall of formerly perceived cow which he cognizes now as similar to the before his eyes. Then, it forms the objective of analogical cognition is the similarity as qualified by the previously known animal. Here, similarity is perceived while the cow is remembered, yet the two together, i.e. the cow and similar to the seen animal are not cognized either by perception or by remembrance. Therefore, for the cognition of two together, there is a need of analogy as distinct means of cognition.

Arthapatti (presumption) - It consists in presuming of something not seen on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that presumption. For instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house and this absence in the house leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house, as without this the fact of he is being alive and not in the house could not be explained. Kumarila classifies this presumption into six. They are as follows:

1) *Presumption based on perception,* e.g., burning capacity in fire, which is based upon the perceived fact that it burns.

2) *Presumption based on inference,* e.g., we have in the presuming of the moving capacity in the Sun, which

is based upon an inferred fact that the Sun moves from place to place.

3) *Presumption based on the verbal cognition,* e.g., when one hears the assertion, 'Devadatta is fat and yet he eats not during the day', he is led to the presumption that the man eats at night.

4) *Presumption based on the analogy,* e.g., we have in the presuming of the cognisability of the cow by the cognition born of the similarity between the cow and the gayal.

5) *Presumption based on the presumption:* It is found in the cognition of the denotative potency of the word through presumption. The well known fact that it denotes certain things and on the basis said presumed denotative potency which cannot be otherwise explained, we presume the eternality of word.

6) *Presumption based on non-apprehension:* In the case, where the non-apprehension of Devadatta leads to the presumption of his being outside.

Abhava (non-apprehension) - According to Sabara abhava stands for the non-operation of the five means of the cognition and it is what brings about the cognition that 'it does not exist' in regard to the things not in contact with the senses. This is explained by Kumarila that in the case of an object where the other means of cognition do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object we have the notion of

non-existence of certain thing. This ascertainment of the non-existence of an object is got at is called abhava.

This non-apprehension is of four kinds, viz.,

1) Pragabhava (previous absence) e.g. the absence of the curd in the milk.

2) Pradhvansabhava (absence after destruction) for e.g. the absence of milk in the curd.

3) Anyonyabhava (mutual absence) e.g. the absence of cow in the horse.

4) Atyantabhava (absolute absence) e.g. the absence of horns on the head of hare.

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Chapter 6

Main principles of Mimamsa

1) Sabdanityatva (eternality of word) - According to Mimamsakas word is eternal, the relation between word and its meaning is also eternal. Jaimini says that the relation of the word and its denotation is inborn, instruction is the means of knowing it (Dharma), and it is infallible regarding all that is imperceptible, it is valid means of knowledge as it is independent. Sabara asserts that the relation between the word and its meaning does not originate from any human being. The notion derived from Vedic injunction must be right. However, the notion derived from the words of human beings, there might be doubts regarding its validity since the assertion is dependent for its validity upon things extraneous to itself. In the case of notion derived from the injunction is not of a doubtful character, such as, 'this may or may not be so', despite any other time or place or any other circumstance.

This relation could never have been created by a human being, because it follows from the fact that there could not have been any person to create the relations. He cannot be admitted, otherwise he would have been cognized by sense-perception and the rest. Even if he had existed a long back, it would not be impossible to remember him. In the case of such things as the Himalaya mountain and like it would not be possible to forget the creator. In the cases, such as, the builder of a wall or a creator of a garden etc., the creator is forgotten as the result of the disappearance of the builder etc. either due to the disruption of his country or the extinction of his family. However, in the case of words and their meanings, there is no total disappearance of persons making use of them. If there is a person who created the relation and started its use, he would have been remembered at the time of its using the word. A certain usage becomes possible only when there is an agreement between the creator and adopter of the usage. For instance, Panini is the originator of the relation between the technical term and the letters at-aic denoted by it. A person making use of words independently of Panini as authoritative, could never apprehend the word Vrddhi standing for those respective letters. One who is able to understand the relation between the words and their usager in Panini and Pingala and so on, would surely remember the creator of those works. If there is a creator of the relation between the words and their denotations in the Veda, persons making use of them would surely remember him. However, it is not so. Thus it follows that no person has created the relations of words and then for the purpose of making use of them, composed the Vedas.

2) Vedapaurusheyatva (being the status of non-human origin of the Veda) - The main thesis of the Mimamsakas is that the Veda is a reliable source of knowing Dharma and that it is not the creation of a human being. If there existed any author or the

composer of the Veda, he should certainly have been remembered through the long tradition. There is an unbroken tradition of the text among the students of the Veda and there is no such presumption of an author of the Veda justifiable. People might call a text by the name of one who is not the author at all. The names like, Kathaka, Kalapaka etc. cited indicate not the authorship but they are mere expounders of those sections of the Veda. As a matter of fact, we do not know of any author of the Veda, if there had been any author, he would have been surely known. There is a syllogism regarding the human origin of the Veda, like, 'वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि वाक्यत्वाद् भारतादिवत्', 'The Vedic sentences are of human origin, because they are sentences, like the sentences of the Bharata etc'. To this, answer is that 'because there are extraneous adjuncts, because there is opposition to the articular and to counter probans, being sentences' is not instrumental to the establishment of the human origin of the Vedas. It is said by Kumarila,

वेदाध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् ।
वेदाध्ययनवाच्यत्वाद् अधुनाध्ययनं यथा ॥

The study of the Veda is always preceded by its study by one's teacher, because it is mentioned by the expression 'Vedic study' like Vedic study of the present day'. Similarly, there are counter arguments, like 'विप्रतिपत्रः कालो न वेदशून्यः कालत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नकालवत्', 'The time is not devoid of the Vedas, because it is time, like the well-known time'.

If it be said that in the same way, the Bharata etc. can be shown to be of non-human origin, no; because there is very firm of tradition of authorship. Again, in some Vedic passages the human origin of the Vedas is declared, like,

'वक्त्रेभ्यो वेदास्तस्य निःसृताः। ऋग्वेद एवाग्नेरजायत, यजुर्वेदो वायोः सामवेद आदित्यात्', 'तस्माद्यज्ञात्सर्वहुतः, ऋचः सामानि जज्ञिरे' etc.

'From his face the Vedas proceeded', 'The Rigveda was born from the fire', 'the Yajurveda from the wind', the Samaveda from the Sun', 'From that sacrifice of all oblation the Rks and the Samans were born' and so on. The assertion of the Mimamsakas is indeed these passages are contradictory to one another and their content sublated by other means of valid knowledge as in the case of 'The sun is sacrificial post', etc. these are accepted as praises. So long as explanatory passages continue to exist in the Veda, there can be no assumption of any other ground. Thus, the Veda is not a work of any personal author and being thus, they are free from defects that are likely to be caused due to the authorship. The Veda must be regarded as the only source of knowledge which is infallible in its self sufficient validity.

3) Moksha (Final deliverance) - The concept of Moksha cannot be found in the Jaimini Sutras or in the Sabara's bhashya. This concept is developed by Kumarila and others. It is explained like,

दुःस्वात्यन्तसमुच्छेदे सति प्रागात्मवर्तिनः ।
सुखस्य मनसा भुक्तिर्मुक्तिरुक्ता कुमारिलैः ॥

"When there is an absolute rooting out of misery, the experience mentally of the happiness that already existed in the soul is said to be Moksha (mukti) by the followers of Kumarila".

Now, the question arises that if this bliss be certainly inherent in the soul even in the state of transmigration, then how it has not been experienced? Answer for this is, that it is due to the non-existence of the cause of its experience. Mind assisted by the absolute destruction of the body, the senses etc. is the means to the experience. Then what is the proof for the existence of such a bliss? It is the scripture itself. 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च मोक्षेऽभिव्यज्यपते', 'Bliss is the nature of Brahman and that is manifested at the stage of final deliverance'. It can be explained, like

निषिद्धकाम्यकर्मभ्यः सम्यग्व्यावृत्तचेतसः ।
नित्यनैमित्तिकप्रायश्चित्तप्रध्वस्तदुष्कृतेः ॥
सुखदुःखानुभूतिभ्यां क्षीणप्रारब्धकर्मणः ।
युक्तस्य ब्रह्मचर्याद्यैरङ्गैः शमदमादिभिः ॥
कुर्वाणस्यात्ममीमांसां वेदान्तोक्तेन वर्त्मना ।
मुक्तिः संपद्यते सद्यो नित्यानन्दप्रकाशिनी ॥

"One who properly withdraws his mind from the prohibited and optional rituals, whose sins are destroyed by the obligatory and the occasioned rituals and by the expiatory rites; whose karmans that have begun to take effect are exhausted through the experience of happiness and misery, who is endowed with brahmacharya and subsidiaries like calmness and equanimity; who betakes himself a respectful inquiry into the soul along the path declared in the Vedanta, by him is immediately accomplished final release which manifests the eternal bliss.

4) **Svatah-pramanya** (self-validity) - Self-validity, according to Mimamsa philosophy is that the rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent of an object and all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation. This is known as self-validity of knowledge in its production (utpatti). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed and there is no link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action. Thus knowledge is not only independent in its origin but in its own action.

In some cases of illusory perception, a later perception or cognition carries with it the notion that our original knowledge is invalid. Thus the invalidity of knowledge may appear by later experience and then we reject the first knowledge. This is what Mimamsa philosophy says that the invalidity may be derived from later experience.

Thus the validity of knowledge certified at moment of its production need not be doubted unnecessarily even after enquiry. All knowledge except memory is

regarded as valid by itself, unless it is shown to be invalid. Memory is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon previous experience and cannot be regarded as arising independently by itself.

The origin of the doctrine of self-validity can be found in the definition of Dharma-Sabara, clearly refers to the self-validity of the Veda, such as, the idea brought about by the assertion, "Desiring heaven one should perform sacrifices" is not an uncertain one. Infact, the idea is definitely certain that heaven should follow and when it is cognized for certain, it cannot be false. It is never found to be checked by any other cognition at anytime or in regard to any person or under any circumstances or at any place. Therefore it follows that it is not false or wrong.

That cognition alone is false which having appeared becomes checked by the notion, 'such is not the actual case'. In the assertion of ordinary men, if it emanates from a trustworthy person or if it pertains to something that is directly perceived by the senses, it must be true. On the contrary, if it pertains to something that cannot be perceived directly by the senses, this is unreliable. However, in the case of the Veda, there is no room for illusion or wrong knowledge as there is no human agency involved, while in the case of human instructors, there is always chance of mistakes, illusions and ignorance. On the other hand, in the case of teachings emanating from human sources is not always compatible with truth. But in the case of Vedic assertion, there is nothing to indicate its falsity.

Thus established conclusion is; validity is inherent and invalidity is extraneous.

5) **Atman** (soul) - The Mimamsa philosophy emphasizes that the Veda speaks of the 'Sacrificer' going to heaven after death; the body perishes after death; hence the entity that is spoken of as 'proceeding to heaven'. It must be something other than the perishable body. This entity is the 'soul'.

This soul is distinct from the body, the sense organs and the buddhi. It is imperishable eternal, the real doer of action, agent of acts and the experiencer of their results and reactions. Soul is self-luminous and omnipresent (all-pervading) since we find it functioning everywhere. It is not qualified by any limitations of time and place. It is the soul that passes through the experience of pleasure, pain etc. without which pleasure, pain etc. cannot become manifest in a body. Such manifest requires mind-contact and the mind subsists the body. Even it is all-pervading, it cannot experience what is occurring in the body of another personality, since experience is always due to Karma of the particular personality. Therefore the experience of one personality cannot from the experience of another. This soul is distinct from each body and is capable of ensouling several bodies.

6) **Apurva** (potency) - According to Mimamsa, there is an apurva, since action is enjoined, in such injunctions as 'Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifice'.

In the absence of Apurva, such an injunction would be meaningless since the sacrifice itself is perishable. If the sacrifice is to perish without bringing something into existence then the result in the shape of heaven could never come about. Thus, established conclusion is that there must be something which is called apurva which continues to exist and operate till the final result. It must be said that the sacrifice brings about the final result through the agency of the power called apurva.

It is of four kinds, viz., The Phalapurva, the Samudayapurva, the Utpatyapurva and the Angapurva.

1) The Phalapurva (Productive potency) - Which leads to the result directly and as such is immediate cause of the result.

2) The Samudayapurva (Collective potency) - In the Darsapurnamasa sacrifices, the three sacrifices are performed on the moonless day from one group and the three are performed on full-moon day from another group. Each of these two groups occurring at different point of times and therefore each group should have a distinct apurva of its own, each of these two distinct apurva is called Samudayapurva, which combine to produce Phalapurva.

3) The Utpatyapurva (Initial apurva) - The three apurvas following from the each of three sacrifices constituting the first group of Darsapurnamasa and the three following from the three sacrifices constituting the second group.

4) Angapurva (Partial potency) - Each of these sacrifices is made up of a number of minor acts, each of which brings about an apurva of its own which helps the main sacrifice in bringing about its result.

In Kumarila's view, Apurva means

कर्मणः प्रागयोग्यस्य कर्मणः पुरुषस्य वा ।
योग्यता शास्त्रगम्या या साऽपूर्वमितीष्यते ॥

"Apurva is a potency in the Principal Action or in the Agent which did not exist before the performance of that action and whose existence is proved by scriptures". It means, before the performance, in the sacrifices there is an incapacity to lead any one to heaven, secondly, in Agent, there is an incapacity to lead the heaven, both these incapacities become set aside by the performance of sacrifice. The performance produces a capacity or potency is named as Apurva. The proof for existence of such an apurva lies in Presumption, since it is based upon the fact that without which Vedic texts are inexplicable.

The school of Prabhakara admits Niyoga (prompting) and considers it to be the import of a sentence. Injunctive sentence denotes is the Karya (something to be effected). Niyogya (prompted person) is directed to function that Karya or niyoga continues to exist till the attainment of heaven from the sacrifice.

7) Svarga (Heaven) - According to Mimamsakas, svarga means, it stands for a form of happiness and it is only

in its figurative sense, it applies to thing or substance that causes happiness. This happiness is totally free from all touch of pain. It is described as happiness is not mere absence of pain since in the absence of pain we feel that there is no pain. Thus this feeling is negative one. On the other hand, when we feel happy and feel pleasure, we are conscious of something positive which is belonging to soul. It is also said like -

यत्र दुःखेन संभिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।
अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत्सुखं स्वपदास्पदम् ॥

8) Bhavana (creative energy) - This bhavana is explained as ''भक्तिर्भवनानुकूलो भावयितुर्व्यापारविशेषः''. Bhavana means that activity of a productive agent (bhavayita) which is favorable to the production of that which is to come into existence. This is two fold, viz., Sabdibhavana (verbal creative energy) and arthibhavana (actual creative energy). Sabdibhavana is a particular activity of a productive agent which is favorable to a man's exertion and it is expressed by the optative element of the suffix. On hearing an optative form one invariably understands. This impels me to an action; this person possesses an activity which is favorable to my exertion. This verbal creative energy requires three factors, viz., साधन (what is to be achieved), साध्य (by what instrument it is to be achieved) and इतिकर्तव्यता (how it is to be achieved). The arthibhavana represented by persons inclination comes into relation as the thing to be achieved; the optative suffix etc. known through

study comes into relation as the thing to be achieved and the knowledge of praiseworthiness conveyed by the arthavadas comes into relation as itikartavyata.

आर्थीभावना is the activity of a person referring to an action engendered by the desire for some object and it is expressed by the factor of verbality. It also requires साध्य, साधन and इतिकर्तव्यता. The fruit consisting of heaven and others is construed as sadhya, sacrifice and others are construed as sadhana and the group of subsidiary acts as fore-sacrifices is construed as itikartavyata.

The Vedic hymns have a capacity to impose an action on the persons and the capacity of person which is reactive and internal. The former is called pravartana and the latter is called pravrtti of a person to some action. Both are known by common term Bhavana, because of their leading to the same result. Pravartana leads to the pravrtti in a sacrifice and pravrtti in a sacrifice leads to the desired result from the sacrifice.

9) **Abhihitanvayavada** - According to this theory, words convey only the individual word meanings which in their turn come to be mutually related. Even if the meanings of individual words can be comprehended separately, it results from the association of word meanings constituting the sentence. It clearly says that the meanings of all words are responsible for the total meaning of a sentence. When we hear a sentence first we understand the meanings of words one after another. Then by way of putting together all padarthas (word

meanings) in accordance with the three factors, viz., आकांक्षा (expectancy), योग्यता (compatibility) and सन्निधि (contiguity). We recognize the construed meaning of the whole sentence. Parthasarathi Misra says that the meanings of the words convey the meaning of the sentence only by secondary implication. Bhaa school has established this theory.

10) **Anvitabhidhanavada** - According to this theory a word expresses its meaning as connected with some acts to be done (karya). The words in a sentence convey their meanings in relation to the meaning of other words. Thus, it is well established in the school of Prabhakara that the words of a sentence have the double function of giving their individual as well as the construed meaning. It clearly says that a word has no separate existence and it always conveys a complete meaning only in relation with other words. Every word expresses its meaning as connected with an action which is denoted by other word and these cumulative expressions of all the words in a sentence are called Anvitabhidhana. For example, in 'gamanaya' (bring the cow) does not mean properly 'gotva' (cowness). But it does mean this cow is certainly to be brought, and bring is certainly related to the cow.

11) **God** - Mimamsakas do not accept the god as creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. Mimamsa teaches ritualistic morality and religion, and enjoins the performance of sacrifices to Gods. Gods are not objects of worship and they do not give the rewards

of the offerings. The deities are only Beings to whom offerings are made. Either Jaimini or Sabara do not refer to god. Prabhakara and Kumarila deny the creatorship of God. According to Mimamsa word is eternal, meaning of it is also eternal. Jaimini had established the doctrine that the relation of word and its meaning is eternal. Hence there is no creator of the Vedas since they are called as apauruseya (non-human origin). If there is an author or the composer of the Veda, he would have been remembered like Panini, Kalidasa and so on. In the same way, Mimamsakas denied the God as creator of this world. According to Mimamsa, there is neither beginning nor an end to the world. If god is a creator of the world, he must have a body. He cannot have desire to create without a body, since desire is produced by the contact of soul with manas and senseorgans. If God has no body he could not exert his will on the atoms. If he does not act on the unconscious atoms, they could not follow his will. The atoms cannot combine with one another and form various substances under the guidance of will of God. Similarly they cannot separate from one another and bring about destruction of world under the guidance of devine will.

Further, God has no motive for creating the world. Compassion for living creatures could not be his motive, since there were no living beings before creation, for whom he could feel compassion. Moreover, if he moved by compassion to create the

world, he would have created only happy beings. But the world is full of suffering and misery. If he cannot create a world free from evil, he is not omnipotent. If he is so, he would have certainly created a world free from evil. If he created the world without a motive, then he is not intelligent. Even a fool does not act without a motive. If God created the world or amusement (krida) he would not be happy and contended and creation would involve him in wearisome toil.

Thus, earlier Mimamsakas did not believe in the creatorship of God and regarded the world as self-existent and self evolving. However, later Mimamsakas like Laugakshi Bhaskara and Apadeva believe that he is the cause for final liberation. Narayana in Manameyodaya says that we accept the God who is said in the Veda. Even the Kumarila, who refuted the creatorship of God in the Slovarttika, salute God in the opening verse of the same. By all these, one may say that Mimamsakas accept God but not as creator, preserver and destroyer.

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