PANCHAPADIKA VIVARANAM
ei
PRAKASATMA YATI

Rendered into English
by
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PANCHAPADIKA VIVARANAM
of
PRAKASATMA YATI

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For My Parents
who taught me Metaphysics
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A Word from Sadhana Grantha Mandali

Sadhana Grantha Mandali was founded at Tenali in 1945. Many eminent scholars have enriched the Mandalī with their valuable contributions on Religion and Philosophy. Many more have financed the publications. One of the aims of the Institution was to bring about the major works of Sri Sankara Bhagavatpada. We started with the minor works attributed to Sri Sankara. So far sixteen volumes of these works were published in Telugu with translation and commentary. We have also published ten volumes of the teachings of the late Sri Chandrasekharendra Saraswati of Kamchi Kamakoti Pitha.

Works like Saundarya Lahari, Siva Sutra Vartika, Chaitanya Charitamrita, Indian systems of philosophy, Matrika Cakra viveka, Biography of Sri Sankara, Muka Panchasati, some works of Sadasiva Brahmananda and others were published in Telugu. In Mantra Sastra we brought out Amnaya Mandara, Sudarsana Kalpa, Sri Kalpa, Mahaganapathi Kalpa, Dattatreyakalpa, Hayagreeva Kalpa, Dakshina Murthy Kalpa, Chandi Sapta Sati, Vanadurga Mahavidya Panchasati, Pratyangira, Manyusukta, Sarvadevata Pratishtha, Homasata chandi, Pratishtha Mandara and others in Telugu script during the last 52 years.

The latest is the present work Pancha Padika Vivaranam of Prakasatma Yati rendered into English by Sri Potukuchi Subrahmanya Sastri, retired Professor of English, University of Nagpur. This monumental work is a major landmark in the evolution of Advaita Vedanta.

We invoke the blessings of the divine on all authors.

Tenali, 20-7-1997

(Bulusu Suryaprakasa Sastri) Founder : Sadhana Grantha Mandali.
PREFACE.

Sri Sankara’s commentary on the Vedanta Sutras of Badarayana is a monumental work. Known as Sarrisraka Mimansa Bhashya, the commentary introduced the concept of ‘Adhyasa which is of the greatest significance in metaphysics. This paved the way for the classification of the Upanishadic passages.

Relational God and Supra-relational Absolute were introduced. Empirical and ultimate degrees of Reality came next. The Upanishads are not dogmatic utterances. They present the recorded statements of the spiritual experiences of the ancient wise men. Nagarjuna’s neyartha and nitartha, samvriti satya (empirical truth) and parmartha satya (absolute truth) have different terms in Advaita Vedanta. Vasubandha’s Tri Svabhava Nirdesa introduced a third degree of truth. It is the pratibhasikasatya (transient truth) during the erroneous cognition of Advaita Vedanta.

After Sri Sankara there came Bhaskara who expounded the theory of Bheda-abheda (Identity in difference). The theory was there carrier.

Padmapada was said to be the direct disciple of Sri Sankara. This is debatable. His Panchapadika is a commentary on Sri Sankara’s commentary on the first four sutras of Badarayana.

Soon after these arose divergent developments in the metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta (non-dualistic Absolutism). Vachaspati Misra who wrote his Nyaya Suci Nibandha
in 841 A.D., wrote a commentary called Bhamati on Sri Sankara’s commentary. With this starts the Bhamati school. It starts with an empirical base and develops into Absolutism. This grants many concessions. It allows karmas or righteous activities, multiplicity of selves, emphasizes on nididhyasana (contemplation), and many others. It is more electie.

On Padmapada’s Panchapadika Prakasatman wrote an elaborate commentary named Vivaranam. This is the starting point of the Vivarana school in Advaita Vedanta. This provides the metaphysical basis and exposition of Advaita. It offers an ontological and epistemological basis, admitting that in the final analysis epistemology offers only a bloodless ballet of categories. Perception, inference and implication are accepted as empirically valid means of knowledge. The emphasis is on sound, hearing (sravana). It leads to the apprehension of Reality as Experience.

The dialectic followed by Prakasatman is not spiral as in Hegel. It is like Bradley’s dialectic, like Nagarjuna’s catushkoti, like the Socratic dialectic.

Prakasatman criticises Bhamati, Bheda abheda and Vijnanavada. His exposition of erroneous cognition (Khyati) is superb. The major opponents are the philosophers of Vijnana veda like Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. While Sri Sankara fought a successful battle against the thinkers of the Sankhya system of Philosophy (dualism), Pragksatman destroyed the Vijnanavada system of Buddhist philosophy. At the same time he assimilated some of the important elements from that school.
The Vivarana of Prakasaiman is a hard nut. Many of our Professors of Indian Philosophy have not touched it so far. It is time their eyes are opened to the golden mine of Vivarana, Indian philosophy cannot be brushed aside.

We rendered the first Varnaka of this text into English in 1957. Since then it underwent many revisions. We are grateful to Sri Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam for the financial assistance given. We are grateful to Sri Bulusu Surya Prakasa Sastri under the patronage of whose SADHANA GRANDHA MANDALI this is being published. We wish more and more students and teachers of Indian Philosophy delve deeper and deeper into the golden mines preserved by our ancient thinkers.

Tenali, 20-7-1997

P. S. SASTRI

(Potukuchi Subrahmanya Sastri)
PANCHAPADIKÂ VIVARANAM

The first verse of the Panchapadika offers the author’s obeisance to his deity in accordance with the traditional convention, so that the intended work might be completed safely and spread far and wide. It also suggests briefly the final import of the whole commentary to be one of (absolute) identity between the ‘self and the Absolute. The knowledge of this identity is arrived at from a close enquiry into the meanings of the terms subject (=tvam) and object (=tau). All the truths or conclusions that are arrived at later on, are within the framework of this identity.

The first verse is fully substantiated (or supported) by the author’s offering addressed to God and his preceptor. This in itself is capable of bringing into fruition the result desired by him. Yet with his speech, mind and body, the author offers his obeisance to his preceptors in the next three verses so that the listeners too might realize the same result.

The fifth verse sets forth the author’s objective in composing the Panchapadika.

Objection: Sankara’s Commentary should not be commented upon since it cannot be considered to be a commentary in the strict sense of the term. Where the meaning of an aphorism is explained (or described) in words or sentences that are dependent on the aphorism and where the explanations are elaborately discussed, there alone we have a real commentary. Let us apply this definition to the very first sutra—“atha brahma jijnasa”. In order that there can be purusha pravritti we have to presume here the word ‘Kartavyaa’.(This is against the Bhaamati school which
rejects a ‘Vidhi there and accepts only an ‘anuvadā’ by completing the expression with ‘bhavati’. Jijnaasaa conveys in between an incomplete and a complete knowledge; ie, it implies the investigation or enquiry that comes after a preliminary cognition. So the sūtra would read- One who has the ‘saadhana catuṣṭhayā’ must undertake (= Kartavyaa) the enquiry (= Vihaara) into Bramaṇanā. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that Brhmaṇanā is the means for liberation of a specific adhikāra. From the context it would appear that this enquiry is into the vedānta vākyas. Hence, one who has the ‘saadhana catuṣṭhayā’ must undertake, the enquiry into the vedaṇta vākyas so that he might have the Brhmaṇanā which is the means of liberation. This is the meaning we apprehend from the first aphorism. Now the ‘adhyasa bhaasya’ of Sankara does not explain even remotely the meaning of this aphorism; and hence it should not be commented upon.

**Reply:** To answer this objection, Padmapada states that this part of the commentary explains the ‘Vishaya’ and ‘prayojana’ which are implied by the meaning of the aphorism. That part of the commentary ending with “Loka vyāvaharah” has its full meaning only when read with the next few sentences ending with “Vedaantaa a rabhyante”. These two parts together explain that the ‘Vishaya’ and ‘Prayojana’ of this system are implied in the first aphorism.

**Objection:** How is it then that we have then two Bhashyas propounding the ‘Vishaya’ and the ‘prayojana’? The last sentence alone is giving out the ‘Vishaya’ and ‘prayojana’; and what then is the purpose of the earlier part? If both these parts are giving only the subject matter and purpose, where is ‘adhyasa’ propounded? If these parts
are to give only the subject matter and purpose, why is ‘adyasa’ explained?

Reply: If the ‘Vishaya’ and ‘Prayojana’ that determine whether a particular system should be studied or not; and it is the principle of adhyasa that determines the ‘vishaya’ and the ‘Prayojana’. In other words, you can not know the subject matter, nor the purpose of the system if ‘adyasa’ is not enunciated. The middle term (= hetu) always establishes the relation of the major to the minor. ‘Adhyasa’ is the ‘hetu’ for the ‘Visahya & prayojana’ which in their turn explain why the system should be studied carefully. Just as the tilling of the field should be undertaken since it has an object and a purpose, so should the enquiry into any system of knowledge be undertaken if it has an object and a purpose.

When we are awake, we come to understand or comprehend the world around us. In like manner Sankara’s commentary reveals to us the nature of ‘avidyatmakabandha and how to overcome it. As such here we have a specific subject-matter and a definite purpose attached there to. That the bondage (bandha) is ‘avidyaatmakak’ is the import of both the parts in this ‘adyasa bhasya’. And this part of the commentary consequently explains the ‘vishaya’ and ‘prayojana’ of this system which enable us to study it.

Objection: We are told that the bondage of the self is due to ‘avidya’. This reason (‘hetu’) is ‘asiddha’ (unproved). How can an ‘asiddha hetu’ establish an ‘asiddha sadhya’?

Reply: In the sentence “asyaanantha praahaanaya...” it is well established that the ‘saadhya’ is ‘avidya nivratti’. In
arriving at this ‘Vishaya’ we are told about the definition (laksana), conceivability (sambhaavanaa), possibility (sadbhaava) and the ways of establishing (pramaana) ‘adhyaasa’. In this manner did the commentator establish and prove adhyasa, and then did he establish the subject matter and purpose of his work. Thus the earlier part of the ‘adhyaasa bhasya’ is related to the main text through the latter part. This explains why Padmapada divided the ‘adhyaapsa bha-shya’ into two parts.

Objection: But the passage ending with ‘asyaanartha hetoh prahaanaaya…’ does not prove ‘adhyaasa’. That ‘adhyaasa’ exists is proved only by the sentence ending with ‘sarva loka pratyakshah’. As such it should be said that the earlier part should be read only with reference to or along with this part ending with ‘sarva loka pralyakshah? 

Reply: It is true. However, that part of the commentary ending with the sentence ‘sarve vedaantaa aarabhyante’ explains the ‘Vishaya’ and ‘prayojana’ and states that they are found in the vedaanta vaakyas. As such that sentence alone explains the relation of the ‘Vichaara’ ‘saasfra’ to the earlier part of the text. In arriving at the ‘Vishaya’ and ‘prayojana’ of this investigation which are given in the latter part, we come to establish ‘adhyaasaa’ through which alone we can establish the other. This explains the relation of the two parts.

Objection: Yet, the Vishaya and prayojana expounded here do not seem to be implied by the first aphorism. They appear to be totally unrelated to the aphorism.

Reply: This is answered by Padmapada when he observed that since these are implied by that aphorism,
the commentator begins with an exposition of those implications.

The next objection takes a serious turn. It argues that the first aphorism itself is ‘asamgata’ and hence the commentary need not be gone through. There is an injunction ‘Svaadhyaya a dhyetavyah’ and this is a ‘nitya ‘vidhi’. According to this injunction, one has to study his own veda which includes the Sanhita, Braahmana, Aaranyaka and Upanisad. One who studies his own veda is surely bound to come across vedaanta vaakyas which give him a knowledge of Brahman. This apprehension is a logical corollary of the ‘Svaadhyaya Vidhi’, and it can not be an additional Vidhi. Some of the passages which give an understanding of Brahman and which he will go through while studying his own vedas are referred to. This is a passage beginning with ‘Everything becomes dear or loveable only for the love of the self. Having begun with this sentence, it is said at the end with reference to him that has renounced everything and that loves the self, ‘when the self is apprehended, all this is known; this much indeed is immortality’. The apprehension of the self is here said to be the way of realising immortality. In the statement “The self is to be seen, heard, meditated and contemplated”, the word drashtavyah does not indicate an injunction. Any command refers to some conation and the realization of an end which does not ‘exist’ as such prior to the conation. ‘Dyshtavyah’ does not imply a command since sight as such does not lead to any further conation in the present context. On the other hand ‘manana’ and ‘nidadhyasana’ are the essential elements in the conation arising from ‘sravana’. As such the command refers to sravana and it makes ‘manana’ and nidadhyasana subordinate to it. (The Bhamati school makes
‘manana’ the central pivotal word in the sentence.) And he who studies his veda has to enquire into the following: what are the specific features of an ‘adhikari’? What are the ‘pramanas’ he has to follow? What is the ‘vedanta vakva vihara’? Can it be had by any other means or not? How is ‘atmajnana’ the way to liberation? What is this ‘atmajnana’ and how can he have it? This ‘jijnasu’ desires the chief ‘purushartha’. It is with reference to such an one who possesses the ‘saadhana catushtaya’ that Badarayana has decreed enquiry into the ‘vedanta vakyas’ so that there can be the knowledge of Brahman which is the way to liberation. This injunction implies the ‘adhikari’, ‘vishaya’ and ‘phala’ which are the three ‘anubandhas’. To determine these three, he gave the aphorism ‘athaato brahma jijnasaasaa’; for it is generally admitted that the ‘sruti’ and the ‘vedanta sutra’ are in essence identical. And it will be explained later on how ‘manana’ and ‘nidadhyasana’ become the ‘angas’ of ‘sravana’.

Objection: The first aphorism is said to be based on ‘sravana vidhi’. But the ‘sravana vidhi’ itself is impossible. This ‘vidhi’ cannot command ‘vedaanta vakya vihaara’ which leads to ‘moksha saadhana brahmajnana’ for one possessing the ‘sadhana catuhtaya’. This injunction cannot be an ‘apurva vidhi’ which refers only to an ‘atyanta prapta vishaya’. The ‘sravana vidhi’ is said to give rise to ‘jnana’. This ‘jnaana’ can be had not only through ‘savana’. There are other ways too, and there is no necessary relation between ‘sravana’ and ‘jnaana’. Nor can we take ‘srotavyaḥ’ to be a ‘niyama vidhi’ as in the case of ‘vrihiṇi, avahanyaad’ where the removal of the husk is the ‘drishtaphala’ and where there is also an ‘adrishta prayojana’ Since the husk can be removed by other ways also, we
assume here an ‘adrishta phala’ also. No such thing can be found in the ‘sravana vidhi’; for if we were to take it as a ‘niyama vidhi’ we have to find out whether the ‘saadhya’ is ‘paramaa purva’ or ‘atma bodha’. It can not be the former for the sravana vidhi does not have any ‘adrishta sadhya’. Nor can it be the latter since ‘atmaavagama’ is ‘drishtopaaya maatra sadhya’. Hence there is no ‘adrishta phala’.

Reply: It is neither an ‘apurva vidhi’ nor a ‘parisan-khya vidhi’. But it is a ‘niyama [vidhi’. In the context of “sarva peksa ca yajnadi sruter asvavat”, it is decided later on that the immediate apprehension of the self (aatma tatt vaaparoksyta) is ‘sarvaadrishta sadhyatva’. It can be construed like ‘vrihin avahanyad’ as having both the ‘dritishta’ and ‘adishta phala’.

Objection: Sankara himself has rejected the view that the ‘vedaanta vakyas’ are injunctions. If they are to be treated as ‘vidhis’, their object which is Brahman must have to be a so-far non-existent entity. The rejection of ‘vidhitva’ to these passages removes such ‘asiddhi’ and other defects. Hence we cannot accept a ‘sravana vidhi’ here.

Reply: Sankara has rejected only a ‘jnana vidhi’ and not a ‘sravanavidhi’ there, for in the latter case those ‘doshas’ do not arise. Thus, in a ‘darsana vidhi’ we have an object called Brahman and this object is to be apprehended through an action. The object becomes specific and distinguishable, and we will then have a Brahman which is ‘guna bhuta’ (qualified). In a ‘vichara vidhi’ however, the object aimed at is ‘Brahma darsana’. Brahman then becomes the object which is an end in itself and not a means to an end. Thus the ‘vedaanta vaakyas’ enunciate Brahman as an end in itself, and towards the apprehension of Brah-
man they provide the injunction for ‘sravana’. This does not in any way vitiate the nature of Brahman.

**Objection:** In accordance with the ‘upakramopasamhara nyāya’, (harmony of the beginning and the end), we learn that the vedānta vaakyas are directed towards the enunciation of the nature of the self. And if we were to rely on some passages alone and come to the conclusion that they refer to ‘sravana vidhi’, we will be going against the final or total import. How can the later conclusion arise in view of this final import?

**Reply:** To this objection two lines of reply are offered. i) There is the passage — “Tam vividishanti yajnetā, danena, napasanatkena”. This is one of the passages occurring in the texts and this cannot be interpreted as identical with the final import. Yet ‘yajna’ and other ways referred to in the passage are essentially ‘Jnaanarthaka’ (means to knowledge). Likewise in a context of ‘adho dharana’, we come across the injunction “upari hi devebhyah”. Here is no ‘vakyabheda’ for the latter injunction has an ‘apurva’. In the same manner the sravana vidhi does not come into conflict with the ‘atma vakya’. Further, in the context of ‘darsapurṇa masa’ we read “Tisroratrir vratam caret anjalinava a pah pibet” and also “malayad vasasana samvadet”. From the context (prākarana) it appears that the prohibition in the latter sentence is ‘kratvartha’ and not ‘purusharthta’. But it has been determined that it is a ‘purusarthaka para’. A similar interpretation is to be given to ‘avantaravakyas’ like ‘sravana vidhi’.

Or ii) take a sentence like ‘Tasmad braahmanah paaṇdityam nirvidya...’. Since this refers to ‘sravana’, we can take it to be ‘sravana vidhaayaka’. Even the sutrakara ob-
serves the same thing in the aphorism "sahakary antara vidhih pakshena tritiyam tadvato vidhyadiva" (3.4.47). Thus considered in any manner there is a 'sravana vidhi' to which 'manana' and 'nididhyasana' are 'angas'. And to determine the three 'anubandhas' implied by this vidhi, the first aphorism is given.

This aphorism declares that a proper 'adhikari' must undertakes the enquiry into the 'vedanta vakyas' so that he may have 'mokshasadhana brahma jnana'. This enquiry commences with the second aphorism. The injunction of 'sravana' implies, as we have said, an 'adhikari', a 'vishaya' and 'prayojana'. In determining the last two, Sankara explains that bondage (bandha) is 'mithya'. Thus the 'adhyaasa bhaashyais inecesarily implied by the first aphorism.

**Objection**: If however, 'vishaya' and 'prayojana' are implied by the aphorism, then the coomentator aught to have first explained the purpose of the aphorism; and then he should have clearly and plainly explained the 'vishaya' and 'prayojana' in the form of question and-answer. Otherwise it would appear that the sutrakara's views are not given by the commentator.

**Reply**: Padmapaada replies that a full and convincing answer will be given when we come to the passage therefore Brahman should be enquired into*.

Padmapada then proceeds to explain clearly the opening sentences of Sankara. Padmapada raises an objection—'If the purpose of the 'adhyasa bhashya' is only to provide the 'visaya' and the prayojana', it is better to have only the sentence 'asyananantha hetoh...'. Why should Sankara compose the earlis sentences? If the entire 'adhyasa

(2)
bhashya’ is only to provide the ‘vishaya’ and the ‘prayojana’ like thed sentence ‘asyanartha hetoh...’, where is the necessity for the earlier sentences?

**Reply:** We have in this aphorism the enquiry (vichaarakartavyataa), ‘vishaya prayojana’ and ‘adhyasa’ in this part of the commentary. Here every succeeding thing makes the preceding thing necessary. As such we can arrive at vishaya and prayojana only when we have established shed ‘adhyasa’; and we can have ‘vichara kartavyatya’ only later on.

**Objection:** The aphorism indicates the ‘vihaara kartavyataa’ whose ‘prayojana’ is the knowledge of Brahman. Then how can the dispelling of the bondage be the prayojana for the enquiry and for the knowledge?

**Reply:** The subject matter of the aphorisms is the knowledge of Brahman, which knowledge destroys the cause of all evil. The enquiry gives us knowledge. The ‘prayojana’ of this knowledge is implied by or involved in, the ‘vicharavidhi’; and this injunction makes us understand that liberation for a specific ‘adhikari’ is the ‘prayojana’.

**Objection:** ‘Anartha’ is generally seen to be of the nature of falling into hell. But here the ‘anartha’ is said to be the appearance of body etc for which you are going to establish ‘mithyatva’. Is this proper? How?

**Reply:** ‘Anartha’ involves the meaning that the self is taken to be the subject of all actions and to be the enjoyer.
Pramatritva, kartritva and bhoktritva (knowing, doing and enjoying) constitute the object or the nature of the object. Can knowledge dispel these? These is an object having specific avayavas (parts) and we have the knowledge that it is a blue substance. This knowledge does not dispel the substance; nor can it dispel the properties that are necessarily connected with it; nor can it dispel the absence of its contradictory. What is dispelled by this knowledge is only the absence of understanding of the object, i.e. the knowledge of an object puts an end to the ignorance of the object that we have.

You cannot say that by knowledge there is dispelled that which has its ‘asraya’ (locus) in the self. For the knowledge of the pot does not dispel the properties like dharma and adharma that are in the self.

Nor can knowledge dispel that object which is related both to the ‘asraya’ and to the ‘vishaya’ for even when the self has the knowledge of the body, we do not see that the relation of the self and the body is dispelled.

**Objection:** From our experience we can not say that knowledge dispels bondage; for the dispelling of the bondage is not seen and knowledge then would have to be ‘avidyatmakā’. But it is only the scripture that tells ua that knowledge liberates us from bondage.

**Reply:** It is only to make the sruti like “Tathāa vidvaan nama mupad vimuktah” intelligible that we accept avidyatmatva to be the nature of bondage. Eg. such interpretation has been accepted with reference to the ,apurva of the ‘aagneyaadi yaagas’ and also with reference to the ‘sruts svargapurva’.
Objection: But there we have the karmas which are momentary and whose results are to be experienced after a long time. To facilitate that many apurvas are presumed in the meanwhile; and thus they have ‘surtopapatti’.

Reply: Here too we have such a concomitant relation. “Knowledge can dispel only ignorance”. Hence the aphorism itself indicates that the bondage is of the nature of avidya. As such to arrive at the ‘vichara kartavyata’ given by the meaning of the aphorism, we should establish the purpose of the sastra. And the ‘prayojana’ can arise only when we have given an account of adhyasa.

“If kartritva and bhoktritva are brought by ajnana, then Brahmajnana alone can dispel this evil. Badarayana indicates that Brahmajnana dispels this anartha; and in so doing he implies that this anartha is brought by avidya. And by explaining this ajnana, Sankara makes the meaning of the aphorism consistent and intelligible”. Sankara does not give the plain meaning of the aphorism first, but its implication because this part of the commentary is the general introduction to the whole system.

The identity of the Brahman and the self is the final conclusion or meaning of the whole system.

Objection: Let adhyasa be the ground from which we can establish the ‘prayojana’. But how can this be also the ground for maintaining that final conclusion?

Reply: “All the vedantas go to establish the reality of Brahman who is pure bliss, pure existence, ‘kutastha chaitanya’ (Integral consciousness) and ‘asamsarin’ (non-relational whole). This is the ultimate nature of the self”. This meaning has been propounded by the aphorisms and
by the commentary. Since this conclusion is arrived at from an examination of adhyasa, Padmapada proceeds to state why adhyasa is to be described first. "We have the cognitions — I am the doer, I am happy, I am unhappy — and these are immediately apprehended by us. These are opposed to the nature of Brahman. To put an end to this contradiction, we should know that we are identical with Brahman and that the apparent apprehension of difference is due to avidya — which has Brahma svarupa viparita rupa'. (Other than the being of Brahman). If the true nature of the self is not apprehended, the anartha would remain as it is like a meaningless sentence".

**Objection:** When the Sastra itself treats bondage to be unreal and propounds the identity of the self with Brahman, then why should you describe adhyasa again?

**Reply:** If it is not described, the Sastra would be unintelligible like a series of nonsense syllables. "To get rid of bondage we should know that it is ‘avidya vilasita’, that it lies in falsely taking ourselves to be different from Brahman.

**Objection:** If the Sastrartha can be established only by establishing adhyasa, then adhyasa being the more important one it ought to have been rendered into an aphorism at the very outset. Otherwise adhyasa would be out of place and inconsistent with the views of Badarayana.

**Reply:** "Samkara himself would explain later on under the aphorism ‘Tadguna saratvat’ that it is not out of place and that it is not inconsistent."

**Objection:** If so, adhyasa being the general introduction, it ought to have been the first aphorism.
Reply: The aphorism is engaged in setting and determining the final truths, and not in writing introductions. "The first aphorism cannot be written on adhyasa because of the purpose on hand for the aphorist. When the truths are arrived at and the conflicting texts are properly interpreted, then there might arise doubts, and it is only these doubts that are to be rejected later on. If the truths are not stated, how can a doubt and its rejection arise?" I.E the aphorism on adhyasa would come under doubt and its rejection.

Objection: Then the commentator too ought to follow the order of the aphorisms.

Reply: The commentator begins with adhyasa which is implied by the first aphorism, only to make us understand the text easily.

Mangalacarana (Salutation at the beginning)

Objection: Yet this commentary should not be commented upon since there is no 'mangalacarana'. If it is not there the sastrartha may not be comprehended, may be construed otherwise, or may be inconsistently understood. So many obstacles go with the sastrartha. Further a Mangalasloka at the beginning is sishtacara (convention of otherwise) which has been violated; and this makes the commentator an 'anapta', one on whose words we cannot keep reliance. The prayojana intended can be safely realised being having the 'mangalacarana'. "It is generally seen that mangalacarana' has its purpose in putting an end to or in gnietening the obstacles. This work is aimed at 'nissreyasa,
prayojana' which is very great. And when there is such a great purpose, obstacles are found to be many. Then why did Sankara act thus’?

**Reply**: Those who have God always in their heart and those who have always the experience with God, they have nothing to fear about; they have no obstacles. Thus the Smriti proclaims. To quieten the obstacles, it is enough to have the 'mangalacarana' in one's own mind, and Sankara has performed it. "Our proof for this statement is found in the opening lines ending with the words 'sutaram itaretara bhavanupapattih'." This may also be taken to be the 'mangalacarana'.

**Objection**: How does this passage give us the knowledge that it is 'visista devatanusmarana'. (continous remembering of a specific deity).?

**Reply**: "This passage declares that the self is devoid of any obstacles and destruction and that it is pure thought (= prajnana ghanah). When this reality appears like another entity, this appearance is false. Sankara proceeds to declare the mithyatva of this appearance by expounding the self to be pure consciousness and to be devoid of all 'upaplavas' (fluctuations). When Sankara is expounding the nature of such consciousness, wherefrom can the obstacles arise? This in itself is the 'mangalacarana'.

While he is explaining the nature of adhyasa, by implication he is actually referring to the pure consciousness which is the ground of adhyasa.

**Adhyasa—Virodha**

"The object and the subject are opposed to one another as darkness and light. What is this 'virodha'?"
(contrariety) and what is the nature of the ‘itaretara bhava’ which is said to be inconsistent with the nature of these two?

There are two forms of ‘virodha’ and two forms of ‘itaretara bhavanupapattih’ (impossibility of the two natures being one). When two objects cannot be at the same place, at the same time, or in the same stage, we have the ‘virodha’ which refers to the nature or dharma of the objects. The absence of the ‘avastha laksana karya’ brought by such virodha is the incompatibility of their ‘itaretara bhava’.

When two objects cannot have the nature of one another, we have the second type of ‘virodha’, which also is based on the nature of the objects. The absence of the ‘itaretartvata lakshna’ brought by such virodha is another form of the incompatibility of their itaretara bhava.

If it is said that virodha means that two entities can not coexist, then when there is light there cannot be darkness. This is false. Eg when there is a faint light in the room, we cannot cognise the objects clearly. I.E. in such a room both light and darkness are found coexisting. Like wise in the shade, we have both heat and shade in varying degrees. Similar is the case with cold and heat.

Then one might argue that virodha means that of two objects, one cannot have the nature of another. Then consider the universal and the particular. Though they are distinct from one another, one penetrates into the other. Such an integration ought to be impossible if the nature of the one is not to be found in the other.
Vivarana proceeds to examine the nature of 'tamas darkness) and rejects the view that it is only 'prakasaa' bhava'. (absence of light).

9. Objections concerning adhyaasa

Objection: There may be the natural incompatibility of any relation between the dark (seeing) and the drsyaa(seen). Yet it can not obstruct the appearance of 'tadatmya' which is the cause of error. Eg sukti (mother of pearl) and silver have no relation of tadatmaya ap ob. Yet there appears an identical ground for both and this gives rise to error. And the same may hold good here also.

The ground is only the 'this', and that which is adh- yasta (superimposed) is the silver. There is some tadatmya between the two. This relation between the 'this' and the 'what' may be one of 'samanya viseshaabhava', (general and particular) or of gunaguni bhava' (quality and qualified). And we find the 'amsa' (aspect or part) of one appearing as the 'amsa' of the other. Such an 'anyataramsa adhyaasa (an aspect of one cognising as that of another) which is a case of error is seen. Like wise we have consciousness as the ground, and the not-self as the adhyaasta. But here we do not have such a relation as before. "Since the subject is in itself pure consciousness it can not admit of any 'yusmad amsa' (aspect of the object) in it."

If there were to be an adhyaasa of the not-self on the self the self as the ground must admit of the 'idam amsa' (thatness). That will have to be the 'acid aunsaa' (aspect of non-consciousness) which may be natural or 'agantuka

(3)
(adventitions) to consionsness. It cannot be natural since it is pure consciousness and consciousness alone in itself. The object is unconscious and is appearing as the object for consciousness. How can the subject of an act become also the object of the act? Is this not strange and fantastic? If it is then 'agantuka', has it a cause or no? If it has no cause, it cannot come into existence. If consciousness which is 'niravayava' (having no parts) cannot evolve itself into a 'savayava' (having parts) entity. It can not have also a cause, since consciousness is 'niranjana' (non-relational) Eg the amsa has no avayavas; and we do not see any evolution of it brought about by a cause.

"Nor can the not self be the ground, since the object in itself is not a conscious entity. Further, if the object is a conscious entity, it would be the same as the subject; and thus it would cease to be an object." Eg one percipient cannot have any immediate experience of another percipient; but can only refer the other. Like wise the object, that is a conscious entity, could not be directly congnised, but only inferred.

Moreover the object cannot evolve itself into the form of consciousness, since an unconscious entity can be the cause of only that effect which is also unconscious.

Then can’t we say the not-self accepts the 'atma caitanya' as its own amsa?

This is impossible since consciousness cannot move like that. It is 'aprati samkrama' (motionless). Thus no where do we find 'tadatmya' even to a very slight extent. And
we cannot have the amsa of one in another, whence the adhyaasa which is of the form of 'anytaraamsa' is imposible.

"The same argument will tell us that the properties of an object cannot appear in another object since any property cannot give up its ground or locus.

"Thus there arises the impossibility of 'itaretara bhaava'. The subject is apprehended as asmat pratyaya gocara and is of the nature of consciousness. This is the 'anidamamsa' or the element of the not-this in the 'asmat pratyaya'. On this is supposed to take place the adhyaasa of the 'yus-medartha, (the this) which involves the attachment to the body etc. When the 'I' and the 'this' have the mutual interpenetration, there is supposed to arise a single datum which is called adhyaasa", That this is not possible, is the contention of the objector.

We refer to all the entities beginning with the ahamkaara (Ego) and ending with the body not as the 'this' but as the 'I'. How are these taken to be 'yusmat pratyaya gocara'? (aprehended as this).

The reply: Consciousness is 'asmat pratyaya gocara' Now ahamkaara etc are apprehended as almost identical with this consciousness, Due to this strength, and due to the fact that they are all illumined directly by consciousness they can not strictly be taken to be on a par with the other objects. Yet in so far as they are directly illumined by consciousness, They are in a sense objecto — objects for consciousness.

"Now in the 'vishayaadhyas' (super imposiation of the object) the properties of one object may be cognised as the properties of another. Yet even without any such 'vishyaa—
dhyaasa*, there can be only the adhyaasa of the properties. Eg deafness is a property of the ear, but is cognised as an attribute of the person. In the same way we can also have the adhyaasa that involves the properties of the subject.

"Now, if the subject is pure consciousness, how can it have properties and can there be the adhyaasa of these properties?"

‘Ananda’ (Bliss), ‘Vishayaanubhava’ (experience) and ‘nityatva’ (eternity) are the properties of consciousness. Even though they can not be separated there is nothing wrong in saying that the properties of consciousness also can be adhyaasta. These properties constitute the very nature of consciousness. Yet they appear as if they are many properties only in the ‘antah Karana Vṛtty Upaadhi’ (conditioned psychosis).

Adhyaasa requires a similarity between the two objects; and this similarity must be found in the case of the parts of the object. But when the self in concerned such an ‘avayava saadrisya’ (similarity of parts) cannot be found. So, when we speak of Kartritva for the self, we admit that it is due to the upaadhi called the ahankaara. Though this ‘bhrama’ (illusion) has such a cause in the upaadhi, it is a fact that the ‘sadrisya adhyaasa’ does not have an upadhi. For the adhyaasa of the body etc., there is no ‘sopadhika bhramatva’. As such it is impossible to say that the entities from ahankaara to the body are adhyaasta on the percipient. This impossibility has been accepted and recognised by Padmapaada.

Suppose, we know the smell of the ‘Ketaki gandha’ and we also know that the sarpa Gandha’ is similar to it.
When we smell the latter and when the other is absent, the argument from analogy would tell us that we are smelling only the 'sarpa gandha'. When we cognise yellow in the conch we try to find out a cause for this yellow, and we assume the reality of such a cause. In the same manner when there is the congnition of the effect of the 'nirupaadhika bhrama' (unconditioned illusion) we have to assume that this is due to something similar to it, or that there is a cause for it. That this is the procedure is given by Padmapaada.

"Adhaasa is the appearance of a form where that form is not. This is mithyaa. Mithyaa means that which conceals something, or that which is inexplicable. Here it is the former meaning intended. In reality there is no such adhyaasa. Yet it is naisargika (Naturals.)"

"Naisargika means that which is internally related to the 'Pratyak Caitanya Sattaa' alone. When the defects of Kartritva and bhoktritva are related to the self, then we have adhyaasa. To be an enjoyer, the self must be a doer, for one who is not a doer cannot enhoy the consequences of his actions. To be a doer, the self must have the 'samyo-gaadhyaasa' (relational) with love and hatred. One cannot be a doer if he does not have love and hatred. Once there is the contact of the self with such defects, it must necessarily become an enjoyer; for in the absence of such an enjoying, love and hatred would be inconsistent. In this manner the adhyaasa goes on endlessly and without a beginning; It is as beginningless and endless as the relation between the seed and the plant. As such adhyaasa is spoken of as being 'naisargika' or natural.
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“This natural adhyaasa is manifest in ‘lokavyavaha-rika’ as—I am this, this is nine etc. Just as we can not reject the existence of the I, so too we cannot reject the existence of adhyaasa.” ‘Lokavyavahaara’ takes the form of—‘I am a man’, ‘I am a human being’. Here in we are treating the I not as the self, but as something else.

Adhyaasa is said to be the appearance of an entity as having the nature of another. If so, the expression ‘white cloth’ ought to be a case of adhyaasa, since the white is predicated of the cloth. The remove such instances from the sphere of adhyaasa, it has been said that adhyaasa arises when there is the interpenetration or integration of the real and the unreal into a single entity. There should be the ‘samyoga’ of the real and the unreal. It is only such an integrated or synthetic single entity that can be taken to constitute avidyaa. With this in mind, Sankara has spoken of ‘satyanrita mithunikritya’. ”By styam is meant the consciousness which is the not-this; and by anrita is meant the this, since it is to ‘swaruupa’ itself that is adhyasta.”

**Objection**: ‘mithunikritya’ means having conjoined or united the two. This suffix—‘kritvaa’ inffies that the act conveyed by this verb is different from the act conveyed by another verb which alone can complete the sentence and the action. Further, prior to this ‘mithunikarana’, there must have been something etc. ‘As such how can you maintain that ‘adyaasa’, ‘mithunikarana’ and ‘lokavyavahara’ are all synonymous with one another?

**Reply**: ”This suffix—‘kritvaa’ does not reveal that something takes place after it; it does not show that it is distinct from ‘likavyavahaara.’ In ‘bhuktvaa vrajati’ also we have the same sfiux but two different verbs. On the
other hand in 'mithunil.ritya' we have only the suffix and not two different verbs. It does not simply or involve another verb. 'adhyasya' and 'lokavyavaharah' and this - 'ktriaa!, here only explains the same. We con not admit, of 'Kripabheda' (difference in verbs) because at the end sankara sums up by saying 'Evan ananto naisargik adhyaash' Thus the 'upakrama' (beginning) and the 'upasamhara' (conclusion). So to establish that this 'kritvaa' is not different from 'adhyaasa,' and from 'lokavyavahara.' Just as we say, 'Caitayam purushasya gunam' even though consciousness is not distinct from the purusa, so too is employed this '–kritvaa' suffix. It is only an 'Aupacaarika (conventional) usage, and it does not bring out any distiction of the succes-sive stages.

Fg. In itself there is only one adhyaasa where one object is apprehended as having the nature of another. Yet it appears as many and all these are called adhyaasas only through 'Upacaara.' They are not really different adhyaasas having specific differences. They only appear as 'aham', 'idam', 'mamedam'. This difference is between the upaadhis of these entities. The 'paurvaaparya' (succession) of these adhyaasas is determined only from our 'pratipatti or apprehension. Consequently, we can say that the suffix '–Kritvaa' has been employed by accepting the Kriyaa bheda'because of the 'Visessha bheda'.

"This adhyaasa is 'mithya'; mithyaa and anrrita are referred to here. Mithyaa conveys the meaning of inexpli-cability (anirvachanniyata), while ajhnana conveys the Avidya sakti which is of the nature of unconscious." Instead of 'mithyajnana', if Sankara had employed only 'ajnanam,'
it would mean only the absence of negation of knowledge. If he complied only the word 'mithyaa', it would mean erroneous knowledge (bhranti ajnanam). To exclude there are two meanings, Padmapada explains the two to mean that 'ajnana' which is also 'mithya', It means 'ajnana', which is not the absence of jnana, but is a positive existent entity. It is not a merely unreal or totally false entity; for it has some form of reality. Such an 'ajnana' is the material cause (upaadana) of entire adhyasa.

11. **Objection**: How is 'mithyajnana' the mete- rial cause (upadhana) of adhyasa?

**Reply**: It is through the method of agreement and difference that this is established. Adhyasa arises when there is a 'mithyajnana', and it ceases to be in the absence of the latter.

**Objection**: 'Adhyaasa' is dispelled by (is the con- tradictory of) 'tattvajnana. The absence of the latter is 'ajnana'. Thus the 'pratibandhaka abhava vishayata' is adyasa. And the method of agreement and difference does not prove anything.

**Reply**: 'Pratibandhaka' (obstaeles) actually means 'Utpatti virodhi', that which prevents a thing from coming into existence. When there is a sufficient cause, anything that prevents the emergence of the effect, is called 'pratibanda ndhaka.' When there is the sufficient cause called 'adhyasa', we do not become a ware of 'tattvajnana' as that which prevents the emergence of the effect and even if the sufficient cause called 'adhyasa,' were absent, we have the emergence or awakening of 'tattvajnana'? As such it is evidence that
the concomitant relation of 'ajnana' to 'adhyasa' does not apply in the case of 'pratibandhaka = bhava.'

**Objection:** 'Adhya-a' is not a 'Pratibandhaka' for the knowledge of truth ('tattva bodha'). Yet the former can be dispelled only by the latter; and as such the latter is the 'virodhi' (contradictory) of the former. One is the 'abhaava' 'negative) of the other. One totally excludes the other.

**Reply:** But given an 'effect' it demands the knowledge of its cause, and never its contradictory ('virodhi samsarga bhavaa'). The method of agreement and difference, then attempts at determining its cause alone at the outset, for the 'apekshita vidhana' and the anapekshita 'vidhana', the former is the stronger and has precedence.

**Objection:** Why can't we say that the 'vishaya-dosha', like similarity, the 'Kaacdi indriya dosa' attachment, to be the cause (Upadana) of 'Adhyasa'?

**Reply:** These 'dosas' (defects) constitute only the conditions and not the cause. If these 'dosas' were to be taken as the cause, we have to enquire the cause of this cause. In this process we will have to admit at some stage or other that 'ajnana' is the final cause. Everything that is an effect has a material cause since the effect is a 'Bhavakarya', as the pot which is an existence has its material cause in the clay. In the absence of a material cause, there can be no effect. The cause and the effect are in essence non-different. The effect comes into existence along with its 'gunas' (qualities) and 'Kriya', (activity). The substance with its 'grunas' and 'kriya' finds 'asraya' in its 'Upadana'
or Material cause; and the 'upadana' and the 'Upadeya' (effect) are not related to one another. This 'adhyasa must take as its 'upadana' something which is its 'asraya' and which has in essence the nature of the 'upadcyya.' Such an entity can be found only in 'ajnana'.

**Objection:** The 'bhrantijnanopadana' can be the self or the 'antah karana.' Instead of consider an unknown entity like 'ajnana' as the material cause, it is better to consider something known in this light.

**Reply:** The self which is beyond any change will have to undergo some change or other if it were taken to be the material cause. The self is 'niravayava' and hence unchanging.

Next we have to consider whether the 'antahkarana' can be the material cause. Since this is 'savayava' it can undergo some change or other. Does the 'antah karana' as the material cause imply its connection with the sense organs, or does it not? It cannot be the latter since the 'antah karana' being internal cannot come to cognise the objects that are outside. It cannot be the former too, since in the case of erroneous cognition the sense organ does not come into contact with an object like 'mithya rajata' which in reality does not exist. We have to admit that the 'antahkarana' alone cogness it; and this is impossible. 'Mithyanana' is 'anindriya janya' (not the out come of the senses) in general.

In the erroneous cognition there is the knowledge of the 'this' which is the 'adhisthana' (ground) and a specific knowledge of the 'what which does not fit into the 'this'. Without the general knowledge of the 'adhisthana' there is
no erroneous cognition. If the 'antahkarana' (inner organ) cognizes the 'this', it should be able to cognize the 'what' also. It cannot be taken to be the 'upadana.'

If knowledge is the 'parinama' (transformation) of 'antahkarana', we have to admit that the 'antahkarana' is not 'jada' (insentient). This is absurd for it is not by itself 'conscious' of anything; and as such it cannot know anything. Pure 'antahkarana' by itself cannot be the 'adhar' (substratum). We cannot refer error to 'antahkarana' and 'tattvajnana' to the self. Both error and truth must have the same 'asraya' (ground) and if error is 'antahkarana-asraya', the self has nothing to do with it. This would imply that the self has nothing to do even with bondage, removal of this bondage and the true knowledge. The self will have to be pure; and this is against the facts.

Neither the self nor the 'antahkarana' can be the 'Upadana' of adhyasa'. Hence 'mithyajnana' alone can be the 'upadana'. 'Adhyasa' is Mithyabhuta'; and it has 'mithyaarththa' and is 'mithyajnanaatamaka'; and the consideration of 'upadana kaarana. Such an 'upadana karana' cannot be found in 'Kaacadi nimitta kaaranam' (Physical defects of the age) which differ from individual to individual and from occasion to occasion. 'Adhyasa' cannot have its 'asraya' in any of the 'dosas'. Further, the 'dosas' are in a sense 'real', while 'adhyaasa' is not so real; and a real entity cannot be the cause of one that does not partake of its nature.

When the object is 'mithya' its appreciation too is 'mithya'.
This principle of ‘ajnana’ is in agreement with the nature of all effects; and it is present in all cases of erroneous cognition. This ‘ajnana’ has the ‘asraya’ (superimposed on the self). And anything that is apprenended by it partakes of its nature. As such the ‘upadana’ of ‘adhyasa’ can be only ‘mithyajnana’; it can be neither the self, nor the ‘antahkarana’, nor the ‘Kaacadi dosas’.

So far we have argued for the ‘atmasrayatva’ (self being the ground) of ‘jnanadhyasa’. How can we have the same ‘asraya’ for ‘arthaasraya’. For, in the cognition ‘this is siver’, we apprehend it as external, as lying outside the self. The silver that is cognised has the mother-of-peal as its ‘asraya’; and the latter, in so far as it is cognised is actually ‘idam amsaavacchinna caitanya’ (consciousness as conditioned by the ‘this’). That it is not really external will be explained later on.

Now with reference to ‘adhyasa’ we find Sankara observing ‘mithyajnana nimittah’ and “naisargiko ‘Yam loka Vyavaharah’”. It is both ‘naimittika’ or conditioned and ‘naisargika’ or natural or inherent. Padmapada asks how is the unconditioned taken to be the conditioned?

To this we have the reply that ‘adhyasa’ is ‘naisargika’ in so far as it is a cyclical process and is in essence identical with its material cause. It is ‘naisargika’ in the sense that it is like a ‘pravaha’ (process) where we can make out neither a beginning nor an end. It is said to be ‘naimittika’ since it appears in the manifestation of the effects or products. As such there is no difficulty here. To arrive at this conclusion Padmapaada proceeds to establish ‘bhaavaru-pam ajnaanam’ (positive character of nescience) in the self.
With this in view, Padmapaadā states that this (adhyāsa) necessarily ‘be accepted.’ Here he employs two words—(the adhyāsa) and ‘avasyam’ (necessarily). The first word refers to ‘Pratyaksha Pramaana’ (perceptual apprehension) and the second to ‘anumaana pramaana’ (inference). These two pramaanaas conclusively prove the positive nature of ‘ajnana’.

To begin with, perception. Take the expressions, ‘I am ignorant, ‘I do not know myself and other’. The first sentence makes the self the ‘asraya’ of ‘ajnana’. In both I have the immediate and direct apprehension of ‘ajnana’. They establish the positive existence of ‘ajnana’ and take the (the not-self) to be the object of ‘ajnana’. This is a fact of experience.

**Objection:** When I say ‘I am ignorant’ is it not an apprehension of the absence of ‘jnana’? Is not ‘ajnana’ the negative of ‘jnana’?

**Reply:** No. Just as in the statement ‘I am happy’ I have an immediate awareness of a positive content, so do I have in ‘I am ignorant’ This is a pure perceptual knowledge. This is not possible; ‘ajnana’ is the negation (‘abhava’) of ‘jnana’ for ‘abhava’ is cognised not by perception but by ‘anupalabdhi’.

Is ‘abhava’ cognised by perception? It is impossible to apprehend perceptually the absence of ‘vijnana in the self. So we experience ‘jnanabhava’ after experiencing the contradictory of the ground or without experiencing? Now in the statement ‘There is no knowledge in me’, we have an experience in which we have the apprehension of ‘dharmipratiyogi’ and ‘artha’ or a positive something. Here
is 'jnanasadhava' (being of knowledge) and as such it is impossible to have the direct apprehension of jnanabhava. And if the 'dharma' etc. is not apprehended, 'abhava' can never be cognised. 'Jnanabhava is experienced only when there is the 'dharmaadi pratipatti.' This apprehension is through 'anupalabdhi' a new means of cognition. 'Abhava' may also be said to be cognised through inference. In any manner whether 'jnanabhava' is apprehended in the self or not we cannot have 'jnanabhava pratipatti' in the self we cannot have 'jnanabhava pratipatti in the self' (apprehension of the absence of knowledge).

It is generally seen that there is a conation in the world after apprehending ajnana in the form of 'I do not know what you say'. Even when the objects are known, it is quite possible that the number may not be known and the 'sastrartha' too may not be known. Here we apprehend 'ajnana' which is 'visaya vyavritta' and then we proceed in our activities of listening etc. with reference to it.

Then 'arthajnana' and 'abhava' (its absence) do not have a simultaneity or co-existence. In the same manner we cannot have both the knowledge and the absence of the knowledge of the same object at the same time.

As against this view we hold that 'ajnana' is a positive entity and that it is perceptually apprehended. Its 'asraya' is the self and the 'praty yogi' (contradictory) of the self is 'ajnana'. We have said that 'jnanabhava' cannot co-exist with 'jñana' without violating the law of non-contradiction. Such a violation does not arise when we have the 'asraya praty yogijñana, for it can coexist with a (different positive quality).
Now the ‘sakshi caitanya’ (witnessing consciousness) ‘asraya’ pratiyogi jnana bhutam (having the knowledge of its contradictory). Yet it does not dispel ‘ajnana’ which is a different positive entity, or it makes the object of knowledge manifest. And it is a fact that the knowledge of something does not dispel that something.

**Objection:** The object ‘gives’ knowledge; and knowledge is the contradictory of ‘ajnana’. The object then is ‘ajnana’ vyavartaka (dispeller of ignorance). The object is determined by a ‘pramaana’; i.e., its validity or existence is determined or conditioned by a valid means of knowledge (Pramana). If so how is the object made manifest by ‘sakshi caitanya’. Does ‘sakshi caitanya’ make manifest ‘ajnana’ as qualified by the object? Or pure ‘ajnana’? It cannot be the former, for any object is apprehended though one of the pramanas only. It cannot be the latter since mere ‘ajnana’ is beyond apprehension.

**Reply:** We do not speak here of more and unqualified ‘sakshivedyatva’. It is always ‘visista saksi vedyatva’ (known as qualified witness-courciousness) that we recognise here. Ady object is an object of ‘sakshi caitanya’ either as known or as unknown. The object as known is apprehended by one of the ‘pramanas.’ The object as unknown is apprehended in a general or specific form as ‘ajnana’ vyavartka. One demands the ‘pramana vyavadhana (mediation by a means) while the other does not. In either way there is ‘ajnana pratyaksa’ (direct apprehension of nescience) and this ‘ajnana’ a positive entity which has the self as its ‘asraya’.

Now with the aid of inference the author proceeds to establish ‘bhava rupaajnana’ (positive character of ajnana).
An object that is in a dark room is not apprehended because it is not visible. The first rays of light coming from the candle illumine the object; and the object is distinct from the darkness that is dispelled by the rays of light. Likewise take an object which is at a fixed place and which exists for a certain period of time. Inference is to establish 'ajnana' as a positive entity. It is 'vasthvantara purvakam' distinct from the object cognised, distinct from the self. It is at the same place as the object but is not cognised by the sense-organs. It dispels itself as the object is apprehended; i.e., it is not 'adrsra'. The object that is not cognised stands as 'avrita' (concealed covered) just as the cognition sublates the prior conition, we cannot say that the cognition of the object dispels the ignorance that has enveloped it so far. It is 'svaprabhava vyatirikta' (other than its own prior-non-existence) or brought about by nothing outside of itself. Since there is nothing external to it, it itself is the 'avarana' (occupying, covering). And when the object is cognised that which is sublated is this 'avarana. The moment it is sublated, the object gets known; and this is possible only when the object and 'ajnana' are at the same place. And since it is not an erroneous cognition that results, it is said that it is 'vastav antara' or an object distinct from that which is known.

The 'hetu' (cause) for all this is the illumination of an object in a dark room by the first rays of light. It is said the raysh illumine the object which is so far unillumined. Cognition is 'dhara vahika' (continuous process). Here cognition is taken to be a continuous stream or span spread over successive moments. The cognition of the second moment does not destroy the knowledge of the first moment; and by the time we come to the second moment, the
object is already illumined and known. Hence it is said that the object is so far unillumined and that it is the ‘prathamotpanna prabha’ (emerging first ray of light) which is said to illumine the object.

Is ‘anatma jnana’ the dharmi? or the ‘atmajnana’? It cannot be the former since ‘ajnana’ is not ‘anatmavarka’ (concealing not we self). Nor can be accept the latter since it does not exclude anatmajnana as such – ‘Pratipannasy aatma jnanasy anatma jnanasya cadharmitvam’. It is the ground of the emerging knowledge of the self and that of the not–self. This would make ‘ghat adhyavacchinna caita-nyam’ the object of perception. That is, consciousness conditioned or delimited by the object, like the pot, is the object of perception. This is ‘ajnanavarakam’ (enveloped my nescence).

Thus is established the positive nature of ‘ajnana’ and with jnana it has ‘samanasrayavisaya’ (similar ground and consignment).

Padmapada speaks of ‘avidya sakti’. ‘Avidya itself is saktidattva’ (having potency). It is external to the self. And since it is capable of fulfilling the functions of the self which is ‘sarva kaaryaopadana’ (material cause of all activities) it is said that there is a ‘sakti’ of ‘avidya.’ The ‘sakti’ (potency) is not outside of ‘avidya’. It is inherent in ‘avidya’. And when we speak of a ‘sakti’ belonging to it, we should consider the expression to be purely metaphysical.

Padmapada says, “avidya saktir bahya dhyaatmikesu vastushu tat swarupa sattaa ................. This ‘avidya
sakti' is always attached only to the 'atma tattva satta' (the being of the self). When we cognise the objects which are outside the self or speak of the 'ahankara' whose 'asraya' is the self. We have avidya attached to the 'atmasatta' for the objects constituting the not-self, we have the self as the 'adhishthana'.

Then Padmapaadada proceeds to argue bringing in another pramana called 'artha patti ! In the absence of this 'avidyasakti' we cannot consistently and satisfactionly explain 'mittyartha' (illusory object) and 'tad avabhaasa' (its appearance). And in establishing the 'bhaavarupajnana' we have 'arthapatti' as another 'pramaana'.

Now 'ahankaara' is 'adhyasta' on pure Brahman as silver on the mother-of-pearl. Both the object and the knowledge of the object are cases of 'adhyasa': for knowledge presupposes the existence of an object. We have to find out the 'upadana' which also should be mithyaabhuta'. The material cause is real, the effect also ought to be real since the effect partakes of the nature of the cause; and in such a case the 'adhyasa' would have to be real. Has the 'upadana' a beginning? or no? The former would lead to a regress. No 'Pramana' can prove the latter. If the 'mithyopadana' has a beginning, its cause will be another 'mittyapadana' and this will land us to a regress. As such we have to assume that the 'mithyopadana' has no beginning. That which is beginningless, is itself 'mithya' and 'mithopadana' is no other than 'ajnana' which is 'atmasambandhi'. Hence 'mithyadhyasa' alone is 'jnanopadana'. Apart from this we can have nothing else.
Objection: 'Avidya vishayatva' (nescience as object) has been maintained for 'anatman' (not-self). Anything that manifests or reveals or brings its nature because of something else, is the object of the latter. Then how can there be an object for 'avidya'?

Reply: Due to 'ajnana' there arises an 'avarana' for the object (the anatman). Ajnana cannot be taken to be envaloping (the avarna of) the self, for it cannot hide it or illumine it. There is no 'pramana' to show that it envelops; and that it envelopes is inconsistent with its nature and function. Admiting that 'ajnana' is only 'vishayava, raka' (enveloping the object) how do we know that it exists? When we know that this is a blue pot, the 'avarna' has ceased to exist for the pot; and it is then impossible to know the 'avarana'. When we do not know that this is a blue pot, we cannot know the 'avarana'.

Objection: Since we apprehend the object now, we can assume that it was 'avrita' prior to this moment.

Reply: But in the case of 'dhaaravaahika jnana' we find that the object cognised in the second or third moment is also cognised in the first or the preceeding moment.

Objection: But in so far as it is known at this moment, is there not the non-apperhension prior to this moment?

Reply: No. first we have the cognition and we know that it is a blue pot. Here we do not become aware of our prior non-apprehension of the object. This awareness comes only later on.
Objection: But take the case of ‘pratyabhijna’. (recognition). An object has been cognised some time back and it is recognised now to be the same. In the intervening time we have to admit the non-apprehension of the object. Otherwise there ought to be this recognition even in the intervening time.

Reply: This does not establish non-apprehension (anavagati). In the case of the self which is ‘dhaaravahiaka jnana gamya’(apprehended by knowledge which is a process) we have a situation similar to that of pratyabhijna’. This ‘purvapara sambandha vishaya’ is found even in the case of self which is always ‘avagata (apprehended).

Objection: Through ‘arthapathi’ (implication)one can establish this ‘non-apprehension’. In the interval between the past cognition and the present recognition there is the absence of ‘jnanasmriti’. As such is not non-prrehension apprehended?

Reply: No. Even in apprehension there is no necessity of smriti.

Objection: However, ‘avarana’ is a fact of experience. How can it be rejected by reason?

Reply: The apprehension or otherwise of an object is determined by a ‘pramaana’. But the apprehension of non-apprehension is not determined by any ‘pramaana’? And this ‘anavagati’ along with the objects is ‘adhyasta’ on the ‘saaksin’. There is the ‘ajnaanadhyaass’ along with the objects on ‘saksicaitanya’ and this explains the experience.

That which is ‘adhyasta’ has no ‘savarana’. But the object cannot be apprehended if the ‘savarana’ is not des-
troyed and as such the 'avarana bhanga' (destruction of the enveloping) must be stated. Is the 'avarana bhanga' accomplished by a 'pramana' or by 'sakhin?' It cannot be the former for in the perception of two moons there is no 'pramaanagamayatva'. Nor can it be the latter since the, 'avarana' arises as dependent on the 'saakhsin'.

Hence there is no pramaana which can make us say that there is 'ajnaanavarana' for the not-self. The not-self is essentially dependent and is 'prakaasahina' (non-illuminant); and no purpose is served by an 'avarana' for the non-conscious not self. And since the not-self as object does not get any 'atisaya', from 'ajnana', it cannot be 'agnanavishaya'. Padmapada, therefore, observes, that the Avidya Sakti does not prevent the 'svarupavabhaasa' of the non-conscious objects'. The 'svarupa' (nature) of the not-self is 'ajnanatmaka'. Since the not self is 'acidrupa' there is no possibility of any 'prakaasa'; and hence it does not prevent the 'svarupavabhasa' (appearance of its form).

But, then, how do you maintain 'anatmavishayatwam'? The reply is that though 'ajnana' is not 'visayavaraka' (enveloping the object), get is has a 'vikshepa sakti' (power of revealing plurality). Because of 'vikshepa' we can maintain 'anatma vishayatman'. It is 'rupantaravebhasa hetuh' (cause for the appearance of another form). This will be explained later on.

If the not-self has 'avirita svarupa' (form of being enveloped), we have to say that it is now 'ajnata' 'unkown'; since this is absurd we should say the 'ajnatatva' is due to some other reason. But this is faulty. "Anatma visaya-
ntah karana parinaamaa’ nudyalaksana vaikalyaat” (it is due to the non-emergence of the modification of the psychosis having the not-self as the object.

We can interpret Padmapada’s statement ‘pramaana vaikalyadeva’ differently thus. Even though the not-self it not by itself luminous, it might become luminous since is has the contact with ‘caitanya prakaasa’ (self luminous consciousness). Then the not-self will be like the real and it will have ‘nityatva prakasa’ (eternally luminous). Then ‘aajnana’ is required to function as the ‘avarana’ of this not-self. To avoid this conclusion, Padmapada has to give that statement by way of reply. ‘caitanya’ is ‘nitya’; and it is the ‘saadhana’ (means of establishing) for the not-self. Since it is the ‘anavirta caitanya’ (unenveloped consciousness) which is the ‘vishaya saadhaka’, the object cannot be apprehended only when the ‘caitanya’ is enveloped by ‘aajnana’

Hence there is no necessity to assume another ‘avarana for the not-self. This is given by Padmapada in the next sentence ‘rajatapratibhasad’ (from the appearance of silver).

If the ‘aajnana’ which is ‘atmaasraya’ (grounded in the self) were to be ‘anatmavarana’, then a curious result would follow. Unless the ‘avarana’ is destroyed, the object, cannot be apprehended; and when there is the knowledge of the object, then the ‘aajnana’ which is in the self ought to disappear completely. This is contrary to experience. As such there is ‘avidya’ in the self. Then in all the three periods (before ‘rajata bhasa’, during ‘rajata bhasa’ and after ‘rajata bhasa’) we have the ‘vishaya svarupa pratibhasa’ (appearance of the form of the object). And this means that ajnana, cannot have ‘anatmavarana’.
**Objection**: ‘Ajnana’ need not be one only. There is ‘ajnana’ with reference to ‘shukti’ (mother of pearl) and it is dispelled by ‘sukti jnaana’, There is another ‘ajnaana’ which we apprehend with reference to the self. This is distinct from the previous one.

**Reply**: No. To establish ‘bhavarupaajnaana’ as existing distinctly in every object apart from the ‘ajnana’ which is ‘atmaasraya’ and ‘atmavishaya’, we have no ‘pramaana’. The object is not apprehended precisely because there does not arise any ‘vritti’ (psychosis) and because there is ‘caita-nyavarana’ (enveloping consciousness).

Further ‘ajnana’ is ‘atisayaantarajaaaka’ (causing a different mark) with reference to the object; and hence it is proper to speak of ‘ajnana vishayatva’ for the object. In maintaining ‘anatmavishayam ajnanam’, Padmapada states ‘rupantaravabhasa hetur kevaellam’ (merely). ‘Avdiya causes the object to appear in a form other than its own.

**Objection**: This too is inconsistent and impossible when we have the knowledge of ‘shukti’ we find that silver which is its ‘rupantara’) is dispelled along with the ‘ajnana’ which is the ‘upadana’ of the form of silver. Now when the ‘agnanadhyasa’ is dispelled by the knowledge of ‘shukii’, how is it that we still have the ajnana in the self? Hence we have to admit that there is a different ‘ajnana’ for every different object. And if many ‘ajnansam’ cannot be accepted, we cannot have ‘agnana’ as the ‘upadana’ of ‘adhayasa’. But we cannot have a ‘satyaopadana’ (real cause) for a ‘mityabhuta vishaya’, (an erroneous datum). Then we may have to admit that ‘adhyasa nirtti’ is possible if there is no ‘upadana nivritti’.
Reply: When the pot is destroyed we speak of the pot as having its 'pravilaya' (involution) in its own 'karana' (cause). In the same way, when we have the knowledge of 'shuktī', the 'rajatadhyasa' too has 'svakarana pravilaya' (dissolved into its own cause).

We can argue that there is a 'mitijnana' (primal nescience) which has a different 'avastha' (status). These 'avasthas' are the 'upadanas' for the cognitions of silver etc. These 'avasthas' or 'upadanas' are dispelled along with 'adhyasa' and the knowledge of 'shuktī' etc.

Objection: But in ordinary experience; we do not apprehend the 'nivṛtti' (sublation) of 'adhyasa' along with 'ajnana' though 'tattvajnana' going against this experience how can we say that 'adhyasa' along with 'ajnana' can be dispelled by the knowledge of Brahman?

Reply: But 'jnana' dispels that which is not 'jnana' and this is a fact of experience. 'Ajnana' being the contradictory of 'jnana' it is capable of being dispelled by the latter. 'Agrahana' (non-cognition), 'mitthya jnana' and the like are tattvavabhasa virodhinah. (contradictories of the appearance of the real). That they are dispelled by 'tattvajnana' is a fact of experience. In the same way when we say that 'bhavarupainana' is the contradictory (virodhi) of 'tattva-vaaabhasa', it is but proper to say that Brahmajnana can dispel that 'ajnana'.

With reference to 'avarana' we have said earlier that if it were for the object, it cannot be known. Such a defect does not arise here in the case of this 'vikshepa', for it is through 'bhranti jnana' that we apprehend 'vishaya vyavritta rupantara' (a different form which is other than that of the object).
Objection: Then even for the self there need not be 'ajnana nimittam avarana krityam'. (caused by nescience). An 'avaran' hides or conceals 'prakasa'. But the 'svarupa' of the self cannot be so hidden. Nor can there by any 'karya pratibandha' nor this 'pratikri'. There is neither a pratibandha nor a 'pratikriya' for jnana which is 'visayavabhasatmana udita' (arising just in the appearance of the object). And since no useful purpose is served by this 'bhavarupajnana', it does not exists even in the self.

Reply: To this Padmapada replies: 'Pratyagatman' is of the nature of consciousness and it is 'svayam prakasa' (self-luminous). Brahmaavarupa cannot be for any reason or factor outside of Brahma; we have to admit that this 'anavabhasa' is due only to the 'pratibandha' (obstacles) of the 'avidhya sakti' which is 'tadgata nisarga siddha' arising naturally from is ground).

Now, on the one hand there is the sufficient cause for the 'avabhasa' of Brahma, for it exists and is luminous. And yet, on the other hand, there is the 'atma tattvalambana vyavaharah' (activity depending on the self) in the form that it does not exist and that it is not luminous. Its nature is one thing and the way it is apprehended is a different thing. This difference can not be explained unless we assume an 'avaran' in the form of 'ajnana', as a positive entity. When there is the presences of the sufficient cause and the absence of 'avaran', the pot which is near by is apprehended as existing. Hence empirical statements like 'Brahman is not' and 'Brahman is not luminous' go to imply through rthapatatti' (implication) only that 'ajnana' which
is ‘bhavarupa’. In this way ‘arthapatti’ or ‘anumana’ go to establish this ‘ajnana.’

And with reference to the empirical statement like the self is luminous ‘Padmapada’ proceeds to show that the self is the sufficient cause; ‘Pratyagatman’ is of this nature of consciousness; and yet there is the ‘brahmasvarupa anavadha’ (non-appearance of the being of Brahman) for we have such expressions as ‘nasti’ (is not) and ‘naprakasate’ (does not appear).

This consciousness is the ‘adhisthana’ and the form in which it is apprehended is its ‘karya’ (product or effect). It is only what there is a ‘Pratibandha for this ‘adhisthana’ that we apprehend its ‘Karya’, as other than itself. And since the ‘avarana’ has ‘avidyasambahdha’, it is quite probable that the former has ‘anirupitakarata’ (indeterminate form).

**Objection**: Even though it is ‘svayam prakasam’, there is non-apprehension in the case of ‘purusanatara samvedana’ (apprehension of another person). Why can’t we accept the same ‘agrahana’ here too?

**Reply**: No, In the case of apprehending another person that person is an other. Because of this otherness, we can speak of ‘agrahana’ there. But Brahma is not other, but pratyak (immediate experience). Consequently a cause other than ‘ajnana’ can not be found here. For the ‘anavadha’ of Brahman there is sufficient cause in the form of ‘ajnana’ which functions as the ‘pratibandha’ of the self and which is ‘tadgata naisargika siddha avidya sakti’. Since Brahman is ‘pratyaksvarupa’ (the form of one’s self)
substance (murtadravya) can be its 'vyavadhayaka'. Hence 'ajnana' arises from the preception of 'Karya'. It makes the object appear as something else. That it, the avarana krtya is to alter (viparyaya) the object and its apprehension by the self. And we have to assume because of anyathanu- 'papatti', the existence of 'bhavarupajnana' which is the cause of the 'mithyavastu' and the 'mitthijna' alike.

Objection: We do not find 'ajnana' as an entity distinct from 'agrahana', 'mithyajnana' or its 'samskara'. Even though the 'svarupa' of Brahma is self-luminous, these three alone are capable of preventing its 'avabhasa' for the self.

Reply: No, says, Padmapada.' This 'ajnana' remains as 'ahankaradi viksepa samskara mtrae' in deep sleep. And when we get up, due to this 'samskara', it again springs up.'

Even in deep sleep the 'avidyasakti' remains merely as a 'samskara'. We cannot say that the 'samskaras' alone are 'ajnana'. In the apprehension of another, the precipient is different from being perceived there; and in deep sleep, then, the other is not apprehended. In the same way we cannot say that in deep sleep there is the 'anavabhasa' of Brahmaswarupa which is 'svayamprakasa', because we are told of the identity of the percipient with pceived Brahma (in the srutis).

It is not 'mithyajnana' which prevents us, for in deep sleep there is no 'mithyajnana.'

Nor can we say that the 'bhrami' (illusion) arises from the fact that 'samskaras' of this 'mithyajnana' prevent
the ‘avabhasa’. For it is not a rule that the ‘samskaras’ prevent the ‘tattvavabhasa’. Even when there are the ‘samskaras’ in the form of ‘rajata bhrama’, we have the apprehension of ‘sukti’.

Nor can ‘agrahana’ prevent the ‘avabhasa’. ‘Svarupa grahana’ is always there. When the ‘samvedana’ is self-luminous the ‘visaya kadacitka agrahana’ (non-apprehension of the object) cannot prevent it.

Even the ‘Karanas’ or actions are not opposed to ‘svarupaavabhasa’. If the ‘kaarnas’ are its ‘virodhis’, then ‘caitanya’ should cease to be luminous (prakasa) always.

**Objection**: Don’t we get the same conclusion even if we admit ‘ajnana’ as preventing the avabhasa?

**Reply**: No. ‘Ajnana’ has its ‘asraya’ in consciousness. It is not offered to consciousness. It is not a ‘pratibandhaka’, for’svavishaya caityanyakavahasa’ (the apprearence of its object).

‘Aiiana’ is ‘saksi caityanyakavahasaya’ (illumined or manifested by the witness consciousness). Karanas are not so, since their ‘avabhasyatva is due to the ‘pramanas’ If, on the other hand the karanas too are ‘cidbhasya’ (mainfested by consciousness), then the ‘saksi caitanya’ will have to be always luminous and fire. That the karauas are the ‘virodhis’ for the ‘avabhasa’ of their own ‘asraya’ cannot be established by any ‘pramana’. The ‘bhranti samskara’ does not prevent the ‘sukti bodha’; likewise the karanas which are ‘samskara rupas’ cannot prevent the ‘avabhasa’ of ‘Brahmasvarupa’. Hence we have to admit that the ‘svaru-
panavahasa (non-manifestation of the form) in deep sleep is not due to ‘agrahana’, ‘mithyajnana’, ‘samskara’, or ‘karana’. But it is due to ‘ajnana’, which is different from these and which alone can prevent the ‘avabhasa’ of Brahman.

**Objection:** Then why should you assume ‘ajnana’ as ‘pratibandhaka’? Why should you not assume a different substance altogether?

**Reply:** No. only when the ‘pratibandha’ is dispelled by the knowledge of Brahman, can we have the ‘svavisaya-vabhasa’. And jnana can dispel only that which is not jnana. Such an entity is only ‘ajnana’.

**Objection:** Here arises an objection from the standpoint of Bhedabhedavada. There is no ‘ajnana’ which is distinct from ‘agrahana’, ‘mithyajnana’, and ‘tatsamskara’, and which is the primal cause of the whole ‘samsara’, which continues to remain undestroyed in ‘jagrat’, ‘svapna’ and ‘sushupti’, and which remains till the ‘samsara ceases. It is only ‘bhranti jnana’ which can be called ‘ajnana’.

But what is ‘Bhranti’? It is only the ‘atmanubhuti’, (awareness of the self) in the not-self which is from ‘ahan-kara to the body.

But this is against the tenets of the Bhedabheda school. In ‘Khanhndlgant’ they maintain its ‘abheda’ (non-difference) with the other cows because of ‘gotva’ (cowness) and its ‘Bheda’ (difference) with them because of ‘Khandatva’. In the same way, why should we not take ‘ahammanushyah’, (I am a man) also as a case of bhedabheda? In ‘aham
amsa', there is 'bhedā' with Brahman, and in the 'manusya-amsa' there is 'abheda'. We cannot say that there is the apprehension 'I am not a manusya, but Brahman.' For, even in a statement like 'nayam khando gauh, kintu mundogauh' (this cow is not khand) both the Khanada' and 'munda' agree in 'gotva' and as such are identical. Likewise when I think of myself as being a man, the self is identical with the body and when I take myself to be Brahman, the self is identical with Brahman.

It cannot be said that 'aham manushyah' is a case of 'bhranti' as in 'this is silver'. For even in 'Khando gauh too we will have to admit the same 'bhranti'?

But in 'nayam khandogauh, kintu mundah', we find that 'khandatva' is negated in 'mundogauh'. The 'gotvopadhi' (cowness as delimitedy it) is there. And there is no putting an end to 'vyavahara' to the latter. As such it might be argued that this is not a case of 'bhranti'. To this we can reply that the same holds good even in 'aham manushya'. In the state of liberation there is 'sarvatmatva' and in this state the whole 'vyavatara' (activity) based on the love of and attachment to the body and sense organs ceases to exist.

And when there is 'vyavahara uccheda' (distracted activity) we have an erroneous cognition.

To this the bhedabheda vadin might say that we may not be able to define exactly what bhadabheda is. But the relationships that subsist between the universal and the particular, quality and substance, effect and cause, 'visista' and 'svarupa', 'amsa' and 'amsi' (part and whole)—these are all cases of behda bheda. Such a relationship does not exist between the body and the self.
But we have to ask how ‘sarirasaririsambandha’ (body-soul relationship) differs from ‘gunagunyadisambandha’ (quality and substance relation). All these are identical relationships. It is meaningless not to extend that relationship here. Since ‘brahmatva’ is admitted to the ‘cetana svarupamsa’, we have to say that there is a causal relation between the ‘cetana svarupa’ and the body. Hence there is no ‘bhranti’ in this school of Bhedabheda.

Further, if ‘Bhranti jnana’ is ‘antahkarana parinama’, then ‘vidya’, cannot be ‘atmasraya’ (self as ground); if it be said that the ‘antahkarana parimana’ (evolution of the inner organ) itself is ‘atmani adhyasta’ (grounded in the self). Then there cannot be any ‘atmavidyasambhanda’, for in the ‘anyathakhyati’ theory there is no relation between the real object and the ‘mithya object.

Bhranti cannot be even ‘atmaparimama’ since the self is ‘aparinami’ (changeless).

Accordings to this school jnana is only a property of the self. We cannot say whose property is jnana, which will undergo a change (parinama) in the form of another ‘jnana guna’. Now the clay which is the ‘aadhara’ (basis) for the pot, cannot be the ‘adhara’ for some other object. Like wise the self which is the ‘asraya’ for knowledge, cannot be the ‘asraya’ of another knowledge. Two distinct properties that differ in their nature cannot have the same identical ‘asraya’.

This ‘sarva sankara vadin’ (theory that mixes up all kinds of views) does not accept the ‘mithyajnana’ which is ‘anadisiddha’ (beginningless) and as such there can not be any ‘samskara’ of this ‘mithyajnana’. He cannot have
‘avidya’. Even though there is the relationship of the self to the ‘mithyajñana’ which is ‘anadi’, yet it is only a temporary relationship like ‘ajñana’. Just like ‘ajñana’ this can be dispelled by true knowledge. ‘Ajñana’ is related to the self like the colour blue to the sky. As such it does not put an end to the ‘kutastha’ (integrality) of the self.

Thus far we have shown that perception, inference and ‘arthapatti’ are the valid means of knowledge that establish ‘ajñana’ as a positive and beginningless entity. Such an ‘ajñana’ is both ‘naimittika’ and ‘naisargika’. It is manifest both as the cause and as the effect.

Padmapada says that the aham (I) is the first adhyása. How is this possible? The self is essentially pure consciousness itself. It is devoid of parts and is ‘anandaikara’ (of the form of Bliss alone). Ajñana etc. are made possible by this consciousness which is the ‘saksin’. They are ‘sak-sibhasya’. This ‘ajñana’ is the ‘upadana’ for adhyása itself. As such this ‘ajñana-adhyása’ is anadisiddhi; yet Padmapada takes up a temporary case of adhyása and says that “the I is the first adhyása”.

**Objection**: Just as in the adhyása of this is silver we have two entities (Viz. This and silver), similarly if ‘aham is a case of adhyása, we require two entities; and hence it is apprehended as pure consciousness which is ‘nir-amsi’ (partless); we do not find any other ‘amsa’ which is ‘adhyasta’ or ‘anadhyasta’

**Reply**: The reply will be given later on.
Objection: Padmapada speaks next of 'sariradhysa'. This is impossible since the body is like the 'ahamkara' ego in being unconscious (jada). We do not apprehend the 'antahkarana' and the sense-organs as having an existence apart from the self. We even take them to be practically identical with the self—i.e., we cognise them as 'adhyasta' on the self. And when there is the 'atmatattvavabodha' their very 'svarupa' is lost in the nature of the self. So let it be accepted that they are adhyasta on the self in their own form and also as 'samsrsta' (fused) with the self. As regards the body, however, it is apprehended by the sense-organs as the 'this', and, therefore, not 'kevalasaskvedya.' Even when the soul leaves the body we find the body to be distinct from the soul and the body has its 'laya' (dissolution) in the elements. Hence it is not adhyasta. By the 'this' we apprehend the 'karya karana sanghata' (causal complex) which is the 'bhogasadhana' (means of experience) of the 'ahankarta' (agent). That which is said to be mine is distinct from the body and it can not at all be adhyasta on the self. Hence we cannot take the 'this' and the 'mine' to be cases of adhyasa.

Reply: The 'sariradi padrthasvarupa' (body and sense organs) is the object of the self; and the self is taken as 'samyukta' (combined) with the doer or karta(doner) bhokta (enjoyer) and pramata (knawer) and these distinctions are 'mithya kalpita'. For such a self there is the body considered as the karya(effect) bhogya (enjoyed), prameya(object), and dvesya (hated) and the body is created only for these purposes. That such a body is in itself and by itself mithya can be inferred from 'svapna drstanta' (example from dream). So Padmapada rites—'When the 'ahankarta is adhyasatmaka, the upakarana' (means) too get the same

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nature. When I dream myself to be the crowned king or when the magician creates a crowned king, the ‘rajyopakarana’ (kingship) does not become real. Thus the ‘yaikvovahara’ (normal activity) which is ‘ahamkartrtva pramukha’ (based on I as doer) and which is ‘kriya karaka phalatmaka (result-oriented) is adhyasta on the self whose nature is eternal and pure and partakes of the ought and freedom. Hence in order to have the atmanubhava (self-realization) of such a Brahman we should have knowledge which dispels the adhyasa; for adhyasa is the cause of all this ‘avartha’ (evil error). As such the vedanta Mimansa is begun with this ends in view.

The appearance of the drisya (external) is the avidya adhyasa on the perceiving self. Only when this is accepted we can have the subject matter and purpose of this sastra. This sastra would explain how the ‘brahmatmanubhava’ and the ‘bandha nivrtti’ (cessation of bondage) are possible. When the ‘visaya’ and the ‘prayojana’ are established we arrive at the ‘sastra-rambha kartavyata’ (activity of beginning the study of this system of philosophy).

‘From ‘ko’ yam adhyasarama (what is this adhyasa?) we have the commentary that establishes ‘adhyasa’. In till the beginning of ‘Katham punar avidyavad visayani’ (How are these the objects like nescience?) We have adhyasa svarupa and adhyasa sambhavana (possibility of adhyasa). From that sentence we have determining the positive character of adhyasa. If this is the division there is no need to give adhyasa svarupa and its sambhavana separately; for if the svarupa of an entity is not known and if it is ‘asambhavyamana’ (cannot be imagined as possible) you
cannot have its 'nirnaya'. 'Niraya' already presupposes its definition or nature and its possibility. In the absence of these two, the 'nirnaya' will become all the more difficult of obtaining specially as regards the adhyaksanubhava nirnaya.'

It is the pramana itself which is the object. The object here is 'adhyasa' which is defined as 'anyasyanyamana avabhasah' (one appearing on having the nature of another). Only after 'atma sakshatkara everything becomes 'asambhavita'; till then everything must be 'sambhavita' (possible). The pramana in establishing adhyasa also establishes that adhyasa has a conceivable form having its own place, time and upadhi and that it has also its specific and unique form. Then why should there be a separate discussion on the definition and possibility of adhyasa?

But inference and other pramanas give us the valid cognition of an object. Later on we enquire about the nature and possibility of that object. This is generally the case. Why can’t we say that the same is the case with adhyasa also?

To this the objector replies that it is very difficult to have such a later enquiry which can specify it and distinguish it as unique.

Reply: That the arceiving self is apprehended as having the nature of the perceived, is found. This much of pramana is given later on.

Further, Avidya is that which is dispelled by knowledge; bhranti has only 'Pratibhasa matra sarira' (having only the form of appearance). Adhyasa involves the unity of
the real with the false; and mithya is ‘sad asad vilakshana (other than the true and the untrue). In view of these distinctions, "it is not possible to establish" the ‘adhyasatmakata’ for those having the ‘aham mamabhimana’ regarding the body and senseorgans, by merely presenting the pramatrtra’.

**Objection:** The definition given is the appearance of an object as having the nature of another. Since two objects are taken as one object here, why can’t we say that ‘mithyatva’ is established?

**Reply:** It is not through experience alone that we can establish it. ‘In the world there is no experience of adhyasa like that of the ‘suktirajata’ or like that of the two moons.’

**Objection:** When there is the pramana, how can you say that there is no such experience?

**Reply:** Suktirajata etc. are taken to be experiences of adhyasa only when they are negated. If there is something that cannot be sublated, then it is not a case of adhyasa. The self is such an entity. But to show that there is the appearance of the not-self superimposed on the self, we have pramanas like perception, inference, arthapatti (implication) and agama (verbal testimony).

**Objection:** The erroneous cognition is sublated when freed from the adhyasta. This discrimination is the cause of the sublation. In the absence of such a discrimination we cannot know that the cognition was a case of one object appearing as having the nature of another. If there
is no discrimination. the cognition will be that of an object appearing as having its own nature. So where is adhyasa? It presupposes discrimination and discrimination is applied to adhyasa.

Reply: "The sublation is not found here" Logical reasoning gives us a mediated knowledge of discrimination. To establish the 'parasparatmatavabhasa' (appearance of one in another) we should depend on discrimination. The immediate sublation is that which puts an end to the 'bhra- nti pratibhasa'. But since there is nothing that puts an end to the erroneous cognition, the experience of mithyatva is not clear.

The erroneous cognition which is immediate can be sublated by that cognition which also should be immediate. And in the absence of the sublation, you cannot establish the mithyatva of the cognition. But to have the 'badhaka pratyaya' it is not enough to know only the pramana. You should know the nature and definition of mithyatva; and this knowledge will tell us how and when it can be sublated. "Hence the definition of adhyasa should be given first; and then the possibility of adhyasa in all cases to which this definition applies, should be established".

Objection: In such a case you can establish adhyasa clearly by presenting only the definition and the pramana. And the pramana will conclusively establish its possibility and dispel all doubts regarding the possibility. As such one need not speak of 'adhyasa sambhavana'?

"When the possibility of adhyasa is established or apprehended from the pramanas, no doubt can arise regarding
this very possibility. And as such nothing need be told again on the question of possibility."

**Reply:** Even though the pramanas have the capacity to establish it still we do have experiences where we reject as impossible that which is directly and immediately apprehended. We have the direct experience of the sukti and this has no conceivable cause. We have also the direct experience of the things produced by the magician. Yet we reject these as impossible because of the pramanas which aid us in drawing our conclusion.

**Objection:** Sometimes the pramanas make us accept the impossible as real as in the movements of the bird in the sky; at times they make us reject even an immediately apprehended object as impossible to be there. Now when you say that there is the appearance of the not-self in the self, which of the above two alternatives does it fail? Since it is something impossible, you can't say that adhyasa is quite possible.

Now the self is not an object, but the subject. The ground and the consequent must be there to give rise to a simple knowledge. In the absence of a ground, you cannot have adhyasa. As such we should note that the self is not an object. The entire 'Karya karana sanghata' (causal series) which is distinct from the percipient is to be explained as having the nature of adhyasa; and this requires 'kacadidosas' in the percipient. But the self is free from such defects and is non-relational (asanga). Further there must be a similarity between the avayava (parts) of the ground and those of the consequent. But the self is free from all attri-
butes and avayavas. Moreover, when the ground appears as in itself it really is, adhyasa ceases; and if the ground is always luminous there is no possibility of adhyasa. The self being "niskalanka caitanya" (spotless consciousness), it is capable of dispelling all adhyasa. In such a case we are not able to imagine any possible defect or cause that can give rise to this vibhrama (illusion)".

Further, if we do no apprehend or understand the self as the subject, we can't have any "asambhavana buddhi", (awareness of an impossibility). and if we do understand it to be the subject, there does not remain any adhyasa.

**Reply**: The self is the subject; and the 'asambhavana buddhi' arises from the 'paroksha avabhasa' (appearances as external). Only when there is the immediate apprehension, adhyasa is dispelled. As such "not only should adhyasa be defined, but its possibility too should be established." So Samkara proceeds to give the definition, sambhavana, and pramana of adhyasa in a regular sequence.

**Adhyasa Laksana** (Definition of Adhyasa).

The question is - 'Ko' Yam)adhyaso nama" (What is adhyasa ?)The word koyam'(What, refers both to a question and to a doubt; and both are found here, The word is employed with two meanings at the same time. These meanings respectively refer to definition and 'sambhavana' (possibility). But it is only the former that it first taken up because to dispel the doubt regarding its possibility we should first have a working definition on which the question of doubt can be raised.

The definition is to define 'adhyasa'; and the word to be defined is not found in the definition given. So we,
have to interpret this definition as that of adhyasa, because the question begs its definition.

**Objection**: Adhyasa is later on stated to be the appearance of one (parasya) having the nature of another (Paratra). Then how is it that in the definition we have only one word ‘paratra’. How can it complete the definition?

**Reply**: “The word’ paratra (elsewhere) implies necessarily ‘parasya a avabhasamanata’. This word ‘paratra’ is qualified by the adjective ‘smrti rupah’ (having a form similar to that of memory). Smrti or memory is that which is remembered.

**Objection**: The suffix ‘ghai’ is explored only in ‘bhavartha’. But you are explaining the ‘ghai’ in the word ‘smurti’ to refer to an object(Karma) and not to ‘bhava’(being).

**Reply**: “Panini’s” aphorism ‘asamjnayam apy’ states plainly that for all the Karakas (declensions) save those of the nominative case, we can have the ‘ghai’ both in ‘sanjna’ and in ‘asanjna’?

**Objection**: If ‘smrti’ is that which is remembered? why is there also the word ‘rupa’ attached to ‘smrti’?

**Reply**: It is intended for comparing that which is remembered with that which is not remembered. “So ‘smrti rupah’ means the former similar to the form of that which is remembered”.

A khyativadin (Prabhakara Mimamsa): What is this comparison? This silver is only the remembered silver.
Reply: No, it is not merely the remembered one.

Objection: But since the cye etc. cannot have a contact with such an unreal silver, by a process of elimination we may say that it is the remembered silver.

Reply: No. It cannot be the remembered silver since "it appears or it is cognised, as being immediately" before us”.

In non-erroneous cognition we have the experience like 'this is silver' and 'this is a pot'. In such cases the 'this' is cognised as 'silver' or as 'pot'. The 'this' is taken to be necessarily the 'silver' or 'pot'. The 'this' and the 'what' are apprehended as 'samsrśhta' (fused) There are not two entities cognised as two, but as one. The cognition is immediate and direct. Likewise in the erroneous cognition we have the immediate apprehension of the 'this' and the 'what' as 'samsrśhta'. The 'what' is not the remembered content but the perceived content.

It might be argued that the 'this' is immediately cognised; and that due to non-discrimination the 'what' too is taken to be immediately cognised. As such there is no 'samsarga samvid' (unified awareness).

But is it the 'samsarga samvid' rejected because this cognition is sublated later on? or because there is no silver in the erroneous cognition? The former (Pratibhasa vailakṣanya) is impossible since the apprehension of the real silver involves as much 'samsarga' of the 'this' and the 'what' as that of the erroneous silver. In the actual moment of apprehension there is no difference and we cannot deny the 'samsarga samvid'. It cannot be the latter.
How can there be an immediate apprehension in the absence of the object? The ‘artha satta niscaya’ (determining the being of the object) is dependent upon samvid avabhasa’ (appearance of awareness). It is not the object which makes apprehension possible; but it is the apprehension which makes the knowledge of the object possible. If the ‘samvit sattaniscaya’ (the being of consciousness) were to be dependent on the ‘artha satta niscaya’, we have to find out another ‘niscaya’ on which does depend the ‘artha satta niscaya’. To avoid this regress we have to assume ontological and logical priority of ‘samvit satta’ (being or reality of consciousness).

**Objection**: But there is a later apprehension (samvedana) that ‘this is no silver’? Does not this determine the absence of the object even during the erroneous cognition?

**Reply**: But prior to this sublation there was an apprehension (samvedana) which proves the existence of that object which is sublated later. In the later cognition we have ‘this is no silver’. The silver which is the this is negated. It is not mere silver that it negated but the silver which is ‘samsrishta’ (fused) with the ‘this’.

**Objection**: In the prior cognition we have the apprehensions of ‘this’, ‘silver’, and the ‘abhava’ of this silver. These are not distinguished likewise; can’t we say that in the later cognition too these are not distinguished and as such there is only ‘samsarga samvid abhava’? (negation of the fused awareness). Since there is ‘vyavahara sambhava jnana’ (knowledge which is in agreement with activity) in the later cognition, we can say that then alone there is the samsarga’ between the ‘this’ and the ‘silver’.
Reply: This would mean that 'artha samvit sadbhava niscaya' is due to the knowledge of its utility. Though the Prabhakara Mimamsaka admits' samvit Pratyaksatva' (immediacy of consciousness) here he argues that 'samirt' is known through something else. It is no longer immediate. This is contrary to their fundamental principals. Even if we admit that the knowledge of its utility, determines the 'artha samvitsadbhava', the reality of the former is known again through another apprehension. In this way the argument will involve both the regress and the vicious circle.

There is an objection from one of the followers of the (advaita) siddhanta' to the effect that we too maintain the absence of the object. For we are negating it later on. But its there the absence of the object during the 'pratibhasa samya'? (moment of appearance) or later on? It can not be the former, for the silver is apprehended as existing then. In the later cognition we are rejecting the 'mithyarajata': unless it existed earlier, we can not negate it later. (This is closer to the view of Bhamati).

There is real silver in the world outside; and since it is not this silver which is apprehended, how can you negate it and say that there was, is, or will be, no silver? But there is the 'rajatabhasa prasakul' and this implies that the real silver too is in the mind. As such the negation becomes possible. There are the 'two 'samvits' (of the real and' mithya silver) and that which is said to be non - existing; hence in all the three tenses is the real silver as such. Of these two 'samvits' why cannot we leave one and thus give up the 'alaukikakalpana'? (assuminga mysterious one) We cannot do so because during the erroneous cognition we do not have the knowledge of two silvers. If there were this know-
ledge, we could easily give up one. When we later on say ‘nasty atrarajatam’ we are repeating the existence of real silver in all the three times. But when we say ‘mithyaivaraja-tam abhat’, we are predicating its existence. The nisedha’ refers to the empirical silver, and the acceptance of the reality of silver during the erroneous cognition refers to ‘mayavivartita rupya’ (silver distorted’ appearing through maya).

**Objection**: Because of the non-discrimination between the knowledge of ‘aprakasa sukti’ and the memory of silver, we might say that silver, is apprehended immediately (This is Prabhakara’s view).

**Reply**: Padmapada replies, it is clear as it is immediately apprehended). The alleged non-discrimination is contrary to experience. Even when there is the discriminating knowledge, there is the ‘pratyabhijna’ (recognition) in the form, ‘Till this moment this was silver’, ‘this appeared (abhat). Here the recognition takes the form in which the ‘this’ is apprehended as ‘samsrista’ with the silver. In the erroneous cognition the silver is apprehended as ‘samsrgata’ with the ‘this’ which is immediate. And that which is negated later on is not the mere silver but the ‘this silver’ It is this that accounts for the later’ pratyabhigna. Otherwise the ‘Pratiti (Apprehension)’ ought to have been’ that (remembered) silver is “avivikta”—(not discriminated) till this time? The ‘this silver’ is the object of experience.

We can also interpret it differently. It is the knowledge of the object (that) that gives rise to the ‘pravrfti’ with
reference to the object. Thus there is a necessary relation between the 'Padarthajnana' (apprehension of the aspect of the object) and 'tatpravrtti' (activity there after). Likewise here too for the 'samsagajnana' the condition is 'samsarga pravrtti'. We have the 'pravrtti' with reference to something because of the knowledge of that something. And one who needs silver (rajatarthi) has his 'pravrtti' with reference to the 'this'. Hence knowing that the immediately present object is silver, he proceeds. This is the meaning of Padmapada's statement.

Since the silver is apprehended as immediate and direct, how can we say that the silver has the form similar to that which is remembered? To this Padmapada says; "purvadrstava bhasah" (appearance of what was seen before) is the 'upapatti' given for 'smriti rupatva'. But it is the "sukty avidya" (avidya concerning the mother of pearl) that at once brings into immediate and direct existense the silver. If so how can we speak of it as 'purvadrsta'? The reply is that it is similar to that which was seen before. the silver was not seen earlier. There cannot be 'rajatavabhasa' (appearance of silver) when we cognise the 'sukti'.

So far we have considered 'adhyasa' as 'smaryamana sadrsah anyatra anyatmana avabhasamanah' (that which is similar to the remembered appearing else where as the form of the object). This accounts only for the superimposition of the object. Padmapada now begins to explain the definition with reference to 'jnanadhyasa' also. But when we admit one of these 'adhyasas', the other too is automatically implied. As such why should there be a separate explanation for jnanadhyasa' (super impositian of the cognition)
Even though when one of the two adhyasas is established, the other too is implicitly established, yet the definition of ‘arthadhysa’ cannot cover the cases of ‘jnanadhyasa’. Hence a separate explanation is given.

But when the ‘jnana’ or knowledge which is ‘arthaviscista’ (qualified by the object) is taken to be a case of ‘adhysa’, then an object appearing as having the nature of another object becomes a case of ‘adhysa’. Here it becomes ‘smrti samana’ (equivalent to memory). Thus Padmapada says; “The expression ‘smrti rupah’ in the definition means that which has a form similar to the form of memory. It is not really a case of memory. Any case of memory requires a prior perception. This perception creates a ‘samskara’ (impression) in the mind. Since the erroneous silver is not apprehended as that which was seen earlier, we cannot take it to be a case of memory, but one having ‘smrti rupatvra’. This is possible because it has come into existence due to the ‘samskara’ of a prior perception (Pramana) or existence. How can it be ‘samskara gayyam arising from an impression When we deny ‘smrititva’ (having the nature of memory) to it? We deny ‘smrtitva’ because we do not apprehend it as having ‘smrtirupa’ and yet we cannot apprehend it so if there were no such ‘samskara.”

**Objection**: If we deny ‘smrititva’ to the cognition, we cannot take it to be due to the ‘samskara’. It cannot be ‘samskara anything because it does not have ‘smrtirupa’. If it is not a case of memory, it is a case of ‘bhranti’ and like the preceptual knowledge it is not ‘purvanubhavajanya’.

**Reply**: By the method of agreement and difference we conclude that this cognition too is the result (janya) of
our prior experiences. In all those apprehensions where there is no 'caksusamprayaoga' (contact of the eye) with the object in all cases of erroneous cognition— we can— clude that this is made possible only by the impressions of our previous evpriences.

AKHYATI (Nature of erroneous cognition according to Prabhakara).

Objection: Let us admit that an erroneous cognition is due to this 'samskara'. Then the sense organ is in contact with one object and there is the knowledge of some other object immediately. This can be only 'smrti'. and any knowledge which is mediated by 'smrti', is called inference etc. Thus knowledge arises only in two ways-experience or 'Anubhava' (which is always true or Yathartha) and 'smrti' (memory). There can be no third type called 'mithya' jnana.

Padmapada states this view thus: "When the eye is in contact with one object and there is the knowledge of another object, we have only 'smriti'. In erroneous cognition the 'smaranabhimana' is suppressed (pramrishta). Due to some specific 'dosha' or other the sense organs which are the causes of knowledge come to have the 'smriti sam udbodha' (awakening of the memory)of some one specific object. The 'dosha' does not allow the sense organ which is in contact with the object to be the cause of 'Visesha pratabhasa hetu' (cause of a specific appearance). Mainly due to the 'dosha' of the sense organ we are unable to distinguish between the perceived content and the remembered content which are 'nirantarotpanna' (arising without an interval). Just as two trees which are far away areapprehended as one,
so here both the apprehensions are taken to constitute a single apprehension. This is the ‘uptanna bhrama’ (emerging illusion).

When we see the ‘gavaya’ and remember the cow, the cowness is given up and only its similarity with the ‘gavaya’ is taken note of. From the perceived ‘gavaya’ the ‘cow’ is distinguished and we have the experience that ‘I remember’. So if there is ‘smriti’ in the erroneous cognition, it should be like this. To this the reply of the Prabhakara is that memory is suppressed (‘Pramrishta’).

Why do we remember silver when we perceive ‘sukti’? Because of similarity between the two. Then since there is the greatest similarity with another ‘sukti’, why don’t we remember another ‘sukti’? To this the reply assumes some defect or other in the sense-organ.

Let there not be the discrimination of the object because of the suppression of memory. But the perceived object distinguishes itself from the remembered. This too cannot be accepted for the ‘dosha’ does not allow the sense organ (which is in contact with the object) to be the ‘visesha pratibhasa hetu’.

But it is said that there is memory and then perception. These two do not come at the same time, but one after the other. Then the prior knowledge is ‘vyavahita’ (has an interval) and as such cannot bring about the ‘pravritti’. There is no ‘pravritti’ because of ‘samanya jnana’ (general knowledge) alone (idam) or because of ‘Visesha jnana’ (particular knowledge) alone (rajatam). It ought to require both.
To this the reply is: "Mainly due to the 'dosha' of the sense organ we are unable to distinguish between the perceived content and the remembered content which are 'nirantar otpanna (successive)'. It is the 'Nirantorotpatti' alone which is the cause of 'pravritti'.

But we do have the experience that this is silver? Here we do recognise (pratyabhijna) the 'samsarga pratyaya' (principle of relation) between the this and the silver. The reply given is that the 'ekatva' (oneness) itself is the 'bhrama'.

Another objection to 'akhyati' is stated by Padmapada. The experience of the past life is not remembered. Now the child who cannot and does not remember the experience of its past life takes for the first time some thing that is sour. And yet it has the experience of sourness and apprehends it as sour. How is this possible? The reply is that it was experienced in the past life. Otherwise, the child ought to have apprehended not any one of the six 'rasas', but a seventh one. How is it that only a part of the past experience is remembered, not the whole? Because of the 'doshabala' (strength of the defect). Then how is it that the 'dosha' does not make the whole of the past experience remembered? The reply is 'Kaarya gamyataaad hetu bhaavasya' (the cause is apprehended from the effect). That which is to be remembered in the act of taking in the sour, is only sourness.

But if we don't accept that there is 'ayathaartha jnaana' (untrue knowledge) also, there will be 'siddhaanta kshati' (destruction of the theory) for the Praabhaakara. The 'saastrakaara' (Saankhya system whose cosmology etc. is acce-
pted by Prabhaakara) defines 'ayathaartha jnaana' as 'ata-
tive tattva jnanam' (knowledge of the real in the unreal). Then how can Praabhaakara reject it?

The reply given is that that statement has a reference only to 'vyavahaara', and that 'samsarga bhrama' is really a case of the suppression of the knowledge of memory. And instead of assuming 'samsarga jnaana' as the cause of the erroneous cognition, it is easier to assume 'akhyaati'.

**Criticism of Akhyaati theory.**

What is 'akhyaati'? It cannot be the mere negation or absence (abhava) of knowledge (khyati), for it is accepted to be a form of knowledge. And all cases of the absence of knowledge are not cases of 'bhrama' (illusion).

When a person has 'pravritti' (activity) with reference to one object, there arises a knowledge which is the cause of 'pravritti' for another object. Can't this be the definition of 'akhyaati'? Then there are cognitions where we have objects with reference to which there is no 'pravritti' and no quick sublation too. How can we treat them as cases of 'bhraanti'?

**Objection:** The absence of discrimination between the knowledges of many 'padaarthaas' (objects) may be taken to be 'bhraanti'.

**Reply:** Take the cognition 'this is silver'. The 'this' is not a synonym of 'silver'. There are two words and the two are clearly distinguished because they are not synonyms. Further there is admitted to be also memory. Hence we cannot say that here we have 'bhrama' arising out of the
non-discrimination between the 'saamanya' (idam) and 'visesha' (rajatam). The Prabhaakara admits the knowledge of difference between the 'this' and the silver; and when he cannot recognise that this is only one knowledge, he cannot plead for the non-discrimination between the 'saamaanya' and the 'visesha'. Further is this difference the nature of the 'padaartha'? Or its property? It cannot be the former; for when the Padaartha is apprehended, its 'bhed' (difference) too is apprehended and then there is no 'aviveka' (non-discrimination). Regarding the second alternative it might be argued that 'bheda' can manifest itself as mutual exclusion, or as the apprehension that there are two or more knowledges; and only when we have the specific knowledge that the terms are mutually exclusive or that they are two, we have 'viveka' (discrimination).

Even this is not possible. Take the sentence 'bring the cow with the stick'. Here the cow is in the accusativa case and the stick is in the instrumental. Their Karakas (declensional suffixes) are different. And the cow is also distinct from the stick. And if we were to apply their definition of 'viveka' to this statement, this would become a case of 'aviveka bhrama'.

Objection: But even there we have the knowledge of difference in an implicit form.

Reply: Then in 'this is silver', since the words are not synonymous we have to accept the implicit difference; and then it cannot be a case of error arising from non-discrimination. Otherwise, there must be the non-apprehension of the distinction (viveka) between the 'viseshakaara' (particular) and the 'saamaanya kara' (general) and then the cognition ought to be only 'this is' or 'silver is', and never 'this is silver'.
Is there non-discrimination between the objects which are 'bhaasamaanas' (appearing entities)? or objects which are not 'bhasamanas'? It cannot be the former. It cannot be the 'aviveka' between the 'pratiiyamaanaakaras' (apprehended forms) since there is the apprehension of distinction arising from the rejection of synonymity. Nor can it be the latter since in deep sleep too there is the non-discrimination between the 'apratiiyamaana akaras' (unapprehended forms). Hence non-discrimination cannot be a case of 'bhrama'.

It has been said earlier that 'bhrama' is 'aviviktaaneka padaartha jnaana maatram' (mere knowledge of the undiscriminated plurality). Is this an explanation of erroneous cognition? Or is error ('bhrama'), 'grahanna smarananaatmaka' (apprehension and memory)? Or is it 'samsarga jnaana asamsakritatva vishesham' (not cooperated by a relational cognition)? There is the knowledge of 'sukti' which is the 'adhishtaaana' of 'rajata', and the 'sukti' totally excludes the silver. Is error then 'anadhikara natva visheshtitam' (that which has no ground or basis)? Of these alternatives, let us take the first which involves 'ativyaapti' (applying to those to which it cannot apply). Take the sentence 'Khando gauh'. Here are two 'pratyayas' (terms) which are not only not discriminated, but related. This does not make this apprehension erroneous.

We cannot take up the second alternative and say that error is the non-discrimination between perceptual and memory apprehensions. For in 'aham manushyah', we have this non-discrimination between two perceived contents; and yet it is a case of error.

We cannot admit the third alternative and say there is only 'samsarga jnaana' (relational cognition in 'samanya
viseshe" (general and particular ede, for, where we do not distinguish the knowledge of the various ‘padaarthas’, we may have to recognise error. And in ‘samsarga jnaana’ there is no such discrimination. Further, there cannot be even a ‘samsarga pratyaya’, for the ‘aalambana’ (support or basis) which is required in ‘samsarga’ is taken to be absent in the erroneus cognition. We cannot say that for ‘samsarga pratyaya’ there is, lhe ‘aalambana’ in ‘guna guny adi sambandha’ (relation between quaity and ubstance and so on); for in the case of recognition, there is ‘aikyaalambana’ (identical ground). Like the ‘guna gunyaadid sambanndha’ we can say that even the relationship of similarity can be the ‘aalambana’ in the cognition ‘this is silver’.

Let us take the fourth alternative. In the theory of ‘akhyaati’ that which sublates the error is the knowledge of discrimination. The object of this ‘baadhaka jnaana’ (sublating cognition) is the silver which totally excludes or negates the ‘ssuktii’ that is its ‘adhikarana’ (locus). But in ‘this is silver’, the ‘this’ is the ‘saamanya’ and it is distinguied from the ‘silver’ which is the ‘visesha’ (particular). Now in ‘ghatasya shuklatvam (whiteness of the pot) the possessiva case clearly shovvs the difference of the pot from its whiteness. The same ‘viveka’ is obtainable even in ‘this is silver’; and both will have to stand on the same level.

When we say that error is the failure to distinguish between perception and memory, there is another defect. Why can’t we say that the perceived content is capable of making the remembered silver give up its specific content of silverness? ; and thus, why can’t it distinguish itself from the perceived? One might reply that this is because there is no ‘visesha darshana’ (perceptual apprehention of the par-
ticular or difference). But if the merely perceived 'shukti' is different from silver, then the 'visesha' implied by the difference will be the 'adharmy aakāra', or the form of suktiy, or the 'pratiyogy aakaara' or its opposite the rajata, and none other. And thus the 'bhedakaara' (different form) which is perceived ought to be apprehended distinctly (viviktaḥ).

Is the 'bhedajnaana' merely the knowledge of the 'dharmi pratiyogi' the contradictory of the locus whice is rajat—Then the 'dharmi pratiyogi jnaana, (knowledge of the contradictory of the locus) is the knowledge of difference; there is on the one hand this knowledge, and on the other, both the 'dharmi' and its 'pratiyogin' are known. Then even the difference ought to be apprehended distinctly.

Let us admit that both the 'dharmi' and its 'pratiyogi' are apprehended (perceived). They are mutually exclusive and as such these two make us apprehend a third called difference. Then prior to our apprehension of the difference there is the apprehension of the two terms, the this and the silver. Then before we perceive the difference, these two are undistinguished and as such it will be a case of 'bhrama'. All knowledge then will be 'bhrama jnaana'.

You cannot say that in mere apprehension as such there is no difference of the sukti from silver; for, then we have the knowledge of the identity of the this with the silver. And 'samsarga jnaana' will have to be the 'aalambana'.

Now let us examine 'smriti' after 'grahana'. We perceive the 'gavaya' and observe its similarity with the cow
which is remembered. Here the difference of the ‘gavaya’ is suppressed and its identity alone is taken into account. Likewise, the perceived ‘sukti’ can give up its specific difference and yield only its identity with silver. It might be replied that the ‘smaranaabhimaana’ is suppressed.

What is this ‘smaranaabhimaana’? This cannot be ‘smriti’, for when memory is suppressed, there is the possibility of the very absence of knowledge.

You cannot say that ‘smaranaabhimaana’ is different from memory; for when that which is different from memory is suppressed, how can the full knowledge that has arisen, to bring about the discrimination in its objects? There cannot be a ‘smaranaahimaana’ which is not ‘smriti’.

**Objection**: That which involves the space and time of the previous experience, or that which is referred to as ‘that’ (saḥ ity aakareṇa) may be called ‘smarnabhimana’.

**Reply**: Padmapaada says: “Nn tavaj jnanenuviddhataya grahanam” It cannot be apprehended as united with cognition. Now in the case of error arising out of recognition we apprehend the ‘this’ as the ‘that’ and we are also aware of remembering the time and place of the earlier cognition. With all these apprehensions, we are unable to distinguish the ‘that’ from the perceived ‘this’.

Further, the ‘sambheda’ (unity) of the past experience does not take place when we are remembering. And Padmapaada says that “the knowledge acquired in the past cannot become an object now by being the adjective of the perceived.” The past knowledge is capable of giving rise to the
‘smrīti samskaara’ for the object. This knowledge cannot be an object to itself, for the previous knowledge has only an object as its object. Knowledge has an object other than itself, and it cannot be its own object. With reference to that object which was not an object in the previous knowledge, there cannot arise any memory which is ‘tāt samskaara janya’ (arising from that impression) Experience and its memory do have only the same identical object. The ‘samskaara’ that came into existence by the mere experience alone does not have the power to give rise to ‘Visista smrīti (specific memory) Hence the memory which is a product of that experience has the same object. It is ‘artha matra visaya’ (merely having an object). Hence memory which arises from the knowledge of ‘artha matra vishaya’ can have only the ‘artha maatra’ as its object. It cannot have as its object that knowledge which was not the object of the previous knowledge. Otherwise from the apprehension of the blue thing we may have to obtain the memory of the yellow thing.

**Objection:** Take the cognitions, ‘this pot is known’ and ‘I remember this known pot’. In the first, ‘the object is the pot; and in the second the object is the known pot or the knowledge of the pot. Here we do find that the knowledge which is not an object in the second Thus, has not knowledge become its own object? Is this not a fact of our experience?

**Reply:** Yes. In the previous experience the object is cognised and thus arises a property (according to the Mimaamsakaas) called ‘jnaatataa’ (known-ness) in the object and it is known. Due to this ‘hetu’ (reason) called ‘jnaatataa’ we are able to infer its cause, viz. knowledge which
is 'aatmaasraya' (dependent on the self). The 'samskaara' of this inferential knowledge gives rise to memory which makes us apprehend the object experienced. The memory of the object is determined only by the apprehension of the object. The knowledge of the object has its object in the memory that arises from the earlier cognition. Thus the knowledge 'this is a pot' has its own specific memory where the object is memory. On the other hand the knowledge 'jnaato ghatah' (the pot is known) has its memory 'jnaatatam ghatam aham smaraami' (I remember the known pot). This memory cannot come in the first cognition. Each cognition has its own specific memory attached to it.

First we have the memory of the object. After this there may arise another memory which takes the form 'I remember the pot that is known'. The latter arises after the former, and it has its own specific object. But that which is present in the erroneous cognition is the memory of the object as indistinguishable from perception. It is not the latter one. As such Padmapaadā states, "memory apprehends the object in itself, and not the object along with the knowledge of the object". Only that much of the object as such, or that much of the object along with its knowledge as was the object of the previous knowledge, is made manifest (avabhaasayati) by memory. It does not make manifest the knowledge which is its basis and source.

From the mere knowledge of the object there arises a 'samskaara' because of which we have memory. This object is purely or merely an object. Any other object is a qualified or specific object. The memory of the object is 'artha maatra vishaya'. This is explained in another way.
By the memory of the object we mean that 'pratyaya' which arises from the 'samskaara' that comes from the knowledge of the object as such. And that 'pratyaya' which arises from the 'samskaara' that comes inferentially or mediately is called 'smrityantara' (followed by memory). Is 'jnaatam ghatam smaraam' (I remember the known pot) a case of 'artha smriti'? or a case of 'smrity antara'? How to distinguish here? To this Padmapaada says: "While we go through the words in a sentence, each word gives us its meaning. But this meaning remains as a remembered content till we come to the end of the sentence. When we have the 'Padaartha smriti' from the word we do not find 'Jnana Sambheda' (Jnananu viddhatva = being together with knowledge); for even knowledge is dependent on 'Sabdarthatva'.

The Statement of Purvapaksha:

We want to know the meaning of a sentence and we come to the end of the sentence word by word in a regular order. Then in this process there arises the knowledge of that which refers to the meaning of the words. Thus there are as many jnanas as there are words. Each word has its meaning and a specific jnana. As the related or appropriate word is apprehended, these jnanas come to have "Sambandhya antaratha Vishayah". Their objects are other related ones. And these are retained and are called 'smriti'. So much is common ground for both the schools of Purva Mimamsa (of Kumarila and Prabhakara).

Objection: The apprehension of the word is said to give rise to the memory of the meaning. Now, what is the relation of the word to its meaning?
Reply: This relationship may be said to be of the nature of having the ability to give rise to 'artha buddhi' (apprehension of meaning).

Objection: Is it of the nature of having the ability to give rise to memory? Or is it something different?

Reply: It is not something different since the words cannot and do not give rise to anything different from 'smriti' in their 'padarthamsas'.

The relationship between the word and its meaning, we have said, is capable of giving rise to smriti. Is this ability given to a known relationship? Or to an unknown one? When a thing is said to be capable of producing something, this ability is apprehended only through the product or the effect. Thus when there is memory, from this we can apprehend the capability or power (samarthya) of the word. Then to say that memory arises when this ability is known, is arguing in a circle. We cannot argue that memory arises from the ability of another memory, since this leads to a regress. This ability cannot be attributed even to an unknown relationship, for even the ignorant ones must then be able to understand the meanings of the words as soon as they hear the words. Thus in any way it is difficult to explain "Smriti Janana Samarthyā lakshana" (nature of being able to give rise to memory). Memory cannot arise purely from the 'smriti janana samarthya sambandha'.

Further, there is another defect. When A and B are similar to one another (sadrisyadi sambandha), the perception of the one will bring the other to memory. Here in
the case of the word and its meaning there is no relationship of similarity etc; and as such we cannot say that the word gives rise to the memory of the meaning.

**Answer to this Purvapaksa:**

The ability to give rise to memory is said to be the relationship between the word and its meaning. Only when this relationship is known, it becomes 'arthabodhaka' (cause of the apprehension of meaning). The samskara arises from the knowledge of the relationship. Even if the 'samskara' is not apprehended, the 'artha bodhakata' is admitted. Even though the 'samskara' is always there, we cannot say that there is always memory, for it is admitted that the 'smriti hetu' is the 'samskara' that is aroused from the perception of the word. Thus both the 'sambandha jnana samskara' and sabda darsana constitute the 'smriti hetu'.

The knowledge of the word as qualified by its relationship with the meaning cannot be the cause of the memory (in giving rise to the apprehension of the meaning). If this were not so, the ability to give rise to memory will have to be determined by this 'vaisishtya' (speciality). Then the vaisishtya is one relationship and this would require another relation with memory. Further, when we apprehend the word as qualified by its relation with its meaning, we cannot say that the word is the cause of memory, for in the apprehension of such a word, the meaning is already known since the word is apprehended as qualified by its relation to its meaning. Thus even before the 'smriti' (which is said to give us the meaning), the meaning is known.

It has been said that since the perception of a related entity (sambandhi) is capable of giving us the memory of
another related entity, we have 'sadrisyadi sambandhy antara'. A 'samarthya sambandha' which, does not involve any 'sambandhantara' (another relationship), has the property of 'smarakatva' (being remembered). Does it mean that elsewhere too the same thing holds good? Or since elsewhere the 'samarthya' involves the relationships like similarity, do we try to establish 'sadrisyapekshatva'? Or do we say that since there is no original relationship, there is only the 'anutpatti' (non-emerance) of 'buddhi'? The first two alternatives are at first rejected.

Similarity and other relationships do not have the power to give rise to memory (and thus make us apprehend the meaning of the word). That the 'samarthya sambandha' can make us apprehend the meaning of the word, is not opposed to its nature. This cannot be rejected. That the original relationships like similarity etc., have the property of 'smarakatva' can be proved by agreement and difference. We cannot speak of 'samarthya rupatva' with reference to these. And this makes the first alternative untenable.

Regarding the second alternative we say: The original relationships like similarity etc., can give the awareness of 'arthantar' (another meaning) because of 'samarthya sambandha' since there is no 'buddhi samarthya eakshanantara'. 'Buddhi Samarthya Lakshana' means that which can give the awareness of 'arthantaravam', 'asamkiranavam', 'sabda samarthyena sahaanavasthitatvam', (another meaning, non-confusion, non-co-existence because of the power of the word).

Even though this memory is of a different object when we have the relationship like similarity, yet in the present
context we cannot assume a new relationship since it is impossible and unnecessary.

If we refuse to admit that the ability to give rise to memory (that enables us to apprehend the meaning) does give us the meaning of the word, then it is a self-contradictory statement. This is how the Buddhists argue.

Regarding the third alternative we say: Does this alternative seek to maintain 'buddhi anutpatti' (non emergence of cognition) through the 'samarthya' by accepting the 'buddhi samarthya' of word? or does it deny the very 'samarthya'? But when there is 'buddhi samarthya' for words, it is self-contradictory to argue 'buddhi anutpatti'. The second alternative cannot be maintained for the word has the ability to give rise to an apprehension (buddhijanana samarthya). As such it is maintained that a word has the ability to give rise to memory which gives us the meaning of the word. From the words we get the memories and these in their turn give meanings. The 'sambandhi darsana' and 'sambandhyantara smarana' are 'sambandha siddha' for the word and its meaning. And when one is perceived, the other is re-membered. It has been said that like the memory of 'padartha', even the other memory does not involve any relationship with jnana. Here the author begins to doubt 'drishtanta asampratipatti' (fallacious analogy). He asks, where then is the absence or negation of the integration of knowledge (jnana sambhanda)? Padmapada says, 'jnana-syapi sabdarthtva prasangat'. As explained in Tattvadarpana, 'Sabdasya Sakti bheda Kalpana prasangad artha matra vishayatvam yuktam'. The word refers to its meaning. The power of the word brings about a relation between the meaning and memory; and even knowledge necessarily involves 'sabdarthatva prasanga'.
Objection: Smaranabhimana may be interpreted as ‘smaranagato dharmah’ (quality present in memory) and not as ‘smaryagato dharmah’ (quality in the remembered). Just as in triangularity we find a specific ‘Avagata vishesha (inherent feature) so in (smritijnana) too we have a specific property and this is ‘smaranabhimana’.

This is an internal property and hence is necessarily involved whenever the object having it is taken into consideration.

Reply: Padmapada denies this by saying that we do not apprehend a new and distinct form called ‘smaranabhimana’ as the ‘avagata’ or internal property of knowledge; this property is not perceptually cognised. Nor is it inferentially cognised. Sabara, therefore says, that we have to infer the ‘buddhi’ as ‘anakara’ by which is meant ‘anirupita akara vishesha’ or ‘anirdishta svalakshana’ (indeterminate form).

Objection: That ‘smaranabhimana’ is some specific internal feature of ‘smrati jnana’ can be maintained inferentially. ‘Vyapara vishesha’ can make us infer ‘vyapaka vishesha’ (pervasive feature). From ‘linga vishesha’ (specific cause) we can have’ hetu visheshanumaana (inference of a specific reason.

According to the Mimamsaka, knowledge is always inferred. And in inference from a perceived object we can infer that which is necessarily related to it. Further, from the effect of a perceived entity, we can infer the cause of the inferred entity. Thus for example from the sweet fragrance coming from a smoke (linga vishesha) we infer that there is a tree having fragrant wood (hetu vishesha).
Reply: What is ‘linga vishesha’? Is it a ‘grahya visesha’? Or a ‘phala vishesha’ (specific result)? It cannot be the former, for there is no invariable rule that only the pramana grahya (apprehended through pramana) is apprehended by memory. The internal property must be directly apprehended when the object is being cognised. We cannot bring in the ‘ayam’ (this) in recognition and the ‘sah’ (that) in memory as maintaining this rule; for space and time are apprehended mediately and also immediately, and this does not constitute a difference in the object.

It cannot be a ‘phala vishesha’ also, for this is unproven. Phala vishesha means that which refers to the object. According to the Mimansakas it is jnata which is the ‘phala’ of perception; and according to the Nyaya system, it is ‘anuvyasaya’ in the form ‘I know that this is a pot’. The phala vishesha is conditioned by the difference in the object; and there is no difference in the object between the ‘Pramana phala’ and ‘Smriti phala’.

Objection: There is the knowledge that I remember (‘smarami’). This may be taken to be ‘smaranabhimana’.

Reply: Padmapada observes; any knowledge that takes the form ‘I remember that...’, arises at times with reference to the object and also with reference to the time and not every where; and the experience ‘I remember’ is apprehended by the explicit mention of the word ‘smarami’; as such this cannot be a cause for its non-discrimination from perception. The ‘I remember’ is a specific immediate experience which involves ‘smaryā’ ‘smarta’ and smriti (remembered, one who remembers and memory). It may be taken to be inferential knowledge involving these three
factors. In either theory, it is not the ‘I remember’, that distinguishes memory from perception. To have the experience ‘I remember’, I should know all ready that it is a case of memory; otherwise I cannot say ‘I remember’. To know that it is a case of memory I should know that the other experience is a perceptual one involving ‘grahya’, ‘grihita’ and ‘grahana’. [(apprehended object, one who apprehends, and apprehension), Even prior to the memory I should know that there is a perceptual experience which differs from this memory experience. Therefore I cannot have either the immediate experience of memory which is distinct from the perceptual one, or the inferential cognition of memory which is distinct from the inferred knowledge of perception. I cannot have this or that unless I cognize that this experience or that cognition differs from its perceptual correlate.

For, the ‘I remember’ and the ‘I infer’ are determined by the apprehension of the specific meaning of the given. Hence even before I have the experience of ‘I remember’ I should be knowing the difference between perception and memory. I cannot bring in the ‘I remember’ as pointing out the difference to me for the first time.

**Objection:** Both experience and the memory thereof have the same object (and yet that they differ is well known. What is this difference?

**Reply:** Padmapada says that memory arises from the ‘samskara’ of the earlier experience; and the function of memory is only to make manifest the object.

11)
This 'samskara samutthatva' (emergence of the impression) is common to both experience and memory. But in memory it is the mere 'samskara' that brings forth the awareness of the object; whereas in perception there is also the contact of the object with the sense organ. Even though they have an identical object, they have different causes.

Do 'smriti jnana' and 'jnana numana' (remembered knowledge and inferred one) differ because of a difference in their objects? Or because of a difference in their respective causes? Or because one takes the form of a reference to 'that' (which was experienced) and the other does not to do so?

Since both have the same object which gives knowledge, the first alternative is to be rejected. Since both are based upon the same 'samskara' we cannot admit of any difference in their respective causes.

Then there remains the third alternative. Memory is said to have the form of reference to that ('sati akarah'). What is this 'sati akarah'? Does this mean the object as qualified by the place and time which are not the here and the now? Or does it mean the integration of the previous experience? Does it mean that which has arisen from the 'samskara' of the previous experience? The first alternative is common also to inference which too involves the place and time which are 'paroksha' (not immediate or direct.)

Regarding the second alternative, we have to ask whether it is the integration of the mere previous experience? Or is it the integration of that knowledge which is its cause? The former is common also to 'jnana numana' (inferential
knowledge) while the latter is common also to the knowledge that arises from a ‘paurusheya vakya’—(human utterance). Take the sentence, ‘there are flowers on the banks of the river’. From this we get the apprehension of the knowledge about the flowers which are on the banks of the river. As such here too we have the integration of the knowledge which is its cause. This second alternative cannot constitute a difference between ‘smriti jnana’ and ‘jnananumana’.

Hence we have to admit that ‘saity akarah’ means that which arises from the ‘samskara’. Then we have to recognise that memory is different from jnananumana in so far as the former arises only from the ‘samskara’. Padmapada rejects this argument and observes ‘in order to assume the suppression of any entity due to ‘dosha’ there ought to be an additional something in the cognition. This additional something is not to be found either in the apprehension (pratiti) or in the object (artha)’.

Now, take dream cognition. Is it a case of error where there is non-discrimination between two perceived entities? Or between a perceived entity and a remembered one? Or between two remembered entities? The cognition of blue cannot be different from the cognising self. And since we do not cognise the blue that is different from the self, the first alternative stands rejected. In the cognition of blue, since the blue is not different from the self, we may have to say ‘I am blue’ and this is absurd. The ‘I’ is immediately apprehended and the ‘blue’ is the remembered entity. The non-discrimination between the two is there. Since the perceived is not discriminated from the remembered, the latter becomes immediate (‘aparoksha’). Likewise, since the reme-
mbered is not discriminated from the perceived, the latter might be 'paroksha'. Because of this difficulty the second alternative too is faulty.

"In the erroneous cognition", says Padmapada, "there is no apprehension of the object of the previous experience; for the object is apprehended as being before us, as being immediate."

It we accept the third alternative, we have to say that there is the non-discrimination between two remembered entities. If there is this mutual non-discrimination between these two entities, then we have to apprehend the whole of 'paroksha' (that which is not immediately or directly cognised).

Hence knowledge does not come only from experience and memory. There is also a third source called 'bhranti jnana'. Padmapada says, "when we have a contact with one object and there is the knowledge of another, it is not a case of memory but one of 'adhyasa'.

If it is not a case of memory, what is the explanation for the cognition 'this is silver'? The reply leads us to ANYATHA KHYATI :- (Theory of Bhatta Mimansa and Nyaya systems).

**Statement**: Well it is 'anyatha khyati. When the eye has the contact with 'Shukti', the eye, which suffers from some defect, receives the impression of silver which is at some other place. The silver is in its own place and it is apprehended in the nature of 'shukti' ('Shuktikatmana') by the sense organ which suffers from some defect or other. Then it might be asked--why should such an organ appareh-
end only silver? It can as well apprehend something which it has not experienced before. To this, the reply is that the sense organ received the impression of that which bears a similarity with the given object. Similarity etc, are some of the 'doshas'. Hence this 'Anyatha Khyati' is a form of knowledge and it is cognised ('Grahanatmaka').

**CRITICISM:** What is 'anyatha khyati'? The word is so vague that it can mean any one of the following four things:

i) The knowledge of one object appears as the form of another, 'anyakaram Jnanam'.

ii) The object apprehended does not have its basis in itself but in something else, 'anyalambanam'.

iii) An object appears as having the nature of another object. Vasturah vastvantaratmana avabhasah'.

iv) The knowledge that arises does not agree with the 'given' but with its 'parinama' or evolute - 'anyatha parinata vastuni Jnanam'. They respectively refer to 'Jnana', esphurana', 'vishaya' and 'parinati'.

The first two meanings are not correct. It might be argued that there is 'vaiparitya' (inappropriate strangeness) whence the perceived 'shukti' appears in the form of silver'. The 'alambana' or basis of the given is 'shukti' and that which is apprehended is silver. Now it is the apprehension that determines the nature of the object or the given. That which is the form of the apprehension is always the 'alambana' or the object given. We cannot have one object and an apprehension that refers to another object which is not
given. If the ‘shukti’ were to be the ‘alambana’ the apprehension cannot have the form of silver.

**Objection:** We need not have the form of apprehension and the ‘alambana’ always. The ‘alambana’ is that object with reference to which the apprehension is engaged (‘prayukta’). Since ‘shukti’ is not the object with reference to which there is the ‘pravritti’ (activity) of the apprehension. We are not able to apprehend it even though it has its own ‘svarupavabhasa’ (appearance of its own form). The apprehension is ‘rajata vyavahara yogya’ (appropriate to silver) and hence the silver is apprehended. Why cannot silver be the ‘alambana’?

**Reply:** Take the cognitions of a tiger and a snake which make us catch hold of a stick. But the stick is not the ‘alambana’ for our cognitions. One who is in need of a substance takes it up; and since its qualities do not exist apart from it, these qualities too are involved in the act. Similarly one who takes up a quality is involved also with the substance. In such cases we have to say that of the substance and its qualities, one is the ‘alambana’ for the knowledge of the other. And this is absurd. Hence ‘shukti’ cannot be ‘alambana’ for this cognition. The knowledge of one object can not appear as the form of another. The object apprehended must have its basis in itself and not in something else.

The third view states that an object appears as having the nature of another object. “If the shukti appears as having the nature of silver”, asks Padmapada, “is this appearance real or no for the shukti? If it is a real appearance,
it cannot be sublated later on. And since there is the sublation, this view cannot be accepted”.

The propounder of “anythakhyati” argues for the complete difference between the given ‘shukti’ and the cognised silver. They cannot accept a real ‘samsarga’ between the two; and since they do not accept an ‘anirvacaniya samsarga’ (inexplicable relation), the ‘samsarga’ must be a non-entity. And a non-entity (sunya) cannot be apprehended. Likewise even in ‘Khando gauh’ there can be no ‘samsarga’ and then it ought to be a case of error.

The Bhedabhedavadin might accept that the ‘samsarga’ is real. Then is the appearance of silver real or no? It is not real because it is sublated later on. In ‘Khando gauh, there is ‘samsarga’ and also identity—in—difference. And since there is identity—in—difference every where there cannot be any where an error and its sublation; or everywhere there will be error and its sublation.

Then there is the fourth interpretation on which Padmapada argues thus: “It might be argued that due to some ‘dosha’, there is the evolution of the form of silver for the ‘shukti’”. This is faulty. Curd is evolved from milk; and if the curd stands on the same footing as the silver there ought to be the sublation of the curd. No such later cognition arises, And no one can cognise the curd as milk and call it a true cognition. Both these are found in the silver; for, we sublated it and cognise the this as ‘shukti’. If the ‘shukti’ has evolved itself in the form of silver due to some ‘dosha’ then even when the ‘dosha’ disappears, it should remain as silver’. We cannot compare this to the blossoming of ‘kamala’ by the rays of the sun and its closing in of its petals when the sun sets. Here we have its stages:
and with the setting of the sun, it goes back to its earlier state. Likewise in the case silver, we cannot say that we separate the silver. We can only say that the silver has gone back to its earlier state”.

The subsequent part of the Panchapadika may be interpreted as the refutation of the fourth interpretation, or as the refutation of Atmakhyati. The author of the Vivaranana, however, interprets it by following the second alternative.

ATMAKHYATI ::- (Theory of Vijnanavada Buddhism).

Statement ::- It is the ‘buddhi’ (intellect) that has the ‘rajatakara’ (form of silver). There is no silver outside, since it is sublated later on. How can we attribute ‘buddhi akarata’ to silver? This silver is not the object of knowledge that arises from the contact of the sense organ; and yet it is immediately apprehended like consciousness.

Is the form of silver for knowledge natural or brought about by anything else? It cannot be the former since knowledge is merely and purely knowledge. And for the same reason, the second alternative does not arise. And yet due ‘samskara samarthya (power of impressions) there arises the form of silver for knowledge. Some time back in the past when there arose the knowledge of silver, that knowledge remained as a ‘samskara’.

This ‘samskara’ arises from knowledge and how can we attribute ‘jnanatva’ (knowledge) to it? Is the ‘samskara’ which is distinct from ‘jnana’, something to be known or not? It cannot be the former since there can be
no possible relation on this view between 'jnana' and the 'vedya' (known object). It cannot be the latter due to 'Vyavahara gocaratvanupapatti' (impossibility of any activity). Hence we have to attribute 'jnanamatratva' to the 'samskara'.

This 'samskara' arose long ago and there were many 'vijñanas' in the intervening times. How can that 'samskara' be the cause now? The reply is that the 'salibija' (corn seed) is able to give rise to another seed though prior to the emergence of the new seed there are many intervening stages. Likewise even though the 'samskara' is 'vyavahita's (having intervals) by many different Vijnanah it is capable of giving rise to the knowledge of silver now.

One seed is not the cause of another seed. But the first seed is the cause of those things that bring about the next seed. In such a case these intervening things are the immediate causes. The first seed is thus 'Vyavahita' and cannot be the cause. And to show that even if it is 'Vyavahita' it can be a cause, another argument is given. From the knowledge of silver there arose a 'jnana santana' (series of cognitions) which constitute the 'samskara'. The form of silver which was in the earlier knowledge takes the form of 'buddhi' and is apprehended as it is were outside.

**CRITICISM :-** We have to ask whether the silver comes into existence or no? If it does not come into existence, it cannot be there like the 'akasa'. If it comes into existence, it cannot be from an object since there is no object other than jnana. It may be said that due to some 'dushta karana' (defective cause) there arises the existence of silver from jnana.
Padmapada gives the following reply: Let us suppose that knowledge can bring an object into existence. Is it this apprehension that brings about the silver? Or some other apprehension?

The ‘janaka pratiti’ (or the apprehension of jnana which is to give rise to the silver) is prior to the silver. It does not have the silver as its object at that time. The ‘pratiti’ and the silver belong to two different times. When there was the knowledge (which is the cause of silver), there was no silver and also no knowledge of silver. Knowledge is said to be momentary. Then while there is the apprehension there is no silver. And when there is the silver, the apprehension has ceased to be there. As such this apprehension cannot be the cause of the silver coming into view.

It is some ‘dushta karana’ in the jnana that has brought about the silver. Prior to this moment there was no ‘dushta karana’ in the jnana; nor is there any such defect after the silver came out. And if the pratiti which is free from all defects were to have the silver as its object, then everything will have to be apprehended in every apprehension.

Does the ‘pratiti’ create the silver? Or no? That which gives us something positive is real. Since we accept this maxim, and since the silver too is a cause of its meaning or apprehension, the silver will have to be real. The ‘dushta karana pratiti’ is taken to bring out the silver, whence the silver is the ‘alambana’ for the former. And since the silver gives us its apprehension or meaning it should be accepted as real.
If the 'pratiti' does not create the silver, the silver is not its object and as such it cannot be apprehended.

The akhyatavidan says that since these two theories are found to be illogical we have to admit the suppression of memory as explaining the nature of erroneous cognition. But we have said earlier that this suppression itself is impossible.

Panchapadika reads: "The Yoga system observes that the non-suppression of the experienced object (or content) is memory".

Advaitic position:

If this is neither a remembered silver nor a perceived real silver, how can you maintain that this knowledge will be 'alaukika'? How is this possible? As Padmapada puts the question: "What is the way out to explain the appearance of silver when we have the contact with "shukti"?"

Does this question refer to the 'saamagri' (totality of factors) or knowledge, or the object? If it refers to 'saamagri' the reply is stated thus by Padmapada—"Memory which arises from 'samskaara' and which does not involve the awareness of the 'I remember', is not distinct from the knowledge that comes from sense-perception. It is identical with the knowledge of sense-perception which involves the 'samskaara'."

If the sense-organ and the 'samskaara' constitute the 'saamagri' then this will be the true knowledge itself like memory and perception. But the erroneous cognition
involves the cooperation of the defect (dosha) also; and the ‘dosha’ is the third entity in the ‘saamagri’.

Though the ‘sukti’ is immediately before us, we do not apprehend it. For the ‘kaarana dosha’ or the defect in apprehension prevents its own power in the ‘kaarya’ (object); and at the same time it also awakens the samskaara; for the ‘kaarana dosha sakti’ is ‘kaaryagAMYa’. (defect in the causal potency is inferred from the effect).

**Objection:** Defect (dosha) appears to be involved in the ‘saamagri’ of knowledge. A defect is that which prevents the proper result from coming into existence. It does not create a new effect; for the seed immersed in oil does not only not give rise to its own plant, but it also does no bring out a new plant.

**Reply:** That there is a defect in the cause is known only from the effect. Hence there is only one ‘saamagri’ which is constituted by the integration of ‘samskara’ with ‘dushtakarana’ (defective cause).

The dosha cannot be the cause of the prior non-existence (pragabhava) of the effect, for there is nothing for which this can be taken to be the cause. But the dosha can give rise to a ‘viperita karya’ (a different or strange effect) just as the ‘bhasmaka’ disease brings about excessive hunger and just as the ‘vetra’ seed burnt by the fire of the forest brings out the plantain tree. In the same way the ‘Kacadi doshas’ can function as a ‘viparya hetu’ (contrary cause) for the result.

**Objection:** If a ‘dosha’ can awaken a ‘samskara’, it cannot form part of the ‘saamagri’. If a ‘dosha’ can awa-
ken the samskara, why can't it also give the knowledge of the object?

**Reply:** There is no pramana to show that it is both. As such there is only one samagri which involves both 'samskara' and 'dushtakaranata'.

Regarding the second viz., knowledge: In the erroneous cognition we have only one knowledge. There are no two apprehensions.

**Objection:** To say that there is only one knowledge is against the tenets of Advaita. The sense organ has the contact with the this; and there arises a knowledge of the this. This knowledge is 'antahkarana parinama' (modification of the psychosis). There is the contact of the sense organ with the 'this' and then arises a knowledge. This has the 'samsarga' of silver with, the 'this' as its object. Has the knowledge arisen from the contact with the mere 'this'? Or from the contact with the silver? Neither the silver nor its 'samsarga' is the object of this cognition. The silver being 'mithya' cannot have the contact with the eye. It if were the silver which is elsewhere, even then the eye fails to have any contact with it.

But it might be said that when I close my eyes I cannot have the cognition of silver, and that this cognition arises only when I open my eyes and have the contact with the object.

This argument is faulty since what I cognise is only the 'this' which is the 'adhisthana'. I cannot say that I apprehended the silver because of the 'samskara' that has arisen
from my previous experience of silver; for, memory is not recognized or accepted to be present in the erroneous cognition. We cannot also say that a defect by itself can use knowledge. The dosha or the defect can only prevent an effect from coming into existence. It cannot be a cause. And since a 'jnana karana' (cause of knowledge) alone can bring about the effect (the knowledge of the effect), the defect as 'Jnanakarana' cannot give rise to the knowledge of the object.

Hence you cannot say that there is only one knowledge of silver which is integrated with the very existence of 'shukti'. On the other hand, it is maintained that there is 'avidya'. Due to the 'bahya doshas' (external defects) functioning as an instrumental cause, this 'avidya' assumes the form of silver in the 'shukti' as there is some similarity between the two. Avidya which is conditioned by that consciousness that is reflected in the 'Idamakara vritti' (psychosis having the form of the this) cooperates with the 'samskara' that gives the knowledge of silver. This avidya evolves itself in the form of 'jnanabhasha'. The silver that conditions the consciousness is the cause of the 'jnanabhasha' which therefore takes the form of silver. This form is 'svavishaya vyayahara ajanaka' (ineffective to give rise to the awareness of its own object) since it is 'acetana'. As such this form of avidya becomes the object for the 'sakshi caitanya'.

In this statement of the advaitin's position, how do we have only one knowledge? And since the difference in the Jnanas brings about a difference between the objects, how can we say that there is only one object?
The reply is as follows:

We cognise an object and there is the apprehension. It is the mere apprehension (sphurana) and it is not 'jnana visishta' (qualified by its knowledge). There is the 'avabhāsa' for the apprehension or 'sphurana' as 'vishayavaccchīna' and not as 'jnanavacchīna'. The 'sphurana' or apprehension is not conditioned by any psychosis, but by the object alone; and the object is cognised as having the 'pratiphalita caitanya' (reflected consciousness).

Now the true and the false (mithya) objects appear as one in so far as they assume each other's nature (anyonyatmata). This is the object cognised and it gives rise to 'Vishayavacchīna phalaikya'. In this 'Upadhi' both the true knowledge and the false one, even though they are two, are taken through 'upacara' to be one only.

Then we come to the third meaning which refers to the 'vishaya'. The knowledge (that is said to be one) arises from the 'samagri' which includes the 'samskara' that has awakened from the dosha. For such a knowledge it is but proper to have the 'avabhāsa (appearance)of the 'alambana' viz., the erroneous silver in the shukti (shuktigeta mithyarrajatam). Then the 'mithya jnana' is 'mithyalambanam jnanam'. Since knowledge as such has no sublation, knowledge in itself is not mithya.

Neither knowledge nor its negation can be treated as mithya. But in the erroneous cognition we have a knowledge which is integrated to 'mithyatva'. Such a jnana samavayi mithyatva is understood to be no other than 'anirvacaniya' (inexplicable).
This ‘mithyajnana’ is neither true nor false; and hence it is called ‘anivacaniya’.

Objection from akhyativadin:

When there is the contact of the sense organ with the object, this contact (samprayoga) is a cause of knowledge without the aid of anything else (nirapekshah). The contact with smoke by itself gives us the knowledge of fire. Likewise samskara by itself is the cause of the memory of a past experience. Thus we have two ‘nirapeksha karanas’ called perception and memory. Now the erroneous cognition is brought about by these two causes which are continuous and simultaneous (nirantara). As such there we do not have one knowledge alone but two. There is knowledge arising from the contact, and there is also the samskara. These are two distinct entities. Then how can we say that there is only one knowledge arising from the cognition of silver in the shukti? From these knowledges there is the specific ‘pravritti’ (activity).

Reply: This ‘visishta pravritti’ itself is impossible. The apprehension of the ‘samsarga jnana’ (relational knowledge) is found in the cognition ‘this is silver’. If there is not one knowledge then one knowledge ought to come after the other. And because of the interval (Vyavadhana) there cannot arise any ‘pravritti’. The pravritti is brought about by the ‘avyayahitatva’ which makes us apprehend the ‘this’ as ‘silver’.

For example, take a word which consists of many syllables. Each syllable being momentary, it is destroyed seen after we utter it; and each syllable by itself cannot convey the meaning. Each syllable is said to give rise to a samskara. The last syllable, aided by these samskaras
functions as the cause in giving us the meaning of the word. This is assumed so that all the preceding syllables (which are the causes) might give us the apprehension. If all these preceding causes are absent in the form of samskaras there can be no apprehension of meaning. Even though there are many causes here, this is not a defect since the preceding causes function as accessories in the form of samskaras to the last cause.

If there is a difference in the cause, we can infer the difference in the effect. Then there cannot be one knowledge, but many. Memory and perception are different causes and they give rise to different effects. But due to the presence of the defect, there arises a distinctly new effect. Thus even though the ‘vetra bija’ can give rise to a vetra plant, still it gives rise to a plantain when it is scorched in the fire of the forest. It cannot be said that since the defect is ‘sapeksha’ (reflexive) and since perception and memory are ‘nirapeksha’ (non-reflexive), the defect cannot cooperate with the other two to bring about one effect. The smoke that is apprehended in infrential cognition is ‘sapeksha’; and the memory of the concommitance of smoke with fire is ‘nirapeksha’. Both these cooperate with one another in giving us one knowledge. Thus both the knowledge of the cause (linga jnana) and the samskara function together in giving rise to the knowledge of ‘lingi’ in inference. And in recognition we find that perception and memory function together. In both there is only one knowledge which has in it memory inherently (smriti garbham). And if the samskara is not awakened, we cannot have such a knowledge. Hence the perception of the ‘linga’ itself awakens the ‘sambandha jnana, samskarara’, and these
two together give us the knowledge of the 'lingi'. The same
holds good in the case of recognition also" (Padmapada).

We cannot then admit any difference in the different
causes in this cognition. We cannot treat the perception
of 'linga' and the memory of 'vyapti' as the causes, for the
latter is only a samskara. If the samskara is not awakened,
then we cannot have the knowledge. Only when the sam-
skara is awakened we have the 'jnanadvaya yaugapadya
'(simultaneity of knowledges).

**Objection**: In recognition we have perception and
also the memory of the past experience as the causes.
There is 'jnanadvaya yaugapadya' here since we have the
cognitions of 'ayam' and 'sah'. Then we have two
knowledges.

**Reply**: No. The knowledge of the 'linga' gives us
the knowledge of the 'lingi' with which it is necessarily
connected. And from the 'artha jnana janana sakti sam-
bandha' (relation of the power to give rise to the knowledge
of the object) we apprehend the meaning of the word. But
there is no such relationship between memory and recog-
nition. As such memory is not the cause of recognition,
but only a samskara for perception in recognition.

When the 'samskaara' is awakened, there arises recog-
nision; and here we do not find a second entity called
memory.

**Objection**: The copresence of the causes which
are 'nirapeksa' is to be found only in the cases of the
pramaanas other than 'abhijnna pratyaksa'. 'Abhijnna' is
the knowledge of the object which is conditioned by one place and by one time.

Reply: From the cognitions of blue etc. which are the causes of different knowledges, we get only one specific knowledge of the picture. Even in perception these is the 'nirapeksa kaarana samaahaara' (totallily of non-reflexive causal factors).

Objection: If the samskaara is necessarily involved in the 'pramaana kaarana', then we have the 'pramaana jnaana' in which memory is an essential element (smrti garbha). Then we cannot have the cognition 'this is silver' in which we do not find this memory.

Reply: Inference and other valid means of knowledge give rise to knowledge without having the co-operation or aid of the 'dosha'. But 'bhranti jnana' is different from these. "Inference, recognition and 'citra jnana' do not require 'dushtakarana'; and hence we are able to apprehend the object as it is. But in 'bhranti jnana' there is a 'karana dosha' and the object is not cognised as it is" (Padmapada). And this cognition has only one knowledge where we have the 'samsarga' between the 'this' and the silver. They are necessarily connected. The this is necessarily cognised as silver.

The 'akhyati vada' accepts two jnanas here. The silver which is cognised immediately and directly is taken to be the remembered one. This is contrary to facts.

In 'anyatha khyativada', the existence of the object in the cognised' adhishthana is rejected. Though the 'this' is cognised to be the silver, the 'samsarga' is rejected. And
the silver that is apprehended immediately and directly is said to be the silver existing elsewhere.

In 'atma khyati', the silver that is in actually apprehended as existing outside of us is taken to be in reality purely internal.

These defects are not found in our anirvacaniya khyati. And our theory is not contrary to experience since we accept the silver that appears (pratibhasamanasya).

**Objection**: But the silver is apprehended as real and not as 'anirvacaniya'. Is this not contrary to experience?

**Reply**: Just as the thisness (idanta) has the 'samsarga' with the silver, what appears (avabhasate) is the 'shuktika satta samsarga' (relation of the being of shuktii). This is not a new, 'sattva' of silver. The reality of the shuktii is apprehended as the reality of silver.

Or, we accept three degrees of reality (sattvam). Ultimate reality (Paramartha sattvam) is that of Brahman. Then there is the empirical reality which has the ability to bring about the objects and actions. This is conditioned, by maya and it is manifested in the form of akasa etc. Then there is a third degree of reality which is conditioned by 'avidya'; and it is apprehended in the form of silver etc., in erroneous cognition. Considered with reference to ultimate reality, the third degree of reality is called 'anirvacaniya'. As such it is not contrary to experience. Following experience we accept the reality of the object here also.
i) Neither the real, nor the unreal can be taken to be ‘bhranti jnana’ (erroneous knowledge). ii) The other theories of error are shown to be violating the facts of experience. iii) In ‘akhyati’ we have to assume many things like ‘parokshya’, memory, suppression of the knowledge of memory, non-discrimination brought about by this suppression, ‘pravritti’ brought out by this non-discrimination; and the memory of the experiences of the past life; all these are not warranted by the cognition as such. ‘Anyathakhyati’ assumes many things like: an object apprehended at one place has its reality or existence at another place; the sense organ can apprehend an object experienced in the past; the sense organ can cognize an object which is at another place and at another time; the ‘dosha’ is said to bring about this ability to the sense organ; even though there is no ‘samsarga’ in reality it is said to be immediately apprehended. All these are opposed to the pramaanas.

Hence to put an end to all these defects we have to accept the nature of the apprehended silver to be ‘mithyatva’. In the later cognition we say ‘there is no silver, it appeared as mithyaa silver only’. We have to accept the ‘mithyatva’ or ‘anirvacaniyatva’ for the silver on the basis of this experience. The ‘upaadaana’ for this silver is ‘avidya’ and it can be proved by agreement and difference. Hence Padmapaada speaks of the silver as ‘mithyaamayam’.

A true object gets itself integrated to the existence of a mithyaa object; and as such it appears. Such an appearance is called ‘maayaa’, ‘mithyaa’ ‘anirvacaniya khayaati’ and also ‘adhyaasa’.
MAYA AND AVIDYA

Objection: The silver in erroneous cognition can be only ‘avidya mayam’ and not ‘maya mayam’. Since all cases of error or illusion are dispelled by true knowledge, error has the nature of avidya. Further Maya is different from avidya. Maya cannot bring out any vyamoha (desire or passion) to its own ‘asraya’, and it follows or abides by the will of the agent (karta). Avidya functions in a totally different way. Even in empirical experiences maya is taken to be different from avidya. Thus the elephant, horse, and chariot constructed by maya cannot be spoken of as arising from avidya.

Reply: Is this difference made out on the basis of a difference in their nature (lakshana)? Or is it based on ‘loka vyavahara’? Both are faulty. To begin with, it cannot be the former.

The ‘svarupa lakshana’ (real definition) of maya and avidya is the same. They have also the same ‘visesha lakṣaṇa’. They both prevent the object from manifesting itself in its own form; and they also make the object appear in a different form.

Objection: When an object is said to be the product of maya, the material cause for this product consists of ‘mantra (spell)’, ‘oshadhi (medicine)’ etc. These are real entities. But ‘anirvacaniyatva’ does not admit such a reality.

Reply: No. The word maya is not applied to the material cause, but to the product that is immediately co-
gnised or apprehended. The onlooker does not have any knowledge of the mantra or oshadhi, and the word maya is not applied to these. Mantra, oshadhi etc., are only the instrumental causes like kacadi dosas.

Elephant, horse etc., produced by maya have the nature of maya; and since they are ‘anirvacanīva’ their material cause too must be that ‘ajnana’ which is ‘anirvacaniya’. It is the same avidya which is the material cause of adhyasa.

Mantra etc., are brought about by a cause which is the ‘anady avidya’ or ‘anadyajnana’. Maya and avidya are one and the same and they have no beginning.

But it is the object like the elephant etc. that is said to be ‘mayamaya’. How can its cause also be maya?'

The reply is based on the text ‘mayantu prakritim vidyan mayinam tu mahesvaram’. Here the word maya is employed to convey the idea of a material cause. Maya and avidya are the material causes. Their ‘vikaras’ or modifications are adhyasa and maya. These have the same nature. Hence the cause and the effect as well are spoken of as being maya which term is identical with avidya.

**Objection**: Avidya is seen to bring about the ‘vyamoha’ for its ‘asraya’ who is the agent. Maya does not bring out such a thing. There is at least this much of difference in their natures.

**Reply**: No. If the ‘asraya’ is the percipient, he ought to have the ‘vyamoha’ when he sees the maayamaya object near by. If he is the doer or agent he does not have the ‘vyamoha’ not because he knows maya, not because he
knows that it is all maya; but because he knows that it is surely sublated later on, and because he knows also how to counteract it. If this were not the explanation, he ought to have the ‘vyamoha’ like the percipient.

**Objection:** Maya functions in obedience to the will of its owner, while avidya controls the will.

**Reply:** This difference too is faulty. The agent or deer has complete freedom in selecting the instrumental causes like mantra and oshadhi. Having secured these, he cannot prevent maya from bringing out the result. Avidya too functions in the same manner. If we place the finger on the eye-ball we will perceive two moons. Whether we should place the finger thus or no, is dependent on our will. But having placed it there we cannot prevent the two moons from appearing. After we rub the eyes we have the ‘Kesondraka bhrama’ (illusion of a woolly mass). Offering prayers and taking some medicines give rise to ‘svapna bhramas’. All these are cases of avidya and they are on a par with maya. These appearances (pratibhasah) continue to remain even when we have true knowledge; and they arise from the will of the doer.

Sastra vyavahara (the teaching of the system of philosophy) too does not maintain that maya is different from avidya. In the sruti passage, “Tasyaabhidhayanad yajanat tattva bhavad bhuyascante visva maya nivritthih”. We find the word maya employed to denote avidya that is dispelled by ‘tattva jnana’. In the surti passage, “taraty avidyam vifatam hrdi yasmin nivesite Yogi mayam ameyaya tasmaid vidyatmane namah”. We find that maya and avidya are
synonyms and they can be overcome by true knowledge. In the Vedanta Sutras we read the aphorism—“maya matram tu kartsyena anabhivyakta svarupatvat”, where the word maya is employed with reference to dream experience which is one of avidya. Sankara often writes ‘avidya maya’, ‘avidyatmika maya sakti’ etc. Padmapada too observes “avidya maya ksharam”. The author of *Brahma siddhi* too writes in the same manner, ‘Iyam avidya, maya, mithya pratyayah’.

Thus the identity in their nature and the ‘Vriddha vyavahara’ (usage by elders) go to show that maya and avidya are identical.

Yet when we emphasize the ‘vikshepa’ sakti’ (power of diffusion, of plurality), we speak of it as maya; and when we emphasize the ‘acchadana sakti’ (power of concealing) we call it avidya. This is only a difference in our use of the terms.

**ERROR**

Now the silver in the erroneous cognition is spoken of as maya maya because, unlike avidya which controls the will or ‘iccha’, maya is controlled by the will. If it controls the will, it can be called ‘avidya maya’. Either way it is only a difference arising from our use of the terms.

**Objection:** Then, as we apprehend why should we not accept an ultimately real silver in the apprehended ‘adhishthana’? And this will put an end to the defect of unnecessary assumption.

I4)
Reply: If it is the ultimately real silver, every one should be apprehending it thus.

Objection: Only those that have the ‘karana dosha’ apprehend it thus. Otherwise it is an ultimately real one.

Reply: If the silver is ultimately real, it does not require a ‘karana dosha’ to give rise to the knowledge of this real entity. If it requires a ‘karana dosha’ then in its absence there cannot be any apprehension. Just as in the absence of light, form cannot be apprehended, so in the absence of the defect silver too can’t be cognised. In the absence of the defect silver has to be cognised not only in the shukti, but every where.

Objection: Avidya is said to have its asraya in the self. Even if the silver is of the nature of this avidya, it ought to be cognised by all. Due to the avidya which is in the ‘idam amsavacchinna caitanya’ (consciousness conditioned by the thus), there has arisen a silver in front of us; and since this avidya is common to all, all should cognise the silver

Reply: Due to the ‘mantra’ the eye of the spectator gets a defect and fails to cognise the object as it is. Likewise only those who have the dosha are able to cognise the silver because this silver is ‘mayamatra’.

This silver is ‘sakshi bhasya’ and as such its asraya is said to be ‘sakshi caitanya’. This witnessing consciousness appears as silver when it is ‘idam akaravacchinna’. This ‘sakshi caitanya’ differs from individual to individual. Now, the silver is apprehended as the same as the shukti.
Such an integration of the two is also of the nature of avidya; and it is apprehended as silver only by that person whose ‘sakshi caitanya’ is responsible for this appearance. And just as my happiness cannot be apprehended by anyone other than myself, so is this silver.

That knowledge is not ‘bhranti’ needs no proof. When we take the ‘bhranti’ to be ‘mityatva’ we are assuming the barest minimum and we are not going contrary to experience: ‘Bhranti’ enables us to apprehend its nature as ‘mityarthajnana’.

BADHAKA PRARTYAKSHA. (Sublation)

There is the sublation of the erroneous cognition and it takes the form of ‘this is not silver’. The apprehension of this sublation (badhaka pratyaksha) by itself establishes the ‘mityatva’ of silver.

Objection: The subsequent negation (‘badha’) makes us understand the absence of silver in the apprehended ‘adhishthana’.

Reply: No. It only implies the mityatva of silver. Mityatva means the ‘abhava pratiyogi’ (contradictory of the negation) in the apprehended ‘adhishthana’. When we predicate the presence of an entity at a particular place and later negate it, this negation cannot refer to the mere absence; for it implies something positive. When there is the knowledge of the negation, the silver appears (avabhasate) as its own ‘abhava pratiyogi’ in the apprehended upadhi (adhishthana); and this is a perceptual apprehension.
The silver then comes to be the ‘abhava pratiyogi’ of the apprehended adhishthana through the knowledge of its negation. Such a silver can be only mithya rajata. We therefore say not only that ‘this is not silver’, but that ‘it appeared as mithya (Mithyaiva abhasishta). We refer to it as explicitly mithya; and this is the object of the negation.

**Objection:** Even if we take the silver to be that existing at another place and time, we can negate it and say ‘this is not silver’.

**Reply:** No. The silver is the object of negation and we have the knowledge of this object. This object was earlier apprehended as being the ‘this’ with which we have the sense-contact. If silver exists elsewhere, how can we apprehend it here and later negate it here? The negation, then, cannot have the form ‘this is mithya silver. It ought to have been ‘that is silver’ or ‘the silver is only buddhy akara’ (in the intellect as an image). If the error has arisen because of the non-discrimination between the perceived and the remembered, then too negation cannot take the form ‘this is mithya silver’. We see the ‘gavaya’ and remember that it is similar to the cow we have seen earlier. Here the true knowledge has taken the form of the awareness of similarity. Likewise we should say that ‘this shukti is similar to that silver which I have seen earlier.’

What is a negation (badha)? 1. Is it the obstruction of the acitivity at one place of a person who is desirous of something else? Now a mendicant cognises silver in the shukti and yet he does not have any pravritti. If the def-inition were correct, he cannot negate the silver, and yet he negates it.
2) If it is not the obstruction to the pruvritti, can it be the putting an end to the possibility of pravritti? No. I cognise silver now and the possibility of my pravritti is destroyed as I find that it is only shukti. Later on I again cognise silver. If the very possibility of pravritti is destroyed, I should not have the cognition of silver at all. Further, a thirsty person is in search of water; he sees snakes or thiever and controls his thirst. His pravritti for water is obstructed. Does the knowledge or cognition of snakes etc., function as the negation of the cognition of water?

(3) When two things are apprehended as 'avivikta', the later discrimination may be taken to constitute the negation. No. In the beginning all objects are apprehended as avivikta. Later on we are able to distinguish them with reference to one another. This latter 'viveka' does not constitute negation.

Does 'aviviktatva' mean not apprehending through discrimination? Or does it mean the apprehension of their identity? In the former case, is the apprehension through discrimination 'padartha jnanatirikta' (other than the knowledge of the object)? Or is it the 'padartha jnana' itself? When we have the 'padartha jnana', we do not apprehend this difference; and when we later on distinguish one object from another, we should be able to say that this cognition negates the earlier one.

So we ought to say that the apprehension of difference is the apprehension of the object itself. In such a case, as we apprehend an object we are apprehending also its difference; and hence there is no question of 'aviveka'.

Vivaranam

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4) Then one might say that ‘avivicktatva’ is cognising the objects as identical. An object is apprehended as having the nature of another object; and later on we come to cognise that one excludes the others. Can this be the negation? But take the first apprehension that ‘the pot is white’ Later on we come to apprehend that the whiteness of the pot is not a substance but a quality. This ought to be constituting the negation of the first apprehension.

In the theory upheld by the objection every object is defined in terms of identity-in-difference. In such a case when we apprehend the identity first and later cognise the difference, the result will be that every object negates itself.

5) Negation may than be defined as the apprehension of the ‘abhava pratiyogi’ in the apprehended ‘adhishthana. Then, is it the ‘abhava protiyogita’ (being contradictory of negation) of more knowledge? Or of the difference of the object known (jneya)? Negation cannot be the destruction (pradhvansa) of knowledge, since knowledge being momentary, is destroyed every moment. So the second alternative remains. Here we have to ask. Is there the negation of the apprehended object? Or of the unapprehended object? If it is the negation of the apprehended object, does this negation arise from the knowledge of that very object, or from that of another object? It cannot arise from the knowledge of that very object, for the apprehension goes to establish the validity of the prior knowledge. It cannot arise from the knowledge of another object; for the objects or knowledge being different, one cannot be the negation of the other.
There cannot be the negation of the unapprehended object.

6) Can negation be the dispelling (nivriti) of ajnana? No, for, in such a case, all the knowledges that dispel ajnana will have to constitute negation only.

Then what is negation? Ajnana has brought about the cognition of an object and this cognition does not give us the knowledge of its ‘adhishthana’. Now negation not only dispels the cognised object but also ajnana which is its cause. It gives us the knowledge of the ‘adhishthana’ also.

Then, is negation the dispelling of ajnana along with its product which is cognised here and now? Or is it the dispelling of ajnana whose products has obtained its ‘laya’ (involuition) in itself?

There is the cognition of silver in the shukti. Let us assume that later on the mind wanders after some other object. Then again the eye comes back and has the contact with shukti, There arises the knowledge of the ‘adhishtana’ and the ajnana is dispelled. Here we do not have the ‘dhwansa’ (destruction) of the immediate product (karya) of ajnana. Thus the first alternative is too narrow. The second alternative is not applicable in the case of ajnana which is dispelled along with its present or immediate product.

But in both the cases there is negation in so far as we have the dispelling of ajnana which has evolved itself in the form of the product. This is the definition of ‘negation’; and negation has its meaning only in the dispelling of such as ‘anavabodha’ (non-knowledge). Hence ‘badhyatva’ is taken to be ‘mithyatvam’.
DEFINITION OF ‘ADHYASA’
THAT IT IS TOO NARROW.

In the definition we find the word ‘smriti rupa’ which means ‘the form similar to that of memory’. From this we deduce samskara as one element. Since similarity involves difference, we get the sense-contact as the second element. Since the cognition is that of error and these two do not give rise to such a cognition. We arrive at the defect or dosha as the third element. These three elements are implied by smriti rupa. They give rise to the erroneous cognition which is the apprehension of one object as having the nature of another.

Object: This definition does not apply in all cases. It is too narrow and does not cover all the ‘lakshyás’ (Object). For example how can we explain the sorrow experienced in the dream? It is a case of adhyasa; and yet the definition does not seem to apply here. In every adhyasa there is an object external to the individual and something else is apprehended there in. This apprehension requires the contact of the sense organ with the external object. Now, in dream we cannot have such a contact of the sense organ with the external object. Both the sense organ and the external object are absent here. In the absence of any cause other than the samskara or ‘vasana’, we should say that in the dream cognition we have only the smriti and not smriti rupata.

Reply: We see the ‘gavya’ and remember the cow for it is said to be similar to the cow. Here our apprehension that the object is ‘gavya’ has arisen from memory;
and it is not erroneous. There is no dosha in a cognition that results from memory.

Further the dream cognition is not a case of memory. The object is cognised immediately and directly.

**Objection**: In the dream there is no contact with the eye, for the eye has ceased to function, and also because the object is not external. There cannot be any dosha since the eye itself is not functioning then. There cannot be any 'vishaya dosha' (defect in the object) also for this dream cognition. If the 'vishaya dosha' were the cause, is it 'jnaya manataya hetuh' or 'ajnayamanataya' (causal in the process of being known or not being known). Since the eye does not function then and since the mind cannot have a contact with the external directly, the former alternative is to be rejected. It cannot be the latter for the vishaya dosha that we apprehend in our waking moments has a specific cause. Further, there cannot be any 'pramāтри dosha' during sleep. Thus we do not have all the three factors necessary for adhyāsa. As such it cannot be an erroneous cognition.

**Reply**: This cognition arises from all the three factors working together; and it is a cognition which apprehends an object as having the nature of another. There is no contact of the object with the eye; and the object is apprehended immediately. It is neither a case of perception nor a case of memory. And as such it must be a third type of knowledge which is capable of giving us the nature of adhyāsa. Padmapada observes; “it has been said that the form of memory is only to make us apprehend the object of our prior or earlier experience”.

15)
The cognising individual of the dream world is different from the cognising individual of the waking stage. There is vijnana for this ‘pramata’ also, and there is his ‘antah karana’ which is the means of obtaining knowledge. This ‘pramata’ suffers from the doshas like sleep and ‘vata’; and he has also the samskara of the past experiences. Thus all the three factors are present here: and hence it is said that b'hramanti jnana’ is ‘smriti rupa’.

“There is the mind which is overcome by the defects like sleep, and which has all the samskaras. These samskaras are awakended by the ‘adrishta’ karma. The mind takes up that form which is necessitated by the ‘samskara visesha’. Such a form is ‘mithyartha vishaya’ and there arises knowledge” (Padmapada).

**Objection:** You may establish the ‘tatastha lakshana’ (definition per accidents). How can you establish the ‘svarupa lakshana’ (definition per se)? In adhyasa we have an object appearing at a place other than its own. What is its adhishthana?

**Reply:** “There is the avidya sakti in the immediate (aparoksa) consciousness of the individual (who is sleeping). This consciousness is determined or conditioned by ‘antah karana’. Such an avidya sakti appears (vivartate) as the ‘alambana’ for the object” (Padmapada).

The antah karana is overcome by the doshas like sleep and by the samskara. This is the instrumental cause of the mithyadhyasa. And there is the avidya sakti in the consciousness as conditioned by the antah-karana.
The ‘upadana’ is not the antah karana but the ‘mithya-
dhyasa. And the ‘adhishthana’ or the ‘this’ in the cogni-
tion is ‘manasa samyuktan’ (united with the mind); and it
is the consciousnessas conditioned by the avidya sakti.
Thus there is the samsarga with the sufficient instrumental
cause. As such this avidya sakti brings about the sufficient
cause for adhyasa; and it becomes as if (vivartate) it is the
alambana for the ‘mithyarthatha’. It is not the avidya sakti
that appears as the mithyarththa, for every adhyasa requires
the samsarga of the real with the unreal. But it is consci-
ousness itself that appears like that through the avidya
whose ‘asraya’ it is. Then we have the integration of the
real object with the unreal and it is this integrated entity
that appears. Consequently we have ‘paratra paravabhasah’.

The same explanation holds good of the erroneous
cognitions that arise in the waking moments. The shukti
as such is not the ‘adhishthana’ of silver. It is that consci-
ousness as conditioned by the shukti; for an unconscious
entity cannot manifest any other entity. Such a shukti is
the ‘alambana’ for siver.

When the sense organ has the contact with the external
object, then through the sense organ the ‘antah karana’
becomes or appears as (viparînamate) the external form.
Unless the antahkarana comes into contact with the object,
there can be no apprehension. In this pure antahkarana
there appears or arises the reflection of consciousness and
through the antahkarana there is taken the ‘vishaya samsa-
rga’ also.

Consciousness is ‘samsrishta’ (fused) with the external
adhishthana. Since this ‘adhishthana’ is only the ‘caitanya
vivarta’ through avidya. It is to be treated as the ‘adhishthana’ of consciousness.

This avidya sakti appears (vivartate) in the form of silver which is ‘samsrishta’ with the external ‘adhishthana’.

Hence that consciousness which is conditioned by the shukti is the ‘alambana’ for the silver; and as such we speak of ‘bahyalambana’ (external locus).

Everywhere the ‘alambana’ for the erroneous cognition is either pure consciousness itself or consciousness as conditioned by something. Hence it is but proper to say ‘paratva paravabhasah’, (the other appearing in the external).

There comes an objection from one who does not take this ‘adhishthana’ to be consciousness which appears everywhere and which assumes a variety of shapes like the sky. He takes the adhishthana to be the ahankara and asks: Then the ‘svapnartha pratibhasa’ (appearance of dream object) must be purely internal or inward. If this ahankara which is the ‘paricchinna atman’ (conditioned self) is the adhishthana, we should have the cognition ‘I am blue’ where the ‘T’ is the ‘this’ of normal cognition. In such a manner we should be having our dream cognitions.

The reply is that the adhishthana is the self which is pure consciousness and which is distinct from ahankara. And everywhere we have the ‘samanadhi karanya’ of the object (Cetya) with the cit or consciousness. As such we admit that the apprehension is internal.
Objection: If there is the 'cit samanadhikarana' for all apprehensions or appearances, we cannot have the experience of 'vicchinna desa'. If the object is apprehended here or there, we can say that the object has 'antar anubha-vasraya (having a locus of experience internally).

Reply: The object is apprehended not as here or there, but as 'this'. The 'this' means that it is distinct from the self. Then the 'avabhasa' ceases to be internal.

Objection: Even this 'avabhasa' as distinct from the self is really internal or inward. Reply: Even space is not external, for its adhishthana is the self. Difference too is apprehended through the 'samsrishti' with the unconditioned consciousness.

If the objector brings in the self as conditioned by ahaṅkara and makes it the adhishthana, the cognition of difference will have to take the form of 'I am difference'.

All the objections are based on the view that the 'aḥan-karavacchinna atman' (self as conditioned by the ego) is the adhishthana'. The reply takes the pure consciousness to be the adhishthana. Now Padmapada proceeds to make this point clearer and plainer. He begins to state clearly that pure consciousness which is the self-huminous self, is the locus.

When the self is the basis of all cognitions, the apprehensions can be only internal. This is true of the cognitions of the waking state also. The 'pramanajnana' gives us the immediate experience with the self. This immediate experience does not differ from the immediacy of the obj-
ect. Both the subject and the object have the ‘eka rupa prakasana’ (one form of appearance). Hence even in the waking stage the object is experienced as enveloped by the ‘antar aparoksanubhava’.

The dream cognition does not differ essentially and fundamentally from the other cognition. The difference is only one of degree, not of kind. It is ‘pratibhasika bheda’ (momentarily apparent difference).

**Objection**: Why should we think that there is only one consciousness? Why cannot the ‘vishaya gata Caitanyani, be different and distinct from ‘aham avacchinnna caitanya’?

**Reply**: If they are different, the object being ‘jada’ (unconscious), cannot manifest itself. Just as the pot enveloped by darkness cannot be manifested in the absence of light falling on it, so is the object incapable of being manifested if it is not illumined by consciousness” (Padmapada). If the objects which are by themselves devoid of consciousness, do not have the samsarga with the ‘atmavagati prakasa (illumination of self realisation), we cannot have the sambhandhavabhasa in the form they are known by me.’

If consciousness is everywhere, how is it we have the apprehension of the distinction or difference between the self and the not-self as ‘I’ and ‘this’? The reply is that even in the waking state this ‘vicchedavabhasa (appearance of difference) is due to maya. The whole universe has its ‘asraya’ only in consciousness. This consciousness is devoid of parts and as such there can be no ‘Pradesa bheda’ in it
Consciousness appears everywhere with the distinctions of internal and external, it is no longer akhanda and advitiya (non-dual). We cannot apprehend the 'svarupabheda' (difference from others in essence) unless we have the difference brought about by the differences in the objects. These differences are due to the conditioning upadhis (limiting factors). Hence consciousness is said to be devoid of parts.

Such an entity which is 'niramsa' (without parts) is either an anu (atomic) or is 'ananta' (Infinite). But it is apprehended everywhere as having 'madhyama parimana'. To this we reply that the 'parimana' (magnitude) of consciousness is the same as that of the 'upadhi' which conditions it.

When consciousness thus becomes the adhishtana (locus, ground) even during the cognitions of the waking stage, it need not be said again that the same holds good of dream cognitions. The upadhi which conditions it brings about the empirical distinctions of internal, external etc.

Padmapada gives another explanation as an alternative way of explaining the same phenomenon. This does not represent his conclusions, for the mind, not being a sense-organ, cannot by itself come into contact with an external object. This is only an 'abhypagamavada' (theory assuming the opponent's view) presented by Padmapada.

So far we have disproved the contention that the definition of adhyasa is too narrow.

That it is too wide

It is argued that even though mithya, adhyasa, bhranti and avidya are not present, we do find that there is 'anya-
syā anyavabhāsa’ (other appearing as another). As such there is ‘ativityapti’ (too wide). ‘There is ‘brahmadhyasa’ on names. How is this possible? There is no ‘karana dosha’ here; nor do we find ‘mithyarthavabhāsa’.

The reply is that adhyāsa is defined as apprehending an object as having the nature of another. In the case of the ‘brahmadhyasa’ we find that an individual has his ‘manasi kriya’ (mental action of mediation etc.) with reference to some object. “This meditation is regulated by a ‘codana’ (injunction) and it demands ‘icchato anushthana’. It is a mental act and not a knowledge (or cognition). When there is an object giving us a knowledge arising from ‘dushtakaraṇa’, we consider the object to be ‘mithya vastu’. In adhyāsa proper we have some knowledge or other, while in upasana we have only a mental act” (Padmapadā).

We cannot say that knowledge itself is the ordained here; for desire (iccha) can neither create nor prevent knowledge. The desire of the individual gives rise to ‘prayatna’. This desire comes into existence because of an injunction. Where such an ‘iccha prayatna’ is not involved (nirapeksa) there we have the sufficient cause for knowledge. For even if we do not desire it, we do have the ‘apishta darsana’ (unwelcome apprehension). As such the ‘brahmadhyasa’ refers to a mental act. It is not a case of ‘adhyāsa.

**ADHYĀSA LAKSANA**

Since there is no unanimity amongst the critics in defining adhyāsa it is impossible to give an acceptable definition. The defferences amongst the critics, refer to the ‘avarupa’, ‘tatva’ (nature), ‘desa visesha’ (space) and ‘kala visesha’ of
the ‘adhisthana’ and adhyasyamana’. They all agree in admitting that adhyasa is no other than apprehending one object as having the nature of another.

But such a definition is lopsided, since the cases involving the relationship of substance, quality etc., will have to become erroneous cognitions. ‘Khando gauh’ will have to be an erroneous cognition since ‘Khandatva’ is apprehended in the cow, the cow is cognised as having ‘Khandatva’. This implies that when both the elements are real and when both exist together, we cannot have adhyasa. Hence we have to say that adhyasa is the apprehension (avabhasa) of a content which unites a real object with an unreal one. With this in mind, the commentator states the view of error held by others.

Of the three views stated, the first is Atmakhyati and Anyathakhyati; the second is Akhyati; The third is Sunya khyati if we interpret it to mean that shukti is cognised as having the nature of silver which is ‘asat’ or ‘abhava’ (non-existent). This third is Anyatha Khyati if we interpret it to mean the cognition of the nature of silver which is the negation of shukti.

Padmapada: “To present his own view in a clearer and purer form, Sankara is stating the views of others on the nature of adhyasa. According to the first view, the silver is distinct from shukti; there is the cognition of the property of silver in the shukti. This silver has the form of knowledge, or it exists elsewhere. The second view states that adhyasa is an erroneous cognition arising from the non-apprehension of discrimination between the adhis-
hthana and the adhyasta. There is the ‘ekatva Bhrama. According to the third view silver is adhyasta on the shukti. ‘Rajatadi rupatva’; is the ‘viperita dharmatva’ of the shukti. This ‘kalpana’ is assumed here. ‘kalpana’ means the appearance (avabhasamanata) of the non-existing. All these views agree with ours in holding that adhyasa is the cognition of an object as having the naturu of another. This definition does not deny the ‘paravabhasa’ which is conveyed by the word ‘paratra’ (externally) in the original definition. How? In the first view the silver which is of the form of knowledge or which is elsewhere, is cognised as the nature of the shukti. In the second view, shukti and silver have a distinct and independent existence and they are taken to be appearing as indistinct (aprithak). This meaning we have to derive from their statement. For in this theory they have to accept a ‘samsarga jnana’ (relational cognition) which is mental (as in sankhya); or they have to accept ‘samsargabhimana’ (as in the Prabhakara system). In the third view, there is the ‘pratibhasa’ (momentary appearance) of the form of silver for the shukti.

Since ‘smriti rupa’ has been found in all the views to be so significant, and since this implies only perceptual contact and dosha, does it mean that we need not emphasize the three factors? No. “For, smriti rupatva’ and ‘purva drishtatva’ are factors common to all the theories of adhyasa.

Nir adhishthana bhrama

Objection: An erroneous cognition is the knowledge of the padartha (object) itself arising from the dosha like avidya and from the samskaras of the previous errone-
ous cognitions. The erroneous cognition does not stand in need of a real object and in need of the 'pramana karana like the sense-contact. As such this cognition, says the nihilist Buddhist, has no 'adhishtana'.

Reply: In the absence of the 'adhishtana' conveyed by the word 'paratva' of the definition, we have to accept niradhishtanadhyasa which is illogical. To avoid such an illogical conclusion this word 'paratra' (in the 'external') is employed. We can neither perceive nor conceive such an adhyasa which is devoid of an adhishtana. Even the appearance of the 'kesondraka' has its basis (locus) in the 'tejo avayava'.

Is error the mere knowledge of the 'padartha'? Or is it the product of causes like avidya? If the first alternative is true, then even the knowledge of 'sunya' would have to be a case of error. It is the knowledge of an object at a place other than its own. The Buddhist argument is 'nir upapattika'. (unfounded). If the second alternative is taken, then by the method of agreement and difference we can say that the locus too is cognised.

Objection: There is the 'samvit' (consciousness) which apprehends the silver, and there is the silver which is apprehended only by the 'samvit'. From this it can be argued that it is a case of 'sadhishtana bhrama' where one is the locus for the other. As such we need not bring in as the locus a third real entity. The seed is the locus of the plant, and the plant is the locus of the seed.

Now, the locus is 'always different from that which is adhyasta. If one is the locus of the other they ought to
imply mutually one another and this is impossible. But such is seen in the relationship between the seed and the plant.

**Reply:** In the 'bijankura' (seed and plant) relation we do not find that one is the cause of the other in a mutual relation. For this seed gives a plant and the plant gives rise to a new seed. The new seed gives rise to a different plant. In this way we do not have 'anyonyasraya' (vicious circle) but only a 'karana-parampara' (an infinite causal series). On the other hand the samvit which apprehends the silver is taken to be the locus of the silver; and the silver is the locus of the same samvit. This is impossible.

**Objection:** The silver has its locus in the samvit. The silver has its locus in the previous samvit; and the samvit has its locus in its own object. In this way we can assume an infinite series here also.

**Reply:** Then the present samvit is the locus of the silver which comes in the next moment; and the silver of that moment is the locus for the samvit of the next moment. In this way we have to argue; and this will put an end to the momentary nature of cognition or knowledge. For, the samvit of the previous moment must continue to be there so that the silver of this moment may be adhyasta on it.

**Objection:** Even in the 'bijankura', we do not find both the seed and its 'ankura' coexisting even though one is the 'upadana' (material cause) of the other.
Reply: Here too it is not the mere ‘bijankura parampara’ (causal series or chain) that can bring about the ‘anvayi karanaatva siddhih’. In bringing about the plant, the seed as a cause functions not by itself but by undergoing a series of changes. And by the time the plant comes up, the seed is no longer there as the seed. The seed is ‘anvita’ (involved) with the plant. It exists in the plant and as the plant. If this were not there, there can be no plant. That it is not the mere ‘bijankura parampara’ is established by the ‘pratiiti’ (apprehension), and by the factual data also. Those entities (avyavah) which function together (anugatah) as giving rise to the ‘bijady arambha’, they constitute the ‘upadana’. This does not mean that the seed etc., is useless. The seed and the ‘ankura’ have the mutual ‘nimitta naimittikata sambandha’ (casual relationship).

Objection: Just like this, we may say that the samvit is prior ‘anvita’ (fused) with the latter, viz., the silver; and that the former is the ‘adhyasa nimitta’ for the latter.

Reply: There is no pramana for this. We accept that the seed is the cause and that the ‘ankura’ (plant) is the effect because this is seen (drishtatvat). No such relationship is seen between the samvit and the silver. The relationship between the seed and the ‘ankura’ is seen in certain cases and we extend it to all seeds in so far as they are seeds. Since this is seen to be a fact there is no fallacy of infinite regress. As regards the relationship between the samvit and the silver, we have to assume their casual relation in the very beginning. It is not an assumption based on experience, but on a faulty analogy. As such this relationship is not a ‘drishta parampara’ (proven serves) but an
andha parampara (unproven series). The andha parampara alone involves the infinite regress.

All erroneous cognitions are of the form ‘this is silver’, ‘this is a snake’. Here we have two entities conveyed by the ‘this’ and the ‘silver’. The ‘this’ is the locus; and as such it is said that error is ‘paratra paravabhasah’ (an other appearing as another elsewhere). Even if we examine the latter negative judgment, we will have to admit the ‘adhisithana’. We find that the object which is apprehended as giving the erroneous cognition, does not admit the ‘bhranty amsa’ because of the knowledge of another ‘visishtamsa’. This negation too implies that the previous cognition is a ‘sadhishthara bhrama’ (of error grounded in a fact).

First there is the cognition ‘this is silver’ and later we negate the silver. If there is no ‘avadhi’ in the form of the ‘this’, there cannot arise such a negative judgment.

**Objection**: Instead of the negation taking the form of ‘this is not a snake’, it is also seen to have the form of ‘not a snake’. Inference and the word of elders do thus give us merely the ‘sarpabhava’ (non-snakes) and not the ‘amsantar’ as qualified by the ‘abhava’ of the snake.

**Reply**: But even in such cases, there arises the question ‘what is this’? We then find the locus (avadhi) to be the object in itself which exists before us. There too we apprehend the mere object as qualified by the negation of the snake; for the negation implies the object mistaken.

**Objection**: Take the statement, ‘Pradhanam nasti’ (there is no prakriti), where the pradhana’ is taken to be the
cause of the word; and where it means the three constituent ‘gunas’. In this negative judgement we are not apprehending any other object as qualified by the negation of the pradhana or of the three gunas; for the pradhana cannot be said to be adhyasta on any other entity.

**Reply:** When we negate the pradhana as being the cause of the world, something which is the cause is there as the basis of this negation.

Another explanation of the negative judgement is possible. In all erroneous cognitions the ‘alambana’ is the witnessing consciousness; and this has been found by us earlier. And even in the negation of the alleged ‘niradhishtana niravadhika bhrama’, we have this consciousness as the ‘adhishtana’ for error and as the ‘avadhi’ for negation. When we negate the ‘kesondraka’ that which is negated is the reality of the kesondraka and not the reality of our apprehension (‘bodha’); and this ‘bodha’ implies the ‘sakshin’ as the ‘avadhi’.

**Objection:** When there is the negation of the object, there is also the negation of that knowledge. So with the negation of the error, there must be also the negation of the ‘sakshi caitanya’ which makes the objection appear thus. As such ‘sakshin’ cannot be the locus.

**Reply:** This conclusion is impossible since that which is negated is only the ‘kesondraka’ appearance of the ‘sakshin’ and not the sakhini itself. The ‘sakshin’ is not negated since it is also the sakshin of the negation and since it is also the cause of further erroneous cognitions. It remains as the ‘adhishtana’ or ‘avadhi’.
Negation, then, involves or implies the reality of the 'avadhi'. Without the 'avadhi' there can be no knowledge of negation. And this 'avadhi' itself is not therefore negated. This 'sakshin' or 'avadhi' is not negated since it is not internally differentiated. Such an 'avadhi' is that consciousness which is 'kutastha' and 'approkshaika rasa'.

There is then a locus for all erroneous cognitions. In such a case even the 'adhyasta' cannot be 'sunya'. It is not an unreal (asat) entity, for an unreal entity is not capable of appearing (pratibhasa) immediately and directly. If we deny the mere appearance as such, there is no error. Such a denial would be as meaningless as the statement, 'the sunya does not appear'. If it does not appear, how can we say it is sunya? If it appears, it is no longer sunya.

**Objection:** All that is adhyasta is sunya or unreal even according to your view.

**Reply:** Who said that? We have often repeated that it is of the nature of avidya which is beginningless and which is 'anirvacaniya'. It is distinct from the sunya of the Buddhists. And if we say that the silver is 'asat' we only mean that it is different from 'sat', and not that it is unreal.

**Objection:** During the erroneous cognition the error may have the nature of 'anirvacaniyatva'. But when there arises the negative judgement, we say 'this is not silver'. This negation implies the sunyatva of silver. If when true knowledge arises, avidya is seen to be unreal (nirupakhyā asat); and hence why cannot we speak of it as 'asat'.


Reply: All the theories agree that even though the object (viz., silver) exists during the cognition, it is non-existent after the negative judgement arises. We accept this much and you can say that it is 'asat'.

Objection: The object may be 'sunya' after its 'vinasa' (destruction) has taken place. But an object cognised as existent during error, cannot become sunya. It exists in some other place.

Reply: We have then to ask – Does the 'badhakajnana' (cognition of negation) itself make us apprehend the reality of silver at some other place? Or does it mean that it is impossible to negate it here? It cannot be the former, for the 'badhakajnana' negates only that silver which is taken to exist in a specific place and at a specific time. It does not imply its existence elsewhere, for we do not have the apprehension that 'that is silver' after this negation. We do not have the apprehension that the silver is at some other place and at some other time; or that it is in 'buddhi'. A sentence enables us to apprehend only that meaning which it is capable of conveying. The negative judgment 'this is not silver' does not have the power to convey the meaning that the silver exists elsewhere. And this latter meaning is not the meaning of the negative judgment. Thus, one takes the rope that is far away to be a snake. And an elder who is near by tells him that 'this is not a snake'. This sentence only conveys the absence of the snake here, not its existence elsewhere; because this sentence does not have the power to give such an apprehension.

Objection: An object like silver is apprehended. We cannot deny its existence here if we do not assume its
existence elsewhere. Thus through arthapatti (implication) we can say that the negative judgment is capable of implying the existence of silver elsewhere.

**Reply:** No. Even arthapatti will not help us in deriving such an implication. If the person who is putting forth is a Mimamsaka, he accepts anyatha khyati or akhyati; and in both such an interpretation is an impossibility.

Aryathakhyati rejects samsarga (relation) and yet it is cognised as external. In either case negation is possible only if the object negated exists immediately. And yet it is negated. As regards Akhyati; there is the exist of the Ritviks from the yajasala in Jyotishtoma, holding one other's 'kaccha' (cloth). If the 'pratiharta' loses hold of it, there is ordained 'sarvadakshina' to complete the sacrifice. If the udgatri loses hold of it, it is ordained that the sacrifice is to be completed without 'dakshina'. If both lose hold of it, we should normally take up the 'sarvasva daksina'; but it is decided that the sacrifice should be completed without 'dakshina'. The second 'viccheda' functions as the 'badha' of the former. Here only the second case is ordained.

We cannot say that pravrtti itself is prevented in the case of the former; for the prevention of pravrtti is not a case of 'badha'. Further take the case of a person having his 'pravrtti' with reference to a sacrifice. He cognises the 'pratibandha' from the king or from the thieves; and the 'pravrtti' is prevented. Yet there is no badha, so far as the 'yagadibuddhi' is concerned. Such an individual may perform the sacrifice at any time. In spite of the 'pravritty anupapatti' with reference to the Yaga, we find the possibility of pravrtti.
The same conclusion arises even if we take a normal experience. We apprehend an object in a particular place; and in this adhishthana (ground) we negate it later on. We do not assume the existence of the object in another similar upadhi. Take the sentence ‘the broken or destroyed pot is not here’. The broken or destroyed pot is negated in this apprehended place; and we cannot assume the existence of this pot in some other place. Thus an object which is negated in the apprehended here and now cannot be said to have its existence in the unapprehended there and then.

**Objection**: Then how do you apprehend the totally or absolutely non-existent?

**Reply**: What we apprehend is having apprehended only ‘anirvaccaniya mithya vastu sadbhava’ (existence of the nonreal which is inexplicable). And this is arrived at from our pratiti.

**Objection**: There was silver before, and it is not there now. These facts tell us that the negation has become possible because of the difference in the time of the apprehensions.

**Reply**: No. What is said to be not existing in all the three tenses is only the empirically real silver. With reference to such a silver we say that such a silver, which does not have its adhishthaana there (which is nirupa-dhika) is not there. The negation refers to the empirical silver and not to the praatibhaasika (apparent) silver. From the negation of the empirical silver we get at the apprehended silver through implication as being
the 'mithyaa rajata'. Hence after the negation we are able to refer to the apprehended content as 'mithyava rajatam abhaat'.

Instead of this, if we were to admit the difference in time, it ought to be the real silver. The immediate apprehension of 'this is no snake' refers only to the 'abhaava' of the snake and not to its existence elsewhere. For, the apprehension settles down to the 'this' and we say 'this is a rope'. Hence we speak only of the apprehended 'adhis-thaana'.

The cognition of the this as a rope negates the snake. This arises from the sense-contact. The same knowledge might arise also from the sentence 'this is no snake'. In both cases we are left with the 'adhishtana' and not with the snake that exists elsewhere. Hence there can be no 'adhyasa' which has no 'adhishtana'.

If so, let the definition be only 'paratra purva drish-tavabhasah (seeing outside what was seen earlier), for smriti rupatva (form or nature of memory) seems to be inconsistent with the definition.

Yes, the knowledge of an object seen before has 'smrititva' (quality of memory) only, and not smritirupatva (form of memory). But we cannot speak of adhyasa for the 'smriti vishaya' (object of memory). So let the definition be only 'paratra smriti rupavabhasah'. Then we mean by it that an object having 'smriti rupa' is apprehended elsewhere. 'Smriti rupatva' qualifies 'paravabhasa'. If there is no 'purva drishtatva' we cannot attribute 'smriti rupatva'.
Yes, the expression ‘purvadrishta (seen earlier) is employed for the sake of clarity (Padmapadā).

Erroneous cognition needs a locus with which we have the contact of the eye. Then we can drop ‘smriti rupa’ from the definition. Does the word ‘smriti rupa’ mean that the erroneous cognition arises from the samskara? Or that it involves the ‘sambheda’ (fusion) of the past experience with the present one? Or that which has similarity with memory?

When there is a doubt like this, the author of the Tika proceeds to make clear that it means only ‘samskara janyatvam’. As such he says that it is the appearance (avabhasa) of something that was seen (drishta) earlier. It is not the appearance of the earlier perception (darsana). The other apprehended is the ‘sajatiya’ (similar to) the object seen earlier; and this makes us accept it to be ‘anirvacaniya rajata’. If it is said to be a case of ‘bhranti’ (illusion)only, we reply that we have the appearance of a real object having the ‘mithya vastu sambheda’ (fusion with the unreal). Otherwise many cognitions which are not erroneous would become erroneous. This is the logical argument given so far. However adhyasa is also ‘lokanubhava siddha (fact of experience). It does not mean that the logical argument is useless.

Sankara refers to our experience in the world and this experience goes to prove the validity of adhyasa. And he has given the definition of the svarupa (nature) of adhyasa which is ‘loka siddha’. Logical argument can only support this fact of experience; as such it is not necessary to multiply the arguments.
Samkara gives two illustrations. The first is: shuktika appears like silver', and the second is; 'one moon appears as two'.

**Objection:** The first sentence does not represent the erroneous cognition, for we apprehend 'this silver' only. We are not then aware of it as shukti appearing like the silver. This sentence does not represent even a negation, for in the negative judgment we do not say that 'this is not like silver'. It is not the shukti but the silver that appears; as such the words 'shuktika' and 'rajetavat' (like silver) in the sentence are faulty.

**Reply:** With reference to the 'badhaka jnana' (cognition of negation), it is said that shukti appears like silver; and this presents the definition of adhyasa. Either reference to the object of the 'badhaka jnana' or the implication of the 'badhaka jnana' establishes adhyasa and makes out the apprehended content to be 'mithya rajata'. This object being mithya it is employed with the suffix 'vat' as 'rajetavat'. Thus this sentence is expressed keeping in mind both the lakshana' and the 'lakshya' of adhyasa (definition and the object).

The true knowledge which arises later on reveals that the this is the shukti which is real. With reference to this real shukti Samkara has employed shuktika in the example. The shukti has the svarupa (form) of the non-silver with which we have the contact; and since it appeared as having the 'mithyaratjata sambheda', he has employed 'rajetavat'. Due to the temporary doshas and from the later negation we are able to comprehend the silver as mithya. When we speak of the 'mithyaratjata sambheda' with the shukti, we
employ the word mithya to describe or define the apprehended silver, not to exclude the other silver. We refer to this silver as mithya not by recognising its difference from the real silver.

**Objection:** If the silver is mithya, since it is predicated of the this, the this too ought to be mithya. And when the this is mithya, we have ‘nir adhissthana bhrama’.

**Reply:** The silver is not the object of the (asamparayukta) sense contact; and the appearance (avabhasa) of the thisness does not belong to the silver.

**Objection:** If the silver does not have the contact with the eye, how can we say that it is immediately cognised?

**Reply:** But the silver is cognised as being in the this with which we have the contact. Those who have the samskara are able to cognise the silver immediately because of some defect or the other. And it is the sense organ having the defect that gives rise to this knowledge. It is an immediate experience arising in the perceptual one.

Thus in the example of the shutika we find the silver to be the anatma (not-self) of the this with which we have the sense-contact.

Consciousness which is ‘niranjana’ has the ‘pratibhasa’ as the I; and it is that element (amsa) which is the not-this; The this is the not-self which is ‘cidavabhasya’ ‘(illumined or manifested by consciousness). Even though there is no ‘Yusmad arthatva’ (being an object); still in
so far as there is 'cidavabhasyatva' we get "the" Yusmad artha' which is the 'ahamkara' and which is adhyasta on consciousness. This is the implication of the first example. The second example implies the 'bhedavabhasa' (appearance of difference) between the self and the Absolute; and this is the 'anatma rupo bhedavabhasah,'.

Objection: 'Ahamkaradi samghata' is adhyasta on the self which is 'advitiya caityany prakasatman', (non-dual, self-luminous consciousness). This self is the percipient and to explain the adhyasa here we require three factors. First, in every adhyasa we have a locus which is distinct from the adhyasta; and so we require an adhissthana. Secondly, there should be a 'pramana jnana' which can give us valid knowledge of the adhissthana. Thirdly we need a percipient. Here we have to say that the self is all these three factors.

This implies a good deal. There is one dosha belonging to the locus, another attached to the percipient, and a third possessed by the 'prama karana' (instrument of knowledge). Then all these doshas must be said to be in the self.

This is not true, for the self is pure. Consciousness is the knowledge that makes us apprehend the adhyasa and the 'vishaya'; and this consciousness is not something which comes into existence now or hereafter. If the self is adhyasta on the self, we cannot get that knowledge which requires the three causes - viz., 'samskara, sense-contact with the object and the doshas; and these causes are essential in all erroneous cognitions. The adhissthana in every adhyasa has a general (samanya) nature and a specific element out of which only the former is cognised.
The self then ought to be the adhishthana whose general nature alone is cognised and not the specific nature. But such a thing is impossible in the case of the self. And finally the adhishthana must exist external to the percipient. All difficulties make the anatmadhyasa on the self impossible. Hence the objector asks;

The object exists external to the percipient in every adhyasa. Here we have the 'karana dosha', the doshas itké timira (darkness) attached to the sense-organs. Due to these doshas we apprehend only one 'amsa' of the object and we are prevented from cognising the other 'amsa'. Such a thing is not possible here. The self is not brought about by any cause other than itself; and this rules out the 'amsavabhasa' (non-appearance) due to the dosha of the cause; This is impossible with regard to consciousness, which is 'niramsa' (partless) and 'svayam jyothi' (self-luminous). But is it not a fact that there is the anavabasha of Brahma svarupa? No, for if this were true, this 'anavabhasa' would not give rise to the 'anavabhasa' and 'viparyasa' of the self. When the shukti is not apprehended, do we have the non-apprehension or 'viparyasa' of the pillar?

But the self is not different from Brahman, for it is said 'anena jivena atmana anupravisya'. And hence this non-apprehension may be said to belong only to the self.

If this position were accepted then it is absolutely impossible to have avidya in the self. The self is of the nature of vidya. And the text 'tasya bhasa sarvam idam, goes to show that everything is made manifest only by the consciousness which is the self (Padmapada).
In the case of a normal erroneous cognition, we apprehend the general nature of the object and we have the non-apprehension of its specific nature. Likewise we cannot infer the same process as regards the self by cognising its general nature of existence and by the non-apprehension of its specific nature as constituted by 'cit' and 'ananda'. We cannot do so because the self is not 'karanantara ayatta' (brought about by other causes), and because it is devoid of parts. Whether the self is 'madhyama parimana' or 'anu' or 'ananta' it is 'nir amsa' (without parts).

**Objection**: It may be 'niramsa'. But so is 'akasa' which does fully manifest its nature.

**Reply**: Such a thing is impossible for the self because it is 'svayam jyotih'. Such an entity has 'avabhasa' completely as long as it exists. It is fully luminous. Such are the passages 'atrayam purusah svayam jyotih', 'atmapasya jyotih' etc.

**Objection**: By 'jyotih' we cannot mean the mere 'prakasaguna' (quality called light) since that would make the self something that has a property ('guna'). Hence we should say that 'jyotih' is a substance like 'prakasaguna'. There is a pot and the knowledge of a pot, and the knowledge of a pot. The relation between these two is 'guna nishtha' (having quality as its locus) because it is 'jnana nishtha'. In the absence of theguna these two cannot be related and so we speak of jnana as being the guna. Likewise jyotih may be taken to be a 'prakasavad dravyam' (substance like light). This 'prakasa' is the 'janya' (product) of the self; and from the knowledge of this 'janya')
(viz. prakasa). We speak of the self as having the 'prakasa guna'; and hence it is called jyotih (luminous).

**Reply**: This is impossible. There is 'anynimitta prakasa samsarga' (relation with light caused by another) for all entitles. And to show that such a thing is impossible in the case of the self, it is explicity said that it is 'svayamjyotih'. And the word 'eva' in the second passage clearly states that the self itself is its own jyotih.

**Objection**: Why can't we say that there is no 'karakantara apeksha' (related to another agent) here; and that as such the self creates knowledge in itself by itself, whence the word 'svayam' is an adjective?

**Reply**: No; for the substantive is jyotih itself whence it does not stand in need of a 'karakantara'.

Further, knowledge is not something that newly comes into existence; and when we reject jnana 'janma' (coming of knowledge into existence), there can be no 'karakapeksa' (reflexive relation).

**Objection**: The knowledge of the object is seen to come into existence, to arise from the object. As such we do find that there is 'jnana janma'.

**Reply**: No. We speak of the 'prakasa guna' of the self because of the 'prakasa' itself. This 'prakasa' only reveals that the substance has come into existence. Take eg. the 'pradipa' (lamp) which is said to have 'prakasa'. The 'pradipa' is its 'asraya' and the upadhi; and in this upadhi we find the substance coming into existence. We do not find the prakasa coming into existence in the pradipa;
but we only see the pradipā coming into existence since it is manifested by the prakāsa. From this we have to conclude that the word jyotih does not mean that a ‘prakāsa guna’ is born in the self.

The argument is: Anything that has an asrayopadhi, (conditioned by the locus) is not born ‘in its asrayopadhi because it is prakāsa itself; and the ‘pradipā prakāsa’ is the illustration.

There is the ‘jnana parinama (evolutionary process of knowledge) in the antahkarana, and this is generally known as ‘vṛitti jnana’ (psychosis). Even when there is this vṛitti-jnana there is no ‘prakāsa gunodaya’; for the vṛitti jnana is not really jnana, though we speak of it as jnana. The antahkarana is a substance like ‘prakāsa’; the vṛitti jnana is an evolute of this antahkarana. Just as clay is evolved into the forms of pot etc., so does antahkarana have the evolution into the form of knowledge. Both the antahkarana and the pot are ‘jada’; but one is seen to have the ‘prakāsa guna’ and the other not. This is because the antahkarana is by nature a ‘prakāsa guna vad dravya’.

When we speak of vishaya jnana (knowledge of the object), does the word jnana mean ‘svarupa jnana’ or vṛitti’? No where do we find ‘svarupa jnana’ to be that which comes into existence. So it may be said that we do find that the vṛitti comes into existence in the antahkarana. But it is jnana that brings about the ‘arthaprakāsa’ (manifestation of the object) for the knower; and this jnana has its asraya in the self, if we can make such a distinction only for the sake of convenience. And when the word jnana is applied to the vṛitti, it is purely a conventional (aupacarika), and not a real usage.
Nor can jnana, be a substance having the self as its ‘asraya’. If jnana has ‘prakasa guna’, it means that the self has this property; and in such a case the self cannot be ‘svayam jyotih’ (self-luminous).

**Objection:** The ‘Prakasa’ has its ‘asrayopadhi’ in the antakarana, and it is not born in this upadhi. Then as the ‘jada prakasa guna’ it may not come into being; but it can come into being as ‘cit prakasa guna’.

**Reply:** No. Take the mirror in which is reflected the face. The prakasa is already there whence the reflection becomes possible. It reflects the face when the face is present and does not reflect it when the face is not there. And when the mirror is covered with dust etc., there is no destruction of the ‘prakasaguna’ but only the prevention of the ‘prakasa guna’ from appearing. Now, the self has its ‘asrayopadhi’ which it illumines, and in which it does not come into being. And what we say is the ‘tirodhana nirakarana’ (negation of the disappearance) of the vidyam..na prakasa (illumination that is present) only. When the dust is rubbed off, the mirror is again able to reflect.

**Objection:** But the prakasa guna seems to come into existence only when there is the pradipa.

**Reply:** In the case of the pradipa that which comes into existence is the pradipa itself and not the prakasa guna.

The self is spoken of as ‘prajnana ghana’ (integral knowledge) and it can be ‘prajnana ghana’ only when it is completely ‘prajnana’ alone. This expression tells us that the self is Caitanya jyotih (effulgence that is consciousness)
and not ‘jada jyotih’. Likewise we have passages ‘vijna- nam anandam’, ‘prajnanam anandam brahma’ etc.

**Objection**: ‘In vijnanam brahma’ we have only ‘jnitr abedha’ (non-difference from knower) and not ‘bodha abheda’ (non-difference from knowledge). By jnana we should mean ‘bhavartha’ and not ‘jnatritva’ (knower-ness). Jnana means knowledge and not the knower.

**Reply**: ‘Bhavartha’ is ‘kriyatmaka’ (having the nature of an activity) and knowledge is not an act but an existent state.

Further, it is easier and better to accept ‘ananya nimi- tta prakasatva (uncaused luminosity) for the self. The prakasa is not something which comes into being from outside (agantuka), because it has no prior non-existence. There is no pramana to prove that prakasa guna comes to the self from somewhere.

**Objection**: There is an element in the nature of Brahman which is not cognised or apprehended; and this is a fact of experience – i.e., there is the ‘anavabhasa’ (non-appearance) of Brahma svarupa.

**Reply**: Then just as in the case of the shuktí there will be the ‘anavabhasa’ and ‘viparyaya’ (opposite) for Brahman only. There is no valid means to show that the self is identical with Brahman, yet the ‘anavabhasa’ and ‘viparyaya’ cannot be for the self.

**Objection**: When two substances have no causa relation, they may both have the ‘samanadhikaraya’ (ap-
position) in the same substance as in ‘so yam devadattah’ (this is that Devadatta). Likewise, since there is only one substance, the ‘anavabhāsa’ and ‘viparītayā’ will belong only to the self.

**Reply:** Then due to ‘jnana prakasa virodha’ (negation of luminescence of knowledge) and due to the absence of the ‘asraya vishaya bheda’ (difference of the locus and its object). Brahmam cannot be the asraya of ajnana.

So far the Purvapaksa is stated and explained.

**Reply:** At first Padmapada proceeds to show the ‘avidya karana dosha samsarga’ (relation of the causal defect of avidya for consciousness. This consciousness refers to ‘advitiyadhishtana brahmatman’ (the ground or locus which is the non-dualistic Brahman-self). It is avidya that prevents us from having a knowledge of the adhishthana. “There is a dosha even here and it is of the nature of ‘agrahana avidya’ (avidya that does not apprehended) which conceals (acchadaka) the prakasa. We come to know this from the sruti and from arthapatti (implication).”

We have earlier established ajnana through’ perception, inference and arthapatti; and now we proceed to explain the same from sruti and arthapatti.

There are surti passages like “anritena hi pratyudhah and “anisaya socati muhyamananah”. Now in deep sleep there can be no mithyajnana; and even though the bhrama samskaras (impressions of illusion) exist, they are not able to prevent a right cognition. A temporary non-apprehen-
sion is not opposed to an apprehension that is ‘svatah siddha’ (self-existent). And the ‘svarupa caitanya’ itself gives the ‘brahma svarupavabhasa’. Yet Brahman is not cognised as Brahan. That which prevents the avabhasa of such a Brahman is here called ‘anrita’. This ‘anrita’ is the ‘mithya vastu’ which is the condition preventing the ‘avabhasa’. Such a condition is distinct from the mithya jnana, from the samskara of the erroneous cognitions and from non-apprehension.

In the second passage quoted above we find that ‘Isvarata’ (Good-ness) is ‘svabhavasiddha’. And yet the individual cognises himself as ‘anisvara’. Such a fact is due to the non-apprehension of Isvaratva. This Isvaratva is something that comes and goes. And the non-apprehension expresses itself as sorrow which is to be traced to ‘moha’. This ‘moha’ is the same as ajnana.

We can also refer to ‘Na tam vidatha ya ima jajana anyat yushmakam antaram badhuva/niharena pravrita jalpya casutripa uktha sasas caranti’. This ‘nihara’ is synonymous with tamas (darkness) and ajnana. From this it is evident that nihara (frost) which has enveloped the self is the cause of not apprehending Brahman and is also the cause of the ‘jalpyatvady adhyasa’ (super imposition of futile things due to Prattling).

Again the text - “Avidyayam antare vartamana nanyacchreyo vedayante”- explains that avidya is the cause of the ‘sreyo rupa brahma aparijnana’ (Non-apprehension of the Brahman-bliss) and of the ‘kriya karakadhyasa’ (superimposition of agent and act).
Similar texts are “ajnanenavritam jnanam tena mulya-
nti” and so on.

Arthapatti also gives the same conclusion. We know
that there is ‘bandha nivritti’ (cessation of bondage) only
when there is the knowledge of Brahman, and yet Brahman
is not known earlier. This must be due to a cause which
is related to adhyasa. Thus we assume avidya because of
the ‘phala srutya anupapattiti’. Or we can arrive at the same
conclusion from the ‘vidhananupapattiti’ since there is a
command that Brahman should be apprehended. This is
possible only if the self does not know Brahman earlier.
There must be a cause for the ‘anavabhaska’ of Brahma svarupa;
and such an ‘adhyasa hetu’ must have the self as its asraya.

Ajnana is apprehended by the Sakshin. That which is
apprehended must be valid; but these pramanas are only
intended to show that jnana is not an abhava (negative ent-
ity) and hence they are not useless.

**Objection:** But the self is said to be not different
from Brahman. Then ajnana may be posited in Bra-
hman.

**Reply:** Does it mean that this contention is based
on the identity of the self with Brahman? We have three
alternatives-

i) Is there ‘asraya vishaya bhedanapattiti’ (incompati-
bility of the difference between the locus and its object) be-
cause of the identity? Or

19)
ii) Does it mean that ‘avidyasrayatva’ (being the locus of avidya) is inconsistent with the nature of Brahman, viz. consciousness? Or

iii) Does it mean that if there is avidya, Brahman cannot be sarvajna?

i) To begin with the first alternative. Ajnana does not require an asraya which is distinct from its ‘vishaya’. It has its asraya in a place which it also envelopes. It fulfills two functions at a single stroke. It is like darkness which conceals or hides its own asraya and which thus has a two-fold function. It realizes these functions in so far as it is ‘akriyatmaka’ (non-action) and is an ‘avarana’.

The pot is ‘mrinnishtha’ (having its locus in clay) because its upadana is clay. The clay is its asraya; and yet it exists at a place which is its asraya. Likewise darkness has its asraya in its upadana; and it can still have another asraya which it envelopes. It does not manifest these two. So is ajnana. Knowledge involves two distinct factors—an asraya (locus) and a vishaya (object). But like knowledge, ajnana does not require these two as distinct from one another. But there seem to be these two factors. Thus the word ‘agaman’ (not-going) conveys the meaning of ‘sthiti’ (state). It involves the reference to an object and also to an action. But the action being absent there is in reality only one reference and not two.

Like darkness, ajnana envelopes its own avarana and it is not inconsistent with its identity with its own asraya.

ii) Nor is ajnana inconsistent with the ‘cit prakasa’ which is its asraya. It is the knowledge (samvedana) as
the 'cit prakasa' that illumines or apprehends this ajnana. Even ajnana is rendered possible by being 'sakshi bhasya'. Hence there is no 'cid asrayatva virodha' for ajnana.

In all the three stages (jagrat, svapna and sushupti) objects are cognised by the self, and there is the knowledge arising from the objects. There is the avabhasakatva of the self and this is not inconsistent with its ajnana sambandha. Such a self can be ajnanasraya (locus of ajnana).

Further, prakasa itself is not opposed to ajnana; for it is not there in 'ajnana vishaya jnana'. Since the self is 'svayam prakasa' we do not find any 'jnana samsarga virodha' also. Svaprakasa can have a samsarga (relation) with ajnana. There cannot be any samsarga only with the objects which are illumined not by the self but by something else (vishayanam para prakasyanam).

To show that there is no 'jnanasamsarga virodha', another argument is given from the standpoint of samvedana. Samvedana or knowledge is of the nature of atma svarupa, and we find that ajnana has its asraya in this jnana.

iii) Brahman is sarvajna and is identical with the self. Yet it is the self which is the asraya of ajnana. For the syamatvaa (blackness) etc., which are adhyasta on the reflection are not seen in the original bimba. Further there is no virodha between the purity and the ajnana of the self. Hence even though the self is identical with Brahman, it is not inconsistent to say that the former is the asraya of avidya and that the latter is sarvajna. Moreover, the identity itself implies that avidya is there.
Hence we assume in the self that avidya which conceals the ‘brahma svarupa prakasa’. Ultimately the self has brahma svarupa. Still the self does not have the real avabodha (awareness). In the absence of avidya, there ought to be not only svarupa abheda but also, the avabodha. And if this abodha (apprehension or knowledge) is already there, texts like ‘tattvam asi’ which teach this identity would be meaningless.

The self is identical with Brahman; and it is svayam prakasa and sarvajna. Yet there is the anavabhasa (non-manifestation) of Brahman. To explain this we assume the avidya which is its ‘acchadika’. If there is no such avidya, we have to admit the difference between the self and Brahman, and ‘jadyatva’ (unconsciousness) and ‘kincijjnavatva’ (non-omniscience) to the self. In such a case all the texts teaching avidya and identity would become useless and faulty. Such texts emply the words ‘tamas, anrita, nihara, ajnana, avritatva’ etc. These words propound a positive entity called ajnana which causes the ‘anavabhasadhyasa’, and the denial of avidya would amount to interpreting ajnana as only jnanabhava (negation of knowledge).

If the self and Brahman are identical, whence arises the distinction between the two, which distinction attributes ‘avidyasrayatva’ to the one and ‘sarvajnatva’ to the other? Three views are propounded to answer the question. i) That the self is delimited by antahkarana whence arises the difference (view of Bhramati); ii) That it is due to ‘atireka’ which is a property that achieves identity - in - difference (theory of Bhaskara); and iii) That it is due to the ‘amsamsibhava (part and whole relation) which is natural and not artificial (opinion of Yadava Prakasa). To reject all
these views, Padmapada states that “Brahman is the one reality which makes the many selves possible, each self being that which is conditioned (avacchinna) by avidya; and this avidya is ‘anadi siddha’.

That which envelopes the self is ajnana that is in the self; and this ajnana is the upadana for the ‘jiva brahma vibhaga adhyasa’ (distinction of Brahmam and self). As such ajnana is the cause that delimits or conditions the self. It is the upadana even for the ‘avaccheda’ which is the ‘pratibhasika adhyasa’. In the absence of this ajnana, we cannot explain the appearance of duality (dvaidhibhava) for that which is in reality ‘niravayava’. Further there are the doshas like those of the doer and enjoyer which are attributed to the self: and we have shown earlier that these doshas are beginningless like the relationship of the seed to its ankura (plant); and the upadana for this too is ajnana which is therefore said to be ‘anadi siddha’. For the beginningless process of the adhyasa, viz., that of the distinction between the self and Brahman, the cause is only the beginningless avidya.

i) It cannot be the antahkarana. If the self is conditioned by the antahkarana, the ‘avacheda’ cannot be torn off in reality. The ‘avacchaeda’ (antahkarana) is only ‘vibhramamatra’ (illusory). Even its upadana is no other than ajnana. When the true knowledge comes, the antahkarana stands rejected, and as such it is only a case of ‘avidyadhyasa’. The antahkarana becomes the avacchedaka only when it is conditioned by its own cause, viz., ajnana.

The antahkarana is real, and it has a beginning. But such an entity cannot be the upadhi for the ‘anady avac-
heda' (the self). In deep sleep the antahkarana is absent and we ought to say that the self is unconditioned at that time. These are some of the objections against the first view.

**Objection**: Yet in deep sleep the antahkarana is in the 'sukshmakavastha' (subtle state) and as such can condition the self.

**Reply**: Does 'sukshmata' mean the absence of its parts? In such a case, it ceases to exist since that which has parts has ceased to have parts, or, does it mean the decrease in its parts? If so, this would differ from that which has all its parts, and this would not bring about those things which it could otherwise bring.

**Objection**: It exists potentially in a causal form.

**Reply**: Does this mean that only the cause (ajnana) remains? Or does the cause remain along with its effect (antahkarana)? In the former case there is no antahkarana. In the latter it does not differ from the usual antahkarana.

**Objection**: The antahkarana remains in the form of a cause having a 'sakti' and being aided by the 'karya samskara' 'Impressions of products).

**Reply**: The samskara cannot be the 'avacchedopada' whence in deep sleep every one ought to be liberated. Hence the self is not conditioned by the antahkarana.

ii) We cannot assume even 'atireka' also as bringing about the distinction between the self and Brahman.
Objection: Ajñana cannot explain how this distinction arises. Now, there is avidya for the self as regards Brahman. Even before avidya is there, there ought to be the distinction between the self and Brahman. Such a difficulty does not arise if we accept atireka.

Reply: Let us admit that there is atireka. This would involve the questions 'whose' and 'why'; and this means that the atireka arises only after the distinction has set in. The 'dhammapratiyogibhava' is dependent on difference. One can be the 'dhammi' and the other can be its 'pratiyogin' (opposite) only if they differ. They presuppose difference and yet it is difference which makes them come into existence. This difficulty is common both to atireka and to ajñana. The 'jiva brahmabhava' puruposes ajñana and also brings about ajñana.

iii) There cannot be a difference based on 'amsamsibhava' since Brahman is devoid of parts (niramsa).

Hence we conclude that avidya alone is the cause of the bhedadhyasa (superimposition of difference). What is that to which avidya is related so that it can be a cause of difference? We ask by way of reply: what is that to which the mirror is related so that it can be a cause of the 'bimba bheda'? The mirror is related to the face only; and likewise ajñana is related only to the 'cit svarupa' whence it brings out the 'jiva brahma vyavahara bhedha'.

But then ajñana is related only to the 'cit svarupa'. Yet it gives up its attachment to the Brahma svarupa and develops a partiality only to the self. The mirror brings about a distinction between the face and its relation, as the
pot brings about a difference between the akasa outside it and that inside it. Yet they give up their attachment to the face and the akasa (that is outside), and show their partiality only to the reflection and the 'ghatakasa' respectively.

What is the asraya of avidya? It can not have as its asraya that svarupa which is qualified by the antahkarana because there is no pramana to prove it.

**Objection:** There is the apprehension (pratibhasa) like 'I am ignorant'. Since ignorance cannot be attributed to another ignorance, we have the experience to say that there is here a 'visishta asraya' (specific locus).

**Reply:** Take the experience 'I experience'. If we accept the contention of the objector, then even the Caitanya prakasa would have to find a 'visishtasraya'. The 'pratibhasa' alone cannot be the criterion. Experience is cit prakasa and a 'visishtasraya' cannot be cit prakasa.

**Objection:** But consider 'ayo dahati' (cron is burning), Burning is a property of fire; but it is treated as the property of the iron here. Because of the fire there is the mutual 'sambandhavabhasa' (apperance of the relation) between the iron and the burning. Likewise experience and antahkarana are related to the same self; as such that which belongs to the self is to be attributed to the antahkarana. But the antahkarana is apprehended by experience. Hence there is no avabhasa for the antahkarana.

**Reply:** In this way ajnana and antahkarana too have their relation to the same self. Then the apprehension 'aham ajnana' (I am ignorant) cannot belong to the
antahkarana for the antahkarana is conditioned by ajnana. Hence the asraya of ajnana is the self and this is corroborated by the apprehension. Further since the antahkarana is the karya (product) of ajnana, it cannot be ajnanaasraya (locus of ajnana) for that would involve the fallacy of ‘anyonyasrayatva (mutual dependence). Further, if avidya is related only to the antahkarana it should cease in deep sleep; whereas avidya which is related to the self is there in deep asleep also.

**Objection:** It is inconsistent to speak of mere svarupa caitanya (consciousness per se) as the asraya. Hence we should assume a ‘visishtasraya’ (specific locus).

**Reply:** But even this is related to the svarupa caitanya. And if an unconscious entity like the antahkarana were to be the asraya of ajnana, it would have to be the asraya of the erroneous cognition and of the true knowledge as well.

**Objection:** If the svarupa caitanya is taken to be its asraya, is it not inconsistent with the nature of Brahman?

**Reply:** Yes, But instead of assuming two asrayas (viz., antahkarana and the self), it is better to assume only one asraya which is already established. If the asraya is the antahkarana, he who is bound is not the person liberated (mukta).

Bhaskara argues that if there is ajnana, is it there only for the antahkarana. We have to ask him whether the self is
sarvajna (omniscient) or 'kincijjna'? The self is 'kincijjna'; and as such it does not know something at some time or other. There is the 'vishayananavabodha' (non-awareness of the object) for the self. Ajnana is here assumed to have its asraya in the self.

**Objection**: 'Agrahana' (non-apprehension) and mithyajñana (erroneous cognition) may have the self as their asraya; but the positive entity [called ajnana] has only the antahkarana as its asraya.

**Reply**: What is this? If it is different from jñana, it is only ajnana; and we too accept that the 'kacakama- ladi' defects are forms of ajnana. Ajnana cannot be that which is opposed to jñana; for according to you, jñana and ajnana have different asrayas and the same vishayi (subject); and yet we do not see that they are opposed to one another.

**Reply**: There is no pramana to prove these different asrayas. Further take a person who is in deep sleep. His antahkarana which is the instrument of cognition has its 'laya' (involution) then. From the absence of any action on the part of this person, another infers so much about his antahkarana etc. This inference ought to dispel the ajnana which is in his antahkarana; and this is not seen.

**Objection**? The kacadi doshas are the cause of the erroneous cognition. These doshas have their asraya in the instrument of cognition. Likewise, can't we say that ajnana too is 'karanasraya' (its cause as its locus)?

**Reply**: Then even the eye would become the asraya.
Objection: But the eye and other sense organs have a beginning. As such they cannot be the 'asraya for the beginningless ajnana.

Reply: You should not forget that the antahkarana too has a beginning.

Objection: Accepting 'satkarya vada' (evolutionary theory) we can say that the antahkarana has no beginning.

Reply: The same is the case with the sense organs like the eye.

Hence the antahkarana cannot be the asraya of the beginningless ajnana. Both for those who have realized knowledge and who haven't; for both these conscious persons only there is stated 'avritatva' by the words anrita, nihara etc., As such ajnana is not 'antahkaranasraya'. It is 'caitanyasraya'.

"Such a Brahman is expressed by the sruti, smriti and the scholars of Nyaya". The sruti texts are like "anyad yushmakam antaram babhuva, niharena pravrita jalpya ca..." etc. Here we find ajnana to be the cause for the vyavahitatva (distinction) between the self and Brahman.

There is the surti passage - 'vibheda janaka jnane nasam atyantikam gate/atu mano brahmano bhedam asantam kah karishyati".

That there is a beginningless entity called ajnana which is distinct from Brahman is conveyed by the surti passage - "prakrtim purusam caiva viddhy anadi ubhav api". That avidya is anadi siddha is conveyed by the
word prakriti. Such is also the case in the sruti—mayam tu prakritim vidyat.

Even though the svarupa of Brahman is different from that of the ‘mayavacchinna rupa’, the self does not know that its real nature is that of Brahman, because of the ajnana. Thus we also read—“anadi mayaya supto yada jivah prabuddhyate/ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam budhyate sada.”

Thus we have established that the locus of avidya is self which is svayam prakasa. Now, we begin with the objection that the svayam prakasa Brahman cannot be the avidya vishaya (object of avidya).

**Objection**: When other pramanas cannot establish the svarupanavabhaha of Brahman through avidya, you cannot establish avidya only through the sruti and through arthapatti.

**Reply**: Take the cognition: ‘I do not know that which you said’. Here we find that there is avabhaha for that which excludes ajnana. The that which excludes the ajnana has also the pratibhasa (appearance).

**Objection**: There we apprehend the general nature (samanyakara) only. That which is excluded is the unknown (anavagata) ‘viseshakara’ (specific form).

**Reply**: If the viseshakara is not known it cannot have any avabhaha; and that which has no avabhaha cannot be apprehended as the excluded one.

**Objection**: Now even that which is apprehended (has ‘avabhaha’) cannot be apprehended as the excluded one.
Reply: This anupapatti (incompatibility) does not affect ajnana. Ajnana is nothing but a pratibhasa. Its anupapatti is itself an ornament. It is well known that there is the pratibhasa. It is nothing but an appearance.

So Padmapada asks: When the object is apprehended, how does the anupapatti arise for the 'avidya vishaya'? What is that pramana which conflicts with sruti and artha-pathi that have established ajnana? The objector replies that artha-patti itself can disprove it. "When Brahman is savyam jyotih and niramsa", there cannot be any 'svarupa-navabhasa' of Brahman.

An object is that which is immediately and directly apprehended. Such an 'aparoksha prakasamanata' means the non-difference of the object from samvit or knowledge.

The self is 'bhasamana' (always manifest) and yet it is not apprehended as being distinct from the body. The self as separate from the body is not cognised. But that which has bhasamana is always 'adhigata'. Such a thing is not seen here.

Now does the difference from the body mean the non-difference (svarupa abheda) with the atma prakasa which is savyam jyotih? Or does it mean the non-difference in so far as its property (dharma) is concerned?

If difference is a property, how can we have 'aparok-shatva' only by having the knowledge of the 'dharma'? In the immediate experience of the 'dharma' etc., we do not find the non-apprehension of the difference. We do experience it or apprehend it immediately.
Hence Padmapada says that “the enjoyer has the ‘karya-bhava-sanghatadhyasa’ (super imposition of the causal aggregate) whence he is not able to cognise the self as distinct from the self which is svayam jyotih”. To this the objection is: The enjoyer is not svayam jyotih; but is one apprehended as the ‘aham pratyaya’ (object of I). Padmapada states that he will explain later on how the enjoyer is svayam jyotih.

The self, then is apprehended not as united to the body but as distinct from the body.

This position is objected to. The self is not apprehended as distinct from the body because we do not have the ‘bhedaja nam samagri’ (the knowledge of difference). We have the self and the body. To cognise the difference, we require not the knowledge of the self and of the body, but a third knowledge which alone comprehends difference. In having the knowledge of the padartha we are also having the knowledge of difference. As such when I say ‘aham’ I have the knowledge of the ‘atma padartha’; and this knowledge itself gives us the knowledge of difference. This itself is the required pramana. Prior to this third knowledge there can be no apprehension of difference, and then the two terms being intermixed there can be no knowledge of the dharma and its pratiyogin. And in the absence of this knowledge there can be no knowledge of difference. As Padmapada puts the objection: How is it that the enjoyer who is the svayam jyotih does not have the prakasa as being distinct from or as excluding the ‘karya karana sanghata’?

The reply: Everywhere the cause for the non-apprehension of difference is only the ‘samsargadhyasa’ (rela-
tional super-imposition). The self is distinct from the body. Then to explain the ‘dechatma buddhi’ (apprehension of the body as the I or self), we may have to adopt either ‘adhyatma’ or ‘gaunatva’. To take the first alternative. In every adhyasa, that which is not cognised or apprehended or apprehended is the difference; and the absence of the apprehension of difference must be accepted. Such a ‘samsargsa-dhyasa’ is the condition for the non-apprehension of difference. In ‘aham manusyah’ (I am a man) the apprehension of identity between the two persons is then really mithya. To this one might say that it is not mithya, but only ‘gauna’ (metaphorical). ‘Padartha pratyaksa’ itself gives cognition of difference; and the ‘samanadhikaranaya’ (being in apposition) of the two terms constitutes only a ‘gaunavabhasa’ (indirect appearance). Sankara himself would later on explain how this is not true.

Now the ‘gaunavadi’ raises an objection.

**Objection**: If the ‘I’ in ‘aham manusyah’ has no ‘samanadhikaranaya’ (similar loci’s) with the body, then it would mean that there is a self apart from the body; for there is no such ‘pratyaya’ as the ‘I’ for another who does not apprehend like that. Even agama (revealed testimony) and inference are not capable of disproving it since it is a perceptual experience. Any pramanah has validity only if it does not contradict the perceptual experience.

But it might be argued that as in the case of the perception of two moons, that which is perceptually cognised is mithya. As such agama (revealed testimony) and inference alone have validity and that which is negated is the perceptual condition. Where the perceptual cognition is based
on the absence of any discrimination, there let inference etc., establish its invalidity at once and let the perceptual experience come to naught. But where the cognitions are fully supported by discrimination and the like, there inference etc., cannot make out the perceptual cognition to be mithya. That a perceptual cognition to be 'mithya' can be made out only by examining the strength or otherwise of the fully developed and substantiated cognitions. As such it is not inference etc., that can establish the mithyatva of perception.

Hence the objector asks: "Wherefrom does mithyatva arise?" We might reply that since there is the 'anyathavagama' (apprehension in another manner) we argue that mithyatva is established through agama or inference. Then the objector proceeds to argue thus: "Your argument would involve the fallacy of 'anyonyasrayata'. Only when agama and inference function we have the mithyatva of the perceptual cognition; only when there is this 'mithyatva', agama and inference function. Hence the atmavadins should accept that the ahamkara is only that which is distinct from the body. If there is the 'tadatmya' between the body and the aham, the 'atma siddhi' would not have any validity. As such the 'manushyabhimana' in 'aham manushyah' is only 'gauna' or metaphorical or conventional.

Now the reply follows:

Does ahamkara have as its Vishaya the self which is distinct from the body etc? or the self which is distinct from the prathibasa? Take the first alternative. Padmapada answers: "Even though the 'vishaya' of this ahamkara is that enjoyer who is distinct from the body etc. still we
are not experiencing such an enjoyer. As such the properties of the body etc. are adhyasa on this enjoyer". The prathibhasa of the distinction between the self and the body is inconsistent with or opposed to adhyasa; and as such there arises the gaunatva for the 'samanadhikaran-ya'. It is said that when the viseshas (particular entities) are opposed to one another, their viseshas (qualities) too become mutually contradictory. But even when the garland and the snake are excluded, still we have the adhyasa of the form 'this is a snake'. Hence mere difference cannot make the two terms mutually opposed. 'Aham' and manushyayah' may differ from one another and yet we may not be consciously aware of this difference.

**Objection**: We cognise only the 'samanyamsa' (general aspect) and since we do not apprehend the viseshahamsa (specific aspect) there arises the 'avabhasa' of 'anya samsarga' relation with anothee. Now the self is cognised in its 'vishesha rapa' as conseiiouness. How can there be an adhyasa?

**Reply**: Consciousness illumines the other not as the mere ‘atma dharma’ (property of the self) which excludes the ahankara. It necessarily requires the ahankara to illumine the other. Hence even though it is ‘pratiyamana’ (apprehensible), there arises adhyasa. “Even though there is the ‘svarupa avabasa’ we do not experience its difference from other objects; and hence it has its avabhasa as having its integration with other objects. This is similar to the case of the letter ‘a’ which is one letter and yet short and other differences are integrated with it". 
Now let us take the second alternative. Here the objector argues that the object of the 'aham pratyaya' is the self which is distinguished or separated from the pratibhasa. Just as 'rasa' (taste) is totally different from 'gandha' (smell), the ahankara appears (avabhasa) as fundamentally or essentially different from the body etc.

**Reply**: If there is such an 'avabhasa', there should not be different opinions regarding its sadbhava (existence) and then there is no necessity for any enquiry to establish it.

Then it might be argued that there is 'gaunatva only after the enquiry.

Now with the aid of logical reasoning we find that the self is distinct from the objects; and even after the enquiry we have the 'samanadhikaranya' whence we say 'aham manushyah'. If there is only 'gaunatva' (metaphonical expression) here, it would mean that prior to this enquiry too it was a 'gauna' expression.

But the objector says that there is this gaunatva only after the enquiry and not before the enquiry. Jijnasa (enquiry) means bringing out the logical arguments to bear on a problem. Now 'yukti' (logical reasoning) cannot separately bring out a different knowledge. Its function is to enquire into the already existent vishaya of the aham pratyaya. The 'aham pratyaya vishaya' (object of the term 'I') is already existent an distinct from the body etc. This is known after the enquiry. After the enquiry the 'I' is taken to be distinct. As such the gaunatva is there in expressions like the 'aham manushyah' only after the enquiry.
Reply: Even after the enquiry we do not get the ‘aham pratyaya vishaya’ as distinct from the body etc. But always we get at the ‘aham pratyaya’ as the ‘svarupa matra vishaya’ (object of the mere form). We get at the self as such, the self in itself. And it is the logical reasoning alone which gives us the knowledge that is distinct from the body etc. The knowledge derived from logical reasoning is mediate and it cannot be contradictory of the aparoksha bhrama (immediate or direct illusion). Hence adhyasa remains as before till we have the immediate experience of this distinction.

Padmapada says that “it is impossible to argue that there is gaunatvabhimana only after the enquiry. Just as in ‘hrasvo akarah’ (the letter ‘a’ is short) we donot have any gaunatva, so in ‘aham manushyah’. Even though ‘akara’ is one it stands for hrasvatva, dirghatva (being long) and ‘plutatva’ of ‘akara’. Now we say that there is no ‘gaunatva’ in ‘hrasvo akarah’ because we experience it as ‘hrasva’ just as we experience the silver in ‘this is silver’. This experience makes it a case of adhyasa.

From logical reasoning if we accept that ‘akara’ is excluded from ‘hrasvatva’ etc., how can we explain the experience of the ‘akara’ as being short? We have no apprehension or knowledge that the ‘hrasva’ (shortness) is excluded from the ‘akara’; from this we cannot say that there is no experience of the adhyasa. When there is the apprehension that ‘akara’ is excluded from ‘hrasva’, then there is the possibility of apprehending that some other thing also is excluded from ‘hrasva’.

Is akaro hrasvah the same as ‘this is silver’ in so far as both appear to involve adhyasa? In one single ‘akara’
we have the integration of ‘hrasva’ etc. ‘Akara’ being a word is real or external; and ‘hrasvatva’ etc., is only a property of sound. Thus from grammar we know that akara is necessarily the shorts syllable. But ‘hrasvata’ cannot exclude the ‘akara’ as such. So the objection is: “we can have the experience of ‘akara’ as such when we have the necessary logical understanding of its nature. But we do not have the experience of ‘hrasvatva’ etc., as mere ‘hrasvatva’ etc., though these are distinct properties.” ‘Akara’ excludes ‘hrasvatva’, but ‘hrasvatva’ does not exclude the ‘akara’. There is adhyasa in akaro hrasvah. On the other hand, in ‘this is silver the this excludes the silver and the silver excludes the this. Then there cannot be adhyasa there.

The reply: Two things differ from one another. Now they differ exactly in the same way. A’s difference from B is identical with B’s difference from A,. Now, if A is said to differ from B, it implies necessarily that B differs from A. Just as ‘akara’ excludes ‘hrasvatva’, so can ‘hrasvatva’ exclude the ‘akara’.

Logical reasoning reveals clearly and conclusively that the entities or terms have their own specific and unique natures; and when they are apprehended as identical, this apprehension is not accepted to be gauna. This seems to be the great stroke of a magician. To this objection, Padmapada says that this is really magic since all this is the product of avidya.

When we have the knowledge of difference, adhyasa is dispelled; and yet we employ expressions like ‘aham manushyah’. Since we have the knowledge of difference here, it is argued that such expressions are not cases of erroneous cognitions, but ‘gauna’ expressions.
Vivaranam

When we have the discriminating knowledge, is adhysa contradicted by the mere ‘aham pratyaya’? Or by logical reasoning? It cannot be the former. So Padmapada says: "The ‘aham pratyaya’ has its existence in the body because of the beginningless avidya. And yet it has in reality its locus in the self and this is different from the body; and this is not prevented by the body. The body does not bring about any ‘pratibandha’ (obstacle) for the self in having its own separate and distinct existence in itself". The self exists in the body; it acts through the antahkarana, and the vishaya or the object of the aham pratyaya (ahamkara) is the self. Hence the dependence of the aham pratyaya on the self is not opposed to its ‘dehadi vishayatva’ (body etc., being the objects).

Objection: Logical reasoning makes out the self to be distinct from the body; and prior to this logical reasoning that which we apprehend must be the self as distinct from the body.

Reply: We have said earlier that the aham pratyaya can be dependent on the self and also on the body, for these are not inconsistent with one another. From this it follows that we may enquire into the object with the aid of logical reasoning; and we will come to know what these entities are. Even with the aid of logical reasoning we cannot get anything more than that already apprehended. Logical reasoning will only tell us that the self is distinct from the body. But it cannot make us experience the self as distinct from the body. Even if there is a different knowledge near by, perceptual cognition does not involve the awareness of this different knowledge which is not contained in it. The knowledge thata rises from the enquiry is not integrated to
the perceptual cognition. Even if it is integrated it is not an immediate knowledge, but only one that is mediated by logical reasoning; hence the aparokshadhyasa cannot be different from the earlier stage.

Therefore there is no difference between the aham pratyaya of the earlier stage and that of the present. The apprehension ‘aham manushyah’ can never be a gauna cognition. The self which is svayam jyotih does not appear (anavabhasa) as distinct from the ‘karya karana sanghata; and we have the apprehension of the adhyasa in the form ‘aham manushyah’. Even though the self is identical with Brahman, there is the anavabhasa of Brahmašvarupa. The prakasa is enveloped or concealed because of a darkness; and that there is this darkness or avidya is given to us by the sruti and by arthapatti. From this cause or condition we do determine the ‘aham-karadhyasa’. And since it is beginningless, we have ‘purva drishtatva’ and ‘smruti rupatva’. (prior experience and similarity with the form of memory).

Objection: In ‘aham manushyah’ there is the adhyasa of the body on the self. This is a perceptual cognition. Can the knowledge of the difference between the two be a valid one without negating the identity of the two?

Reply: Mere inference and agama cannot establish the difference between the two. That there is only one moon has arisen after we have negated the two moons. A similar negation of adhyasa can arise only when agama and inference are strengthened by the ‘aham pratyaya’ which cooperates with logical reasoning. Only
such pramanas as are based on the evidence given by the ‘aham pratyaya’ can establish the distinction.

The self is ‘svayam prakasa’ and yet due to avidya it is not cognised or experienced as such; and the self thus becomes the adhishthana for avidya. This would enable ‘paratra paravabhasah’ (the other appearing in the external).

Thus we have consciousness which illumines the self, and the self is without a second. There is the avidya dosha here; and the antahkarana would constitute the kara-na dosha. And since avidya is beginningless there arises a samskara. Thus we have all the three factors required for adhyasa.

**Objection**: Inspite of the presence of the three factors there cannot be adhyasa here. There can be no samsarga for this consciousness which is the adhishthana, and we therefore have the knowledge of this adhishthana and also the knowledge of something else. For, the self is not an object and consciousness is external. We do have the apprehension of the adhishthana because it is the subject, and we have the knowledge of the object. Adhyasa requires only one knowledge arising from the entities in so far as they are apprehended as ‘samsrishta’. But here the samsarga itself is impossible. Hence there is no adhyasa.

**Reply**: The self may not be an object. Yet there is the apprehension of the aropya and there is no other knowledge. Consequently it constitutes the adhishthana. We do not have the experience of the enjoyer distinctely or separately and we have a single experience in which is integrated the consciousness as enjoyer. Thus there is the ‘anyonya sam-bhedha’ which renders it a case of adhyasa. Atmaicatanya
itself manifests the integration of the self and the not-self. And even though it does not come into existence in its pure form, it appears as if it comes into existence because of the specific ‘vishayoparaga’ (attachment to the object). Thus ‘aham manushyah’ is a case of error. Since it is an erroneous cognition, the ‘vishaya’ (object) and the ‘vishayi’ (subject) are able to appear in the same pratyaya as an integrated whole. Thus we have adhyasa here; and this is the knowledge which manifests the non-self in the self; and this erroneous cognition arises from three factors, viz. sense-contact, samskara and dosha (defect).

AHANKARA :

Padmapada next proceeds to give the import of that part of the commentary beginning with ‘katham punah pratyagatmani...’ This part deals with the ‘sambhavana (possibility) of adhyasa. There was a question earlier, ‘ko ayam adhyaso nama’. The ‘kim’ implies both a question regarding the definition, and a doubt regarding the possibility of adhyasa. Thinking that the question was really raised by the doubter, the definition has been given. Then since it is also doubted Sankara proceeds, to answer the doubt regarding its possibility. Sankara states the doubt thus—“Katham punah pratyagatmany avisaye adhyaso vishaya tad dharmanam? The definition of adhyasa given earlier is not possible in the case of the self. For, everyone cognises an object in the place of another object which is immediately before him. Since the pratyagatman (self) is distinct from the ‘yushmat pratyaya’ (object) you maintain that it is not an object. When the adhishtana is not an object, can there be ana adhyasa? Is it cognised? Can it be possible?

The adhishtana is always on the same level with that which is adhyasta on it so far as both are the objects cog-
nised by the same sense organs and intellect. Since this is absent here, there can be no adhyasa. This is the import of the 'akshepa' (objection).

The reply: What is required is that in one vijñana (cognition) there should be the avabhāsa of two vijñānas, and these two should be integrated into one. This much alone is necessary for adhyāsa. It is not necessary that two entities should appear as one object. With this in mind, Sāṅkara replies: 'Na tavād ayam ekantena avīshayah asmāt pratyaya vīshayatvat', it is the object of 'asmāt pratyaya'.

The objector takes 'asmāt pratyaya' to mean the knowledge which is atma vīshaya. So the objector argues: "The ciddatman is the subject. How can it become an object? An object is something other than the subject and it is always referred to or cognised as the 'this'. Can such an entity overcome its nature by a strange process and become the subject which never is the 'this'? In a perceptual cognition the subject cannot be the same as the object; there cannot be one entity which is both the subject and the object.

Then we might say that there are two elements in the subject and that one can be the subject while the other can be the object.

To this the objector replies: "The self is devoid of parts; how can you attribute two mutually exclusive parts to such a self?"

Reply: Take for example the sun. Its radiance is spread in all directions. In order to have a specific (unique)
manifestation of this radiance, we hold a mirror against it; and the radiance is concentrated and radiated.

Now the sun is like the atma caitanya and like the mirror there is the antahkarana. In order that the atma caitanya may become clear and distinct with a specific form, there is adhyasta on the self the antahkarana which is a 'bhasvara dravya', (a shining substance). This antahkarana is meant by the 'asmat pratyaya'.

But in an adhyasa like this is silver, we have the this and the silver: two distinct entities. Likewise, are we to say that 'aham' means two different forms or entities? In answering this question, Padmapada says that "ahankara (antahkarana) has implicitly in it the this and the not-this'.

Take the cognition, 'Iron is burning'. The burning is a property of the fire and is cognised in the iron, i.e., it has 'dvai rupya avabhasa' (appearance of two). Likewise in 'aham upalabhe' we have this 'dvai rupya avabhasa' for 'aham'. The 'upalabhritya' is attributed to the self through the 'antahkarana'. That which has actually the 'upalabdhhi' is the antahkarana, but it really refers to the self. When there is the integration or attachment (uparaga) with the 'asadharana kriya' such a self appears as qualified by another object.

As antahkarana it appears as having sorrow and as undergoing changes; but as the self it has the form of 'pre-maspada' (love) and is the percipient. In all the objects like ahankara etc., it is manifest as consciousness which is immanent; and as excluding the other objects, it is manifest as ahankara. This is a fact of common experience, and
the same entity appears as having two forms. It is said that it is ‘sarvaloka sakshi’; and let those who argue examine, their own experience carefully and say whether this is a fact or no.

**Objection from Prabhakara Mimansa**

The self is the asraya for the knowledge of the object. In ‘aham janami’ (I know) we find that the ahankara appears as having its asraya in knowledge. Then how can the ‘aham’ be the this? The experience or cognition of ‘aham’ shows plainly that it is untouched by, that it has nothing to do with, the this.

Objection to this objection from Advaita: In ‘ayo dahati’ it is well known that iron is not the agent having the action viz., burning. Likewise even though it is not the agent (karta) there is the ahankara which has the cognition (or which cognises).

The Prabhakara replies: Quite apart from the iron we find the fire whose natural property is to burn. The fire is the asraya for the act of burning. Likewise we do not find an entity called the self as distinct from the ahankara, because apart from the ahankara we cannot have the jnana kriya. Hence the ahankara itself is the self.

According to the Sankhya system, there is the appearance (avabhasa) of the reflection of consciousness on the antahkarana which is unconscious (acidadatman). Just in front of it there is its original ‘bimba’, for the reflection of the face is possible only where there is the face in front of the mirror. From this they infer the self to be of the nature of the ‘bimba’ or the original for the reflection in the antahkarana.
According to the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems, desire and other 'gunas' are the 'vishesha gunas' of a substance which is distinct from the Mahabhutas. In these elements desire etc., are not found; and since these gunas are apprehended or cognised only by the mind, they are called 'vishesha gunas'. There are no 'vishesha gunas' in the elements, or in the 'dik' or in 'kala' (space and time) or in the mind. And by a process of elimination it is inferred that there is a distinct substance having the gunas like desire etc. Such a substance is the self.

According to the Sautrantika school of Buddhism, there is the appearance of the reflection of the objects in the 'samvedana', and this requires its 'bimba' near by. The bimba is reflected in soumething other than itself. And from the reflected face in the mirror, we infer the face is outside the mirror. From the redness in the crystal we infer a red object is near by. Hence objects are always inferred.

It is with reference to these three views that the Prabhakara maintains that 'the subject (pramata), the object (prameya) and the means of cognition (pramana) are all immediate (aparoksha)'.

If these systems say that though the self is immediately apprehended, we require inference to present it clearly, we have no quarrel with them. But if they say that the existence of the self can only be inferred, then this conflicts with the immediacy of the self, just as it conflicts also with the immediacy of the objects.

The Sautrantika argues that the objects are only inferred. If the objects are apprehended directly in the infer-
essential cognition, they can likewise be cognised even in perception. That which is an immediate and direct object for inferential cognition can be an immediate object in perception with greater plausibility and truth. But if there is no apprehension of the object (which is bimba bhuta) in inference, then you cannot say that the objects are inferred; and there is no need for them to take recourse to inference. Inference here is opposed to the avabhasa of the objects which are ‘aparoksha vyavahara yogya’ (capable of being cognised directly).

The vijnan avadin argues that the object is essentially of the form of vijnana, and that there is the immediacy of the vijnana. Since there is no difference between the vijnana which is the object and the vijnana which cognises it, there is the ‘aparokshavabhasa’ (immediacy) of the object.

It is to reject such an argument that the Prabhakara says: “there is the immediacy of the object in so far as the object is the object for a subject in a cognition”. There is the experience, “I am seeing this”. It is not due to its non-difference from vijnana; there is the immediacy of the object. The self has an immediate silver which is cognised as distinct from me and from my cognition. If it is said that the external silver is vijnana itself, then like the external silver it cannot have negation. Hence without any mediation we have the immediacy of the object; and this immediacy is the same as the cognition that requires the sense contact with the object.

According to the Vartikakara and the Nyaya–Vaiseshika systems, there is a perceptual cognition arising from the ‘samyoga’ (contact) between the self and the mind; and this
perceptual cognition apprehends the self as immediate. The Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems observe that the self is united to the mind. There is ‘samyukta samavaya’ (conjunct inherence) relationship here. This relationship is the condition or cause giving rise to a distinct or new knowledge. Such a knowledge makes ‘pramiti’ immediate. But according to the Vartikakara, the pramiti or means of cognition is ‘prameyagata’. The eye comes into contact with an object and with such an object that there is the relationship of identity-in-difference for knowledge. Due to this relation of ‘tadatmya’ there arises a distinct or new knowledge as the object of the ‘pramiti’. And from this is established the immediacy of the pramiti.

It is with reference to these views that the Prabhakara states that ‘the subject and the pramiti are purely immediate only; they are immediate in yet another way from the immediacy of the object.

There is no ‘pramana’ by which we can say that because of a new knowledge arising from the mind the self is immediate.

The objector may argue that in the presence of the mind there is not the apprehension of the self and in its absence in deep sleep there is no such apprehension. As such it might be said that agreement and difference establish the Nyaya contention.

But the actual experience of the objects goes against this contention. Our ‘anubhava sambandha’ (experience) with the objects itself proves the immediacy of the objects. In the same manner there is the immediacy of the self expe-
rienced by us. In such a case it is unnecessary to assume a new knowledge and a new function of the mind to establish it. The self is the asraya for the knowledge of the object; and we need not assume a ‘jnanantara’ (another cognition). As such we conclude that there is the immediacy of the self without the mediation of the objects.

The Nyaya contends that the samyukta samavaya is the cause of the ‘jnanantara’. We cannot say that the experience of the self or of the object is immediate through jnanantara because of this relationship. Now, perception refers to or involves the reference to an object here and now. In such a case the Nyaya theory would require that there should be two experiences at the same time.

Let us assume that ‘samyukta samavaya sambandha’ or the relationship of ‘samyukta tadatmya’ gives us the apprehension or experience. In such a case along with the immediacy of the knowledge there ought to be the immediacy of the ‘parimana’ of the self and of the ‘rasa’ of the object as well. Experience cannot be apprehended (gamyah) by another knowledge, for that would involve the violation of its ‘sva prakasatva’.

There are some (Bhatta Mimamsakas) who hold that the ‘prakatya’ (manifestation) which is in the object is also ‘svapракasa’. In this theory it is impossible to maintain the very emergence of this ‘prakatya’. The experience of the object cannot be said to arise from the ‘atra vyapara’. And many reasons can be adduced. An activity can be due to ‘parispands’ or to ‘parinama’. The self is ‘vibhu’ (all-pervasive) and as such cannot have any ‘parispanda,
like the pot. It cannot undergo any change for the product of the change is dependent on the act which brings it about; and the act is seen to merge into the effect. But the activity of the self is not seen to merge into the object. And if knowledge is the ‘asraya’ of the object, the objects would have to become conscious entities.

It cannot also be argued that the objects have the power to give rise to their knowledge; and since knowledge has its asraya in the self, the self is conscious. In such a case the mind too would be conscious for it too gives rise to knowledge. If the objects are ‘svaprakasa’ and have the property of ‘prakatya’, take the cognition, this is known by me. Here is the avabhasa of a relation between me and this. The object is apprehended by me, or is made known by me. If the object is ‘svaprakasa’ such a cognition is impossible; and the Bhatta Mimansa cannot even infer the ‘jnana kriya’ in the self. When experience does not have any relationship with the self but only with the objects, the ‘parinama kriya’ will be in the self and its ‘phala’ will be in the experience. In the absence of this ‘ekadhikarana (identical locus) we cannot have Jnananumiti (inferential cognition).

Hence ‘pramata’ and ‘pramiti’ have no immediacy in the sense of ‘karmatva’. They are immediate in a different way.

**Objection**: It is not proper to assume ‘svayam prakasatva’ for both the subject and the ‘pramiti’. It is better to accept only the immediacy of the self, and not of knowledge also; and it is better to accept the ‘sva prakasatva’ of the self only. If the self has ‘svaprakasatva’, it would make every activity possible including knowledge.
Reply: The Prabhakara replies that our experience proves the ‘svapprakasatva’ of the pramiti; and because of this everything else is illuminated. If experience is devoid of ‘svapprakasatva’ there can be no experience. Even if the self is devoid of ‘sva prakasatva’, it does not cease to be a self, since it is the ‘asraya’ of knowledge. But if the ‘pramiti’ is devoid of ‘svapprakasa’ it cannot cognise or apprehend the objects.

Another way to establish this contention is to focus our attention on the ‘pramana phala’. Only after the perceptual ‘contact we have the ‘hanady upa lampha’ etc. Because of this we are able to say that perceptual contact has a ‘phala’ or results in a valid experience. The ‘pramana phala’ is the ‘pramiti’ or knowledge. Suppose there is the ‘catushtaya saunikarsha’ and there can yet be the absence of the experience of the objects. In such a case we can have neither the ‘hana’ (loss) nor the ‘upadana’ (gain). As such experience itself is the ‘phala’. When there is the experience proper, it is not illogical to think of something else as being the ‘pramana phala’.

It has been said that knowledge is the ‘pramana phala’; and this is doubted by the Buddhists. Since knowledge (samvedana) has the specific form of the object, we are able to speak of the pramanatva of the ‘samvit’. The ‘phala’ of this pramana is of the form of the ‘vishaya sphurana’. Samvedana has the ‘pramanatva’ in so far as it has a form similar to that of the object. This ‘pramana phala’ is the apprehension (upalabdhi) of the objects.
To prevent such a conclusion, the Prabhakara observes: The pramana is the act of the subject, having its ‘phala linga’; and it is always inferred. Pramana, according to this school, involves the ‘sannikarsha’ (contact) of four entities; these four are the object, the sense organ, the mind and the self. We do not have a perceptual cognition of this ‘catushtaya sannikasha’. But from our valid perceptual cognitions, we infer that these four were present in that cognition. The phala linga spoken of is the apprehension of form etc. From this ‘upalabdhi’ we infer the presence of the four entities.

Take the cognition ‘aham idam janami’ (I know this.) The ‘I’ represents the experiencing self and the this stands for the experienced not-self. ‘Janami’ is the experience of knowledge. The objector argues that to reject the ‘karmataya aparokshatva’ of the pramata and the pramiti is to contradict or go against experience. But we have to remember the distinction we have made out between the three. Now, if the experience having the not-self as its object were to be the asraya to make the ‘atma vyavahara’ possible, we need not assume a separate jnana. There is no scope for assuming a jnana in the subject. As such the Prabhakara states: “The jnana vyapara (act of knowing) of the subject refers to the object and not to the self. The self is the condition of the experience of the objects; and as such it is seen as the I both in the phala or experience and in the object. The I is the condition or cause of the experience of the objects.”

Objection to the Prabhakara theory from the Bhatta standpoint -
Vivaranam

That which appears (avabhasate) always appears as the objects of knowledge; But in the cognitions of the objects the self too necessarily appears. If this is accepted the self would appear to be the object, not to be a more ‘asraya’. So the Bhaṣṭa argues that “the I is not the cause or condition for the experience of the objects. It is different from this position. The ‘aham’ is only ‘atma matra vishayah’. The ’aham’ is nothing but the self.

Now perceptual knowledge arises from the object; and we have to accept ‘karma karakatva’ for the object. The Prabhakara argues that there is the immediate apprehension of the self. In such a case the self that apprehends must be the subject of the apprehended self which is the object. In the same act how can one and the same thing be both the subject and the object? The subject and the object are mutually exclusive entities. Further, of the subject and the object in the knowledge situation, the latter is more important and the former is subordinate. Thus when the same entity appears as two, these two forms are opposed to one another in their nature also.

So the Bhatta Mimamsaka argues: “The self has two forms. As having the form of a substance, the self becomes an object; and as the knowing form, it is the subject. Thus the aham pratyaya is constituted by the two forms of the subject and the object; and the self, then, is both the cogniser and the cognised. Hence the self has the form of the this and also the form of the not-this. The ‘prameyamsa’ is of the form of the this, while the ‘pramatramsa’ is of the form of the non-this”.

Reply of the Prabhakara to this objection:
The self is said to have ‘amsas’ (parts). The ‘samanyamsa’ is of the from of the object. It is a substance and not a subject; and yet it is common both to the object and to the subject. But since it is an amsa making the self an object, it cannot be treated as the self. The ‘viseshamsa’ is said to be of the form of the subject; but the self is devoid of any parts. Hence there cannot be any distinction of the subject and the object in the self itself.

If the self were to undergo any change, it ought to be ‘savayava’ (having parts). But the self being ‘niravayava’ (having no parts) it cannot change itself into the subject and the object at the same time.

Further, does the apprehending (grahaka rupa) self ever have the nature of the object? Or no? If it does not have the nature of the object, it cannot be the apprehending self since the Bhāṭṭa does not accept the self to be ‘svayam prakasa’ and does not recognise the self to be the asraya of knowledge. If it can have the nature of the object, the reply is: “The object is of the form of the ‘this’ and is always the other, not the I; and then it would be the not-self”.

Thus from a consideration of knowledge alone we can establish the immediacy of the subject, object and ‘pramiti’. And the ‘aham’ is the asraya of knowledge and thus it too becomes immediate. Consequently ahankara cannot be the ‘idam amsa’ (this).

Experience is the phala (product) of ‘catushtaya sannikarsha’ with the objects and it is ‘svayami prakasa’. The object is apprehended as the this; and the apprehending entity is revealed as the not-this by experience. And this
experience enables us to infer the pramana (catushtaya san-
nikarsha). Hence we cannot take out ahankara to be the
‘idam amsa’.

Reply of Advaita to the Prabhakara

The purport of the reply is to distinguish the self from
ahankara. Towards this end Padmapada first proceeds to
establish that the self is ‘svayam prakasa’. And he esta-
blishes this through a criticism of the Prabhakara view.
The Prabhakara view may mean three possible things and
all are impossible. These three alternatives are: i) The
self is ‘caitanya prakasa’ and experience is ‘jada prakasa’;
ii) Both are ‘caitanya prakasa’; and iii) the self is ‘jada
svarupa’ while experience is ‘caitanya prakasa’.

(i) The first alternative is impossible. If experience
is ‘jada svarupa’ (nor.-sentient), we will have to admit that
there is the non-appearance (anavabhasa) of everything.
‘Jada prakasa’ means that though it is not ‘sva prakasa’ it
can reveal or illumine the objects because of some other
factor.

Objection: Does knowledge reveal that which is
not known? or that which is known? The eye reveals
that which is not revealed: and you cannot then make out
the non-appearance of everything.

Reply: No. The eye reveals or illumines the objects;
but it is not svayam prakasa. The eye has the prakasa
only to reveal the objects and not to reveal itself. Herein
it differs from knowledge which reveals the objects im-
mediately and in so doing also reveals itself. Know-
ledge cannot have another knowledge (samvedana) to illu-
mine it, for this would lead to a regress. As such it is
sva prakasa. It therefore differs from the sense organs like the eye. We can say that experience reveals the objects like a 'pradipa' (lamp) which also reveals itself.

**Objection**: No such distinction can be made out between the eye and the 'pradipa', for both reveal the objects only by giving rise to the experience of the objects.

**Reply**: This is a faulty argument for there is a distinction between the eye and the 'padipa'. Both these again differ from knowledge. Knowledge gives us the apprehension of the objects while it dispels ignorance. The 'pradipa aloka' is different from this jnana, in so far as the former has the prakasa only to dispel darkness. The aloka is different from experience and its prakasa can dispel darkness without giving rise to knowledge. But knowledge has prakasa which not only dispels ignorance but also gives the knowledge of the objects. The eye does not and cannot fulfil any of these functions, since it has neither the nature of jnana nor that of the aloka.

Hence experience does not require any similar experience to illumine it or reveal it. While it has prakasa it is also the condition or cause that brings about the 'prakasadi vyavahara' in the object. Just like the 'pradipaloka', it brings about the 'prakasadi vyavahara' in the object immediately.

**Objection**: The 'pradipa' is illumined by the 'aloka' which is of the same nature as the former. In the same way can't we say that there is a 'sajatiya prakasa' (illumination of a like nature) for the eye because of which the eye is able to reveal the pot?
Reply: This is impossible because the eye itself is not a prakāsa, but only a property of prakāsa.

Does the ‘aloka’ require the illumination of the eye (‘cakshusha prakāsa’) so that there might arise that prakāsa which is opposed to darkness? Or does it require the ‘cakshusha prakāsa’ so that there might arise that ‘jñāna prakāsa’ which is opposed to ignorance?

The first alternative is impossible since the eye is only a prakāsa guna. As regards the second alternative we should note that the ‘pradīpa’ is illumined by the knowledge which is distinct from it. It does not require a similar ‘aloka’.

Hence just as the ‘pradīpa’ which is screened cannot illumine the objects, so also experience, which is devoid of ‘prakāsa’, cannot illumine or reveal objects. And everything would remain unrevealed or unilluminated. Consequently we cannot admit that experience is ‘jāda prakāsa’.

Objection: Even though experience is ‘jāda svārupa’, yet objects are made intelligible by the svaprakāsa of the subject. From this we can argue that ‘pramāṇa caitanya’ reveals itself and the object. Pramana is a conscious entity; and because of this strength the subject is able to make us aware of the object as the this and of the subject as the not-this. He does this like a lamp that reveals itself and also others. Hence the ‘anavabhāsa’ of the world does not arise.

Reply: Experience is said to bring about the attachment (upārāga) of the objects to caitanya. Such a rela-
tionship between the self and the object is brought about by experience. Then experience itself would be a ‘buddhi parinama (evolute of the intellect). This is opposed to the Prabhakara view, but is acceptable to us. It is possible that experience too has svaprapakasa. But the ‘cidatma prakasa’ cannot be dependent on the ‘jadanubhava.’ ‘The self is consciousness and svayam prakasa; and to say that such a self illumines itself as being dependent on the objects is inconceivable. Now how does the dipa (lamp) illumine itself? If it requires another dipa to illumine it, it leads us to a regress. If the pramata is like the dipa we would have to face this regress.

ii) The second alternative makes out that the self and experience are both ‘caitanya prakasa’. Now if both are sva prakasa one does not involve any reference to the other. They will have no relationship at all like two distinct persons. Nor can we apprehend the relation of the self to the samvit. If the self manifests itself by itself why should it refer to the objects or relate itself to the objects?

**Objection:** My knowledge of another person is not svayam prakasa for that other person. This knowledge is the form or property of consciousness. Likewise the self has the ‘caitanyaguna’ (Samvedana) and yet is not svayam prakasa. Though the self is of the nature of consciousness, it is not svayam prakasa.

**Reply:** What is the cause of this distinction? If the self is of the nature of consciousness, how can it be svayam parakasa? And how can the experience of the objects make it immediate? If the self is dependant on the experience of the objects, the experience too will have the ‘prakasa’ by being dependent on something other than itself.
It might be argued that my knowledge of another person is not immediate for that person. It is only a mediated knowledge for him. And such a mediacy is not there in experience. In such a case, the prakasa of the self cannot be mediated by experience, since experience is directly related to the self. Just as one dipa does not require another dipa to illumine it, similarly self and experience do not require one another if both are sva prakasa.

iii) The third alternative makes out experience to be sva prakasa and the self to be ‘jada svarupa’ This too cannot be accepted.

According to the Bhartas, ‘samvedana’ is only a ‘karma’ for knowledge is in the objects as ‘prakatya’ or as ‘jnatata’ whence we know the objects. If knowledge is a ‘karma’ or an object, it is impossible to cognise it, for cognition cannot function without knowledge. Nor can we have the experience and the awareness of the objects.

The Sankhya treats samvedana as a substance. Then it ought to be an atom, or an infinite entity, or one that has only ‘madhyama parimana’. If it has only ‘anu parimana’, then we will be aware of only an ‘anu parimana’ (atomic magnitude) in the object; for if the light of the glow-worm alone is shed on the pot, the whole pot is not revealed. If it is an infinite entity, since its asraya is the self, there should be the avabhasa of the self everywhere. If it has ‘madhyama parimana’ (the magnitutude of the container), then knowledge would be an entity having parts; and this would make knowledge dependent on these parts and not on the self.
The Nyaya and the Prabhakara systems take samvedana to be the property of the self. Due to the necessary relationship between the guna (quality) and the gunin (substance) the self itself will have the prakasa guna; and then it might be said that just like the pradipa, the self reveals itself while revealing the objects. But we have said earlier that the prakasa guna is never born, but only the medium that reveals it. This guna is not born in its ‘asrayopadhi’ like the prakasa of the sun. Thus we would be forced to admit that the self itself is svayam prakasa. Therefore Padmapada says—“Even if the Prabhakara does not like it, the conclusion is unavoidable that the self alone is svayam prakasa (seli – luminous).”

**Objection**: Jnana is svaprakasa and knowledge has its asraya in the self which is of ‘madhyama parimana’. Then as the asraya of knowledge, the self too may be taken to be svaprakasa. The pot has its asraya in its own avayavas, and yet the pot is on the ground. The pot is only dependent on the clay and not on the ground. Likewise svaprakasatva is in knowledge and knowledge is in the self. Thus svaprakasatva is not dependent on the self. Hence it cannot be made out that ‘caitanya prakasa’ is ‘svaprakasa’.

**Reply**: There is no way to establish such a contention. It is impossible to argue that caitanya prakasa is not svaprakasa. Just as we have the cognition ‘it is illumined by the pradipa’, we have also the cognition like ‘this is known by me’. This experience proves that the self itself is ‘cit prakasa’. Otherwise this statement would have to be on a par with the sentence ‘this is illumined by the firewood—

The self is not distinct from experience. Now, knowledge (samvedana) does not reveal the difference between
these two. That which is dependant on experience becomes the not-self since it is similar to an object. We have to accept that the single, unchanging, immanent self alone is experience. So Padmapada states: “If experience arises from a pramana, then such an experience is one which is internally differentiated; and each specific internal differentiation will have to reveal or illumine every object distinctly and separately”.

Instead of assuming many experiences and their universal, it is better to accept that there is a single experience called the self, for this alone is real. ‘Just as there is a single ‘gotva’ (cowness) running through all the cows, we have an ‘anubhavatva’ (experience-hood) common to all experiences or running through all experiences’. Experience, then, is not one which is internally differentiated. We distinguish the experience of blue from that of yellow: and this distinction is dependent upon the objects that enter into experience. These objects do not create internal differentiation, in the experience, but only make us have the experience in a specific form.

**Objection:** When I have the apprehension of blue, the apprehension of yellow has ceased to be there. There is the ‘sthitī’ (state) of one experience and the distinction of another experience. As such we should accept a difference in the dharma and say that there are many experiences. The destruction and otherwise of experiences go to establish the specific differentiations in experience.

**Reply:** If so, because of these differentiations only we have the presence and absence of experiences. In this manner it will involve the vicious circle.
Objection: The required means is near and by a new apprehension has arisen. But since two apprehensions cannot coexist, the previous one is destroyed.

Reply: No, this would involve the fallacy of ‘an-yonyasrayata’ (mutual dependence). The samvit is said to be born; and it is born only when there is the samvit. Consequently you cannot have even one samvit. Instead of this it is easier and better to assume that the samvedana’ is already there; and it requires only ‘sadhana’ (means) which brings about the uparaga of the objects for the experience. It is unnecessary to assume that every experience arises afresh from the uparaga of the objects.

The Buddhists argue that though experiences differ from one another, this difference is not cognised because of the defects like extreme similarity. There is a flame which appears as one even though it is brought about by the individual flames of the sticks put in it. Likewise we are not cognising the differences between the various ‘samvits’.

This theory also involves the same fallacy as above. We assume similarity only when we cognise the difference; and we can establish difference only when we cognise similarity. When the ‘samvit’ is prakasamana, its differences too must be illumined or revealed. Likewise, it is not proper to say that the internal differences in ‘citprakasa’ are not revealed. Only when there are these differences, you can say that in the absence of the ‘bhedan pratasa’ (appearance of difference) there is an erroneous cognition brought about by similarity.
You cannot also bring in the case of the self whose form is that of Brahman and who is svayam jyotih; and you cannot say that just as the Brahman-hood (brahma-rupatva) of the self is not revealed or illumined, so is the difference in the experiences. In the case of the self there is the sufficient cause for such a revelation. But it is the 'avidya pratibandha' that is responsible for the absence of the prakasa. In the case of experience there is no such pratibandha and the differences amongst experiences, if they are real, ought to be manifested.

**Objection:** We can prove the reality of these differences on the basis of the inference called 'samanyato drishta'. The major premise is: Due to similarity the avabhasa of the differences amongst the samvits they are prevented from emerging. The main reason is - because they are cognised or known by the intellect of the shayi prakasa (abiding effulgence); and the illustration is that of the flame.

**Objection:** Then how can there be the experience of the objects for the atma caitanya which is eternal?

**Reply:** That there are differences is opposed to experience and also to logical reasoning. No inference can establish the reality of a non-existent. Experience is one and is of the same form in all experiences; and if difference is real it ought to be revealed.

**Reply:** The self is of the nature of consciousness. The various different objects which enter into this consciousness delimit it: and thus these seem to appear as different experiences. The self, and other words convey the meaning of the 'avivakshitopadhi (undetermined conditioning). The trees are in a forest. The trees are in a particular place and they are given a common name, forest.
And each tree differs from the other and also from the forest. And yet it is only a tree and is also constitutive of the forest.

**Ahamkaranubhava (Experience of the Eg.o.).**

**Objection:** There is the experience of the objects for the atma Caitanya which is 'svayam prakasamana'. Yet the experience of the objects alone gives rise to the 'drashti paramrsa' as the 'aham'. From this we are forced to conclude that the self itself is the ahamkara. The self is the cause or condition for the experience of the objects. Such a self is the ahankara which is of the nature of the not-this. The self can be considered to be the perceiver only because of the experience of the objects. Here the objector does not consider the svarupavabhasa. If we do not so consider the self as the perceiver, then there will have to be the 'cinmatra avabhasa' (manifestation of consciousness alone) which is devoid of 'drashtrad vibhaga' (differentiations of the seer, seen etc. Since the latter is not apprehended, we have to take the self to be the percipient; and the percipient involves the objects and makes us hold to the identity of the self with the ahankara.

**Reply:** In deep sleep there is the avabhasa of the self and not of the ahankara. If they are identical, the ahankara must be apprehended in deep sleep.

**Objection:** The cause of the experience of the objects is the ahankara as the percipient. Since the objects are absent in deep sleep, you can't have the apprehension of the self as the 'ahankara'.

**Reply:** The cause of the experience of the objects is not the self or the ahankara, but the 'avabhasa' of the
objects; for it is not svaprakasaka but only ‘jada’. Hence we cannot have the ‘parnmarsa’ of the conscious self arising from the experience of the objects. Thus it is said; “When the blue is felt in consciousness, there is the existence of the blue; and this cannot be taken to give rise to the apprehension of the peripient as the ahankara. The knowledge of the blue arises from the this and not from the peripient. The perceiving individual is not mere ahankara. In ‘aham’ that which is revealed is the self.

Objection: Now in deep sleep there is the absence of the peripient. Yet how do you refer to that peripient as ‘aham’?

Reply: “In deep sleep there are no objects and there cannot be the cognition—‘idam janami’ (I know this). There is no reference to the objects and to the experience as well. As such there may not be any reference to ahankara. But what is there to prevent the reference being made to the self, and not to ahankara? To be a peripient I must have objects; and if the peripient is conveyed by ‘aham’, then ahankara will be only the not-self, since it is absent in deep sleep. Ahankara involves the objects and is destructible; and it cannot be identical with the self. By ‘aham’ we mean that which does not involve the objects. If the ahankara is the self, there ought to be the ‘aham uttekha’ in deep sleep. But since such a thing is not there, ahankara is the not-self.

Objection: The form of the peripient is that ‘bho-ktritva’ (being an enjoyer) which excludes all relationship with the objects. Ahankara is that consciousness which is ‘nirvikalpaka’ (non-determinate). Such a consciousness is (bhasate) there in deep sleep.
If we include the word ‘katham’ (how) in this objection, the passage would mean: That the presence of the objects would make the ahankara the not-self. This is opposed to experience. The that which is being experienced as excluding the not-self cannot be treated as being the not-self. But in deep sleep there is no experience of the objects; and hence there does not arise the question of the experience of the ahankara.

Padmapada states the objection thus: By aham that which is revealed is the nature of the enjoyer. And in the absence of the objects in deep sleep, how can there be the ‘pratibhasa’ of the ahankara?

**Reply:** This identification of the self with ahankara is impossible; for in view of the absence of the objects in deep sleep, it is not ahankara that is in deep sleep. When the ‘upadhi visesha’ relation with objects is removed, we have only the consciousness which is the meaning of ‘aham’. Then we should always have the ‘aham pratiti’.

**Objection:** Even the objectless ‘svarupa’ may be conveyed by ‘aham’, since the ‘aham’ is present also in the experience of the objects.

**Reply:** In the former the objects are not involved, while in the latter the objects are necessary. The two are dissimilar. You can argue that the same consciousness is spoken of as the ahankara when objects are present. The consideration of the objects would establish the ahankara and not the objectless consciousness. Consciousness by itself exists without the objects. Then to treat the ahankara which is attached to the objects and which requires the obj-
ectcs, as the self that exists in deep sleep, is contrary to experience. The self that appears in deep sleep is that which is unrelated to objects and which has no experience of objects; and since there is nothing to be perceived, there is the 'svarupa siddhi'. The self is 'sarvatmakatva' (universal consciousness) whence it has nothing to exclude from itself. And only when there is the attachment of the objects to the 'aham', there is the awareness of the objects that are distinct from the 'aham'.

If it is said that the ahankara is in deep sleep without requiring objects and that there is this awareness, then we ought to remember it, just as we do remember the ahankara of yesterday. There is the abhimana of the ahankara yesterday; and even though there is no rule that we should remember all that was experienced, yet since the nature of ahankara is to remember, there should be the memory of the ahankara in deep sleep.

Objection: The eternal consciousness is beyond destruction; and ahankara being this consciousness, we cannot have the samskara necessary for memory. Samskara arises after an experience is over; and such a thing is impossible here. Hence there is no memory of ahankara.

Reply: In such a case even the ahankara of yesterday cannot be remembered.

Objection: How can you establish the 'ahankara smriti' on your own view? For ahankara, according to you, is said to be illumined by the sakshi caitanya.
Reply: It is only the antahkarana as conditioned by the ‘aham vritti’ that becomes the object for consciousness. This psychosis has a beginning and an end. Then it can have the samskaras of previous experiences from which there arises memory. And the antahkarana is conditioned by such a memory. But the antahkarana in turn conditions the ‘smrity anubhava’ (a. shi caitanya). In this way we explain the memory of ahankara.

Objection: Now, in deep sleep there is the experience of happiness (sukha), and this happiness always has its leaning towards its asraya which is the ahankara. Why can’t we then say that even in deep sleep there is the experience of antahkarana? After we get up from sleep I say that I slept happily. Herein we refer to an experience of happiness in deep sleep. Since such an experience necessarily implies the aham, there is the ‘aham ullekha’ in deep sleep”.

Reply: If happiness was experienced, we should note that happiness arises from objects. And there will be the ‘aham ullekha’ arising only from the experience of the objects. In deep sleep there cannot be the experience of some thing other than itself by the self. Then there can be the memory arising from the samskara of the experience of happiness. We refer to that state as one of ‘sukha’ and by this we only mean the absence of ‘duhkha’.

Objection: When you enquire into the nature and meaning of ‘sukha’, you give up the primary and essential positive meaning of ‘sukha’; and instead of this you are taking its opposite to interpret ‘sukha’ to mean ‘duhkha. abhava’. You can take recourse to such secondary meani—
ngs (lakshana) only if it is verbal knowledge that is to be determined. When 'sukhavamarsa' is a fact of experience you cannot resort to 'lakshana'.

**Reply**: Since there is no way to find out that there is an experience of sukha and since that state can be described only in a negative way, we treat 'sukha' to mean only the absence of 'duhkha'. As in the waking state, so in dream too we have the experience of 'duhkha'. Since such an experience is not found in deep sleep we refer to it as 'sukha'. We are able to say that there is no 'duhkha' because in deep sleep the sense organs cease to function.

**Objection**: Why cannot we assume the primary meaning of 'sukha' because of the power implicit in the 'paramarsa'?

**Reply**: "If there is the memory of deep sleep and also of its object viz., sukha, we should remember it as having the 'uparaga' (attachment) of the specific objects. But such a memory is not there. And even when we describe it, we only say- 'I slept well; and nothing was done (cetitam) by me? This statement too proves that the object of reference is the absence of unhappiness.

**Objection**: But we can also prove the experience of happiness in deep sleep from the fact that one gets up from sleep and feels himself light and refreshed; and this makes us infer the experience of happiness.

**Reply**: This is false. If the sukha is directly experienced, it does not require an inference to establish it.
Objection: Then how is it that one feels himself light and refreshed as he wakes up, while another does not feel so?

Reply: During the waking state our sense organs get tired; and this is overcome by stopping their activity. Such a stopping of the activity of the sense organs is deep sleep. There too if there is complete cessation of the activity, we feel light and refreshed as we get up. If there is no such complete cessation we feel otherwise when we get up.

From this we conclude that even as the enjoyer the aham is not remembered in deep sleep.

Objection: If the self is experienced as the enjoyer, it ought to be remembered.

Reply: It is not a rule that all that was experienced should be remembered. When the self is being remembered, that aspect of it being the ahankara, what needs to be remembered is the ahankara only and not the self.

Prakasatman’s objection against Padmapada’s contention that in deep sleep we have the absence of unhappiness.

Even if we admit that there is ‘duhkhabhava’, it is not possible to experience such an entity. And there can be no memory of such an entity because it is a negative entity. There can be the experience of the ‘svarupananda’ which is fundamental, and not any other sukha.

Objection: But since that ‘svarupananda sukhak’ is enveloped by avidya, it cannot have any prakasa.
Reply: The 'sukhamsa' of the witnessing consciousness is never enveloped by avidya, for avidya itself is 'sakshi bhasya'. It is 'prakasamana'.

Objection: How is it this sukha is not revealed during the waking state?

Reply: It is revealed as having the nature of 'parama premaspadatva'. But it is not illumined or revealed clearly just like the light of the pradipā which is being blown by a fierce wind; it is 'mithya jnana vikshipta'. Since there is no such preventing force in deep sleep, it is manifested better.

Objection: When one gets up he refers to the absence of unhappiness in deep sleep. Since there is no knowledge of the 'pratiyogi', there cannot be any experience. If so, how does he refer to it?

Reply: That which was experienced is only sukha; and when he gets up he remembers it. We arrive at the absence of duhkha through arthapatti; for, if sukha was experienced, there was no duhkha. The absence of duhkha is not remembered, but only inferred or assumed. Likewise one who gets up refers to the absence of knowledge since that which was experienced is its opposite, viz., ajnana. Since we cannot argue that it is remembered, we infer or assume the experience of jnanabhava.

Objection: During the waking state too we experience ajnana. How can this ajnana be the opposite of knowledge?
Reply: In deep sleep there is the experience of that ajnana which is qualified (determined) by the specific state of sleep. This ajnana is seen to be opposed to the knowledge of pot etc., that we have in the waking state. The knowledge of the pot is opposed to the knowledge of the cloth, when we are having the latter.

Objection: Since we do not have the memory of the various knowledges in deep sleep, we may infer that there is the absence of knowledge. Thereby you need not assume the experience of ‘ajnana’ which is opposed to ‘jnana’.

An object which is beyond this world cannot be seen and therefore cannot be remembered; likewise there is no experience of jnana in deep sleep because it is not remembered.

Reply: Even when there is the knowledge of such a transcendental object, there need not be a memory of it. There was the absence of the elephant in the morning. But I can infer the ‘gajabhava’ through arthapatti by taking into consideration the objects that make the presence of the elephant there inconsistent. I now remember the objects which make its presence incompatible with them. I do not arrive at the conclusion merely from the ‘anudaya’ (non-emerging) of the memory of the elephant: Therefore I arrive through ‘arthapatti’ at the ‘jnanabhava’ and the ‘duhkhabhava’ from the incompatibility of the presence of the specific ajnana and of the experience of sukha respectively.

Objection: We have the experience of ajnana, the experience of sukha, and the witnessing consciousness. We
are said to remember all these three when we get up. But to remember there must be a samskara which presupposes the destruction of the previous experience. In every experience there is the ‘sakshi caitanya’ which has no destruction. Then how is there the memory of these three for one when he gets up from sleep?

Reply: Consciousness in itself is eternal, but as conditioned it is not eternal. Thus memory becomes possible. Ajnana evolves itself into the form of that which witnesses its own happiness. In this evolved ajnana, there arises the ‘caitanyabhāsa’. From this we have the ‘ajnanadi vīśeṣabhāvā’.

Ajnana conditions consciousness and assumes a variety of forms. Of these forms we have the ajnananubhava, sukhānubhava and sakshi. These differ from one another since they are the various stages or forms of the evolving ajnana. Thus arises the difference between one ‘caitanyabhāsa’ (caitanya vritti) and another. Such vrittis have a beginning and end and they are destroyed. They give rise to samskara; and this in its turn gives rise to memory. And the memory appears in the forms of ajnana sukhā and sakshi caitanya.

Now it is a rule that samskara has as its asraya in that which has given rise to it. Such an entity is the self as conditioned by ajnana. It has its asraya in this ajnana, and not in the antahkarana.

Thus there is always the possibility of experiencing the ‘ajnana sukhā’ in deep sleep. Consequently Padmapada’s argument in favour of ‘duhkhabhava’ is faulty and inconsistent.
Formal reply to this objection by Prakasatman himself is now given:

This should not be construed as a mistake on the part of Padmapadana for he is giving the reply not from the standpoint of his own system, but from that of the Nyaya system.

So far we have established that consciousness which is svayam prakasa is distinct from ahankara. The ahampratyaya, whose object is the self, is not at all different from the blue that is the object of cognition. Nor can the ‘ahamullekha’ arise only from the experience of the objects. This distinction between the self and the ahankara as maintained by Sankara has its basis also in the Upanishads. This distinction has its basis in the agamas also.

In the passage- “Sa evadhatat sa evoparishat...”, we find ‘Sarvatmakatva’ attributed to the ‘Bhuma Brahman’. Then in ‘athato ahankaradesah’. We find ahankara treated as ‘sarvatmaka’. And later on in ‘athata atmadesah’ we find that the self is explicitly distinguished from ahankara.

Objection: There are passages where the ‘sarvatmakatva’ is attributed to the self, while in others it is attributed to Brahman. This has been done only to establish the identity of the self and Brahman. Likewise we can say that the ‘sarvatmakatva’ referred to earlier is intended only to identify the ahankara with the self.

Reply: No. When one is distinct and different from the other, both cannot be treated as ‘sarvatmaka’. Such is the case with the self and the ahankara. But the self and Brahman are apprehended as different from one another; and the texts go to remove this error and establish their
identity. As regards the ahankara, it is already apprehended as being identical with the self; and the texts are intended to establish their difference. Since Brahman is not taken to be immediate, the texts aim at establishing the immediacy of Brahman. To achieve this easily, they first identify the ahankara with the self; and later on ignore it or reject it. Thereby they are able to establish the identity of the self with Brahman.

It is not only the sruthi that establishes the difference between the self and the ahankara, but also the smriti as in passages like- “mahabhutany ahankarah...”.


i) The upadana is referred to in the texts as the ‘avyakritha namarupa, avidya, maya, prakriti, agrahana, avyakta, tamas, karana, laya, sakti, mahasupti, nidra, akshara, akasa. Consciousness is in itself and by itself the form of Brahman. Avidya prevents the appearence of this Brahman and brings about the jiva. It is the strange wall which hears or manifests itself in ‘bhranti’, ‘karma’ and the samskaras of previous experiences. In deep sleep it remains as mere ‘vikshepa samskara’ by concealing or enveloping the prakasa. Such a beginningless avidya is the material cause of ahankara.

ii) Paramesvara is the ground; and this ground functions as the instrumental cause whence avidya evolves itself into a specific form called ahankara.

26)
iii) The vijnana sakti and the kriya sakti of Isvara constitute the asraya of this ahankara; and this is its svarupa.

iv) Its karya or product is seen in making us treat it as both the doer the enjoyer.

v) It gets its illumination (jyothis) by its integration with the kutastha caitanya which constitutes its pramana. This ahankara has svayam prakasa and is immediate. Because of this integration of the ahankara with the primal foundational consciousness, consciousness is wrongly treated as the enjoyer even though it is the not-this and even though it is the only self.

vi) In deep sleep all the evolutes of avidya have their laya (devolution) into avidya, whence ahankara ceases to be ahankara. It remains in its ‘karanarupa’ (causeal state) viz, that of avidya. Where there is the devolution of the ‘linga sarira’ (astral body) which is the product of ajnana, there we have deep sleep.

**Objection**: But even in deep sleep there is ‘prana’ which is the ‘kriya’ of ahankara. Then how can there be the devolution of ahankara?

**Reply**: We cannot attribute the nature of ahankara alone to ‘prana’. ‘Prana’ has an existence distinct from that of ahankara and in order there might be the five-fold activity we only say that there is the ‘kriyas sakti’ for ahankara; for the prana vritti is dependent on the mind.

**Objection**: But if the ‘prana vyapara’ is dependent on ahankara, in the absence of the later, the former too should cease.
Reply: An alternative explanation is therefore given. We have said that there is a ‘kriya sakti’ and a ‘vijnana sakti’ in ahankara. And we can say that there is the devolution of only the latter in deep sleep; and since the former remains there is prana. This can be argued out since there are amsas in antahkarana.

Or we can argue from the standpoint of drishti srishti (creative experience). In the dreams the objects seen are created. Extending this principle we may say that there is the devolution in so far as the person having deep sleep is concerned. That the person in deep sleep has ‘prana’ is the cognition of another who is not in deep sleep.

Now arises an objection from the Sankhya: It has been admitted that the material cause for antahkarana etc., is the unconscious maya. When there is the ‘ahankara nir-bhasa’, does it mean the ‘aham pratyaya’ or the ‘sakshin? Avidya which is not implicitly involved in aham pratyaya is only a nimitta, and hence it cannot be the former. And since the sakshin in ‘prajnana ghana’ it cannot involve avidya in itself. Avidya can be said to be in the sakshin in one of the three ways— a) Avidya can be its sakti; b) Avidya can have its asraya in it; c) Avidya can be that which is adhyasta on it. All these are impossible. And hence this ‘pradhana’ is ‘svatantra’ (independent) and it evolves by itself in three ways— Viz. dharma, lakshana, and avastha. The ‘dharma’ (avyayavi) parinama takes the form of the whole world that is ‘karya’ beginning with ‘mahat’. The ‘lakshana’ parinama brings about the temporal distinctions for the evolutes of the previous order. The unborn evolute is born and later it is no more. Here we have the ‘anagata
Bimba - Pratibimba Vada (Theory of Reflection):

Yet Padmapada gives the illustration of the reflections falling in the mirror and in water. These illustrations go to show that the ‘anidamamsa’ (the aspect of the not-this) of the ahankarta is the reflection of Brahman, and that the reflection is not something different from the Bimba (original) of Brahman, but is the same as Brahman. The reflection appears to be different (distinct) from Brahman and it also appears as distorting the original. Only this much is false.

Objection: But distortion and difference are facts of direct experience in this case. How can you say that they are identical?

Reply: There is the recognition that both have the identical features. The features of Devadatta when he is outside the house are found to be the same as those when he is inside. Thus there arises the recognition. Likewise there is the recognition of this identity between the original and the reflection.

Objection: In direct perception there is the awareness of difference. How can this be negated by mere recognition?

Reply: If the reflection is different from the original, there cannot arise any recognition.

Since we have the awareness of both identity and differences, there arises the doubt as to what negates which; and the difference is negated because it lacks logical support.
vrittis is 'he antahkarana, just as the ground or locus for
the fire is the piece of iron, just as the mirror is the 'asraya'
for the face, just as the water in a glass is the medium of
reflection for the moon. Such an antahkarana is taken to
be conditioning or delimiting the self. It is considered to
be that which brings about the adhyasa on the self. Such
an entity which is distinct from the mind is nowhere to be
found. you cannot take the antahkarana to be non-differ-
ent from the buddhi also. For Akshapada's aphorism
clearly states that buddhi is a synonym of 'upalabdhi' and
jnana. You cannot also say that the buddhi knows (janati)
while the self comprehends (upalabhate); for the admission
of a differen between 'knows' and comprehends' would
compelese to accept two distinct entities having these two
functions. Hence there is no antahkarana.

Reply: The intellect separates the evolved ahankara
from consciousness which is the not-self; and the Vedantins
speak of ahankara under the names of antahkarana, manas,
buddhi, and aham pratyaya, for they accept the 'vijnana
sakti vishesha' in this consideration. When they accept
the parispanda sakti the same evolved form is treated as
'prana'.

There is the sruti passage - "Budher gunenatma gu-
nena caiva aragramatro hy avaropi drishteh". Here
Buddhi is taken to be a substance since it has the nature of
evolving. Again in the Sruti text - "yada pancaiva liyante
janani manasa saha, buddhis ca nengate tatra param atma-
nam arnute". Here again Buddhi is the asraya of 'ceshta'
and is thus comprehenned to be a substance.

In "Vijnanam yajnam tanute" we find a separate and
distinct mention of the self which is 'anandamaya'. This
means vijnana is synomynous with buddhi. And buddhi as the ‘asraya’ of ‘kriya’ is again taken to be a substance.

Again we read “vijnanena va rigvedam vijanati manasa hy eva pasyati”. The word ‘manas’ is expressed here only to emphasise the means of apprehension. And manas then is identical with vijnana. Manas has the vrittis like karma, sankalpa and vicikitsa.

Hence sruti and reason establish that the antahkarana has, the vijnana sakti and kriya, and that it is also described as manas, buddhi etc.

Take again the sruti passages - “Buddhergunenatma gunena caiva”, “sa dhih svapno bhautva imam lokam samcarati”, “vijnana mayah” and “manomayah”. Here we find manas or buddhi as that which delimits or conditions the self and as that which makes us take its attributes to be those of the self.

In the sruti passage - “Kasminv aham utkrante utkantoro bhavishyami”. We find that ‘prana’ which is the ‘upadhi’ of ‘utrkanti’ etc., is only an ‘amsa’ of the antahkarana. But we cannot treat both ‘prana’ and the ‘antahkarana’ as the two upadhis; for that is inconsistent. The antahkarana then is the only upadhi (the conditioning principle)

It cannot be argued that all the passages given above are only ‘arthavad’ (laudatory) and that therefore they do not lay down any principles. For we have the self which is devoid of parts, which is all-pervasive or every where, which is asanga (non-relational) and which is unconditioned like the sky. Such a self cannot be treated as having
the 'utkrantyadi gamena'. This movement being inconsistent with the nature of the self, we argue through artha-patti to establish that the antahkarana or ahankara is the upaphi, that it conditions the self due to avidya.

**Objection:** Why can't we say that the 'Vijnana sakti' and 'kriya parinama sakti' belong only to the self.

**Reply:** Any parinama is inconsistent with the nature of the self, for the self is devoid of parts, is all-pervasive, and is asanga. Further the appearances are made possible only when the evolved antahkarana is near by. And Padmapada says that "due to its paraga with the antahkarana the self is falsely treated as the ahankarta, just as the crystal is taken to be red because of the 'uparaga, with the 'japakusuma' which is near by."

Padmapada states the question. "How do you account for the mithyatva of the redness in the crystal?" The crystal is apprehended as red. Redness is not cognised as separate from the crystal. There is the samsarga between the redness and the crystal. This is explained differently in different theories.

**Akhyati:** There is the appearance of the false readiness in the crystal. But the redness that is cognised belongs to or comes from the japakusuma. And it does not appear as distinct from the crystal. The absence of this distinction between the two brings about this erroneous cognition.

**Reply:** The rays of light emanating from the eye catch the crystal; and if these rays approach the japakusuma flower, they will cognise the redness as belonging
to that flower only. The nature of the eye is to cognise the form along with its properties. We never see that the eye apprehends only the form or only the property.

You can not say that since there is a defect in the sense organ there is no contact with the flower and that therefore the erroneous cognition has arisen. The property of an object is necessarily connected with the object. When the property is apprehended, the object also is apprehended. You cannot cognise the mere redness and not the flower having this redness, if the redness belongs only to the flower-

Anyathakhyati: Only the mere form of the flower is reflected and it appears as the nature of the crystal.

Reply: We nowhere see that only the form can be reflected and not its asraya also. It is not the bare abstract form of the flower that can be reflected, but the flower as such in all its concreteness. Otherwise we should apprehend and say that we cognise redness in the crystal, or that the redness of the flower being undistinguished from the crystal appears as having the nature of the crystal. If there is a concomittant relation between the ‘prabha’ of the flower and of the crystal, the crystal should appear as red. In such a case there would be the ‘samsarga’ between the crystal and the redness; for the crystal which is not in itself red, appears as red. This redness is mithya because of the samsarga between the two whence we cognise only one entity as the red crystal.

Akhyati: We can argue that it is only the prabha of the flower that appears as red, and not the crystal.
Reply: We cognise the crystal and the crystal has whiteness. This whiteness is integrally and internally related to the crystal; and its manifestation is not prevented by any thing. Thus even the whiteness must appear in the crystal.

Objection: But there is the red ‘prabha’ coming from the flower and this is opposed to the whiteness. The whiteness is removed, rejected, suppressed or prevented.

Reply: If the whiteness is suppressed or prevented it means that the internal quality is no more there; and in the absence of the quality the object is also not there. How can you cognise a formless object?

Objection: The substance may be devoid of a form; yet there is the prabha which is the ‘rupi’ (that which has the form) and since there is the samyoga with such a prabha the object is cognised, and cognition has become possible.

Reply: This is impossible; for the wind which is formless comes into contact with objects having a form. Then the wind too would have to be cognised by the eye.

Objection: Redness has arisen when the whiteness has been removed or suppressed. The crystal has again a form and thus the eye was able to cognise it.

Reply: Redness has not arisen because of the prabha. The prabha is there even after we overcome the error and if the redness is due to the prabha, the crystal should appear red even then.
So far we have assumed the existence of the prabha. The prabha of the ‘padmaraga’ and other genes is without a ground. But it is apprehended when we cognise them. On the other hand redness is in the crystal and is cognised as such. It has a ground.

The redness cognised in the crystal is conditioned by the flower which is near by. Likewise there is the uparaga of the ahankara in the self. Since the self is conditioned by the ahankara we treat the self as the agent etc. Thus the self and the antahkarana so interpenetrate into one another that they are welded into a single unity. This is called a knot; and ahankara is spoken of as the ‘granthi’ (knot)

**Objection**: ‘Kartritva’ (agent-hood) is a property of ahankara. Is there only a superimposition of this property on the self? Or does there arise anew, but false, property in the self? If it is the former, the illustration of the red crystal will be of no use, and there will be the admission of anyatha khyati. If it is the latter there will be a true kartritva besides a false kartritva, and both these will have to appear.

**Reply**: It is not a property of the ahankara alone that is superimposed on the self. That which is superimposed is the ahankara along with its properties. Hence there is mithyatva and we do not have anyathakhyati. Further the example is taken only to imply that in the presence of one object, there appears a mithya dharma in another. Only this much is to be taken from the example. Or, we can accept that there are two Kartritvas. But since there is only one dharmi, there is no apprehension of the difference between these two kartritvas.
Objection: In “Bhidyate hridaya granthih” we find that the ‘hridayagranthi’ in the self is the cause of all ‘anartha’. Then how do you attribute this ‘anartha’ only to the ahankara which is to be broken?

Reply: Ahankara and the self are integrated (or welded) into a unity or knot.

Objection: The self has the uparaga of the ahankara. Just as the crystal which is uparakta reveals the property of the flower in it. So must the self reveal the properties of the ahankara in itself.

Reply: Ahankara which has the uparaga with the self is an unconscious entity. There cannot be the sakshadbhava (immediacy) of the uparaga. The unconscious and consciousness are the conditions or causes for the appearance (avabhasakatva) and the non-appearance. It is not the ‘uparaktatva’ and ‘anuparakta’ that can be treated as the conditions or causes of appearance.

Objection: Even consciousness does not have the manovyapara of the ‘uparakta ahankara vishaya’. Consciousness does not have any activity with reference to the objects. Then it becomes the same as ahankara.

Reply: There is the uparaga for consciousness and consciousness illumines the ahankara. The vishaya vyapara belongs directly to ahankara and indirectly to consciousness. Ahankara functions because it is illumined by consciousness. Ahankara is immediately connected with or related to consciousness. And due to this samsarga consciousness is the ‘pratibhasa hetu’ (cause of appearance) and not the ‘jnana vyapara’.
Objection: Then ahankara does not seem to require the mediation of the vijnana sakti and kriya sakti that constitute the sakshi svarupaa. In such a case; how can there be the ‘idam amsata’ for ahankara?

Reply: Ahankara is cidadhhsya or illumined by consciousness and it acquires be nature of an object (idam amsata). The not-thisness is the form of consciousness and the object of consciousness constitutes the thisness. This does not require the mediation of jnana and kriya.

Because of the uparaga of ahankara, the self which is not-this is falsely taken to be ahankarta. The self is taken to acquire the nature of ahankara; and such a self has the ‘vyapara’ of the ahankara only. In terms of this vyapara there arises the illumination (prakasa, pariccheda) of the ahankarta; and this ahankarta alone is the object having the nature of the this.

The body, sense organs and the objects are cognised as the this because they are apprehended through the mediation of the antahkarana vritti (psychosis) and since there is no such mediation in the case of the ahankara it appears as the not-this.

Objection: But is not ahankara mediated by ajnana? for ajnana brings about the ahankara. In view of this mediation how can you maintain the absence of the ‘idamtavabhasa’ for the ahankara?

Reply: It is only because of ajnana there is the integration of consciousness and ahankara into one. Since consciousness and ahankara are distinct, some are unable to accept the view that the ahankara has the nature of the
this. Since there is only the mediation of ajnana, the ahankara appears as the not-this; and people are not willing to see any distinction here.

**Objection:** If the ahankara has really the nature and meaning of the object, then it is not proper for the ahankara not to reveal itself as an object.

**Reply:** The ahankara reveals itself as an object and it is proper to treat it so. But we have facts of experience which show that we behave otherwise even when we know the facts. The whole process of the tree beginning with the ankura (plant) and ending in the fruit is the result obtained from the series of the evolution from the changes that took place in the clay. Yet you do not speak of the tree as ‘mrimayā’ as we do speak of the pot or the ‘valmika’ (anthitl.)

**Objection:** Yes, in the case of the tree we must have the ‘mrimayā vyavahara’. But when we come to examine ahankara, we do speak of it as the this. Then this example does not fit in here.

**Reply:** Even the wise are not into learnt of such a usage.

Hence let those who doubt this nature of ahankara examine it carefully from their own experiences and find out whether what we stated is true.

The form of ahankara is the this which is integrated to the not-this or consciousness. So far it is established and the illustration of the red crystal was also given to show that the not-self is superimposed on the self.
Bimba - Pratibimba Vada (Theory of Reflection):

Yet Padmapada gives the illustration of the reflections falling in the mirror and in water. These illustrations go to show that the 'anidamamsa' (the aspect of the not-this) of the ahankarta is the reflection of Brahman, and that the reflection is not something different from the Bimba (original) of Brahman, but is the same as Brahman. The reflection appears to be different (distinct) from Brahman and it also appears as distorting the original. Only this much is false.

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Reply: There is the recognition that both have the identical features. The features of Devadatta when he is outside the house are found to be the same as those when he is inside. Thus there arises the recognition. Likewise there is the recognition of this identity between the original and the reflection.

Objection: In direct perception there is the awareness of difference. How can this be negated by mere recognition?

Reply: If the reflection is different from the original, there cannot arise any recognition.

Since we have the awareness of both identity and differences, there arises the doubt as to what negates which; and the difference is negated because it lacks logical support.
Objection: Since there is a difference you can argue that there is a mirror near the original face and that the "avayavas" (parts) of the mirror have evolved themselves into the form of another person. In any other way there cannot arise a different person. It cannot be the impression of a stamp even, since the reflection is a strange evolute having features opposite from those of the original. There is no "samslesha" (fusion) too which is necessary for such an impression. As such we say that the reflection is evolved from the avayavas of the mirror.

Reply: In such a case we should have to say that reflection is evolved in the mirror in the presence of the original near by; and when the original is removed, the reflection should remain as it is. "You can't say that the reflection is always there since it appears only when we look into the mirror. For, hold the mirror crosswise and you won't see the reflection as you found it earlier.

Objection: When the instrumental cause is removed, its effect also is gone. The Vaishikas argue that "dvijtv", (two-ness) arises because of the "apaksha buddhi", and when the latter is lost, the former too disappears. Likewise when there is the contact with the hand you can stretch a closed mat (which is curling); and when the contact is not there, the mat is closed. Likewise the face is only the instrumental cause of the reflection.

Reply: The facts are otherwise. The mat has been closed many a time previously and there has arisen in it a certain samskara which is the instrumental cause of its closing. When the iron is melted by the fire, it passes into the state of a solid only when an object opposed to the
melted iron has arisen. It is such an object that functions as the instrumental cause. The example from the Vaiseshikas is faulty, since number coexists with the object and is not created.

**Objection:** When there arises a now product that comes from the samskara, you argue that there is the destination of the previous product and not the destruction of the instrumental cause. How is this possible?

**Reply:** If you go on stretching it frequently to put an end to its closing, it will not close even when there is or there is no contact with the hand. It there is the absence of the stretching because of the absence of the ‘nimitta’, then in the absence of the samskara also it must close itself.

**Objection:** Consider here the case of the mirror which is pure and clear. There is a samskara arising from the ‘samsthana’. Because of the strength of the samskara, there arises a ‘viruddha kaarya’ (contrary effect). Then there is the absence of the reflection.

**Reply:** If so take a mirror which has just then come into existence. The continued long presence of the object before it gives rise to samskara of the ‘bimba parinama’. Even then the removal of the original would result in the removal of the reflection.

**Objection:** The rays of the sun have fallen on the kamala and they have given rise to a samskara called its ‘vikasa parinama’ (change into flowering). Yet when the rays of the sun are removed, we find the blossoming too disappearing. Likewise the reflection, which has been
there for a long time. disappears when the original is removed.

**Reply** : No. In the case of the blossoming of the kamala we should note there was a time when it was only in the form of a bud inspite of the rays of the sun falling on it. Its first blossoming was brought about by the earthly and watery elements that are in it.

**Objection** : It is not these elements that have made it blossom. It is only the instrumental cause, viz., the rays of the sun.

**Reply** : No. When these elements are no more in the flower, it becomes old and it does not close even in the absence of the sun.

**Objection** : But even here the instrumental case is the removal of the instrumental cause itself, and not the earthly and watery parts.

**Reply** : But when these parts are in a state of decay, the flower does not close even when the sun has set.

**Objection** : Then why can't we assume a 'parinama hetu' in the case of the mirror for the effect of a contrary face?

**Reply** : We do not find such a parinamahetu in the case of the mirror. When there is the proximity of the Bimba the mirror reveals the form of the face; and this requires carving which is not found. Further the reflec-
ction is not amenable to touch. If it is said that the parts of the mirror mediate the reflection and hence we cannot touch it, then we cannot have a preceptual cognition of the reflection. Further we commonly say that there is no different person in the mirror since there is no cause that can bring about such a person. This different person is as non-existent as the horns of a hare.

**Objection:** Then as in the cognition of the false silver we have mithyatva hare, and as such there is no identity of face. Let it not be a different face; but it cannot be the identical face. Recognition too does not make out the identity here; for the 'suktirajata' which has only a 'mithyarupa' appears as having the form of the real silver. There is the recognition of real silver even in the erroneous cognition; and this does not make the two identical.

**Reply:** No. In the case of the silver, we take it to be 'mithyarajata' since there is the sublation. Such a sublation is not found in the case of the reflection. The sublation does not involve any recognition of identity between the true and the false. Here we do not have the sublation of the form 'this is not a face'. It cannot take some such form as 'this face here is not mine' for there is recognition. If it is the face of a person other than mine, even then I cannot sublate it. Further, when the mirror is removed, the reflection is lost. But this is not a case of sublation; for if it were a case of sublation it would involve the sublation of the mirror itself.

**Objection:** Now, we never cognise our own facial avayavas, and hence there is no perceptual experience of our own faces by ourselves.
Reply: No. We do cognise some of these avayavas; and just as we cognise a part or aspect of an object and feel that we cognised the object completely, so do we feel about our own faces.

Objection: Take "Tat tvam asi". This is intended to sublate the 'tvam padartha' (thou) for no liberation is possible if the samasrin is not destroyed. As such this is not a correct illustration: From the sentence 'tat tvam asi' we do find sublation in such cases.

Reply: Here we should note that "so yam devadattah" (This is that Devadatta) refers only to 'taadaatmya' (identity) and not to the parartha badha because there is no 'samaanaadhikaranya' "between the self and Brahman. The words 'tat' and 'tvam' convey the 'Brahmasvarupa' which is the Bimba for the self which is the reflection. If this were not the meaning, the sentence would have been 'Na tvam asi' (you are not) and not 'tat tvam asi', as in the case of 'na rajatam asti'. Further even the sastraic text 'nekshet adityam adityam nastam yantam kadacana, noporaktam no vaaristham no madhyam nabhaso gatam' goes to show that the identity of the Bimbarupaa is ultimately real. By stating 'no vaaristham' this passage maintains the identity of the sun with the sun's reflection in water.

The Akhyati vadin (Prabhakara) says: The reflection which is in the mirror does not appear as different from the original. But the Bimba itself appears (prakasa) as undistinguished from the mirror. It is not that the rays of the eye falling on the mirror apprehend (or cognise) the Bimba alone as existing in a different place. But the rays of the eye fall on the mirror and are sent back and they cognise the Bimba only as existing in the aakasa.
Reply: It is a fact that there appears the reflection in an object that is in front of us and it appears as ‘praty-ang mukha’. As if it has entered into the mirror, it is cognised by us. We find as if we are seeing another person. The face does not appear as it is but as if it were another. When this is the fact of experience there is no use in contradicting it or rejecting it.

Objection: An object having a specific form is reflected completely in the mirror. We no-where see that a specific object can exist completely and as it is in two different places at the same time. How then can a specific finite entity appear at two different places with an identical nature, and yet how can both be real?

Reply: We only say that there is only one face existing at only one place. Such a face appears as two at two different places because of illusion (bhrama). We do not say that the ‘vicchedaavabhaasa’ (appearance of difference) is real, but we only say that the identity is real.

Objection: Then what is this that we have? One object alone existing at only one place is appearing differently as two and as existing at two places? What is this difference?

Reply: This difference (vicchada) is brought about by maya’.

Objection: But how can even Maya bring things that are inconsistent with the pramanas?

Reply: There is nothing impossible in Maya; for Maya is skilled in manifesting the impossible or the inconceivable.
Objection: How is the appearance of 'viccheda' brought by avidya? The tree, which is seen to have its branches upwards, is cognised in the water as having its branches downwards. And we do not find any ajnana in such an appearance.

Reply: We have said earlier that the cause of adhyasa is not the ajnana which is said to envelop the objects, for ajnana is not vishayaavaraaka. In all these cases where we have 'aupaadhika bhrama' (conditioned illusion) it is only the upaadhi that functions as the sufficient cause for the evolution of 'atmavidya'. In 'sopaadhika bhrama' you may cognise the ground, and yet this cognition is not opposed to adhyasa. The cognition of the ground will dispel or sublate only the 'nirupadhika bhrama' (unconditioned illusion).

Objection: In 'sopaadhika bhrama' we have the 'bheda kartritvadhyasa' (superimposition of a different agent). Here we can and do have the knowledge of the ground and this is the true knowledge. Yet this true knowledge does not dispel adhyasa. But adhyasa is dispelled only when the upaadhi is dispelled. And the appearance of difference etc. ought to remain as it is even when there is the true knowledge. There is the knowledge or apprehension of the identity of the bimba. There is the reflection and also the difference of this reflection from the original; and there are mithyavabhaasas (false appearances). Now even when there is the apprehension of the identity with Brahman, the distinctness and difference cannot vanish.

Before a final reply can be given to this objection, there are other objections to be answered first.
Objection: If the self is only a reflection, we cannot understand the nature of the original since it is a reflection only; The reflection of Devadatta does not comprehend the nature of Devadatta.

Reply: But in the case of Devadatta that which is reflected is only the ‘acetamamsa’ (non-sentient aspect). Since the reflection is an unconscious entity it is unable to comprehend it; for example, the pot does not comprehend its own reflection.

Objection: But there are the atheistic materialists according to whom the body itself is the conscious entity.

Reply*: If it is the ‘sacetanaamsa’ that is reflected we find that the properties like ‘syamatva’ which are not in the original but in the unconscious mirror are seen in the reflection since the reflection has a necessary relation with the mirror. [These properties come to the reflection because of the mirror which is unconscious and with which there is the relation to the reflection. This is the answer if we accept the materialists contention. In any other view, we have to attribute these new properties of the reflection to the naturally unconscious entity called the body with which there is a relation for the conscious element of Devadatta. As such the reflection being ‘acetana’ (unconscious), cannot know that it is identical with the Bimba. There is another argument to show that the reflection of Devadatta is ‘acetana’. It is our experience that the movement is possible in the reflection if there is no corresponding movement in the original. If the reflection has at some moment some consciousness, it should show movement without requiring such a movement in the original.
Objection: It is not possible to suppress the 'ajnata' (ignorance) of the self by merely accepting that Brahman is 'sarvjna' (omnicient) while the self is 'ajna' or 'kincijna'; for Brahman too cannot be said to be 'sarvajna'. The argument is thus stated for the objection. It is the face of Devadatta that is reflected, and Devadatta can find out whether it is his reflection or not by his movements. So, the 'asraya' of 'tattvajñana' as well as the 'aasraya' of the previous doubt is Devadatta himself. Likewise Brahman alone ought to be the 'asraya' for both 'ajnana' and 'tattvajñana'.

Reply: True knowledge can arise only in that person who has no bhranti (illusion) either with reference to himself or with reference to others; and the true knowledge can dispel his own ignorance only. If I am in error, true knowledge dispels only my ignorance. Tattvajñana does not arise from the bimbatva, but from dispelling the error. This error is the result of ajñana and ajñana is the condition that brings the self into existence.

Objection: Does Brahman know that the nature of the reflection as being that of the self? or no? if it does not know, he ceases to be 'sarvajña'. If it knows it will see itself to be the 'samsaarín' (self).

Reply: "When Devadatta knows his reflection to be identical with himself, he does not take the reflection along with the objects that have crept into it. He finds his reflection as being smaller. Yet he is not worried about these defects for he knows that it is his and that it is essentially non-different from him. Likewise Brahman sees in himself the self as his reflection and sees the samsara in the self; yet this is only a defect that has crept with the
reflection, and it does not belong to him. This is what the true knowledge of identity gives. True knowledge and ‘samsara’ are as different from one another as white and black; and one cannot be the other.

Objection: Even when there is the awareness of identity, the ‘vicchedda vibhrama’ does not disappear, Tattvajñana cannot dispel the ‘bheda bhrama’, for it is to knowledge of identity similar to that between the bimba and its reflection.

Reply: Yes, it is true in our empirical experience. The ‘vicchedda vibhrama’ is not brought by the reflection, but by the ‘upaadhi’ which is brought by ajñana; and this ajñana is dispelled by knowledge. By more knowledge alone there cannot be the dispelling or disappearance of the reflections for the cause of reflection is the mirror which is real.

Objection: Then there is the ‘Upadhijaadya’ attached to the self; as such the self cannot be the ‘asraya’ for ‘bhranti’ and for true knowledge. If the self is the asraya for these, he ceases to be a reflection.

Reply: But the self is similar to a reflection and is immediately apprehended by all of us as ‘cidruupa’. He is not completely overcome by the ‘antahkarana jaadya.’

There is the ‘smriti text - “Ruupam rupam prati ruupo babhuva”, and Badarayana’s apoirism - “Ekahsa bahu-dha caiva drisyate jala candravat”; and Badarayana’s apoirism - “Asha eva copama jala suryakadivat”. These passages also establish the self to be the reflection of Brahma just as there is the reflection of aakaasa which is without a form
-as its reflection in water along with the clouds and stars, so can there be the reflection of Brahman. Even in a little pot of water we do find the reflection of a great expanse of the sky. And it is impossible to say that only that aakaasa which is in the water is seen as ‘abhraadi bimba yuktah’. Hence Brahman is the Bimba and the self is its reflection and also ‘cidrupa’. This is arrived at from the sastras and from direct experience. As such it is not possible to reject it.

**Objection:** Why can’t we say that like the ‘ghata-akasa’, the self in conditioned (avacchinna) by the upaadhi?

**Reply:** No. The self is that consciousness which is said to be conditioned by the upadhi; and Brahman is the consciousness while there are only various consciousnesses here. Brahman should have to be outside the sphere of the conditioned. In the sphere of the conditioned Brahman is conditioned as the self completely (sarvatmana). And if Brahman is outside of the conditioned, he is no longer the unconditioned. He cannot be every where, nor can he be the ‘sarvaniyanta’, (controlling object) for the unconditioned cannot be there where the conditioned is, since that would bring about an unnecessary reduplication.

The avacchedvaadin might argue that the ‘upadhy avacchinnatva’ is intended only to explain how the many forms or appearances come to exist, and that this has nothing to do with Brahman that is outside.

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To this the reply is - Brahman is said to be the cause etc. of the world, and to be the ‘sarvaniyantaa’ (all controlling). In passages like ‘yē vijñanat ...’ we hear that Brahman who is distinct from the self appears as the various modifications in the proximity of the self. On the other hand, if we accept the ‘pratibimba vada’, we find that there is the natural akaasa in the water and in such a water we find the ‘pratibimbaakaasa’. Consequently the same original is there both in the water and outside it; but we treat it as due to error. And even though the self is a reflection, Brahman can be the ‘niyanta’ etc. Thus this is a better theory.

The self is ‘cidruupa’ (form of consciousness) and the cause for this reflection is ajnana which is dispelled by true knowledge arising from ‘sravana’. Thus the self is the asraya for the false and the true knowledge as well. This self thinks itself to be having the form of the ahankara. It does think that it has that form which Brahman, who is similar to a Bimba, has. Even the ‘upaadhi svaruupa’ appears as only a case of error. True knowledge dispels this ‘upaadhi’ and then there is an end to the ‘vicchedaava-bhaasa’.” Hence when there is the experience of Brahman, there is the removal or destruction of mithya-atva.

**Objection:** Ajnana has been said to be the upaadhi that conditions the self. Then how is it that you say the upaadhi of the self is ahankaara?

**Reply:** There is no inconsistency here. Those that condition consciousness are many and they condition it in various ways and in varying degrees. It is only our conve-
nience and purpose that determine which of these we should take up. Thus the one pure consciousness which is ‘nirvikalpaka’ gets into a relation with avidya; and in deep sleep it becomes ‘ishadvikalpa vyavahara alambana’. This avidya brings the antahkarana; and when the self is conditioned not directly by avidya but by the antahkarana in the dream state, then it becomes ‘sthulatama vyavaharalambanam’ (ground or locus for the activity of the gross body). When this antahkarana gets into an intimate relation with the gross body in the waking state, it becomes ‘sthulatma vyavaharalambanam’. For these three stages the immediate upaadhis are respectively ajnana, antahkarana and the body. These do not create any differences or distinctions in the ultimate principle. From the difference in the upaadhis, you cannot conclude that there is a different self for each upaadhi. Each succeeding conditioning entity conditions that which is already conditioned by the previous entity. If there is no such relation between the upaadhis, you will arrive at the difference in the selves.

**Objection:** Ajnaana is the material cause of the gross body and it is also ‘uparakta’ by the samskara of the subtle body. This subtle body is absent in deep sleep. Then how can such an ajnana condition the self in deep sleep? The distinction between the self and Brahman is due to bhranti, and there is no such bhranti in deep sleep. And if you argue that the distinction is assumed as ‘arthagata’ (as being in the two objects) because of the ‘bhranty ajnana’, then the ‘vibhaga’ is a product of ajnana. Now there is a devolution of all the products of ajnana in deep sleep. As such the distinction must be absent in deep sleep. In the absence of the distinction, the ‘avidya ahankarya’ will have
to be in Brahman. But if this distinction is not due to ajnana, then the distinction will have to be beginningless. And there cannot be any ‘avidya nimittatva’.

**Reply:** To avoid the ‘avidya samskarya’ (modified by nescience) for Brahman, we assume that the distinction between the self and Brahman exists even in deep sleep.

**Objection:** Then it must be a distinction arising from (or based upon) the nature of the two objects, and not from ajnana.

**Reply:** Yes. In all cases of distinction excepting that involved in deep sleep, the distinction is only a case of error and has its ‘upadana’ in avidya.

**Objection:** Then that distinction which is based on the nature of the two objects cannot have avidya as its upadana, for it is beginningless and is not erroneous.

**Reply:** Yes. Even though it is beginninglessness, we say that all distinction is dependent on avidya. The relation of the self to avidya does not have avidya as its upadana; but it is dependent on, is determined by avidya. Before this relation has arisen, there cannot be an independent existence of the self. Because of this inconsistency we speak of the self and of the relation of the self to avidya as being determined by avidya. There is no ‘avidyo padanata’ for the ‘atmavidya sambandha’ (relation with avidya) for the beginningless ajnana can only bring the relation of the self to avidya.

**Objection:** How is the distinction of the self from Brahman dependant on avidya, or determined by avidya?
Reply: Consciousness is qualified by the beginningless avidya and appears as the beginningless selves by remaining as the asraya (locus) for the temporary yet beginningless difference. It is only a temporary or unreal difference and not an actual one because of the identity of that consciousness with the self. Hence this distinction has its ‘asraya’ in the ‘anaady avidya visishtam caitanyam’ (consciousness modified by the beginningless avidya). This distinction acquires an ‘uparaga’ (relationship) with the svarupa also, and as such it becomes specifically ‘avidya tantra’. Thus we speak of the distinction as ‘avidya krita’ (brought by avidya). Those that are dependent on avidya are like the ‘avidya sambandha’ itself both ‘anirvachaniya’ and beginningless; and this is not inconsistent with them.

It is the specific or qualified mirror and the specific of qualified pot that gives rise to the appearance of an unreal difference between the face and the akaasa on the one hand and their reflections on the other. There is no ‘svarupato bheda’. Hence we conclude that difference is dependant on the upadhi.

The self, then, as the reflection appears to be distinct from Brahman because of the functioning of the beginningless avidya. From this avidya there arise other upadhis like ahankara. And in so far as these belong to the same reflection, they are all treated as upadhis.

Now the Bhedabhadavaadin (Bhaskara) argues that since the reflection is an unreal entity, the self cannot be the reflection of Brahman.

We have to reply that the reflection of the face and that of the ‘cit svarupa’ are not unreal entities or fictions.
Even though we admit that the difference and the 'viyarasa' here are unreal, there is no harm in so far as the face and consciousness are concerned. By implicit rejecting the 'mithyaamsa' we apprehend the 'bimbata' for the face and for the 'cit svarupa'. Bondage and liberation, however, are not for the mithyamas. but for the 'svarupa' of the self. So that there may not be any avidya samkarya for Brahman, we have shown that the self differs from Brahman, because of the upadhi which only the self has. As such Bhaskara errs profoundly in not understanding the standpoint of others and in maintaining the unreality of the reflection.

**ILLUSTRATIONS:**

Ahankara functions as the upadhi and brings the distinction between the self and Brahman. This is the purport of the illustrations given for Bimba Pratibimba vaada – the reflection of the sun in the water, or of the face in the mirror.

That ahamkara functioning as the upadhi brings the 'anatmadhyasa', is the purport of the illustration of the crystal appearing red. These adhyasas require the 'upadhi'.

Then why is the illustration of the snake appearing in the rope given? In the adhyasa illustrated by the previous examples we have real upadhi really in the form of the mirror or of the ahamkara. But in the case of the anatmadhyasa too do we require such as upadhi near by? The self is consciousness and what is adhayasta on it is different from consciousness. To show that the adhyasa here does not require an upadhi, the illustration of the snake appea-
ing in the rope is "often given. Kartritvaadhyasa has ahankara as its upadhi. And this is the consequence of a ‘nirupadhika adhyasa’. It is to explain this that such an illustration is given.

Objection: But everywhere adhyasa requires an upadhi which is different from both the ground and the consequent. It cannot be without an upadhi. In the case of the cognition of the snake the snake may not be near by. But formerly we had such experiences and now there are the samakaras of those experiences and these samaskara-ras constitute the upadhi”.

Reply: So much of an upadhi that is brought about only by the samaskaras of the previous experience is found in the case of the self also. What is denied is only that upadhi which exists independently. The samaskara of the previous experience alone cannot be said to be the cause of error. There is no rule stating that the ‘purva bhranti samaskara’ is not the cause. Here too we have the ahankarta and the samaskaras to which this ahankara gives rise. The relation between these two is as beginningless as that between the seed and the plant. This causal relation begets a samaskara which is the cause of the erroneous cognition.

So far there illustrations have been able to establish the ‘sopadhika’ and ‘nirupadhika’ forms of adhyasa. What then is the purpose of the ‘ghatakasa’, illustration? It aims at explaining to us that the ground which is consciousness is ‘asanga’ (non-relational) Reality. The redness which is a property of the flower has a synthetic unity with the crystal which is a substance. The crystal is
a ‘savayava’ (having parts) substance and it can have the property of redness. Yet there is the ‘asambhed avabhaasa of the red. This appearance is aided by, ‘anirvachani-yatva’ (inexplecablity). Yet this appearance is taken as if the crystal is related to the red colour. In the case of the rope we have the cognition of the snake; and this snake is neither sambhinna’ (fused) nor ‘asambhina’ (not fused) in the rope. Thus these illustrations are not able to explain the ‘asangatva’ (non-relational) nature of the self as conveyed by the srutis ‘asango nahi sajjate’, and ‘asngo hy ayam purusah.’ As such the ‘ghatakasa’ illustration is given. In the case of the ‘ghatakasa’ we find that it is only the consideration of the upadhi that gives us distinctions like difference, form and effect; and these are seen as the internal differentiations of the upadhi (or brought about by the upaadhi).

**Objection** : If the illustrations alone are capable of establishing the ‘avikaritva’ (changelessness), ‘e’katva’ (oneness) and ‘asangatva’ of the self, then the ‘agama’ is of no further use. It is better not to touch it.

**Reply** : Sruti, nyaya and experience establish the self and determine its nature, and these illustrations are only intended to ward off the doubts that arise in the enquiry. They make us comprehend the truths. They do not give us the immediate experience of Reality. Examples alone are not capable of establishing the truth; and there is also the possibility of counter examples. Argument from analoga is the weakest one.

**Pure Consciousness is the Ground**;

Sankara’s statement ‘asmat’pratyaya vishayatvat’ is directed towards establishing the adhyasa on the self. So
far we have established the ‘asmat pratyaya’ (I, self) and
the adhyasa to which it gives rise to. Now the meaning of
‘vishaya’ (object) is given.

Pure consciousness is of the nature of the not-this
and as such is not an object, yet it makes the ‘vyavahara’
(activity) possible in the ahankara: for ahankara conditions
consciousness. As such accepting the ‘gaunivritti’
(secondary idea) we say that consciousness is the object for
the ‘asmat pratyaya’, and this object is also seen to be
‘vyavahayogya’ in so far as it appears as ahankara.

Objection: The ‘anatmadhyasa’ (superimposition
of the not-self) is only ‘savikalpaka’ (determinate, delimited
(finite) adhyasa; and as such the ground should also be
finite or determined. Hence the unlimited or unconditioned
consciousness alone cannot be the ground. How can there
be ahankara adhyasa which is that of a finite entity? Now
there is adhyasa only when there is ‘vyavahara yogyatva’;
and there is vyavahara yogyatva only when there is adhyasa.
This involves the fallacy of mutual dependence.

Reply: The ‘savikalpadhyasa’ is seen to have a nir-
vikalpa (non-determined) entity as its ground. We can
say that the ajnanadhyasa has made the ground a savikalpa
one for the ahankara or the ‘pruvahankaradhyasa (super-
imposition of the prior ego) has made the ground a svikalpa
one. As such for the later ahankaradhyasa, the ground can
be the cidavabhasa.Beginninglessness explains the adhyasa
satisfactorily.
Consciousness as the subject, Doer Enjoyer.

**Objection**: The self is beyond change, is pure consciousness, is undefiled bliss and asanga. Such a self cannot be the pramata (knower) for a pramana involves pramiti (knowledge); and pramiti requires ‘pramana kriya parinama’ (activity of the meaning of knowledge). This is impossible in the case of that consciousness. If one is not a pramata, he can be neither the doer nor the enjoyer. The vyavahara which is of the nature of samsarga implies the groups - pramata - pramana - prameya, Karta - Karma - Kriya, and bhokta - Bhoga - bhoktavya, The vyavahara is impossible in the case of the self. The ahankara being unconscious cannot be the asraya of these. As such there can be no vyavahara at all.

Further, the prakasa (effulgence) of consciousness is natural and inherent in it; as such it itself can illumine the objects. Since it is sarvagata (all-pervamive), it should illumine everything. This would lead to avyavastha (impossibility of any distinctions). Hence we should accept the view that the self is capable of undergoing transformations or changes,

Other objections and an examination of these objections follows:

**Objection**: These difficulties do not arise if we hold to the all-pervasive character of the self. Knowledge may be an act or a property; and if knowledge arises from the ‘catushtaya sannikarsha’ (coming together of the four) this knowledge would have to arise as having a ‘samavaya’ (inherent) relation with the self since it can not have any ‘pradesasrayatva’ (locus) in view of the self being ‘niravayava’.
Then knowledge is related to the self which is its ground; and the self is all-pervasive. Such a self will then have a contact with all finite objects or substances. Consequently all should have the knowledge that illumines all objects. The pradipa has an act and also a ‘prakasa guna’, and these are related to the lamp which is their ground. As such a corresponding illumination is cognised in the object. Why can’t we say that there is only an ‘adrishta sambandha’ (mysterious relation) because of which knowledge does not illumine all objects but only the one concerned?

No, for the lamp is so seen to manifest all the objects that have a relation with the light. This is the nature of the objects, and we find no rule that can go against this. ‘Sukha’ and ‘duhkha’ are taken to be ‘adrishtavishayas’ whence we do not recognise objects like thorn etc. as capable of giving rise to that ‘duhkha’ (sorrow).

Then, the object gives rise to knowledge and knowledge may be said to illumine or manifest only this object and not all.

No. Even the sense organ like the eye has a part in giving rise to the cognition, and knowledge should also illumine the eye. Since even that which has not given rise to knowledge appears as the object, we cannot say that knowledge illumines only that object which has given rise to it. The ‘prakaasa guna’ of the lamp, for instance, is seen to illumine or manifest even the ‘ajanaka vishaya’ (non-existent) which is related to it.

If knowledge is a property, it cannot illumine to object which has brought it. The same difficulty is there even
if knowledge is an act. The arrow may not have any known target; but when once it is discharged it is sure to hit that person who acquires a relation with its ‘asraya’.

Well, the self is ‘niravayava’ (partless) and as such it can have a contact with all.

If so, it can illumine or manifest nothing. Kriya and guna cannot have any samsarga with any object other than their own ‘asraya’. They cannot also have any ‘samsarga’ even with their own ‘asraya’; and in the absence of the ‘samsarga’, they can bring nothing to light. As such the self cannot be niravayava.

Then the objector proceeds to make out his position by arguing that knowledge has the ‘samavaya’ relation only with the ‘pradesa’ (place) of the self which is conditioned by the body. It does not have this relation with the whole self. Then the self would be ‘saavayava’ and it cannot illumine or manifest an object that is not immediate and direct. Since the ‘prakasa’ which has its ground in the self has no ‘samsarga’ with the object, it can be said that kriya, guna etc., do not have the ‘asrayatilanghana’ (overcoming or passing beyond their own asraya). There can not be the illumination or manifestation due to the relation with the ‘anasrayatva pradesa’, for that would involve the manifestation of everything.

But is it not a fact that an ‘abhicaarakarma’ (witchcraft) has its asraya in a person from whom it proceeds and it then proceeds to create the evil in another person who has no relation with the former? It appears to have a relation with one who is not related to its ‘asrayatma pradesa’. Why can’t we accept the same process here?
No. We do see that the harm is created in another and as such we have to admit an ‘adrishta sambandha’ between these two places. But this only makes us infer that the relation here is effected by the presiding spirit, or by god, or by some ‘sakti’ (power). The object is said to be manifested by the relation of the sense organ with the object, of the mind with the sense organ, and of the self with the mind. But this manifestation of the object does not arise from the knowledge which has its ground in the person; for even if another object is related to this object, that another object is seen to be manifested. Further, prior to the emergence of the knowledge arising from the ‘catushtaya sannikāsa’, we cannot say that exists and the knowledge that has arisen has no relation with the objects. Consequently this knowledge cannot determine the existence of the object.

All these defects arise whether the self is anuparina ama ‘(atomic) or ‘deha parima..a’ (medium magnitude)’. Hence no one is able to establish the possibility of ‘prama.. nadi vyavehara’.

Advaitic Theory of Perception:

To a certain extent only Advaita can establish the distinction of subject, object, means of cognition etc.

There is the ‘antahkarana’ which is the idam amsa (the this-aspect) of the ahankara. This antahkarana undergoes an evolutionary process (parinana vyapara) which is spoken of as jnana because it is the ‘antahkarana vritti’ (spistemic act). The antahkarana is a substance having parts of avayavas’, and it has the nature of prakasa. It is that
unseen thing which cooperates with the sense organs etc., and which evolves itself far and wide like a long ray of light; for it is commonly seen that 'tejas' (light) moves quickly to a very great distance in space. It has a quick spatial and temporal movement.

This 'parinama vyapara' of the antahkaraṇa has a transitive reference. It has an object and proceeds towards it. In so doing it brings out something specific to the self which is its ground; for every act functions as a cause and brings a change or modification in its own asraya or ground. This 'parinama' brings a specific state called the 'kārtti karma sambandha', (subject-act relation). The act conveyed by 'prapnoti' (obtains) refers to a specific state of the doer with reference to the object obtained. This is known in the case of the 'antahkarana parinama' as the relation between the knower and the known.

Due to its own 'parinama' let the antahkarana have a relation with the object. But how does the 'vishaya vishesha-vabhaga' (appearance of a specific object) arise for the self? The reply is as follows:

The manifesting medium of consciousness in only that antahkarana which is 'vishaya vishesha sambandha'. The antahkarana has a relationship with the specific object. The antahkarana brings about this relation to consciousness.

Since it is everywhere enveloped by avidya, the nature of consciousness is unmanifested (anabhivyakta svabhavam). Yet since the antahkarana is the medium that conditions consciousness, consciousness is manifested or revealed through it. Whatever be the specific modifications that the
antahkarana undergoes, consciousness alone is revealed through all of them. The ball of iron when it is aflame assumes a variety of forms and all these forms are also the forms of the fire. As such, consciousness, as conditioned by the antahkarana which is already ‘samsrishta’ (fused) with the objects, assumes that form into which this antahkarana has evolved itself.

Let the consciousness which is conditioned by the ‘pramātrirupa’ appear as the pramata (knower). But how does this consciousness become that which is conditioned by the object? The answer is—There is the ‘parinama vyapara’ which is the essential or most important act of the antahkarana. This action has a transitive reference. It refers to an object which is not apparently a conscious entity. Due to the ‘parinama samsarga’ the unconscious nature (jadyatva) of the object stands rejected or transformed. The object becomes capable of giving up its exclusive nature for it is enveloped by the activity of the antahkarana. This is possible because the functioning of the antahkarana is a transformation (vivarta) of consciousness. Just as the antahkarana makes itself capable of manifesting consciousness, so does it make its related object too capable of manifesting the same consciousness.

**Objection**: Because there is the difference in the ‘avacchedaka’ (the manifesting medium), there arises the difference in the ‘cit prakasa’. Then how does the ‘samsarga’ with the ‘pramātrirupavabhasa’ (appearance of the knower) arise for the experience which is conditioned by the objects? If there is no ‘samsarga’ at all, how can we say that ‘this is known by me’? How can we have the knowledge that manifests the samsarga between the subject
and the object? In other words, what is the 'pramana vyavastha'? And how does it arise in view of the differences between one experience and another? The apprehension of only one relation between the subject and the object—cannot bring the manifestation of the objects or of the knowledge of the objects.

**Reply:** 'The 'antahkarana vritti' involves or bring the subject - object relation. Herein the immediate consciousness as conditioned by the 'pramatravastha vishesha' (specific state of the knower) is identical with that immediacy of the object. Such an identity is of the nature of immediacy and this is manifested by the antahkarana vrtti. The vrtti parinama (evolution of the epistemic 'act') has the samsarga (relation) with both the subject and the object.

When there is a 'vyanjaka bheda' (difference in the medium or conditioning) there will be a 'vyangya bheda' (difference in the conditioned). But here such a thing is not possible since the same 'parinama vritti' as having the samsrishti (fusion) with both the subject and the object, has become the vyanjaka (manifesting form). The manifesting medium is the same for both; but that which is manifested appears differently in different parts.

**Objection:** If the 'caitanyaabhivyakti' (manifestation of consciousness) is the same in both, then is the experience as conditioned by the pot the subject? Or is the subject that experiences or consciousness which is conditioned by the antahkarana? Whatever it is, both are identical.

**Reply:** The antahkarana is the upaadhi that conditions the self. The vritt is its specific state in which we
have the conditioned consciousness. This specific state characterizes the 'pramata' (the subject). 'Pramaatrita' being a subject, is of the nature of the doer alone, and not of the object. Since the antahkarana is here the doer, we speak of the subject as the consciousness which is conditioned by the antahkarana.

**Objection:** If there is an identical consciousness, the subject alone will have to constitute the experience or the complete cognition. Is this not inconsistent?

**Reply:** No. Cognition involves that consciousness which is conditioned or manifested by the object; and thus we have the cognition with the experience of such an object. Thus the subject is the consciousness as conditioned by the antahkarana, and the 'phala' is the consciousness as conditioned by the object.

**Objection:** The vritti has its asraya in the antahkarana, while the cognition has the samavaya (in-herence) relation with the self. Thus there are two different grounds for both. Further, they have different objects also. The vritti refers to the object pot, while the cognition refers to the antahkarana. Thus kriya (vritti) and phala (cognition) have different grounds and different objects. Is this not inconsistent?

**Reply:** No. Antahkarana and self are not two different entities; for the adhyasa between these two gives rise only to a common identical ground. And since the pot too is only a medium manifesting consciousness, there is only a common identical object for both the vritti and the cognition.
**Objection**: The samkhya system says that the meaning is in the intellect and that the purusha knows this meaning. Now according to your position, the meaning is consciousness, is in consciousness, and consciousness comprehends it.

**Reply**: The samkhya contention is only this - The meaning is first in the intellect, and later on the self comprehends it having become identical with the intellect.

Thus we have seen that even though the self is all-pervasive its prakasa is enveloped by avidya. This self is conditioned by the upadhi called the antahkarana. The vritti of this antahkarana constitutes the medium through which consciousness is revealed. In so far as this medium involves the objects that manifest consciousness, it is with reference to the objects that we speak of the self as being the subject.

**Objection**: What is ‘abhivyakti’ (manifestation)?

**Reply**: It is only the removal of the ‘avarana’ (envelope), not anything that brightens or adds to the ‘sva-rupa’. It is only the removal of that which prevents the illumination of the real, or it is only the dispelling of the ajnana that has enveloped the conditioned self.

**Objection**: Now there is the sruti text - “hrir dhir-bhir ityetat sarvam manahva”. Here we hear of the upadhi having the nature of parinama. What is its pramaana? Is manas (mind) too an evolute?

**Reply**: ‘Manas’ is that which has the ‘jñana pari-nama’; and this ‘vyavahara’ is the buddhi. Since buddhi
and manas are identical, we are able to speak of the ‘parinamavati buddhih’ (intellect transforms or changes).

Thus it is the upadhi which brings about the ‘vyavastha bheda’. Now if it is argued – that all objects as objects are on the same level in so far as they are all equally well illumined by consciousness; and that therefore everything must be manifested or illumined at the same time then this argument comes from one who does not know the nature of the upadhi and who does not know what it involves.

The subject is ‘svayam jyotih’ (self luminous); when there is a relation with the objects for this subject there arises an experience; and this experience is an immediate one and is identical for all. The kartradi karakas give rise to the ‘jnanakriyaa’ only when they function together. The kartrikaraka (doer-ship) requires a specific object (karma karaka) for a cognition. As such the cognition and the vrittī have their ground only in the subject, and not elsewhere. That karmakaraka which gives us the vrittijnana is the one related to the kartrikaraka. The experience, then, has its ground in the object.

**Objection:** If consciousness is manifested also in the ‘karmakaraka’, then we have to note that the object is an object for all subjects. As such it should appear for all subjects.

**Reply:** “Karmakaraka give us the cognition only when it functions together with the kartrikaraka. As such this gives rise to the immediacy of the subject only, just as the previous argument gives rise to the immediacy of the
object. "Sah graamam gacchati". Here 'grama' (village) is the object and it is realised by the person who moves. It refers to the person as being the one immediately involved here.

The 'vishaya caitanya' (object as consciousness) is manifested only as being identical with that 'pramatri caitanya which is related to the object concerned. It is not identical with any other 'pramaatri caitanya' which is not involved in the cognition. As such all cannot have the same cognition when only one has it.

**Objection**: The lamp has prakasa and it has samsarga with all objects; and it manifests them all. Likewise since consciousness is 'svayam prakaasa' and all pervasive, it has samsarga with all objects; and it should manifest or illumine all. In such a case how can you assume ahan-kaara to be the upadhi for that consciousness?

**Reply**: In so far as the individual is concerned, it is the 'antahkarana parinama vritti that brings about a relation of samsrishti between the subject and the object. The object is necessarily implied by the vritti; and antahkarana conditions consciousness. Even though consciousness has contact with all objects, it can illumine only those with which the vritti is connected; and because of the vritti there arises the cognition. When the vritti is absent the cognition is impossible even if there is the 'vishay oparaga' (attachment to the object) for consciousness.

**Objection**: Prakasamarata is attributed only to the 'samsarga' of the 'prakasa'. It is the prakaas a that illumines the objects on which it falls. It does not illu-
other objects because consciousness being ‘asanga’ (non-relational) does not have any relation with them. If this is given as the explanation, then we have to say, that consciousness being ‘asanga’ cannot have any relation with the antahkarana and that such an upadhi cannot illumine anything.

Reply: Let it be so. The self that is conditioned by the antahkarana is like the reflection; and it illumines those objects which are ‘samsrisha’ with it. Brahman, on the otherhand, is like the Bimba; and since it is all-pervasive, it can illumine every thing. The sarvadarsitva (all-seeingness) of Brahman does not come to the self also, just as the purity of the face does not come to the reflection. And the ‘kincijjnatva’ of the self does not belong to Brahman, just like the darkness of the reflection. Thus we can explain everything.

Objection: This is not convincing. Now, consciousness as conditioned by the object is the Brahma caitanya; and this cannot be attributed to (or cannot be in) the self that is conditioned by ahankaara; just as the ‘sarva-jnatva’ (all-knowingness) of Brahman is not found in the self. Then there cannot be any ‘vishayaavabhasa’ for the self.

Reply: But between the antahkarana which is the upadhi of the self and the object there is a mutual syntactical relation. And even though consciousness is conditioned by both these, the two are mutually samsrisha. As such the self can have the ‘vishayaavabhasa’.

Objection: In such a case, we have to note that the antahkarana is always samsarishta with Brahman who is all-pervasive. The antahkarana is the upadhi. The iden-
tity of the jiva and Brahma caitanya is manifested in the upadhi. As such the sarvijnatva of Brahman which has the illumination for the self is eternal. The self then will cease to be the conditioned mode of consciousness.

Reply : Then we shall argue from another standpoint. The self is conditioned by avidya.

Objection : Consciousness is all-pervasive; and then it cannot even illumine or reveal itself. When ‘caitanya prakasa’ is in itself ‘aprakasamana’, it cannot reveal any object; for the lamp that is devoid of light does not manifest any object. Further, we can place one finger before our eye and prevent the rays of the sun falling on it. Likewise that which conditions consciousness obstructs or prevents the prakasa of the all-pervading consciousness.

Reply : Due to the uparaga (attachment) of the antahkarana, the avarana is overcome; and consciousness which is manifested or revealed therein is able to manifest a little.

Objection : Even this is faulty. The antahkarana is the product of avidya. How can an effect overcome or dispel its cause, since cause and effect have only the mutual relation of co-operation. Thus you cannot establish the ‘kincijjnatva’ of the self from the ‘ahankarapadhi’.

Final Reply : That avidya is the upadhi of the self is quite proper. The all-pervasive self being ‘asanga’ cannot have ‘samyoga’ with all. Only a conditioned consciousness can have the relation with some. Further, prakasa can illumine or manifest only that object with which there
is the 'samyoga'. Moreover, Brahman being the 'sarpvopadana' (cause of all) makes manifest the whole world as non-different from itself, just as it manifests to the self as identical with itself. The self cannot do this because it is not the upadana of the world.

**Objection:** But Brahman is all-pervasive and unrelated to any object being asanga. How does this 'asamsrishta' (non-relational) consciousness acquire a samsarga relation with antahkarana?

**Reply:** Three possible explanations are given. They are respectively (1) ciduparaganta vritti (attached to consciousness), (2) abhedartha (non-different) vrttihi, and (3) avaranabhibhavartha (enveloping) vrttihi.

1) 'Gotva' is a (cowness) generic universal. Even though lions and other animals which are different from the cow are near by, the 'gotva' is not manifested by the horse etc because the horse has no relation with 'gotva'. It is the nature of 'gotva' to be manifested only by those animals that have the dewlap etc., for 'gotva' has a necessary and natural relation only with such animals.

2) There is the pradipa prabha (light the lamp). The ray of light spreads to the air, ether, rasa, gandha etc. Yet because of its nature, it does not manifest these. It manifests only those forms with which it has a samsarga. Likewise it is the specific nature of consciousness to have its samsarga with the antahkarana only and not with anything else.

c) Thorns etc. by themselves do not burn. But when the ball of fire has its samsarga with them, they begin to
burn. The iron ball is like the ahankara, while the fire of the ball is like the self. It is such a self that illumines those objects that are not capable of revealing themselves.

Hence it is proper to treat ahankara as the upadhi.

2) We may argue that the self has an upadhi. Being conditioned by the upadhi, the self is ‘paricchinnna’; and hence it cannot illumine every thing. That which brings this conditioning is the antahkarana which has vritti. This vritti effects a samsarga with the objects whence arises the manifestation of the ‘vishaya caitanya’. ‘Jivacaitanyata’ is not opposed to this. There will be an eternal illumination of all the objects as in the case of Brahman only when the antahkarana vritti undergoes a modification in the form of Brahman. Till such a vritti can have the samsarga, only a few objects are revealed. It is not the samsarga of the real antahkarana that brings this manifestation, since that would have to reveal also the dharmas of this antahkarana. That antahkarana whose vritti has evolved itself into the form of the self, only such an antakarana can overcome the self. If this were not true, the experience of deep sleep would have to be false. Hence we conclude that the paricchinnatva of the self does not bring the manifestation of all objects.

3) The self is enveloped by ajnana; and even though it is svayam prakasa, it is unable to manifest all the objects. And when there is the upasarga with the antahkarana, there disappears the ‘avarana. Manifestation arises there only; and that object is illuminated with which there is the samsarga for the antahkarana. Ajnana envelopes the self and produces the antahkarana, and this antahkarana can dispel the avarana because of the vritti. That an effect
can put an end to the normal act of its cause is seen in the cases of the serpent and the tree coming to appear respectively from cowdung and clay. Thus we can establish the ‘pramatritvaadi vyavastha’ for the self.

**Vijnana Vada:**

We have said that the object is a transformation (vivarta) of consciousness. Eventhough consciousness is not different from the object, it is of the only form of the object; it is of the only form of ‘aham avabhasa’ (appearance of the I). How does it differ from vijnanavada?

Vishayaa paroksha (immediacy of the object) and vishaya paroksha are admitted; and an identity has been arrived at between pramata, pramiti and prameya in terms of consiciouness. If the ‘niladi vishaya’ (object like blue) too were of the nature of immediacy, it means that we have the ‘nilatmika samvit’ (consciousness as blue). The cognition or consciousness of the blue will be the consciousness itself. This amounts to the Buddhist position.

The Vijnanavadins argue that since vijnana is momentary there arises difference. And this difference gives us the cognition of the object which is said to have the ‘arthakriya samar‘hya’ (pragmatic ability) and because of this ‘samathya’, the object is only sunya (void).

The Vedantins argue that due to the ‘samvedana’ (consciousness as experience) which is advitiya (non-dual) there arises the non-difference between the subject and the object. Yet difference too is there; and this gives us the cognition of the object which has the ‘arthakriya sama-
rthya’; and because of the ‘samarthya’ the ‘sthayitva’ (steadiness) of the object is not subject to negation or sublation. Where as there is ‘badhita sthayitva’ (negative steadiness;) in the other view, here we have ‘abadhita sthayitva’. Further, from the standpoint of the ‘samvedana’ difference is absent. Yet an ‘aropita bheda’ (imputed difference) is accepted, whence this doctrine cannot be confused with the Mimaamsaka position.

To distinguish the Vedantic position from that of the Buddhists, Padmapaada argues: There is the avabhasa of the blue and that of the yellow as excluding one another. In so far as both are immediate cognitions, the immediacy proper is identical in both. One immediacy is not exclusive of another immediacy; but the object felt in one immediacy is exclusive of the object felt in the other. We have the ‘samvid eka rupavagama’. The samvit for both is one and the same.”

The samvid (consciousness) is the continuant in all apprehensions and as such may be said to be identical in all of them. But there is the ‘bheda pratiti’ (awareness of difference) also in so far as there are two or more than two apprehensions. Then how can there be the samvid aikyam (oneness of consciousness)? Let there be ‘ekarupata’ because of the recognition of identity. But there is also the awareness or apprehension of difference, since one is a ‘ghata (pot) samivt’ while the other is a ‘pata (cloth) samivt’.

The ‘avabhasa’ of difference is not natural to the immediacy of the samvit. The difference brought by the ‘paropadhi’ does not negate or sublate the ‘svarupa pratyabhijna’.
Objection: Even if there is the identity of samvits why can’t there be the non-difference of objects? Why can’t there be the non-difference of the ‘samvedya’ (known) with the ‘samvit’?

Reply: There cannot be a real identity because of the upadhi bheda. If there is a total difference, there ought to be the ‘avabhasa’ of the ‘vyavritta svabhavata’ (excluded nature) also. But that is not found.

It has been said that the ‘anuvritta’ (continuant) samvit is not non-different from the ‘vyavritta’ (excluded object), since it is the nature of the continuant to imply differents, just as in the case of the akasa which continues to be in the pot etc. Now, the author proceeds to show that the difference between the object and the samvit is also perceptually arrived at.

According to the Buddhists, vijnana is momentary. As such the object and its ‘samvit’ cannot coexist. When they speak of ‘nilatmaka samvit’ (consciousness of the nature of blue) we should take them to mean only ‘nilam’ (blue).

Even the Buddhists admit that the ‘pratyag avabhasa’ (awareness of the self) which is immediate and which excludes the object, is different from the ‘nilatmaka samvit’.

It is well known that ‘aham nilam pasyami’ (I see the blue) is an immediate apprehension. The ‘vishaya samvit’ and the ‘vishayi samvit’ cannot be at the same moment. So, they admit that the ‘aham ulleka’ is different from the ‘nila.’ The blue is the apprehended while the I is that which apprehends. This difference, then, is immediate. The ‘pratyag avabhasa’ is only the ‘aham samvedana’, and it
differs from the ‘paraga avabhása’ which is the object. The 
pratyag avabhása ‘is to be found only in the ‘svarupa’—i.e., 
in the ‘aham samvedana’. We apprehend it as being diff-
erent from the blue. Not only should we accept it as dif-
ferent, but we also experience it. We apprehend the blue 
as the this, as that which excludes the subject, as the appr-
prehended. Thus we have two entities that exclude one 
another and stand in the relation of the appreprehended and 
the apprehending.

The Vijnanavadin observes: Both are ‘svarupa 
matra nishtha’; and as such how can there be subject-
object relation here? If the blue appears as unrelated to 
the samvit, it cannot appear in its ‘samvedana’. Since the 
samvit is said to have the form of the blue, it may be 
said that the blue appears in its samvedana. In the absence 
of any relation it is impossible to have the form of the 
blue. But if it can have the form of the blue, why cannot 
the samvedana reveal all objects? You cannot also argue 
that the blue appears as related to the samvit, for there is 
no specific relationship here.

The Buddhist might argue that there is a causal rela-
tion (Janya janakata sambandha) here. Is this relation 
one of mere ‘janakatva’ (causing to come into being) or of 
vishayataya janakatva’ (using an object to come into 
being). It cannot be the former for that would involv-
the coming into existence of all samvits. The sense organ 
too is essential for the samvit, and as such it too would 
become an object. Hence we have to say that there is a 
relation of identity which is natural but uncommon; and 
due to this relation, the blue appears in the vijnana.
Further, when the 'bhedavabhasa' too is immediate, how can you suppress it or reject it relying only on logical reasoning? How is it that in 'idam aham janami' (I know this) we have the awareness of the 'grahya grahakata' (grasped and grasping) in?

The Vijnanavadin replies that these three are not apprehended in one samvit, but they are three successive samvits; and that they are mutually exclusive.

But if they are successive samvits, when there is the second samvit, there cannot be the avabhasa for the first. These three are together apprehended immediately. The idea of succession, then, is inconsistent with the immediate apprehension.

The Vijnanavadin: This apprehension has arisen from the vasana or samskara that has come from the previous samvits. And these three are so united that we have a distinct and new apprehension. Here we do not have the awareness of the relation.

At first there is the vijnana arising from 'aham' (I). Then there comes the vijnana of the object as 'idam' (this). These vijnanas alone are the vasanas. The 'Sajatiya jnana', (cognate cognition) of the previous moment is the 'vasana', for the 'sajatiya jnana' of this moment. There is no other thing called samskara except this. The two previous vasanas which are together get into a relation with janami (know) which also gives forth a vasana. In accordance with these three vasanas functioning together as the cause, there arises one single vijnana which has three forms in it.
Vedantin: This whole ‘prakriya’ (procedure) is completely inconsistent with experience. We never find the pratyayas like the mere ‘aham’, or like the mere ‘idam’, or like the mere ‘janami’. Even at the very outset the pratyaya is one synthetic unit of the form ‘aham idam janami’; and this is ‘katrikarmanubhavatmaka’. As such we should accept that which is a fact of experience. And we should admit that the object blue which is ‘arthakriya samartha’, is distinct from the vijnana ‘aham’.

Vijnanavadin: Yes. We do not say, because of the experience, the blue is non-different from the ‘samv.-dana’. But because the ‘pratibhasa’ of the blue cannot be explained satisfactorily through vijnana, we speak of that non-difference. Now vijnana and the object are ‘sthayains’, (fixed ones) and not momentary ones. And the uncommon but mutual relation which is the cause of the act would give rise to an uncommon ‘vishayavabhasa’. If the object and the vijnana are not momentary, their relationship would be uncommon. Such a mutual relation gives rise to the experiencing act. As such the vishayabvabhasa too would have to be uncommon.

Suppose the object and the vijnana are only momentary. A momentary entity cannot have any ‘agantuka sambandha’ (relation with an outside intruder). Then it cannot have even a natural abhedha (non-different) sambandha. Then that which has no necessary relation with consciousness cannot have any ‘pratibhasa’.

Hence the Vijnanavadin argues that non-difference is established or arrived at because otherwise the ‘vishaya pratibhasa’ is impossible. “Since this theory accepts the
momentariness of cognitions, in the absence of identity between the subject and the object, there will be ‘kriyanupapatti’ (‘impossibility of the act).

If the vijnana and the object are not momentary, the permanent subject will have the knowing relation with the permanent object only; and then because of the act of knowing, there will be the immediacy of the blue etc; since this is not acceptable, we deny this contention and say that vijnana and aham (i) are only momentary.

Vedantin: Does perception establish the momentariness of vijnana? Or is it inference which establishes it? If it is the former, the jnana that is there now in this moment excludes from itself that which is not in this moment; and it should give us the knowledge of this exclusion also. There is the ‘nilajnana’ which gives us the knowledge of the exclusion of the non-blue. Hence by pratyaksha or immediate experience is meant that vijnana which exists only in this present moment. Such a perceptual cognition cannot give us the ‘vijnana bhedavabhasa’ (awareness of the cognition of difference). If we accept the momentariness of vijnana, then the aham would have to be different at every different moment; for every moment has its own particular samvhit or aham. Whether such a difference is found or not, let them examine their own experiences and say.

Vijnana vadin: The apprehension of difference is there. But the ‘ahamsamvit’ of this moment is so greatly similar to that of the other moment, that the difference is not clearly revealed. The difference is distinct from the samvit and it can be apprehended by another jnana. But
because of the defect called extreme similarity it is not clearly cognised.

Vedantin: The 'aham samvit' of the previous moment is different from that of this moment. That they are different is to be apprehended by another samvid. But one samvit can not be an object of another samvit; and as such the difference cannot be apprehended. If one 'samvit' can be an object of another 'samvit', we will have in the cognition of difference (bheda samvedana) three factors- viz. first samvit, second samvit, and the difference between these two. Are these three factors assumed to be there in the 'bheda samvedana'? Or are they non-different from that cognition of difference?

If may be argued that the 'samvit svarupa' itself is difference and that the samvedana itself is that jnana. 'Samvid bheda' (difference of consciousness) and 'samvid bodha' (awareness of consciousness) are identical.

Vedantin: Then as long as the 'samvidbheda' is not cognised or apprehended, so long will the 'samvid bodha' remain unintelligible and ununderstood. Nothing can be known.

Further when the 'aikya pratibhasa' (awareness of identity) between the I of the past moment and the I of the present moment is there, it is inconsistent with pramana to assume a relation of similarity between the two. When two different objects are mistaken to be identical with one another, then you can assume similarity and no pramana would come in the way. When the two do not differ from one another, there does not arise any question of similarity.
Assuming similarity where there is the apprehension of identity, is useless and is opposed to all pramanas.

Vijnanavadin: But since the 'aikyavabhasa' is due to some error (vyamoha), the assuming of similarity is not opposed to any pramana. When two objects are different, they can be mistaken to be one and the same, only if they are similar. Such an arthapatti (implication) compels us to assume similarity. Thus we establish similarity.

Vedantin: Here is the fallacy of mutual dependency. You can establish 'aikya bhrama' only by assuming similarity; and you can make out similarity only by assuming 'aikya bhrama'. One involves the other.

Vijnanavadin: 'Aikya partibhasa' cannot have self validity. If there is similarity there is no 'aikyatavabhasa'; and if there is 'aikyatavabhasa' (awareness of identity), there is no similarity. The apprehension of identity depends on the absence of similarity; and the latter depends on the former. Thus the same fallacy occurs here also.

Vedantin: The 'aikyapratibhasa' is not dependent on similarity or on the absence of similarity. It has self validity.

Vijnanavadin: Then even similarity has self-validity.

Vedantin: If this were so, similarity too would have 'pramanya' (validity); on the contrary, it is 'apramanya purvika' when we have aikya bhrama; this implies that two different entities are assumed to be similar. This
assumption alone makes the false cognition of identity possible. On the other hand, the aikyavabhasa is a fact of experience and as such it does not stand in need of any proof. That this experience is there is well attested by recognition.

The Buddhists proceed to criticise pratyabhijna. What is this pratyabhijna or recognition with the help of which you seek to maintain the identity of the samvit and thus the identity of the continuant?

V: There is the samskara arising from the previous experience. This samskara cooperates with the present experience where we have the sense contact with the object. From this arises a single cognition which involves the relation of two moments of time and which is a perceptual cognition.

B: Such a recognition might be found in so far as the cognitions of the objects are considered. It is not applicable in the case of the self. According to you the self is of the nature of vijnana and is sthayan; and being svaprakasa, it cannot be an object for another knowledge. Only when it is an object in a cognition and when such a cognition is destroyed, can it give rise to a samskara. Such a samskara is absent; for the svarupa of jnana is beyond destruction. And that which is not destroyed cannot give rise to a samskara. Further, there is no pramatikarana in the case of this self which is svayam prakasa. As such recognition cannot establish the identity of the self of the past moment with that of the present moment.

V: Then the ‘svarupa jnana samskara’ may be taken to be the cause of the recognition.
B : No. the self is like the pradipa which illumines only those that are before it at that moment. Neither the objects of the past, nor those of the future can be illumined by it. As such the ‘svarupa jnana’ cannot effect an identity between two moments of the self. Moreover, in ‘soham’ (I am he) we have two different forms ‘sah’ (he) and ‘aham’ - and these are two different objects. The difference in the objects brings about a difference in the cognitions. And this difference cannot make out any identity like that presupposed in recognition. Hence the ‘atmāikyapratiti’ (apprehension of the identity of the self) is an erroneous cognition.

**Advaitin’s reply to this contention :**

V : We apply pratyabhijnana only in the case of the self that is conditioned by the antahkarana; we do not apply it in the case of the pure consciousness. The sthayitva (permanence) of this pure consciousness is known to us only from the sastra.

During the ‘samsaravastha’ (state of finite life) it is always conditioned by the antahkarana and this form does not disappear. Pratyabhijnana helps us in making out the sthayitva of this self only. The antahkarana of this self evolves itself into an ‘ahamkara vṛtti’ which alone makes the manifestation of the conditioned self possible. The ‘aham vṛtti’ has given rise to the experience of the conditioned self at the previous time. This vṛtti has given rise to a samskāra which is in the antahkarana. Such an antahkarana is the cause of the present ‘atmabhivyakti’. As such it affects an identity between the conditioned selves of the two moments. The awareness of this identity is the recognition of identity.
B: Both in the previous experience and in the present experience, the self is not revealed as the object. How can such a self be the object in recognition?

V: There is no such defect here. 'Samvedana' is 'svayam prakasa' and it cannot then be an object in another 'samvedana'. Yet at a later time it can be the object of memory that has arisen from its own samskara. Likewise the self may not be an object in one experience; but it can become an object in recognition.

B: But the self being 'svayam prakasa' cannot be come an object.

V: It can become an object in so far as it is conditioned by space, time, and antahkarana. Take dharma which can be known only through agama (scripture). Even such a dharma has the specific nature of yielding its fruits in the present. From the consequences that have arisen in the present we come to know of its existence and nature. Dharma which is not an object of cognition becomes an object through its consequences.

B: In recognition the same self is both the subject and the object at the same time. Is this not inconsistent?

V: But all those who accept the self to be distinct from the body, do have this inconsistency. The self becomes an object in the inferential cognitions aimed at establishing the self.

B: This is not so. In inference the object does not have janakatva (karakatva). It is the mere form of the self
alone that is the object, while it is the real self that is the subject. In perception, however, the object has janakatvait gives us the knowledge of itself. As such in a perceptual experience there would have to be an object and this would make the self both the subject and the object at the same time in recognition.

V: As conditioned by the antahkarana, the self is to be treated as the knower. As conditioned by the past and the present moments, the self is the object known. Because of this difference in the upadhi, there is no inconsistency in the position we have advanced. The recognition involved in ‘so ham’ is a fact of experience; and it should be explained some how or other. As such we assume the difference in the upadhis to account for it. And this experience is not opposed to facts, nor is it a case of error.

You can not argue that there is a difference of form in ‘so ham’ giving rise to a difference in the objects and thus to a difference in the two cognitions. You argue that vijnana is momentary. Here vijnana is one cognition, while ‘momentary’ is another and a different cognition. There are two different entities here and two different cognitions. As a result, vijnana would cease to be momentary.

B: It is true. We only speak of the momentariness of vijnana for the sake of convenience. We do not say that it is real.

V: We too speak of sthayitva etc. in vijnana only from the standpoint of the upadhis. They are not real in an ultimate sense. But there is this much of difference when time and other upadhis are there, we are able to arrive
at 'sthayitva' and other 'vikalpa prayayayas' through the experience of identity involved in 'so ham'. They are not cases of error and they have the 'artha kriya samarthyya'. Such is not the case with momentariness etc. accepted by you.

Here arises a dispute with the Prabhakaras for whom the self is the ground of knowledge and not the object. They argue that recognition does not establish the self to be an object, but only as the asraya (ground, locus).

Vedantin: In recognition the self of the past moment is related to the self of the present moment. Cognition being momentary, recognition would find it difficult to bring into it two moments; and the self cannot become the ground for such a recognition. By becoming the ground for a momentary cognition, the self cannot be 'sthayi'.

Prabhakara: I am remembering now the samvedana of the past moment. Since any knowledge must have a ground, the ground of this remembered knowledge is that self as qualified by the past moment. And the ground for the present remembered knowledge is the self of the present moment. Thus the two moments are there and they qualify the same self.

V: The act of remembering would establish the present self, while the past experience would do the same for the past self, like two perceptual experiences. How can you establish that the same self is related to both these moments? You cannot say that this it is established by the two samvits—of the past and of the present; for when we recognise the pot we do not bring in two perceptual experiences, but only one single act of recognition. The two samvits
are not capable of effecting a relation between the two moments.

The two samvits cannot also establish the self to be on the same ground. Each samvit by itself can establish only the self of that moment; and we cannot say that both have the same ground. Nor can the two samvits together establish it; for since both are not together present, each can establish the self of that particular moment only. The self as qualified by its samvit does not happen to be the ground of the other samvit.

P : The two samvits of the two moments having the self of two moments as their grounds, give rise to a third samvit; and the object of this third samvit is that self which is identical in the other two samvits.

V : That the self is the object and not the ground in recognition is the very thing we are establishing.

Further, we have to accept that the self can be the object of recognition, and not its ground. Take the cognition ‘anubhutam maya’, (It was experienced by me). There was an experience in the past, and I now remember that experience as mine. In this act there is the memory of the experience as belonging to the self. The previous samvit as qualifying its ground is remembered. This is a ‘visishta smarana’ (specific remembering) in which the self also is apprehended. We arrive at the self as having had the previous experience in the present memory cognition. In the present specific (visishta) memory we have the memory of the self as qualified by the past experience. We do not have the memory of the past experience as detached from the self. This is a fact of experience.
Now, from the cognition of the present, I can have the knowledge that there will be rain in the future; and even though there is no rainbow, the former proceeds to act in the field so that the future rain may be of use to him. The ‘prakasa manatva’ (apprehension) of the clouds now is the cause of the act. Through jnana we are able to comprehend the rain that will come later. Likewise there was only the samvedana in the past and now I remember it is my own past experience. Even though the past experience is not present now as the present experience, it is cognised through the ‘prakasamanatva’ of the self.

The self may be the ground of the past samvedana; but in the present memory cognition we have the past samvedana of the self. As such that self which may be the ground becomes the object in this present memory cognition. The self which is the ground of the remembered samvedana and that which was there at the time of that samvedana, such a self now becomes an object in my present memory cognition.

The Prabhakara may argue that only that samvedana is made the object by the present memory; and that as that samvedana is remembered, it brings its ground even now as its ground.

This is false. In the present memory cognition that samvedana is not present as this savedana. An absent samvedana cannot establish its ground now; for any samvedana can establish only that ground which was present only when that savedana was there. It is only that samvedana which is ‘svayam prakasamana’ and it is only such a samvedana that can establish its asraya (ground). But the samvedana comprehended in the memory is only the object
in the memory cognition; and as such it is paraprakasya (revealed by the other). Such an entity that is illumined by something other than itself, can not be a sadhaka (means to prove) for the self. Otherwise, dharma etc. which are illumined by agama etc. (which are distinct from dharma etc.), would have to be the sadhakas for establishing their ground. This is absurd.

Hence we have to conclude that the self which was in the past cognition becomes an object only in the present memory cognition.

So far we have shown that perception cannot establish the momentariness of vijnana; and that perception cannot put an end to the aikyavabhaasa of the self.

The Vijnanavadin next attempts at establishing the momentariness of vijnana inferentially. The inferential argument may be stated thus:

Destruction is noticed in the last moment of the object. This last moment is preceeded by a moment which must have the power to produce this destruction. In this way all the preceeding moments must have the same nature. Thus each moment is distinct from the other and has its relation with the preceeding and succeeding moments. And we therefore have a similarity between these moments.

The immediately preceeding moment of the actual destruction has existence; and this moment is called the last moment. There is the distraction immediately after this moment has come into existence. During this last moment,

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the existence of the pot is conditioned by this last moment. The existence of the pot as conditioned by the moments earlier to this moment is distinct from the former existence. This latter existence is referred to as its 'adi' (beginning). Even in these moments each moment finds its destruction in the immediately succeeding moment. The destruction in the succeeding moment is copervasive with the existence of this moment. In this the earlier moments are similar to the last moment. From this inference momentariness is established. And the identity between the moments is based only on their similarity with one another.

To this, Padmapada gives a counter-inference which may be rendered thus:

Existence is noticed in the first moment. Existence can give rise only to existence. As such even at the end we can infer the existence of the pot.

'The first moment' means the moment which conditions the existence of the pot; the 'end' means those moments which condition its destruction. As such even after the destruction of the pot, we may infer the existence of the pot during those moments. We may infer that the existence of the pot is copervasive with those moments of the pot (when the pot is no more). All the moments have the nature of time. The first moments are the times as conditioned by its existence. The same may hold good of the last moment also.

The Buddhist argues that when the pot is no more, there is the experience of its negation or absence; and as such the Vedantin's inference runs counter to experience.
Vivaranam

To this the Vedantin replies that since we experience the existence of the object in the earlier moments, the Buddhist contention too runs contrary to experience as embodied in recognition.

The Vedantin's inference flouts experience, while the Buddhist's flouts recognition. But experience is stronger than the other. Abhijna or perceptual experience can be a 'badhaka' for this inferential cognition; but there can be no such 'badhya badhakata' between inference and recognition.

To this, the Vedantin's reply is that there is no difference at all between the two. In the 'jvalapratyabhijna' (recognition of the flame) we find inference functioning as the 'badhaka' for the recognition. The 'kshayanubhava' (experience of destruction) does not arise immediately but only mediately since it involves the apprehension of both the 'dharmin' and its 'pratiyogin' (contradictory). Whether it is abhijna or pratyabhijna, both are cases of perceptual cognition. Any one of these can be a badhaka for inference and this we find in the case of the cognition of two moons. Hence both the inferences are on the same level. Consequently we cannot establish 'kshanikatva' (momentariness) or sattva (existence) from any of these two inferences.

Arthakriyakarita and Sattva:

The Buddhist then proceeds to establish the momentariness from the doctrine of 'artha kriya karitva' (pragmatic activity). 'Arthakriya kari' means that which gives rise (makes possible) an act. The inference given is:

That which is not momentary is not 'artha kriyakari'; e.g. the horn of a hare. To state this inference, he first
proceeds to show that 'arthakriyakaritva' is incompatible with the nature of a 'sthayin'. This argument is stated thus by Padmapada:

You want the 'aham uttaka' to be a 'sthayin'. The I for you is not a fleeting and changing entity. Does this I give rise to an 'artha kriya'? Or no? If it does not give rise to one, it partakes of the nature of non-existence, and is therefore not at all real. But if it does give rise to one, it is no longer the unchanging 'sthayin'; for the 'sthayin' does not admit of arthakriya karitva.

On this the Vedantin raises an objection: If an object were to give rise to another, then something must set the object in motion. This something is to be related to the object. Such a relation is possible only when the object has unchanging existence. If it is momentary, nothing can be related to it; and then nothing can come out of it. As such only a 'sthayin' has the 'arthakriya yoga'.

The Buddhist denies such a 'yogyatva' (propriety). He argues: Does the sthayin give rise to 'arthakriya' successively? Or simultaneously? Successively means producing many karyas (effects) one after the other in a series. Simultaneously means producing all the karyas at one and the same moment.

Now let us take the first alternative. Since there is no difference between any two moments, why does not the previous moment give rise to that which the succeeding moment produces? If it is capable of giving rise to many 'karyas', it should produce them all at the same moment since it is the sufficient cause and since one cause can produce a plurality of effects.
Then consider the second alternative. If it can produce in a single moment all that it produces through out its life, then immediately after that moment it would cease to exist. It would be unreal since it has nothing more to do.

In the former alternative we do not find any cause which would make it give rise to its karyas only at a later time. And if it is not an agent at a later time, it is no longer real then. Hence any entity which is ‘artha kriya kari’ does not become a ‘sthayin’ only because of this. Consequently the ‘ahamullekha’ differs from moment to moment, whence the ‘aikyavabhasa’ (apprehension of identity) is the result of the similarity between those moments.

The Vedantin now proceeds to reply to this examination. The sthayin, on this view, may produce all its karyas in a single moment; and then it may keep quiet. Yet it does not become a non-existent entity. “Sattva” cannot be defined as that which has the ability to give rise to an ‘artha kriya’. So the Vedantin asks: What is this ‘artha-kriya’ in the absence of which an entity is said to become non-existent?

The Buddhist replies that it is the ability of an object to give rise to the knowledge of itself.

V: This kind of sattva may be found in the case of external objects. But it is not applicable in the case of vijnana. If vijnana were to be a ‘sattva’, it should be an object in another vijnana. Vijnana cannot be said to arise from its own vijnana. Each samvit is ‘svaprakasa’, and such it is not capable of giving ‘svavishaya jnana’ (object of its own cognition). Hence it will have to be ‘asat’ non-existent.
B: There cannot be a subject-object relation between the jnanas of one ‘jnana santana’ (series). Yet my jnana can be an object for the cognition of another person. Thus it will be ‘purushantara jnana janaka’ (able to cause the knowledge of another person). Hence there is ‘artha kriya’ for the samvits.

V: Even this is not possible; for jnana cannot be cognised by the sense-organs. My jnana is not immediate for another. It can only be inferred.

B: Then my knowledge is the object inferred. As such the jnana belonging to one ‘jnana santana’ can give rise to the jnana belonging to another jnana santana.

V: This too is not possible since the inferential cognition is based on a perceptual cognitism; and perceptual cognition is absent here.

B: Yet all the samvedanas are the objects for the Jnana of an all-knower. Thus they can be objects that give rise to the knowledge of themselves. This is possible because the sarvajna (omniscient) has the immediate apprehension of all objects.

V: Such an immediacy which does not exclude the ‘Vijnana upaplavas’ (fluctuations in knowledge) is not possible; i.e., the jnana of the all-knower would have to be identical with the objects and the objects which are our jnana are all imperfect. That would bring about an identity between his jnana and our ‘samsaara samvit’ (finite consciousness). This would impute all our difficulties to Brahman. Since the samvit is non-different from the object,
the 'sarvajna jnana' would be polluted by the 'samsara samvit'.

B. Even though the jnana of the Allknower is 'uparakta' (attached) with our jnana, it does not corrupt or pollute the 'sarvajna jnana' since it is negated (badhita) by true knowledge.

V. Now such a negation for the 'samsara samvit' is not possible in the 'sarvajna jnana' at the same moment. The 'samsara samvit' will be there at one moment, and the negation will arise at the next moment. Till the negation has arisen, there is the corruption of the 'sarvajna jnana'. This 'samara samvit' cannot be negated by the next jnana, for the letter cannot have the former as its object. To have the former as its object, it should continue to exist beyond its moment. Even if it becomes an object, there would be an identity between the 'badhita (negated) samvit' and 'badhaka (negating) samvit

We cannot also say that without any of the upaplavas (fluctuations) there will be the uparaga of the 'samsara vijnanas' in the jnana of the all-knower; for in such a case the samsara samvit is no longer the object. The all-knower would be incapable of apprehending the world by 'upaplavas'; and his teaching would then be out of place.

B: Then I shall advance another definition. Arthakriyaa need not mean giving rise to the knowledge of itself. It only means giving rise to another moment which is cognate with it (sajatiya).

V: Then what would happen to the last moment? Will not the last moment be non-existent (asattva)? There are the vijnanas of the form 'I' changing from moment to
moment. These constitute one 'jnana santana'. Here we assume the relationship of the knower - known-knowing, along with a 'sthayin'. Due to these, our vijnanas are rendered impure by the 'ragadidoshas' and by the objects. Now there are the samskaras of the nature of the vijnana arising from the preceeding cognate objects. From these samskaras, there arise the later vijnanas. When we know (bhavana) that all this is momentary, there is dispelled the 'sthayaitva kalpana'? When we come to know (bhavana) the particular, there is destroyed that assumption (kalpana) which involves the substance, quality, sound, act, adjunct (viseshana) and vishaya (object). When all this is known to be duhkha there disappear the 'sukha duhkha upaplavas brought by the 'ragadi dosha pravritti'? The contemplation of this as the 'sunya' (void) puts and end to the 'vishaya upaplava'?

Thus there are four different bhavanas having four actions that put an end to the corresponding different samskaras. In this way the four types of upaplavas are slowed down. Then there arises a vijnana which is free from all 'upaplavas'. And this arises in the moment that immediately succeeds the last moment of the upalavas. The moment that has the jnana which is free from all upalavas, is preceded by that moment where the upalavas are only slowed down. This moment comes at the end of the 'samsara jnana santana' (series of finite cognitions) and thus it is called the last moment.

This last moment does not give rise to any other moment where the upalavas can be seen. As such this last moment would be 'asat'. Consequently all the preceeding moments too would have to partaka of the nature of non-existence.
B: The last moment may not give rise to a moment having its cognate jnana. But it brings as its object the jnana of the all-knower.

V: Giving rise to the jnana of the all-knower does not make it 'arthavatta'. For, if it gives rise to that jnana, it is no longer the last moment. And when there is no last moment, there can be no liberation. 'Ekasantanata' means that there is a causal relation between two entities having a similar nature. And if the last moment gives rise to the jnana of the all-knower, then both these must have an identical or similar nature. Such a causal relation would make the last moment impossible; and if there were to be liberation, there should be a last moment.

B: There is a moment giving rise to the jnana of the all-knower. There two jnana santanas are similar and have a similar nature. And since that moment is giving rise to the jnana of the all-knower, we have the 'santanaiikya' (identity of the series). This identity itself may be taken to be the liberation.

V: Then this moment is not giving rise to that jnana as its object. One samvit cannot be the object of another samvit, since as samvits they do not differ from one another. Just as one pradipaa as light does not differ from another pradipaa as light, so too two samvits cannot differ from one another.

One samvit cannot be the object of another samvit. One samvit cannot have the immediate experience of another. Somebody else's samvit can only infer my samvit.
Or it might be said that the samvedana is immediate and direct. What is inferred is not another's samvit but the relation of the samvit to another body—ie., that there is such a samvit in him or for him because his body is appearing thus. As such samvit is never an object for any pramana.

As having the nature of the samvit, the two samvits are non-different. One samvit does not differ from another samvit, in so far as both are samvits. If the 'dharmi' is samvit, and if its 'pratiyogin' (contradictory) also is samvit, there are no two samvits but only one samvit.

Of these two, if only one is samvit and the other is not, even then there will be only one samvit. And then there cannot be a subject-object relation between the samvits.

Moreover, does the 'arthakriya karitva' of an entity act as the cause to establish the existence (sattva) of the cause of the entity? Or is it only a 'pratiti nimitta' (instrument or cause of apprehension)?

Take the first alternative according to which an object is supposed to have existence if it is 'arthakriyakari'—if it gives rise to something. The emergence of the effect would establish the existence of its cause. But the cause has come into existence long before its effect. Does it not exist if it has not produced an effect? Till it has produced an effect, is it existent? The horn of the hare does not exist and it does not produce any effect. It is not the absence of the effect that makes the horn of the hare non-existent. But it is its non-existence that does not allow it to give rise to any effect.
So, one may fall back on the second alternative and say that only the apprehension (pratiti) of the existence of the cause is rendered possible by the ‘arthakriya karitva’ of the effect. Then the effect has ‘arthakriya karitva’; it gives us the apprehension of its cause. Any thing can be apprehended only by the knowledge of its effect. To have the knowledge of this effect, we require its effect; and in this way we are led to a regress. As such we cannot have the apprehension of ‘satta’ at any time. The whole world remains unapprehended. It would remain a void.

Buddhist: ‘Arthakriya’ is no other than an effect. An object gives us knowledge and this is the effect and knowledge is ‘svayam siddha’ (self-proved) since it does not require any thing else to be known. This knowledge makes us know that the object exists. As such there is no pratity anavastha (regress in apprehension).

Vedantin: Jnana is the effect and it is said to be the cause that determines the existence of the object, and since these jnanas are ‘svayam siddha’ that which gives us the jnana is self, and not the ‘artha kriya’? Further jnana and its object being identical on the Buddhist view, we cannot say that the ‘karana bhuta jnana’ (causel cognition) is dependant on ‘the illumination of the ‘karya bhuta jnana’; for all jnana is self-luminous.

B: Let this be so. Jnana is illumined by it self. It can by itself be its own ‘arthakriya’.

V: This is a tautology; and it admits in essence that ‘arthakriya karitva’ cannot establish the sattva of the object. Sattva is not dependent on ‘artha kriya’. It is natural and inherent for the object. The existence of the
unchanging object continues to remain unchecked even if it gives rise to its effect once and keeps quiet for the rest of the time.

Likewise the existence of the object remains unchecked even if it produces its effects in succession. The objection raised by the Buddhist earlier on this was: if the sthayin reveals its arthakriya (pragmatic effect) in succession, why should it reveal thus only at some specific moments? Since it is an unchanging entity, there is no difference between any two of its moments. Then why can't it reveal all its future effects also in the present moment only.

Here we have to consider one important factor. The cause has the power to give rise to its effect. But it cannot do so unless the factors that co-operate (sahakari) with it are near by in a specific manner. It is capable of producing the effect only when its latent power is awakened by the cooperating factors or conditions. Because of this it is wrong to say that there is no difference between any two of its moments.

B: If the cause has the power, it does not stand in need of the co-operating factors.

V: Then even that which does not have the power cannot be benefited by those factors. The cooperating factors are useless for a non-cause. And this would lead us to consider that there is no need for any 'sahakari in the world. But we do see in the world that only a potent cause takes the aid of these factors! and the denial of the aid of these factors amounts to a denial of the facts presented by experience.
B: Only those objects that are powerless do require the aid of these factors in giving rise to a potent cause. This is not opposed to experience. In order to become the cause, the non-cause requires these factors.

V: These factors are powerless to produce the effect. Yet when they cooperate with the cause, there arises the effect. Till they cooperate, the cause is in reality a non-cause. Now are these factors powerful to make the non-cause a cause? or not? Are these factors the cause of the non-cause? or not? If the non-cause becomes a cause, it does not require them. If it does not become a cause, they are useless. If these factors constitute the cause for the non-cause, then the non-cause would be an effect and not a cause. If they do not constitute the cause, they require other factors in a regress.

You should not say that a cause does not require the aid of cooperating factors, for this is a fact of experience.

B: The effect is not now there. It is almost non-existent. Such a non-existent entity cannot have an existent entity as its cause. Then why can’t you say that any cause can bring it into existence? The cause too has no specific relation with the now non-existent effect. Then can’t it be the cause of all effects? When there is this ‘avyavastha’ (confusion) how are you able to make out the mere distinction between cause and effect. If you say that there is this relation because of the agreement and difference that exists in between them, there is such a relation also between the cooperating factors and the effect.

V: The cause is always a cause and it has the power. When the effect is there we are somehow or other able to
know that it is related to some cause. But the cause is comprehended not as a single entity but as the totality of conditions working in close cooperation with the main-cause. As such we have to admit that the cause is that which necessarily demands the cooperating factors.

**Objection**: What then is the part played by these co-operating factors or conditions?

_V_: To answer this question, we have to examine a few other views and reject them along with the Buddhistic contention.

**Objection**: The co-operating factors have given rise to a specific cause; and this produces the effect. This is the case because the cause would not require the useless factors.

_V_: There is the cause which requires the co-operating factors. Has it the power to become a specific cause? or no? Can the cause bring about this specific nature in itself? or no? If it cannot bring about this specific nature in itself, it cannot require these cooperating factor. When it is by itself ‘asakta’ (powerless), it cannot produce any effect even if a thousand ‘sahakarins’ are near by. It is inconsistent to say that the mere ‘sahakarins’, without any relation to the cause can bring about the effect.

If it has the power to bring about this specific nature in itself, this specific nature has its cause in itself; when the ‘sahakarins’ are nearby. It is not the ‘sahakarins’ that are the cause of the change. Further the first specific nature must be said to be due to the sahakarins. If the sahakarins can bring this speciality (vishesha), they must already have such a specific nature in them that can produce this ‘vishesha’. In this way a regress will arise.
So you have to say that the sahakarins produce only a little of the visesha in the cause: produce only that much for the production of the effect. The rest of it is in the cause and it does not require the aid of the sahakarins. Thus 'avyavastha' would arise.

Then the cause has the sakti to some extent; and to this extent it does not require the sahakarins. Thus even though the sahakarins are not useful, they should be said to be required. Thus the first specific nature in the cause arises immediately from the mere presence of the sahakarins. Then alone you can avoid the regress.

When it requires the sahakarins even though they are not useful, then the specific nature of the cause is not the effect of the sahakarins. And this is giving up your own position.

The sahakarins then do not help the cause; and their purpose is to be found in the effect. For the effect arises from the cause which is aided by the sahakarins. The part played by the sahakarins is to be found only in the effect. Whether we take the cause to be a momentary entity or to be an unchanging one, there are required the sahakarins so that they will be the 'upakaraks' (helpful ones) for the effect. The cause arises when there is the sahakari sampat. This moment called the cause is bringing about the effect. As such we find that the 'sahakary apeksha' is intended for the emergence of the effect. The pot arises where there is the cooperation of the 'danda' (stick) etc. for the clay. This 'karana samagri' is essential for the effect. As such even though the cooperating factors are not necessary for the cause, they are necessary if the cause were to give the effect.
BUDDHIST POSITION:

Since these co-operating factors are of use only to the effect, they are required only for the effect. They are not of any use to the cause whence the cause does not require them or involve them. Even that momentary entity called the cause does not require them; for the effect arises when these factors are there, and it does not arise if they are not there. Likewise even if the cause is an unchanging entity, there is the 'apeksha' of the cooperating factors only for the effect. This can be arrived at through agreement and difference. Even then it is inconsistent to speak of 'krama-janana' (successive emergence). The main cause is said to be unchanging. If this were to give the effects in a successive series, the cooperating factors too are to be in a successive series. In such a case are these factors directly the cause of the effect? Does the effect arise only when they are present near by (when they are in proximity)?

In some form or other and to some extent the co-operating factors are always present. As such the unchanging cause must always produce the effects. This is absurd, and thus the first alternative falls.

Take the second alternative which states that only the presence or proximity (sannidhana) of these factors is required. Both the 'sahakarin' and its proximity are required. In such a case, since the proximity too is always there, there cannot be a 'krama-janana' (emergence of successive series). There need not be a further 'apeksha' for the proximity, when it is already present.

If the 'sahakari sambandha' is natural there ought to be the 'karya-janma' (emergence of effect) always. If it is
not natural, there is another difficulty. Is the relation between the cause and its sahakarin brought about by the mere sahakarin? Or by anything else? It cannot be the former, for that would involve ‘sada karya prasanga’ (eternal emergence of effect). Nor can it be the latter since that something else also is always there. Further, if the relation is brought by something else, this something else would require another as its cause; and thus a regress is inevitable.

The vedantin might argue that there is the ‘karya satatya prasanga’ (ever-present effect) even for the Buddhist. The momentary entity called the cause has the power to bring forth the effect. Such a cause necessarily involves the sahakari. Then should it also not produce its effects always? The ‘sattakshana’ is the actual cause; and such a moment is always there.

Is there the birth of the effect in the ‘sattakshana’ (moment of its being)? Or in the next moment? But the cause is admitted to be that moment immediately preceding the moment of the effect. As such the Buddhist does not accept the first alternative. Even though there is no ‘karana satta’ in the next moment, still there can be the effect; for there is no difference between the two moments.

With reference to the effect, the cause and its sahakarin are necessarily and inevitably in the preceding moment. This sahakarin has its purpose (function) with reference to the cause. And in the next moment there is the effect. As such there does not arise the contingency of ‘sadakarya janana’ (always producing the effect).
That moment which is the necessary cause has no existence prior to this moment or next to this moment. As such neither the preceding moment nor the succeeding moment can give rise to an effect.

Vedantin’s Reply:

There is an impossibility or illogicality in the Buddhist’s argument. ‘Agnikshana’ (fire-moment) gives rise to the ‘dhuma kshana’ (smoke-moment). Do we apprehend a causal relation between these two moments only? Or do we apprehend the causal relation between the ‘agni kshana jnana santana’ (series of fire cognitions) and the dhuma kshana santana?

Now it is impossible to understand that ‘agnisvalakshana’ is the cause of the ‘dhuma svalakshana’. Svalakshana is that which is identical with itself while excluding others from it. To establish a causal relation we should apprehend the two together. But we apprehend fire in one moment, and smoke in another. The first moment is destroyed when we are in the second moment. There cannot be established any necessary relationship between an absent moment and a present moment. The two moments cannot be apprehended together.

As such one may have to say that through the method of agreement and difference, he can establish a relation between the ‘agnisantana’ and ‘dhumasantana’. Therein one may say that the ‘agnisvalakshanas’ are the causes of the ‘dhuma svalakshanas’. One should assume such a general necessary relation.
Now there is no difference between any one 'agnisvalakshana' and any other. Then why can't there be the emergence of smoke even from that 'agnisvalakshana', which is in the coal.

The Buddhist might reply that there is no 'kashtha' (stick, wood) which is the sahakarin.

Then is the cause only the absence of the 'kashtha svalakshana' for the absence of the 'sannihita svalakshana' (proximate particular)? It cannot be the former for the 'kashtha svalakshana' is formed in its own santana (series). Then you have to argue that there is required a relation between the 'agnisvalakshana' and the 'kashtha svalakshana'.

Then, is this relation between the two brought about by themselves? Or by anything else? If the two santanas are not momentary—i.e., if they are real and unchanging (nitya) then the relation between the two also must be always present. If it is brought by something else, then the Buddhist's position is not far removed from that of ours.

Even if the cause is real and unchanging, the proximity of the sahakarin is there only at a specific time and not always. The 'samyoga' (conjunction) between the cause and the sahakarin is not always there. And the proximity is not always formed. As such there is no sadakarya janana'.

B: Only when there is the promixmty of the sahakarin there is the birth of the effect. This is a necessary and invariable rule. Yet such a necessary relation between the
‘upakarya’ and the ‘upakaraka’ does not exist in the case of the ‘dhumasantana’ and ‘kashtha santana’.

V: If there is such a necessary relation between the sahakarin and the effect, how can the effect not require the sahakarin? To say that there is an invariable concomitant relation between the sahakarin and the effect, and to say also that there is no ‘upakaryopakaraka sambandha’ between the two, is to contradict oneself in the same breath.

B: The concomitant relation is arrived at through agreement and difference. This is a necessary ‘rule’ (niyama). That between the ‘upakarya’ (effect) and ‘upakaraka’ (sahakarin) is a relation. Where is the vyapti (concomittance) between that rule and this relation? There may be a concomitant relation between the sahakarin and the effect. But this needs the one as a ‘upakaraka’ and the other as an ‘upakarya’.

V: That these two are identical is seen in the relation between the cause and the effect. Whenever there is a ‘vyapti niyama’, it implies that one of the terms or objects necessarily involves the other; and if it does not involve the other, it is not a ‘Vyapti niyama’. If there is no ‘upakaryopakaara sambandha’, there cannot be a necessary concomitant relation between the two—eg. between water and smoke there is no such ‘niyama’.

B: We see that there is a causal relation between the ‘agnisvalakshana’ and ‘dhumasvalakshana’. But here we do not find any concomitant relation ‘(vyaptiniyama)’ between the ‘agnisantana’ and ‘dhumasantana’. Suppose we do find such a ‘niyama’; then the two relations are identical. Then what will happen is this: the ‘agnisvala-
Vishnu

kshanasy are the causes of the ‘dhumasvalakshanasy’. Smoke requires the ‘kashtha svalakshanasy’ also. When there is the ‘kashtha samyoga’ with the fire, we have the smoke, and in the absence of that ‘samyoga’, there is no smoke. So the ‘kashtha’ is the co-operating (sahakarin) cause having an ‘anvaya vyatireka niyama’ (principle of agreement and difference) with the smoke. The relation of ‘upakarya’ and ‘upakaraka’ is of ‘apekshaa lakshana’. Both that ‘niyama’ and this ‘sambandha’ ought to be found in the case of the ‘karya karana svalakshanasy’ only. In any other general necessary relation (samanya upadhau ‘samaanya vyaptan), the causal relation cannot be found.

There may be a causal relation etc., between the ‘agnisvalakshanasy’ and the ‘dhumasvalakshanasy’, and there may also be the ‘upakary opakaaraka’ relation between the ‘kashtha samyoga’ and the smoke. But in the relation between the ‘agnisantanasy’ and the ‘dhuma santanasy’, such a thing is impossible. Hence there is no ‘vyaptiniyama’ which makes the ‘sahakaryapeksha’ possible. The ‘vyaptiniyama’, between the two ‘santanasy’ (series) does not postulate the relation of the ‘sahakrin’ (co-operating factor) to the ‘dhumasantana’.

V: But the ‘vyaptiniyama’ is a logical or necessary deduction from the causal relation. And those who want a particular effect do take recourse to a specific cause; and a specific cause is that which gives rise to an effect only when it has a ‘sahakarin’. We find the vyavahara (activity) only with reference to the ‘samanya upadhi’. The ‘Samaanya upadhi’ is that ‘sahakarin’ which brings the effect into existence. The ‘sahakarin’ is thus taken to be the cause.
If there is a causal relation between the ‘svālakshanas’, one who is in need of curd need not take recourse to milk, for there is no identity between the two. Milk by itself does not give curd. Nor can we say that the ‘dugdhasantana’ (milk-series) can give rise to ‘dadhisantana’ (curd-series). Curd requires a sahakarin for the milk.

B: Let there be the ‘janyajanakata yogya niyama’ (appropriate cause and effect-relation) in so far as the ‘samyopadhi’ is concerned. What does it imply?

V: If the cause is only a momentary entity, it cannot involve any sahakarin; nor can it involve any effect. How do you get the ‘vyapti niyama’? The cause is a moment, its sahakarin another. The two cannot coexist. When either is present, the other is not. When the effect is present, the other is not. As such you cannot have any ‘vyapti jnana’.

B: The cause does not require the sahakarin for itself; for the cause is that which has the power in it to bring about the effect. Each preceding moment is seen to give rise to each succeeding moment. This is the relation of cause and effect. Even the effect does not require the sahakarin because it is brought only by the effect. When the cause has the sufficient power, it will perforce bring about the effect; and then the rule that the sahakarin must be nearby is rendered useless.

V: From the agni svalakshana there arises the smoke because there is the ‘kashtha samsarga’ nearby. Then why can’t you say that the sahakarin too has a hand in the emergence of the effect?
B: No. The agnisvalakshana is capable of giving rise to smoke. It has this power (ability) even before there is the 'kashtha samyoga' for the fire. But when there is no 'kasathasamsarga, the 'agnisvalakshana' is said to be a non-cause for the effect. This 'vyatireka', (relation by difference or negation) too must be seen. But we cannot argue merely from the 'anvaya' and establish the 'sahakari'. To say that the 'kashtha samsarga' alone can make the 'agnisvalakshana' the cause of smoke, we require both 'anvaya' and 'vyatireka'. Merely from 'Vyatireka' we cannot establish it. And since we have not seen the 'kashtha samsarga-bhava' (absence of a conjunction with wood) giving rise to the 'dhumaabhava' (absence of smoke), we cannot take the sahakarin to be essential either for the cause or for the effect. Hence we can only say that the presence of the sahakarin in the emergence of the effect is purely accidental (kakataliya).

V: Let the 'sahakarya apeksha' be not there. And then why should there be a cause? Let it also be unnecessary. Then there is an end to all causal relations and actions.

Whether the cause is an unchanging entity or a momentary one, there is the same 'sahakari sam nidhana krama' in both the views. And as a result, that which is taken to be the cause is also the same in both views.

The cause is 'svayamjanaka (self-creative); it produces the effect, for it has in itself the necessary power to produce the effect. And such a cause may be but momentary. The sahakarin is of no use at all for the 'karana svarupa'. Yet in order that there might arise an effect
there is the ‘sahakaryapeksha’ for the cause. Or there is the ‘sahakarya apekshaa’ only for the effect because it is only the ‘karana samgri’ constituted by the cooperating factors that produce the effect. This sahakarin is necessarily involved in the emergence of the effect. The same account holds good of our view also, where the cause is not momentary, but an unchanging entity.

From one ‘agnisvalakshana’we have fire on the ground, smoke above it, ashes below, and the knowledge of the fire for the individual. Here the ‘kashthadi sahakara’ is found for the fire. One ‘agnikshana’ gives rise to another ‘agnikshana’. When moisture is the sahakarin, there is found smoke. Ashes arise from the ‘indhana sahakara’ (cooperation of fire-wood), and the sense contact being the sahakarin, there arises the ‘svavishayajnana’. Thus the difference in the sahakarins involved by the ‘desabheda’, makes one entity give rise to many effects. Thus, when ‘kala bheda’ brings about a difference in the sahakarins, we have different effects emerging from the cause.

Hence, even though there is the non-difference between the object and ‘ahamsamvedana’ from an empirical and relative standpoint we have to construe facts as they are, as they appear. Our apprehension shows that the object is different from the ‘advitiya samvedana’. This object is a ‘sthayin’ (abiding) and it has ‘artha kriya samarthya’ (pragmatic potency). Thus there is a great difference between our view and that of the Buddhists.

The ahamkarta (subject) cognises the object as having the same form; and even though it is a sthayin, it is ‘artha kriyakari’. Thus simply because we admit the immediacy
of the blue, you should not take us to be exponuding a Buddhist doctrine. The ahankarta is the percipient self who is distinct from the not-self. That this ahankarta is the unchanging ‘ekarupah’ (one) has been established from experience and from pure logical reasoning as well.

The Advaita Siddhanta is free from all Buddhistic conceptions. On the other hand, traces of Buddhism appear only in the theories of those who have attacked Advaita. Thus the Prabhakara agrees with the Carvaka and Buddhist systems in rejecting the validity of mantra, arthavada, itihasa, and purana; in rejecting devata, svarga, isvara and moksha; and in accepting the momentariness of the cognitions and of the pramanas. The Bhatta agrees with Carvaka and Buddhist systems in accepting identity indifference and in rejecting the validity of mantra etc. The Bhedabheda of Bhaskara agrees with Buddhism in rejecting the knowledge of Brahman, in degrading the sanyasins, and in making a farce of bondage and liberation.

The Bhedabhedavadin puts a series of questions to show that there is no difference between Buddhism and Advaita.

Obj : You and the Buddhist agree in holding that the world is ‘kalpita’, (artificially constructed) in vijnana.

Ved : Yes. But you and he agree in saying that the world is ‘pratibhasya’ (manifested) by vijnana.

Obj : Though it is ‘pratibhasya’ by vijnana, we admit the distinction between the true and the false.
Ved: Here too we admit the mithyatva of the world And yet in this world we too maintain the distinction between 'sattva' (being) and 'asattva' (non-being) brought by 'artha kriya samrthya'.

Obj: But you can maintain the distinctions not as ultimately real, but as 'kalpita'.

Ved: Even if you admit the distinction between the true and the false, it is only as 'pratibhasya'.

Obj: But such a distinction is seen.

Ved: Why can't there be seen such a distinction even in my view also?

Obj: No one would say that the pot etc., are false.

Ved: Even a 'pratibhasya satyatva' would make the pot etc. unreal. But on my view the distinction is sounder. 'Arthakriya karitva' makes the pot etc. real; and the absence of this 'samarthya' makes the erroneous silver false. And we do see that the act of maya (magic) gives us delight or hatred. You cannot take these to be mere cognitions devoid of an objective existence. For we hear of the battle between gods and Denons where weapons are employed. These weapons are real and are not mere cognitious. They give rise to actions etc.,

**Immediacy and Mediacy:**

Obj: Since the object is the medium for the revelation (manifestation) of consciousness, you admit the immediacy of the object. Then there should be such an imme-
diacy of the object even in inference and other pramanas. But we do not find this immediacy there.

Reply: The antahkarana vritti (epistemic act) comes into contact with the object and assumes the form of the object. Then the object becomes the medium that manifests consciousness. The yogyatva (propriety) is not found in the objects of inference etc; for the objects here are not present before us. As such the object there is neither a karaka (causative) nor a vyaniaka (manifesting one); it does not give the cognition of itself because of the absence of the contact with the vritti; and it does not therefore manifest consciousness. These two properties are found only in the present objects and not in those objects which are not present here and now. As such they are not immediate objects. These objects do not have their vyapara in giving us a knowledge of themselves. This vyapara consists of the properties of ‘karakatva’ and ‘vyanjakatva’ referred to above.

When the pot comes into a contact with fire we see redness. But if the pot is not present, fire will not reveal that redness. Similar is the case with the object in inference.

Objection: There was rain in the past. And I say that the rain is present now as the past rain or as the future rain (atitavrishti, or anagata vrishti).

Reply: But rain cannot be both ‘atita’ (past) and ‘vartamana’ (present) at the same moment. As atita it does not have any ‘anvaya’ with a present object. It appears only as the ‘abhava pratiyogi’ (contradictory of its absence). It is never vartamana if it was only in the past.
Further the 'atitavrishti' (past rain) cannot have any relation with the present 'kriya' and 'guna'. It is only the 'vartamana ghata' (present pot) that has the 'vartamana lauhitya' (present redness). Thus in inference the object is neither a karaka nor a vyanjaka.

In perception, however, the sense contacts the property; and we have the cognition of this property only when the substance begins functioning.

Objection: If the object is not immediate in inference, and if such an object cannot be a karaka or a vyanjaka, how can our vijnana have the vishayakara (form of the object) in inference?

Reply: We have the sense contact with the 'linga' (hetu or reason). And the specific relation brought by this functions as the cause in giving us the 'visisht aikartha jnana'—(a specific unitary cognition).

Objection: If it is 'atita', then it is an object. And when it can have 'vishayatva', why can't it have the 'karakatva' also?

Reply: No. An object is not an object if it does not give rise to a knowledge of itself. The object in inference is an object only in so far as it removes the ignorance we have of it. This absence of ignorance which this object gives, is not its property. Nor can we say that the 'vishaya vyapara' is to give us the 'vijnanakara'. Vijnanakara' belongs only to jnana and to none else. When we say 'vrishi-timjanati' (He knows about the rain) as an inferential cognition, the verb to know has an object. But this object here
kshanas' are the causes of the 'dhumasvalakshanas'. Smoke requires the 'kashtha svalakshanas' also. When there is the 'kashtha samyoga' with the fire, we have the smoke, and in the absence of that 'samyoga', there is no smoke. So the 'kashtha' is the co-operating (sahakarim) cause having an 'anvaya vyatireka niyama' (principle of agreement and difference) with the smoke. The relation of 'upakarya' and 'upakaraka' is of 'apekshaa lakshana'. Both that 'niyama' and this 'sambandha' ought to be found in the case of the 'karya karana svalakshanas' only. In any other general necessary relation (samanya upadhaup samaanya vyaptan), the causal relation cannot be found.

There may be a causal relation etc., between the 'agnisvalakshanas' and the 'dhumasvalakshanas', and there may also be the 'upakary opakaaraka' relation between the 'kashtha samyoga' and the smoke. But in the relation between the 'agnisantanas' and the 'dhuma santanas', such a thing is impossible. Hence there is no 'vyaptiniyama' which makes the 'sahakaryapeksha' possible. The 'vyaptiniyama', between the two 'santanas' (series) does not postulate the relation of the 'sahakrin' (cooperating factor) to the 'dhumasantana'.

V: But the 'vyaptiniyama' is a logical or necessary deduction from the causal relation. And those who want a particular effect do take recourse to a specific cause; and a specific cause is that which gives rise to an effect only when it has a 'sahakarin'. We find the vyavahara (activity) only with reference to the 'samanya upadhi'. The 'Samaanya upadhi' is that 'sahakarin' which brings the effect into existence. The 'sahakarin' is thus taken to be the cause.
Objection: The sruti describes the self as having a relation with many upadhis like the body and the 'kshetra'. How is it you speak of ahankara alone as the upadhi?

Reply: The self is the 'ajnanopadhi'. This is 'uparaka' (affects) by the ahankara and its 'samskara'. During the three stages, such a self acquires many an external upadhi; and the many upadhis described refer to this aspect only. When he is said to have the 'gatagatacarana', it only means that having this one upadhi he comes to acquire many other upadhis.

To show that for this 'savikalpaka adhyasa' (determinate superimposition) there is a ground which is 'savikalpaka'; the explanation is given in 'asmat pratyaya vishayatvat'. Now Padmapada is going to show that there can be a 'savikalpaka adhyasa' even when the ground is 'nirvikalpaka' (non-relational or non-determinate).

The self is 'adhyaasarha' not merely because it is the object for the 'asmat pratyaya; but because it is also immediate. For, the pratyagatman (our self) is experienced by us immediately and directly.

Objection: But the self is always something that is to be inferred. How can you speak of its immediacy?

Reply: If I do not have an immediate experience of my self, what is the difference between my experience and the knowledge of my experience possessed by another? When I say 'mayedam viditam' (this is known by me), I recognise a subject in me and an object for me. This subject-object relation cannot be apprehended by me if the self is only inferentially cognised.
Objection: Your self is the ground for the jnana arising from your experience. This is all the difference between your cognition and somebody else's cognition of yours.

Reply: In the absence of the experiencing self, the other person cannot have any knowledge of the relation between my experience and myself (or between my knowledge and myself). If the absence of the 'anubhavasambandha' (relation of experience) is common both to me and to the other, he cannot have an inferential cognition of the ground of the knowledge. If there is no relation between the self and the 'ghatanubhava' (cognition of the pot), then the 'hetujnananumana' (inference of the cause) cannot arise.

Objection: Let there be the self as the ground of the 'vishayanubhava'.

Reply: The 'samvedya jnana' or the knowledge of the object cannot establish the self; for the self would cease to be the subject of the experience by becoming an object. Further it would make experience itself impossible. If the object and the self were to be the objects of experience, there would be two objects arising at the same time; and this is an impossibility. The self cannot be an object of any samvit other than its own; it is not a 'samvit karma'.

Objection: Samvit may not establish that the self is its object. But it can establish the self as its own upadhi. Since the samvit establishes the existence of the self, the self is its upadhi or viseshana' (unimportant).
Reply: Does upadhi mean the ground (asraya) or the object (vishaya), or one of these two? Upadhi cannot mean the ground. If the self is the ground for the samvīt and if the samvīt gives us a knowledge of the ground, then it cannot give us a knowledge of the object since the object is not a ground at all. The samvīt will have to illumine or reveal only the self and not the object.

Samvīt (consciousness) cannot give us a knowledge of the self if the self were to be an object; for, the self as an object would cease to be the self, and the objects would cease to be objects.

Nor can we say that upadhi is asraya vishayatvam. What is meant by a ‘vishaya’?

Objection: It is that which is capable of giving rise to the ‘vyavahara’ (activity) set in motion by the samvīt.

Reply: Then the self too would become an object.

Objection: The object then may be that which is distinct from the ground and at the same time that which excludes the samvīt.

Reply: Then the eye too would become the object along with that which it is said to cognise.

Objection: It is different from the ground; and yet it is that which is capable of giving rise to the ‘vyavahara’ set in motion by that very ground.

Reply: Then what will happen is this; the relation between the samvīt and its ground would have to be an
object. You cannot say that there is no such relationship; for you admit that there is a ‘samavaya’ (relation of inher- ence) between the samvit and the self, because of which there is no immediacy of the self.

**Objection**: The object is that which is ‘karma karaka’ (causing an act).

**Reply**: Then an object which is not present (atita) ceases to be an object, whence you can not admit 'inference'. The object cannot be merely that which is cognised because of the sense contact with it.

**Objection**: Let the self be arrived at as being the object (karma) of the samvit.

**Reply**: This is impossible. The object is in one moment and the cognition in another. The relation between the two is not comprehended in any moment. As such my knowledge of myself (as object) would not be different from another’s knowledge of the same. That the self is the object of the samvit is established by the cognition other than that in which we cognise the object. Does this ‘jnanantara’ (different cognition) coexist with the experience of the object? or does it come at a later time? If it comes at a later time, we have said already that it is impossible to know the relation between the samvit and the self.

These two cognitious being different in having different objects, how can they together arise at the same moment? Can any person have a forward step and also a backward step at the same time?
That which is ‘niravayava’ (part-less) cannot have two ‘parinamas’ (changes) at the same time in one place or in two different places.

**Objection**: Two ‘parispandas’ (movements) are impossible at the same time for one object, when the object is said to change in its entirety. But there can be a ‘parinama’ (change).

**Reply**: This is not possible. On the other hand, there can be two ‘parispandas’ at the same time, if they have different origins: eg. He goes singing. Going is accomplished by the legs and the other by the vocal chords. Even two ‘parinamas’ can be there for one object, if only we recognise that they come at different times: eg. youth and old age come at different times.

There cannot be the parinama of one part only since the self is devoid of parts. Hence the self is immediate in so far as it is ‘svaprakarsa’. This pratyagatma is ‘svayam siddha’ (self-existent foundational consciousness); and through its own inherent power, it becomes ‘adhyasa yogya’ since it is immediate.

**Objection**: But the ground and the adhyasta are cognised by the same sense organ. Mere immediacy is of no avail here, if the ground and the adhyasta are not said to be cognised by the same sense organ. We do not see any adhyasa or a pure immediacy. In any adhyasa there is the contact of the eye with the ground which is immediate.
Reply: There is no such rule that an object can be 
adhyasta only on another immediate and direct object. The 
akasa is not a case of ‘pratyaksha prama’ and yet surface, 
color et. are imputed to it. Thus says Sankara: the 
akasa is ‘paroksha’ or it may be said to be a perceptual 
cognition which does not require the sense-contact.

The Vaiseshika and the Nyaya argue that sabda is a 
‘vishesha guna’, (particular quality). It is apprehended only 
by one external sense organ; and yet as unlike the case of 
smell, it is apprehended as excluding its substance. It is 
not a general or common property like others. It does not 
coexist with any of the other gunas like touch and form. 
Since it is cognised by an external sense organ, it is diffe-
rent from dik (space), kala (time) and manas (mind) whose 
specific property it cannot be. Hence sabda is the vishesha-
guna of a substance which is other than the four elements, 
space, time, mind and self. That which has the property 
of sound is the akasa. This akasa is inferentially cognised. 
Buddhists and carvakas infer akasa through ‘anupalabdhi 
(non-apprehension) and maintain that it is the mere negation 
(abhava) of a murta dravya (distinct substance).

Since abhavantara is no other than an ‘abhava’ (nega-
tion, non-existence), there is an akasa which is merely the 
abhava, of a murtadravya; and this is established through 
’anupalabdhi’. Thus the Prabhasakaras argue.

But the Vartikakara argues that akasa is cognised di-
rectly by the eye.

If the eye can cognise it, it must have a form; and as 
such it must be something that can be touched. The eye
can cognise only a substance which has the qualities of form (or shape) and touch. Further in arriving at the inferential cognition of akasa we have a 'hetu' (or linga) in anupalabhdhi; and this does not allow us to accept a sense contact with the akasa as possible. Hence akasa is only apratyaksha siddha' (proved by non-perception)

Or we may argue that there is an immediate cognition of akasa, and that this cognition is called 'apratyakasha, because it does not involve the contact of any of the external sense organs. Then it is immediate as known or apprehended by the sakshin or as apprehended by the mere mind.

Those who do not see the truth attribute 'm.linya' (colour etc.) to the sky and speak of its surface as being similar to the 'indranila tamala patra' (dark blue leaf). It is blue like the indranila (blue sapphire). The blue of other objects is apprehended as the nature of akasa.

Thus Sankara winds up the 'sambhavana' (possibility) of adhyasa with the words 'even aviruddhah...'. In the apprehended upadhi we are rejecting the object cognised. And this object along with the knowledge of such an object is spoken of as avidya?

Objection: It has been declared that the cause of 'anartha', (misfortune called bondage) is dispelled by Brahma vidya; and so far we are told that avidya is the cause of anartha. Then it ought to be stated that this avidya alone is the cause of the anarthas like 'kartritva'. Then why is the commentator expounding adhyasa?
Reply: To answer such doubts, Sankara says that this adhyasa whose nature has been given so far is taken to be avidya by the pandits (wise men) who are well versed in the pramanas.

We do not merely say that the anartha hetu (cause of bondage) is avidya because all this has avidya as its material cause and consequently the anartha too is avidya. We do not rely only on agreement and difference between avidya and anartha (adhyasa). It is called avidya because it is opposed to vidya, which alone can dispel it. When we are able to have a discriminatory knowledge, we come to understand the real nature of the objects; and this is called vidya. When the snake that is adhyastha is dispelled, the snake disappears and we have the knowledge that it is a rope. This vijnana is called vidya by the wise in philosophy.

Objection: First describe avidya and then show that it can be and is dispelled by real knowledge (jnana). Thereby you can show the dispelling of adhyasa. When this is a simpler method, why should you describe adhyasa?

Reply: We desire the dispelling of anartha. And since the anartha is dispelled by vidya, what is to be done is to describe how anartha has the nature of avidya. Suppose instead of describing adhyasa, Sankara spoke of avidya. This avidya would mean that which envelopes or conceals, for this is its nature. It does not mean the appearance of an object as having a nature other than its own; and such an appearance is the cause of anartha. Hence Sankara first speaks of such an adhyasa or appearance, and
later on speaks of it as avidya because it is dispelled by vidya. This is the proper method.

Suppose the anartha is described as having the nature of avidya. Its ground is the self and its object is Brahman. Either in the self or in its object we do not find the ‘gunas’ and the ‘doshas’ (defects) that can be said to arise from avidya. As such knowledge can bring about the nivritti (cessation) of all anarthas. So anartha is more important from our standpoint.

Thus the consequence of this enquiry is: there is something adhyasta on the self. Such a self is not stained or touched even to the slightest extent by the doshas and gunas brought out by the adhyasa. This sentence of Sankara shows that anartha is not ultimately real. If the anartha is real, then the declared assertion would be futile and meaningless. The assertion was that knowledge alone can dispel the anartha.

Avidyadhyasa does not in reality bring any gunas and doshas to the self. Due to adhyasa there is the evolution of the self and the self as the ground of the adhyasa is free from doshas and gunas. Now the ‘avabhasa’ (manifestation) of the eternal consciousness is obstructed by the beginningless ‘avidyadhyasa’. Because of this anaditva (beginninglessness) there can be no adhyasa parinama for the self. The self is not evolved out of the ‘avidyadhyasa’.

But can we say that the self is evolved out of the ahaṅkaradhyasa? Now if avidyaa is the ground of such an ‘agantuka adhyasa’ (accidental superimposition) then there is no need on the part of the self to have any know-
Vivaranam

ledge; for the self is free and undefiled by the adhyasa. On the other hand, the self is the ground for avidya and also for the product of avidya. Then a lone knowledge would have a value for the bound self. And the a phoist has made by implication the assertion that bondage is destroyed by jnana.

Summarising the salient features explained so far, Padmapada introduces the purport of the next part. The commentary ending with ‘naisargiko yam loka vyavaharah’ has established that there is an adhyāsa called avidya; and it is shown that the self and the not-self appearing as one is avidya or adhyāsa. To prove this, Sankara has given its definition and has shown how it is possible and conceivable. Again he proceeds to show with the aid of further arguments acceptable to all, how the pramanas can establish it finally. With this desire he states—‘tam etam avidya khyam ... moksha parani’. Our vyavahara is three-fold: pramata (knower), pramana (means of knowing) and pranaya (object); this is the activity of the subject; b) Karta (doer), karma (act) and karya (object of activity). This is the activity of the doer or agent. And c) bhokta (enjoyer), bhoga (enjoying) and bhogya (object). This is the activity of the enjoyer. This three-fold activity is based on the aham adhyasa and the mamadhyasa. ‘Our activity is immediately related (puraskritya, purah saratvam) to this adhyasa. Adhyasa is an immediate or perceptual experience since it is ‘sakshi pramana siddha (established by the witnessing consciousness).

**Objection**: Now all the sastras deal with commands and prohibitions only. Why should Sankara say that moksha too is dealt with in them?
Reply: That there is an entity which does not involve commands and prohibitions is accepted by us. We say that there are texts dealing only with the svarupa (nature) of reality. Such are the texts on moksha. Hence moksha is separately mentioned.

Objection: How then are the pramanas and sastras to be accepted as ‘avidya vad vishayani’ (objects characterised by avidya)? What pramana will help us in declaring that the three-fold activity has avidya as its material cause? The avidya you have described so far may appear even in the case of the self. But this alone does not establish that it is possible or real. You have to show it with the aid of the pramanas. Moreover, the pramanas depend on the pramata (subject); and the subject is their ground. The subject cannot be one having avidya, for the pramanas are useless for such a subject. When the subject does not have avidya, you cannot attribute avidyatva to him or to the pramanas.

Or another line of argument may be advanced. The integration of the ahankara with the self is the work of avidyadhyasa. If this avidya is the material cause for the subject, you cannot establish the validity of the pramanas. How are the ‘pratyaksha adipramanas’ (perception and other valid means of knowledge) and sastras to be accepted as ‘avidya vadvishayani’? If there is ‘avidyavad vishayatva’ for these, the defects of the ground would creep into these and stain them. As such they will not have any validity.

Reply: If I do not treat the body as the I and the sense organs as mine, I cannot become a pramata (subject); and this would make the ‘pramana pravritti’ inconsistent
for me. This sentence of Sankara summarises the main doctrine; and this is elaborated in the following sentences.

That the three fold activity has adhyasa as its 'upadana' can be shown through 'arthapatti' (implication) and 'vyatireka' (negative) inference. There is a negative committance of the form: wherever there is found the absence of adhyasa, in all of them there is also found the absence of activity. This meaning is in Sankara's commentary and Padmapada now proceeds to explain it.

The 'aham abimana' (egocentric attitude) and the 'mamabhimana' (the mine-attitude) are absent in deep sleep; and we do not find pramatritva in the person having deep sleep. The word body does not convey the meaning of only the body, but of a living person having a head and limbs; for the mere body is not apprehended as the I. When we say 'manushyāham' (I am a man) or 'devo ham' (I am a god) we refer to ourselves as being individuals of a certain character having life and consciousness. And this is every one's experience. The three fold activity then cannot be established, for the body which is connected with our existence, or for the sense organs which are necessarily found in the body. It is attributed to the living body or to the conscious body of a person. Here alone we can find the 'dehabhimana' (aham) and the 'indriyadya bhimana' (mama). If the 'mamabhimana' were not to be confined to the sense organs and limbs only, even the servant would have to become necessary for my pramatritva.

Devadatta has the waking state and the dream state. He is the agent having as his 'karanas' (instruments, means)
the body, sense-organs and limbs; and these constitute the
‘aham mamadhyasa’ on whose basis there is the activity of
the subject in those two states. And this has arisen for
Devadatta because he has those states which are different
from sushupti. If there is a time or state that does not
make him appear as a subject, then that state is not diffe-
rent from sushupti. This is the inference establishing pram-
matritva etc. Earlier we have noticed perception establi-
shing the same.

Arthapatti too establishes it. The three-fold activity is
not possible in the absence of adhyasopadana, for when
adhyasa is absent we do not find activity, as eg. in sushupti.
This is arthapatti.

The ‘kartrikarana bhava’ (idea of agent) between the
body etc. and the subject is based on the relation between
the two. There is here no such relation as that between the
master and his servant. The former relation is ‘samanya
vyapati’ (ordinary concommitance), while the latter is ‘vyap-
paka vishesha’. While the former is present we are also
aware of the absence of the latter. Thus the knowledge
arising from these two is one of arthapatti which is the pra-
mana (means of knowledge) for establishing prammatritva.

Objection: But in both the relations it is the living
or conscious body (svattadhna vyavasthita manushya avay-
avi) that brings about the activity. Then how can you rej-
ect the second relation here? What is wanted in activity is
the ‘kartrikarana sambandha’ only and not their‘tadatmya’.
As such arthapatti here is not valid as stated.

Reply: Since the other relations are not valid here,
we have to accept only the tadatmya sambandha. Which
are we take of the following: 1) 'svasvamita sambandah (ownership), 2) 'viniyojya viniyojakata sambandhah (doing), 3) samyogah (conjunction), 4) samavayah (inheritance), 5) 'bhoktri bhogyata (enjoyer), 6) 'svakaramara-bhyatvam', 7) 'svendriyadhishtheyatvam', or any other.

1) The first is impossible because it does not make one a pramata (knower), as eg. the master in deep sleep is not a pramata for the servant; and there is no 'svatvvena sambandha' between them. The 'pramattritva' is 'pramakartritva' and this involves the sense organs which are not active in deep sleep. When the other karakas are not functioning, the 'pramakartritva' cannot function.

2) Objection: Then one might say that the body etc., function when there is the desire. Body etc. obey the desire, act in accordance with desire. And since this desire is absent in deep sleep, there is no pramattritva then. There is the relation between the self and the 'karya karana sanghata' (body, sense organs etc.) brought by desire or conscious willing. This mutual relation makes the body etc. act in accordance with the wishes of the self. When the mere desire brings this 'viniyojya viniyojakata sambandha', then the entire activity of 'kriya karaka phala', which is of the nature of pramattritva (knower-hood) etc. would belong to the self. It is not adhyasa that brings this activity. That this activity has its origins in such a relation is seen in cases like 'I have the desire to get up, and so I get up and also sit'. Experience alone is the pramana here.

But the servants also are seen to act in accordance with the desire of the master. Then there should be the activity on the part of the servant when the master has the desire.
And in the absence of the servant there may have to be the absence of pramatrtla.

This is a faulty objection since the desire of one is mediated by the activity of another body. The activity of the body etc. should have an immediate or direct relation with the body. We do not have such a relation between the master and his servant, for there is no ‘mukhyabhimana’ (feeling of priority) for the body of the servant.

Reply: If the relation is merely that of ‘icchanuvidhana yogyata’, we have it in deep sleep whence there ought to be an activity even then. If is is ‘icchanuvidyamanatva sambandhah’, this is absent in deep sleep and as such there can be pramatrtla. Nor can you say that this relation is seen to be the source of all activity; for when you accept the ‘svaparakasa’ of the samvit, you cannot speak like this. The samvit (consciousness) ‘manushyacham’ (I am a man) is our own immediate experience, and we do not reject it or contradict it. Here we do find that we have our ‘mukhyabhimana’ for the body. You cannot say that this is a guana (ancillary) expression, for it contradicts your experience.

Because of the contact with the upadhi, there arises the desire and this can’t be rejected. Even desire has its origin in adhyasa. Even desire is a ‘parinama visesha’ of adhyasa. How can such a change be predicated of the self which is beyond change or evolution? Antahkarana which is an evolute of adhyasa has the mutual interpenetration with the ahankarta whence desire is attributed to the self. This is a fact of experience also. I have the desire to get up and so I get up and sit. This getting up etc. is an activity
of the body which has an interpenetration through the ahankara with the self.

3, 4) One cannot also argue that the relation of 'samyoga' or 'samvaya' between the self and the not-self is the cause of all activity, for this relation is found even in deep sleep where there is no activity.

5, 6, 7) 'Bhoktribhogyata', 'svakarmarabhyatva', and 'svendriyahishtheyatva' - these relations presuppose their origin in 'bhogadhyasa (superimposition of enjoying); and they are also seen in the bodily activities of the servants etc.

**Objection**: But in the case of the servants, it is their body which mediates bhogyatva. Hence we have to say that the original relation is one of 'bhgoyatva' which does not require any such mediation.

**Reply**: If this relationship has the propriety (yogyata) to enjoy, it is present even in deep sleep.

**Objection**: It is not 'bhoga yogyatva' (propriety to enjoy), but 'bhoyamanatva', (enjoying) which too does not require any mediation.

**Reply**: This is impossible without a prior and different relation. If there is no prior relation of the body to the self, I cannot conceive of a bhoga sambandha for this body. Now the self is immediately present in all spaces and in all bodies. As such there ought to be the 'bhoga every where. Hence this relation is other than and posterior to the adhyasa relation.
Thus by the method of residues, we find arthapatti and anumana establishing that adhyasa is the original relation that is the cause of all activity. If you do not accept ‘avidyadhyasa’, you cannot speak of the ‘pramatritva’ for the self which is by native ‘asanga’ (non-relational) and ‘avikari’ (unchanging).

**Objection:** The self is present in all bodies and there is no difference on this count between the various bodies. Then, how can you say that there is the adhyasa niyama for the self only in this body? How can you speak of the living body of this person only as being the subject etc.?

**Reply:** The ‘avidyadhyasa’ is beginningless; and as such the distinctions between the selves too is beginningless. The subtle body which is the evolute of adhyasa is attached to such a self whence arises ‘pramatritvadi niyama’ for the self. The gross body too is the product of the same avidya. Now that which is begun by the subtle body is taken up by the gross body; or because of the close connection between the subtle and the gross bodies, the gross body acquires this ‘adhyasa niyama’.

**Objection:** But it is only the pramata that is the ground of activity. It is not adhyasa.

**Reply:** No. The ‘pramatritva’ itself is the result of ‘adhyasa’. Then the mere presence of the ‘pramatritva sakti’ is the cause in all ‘pramana pravritti (activity of the knower); yet this ‘sakti’ is the product of the play of avidya. As such we argue the avidya vad vishayatva for ramanas.
**Objection**: Ahankaara is said to be the product of adhyasa; and there is the ahankara with the self. This is the material cause giving rise to activity. But this is vitiated by the defect called avidya. Consequently the pramanas cannot have any validity. They cannot give rise to valid cognitions.

**Reply**: The knowledge of truth that is not sublated by any pramana — i.e. the knowledge that is given only by agama cannot be given by any one of the pramanas. The knowledge given by the pramanas may be contradicted by the knowledge of truth given by the agama; but in so far as it makes the activity and experience in the empirical world possible, such a ‘pramana jnana’ is not subject to sublation. They give the knowledge of the objects correctly within the empirical framework. The ‘apekshavishaya’ of these pramanas does not fall outside of the empirical world. By their own inherent power they give us the right cognition of the objects; and these ‘nirae-ksha pramanas’ do not get contradicted in the empirical framework. As such their validity and their ‘avidyavad vishayatva’ are not inconsistent.

Perception establishes the vyavaharangata (subsidiary to activity) of the pramanas; and that the pramatritvadivyavahara has its origins in adhyasa, is established by perception, inference and arthapatti. Thus we get at their validity (pramanyam) and at their ‘avidyavad vishayatvam’. This is vidhimukhopadarsita’ — ‘vidhi’ isthat which gives the knowledge that this is like this; it is a perceptual knowledge. And ‘vidhi mukha’ means that which takes
the aid of perception, inference etc. Hence the validity and the ‘avidya vad vishayatva’, proved by these pramanas cannot be rejected as being impossible.

Sabda (verbal testimony) may be unreal (mithya). But it is seen to give rise to an act in the form of putting an end to avidya. Sabda and other pramanas have the ‘arthakriya samarthya’ which is of the nature of dispelling avidya and of giving the apprehension or experience of Brahman. Because of this ability they have their validity and this is not inconsistent with their mithyatva. A pramana might have its basis in avidya, but it can become a means of dispelling that very avidya.

**Objection**: Then, the validity of sabda etc. is determined by their ‘arthakriya samarthya’. This would mean that they have a validity brought by something other than themselves.

**Reply**: Jnana has ‘svatah pramanya’. And we show that the pramanas have the ‘arthakriya samarthya’ only to dispel the doubts regarding their invalidity. This is not inconsistent with their ‘svatah pramaanya’ (self validity).

In Mimaansa there is the svatah pramaanya for jnana; and the ‘vishaya svarupa’ (artha tathatva) is attributed to knowledge, since, only knowledge gives the vishaya svarupa. Likewise only by apprehending the object can we determine the ‘artha kriya samarthya’. If this is not accepted by the Mimamsaka, then his jnana too would have paratah pramanya because it is dependent on ‘prakatya’ (jnatas) which is in the object.
Objection: Even the knowledge of Brahman is a false knowledge, for this knowledge arises from ‘ajnana’ which is its ‘upadana’. As such it cannot dispel avidya.

Reply: If by false knowledge is meant ‘svarupa’ mithyatva’ (or the falsify of the epistemic act), it is acceptable to us. In so far as jnana is vritti jnana even the akhandakara vritti’ (internally unified cognition) cannot claim to be ultimately real. We accept the ‘svarupa mithyatva of knowledge; and we reject ‘mithyatva for the object of knowledge. The vritti jnana may be false; but you cannot say that it cannot put an end to avidya. The dream cognitions are false; but the falsity of the objects of these cognitions is made known to us by the absence of the ‘arthakriyakaritva samarthya’ in them.

The vritti jnana may be false; but its object is not false since it has no sublation, since it remains uncontradicted. Brahma jnana does not have any ‘vishaya mithyatva’ since there is the ‘anupalabhya mana badha’.

Objection: But a counter inference too can be given, Brahman is mithya or false since it is comprehended by that knowledge which has ‘ajnana’ as its upadana. The world is false for the same reason. Likewise the silver is false because the cognition is false. Jnana-dhyasa presupposes ‘vishayadhyasa’. Of these two one cannot be false while the other is true.

Reply: The world is false because it is sublated or negated, not because it is comprehended by the knowledge whose ‘upadana’ is ajnana.
Objection: But when the cognition arises from the defect in the sense organ, then both the cognition and the object are false. And here the defect is adhyasa which alone is said to make one a pramata.

Reply: No. It is only an ‘agantuka dosha’ (adventitious defect) that can be a cause in declaring the falsity of the object; but if the defect is natural (naisargika) it cannot make the object false, since this ‘naisargika dosha’ is the very basis of all apprehension.

A defect is called a defect only if it comes after the ‘pramana karanas’ are there. Such a defect is ‘agantuka’, that which arises in the middle. It is not there prior to the pramata and his sense organs.

But a defect which is there as the very basis or source (karana) of the pramana, is not a defect like the ordinary defects. It is the cause of the ‘pramatritva’ and as such is ‘naisargika’ or natural.

Eg. ‘kaca’, ‘kamala’ etc. are ‘doshas’ and give rise to erroneous cognitions. But these very defects can become a basis for inferring the sins etc. committed by the percipient. In such a case we find that a defect can be a cause for establishing a valid knowledge. To the subject proper it is a defect; but to another it is a valid cause for a valid inference.

Now, avidya is a defect in so far as it prevents or obstructs the ‘avabhasa’ (manifestations) of Brahman. It is illumined by the ‘prakasa’ (light) of Brahman and it presents adistored appearance of that very Brahman. But the app-
earences it brings are ‘vyavahara yogya’. Since avidya presents a distorted appearance of Brahman and since it is the cause of such an appearance, avidya is said to be a ‘naisargika dosha’.

To show how only an ‘agantuka dosha’ is taken to be a defect, and how the ‘naisargika dosha’ is not considered to be a defect, Padmapada gives an illustration. The sorrow or unhappiness arising from hunger and thirst is always with us; or when there is the nausea brought by the digestive system, we have the ‘annapana nishpanda’. These cases are not considered by us to be cases of disease. But when there is a slight rise in the temperature, even though it is there only for a very short time; or when there is a slight cold and cough brought by phlegm—in these cases we have the thought that they are diseases. The first is a natural ailment and is therefore not called a disease. The second is a temporary ailment and is therefore called a disease. The same is the case with avidya which is a natural defect; while the ‘kacadi doshas’ being temporary ailments, are called defects.

**Objection:** But Sabara has declared that the mere presence of a defect would make both the cognition and the object false. For he declared—“Yasya ca dushtam karanam, yasra ca mithyati pratyayah, sa eva asamicinah pratyayo nanyah”.

**Reply:** This sentence was given by Sabara only with reference to the non-natural defects. For, the word defects (dosha) is normally and generally taken to mean only an agantuka dosha. It is only with this meaning that we have to interpret Sabara’s sentence.
Objection: The activity of the unwise might have its basis or origin in adhyasa; But such an origin cannot be ascribed to the activity of the wise.

Reply: It is to ward off such a contention that Sankara declared the non-difference in the activity of men and that of animals. This illustration shows that our activity originates in adhyasa. “During the activity of pramatritva etc the animals etc. show activity, inaction and indifference; and it is well known that they have the ‘aham abhimana’ (ego-centric attitude) in their ‘karya karana sanghata (causal complex) only. Now from the activity we infer adhyasa. In this inference, activity is shown as being that of the wise also. “Human beings have the same behaviour as that of the animals. By birth they are more rational than animals, and have the ability to understand the truths given by the sastras”. It is in such persons that we find the middle term (hetu) of the inference, viz, activity. The adhyasa has having the ‘hetu’ is inferred. “Even though they are more rational, they act like animals in so far as they have the ‘atmabhimana’ for their bodies”. Then the inference would be —

The activity of the wise is conditioned by adhyasa;

Because it has the nature of activity;

as, for example, the activity of animals.

The example is ‘sadhya vikala’ (unproven major). As such what is required is that even this illustration can establish the validity of adhyasa.
Vivaranam

Objection: "You argue that there is the 'ahamkar-anubandha' in the body etc., even for the animals. You speak of it as if it is thus known. How do you establish this for the animals?"

Reply: When there are two objects and when the difference between them is not cognised through perception or inference or agama, then by a process of elimination we get at adhyasa. It is only the wise minds that are skilled in inference and agama (revealed wisdom) that can arrive at the self as being distinct from the body. They alone are capable of arriving at it because they are also skilled in perceptual activity etc. If they can understand the self as being distinct from the body without the aid of perception, inference and agama, these pramanas would be rendered useless. In the absence of the pramana vicara (enquiry into the means of knowledge) no such distinction can be apprehended.

Objection: Even those who do not have the "anumanagama vicara" (enquiry into inferential and verbal knowledge) do have certain actions which presuppose an 'adri-shtartha' (invisible purpose) for their souls. These persons have the activities based upon a distinction between the body and the self. "Cowherds, women and others do not have any knowledge of the pramanas; and yet they do accept that they have an unchanging self which exists even after their death, and that this self is the enjoyer of the fruits of their actions". The distinction here is apprehended perceptually.

Reply: There is no such apprehension here, but only a faith engendered by the 'apta vacana' (words of the
wise). Their activity is based on what the elders said. If they have the knowledge of distinction arrived at perceptually, they would have apprehended the pratyagatman. Thus when they are asked ‘who has the relation with the other world?’, they reply that they do not know it definitely and that they heard of it in the world. Hence it has been wisely said ‘pasvadinan ca prasiddho aviveka purvakah pratyakshadi vyavaharah. That samanya darsanad vyutpat-timatam api purushanam pratyakshadi vyavaharas tat kalah samana iti’. Even the activity of the wise is similar to that of the animals during the time of that activity; and that time is the time where adhyasa is found. This much at best is common to the activity of the wise and of the animals.

Perception and other pramanas have the eye etc. as their means. The means are not devoid of a ground; and such a ground is the body. Thus for perception etc., the body is necessary.

**Objection:** Let adhyasa be the cause of activity. Yet just as in the case of ‘rajatadhyasa’ the silver is only an instrumental cause, likewise even for activity we may take adhyasa to be only an instrumental cause. The mere self is the material cause. By the mere self we mean the ‘anadhyasta atma bhava’ (idea of the non-superimposed self).

**Reply:** Sankara states- ‘Na tenanadhyasta atma bhavana asangasya avikarinās caitanyaika rasasy atmanah pramātrtivam upapadyate’. Here we are told that experience, alone makes out the ‘avidya vad vishayatva’ of the pramanas.
After teaching this Sankara has explained the similarity between the activity of the animals and that of men. In ‘rajatadhyasa’ the ground is only the object, and not the pramata who is the ground of natural activity. Even though it is a pramata that has this ‘rajatadyasa’, still it is the sole factor that determines the pramatritva. Even in the absence of this adhyasa we have activity. As such, the silver is the instrumental cause of the activity in rajatadhyasa. This does not hold good of the normal activity which has its ground in the pramata; and it is only the normal activity that determines the pramatritva (krower-ness) of a person. Further, in deep sleep we find that there is no activity of the mere self. And in deep sleep there is present the upadana (material cause) viz., avidya. Even if mithyajaana is not directly and completely the upadana, the upadana is that product of avidya which has interpenetration with the self.

Having established avidya as the basis of all our activity, Sankara proceeds to declare that the sastra in its turn, teaches something with reference to the self as apprehended generally. Here one may say that the activity ordained by the sastra is not based on adhyasa. To put an end to such a false belief, he declares that sastra too is ‘avidyavad vishaya’ when he said – ‘sastriye tu vyavahare yadyapi buddhipurvakari na viditva atmanah para loka sambandham adhikriyate’.

The sastra proclaims an adrishta (unseen) object as the goal to be realised through an act. There cannot be any activity regarding a sacrifice etc. One does not know how he will enjoy the consequences in the world to come. There should be the knowledge of the self’s relation to the other world. Otherwise no activity is possible. Taking
this contention as a convenient one, the Carvaka now raises an objection.

**Objection:** The injunction is a codana (instigation) and it commands that an act should be done for a specific end. The self that will have a relation with another body, cannot be had from the ‘phala codana’ - instigation caused by an idea of the result. Why does the ‘phala codana’ not involve or imply such a self? If this question is asked, you have to reply whether it is the ‘pasvadi phala codana’ (result of obtaining cattle as the instigator of the svarga-di phala codana’) that implies this self. It cannot be the former - One performs the ‘karinyadi’ rites and as a consequence may obtain animals even in this life. It cannot also be the latter. When we speak of svarga (heaven) as the end, you cannot prove that svarga is a different world. You can only say that it stands for happiness; and this does not make out the relation of the self to another body necessary or essential. Either way you cannot get at such a self.

The same result would follow even in ‘naiyyamika codana’ (instigation of an absolute law) and ‘naimittika codana’ (instigation under specific conditions). When the phala codana itself is unable to imply a distinct ‘bhokta’, these codanas are completely weak in implying it. Such ‘phala’ is directly experienced as ‘sukha-prapti, and ‘dukha nivritti’. The Bhatta cannot speak of the ‘phala’ for ‘naiyyamika codana’. Even the ‘prayascitta codana’ does not involve such a self since this act has a direct result here and now in so far as the defect is said to be removed. And it is possible to experience here itself the ‘dosha phala’ viz., sorrow.
When certain crimes are committed, one is said to be born in certain ways and forms. The result is the consequence of the present crime; and the consequence is only sorrow which can be undergone in this life itself.

Further, certain rites do not appear to give any visible results. Thus in ‘karinyadi’ rites, one ought to obtain them, and this is traced to some defect in the performance of the ancillary rites. The same explanation can be extended to all performances. And with the help of the ‘mantras’ and ‘oshadhis’ (medicines) we may develop this body so well that all the pleasures of ‘svarga’ can be experienced in this life.

Hence there is no use in having a knowledge which is said to give us the self as being different from the body.

Reply: The ‘devatadhikarana’ establishes the validity of mantra etc; and as such the Mimamsaka admits the ‘svargadiphala’ which is experienced or enjoyed by the body in a specific place and at a specific time. The specific place is ‘meruprishthadhi’. The specific time is after the bodily death. The specific body is the ‘taijasa’ one. It is on this basis that we have said that the ‘sastra vyavahara’ involves pramatritva etc—viz., the self which appears in adhyasa. Through an exhaustive enquiry into the ‘codana’. Sabara has come to accept a self which is distinct from the body. And only such a self would make possible the ‘upabhoga svargopalabdh’ (enjoyable heaven).

Objection: This is inconsistent with Sabara’s own other statements where he rejects the validity of mantra etc. Even without requiring the validity of mantra etc,
purely from codana he wants a self which should be different from the body. For, Sabara establishes the self only from codana because his purpose was only ‘karma nirnaya’. If the codana does not involve a self distinct from the body, it is futile to establish such a self. And Sabara’s purpose was the ‘nirnaya’ (determination) of only the ‘vidhivakyaartha’ (meaning of the injunction). As such he cannot establish a distinct self on the basis of the validity of the mantra etc.

**Reply:** Sabara’s work was the enquiry into the nature of the vidhis (injunctions). Even he has established such a self purely because the self is implied in the vidhivakyas.

**Objection:** If the self is implied by the vidhis, then there ought to be an aphorism on the self. This is anapekshita (not intended) and asutrita (not given in an aphorism).

**Reply:** There is an aphorism ‘Badarayanasya anapekshatvat’. This aphorism gives the need for establishing the self. And through the validity of mantra etc. it is also ‘parmparya sutrita’. The first aphorism is athato dharma jijnasa where we have the pratijna (declaration of the aim) that this system would enquire into the nature and meaning of the vidhis. Later in the ‘autpattika sutra’ is established the ‘apaursheyatva’ (revealed nature) of the Vedas which necessarily implied the validity ‘svatah pramanya’ of the Vedas. Since the Vedas include also the ‘mantra’ portion, their validity also is implicitly given in aphorisms. Thus even the ‘svarupa vakyas’ become self-valid.
And the atma vicara given by ‘Sabara is based on the validity of the existent object (bhuta artha); and it is not based on the codana samarthya.

**Objection**: How do you come to know this?

**Reply**: It is from Sabara’s own words—“Codana hi bhutam, bhavantam, bhavisyantam, suksmam, vyavahitam, viprakrishtam ity evam jatiyaka artham saknoty avagamayitum”. Codana gives us a knowledge of all these. But codana being an act, it cannot directly give the knowledge of these. Hence we ought to say that this ‘bodhakatva’ is through the ‘seshabhuta mantras’ etc. As such Sabara undertook the atmavicara on the basis of the validity of mantra etc.

**Objection**: According to you, the validity of the ‘svarupa nishtha vakyas’ (statements of facts) would be implied by the ‘autpattika sutra’. Their ‘pramanya’ too ought to have been discussed there by Jaimini.

**Reply**: Through Sabda we get the ‘svarupa avagama’ (apprehension of the nature). Is this svarupavagama valid in the case of the self which is ‘Codana sesha bhuta’? or in the case of an independent self? Is it ‘akhandartha’ or ‘samsrishtartha’? These questions cannot be touched by Jaimini and Sabara, even though Jaimini has implied the validity of the vedantic texts in that aphorism. Yet the purpose on hand was only the ‘vidhivakyartha nirupana’ (determining the import of injunctions) for Jaimini. These questions about the ‘svarupavagama’ are of no use here and hence they are left out in ‘dharmaijnasa’. 
You cannot argue that even though Jaimini is busy with the enquiry into Dharma he ought to discuss the nature of the self because it is implied by the Vidhivakyas. For, such an enquiry would be futile here.

**Objection:** How do you say that it is futile here, since Dharma too requires a self which ought to be distinct from the body.

**Reply:** It is not mere dharma that requires such a self. It is only the ‘phala’ (result) which wants that self and Jaimini is not concerned with the ‘phala vicara’.

**Objection:** But there is ‘phalapeksha’ even for dharma. ‘Dharmopadesa’ cannot be ‘nishphala’ (useless), and the phala is inevitable at some time in the future. Such a phala is impossible in the absence of a distinct self. As such an enquiry into the nature of the self is necessary.

**Reply:** Since this has been done in Uttara Mimamsa by Badarayana, it was not undertaken by Jaimini.

**Objection:** But Badarayana’s enquiry refers only to Brahman and not to the ‘cudanaphala’.

**Reply:** Jaimini’s enquiry establishes svarga which is enjoyed by another body. This ‘svarga bhoga’ necessitates an enjoyer who should be different from the ‘Karya-karana sanghata’ (gross body).

**Objection:** Since we are able to establish the self through the ‘vakya paryalocana’, it is not necessary for Badharayana to undertake this enquiry into the self.
Reply: Brahman or self is an existent and existing entity. That can be established only by a different pramāna. Mere vakya cannot establish it or its nature.

Objection: If such a distinct self is ‘pramanantara yogya’ (to be established by another means of knowledge), it means that no pramana can establish it. Then why can’t you take the body alone to be the self?

Reply: ‘Pramanantara yogyatva’ only means that a pramana like sabda can give an erroneous cognition. The self is the object of experience and experience alone can finally establish it. On the other hand an unreal or an inconsistent object may be given by sabda as in ‘Silah pala-vanti’ (the rocks are flowing) which lacks validity. Because of this possibility of ‘apramanya’, Badarayana had to undertake a separate enquiry to have the ‘virodha parihara phala’, result by resolving contradictions.

Objection: Then even without the ‘virodha parihara’, there can be established the validity (pramananya).

Reply: Even if the self as distinct from the body is absent, then too we hear of the validity of the phalacodanas. Then will arise the ‘paramarsa sanka’ (doubt) about the validity. There is the ‘pramanaya’ of the existant objects like svarga. And when this validity is found, you cannot establish the validity for the ‘phaladi codanas’ in the absence of a distinct self which excludes the body. As such Sankara says—“Sastriye tu vyavahare..... adhikriyate”.

Objection: In the Devatadhikarana both Jaimini and Sabara have explicitly stated that there is no ‘mantradi
pramanya' as far as the devatas are concerned. Then how can you accept that validity which is only implied elsewhere?

Reply: In that adhikarana (topic) the aim is a different one. If the devata has a form like ourselves it ought to be bodily present at the sacrifice when it is invoked. If it is not apprehended as being present, there will arise 'karmanusthana lopa' (lapse in the performance of the rite). To ward off such undesirable consequences there we are given to understand that the devata has no shape etc. The adhikarana does not make out any 'apramanya' for the devatas. Moreover, the non-vidhis, like the 'arthavada lingas' (laudatory statements) too are quoted in the 12 chapters of Jaimini as being texts having a 'pramanya'.

It is only such a self which is distinct from the body that is required in the 'sastriya vyavahara' outlined by Purva mimamsa. So Sankara says — "Tathapi na vedanta vedyam..." Here we have (i) 'kartranvaya' (syntactical relation with the doer) — of the form — 'mayedam anustheyam' (this is to be performed by me); ii) 'adhikaranvaya' (relation with the proper agent) of the form—'madabhbilashita sadhanam idam (this is the means of realising my desire); and (iii) 'bhojokranvaya' (relation with the enjoyer) of the form—'mamayam niyogah' (this is my duty). These three are rejected or negated in the real nature of the self. The self is an 'asamsarin', has nothing to do with 'adhikara', and is not a 'bhojka'.

"The 'Sastriya vayavahara' does not require the 'asamsaryatmatvam' as its 'adhikarin' (proper subject), because such a self is useless here and is also not an 'adhikari'. By 'asanayadyatitam', is meant that 'atma tattva' which is free
from the wheel of life. Hunger and thirst overtake the living and cause them unhappiness and restlessness; and when they are quenched they feel happy. But the self is eternally free from these. It is free from all differences of caste etc. Prior to the having of such vijnana or self-knowledge, whatsoever activity is ordained for us by the sastra, that activity would render that sastra to be ‘avidyavad vishayatva’ only. The activity ordained by the sastra is based on the conception of the I which is the product of avidya. Prior to the realization of the meaning of sentences like ‘Tattvamasi’ (that thou art), all the activity that is ordained by sastra, is only of the nature of avidya. It does not cease to have such a nature.

Objection: How can the knowledge of the self as that which is distinct from the body, coexist with adhyasa?

Reply: The knowledge is a mediate one while adhyasa is immediate. An immediacy can be sublated only by another immediacy. Some others explain the doubt by pointing to the coexistence of the knowledge of one moon with the cognition of two moons.

Others would argue this: The subtle body is the product of atma avidya. Now the product is different from and is also identical with the cause. Such a subtle body is always seen to have a samsarga with the gross body, like the fire in the ball of iron. Thus here we find that the gross body is different from and yet is identical with its cause. This explanation may be taken up.

In any way it is only immediacy that can put an end to adhyasa. Hence Sankara has declared that the pramanas and the sastra are of the nature of avidya.

Here ends the Pramana Bhasya.
It is not only perception, inference and implication that establish adhyasa; but there is also agama (scriptural testimony). The agama provides injunctions for the adhirkarin, whom it explicitly called Brahmana etc. and whom it describes in terms of his age, asrama etc. In so doing it accepts the ‘cetanacetan adhyasa’ as the basis of the activity it ordains. In ‘Brahmano yajeta’ (that Brahmana is to perform the sacrifice) we have the ‘anatmadhyasa’ on the self. ‘Ashta varsham brahmanam upanayita’ involves ‘varnadhyasa’ (superimposition of caste) and ‘vayo’ dhyasa’. Likewise there are injunctions involving the adhyasas of asrama, avastha (state), jivana (profession) and the like.

Thus having shown the ‘sadbhava’ (posibility), definition, and ‘pramana’ of adhyasa, Sankara recalls the definition in the words — ‘at asmins tad buddhih’. What is the ‘Yushmad artha’? and in what ‘ayushmad artha’ is there adhyasa? In presenting this wisely and rationally Sankara states that the ‘Yushmadartha’ is the atadartha’ the not-that which is adhyasta on consciousness which is the not-this. The apprehension of the not-this as this is called adhyasa. Here we have the Yushmad arthavabhasa’ which we take to be the ‘asmad arthava bhasa’. This is the ‘itaretar adhyasa’ (super-imposition of one on another.)

This is illustrated next.

The order in which these adhyasas are stated and explained in Panchapadika have a peculiar order. There we have to note that the proceeding adhyasa presupposes the succeeding one as its base. Finally the ultimate ground is said to be the self. This self is said to be the integration
self is said to be the integration of the self and the not-self into one single unity, and it is not the pure ‘aham pratyaya’.

Objection: Is the body also ‘adhyasta’, and is it not the adhyasa of the dharmas?

Reply: Even the dharmin too is adhyasta. Since the dhar as have no inherent relation to the body, it is not the mere body that is adhyasta. As such the word ‘dharma’ too is employed by Sankara.

The sastriya vyavahara does not take the mere body into consideration, but the dharmas that belong to it. Hence the dharmadhyaasa (superimposition of quality) is more important here than the ‘dharmyadhyasa’. (superimposition of the qualified.

Objection: In ‘aham dandi’ (I have a stick) we find a conjunctive relation. Likewise in ‘aham kami’ (I am in love) too we have the same relation. Thus kama and other dharmas of the antahkarana, which are apprehended as having this relation, cannot be adhyasta.

Reply: No. The antahkarana is that aspect of the ‘aham pratyayin’ called the ‘vijnana sakti’. Its properties are kama and the like. When the antahkarana is adhyasta, these properties cannot escape. These properties are present when the antahkarana is present; and they are absent when it is absent, as in deep sleep. This agreement and difference shows that as the properties of antahkarana they are adhyasta.

42)
Objection: But these are the properties of the self. They are active through the antahkarana which is its karana. As such they are present or absent when their karana is present or absent.

Reply: No. That which is 'karya' (caused) is dependent on its cause (karana); and there is no rule that the effect is dependent on the cause. Instead of assuming a 'karana', it is easier and better to assume an 'upadana'. Moreover there are 'karanas' like the eye etc., and these do not allow us to accept the antahkarana as their karana (instruments) but as their upadana (material cause).

Objection: But in 'aham kami' which is a direct experience, we do find the self to be the upadana.

Reply: If the relation between the 'aham' (I) and the danda (stick) exists also between the 'aham' and 'kama' (love), and if the 'aham' is said to be the upadana, then there ought to be the relation of 'tadatmya'. As such we ought to say 'aham kamah' (I am love). Hence reasoning and inference through agreement and difference compel us to treat the 'antahkarana' as the 'upadana' for 'kama' and other 'dharman'. 'Antahkarana' means 'ahamkara', the 'aham pratyayin'. Because it has the 'pratyayas' called 'kama' etc., it is called 'pratyayin'. This antahkarana is 'adhyaya' on the 'pratyagatman' who is 'asesha svapracaran sakshin' (all prevasive witnessing consciousness).

The self is the sakshin for the 'ahamkara granthi which is the source of the wheel of life, and which evolves itself into 'kama, samkalpa, kartritva' etc. The sakshin is non-relational (asangi) and 'avakari'; and it is 'hanopa-
dāna sunyah' (devoid of receiving or giving). It illumes the antahkarana without being mediated by any.

**Objection**: How then does the all-pervasive self become as if it were internal?

**Reply**: Consciousness is spread in the body. And at the time of citta samadhana (reflection etc) we feel as if it is inwards.

**Objection**: Antahkarana cannot be ‘sakshivedya’ (known by the witness-consciousness). Now the self, sense organs and the object are present together; there does not arise the knowledge of the object. The presence of a fourth term is required for knowledge. Thus that which makes knowledge possible, when these three are present, is the antahkarana or jnana (mind). Thus the mind is known through arthapatti.

**Reply**: No, we can arrive at the mind in a different way. Instead of assuming an entity called the mind having the ability to give knowledge, it is better to ascribe this ability to the self.

**Objection**: Then we can establish the mind inferentially thus; when all the objects are in the proximity of the self there arises the ‘kramakarya’ or knowledge through the objects, sense organs etc; and this requires the common or ‘sadharana’ cause for the agent. When many objects are in the proximity of the agent there arises only the knowledge of the object.

When many objects are present before Devadatta he is able to cut a piece of wood only when he has an axe.
**Reply:** This involves the fallacy of anaikantikata. The mind functions by having a ‘samyoga’ with the sense organ concerned. This samyoga is present in the activity of the sense organ; and the krama here does not stand in need of any other cause. When the mind has ‘kramena samyoga’ (gradual conjunction) with the sense organ, we do not notice any other necessary cause. You cannot say that there is a necessary cause in the form of ‘adrishta’; for when the fruit is falling from the tree, the fruit has a samyoga with the ‘akasadesa’, and there is no adrishta karana in the ‘krama’. You cannot say that in the case of the fruit its heaviness is the necessary cause; for, when the eye has the contact with the object, there is krama (gradual order) present. Adrishta karana is not to be had there; and a necessary cause is never an ‘adrishta karana’ in such cases.

**Objection:** A better inference can be given thus—knowledge is ‘the visesha guna that arises in the object, when there is the ‘dravyantara samyoga’. This ‘samyoga’ of another substance, without having any inherent relation, is the cause required.

For, the knowledge that has arisen comes from a real (nitya) substance.

The redness in the atom arises when the atom has the samyoga with fire. This fire is the mind, the atom is the object, and the redness is the cognition or knowledge. Hence the ‘dravyantara’ which has the samyoga with the object is the mind.

**Reply:** When the self has the samyoga with the body and sense organs, we have that non-inhering cause
Vivaranam

which gives knowledge. Thus arises the fallacy of establishing that which is already known or established (siddha sadhanata). You cannot establish the mind from an examination of dream cognitions; for even in dreams there is the samyoga with the body which can fulfil the same function.

Nor can you establish the mind perceptually. If it is a perceptual entity, it ought to have ‘anu parimana’ (atomic magnitude); and then like the atom it cannot be cognised by any one of the sense organs. If it has ‘ananta parimana’ (infinite magnitude), the whole world should have to be cognised at the same time in a moment. Even if it has ‘madhyama parimana’ (medium magnitude) it cannot be cognised by the sense organs; for when all the sense organs are absent in the dream state, we do find that the mind is present.

We cannot say that there is no ‘pratiti’ or awareness of the mind: for we have the experiences like ‘mam mano nyatra gatam’ (my mind is elsewhere). Thus by the method of residues we have to accept the ‘sakshivedyatva’ for the mind. And that there is such a mind is established only by agama, and not by inference and arthapatti.

Objection: That there is the superimposition for the self in the antahkarana etc. has been shown. This is impossible. The itaretaradhyasa’ means that the self is superimposed on the antahkarana, and that the antahkarana on the self. If both are superimposed, both will have to be mithya (illusory). If both are the grounds, one cannot appear as the other. If the ‘this’ is superimposed on the self, the self like the mother of pearl should not have any illumination (prakasa). But here you admit that
there is the illumination of consciousness in ahankara. If there is the superimposition for consciousness in ahankara etc., then the world ought not to be revealed as having its basis in ahankara.

**Reply:** In every case of superimposition (adhyasa) one object has the ‘samanyavabhasa’ (general appearance) while the other has the ‘viseshavabhasa’ (specific appearance). Here we have the conscious and the unconscious entities. The ‘viseshavabhasa’ of these two makes us understand that there is the ‘itaretaradhyasa’ of these two; for in superimposition it is only the specific appearance that is superimposed. But both cannot be false. The conscious entity cannot have any svarupadhyasa in the unconscious, for then the latter would no longer be the unconscious. So consciousness is a case of adhyasa in so far as it is fused (samsrishta) with the other. The samsargama (conjunction) proper alone is a case of adhyasa here.

Even though there is the viseshavabhasa, it can be the ground since the visesha is not apprehended as the ‘adhish-thana dharma’, (property of the locus), but as the property of another ground. Hence to reject the conclusions raised by the objector, Sankara based his argument on experience—"Tam ca pratyagatmanam... antahkaranadish vadhyasyati"

**Objection:** When both the ‘cit’ and the ‘jada’ are appearing as the general and particular (samanya viseshat-mana), there cannot be any adhyasa. On the other hand there is only Samanadhikaranya (apposition) whence the expressions like ‘aham kami (I am in love)’are gauna (metaphorical) expressions.
Reply: No. Our experience tells us that it is not a gauna expression. Our experience does not show that there is a 'prthag avabhasa' (separate appearance) of these two entities.

Objection: In 'antahkaranadishu' we find the word 'adi' extending the scope of adhyasa. This is impossible an The antahkarana is superimposed on pure pratyagatm, and this antahkarana is the product of caitanyaadhyasa. In all other cases, they are adhyasta on the antahkarana Thus did Sankara say in the beginning— 'tad viparyayena vishayinas tad dharmanam ca... yuktam'. There are no dhar- mas of consciousness that can be superimposed on something else.

Reply: For the caitanyaadhyasa we have antahkarana as the upadhi. Yet consciousness alone is revealed as 'vishayavacchhina' (conditioned by objects); and the antahkarana is the conditioning medium of consciousness. Thus when Sankara speaks of antahkarana in the passage referred to has be the 'pratibhasa' (momentary appearance) in his mind. Where the antahkarana with the body etc is adhyasta, it is not as the mere mind but as the conscious mind. In so obtaining an adhyasa, the mind makes the body become a subject, agent etc., and it remains concealed and unfound. It is only the (cidrupa' (form of consciousness) that is found everywhere in all adhyasa. When the body appears as the subject, there is no samanadhikaranya, for the body makes the self become the subject etc. In all the adhyasas of the body etc., it is only the mind that is unique in conditioning consciousness. Sometimes for the consciousness the 'upadhi is required, and at other times the upadhi is not required.
Objection: Even though ahankara is the other, is external to consciousness, there is the appearance of consciousness in ahankara (caitanya vat sambandha), it is contrary to experience to say that there is no pratibhasa for the mind in the body etc.

Reply: It is impossible for the atheist to maintain the 'atmatva bhrama' in the body; and he cannot hold the 'pratibhasa' of the mind in the body. Those who imagine that the 'cidrupa' is the immanent continuant (anusyuta) in the intellect etc., are only trying to establish the ahankar-ritva' in the intellect, etc.; are only trying to establish the ahankarritva" in the intellect, mind, sense organs, or body. That which they accept they consider to be consious. In 'aham manushyah' etc. consciousness is attributed to the body etc. This is possible because of a false identification of the body etc with the ahankara granthi. It is only the apprehension of mere consciousness that makes possible the 'atmatva vibhrama' in all entitles, like the body etc.,

For the atheist, however, the aham (I) as the body stands for consciousness. In such a case, consciousness is adhyasta on the mind; and this specific consciousness is adhyasta on the body. Then this specific consciousness being now consciousness, there cannot arise any atmatva-bhrama. Ahankara being non-different from consciousness the mind would have to be the self; and we ought to have such an apprehension.

All except the Samkhya argue that the self has the the power (sakti) whereby it becomes the doer and the enjoyer, and adhyasa is said to be the cause of only the activity for such a self. Mithyajnana gives rise to love,
hatred etc., and thus is the cause of activity. But the activity of the self conceived as being the agent and the enjoyer, is the cause of all evil (anartha). As such we cannot say that the mithyajnana is the cause for the activity of such a self. This adhyasa is a fact of common experience.

Thus by implication we arrive at the subject matter and purpose from the first aphorism. To establish these two, Sankara has shown that the ‘abraham svarupatva’ of the self is of the nature of adhyasa. Destroying the cause of such an ‘anartha’ is the purpose.

**Objection**: What is wanted is the destruction of ‘anartha’, and not its cause.

**Reply**: It is only when the cause that brings it is destroyed, there is total or complete elimination or destruction of “anartha”.

**Objection**: This adhyasa is said to be beginningless. If so, how can it be destroyed?

**Reply**: That it is destroyed we have the ‘Sastra-pramanya’ (scriptural testimony).

**Objection**: ‘But it is contrary to experience. Even though the ‘aham pratyaya’ (I-principle) is distinct from ‘manushyatva’ (being human) etc., still the ‘manushyatvady adhyasa’ is beginningless. As such it cannot be dispelled.

**Reply**: It is not ‘anaditva’ or beginninglessness that is the cause of the destruction or non-destruction of the
adhyasa. On the other hand, the cause is the proximity or otherwise of that which contradicts it. That knowledge which arises from the apprehension of 'brahma svarupa' given by sentences like 'tattvam asi' - such a knowledge alone can dispel adhyasa.

We see in the world that the beginningless 'pragabhava' (prior non-existence) is destroyed when an object comes into existence. The Buddhists admit that the beginningless vasana santanas (series of impressions) are destroyed by the four-fold 'tattva bhavana'. The Naiyayikas admit that there is dispelled the beginningless flow of mithya-jnana, and that even the blackness of the atom is dispelled. The Samkhyas recognise that the beginningless non-h discrimination is destroyed by discrimination. The Mimamsakas say that the beginningless 'pragabhava' of the 'dharma tattva jnana' too is destroyed.

**Objection**: In all these cases, the beginningless 'abhava' (non-existence) is only a negative entity. But your adhyasa is a positive entity like the self. As such it can not be destroyed.

**Reply**: But this ajnana (nescience) is of the nature of ineptic ability. Hence even though it is beginningless it can be dispelled by jnana. There is a specific necessary relation of contradiction between ajnana and jnana, wherein jnana is the stronger.

**Objection**: The destruction of the pot means that it remains not in the form of clay, but that it remains in its 'kapalady avastha', (in the state of potsherds). It remains in its causal form. The kapala avastha' is its 'karana samavayiny' (inheres in its causal state). But ajnana is un-
caused and it cannot have such a 'karana samavayin uttaravastha' (posterior to the causal inherence). Hence it cannot be destroyed.

**Reply:** If destruction means that the object goes to the state immediately succeeding its upadana karana; then the qualification-viz. 'samavayikarana' (inhering cause) is useless. As such one has to admit that 'Brahma svarupabhyakti' (manifestation of Brahman) is the same as 'avidya nivritti'. Further if the qualification 'samavayikarana' is retained then there cannot be the dispelling or destruction of the blackness of the atom and of the 'pragabhava' (prior non-existence) as well.

**Objection:** Ajnana is different from abhava, like the self. Hence it can be dispelled.

**Reply:** A counter inference can be given: Ajnana is different from 'sat'. like the 'pragabhava'. Hence it can be dispelled.

**Objection:** Which is the better inference of the two?

**Reply:** The second inference is the better since it brings out plainly how jnana sublates or contradicts ajnana.

**Objection:** Then, even when we know that the self is different from the body, the adhyasa does not seem to disappear.

**Reply:** Adhyasa disappears not because there is the knowledge of distinction, but because there is the apprehension of Brahman arising from the knowledge of Brahman conveyed by the Mahavakyas (conclusive scriptural statements).
Objection: There is the knowledge of the self as being distinct from the body. There is the apprehension of Brahman or the knowledge of Brahman. How do you say that only the later brings about the sublation of adhyasa?

Reply: Ajnana that has concealed Brahma rupa of consciousness and thus brought about the apparently finite self, is the beginningless avidya; and it is the cause of the 'ahankaradi vikshepa' (diffusion of the ego etc.) Now Brahma Jnana reveals Brahman while destroying this avidya. It is not the absence of the knowledge of the distinction between the self and the body, that is the cause of samsara. But the real cause is the non-apprehension of Brahman. That this is the cause we have shown through sruthi and through arthapatti. As such ajnana (or avidya) is dispelled by 'tattva jnana' (knowledge of the real).

Objection: Jnana can dispel only ajnana. How can it dispel adhyasa?

Reply: Ajnana is the cause and its product is the adhyasa which makes the self appear as the agent, subject etc. Now, when the cause is destroyed, the cause disappears along with its products or effects.

Objection: Now the 'aham pratyaya' also is essentially of the nature of Brahman. How is it that does not dispel ajnana?

Reply: Because it does not appear, or it does not manifest itself, as having the nature of Brahman. The 'ahampratyaya' is beginningless and coexists only with the beginningless 'karyakarana'. Here we do not find any
relation of contradiction between the ‘aham pratyaya’ and the body etc., As such mere svarupa vivcka (knowledge of discrimination) cannot put an end to adhyasa.

**Objection**: Adhyasa may not be dispelled by the knowledge that the self is different from the body etc. Yet there arises a knowledge from the enquiry and this knowledge, which is adventitious (agantuka), may be taken to put an end to adhyasa.

**Reply**: If the jananantara arising from the enquiry is inferential, it is a mediate knowledge and hence is of no use here. If enquiry means only logical reasoning (tarka), it is no longer a ‘pramana jnana’.

**Prayojana Bhashya**:

**Objection**: The purpose of the sastra is not the dispelling of the evil (anartha); but it is the realization of the incomparable Brahmananda. Brahman is spoken of in the srutis as being ‘niratisayanandam’ (absolute beatitude). And Brahma vidya is the means of realising Brahman. This meaning is gathered from passages like – “sa yo ha vai tat paraman brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’. Hence the purpose ought to be declared as the realization of ‘niratisaya sukha’.

**Reply**: It is true that it is said that the realization of this is the fruit of Brahma vidya which arises from the sastra. In the same way, it is also said that the dispelling of evil too is the fruit of the same. We have passages like ‘tarati sokam atma vit’, and ‘Jushtam yada pasyauty anisam asya mahimanam eti, vita sokam it’. Here we hear of the destruction of the very origin or source of evil. Can’t this be a ‘prayojana (purpose)’?
Objection: Then the complete or entire 'phala' should be mentioned, not only a part of it. Since both these results are termed in the sruti and since both are desired by us, let both be the prayojanas.

Reply: The realization of bliss is implied in the subject matter; and when we say that 'brahmatmaikatva' is the subject matter, we imply the realization of bliss. Now the 'prayojana' can be only that which is desired; and what is desired here is 'anartha hetu nivritti' (cessation of the cause of evil) which results when we realize the bliss called Brahman. Anandavapti is only 'artha siddha' and as such it does not merit a separate mentioning.

The Brahma svarupata prapti is of the nature of bliss and it is accepted as constituting the subject matter.

Objection: Let the subject matter be the identity of Brahmam and the self. But let the realization of bliss be stated as the 'prayojana',

Reply: No. The realization of bliss does not fall outside of realisation of identity of Brahmam and the self. If it falls outside, the realization of bliss can be stated separately. The 'Brahmatmata' itself is the 'ananda prapti'.

Objection: Even the 'avastha nivritti' can be taken, as subject matter of the sastra.

Reply: No. The avastha is dispelled along with its cause. This dispelling or destruction falls outside of the subject matter, viz 'Brahmatma rupa'. The subject matter is the identity of Brahman and the self, while the 'phala' arises from the realization of this identity.
Objection: Then the subject matter of the sastra itself—viz., Brahmatmaikatva,—this itself is 'anartha nivritti'. As such the destruction of evil need not be taken as the 'prayojana'.

Reply: But in 'tattvam asi' we do not find the 'anartha nivritti' as being the subject-matter.

Objection: This sentence might not give that meaning. But read along with others in that context, that meaning would come out. In all the vedantic passages, the nature of Brahman is spoken of as that of the self. In so doing the 'anartha' is presupposed to be overpowering the self. The plain meaning of the sentence refers to the realizing of something positive. Yet Brahman that is propounded is the Brahman who is free from 'anartha'. As such 'anartha' nivritti too is the subject—matter.

Reply: The sentence is not there to expound the nature or meaning of Brahman, but it is there only to expound the identity of the self with Brahman.

Objection: This is not so. "The text begins with 'sad eva somya' and ends with 'tat satyam sa 'atma'. Here we find that the passage rejects 'sa prapancatva' and proclaims the 'nishpraparcatva' of Brahman. This Brahman is the meaning of the word 'tat' in the sentence 'tattvam asi'. Since Brahman is transcendental, the passage first explains the meaning of Brahman; and then at the end it declares that such a Brahman is identical with the self.

Reply: The 'nishpraparcatva (non—transmigration) of Brahman is the subject matter. How can this subject matter be the same as the dispelling of the 'anartha' which is there for the self.
Objection: 'The 'tvam padartha' (thou) has the samsarga with such a 'tat padartha' (that) referred to. While rejecting such a samsarga, the passage declares that this is the 'anartha hetu', called agrahana (non-apprehension) and anyatha grahana (apprehending otherwise). To establish the identity, this sentence rejects the cause of 'anartha'.

Reply: Ultimately, the subject matter is the nish-prapancatva of Brahman. It is not the rejection of the pratibhasa of avidya, or of the products of avidya. From the apprehension or realization of 'nishprapanca brahmatmata' we derive by implication both the 'avidya nirasa' and the 'avidya karya nirasa'. Such an implied meaning or deduction cannot constitute the very subject-matter. For, if the 'avidya pratibhasa' and the 'avidya karya pratibhasa' were to be absent, then what is required is that which can put an end to this 'pratibhasa'. And this cannot be presented by the sastra. "If 'Brahmatmavagati and avidya nivratti are simultaneous, this simultaneity does not arise from the activity of the word. As such you cannot treat the 'avidya nivritti' separately as the subject matter'.

Objection: In the erroneous cognition we have the 'pratibhasa' of avidya and of its product, and this is negated later on. Yet the sentence 'this is silver' cannot be taken to refer to the non-existent silver. Likewise, the sentence like 'Tat tvam asi' might imply the 'nivritti' (cessation) of adhyasa which is the 'nishprapancatva'. Yet there are other sentences like 'asthulam ananu'; and in these we find 'saprapancatva' directly and they are actually predicated of Brahman.
Reply: That the world is adhyasta on Brahman and that Brahman is related to the world—do we apprehend through perception? or through agama? it cannot be a perceptual knowledge since Brahman is not an object of perception.

Yet, one may say, there is the apprehension of the world which makes us hold that it is relating to Brahman. But any relation is a relation between two factors or terms. When one of the terms is not apprehended, the relation itself cannot be apprehended.

Objection: In the contexts that proclaim ‘nish-prapancatva’, we read passages like ‘Idam sarvam yad ayam atma’; and these sentences go to show that the world appears as being adhyasta on Brahman.

Reply: Yes, there is the mere appearance (pratibhasa). But such passages are not offered to those that speak of ‘nishprancatva’. That Brahman is the all-pervasive self we recognise when we find that therein is the power (samartha) of being the upadana dharama for everything. The prapancatva sambandha is obtained from the causal law; and texts like ‘Idam sarvam’ should not be construed as giving us the knowledge of this causal relation. Hence these texts are not opposed to the nishprapancatva vakyas. Further there are certain texts negating certain things in Brahman; and what these things are, we get from the text bearing on saprapancatva. Because of this ‘ekavakyata’ they cannot become badhaka (contradiction) for the nishprapancavakyas.
Further the saprapancavakyas make Brahman the upadana for everything; and this does not establish the ‘sarvatmabhava’ (omniscience) of Brahman. As such these texts are not able to declare the ‘sarvatmata’ of Brahan. They are only supplementary.

Texts like ‘Idam sarvam’, have ‘ekavakyata’ with the ‘nishedha vakyas (prohibitions). They cannot give an independent meaning. If they can independently convey a meaning, we would have the ‘saprapancatva’ (worldliness) for Brahman. This would be devoid of any purpose or value because only the ‘nishprapanca vakyas’ have a purpose. When ‘ekavakyta’ (unified import) is possible, it is a fallacy to split the passages; and when one is said to have a purpose or value, its contradictory cannot have any purpose or value.

The nishprapanca vakyas have a purpose or value. We do find that the purushartha of the conscious self in deep sleep is nishprapancata. Even the sruti corroborates this by saying ‘asabdam asparsam arupam avayayam nicayyatam nrutayamukhat pramucyate’. Moreover, we do find that ‘saprapancata’ for the conscious self is the cause of evil; we do not also hear of any purpose for it. Hence we should read these texts along with the negative ones as constituting ‘ekavakyata’, so that they are not ‘nirarthaka’ (meaningless).

**Objection**: The prapancavakyas may not be capable of giving us the cognition or knowledge. But they do have the ‘tat pratiti janakatva’. The former is their anuvadakatva, while the latter is the pramiti. The later being the stronger, it can be a badhaka for the former.
Reply: But in so far as it is a 'badhaka', it is its own badhaka, It negates itself.

Objection: Though there is no prapancatva, it is first propounded, and now you say that it is negated or rejected. This is a useless procedure. For, instead of getting into the mind and then washing the fact, it is better to be away from the mind.

Reply: Only by arguing out that there must be an upadana for the whole universe, we are able to arrive at Brahman. This Brahman constitutes the 'advitiya purusharthā' (supreme end of life). To establish it we have made the anuvada of the prapancatva; and then we negate it.

Objection: But the 'sarvopadanatva' itself implies the 'saprapancata pramiti'.

Reply: No. Saprapancatva is arrived at through the ability of srutarthapatti (verbal implication) and this stands negated by the immediate utterances of the sruti. Sruti is stronger than arthapatti.

Objection: Then we do not arrive at the saprapancata through the concept of sarvopadanata.

Reply: It is not so. Till the negation comes, the erroneons silver has its 'pratibhasa'. Likesise there would continue the appearance of 'saprapancata' (externality) derived from the 'sarvopadanatva samarthya', till its negation is realized. For, an immediate apprehension can be negated only by another immediate 'apprehension; it is not the unapprehended, nor is it the 'pramiti' that can be negated.
In the upasana portions Brahman is referred to in ‘saprapancatva vakyas’. But Brahman should not be understood or apprehended as being of the nature of ‘saprapancatva’. Between those passages that speak of ‘nishprapancatva’ and those that refer to ‘saprapancatva’, the latter are the weaker. And the vakyas referred to are in the context of upasana, whence they cannot contradict the negative sentences. For the upasana vakyas refer only to the aropita rupa. And the Brahman spoken of by the upasana need not be real. Moreover this Brahman may be taken to be the ‘aropita rupa’ of the real Brahman. The ‘sruti vakyas’ (statements of creation) are intended only to establish the realization of the advitiya Brahman, because they are ‘nishchedhyata para vakyas’. They are to be construed in harmony with the purport of the negative passages.

Hence the ‘nishprapancatva brahmatva pramiti’ cannot have any contradiction from the verbal or empirical cognition.

**Objection**: The identity of the Brahman and the self is the meaning of the mahavakyas. In the cognition of the meaning of the sentences the object cognised is this identity. As such the self becomes the object. Otherwise the identity cannot be apprehended as an object. But we cannot have the self as the object since the identity of the self who is a samsarin (relational) with Brahman who is asamsrarin (non-relational) is an impossibility. Then, how can there be the cognition of the ‘nishprapancatva vakyarth’?

**Reply**: Does it mean that it is impossible for the object referred to by the ‘tvam pada’ (Thou) to be identical with Brahman? Or does it mean that there is the impo-
ssibility for the 'tvam pada vacya' to be thus identical? It cannot be the former since 'samsaritva' (being in bondage etc., cannot be predicated of the 'tvam pada lakshya (indicated by thou). We do accept the latter.

Now, the self is spoken of as being the agent etc. (1) Is kartritva etc., inferentially apprehended? (2) or perceptually cognised? (3) or apprehended through any other pramana? (1) Kartritva (being a doer) etc. is not inferentially cognised since it is directly, perceptually apprehended. (2) The pratyagatman is not an object that can be directly cognised by the external sense organs; as such there can be no 'bahyendriya pratyakshatva'. If it is said that the kartritva etc. is cognised through 'manasa pratyaksha' (mental cognition), what is the pramana?

Objection: We have the agreement and difference—when the mind is present, the self is taken to be in bondage. When it is absent in deep sleep, this bondage is not cognised (anupalabdhi).

Reply: No This bondage can be established otherwise better. That the self is the cause of the existence of the 'kartritvadi prapanca' can be established by agreement and difference. It is only the 'sattakarna' because there is no kartritva in its absence. Moreover, in deep sleep there is the 'anavabhāsa' (non-appearance) for the kartritva etc. Is this due to the absence of the mind then, or is it because kartritva etc., itself is absent.

Objection: If something is to be apprehended, the karana (means) is necessary; and the karana is absent in deep sleep.
Reply: No. For, any 'pratibhaa' is due to the immediate illumination of atmacaitanya, and not due to any karana.

Objection: The Buddhists and the Prabhakara argue that the 'Kartritva', 'bhoktritva', love, hatred, happiness, sorrow etc., are there in the self as self-luminous or self-revealing (svayam prakasah).

Reply: Are they separate substances along with the self? If so, you should admit that there are many substances having 'svapракasa'. It is better to admit only the 'sva prakasatva' (self-luminosity) of the self whence others are revealed. Nor can they be treated as the qualities of the self, for, if they are 'sva prakasa', you would have to say that one prakasa guna (property of illumination) gives rise to other 'prakasa gunas'. And this is absurd. You cannot also say that they alone are the 'prakasa gunas'; for the 'prakasa guna' as in the case of the sun, does not come into existence in its own 'asrayopadhi' (ground).

You cannot also assume 'svapракasatva' (self-luminosity) for 'kartritva' etc. because their 'satta' involves it. For, they can have the 'prakasa' since they have the 'samsarga' with the eternal or real self.

(3) 'Kartritva (agent-hood) etc., cannot be cognised by any other pramana. There is no immediacy of the bondage for us; and even if there is, you need not assume any other pramana save the self. Otherwise it would come into conflict with the agama that teaches 'nishprapancata' (non-worldliness). Moreover, the passage 'Indro mayabhiih...' clearly shows that there is a 'mithya karana', viz. ajnana for the bondage etc.
Hence there is no pramana to show that there is the 'prapanca sambandha' for Brahman. It is apprehended only by the sakshin, because it is sakshi siddha. We cannot say that the world is ultimately real; for, even a false or unreal object is apprehended by the sakshin. Hence the nishprapanca brhmata pramithi cannot be contradicted or negatived by the 'saprapanca pramiti'.

The world then appears because it is of the nature of avidya. The 'pratibhasa' (momentary appearance) of avidya and its products has its ultimate meaning only in getting itself negaged by the immediate texts. The 'tattva bodha' (apprehension of the real) arises while it negates the avidya-ashyasa' and 'avidya karyadhyasa'. They do not come one after another, but simultaneous by.

**Objection:** If 'anartha nivrtitti' is not the subject matter, how can it be derived from the 'vishaya vagati samarthya' (ability from apprehending the object)?

**Reply:** (i) Do you mean 'anartha mirasa'? Or (ii) the 'anartha mirasa pratibhasa'?

(i) If you mean only 'anartha nirasa' (negation of evil), the explanation is as follows:

When an object is erroneously apprehended, you cannot determine its real nature without rejecting or sublating (nirasa) it. The sentence that 'this is sukti' conveys the real nature of the object only while it rejects the 'atad dharma' apprehended before. The prior apprehension is contradicted by the 'tattvabhasa' (apprehension of truth) and it is also of the nature of avidya being a product of avidya.
Consequently the negation of the prior apprehension is necessarily implied in the ‘tattvabhasa’.

**Objection:** Silver which is the object cognised previously, stands rejected by the cognition ‘this is not silver’. But here we have ‘aham brahmasmi (I am Brahman) which is only vastu svarupa nishta vijnana’ (knowledge determined by the object). It does not negate the world. It only tells something about Brahman or me, and nothing about the world. “How can there be the ‘viparyasa nirasa’ here, when we do not have any negation and any word that stands for the negated?

**Reply:** There are two jnanas that can contradict or negate a ‘viparyasa’ - (a) the positive knowledge of another entity which is real like the sukti and the self; and by the negative knowledge of any entity which is not really there, but is only adhyasta. It is the latter knowledge where we have the ‘adhyasa nirasa’ that negation should be explicitly expressed. No such thing is required in the former knowledge; for the knowledge of the object implicitly and necessarily implies the rejection of the other. And there is no need for an open rejection of the other.

The ‘saprapancata jnana’ is the bhava jnana (positive); and its ‘virodhi bhavantara jnana’ (contradictory knowledge) is the knowledge of identity. The latter puts an end to the adhyasa: for, it is itself capable of negating the former implicity.

**Objection:** Any activity can go to fulfil only that for which it is intended, that to which it refers. It cannot go to establish something else even by implication. No word can give two cognitions at the same time. As such we
should say that the ‘viparyasa nirasa’ (negation of the contradictory) alone can put an end to the saprapancata. You cannot bring in a ‘bhavantara vishaya’ (a different positive entity) as implying the rejection of adhyasa.

**Reply:** No. Take the balance. One of the pans is raised by the hand; and this automatically takes the other pan down. The activity of the hand is not directed to the lowering of the pan. And yet that act which raises one pan also brings down the other. The same is the relation between the knowledge of identity and the sublation of prapancatva. Here we have the ‘nantariyakata siddhi’.

**Objection:** Let the rejection or sublation (nirasa) of the silver and of the bondage arise simultaneously with (nantariyaka) the knowledge of the sukti and of the identity of the self with Brahman. But how do we know that there is this sublation? How can there be the apprehension of this sublation?

**Reply:** Even that too is ‘nantariyaka’. The self has the jnana vyapara with regard to that which it has otherwise apprehended. This jnana is brought about by the word that signifies the truth about it. As the sublation arises, so is the apprehension of truth. The cognitions are apprehended in the order Brahmaham, āham Brahma, (I am Brahma) and ‘naham karta, (I am not a doer) when the meaning is understood as ‘Brahman’; then the ‘nantariyaka sbodīha’ of the form – If I am Brahman, I am not a doer. The same procedure or explanation holds good of ‘nedam rajatam’ also.
Objection: Why can't the same sentence give two meanings?

Reply: No. For, ‘Iyam suktih, (this is the mother of pearl) is a complete sentence which does not have any further syntactical relation. This is therefore a more important sentence, while the negative sentence like ‘nedam rajatam’ (this is not silver) is only an ‘anuvada’. It is the anuvada (explanatory statement) in so far as it is ‘nantariyaka siddha’ from the knowledge of the affirmative sentence. That there is the ‘nantariya pratibhasa’ of an ‘arthantara jnana’ from an ‘arthantara jnana’ is generally accepted. The Mimamsaka admits that the verb is enough to ‘constitute a sentence; and from the kriyajnana (cognition of the verb) we are able to apprehend the sadhanas (means) required. Yet there are other words constituting the ‘itikartavyata’ (ancillary activities). They are employed so that other objects are not to be taken up. These other words are only anuvadakas. Thus they say that the injunction of ‘yajati’ (sacrifices) can and does give the substance, deity and act all in one. Others interpret yajna to mean the substance, deity and tyaga.

Since the verb expresses the act which is the meaning of the sentence, the verb is taken to constitute a sentence by itself. From the ‘kriya janana samarthya’ (cognition of the act) itself all the means implied by the act are apprehended; and we do apprehended that they have the relation with the verb. Then the words are intended only to exclude those that are not mentioned by them. Thus in spite of the apprehension of a unified meaning, these ‘anuvadaka’ (laudatory) words are aimed at excluding others; for any
verb can imply a manifold substances, peities etc., This is all the function of anuvada.

Through the srutarthapatti alone we can have the apprehension of 'arthantara' (different meaning).

**Objection:** But just like the verb we do apprehend the 'vacyatva' of the substance and the deity. How are these to be taken as the meaning of 'yajati' through anupapatti? Why can't we say that there is only 'yajaty abhidhyaatva' (primary meaning)?

**Reply:** A mere verb can convey only the meaning of that which it directly signifies. It can't give up its meaning and directly convey the others. We have to admit the 'nantariyakata siddhi' for the substance and deity.

**Objection:** The meaning of the sentence is the padartha referred to; while the sublation of the viparyasa (contradictory) is not arrived at from the meaning of the sentence since it is not the padartha. Then the apprehension of the sublation can be 'nantariyaka'. But where the negation is immediately conveyed, the affirmative knowledge is not directly conveyed by the sentence. In such a case you cannot admit the 'nantariyakata' for the knowledge of the sublation. In the present context of the self, we find that bondage is dispelled by immediacy (aparoksha jnana). Knowledge refers to both directly, and not to one alone. Hence you cannot speak of the 'nantariyakata siddhi' for the other.

**Reply:** In 'paroksha badha' (Indirect negation) we find that the knowledge of the ground is the cause of both
the sublation of error and the ‘nirasa pratibhasa’. The same holds good of ‘pratyaksha badha’ also (perceptual negation).

Take for example the ‘rajatabhava’ (absence of silver) It is not apprehended through ‘anupalabdhi’, for the silver is apprehended directly as the this. Nor does the cognition of ‘rajata bhava’ arise from the sense contact, for there can be no contact of the eye with an absent object. Both the silver and its absence are not capable of being cognised by the eye.

Thus the saprapancatva is ‘asabdm (non-verbal) and it is ‘avidya vilayam’. Hence Sankara separately and distinctly refers to it in ‘asyaanartha hetoh prahanaya...’.

**Objection:** If the purpose of Bhrama vidya is the sublation or rejection of the ‘anartha’, it is not the ‘vedant-tarambha phala’. The Vedanta refers only to Vidya and not to avidya. Then why should Sankara say— ‘asyanartha hetoh prahanaya sarve vedanta arabhyante’?

**Reply:** The dative in ‘prahanaya’ takes the ‘vidya samarthya siddhi’ into consideration. Only through vidya that the avidya is destroyed. It does not mean that the Vedantas are to be begun for the destruction of the cause of evil. It means that the Vedants brings about this result at the same time.

**Objection:** Then the purpose of Brahma vidya being only the vidya, the purpose of the sastra cannot be the sublation of evil.
Reply: Between 'sukha prapti' (realisation of bliss) and duhkha nivritti (cessation of sorrow) it is the latter that is desired by us. As such the meaning of the sastra would culminate in the 'anartha nivritti'.

Objection: Sankara says — 'vidya pratipattaye'. What is this 'pratipattaye'? When we have the knowledge of an object, the object is other than the knower; and so we may have to state separately that the object is to be obtained or possessed. But there is no such thing here. Vidya has its ground in the knower, and it arises by revealing the object to him.

Reply: The knowledge and the apprehension thereof are possessed by the knower at one and the same time. The way in which objects are possessed is not found in the case of vidya. When we say apti (possession) we mean the immediacy of the object and of the cognition or knowledge. But in the case of vidya it is otherwise.

Even if vidya has arisen it may not have any pratishtha — (it may not be firmly rooted in its immediacy). For this vidya has the object that gives room for asambhavana (doubt) and 'viparita (contrary) bhavana'. By vidya is meant that valid cognition (pramanajnana) which arises from the word wherein there is the co-operation of sakti, tatparya and vicara. The pratishtha it is to have only means that it should have the 'aparokshya' with its own object. Such an immediacy is prevented by 'asambhavana' (impossibility) and 'viparita bhavana'. The former is the impossibility of having that concentration which can bring about the 'brahmata bhava'. The latter is the domination of the 'sariradhya' etc. When we overcome these two, we have the vidya pratipatti (apprehension of knowledge).
Objection: The Vedanta is said to be the cause of the ‘aparoksha prama’ (immediate experience). How can there be the ‘apratitata’ for Brahma vidya? We have two types of ‘Cittadosha’ viz. ‘asambhavana’ and ‘Viparita bhavana’. Then we cannot have any ‘aparoksha niscaya’.

Reply: But consider the example. Take the ‘ardra mariciphala’. We may have seen it in its dried up state. This wet one is at a distance; and we have no samskara (impression) of any previous cognition of this object. On the other hand there may be a ‘viparita samskara’ present. Then even though the object is immediately present we are unable to determine it. There does not arise the real ‘aparoksha niscaya’, which is free from error and doubt. Likewise true knowledge arisess as if it is not ‘pratishtita’. For its ‘svarupa pratishtha’ it takes the aid of tarka.

Objection: How can that which is not determined by pramana, be determined by tarka (logic)?

Reply: Tarka is only the ‘anugrahaka’ (subsidiary) to the pramanas. It is only an auxiliary to all the pramanas. It is present in all of them as an aid. And it is well known that when the sahakarins (auxiliaries) are present, we obtain the required result.

Objection: If tarka too is a valid means, how can you have two pramanas to have the ‘arthana niscaya’? If it is not a valid means of cognition, its aid is unnecessary and even faulty. So, what is tarka?

Reply: Tarka means expedient reasoning.

Objection: But yukti (expedient reasoning) is only a synonym of tarka.
Reply: Even though tarka is not a pramana, it is a sahakarin because it is a necessary feature or element in all. Tarka is the principle whose nature is to distinguish the possibility and the impossibility of the truth conveyed by the pramana, sakti, and vishaya. It is the principle that finds out the possibility or otherwise of their truth; and it is not of a ‘niscaya rupa’ (form of determining).

Pramanya vicara as established in Purva Mimamsa;

(1) The samkhyaas argue that both the validity and nonvalidity of cognitions is internal or self-dependent,

(2) The Nyaya argues that both validity and nonvalidity are external or dependent on something else.

(3) To the Buddhists, validity is external or dependent on something else, while non-validity is internal.

(4) To the Vedavadins only the validity is internal, while non-validity is external.

(1) The first view is untenable because it involves a self-contradiction. The same cognition would have to be both true and false.

Objection: Due to the difference in the ‘jnana samagri vyaktis’, we can distinguish validity from invalidity. If the jnana samagri is not aided by any defect, it gives a valid cognition; otherwise we have an invalid cognition.

Reply: Yes, this explains how the valid and the invalid cognitions arise. But as apprehensions they do not differ from one another, the same cognition would have to
jnana' we should know whether the validity of this 'artha kriya jnana' is external? or internal? If it is external, it leads to a regress. It cannot be internal also.

Objection: By 'sadhana' we mean the 'arthakriya kari vastu'; and by 'phala' we mean the 'artha kriya'. Now 'artha Kriya samvada' gives rise to the validity of the cognition of the object (vastu jnana), and not to the cognition of purpose (phala jnana), because there is further 'arthakriya' or 'phala'. Hence there can be no regress.

Reply: If the purpose (phala) has self-validity, why not admit the same for the 'vastu' also? If this is not accepted, the validity of the 'sadhana jnana' must be dependent on the 'artha kriya'. And the validity of the 'artha kriya' will have to be determined by the 'sadhana jnana'. To recognise the validity of one, we have to assume the validity of another. And when validity is established, there arises activity; and when activity is there, validity is established. This is the fallacy of mutual dependence.

We cannot say that activity arises to determine validity; for all cognitions are free from ambiguity or doubt.

Objection: Activity need not arise in all cases only to determine validity. It may so arise only in certain cases. In examining silver we proceed through 'nirikshana' 'dahana', 'chedana' and 'nigharshana' and thus establish it to be silver.

Reply: In such cases, we have to say that only one of these gives rise to the cognition, and that the others are intended to reject the obstruction to the cognition. When
the first cognition arises, if there are doubts etc., preventing a correct knowledge, then the latter cognitions are required.

(3) The Buddhist view also is faulty. We have only the ‘jnanotpatti-matra prayukta artha vyavahara’ Cognition as such results in the knowledge of the object. ‘Artha niscaya’ (determining the object to be such and such) and validity are not dependent on anything other than cognition. Because of the cause which is aided by the defect, there arises non-validity. And since this is subject to negation, non-validity is not self-dependent.

Non-validity, the objector may argue, cannot be said to arise from something external to the cognition proper; for, non-validity is only of the nature of the prior negation of validity.

This is a faulty argument, non-validity is not the mere absence of negation of validity. ‘Ajnana’, ‘samsaya’ (doubt) and ‘mithyatva’ are the three forms of non-validity; and all these are positive.

**Objection:** How can non-validity be external for the self-valid (svatath pramanasya)?

**Reply:** Heat is the nature of fire; and coldness is impossible, or inconsistent with fire. Yet when the obstruc-tion from a defect is strong as in the case of the gem, there can be coldness. It is not at all inconsistent. All cognition or knowledge is seen to give rise to activity be-cause of the self validity of cognition. This activity would continue till the defect is apprehended. Hence validity and
its apprehension do not have any reflective nature or otherwise; and without this apeksha, jnana has self validity and is the cause of ‘niscaya vyavahara’. 

Mahavakyasya aparokshya Prayojakatvam:

Objection: Now if this self-valid knowledge requires the aid of logic, how can there be the determination of meaning? The very fact that ‘tarka’ is necessary as an aid to the pramanas, is opposed to the self validity of the pramanas.

Reply: No, the self validity of the pramanas is not lost, since each pramana by its own inherent power can determine the nature of the object.

Objection: Then what is the use of reasoning?

Reply: When there is a doubt regarding the impossibility of the object, the ‘anubhava phala’ does not arise. Then tarka comes in to show that it is possible and thereby removes the obstacle. Pramana alone brings froth the ‘arthaparokhsya niscaya’, and tarka dispels the obstacles that obstruct this ‘niscaya’. Tarka is not the cause of ‘artha nirmaya’.

Objection: Let this hold good so far as external objects are concerned. It cannot hold good in the case of the self, for there can be no obstacles for the self-huminosity of the self.

Reply: Consider the example, That thou art. Here the Thou stands for the self, and the That for Brhman. The
self does not consider himself immediately to be of the nature of Brahman; on the other hand, he takes himself to be other than Brahman. As such, even when jnana has arisen, he does not have the determinate experience of the Brahmamatmama bhava. Then comes ‘tarka’ and removes the obstacles. If the obstacles are not removed by tarka, he cannot have the immediacy—he cannot realize the identity with Brahman.

In normal empirical experience we have the immediacy of the object in three ways —

i) The object as non-different from consciousness.

ii) Without being mediated by anything else, if the object can give rise to its samvit; it is another form of immediacy.

iii) When there is the contact for the object with the sense organ which is ‘pramana karana’ there is a third form. If these three are absent we have the inferential and other cognitions where the object is mediated.

The samvits are reflected in the evolutions of the mind, the form of the not-self. For these samvite the upadana is the Brahman who is like the ‘Bimba’. As such Brahman is the upadana for all samvits. And this would make out that Brahman is non-different from samvit.

It is the nature of the word to give rise to the mediated apprehension. Yet it can and does give the knowledge of immediacy to the self which is immediate and self revealing. Now there is a consciousness arising from the ver-
bal testimony and having the form of Brahman. This samvit is different from Brahman, or it arises from Brahman. As such at first Brahman too is apprehended immediately.

**Objection:** If this is the case, is not the mananadi vidhana (reflection etc.) useless?

**Reply:** No. This Brahman appears as if it is the other through some 'bhrami' (error) which is brought by the mind. Two defects aid the mind is having this error and they are the inability to concentrate and the 'viparyasa samskara'. Thus the self is (pratibadha) bound (or limited).

To enable the realization of higher immediacy there are ordained yajna, sama, nididhyasana etc. Thereby the mind becomes 'aparokshya niscaya nimittam'.

Yajna and others put an end to the obstacles of defects. Sama and others eliminate the defect of a contradictory activity: the activity directed towards the not-self.

'Manana' (reflection) shows an object. There arises a 'guna' of the nature of concentration in this object; and that guna itself is a pradipa. As this lamp becomes luminous it becomes capable of removing (or dispelling) the obstacles; and thus it reveals the subtlest Brahman. This Brahman is the 'atma vishaya nididhyasana' – the object of contemplation by the self. As this contemplation is intensified there arises a property which is of the nature of deep concentration.

As the obstacles that have brought about the illusion of mediate apprehension (Parokshya vibhrama) are removed,
the mind becomes the cause of ‘aparoksh pratyaya’ (immediacy) through sabda alone. The mind is able to give the ‘aparokshniseaya’. It is also generally found that when the mind is intensely concentrating, it is able to find even the subtlest and slightest entity.

Here we find that the mind is the sahakarin; and in the Tika this position is ascribed to ‘tarka’. The ability to dispel or put an end to the obstacles is the nature of tarka too; and as such this ‘tarka’ is the same as the mind described above. In other words, ‘tarka’ conveys the meaning to the mirror of the mind.

Tarka puts an end to the impossibility (asambhavana and to contrary possibility (viparita bhavana); and such a ‘tarka’ is the ‘prathama jnana sadhana’ (primary means of knowledge).

The mind then gives the immediacy of Brahman through sabda; further in ‘Tam tvaparishadam, we find the derivative form (taddhita) which states that realization of Brahman. And only an immediacy (aparokshhavagati) can be spoken of as being the true realisation.

The Vedantas then give rise to the immediate experience (aparoksh pramiti) with regard to Brahman; and tarka comes in only to remove the obstacles.

**Objection**: But it is the nature of the word to give only a mediate apprehension; and the Vedantas take the aid of tarka, they become the cause of the ‘aparoksh pramiti. Sabda first of all gives the knowledge of Brahman as the other. And when there is the aid from the mirror
of the mind—which was described earlier—, there arises a second knowledge which is immediate. The taddhita in the passage noted above shows that sabda and other things have their power of application (viniyoga samartnya) in immediate apprehension. As such mere tarka would not do. The contact of the eye with the object first gives a perceptual knowledge; and when the samskara of this experience aids us we are latter able to have recognition. You cannot say that the mediate knowledge about the ‘svaprakasa’ Brahman is an erroneous one; for, even though the samvedina of another is ‘svayam prakasa’ still it is mediately apprehended through inference.

Reply: Whether we accept the contention of the objector or hold to our own, the result is the same. The word ‘pratipattu’ (apprehension) does not conflict with ‘vidya’. In both the views, immediacy is obtained through a ‘prayatna’ (effort) on the part of the mind. Hence it is but proper to use the word ‘pratipatti.’ Before tarka has freed the mind from all obstacles, vidya might have arisen from the Mahavakyas. Still it appears as if it is not obtained (anavapteva).

What then are the sahakarins with the help of which the ‘sabda pramana’ gives us immediacy? To this Padmapada replies—The avapti prakara (mode of apprehension) has been shown in the Vedantas and it refers directly to the ‘anubhava phala’. Here we come across ‘Sravana’, ‘manana’ and ‘nidadhyasana’. And this school of Vivarana takes ‘sravana’, to be the ‘angin’ (principal one) and the others to be its ‘angas’ (subsidiaries).
Sravana vidhi:

Objection: How can you make 'manana' and 'middhyasana' to be the 'angas' of 'sravana'? Sabda (word) has sakti and tatparya. Such a Vedanta sabda gives the knowledge of Brahman and sravana gives the apprehension of Brahman. This apprehension is awakened in the self. Then arises 'manana' which brings the consideration (paryalocana) of those 'upapattis (arguments) that are necessary for the contemplation (sambhavana) of the object. Sabda pramana and yukti sambhavana thus establish or determine the object. Yet, to have the absolute concentration of the mind on this one object there arises 'niddhyasana'. Thus 'sravana' and 'manana' go to help 'niddhyasana' which alone can be the 'angin' since it alone directly brings about that immediate experience.

Reply: Even here you admit that the knowledge of Brahman arises from the word which has 'sakti' and 'tatparya'. The word then first gives the knowledge of Brahman as the other; and when the mind is purified by the other two samskaras, there is said to arise the immediate experience. This may be immediately proceeded by niddhyasana. Yet the 'aparoksha jnana' has arisen directly from the apprehension of the word. As such we have to say that 'sravana' is the most important, is the 'angin'; and that the other two are required as bringing about the 'phala' or experience proper. They aid in the realisation of the 'phala'. They are 'phalopakari angas.'

Objection: Even in the emergence of the 'aparoksha phala', why cannot the other two be the angas of nidi.
dhyasana; for all the three are (practically) identical in being ‘sannipaty opakarakas’. In ‘Darsa purna masa’ we have the angas all of which are equally important (sama pradhana). The same will hold in the present case also.

**Reply**: The word is ‘Sakti tatparya visishta’ (qualified by the power of giving an import). When such a word is heard, the word is immediately the cause of apprehending the object. In this apprehension the word does not require the mediation by anything else. For any pramana gives only the immediate apprehension of its object. Now, ‘manana’ and enididhyasana’ purify the mind; and in so far as they give rise to the intense power of concentration, they function as ‘the cause of the experience of Brahman’. Sabda, then, is unmediated (avyayahita) as far as the ‘phala’ is concerned. If this unmediated apprehension is prevented or delayed, the other two come in as its ‘angas’.

When the sabda alone at first gives that knowledge which is the ‘phala’ of the immediate experience, there are still the ‘bhanti vikshepa samskaras’ (impressions causing a plurality of illusions) in the mind. Because of these ‘doshas’ we erroneously apprehend the aparokshanubhava phala’ (immediate experience) as the ‘parokshanubhava phala’ (mediate one). Then ‘manana’ and ‘nididhyasana’ are required to put an end to these ‘doshas’ that prevent that immediate experience. Thereby they go to confirm the ‘aparokshaphala’. Consequently they are the ‘phalopakar-yangas’ of sabdapramana’.

You cannot say that nididhyasana alone without the sabda karana’, can give that immediate experience; for it has no validity (pramanya).
Objection: Immediacy is of the nature of Brahmatata arrived at from the apprehension of the word. Through this we can establish the ‘pramanya’ of nididhyasana.

Reply: No. Already knowledge has arisen from one pramana and we have arrived at the ‘vishaya sadbhava’; and then we are asked to admit another pramana which is dependent on this. It is better to accept only one having the power to give immediate experience. If two pramanas are to be accepted, jnana would not have self-validity. If sabda alone is accepted it would have self-validity. Hence it is proper to treat ‘manana’ and ‘nididhyasana’ as the ‘phalopakarya angas’ for ‘sravana’.

JIVANMUUKTI:

Objection: Even Brahmaparaksha jnana cannot bring about the dispelling or destruction of ‘anartha’; for even when it is there we find the continuance (anuvritti) of ‘samsara’. This is incompatible as soon as there is that immediacy, the body must be left behind.

Reply: But we have shown that ‘tattva jnana’ is different from the knowledge that the self is different from the body.

Objection: It is true. Yet there is no difference from the standpoint of ‘phala’. Whether there is ‘tattva jnana’ (apprehension of truth) or vyatireka jnana (contrary knowledge), in both we find the continuous presence of the ‘ahankara granthi’ and its consequences.
Reply: No. From the method of agreement and difference and from the ‘sastra’ we do find that adhyasa along with its origins is removed by ‘tattvaparoksha’. In-spite of the ‘vyatireka jnana’ the samsara (bondage or finitude) would continue because ‘avidya’ has not ceased to be. But when the ‘tattvaparoksha’ (immediacy of truth or real) arises the entire avidya dosha is removed. Can’t such an ‘aparoksha jnana’ remove the products of avidya also?

Objection: The apprehension of the self as being different from the body etc. is opposed to adhyasa; and yet it does not put an end to adhyasa. On this analogy we can infer that even though ‘tattvavabhodha’ is opposed to adhyasa, it cannot dispel adhyasa.

Reply: But will the ‘brahmatmanavagama’ (experience of Bhrahman as the self) arise for the self without at the same time sublating or negating the ‘brahmatmanavagama’ (apprehension of Brahman as other than the self)

Objection: The ‘aparokshavagama’ arises for one existing with his body and sense-organs. And since the body etc., constitute the adhyasa, that apprehension must involve the liberation of the self from the body completely. Brahmajnana removes the ‘agrahana’ or adhyasa. And since the ‘ahankara grantha’ is only the product of adhyasa, it should cease to be at that very moment.

Reply: No. Even though ‘tattvajnana’ can put an end to the activity of avidya, still there can be the continuance (anuvritti) of avidya for some time. Even after the ‘agrahana’ is removed there is present its samskara
(impression) for some time as in the case of the fear which continues. The fear is dispelled when the true knowledge of the rope comes; and yet the samskara of the fear continuous and shows shivering etc., Likewise through samskara avidya too continues to be for some time; and thus is the cause for the ‘ahankara granthi.

Objection: There can be a samskara only for an act (kriya) or for knowledge (jnana) and none for ajnana or for its product.

Reply: No. We do find the samskara of the gandha (latent impression) also; and this is not an act, nor a cognition. Further, during ‘pralaya’ we accept that all entities remain in the form of their samskaras. Every where samskara is inferred to remain when that which gives rise to it comes to an end. Moreover, avidya and its products are not taken to be the absence of knowledge, but to be ‘bhanti jnana’. Even ajnana is ‘sakshibhaya’; and it has thus the jnanabhasa’ whence it can give rise to a samskara.

Objection: But a samskara is only the cause of memory. How can this give rise to the immediate apprehension of the appearance of quality?

Reply: We reply that avidya and its products bring the dosha for consciousness. The defect that is in the cause of ‘aparokshavabhasa’ is the cause of ‘aproksha bhrama’ and when the self is the ground of avidya, it can be the ground of this samskara also.

Now avidya is the upadana for all its products save its samskara. And just as the self is not the upadana of
avidya, it is also not the upadana of avidya samskara. Yet it is the ‘asrayopadhi’ for both avidya and its samskara.

Gradually will the samskaras disappear as there takes place the anusandhana of true knowledge. Till this arises the samskara remains for some time and there takes place the ‘videha mukti’ (liberation after the body is dissolved). This is not at all opposed to our doctrine.

One might interpret ‘samskara’ to mean ‘avidya lesat on the analogy of ‘tamo lesa’.

**Saguna Brahmopasana (Personal God)**

**Objection:** All the Vedantas are not begun only for the sake of ‘such a vidya. Some of the texts aim at ‘krama mukti’, ‘aisvarya’, ‘abhyudaya’, ‘karma samriddhi’, There are the upasana (worship) portions in the texts. How are they to be explained?

**Reply:** The main puport of the Vedantic texts is with reference to the apprehension of the ‘nirvishesha Brahman’. The passages bearing on ‘sagunopasana’ come only by the way and are ‘prasangika’ (incidental). ‘Brahman is the object of the upasana. In order to show that this Brahman is ‘nishprapancaka’ and that this Brahman is the real nature or form of the ‘self, there should be given at the outset that Brahman is the creator etc. of the entire universe. Thus at the outset Brahman is declared to be ‘sarvatmaka’, ‘sarvajna’ and ‘sarva sakti’.

**Objection:** If Brahman is established and propounded as ‘nirvisesha’, how does he become the object of per-
sonal worship (sagunopasana)? And how does the world get itself related to be dependent on him? For it is only such a saguna Brahman that makes worship possible.

**Reply:** According to the maxim-‘adhyaropa apavada bhyam nishprapancam prapancyate’, the world etc is ‘adhyasopita’ and this also makes possible the latter sublation. As such we speak of Brahman as ‘apakrtasesha prapancam’ (negation of all finitude).

In the ‘saprapancatva’ state itself, without sublating or rejecting it in Brahman, upasana has been ordained. In this, Brahman is conceived under various conditioning media so that he can be worshipped, whereby one may realize the object he aims at.

**Objection:** Now, if the same Brahman is the object here, it might also require the same competent pursuer. In ‘Darsa purnamasa’ we have the ‘ap pranayana’ with the ‘camasa’. But the adhikarin of the yaga may have also the desire for cattle in which case the ‘camasa’ is to be rejected and the ‘godohana vidhana’ (procedure of milking) is to be accepted. Here we find that the adhikarin for the ‘appramayana’ is already qualified (adhikrita) in ‘Darsa purnamasa’. And he cannot take the ‘camasa’, but only the ‘godohana vidhana’. Likewise the adhikarin for the realization of ‘nirvisesha Brahman’ (non-determinatite Brahman) will have necessarily to be the adhikarin for the ‘upasana vidhis’ also. Only a person seeking liberation (mumukshu) would have to be an adhikarin for the upasanas.
Reply: Now the ‘appranayana’ is already ordained in ‘Darsapurnamasa’ and the adhikarin would have to do it necessarily. It is not ordained by the ‘godohana vidhana’ but by the ‘prakriti’-viz., the sacrifice. The ‘appranayana’ is ‘praptoddesya’. Likewise those desirous of cattle also are there. But here what is ordained is that if the adhikarin for the sacrifice is also desirous of cattle, he should follow the ‘godohana vidhana’?

On the other hand, whether one is a mumukshu or not he can arrive at the upasana of ‘saprapanca’ Brahman through the sabda. The upasana vidhana has no specific adhikarin in mind; and it is the same for both the ‘mumukshu’ and the non-mumukshu. It may be of use to the ‘mumukshu’ also. But the ‘mumukshu’ is not given as the ‘adhikarin’ here.

The upasana vidhana, then, is based on the ‘saprapanca’ Brahman. It is only an ‘asritya vidhanam’.

The ultimate import of the Vedantas then is with reference to Nirvisesha Brahman.

Objection: But there are also abrahmopasananas in the Vedantas like the upasana of prana etc. What about these?

Reply: Even they aim at the realisation of karya Brahman; and thus would lead gradually to mukti. The sutrakara (aphorist) himself would say this much in the aphorism: ‘Karyatyaaye tadadhyakshena sahitah param abhidhanat’.
Vivaranam

All the Vedantas are directed to the apprehension or experience of brahmatmyaikyavagatva either directly, or gradually, on the purification of the ‘antahkarana’.

MUMUKSHOH PRAVIRTTI (The activity of the seeker of Lioration)

The ‘vishaya’ and the ‘prayojana’ of the Vedanta give us the ‘vishaya’ and the ‘prayojana’ of the enquiry or vicara sastra. So Sankara—“Yatha cayam arthah sarvesham...... pradarsayisyamah”. The purport of the Bhasya is stated.

That is the meaning of the Vedantas, Sankara proceeds to show in the ‘Sariraka Mimansa’; Sankara explains the import of the vedantas after the fourth sutra onwards. ‘Saririka’ is that which is of the nature of the body. That which is in the ‘sārīraka’ is the self. And the work dealing with the nature of that self is the ‘Sariraka Mimansa’.

The Vedantas and the vicara sastra deal with the nature of the self, the ‘sārīraka’. The Vedantas have come with reference to the ‘tattva’ of the self; and they culminate in ‘Braham rupata’. To show this Mimansa is undertaken. This Mimansa is begun with reference to that ‘jīva tattva’; and such is designated as ‘Sariraka Mimansa’.

Objection: But the plain meaning of the first aphorism is only ‘vicara kaitavyata’ (something to be enquired into).

Reply: Padmapada has answered the doubt raised by this question previously. Even though ‘vishaya’ and ‘prayojana’ are not given by Badarayana here, still they
are taken by implication because Vedanta and its enquiry presuppose them. So Padmapada—The plain and direct meaning of the aphorism is that one having the desire to get liberated must undertake (karṇa-vaya) the enquiry into Brahmajñana. Yet, by implication we find that ‘moksha’ is the ‘prayojana’ of Brahma jñana.

**Objection**: How is this implication derived from the plain meaning of the aphorism?

**Reply**: First there is the desire for the purushārtha. After this desire (kamana) has arisen we proceed in a particular direction with reference to something desired. The something desired and the means of realizing it are implicitly implied in the ‘pravritti.’

Since there can be no ‘pravritti’ or activity here in the case of Brahman, we have to take ‘pravritti’ to mean ‘pravritti vishaya ishta sadhanata’. And this itself, we say—is the ‘vidhi’ (injunction).

**VIDHI VICARA (enquiry in the injunction)**.

The meaning of the optative suffix is the ‘ishtasadhanata’, ‘pravritti’ or activity is the same as ‘bhavana’ (means of realising the desired). Ishtasadhanata’ alone is the meaning of the ‘lin’ (optative mood). Then how can Brahma jñana be the means of realising ‘moksha’? The optative suffix and other words indicate the ‘pravritti’ which is the means of realising the desired object. This ‘ishtasadhanata’ is the meaning of the root and it has the power where by it involves a relation to the specific ‘adhi-karin’ and to the specific phla. The act conveyed by the root is only general or universal; and it becomes intelli-
gible only when it gives a specific cognition where in it is related to a particular doer or agent, and to a particular object to be realized.

Now, the 'vicara' or enquiry is apprehended through the 'ishta sadhanata' in a general or universal manner. And its ability or power establishes jnana. Through this jnana, we arrive at moksha as being the specific 'phala', and for aspecific adhikarin. Assuch the 'mokshasadhana' can be Brahma jnana.

This is objected to by the Prabhakra who says that 'linartha' cannot be 'ishta sadhanatva'. One who desires a purushartha is ordained to act in a particular way. This 'niyoga' (command) makes the 'dhatvartha' (meaning of the verb) mean the 'purushartha sadhanatva'. Lin etc., give us the 'niyoga' or the command to act; and this involves the person and the object. Thus sacrifice (yaga), the object (vishaya), and the 'svargakami. (one desirous of heaven) as the person (niyoga) are implied. Now, if the yaga cannot be a 'sadhana' (means) for the desired 'svarga', then the 'svargakamin niyoga vishayatva would be impossible or inconsistent. Hence through the 'niyoga samartha' that has been understood from the 'lin' etc. We find that the 'yaga' and 'svarga' are related to one another as the object to be realised (sadhya) and the means of realization (sadhanata). As such from the 'niyoga samartha' it is better to assume that the ordained 'vicara' or enquiry to be the means of realizing Moksha. It is unnecessary to assume the 'ishta sadhanatva vidhi samartha'.

The reply to this argument: There is no 'anupapatti' (inconststancy) or impossibility in our contention. If there
is no relation between the ‘phala’ and the ‘dhatvartha’, what is the impossibility?

(i) Is it the ‘niyoga svarupa’ (the act as such) that is impossible? or

(ii) Is there the impossibility of the initiating an activity (pravartakatva)? (or)

(iii) Is it the ‘phala kami yaga’ (sacrifice to realise a desire) that is impossible?

(i) It cannot be the first. Even without the relation between the ‘phala’ and the ‘dhatv artha’, we have the ‘niyoga’ in ‘svarga kamah. ‘Sikatha bhakshsayet’ (one desirous of heaven should eat sand). Here and in ‘naiyyamika niyoga’ we have actions arising even when the relation is absent.

(ii) It cannot be the second; for, even when the relation is absent, we do have the ‘pravartakatva’. Does the ‘niyoga’ give rise to the act when the ‘phalakamans’ is involved (apekshita)? or when it is not involved? In the former case, the ‘kamana’ itself would have the ‘pravartakatva’. Desire (kamana) alone would be the cause of the activity; and the cause would not be the ‘niyoga’. For, the ‘kamana’ invariably, necessarily, and immediately precedes the act. If the ‘kamana’ is not required (na apeksyate) by the ‘niyoga’, then the ‘dhatvartha’ has no relation with the ‘phala’.

(iii) It cannot be the third; for, even when the relation is absent, we do have the ‘phala kami yaga’.
the Prabhakara establishes the relation between the ‘phala’ and the ‘dhatv artha’, does he mean (a) that it is impossible to take the kamana as only the ‘adhikari viseshana’? (qualification of a competent agent), or (b) that it is impossible to have a ‘viseshana’ (qualification) to be realized (sadhya)?

Now, (a) is untenable. We have ‘yavajjivam agnihotram juhuyat’ (Throughout life one is to worship fire with oblations). Here jivana is not a sadhya’, but an ‘adhikariviseshana’. The ‘phalakamana’ here qualifies only the adhikarin.

Then (b) also is untenable. You cannot say that ‘sadhya viseshanatvam’ is impossible. What is the meaning of the word ‘sadhya’? When you take ‘svarga’ to be ‘yaga’ sadhya, (can be realised by a sacrifice), you would commit the fallacy of mutual dependence, if the ‘phalakamitva’ does not qualify the sadhya; for, once you have the ‘sadhya sadhana sambandha’. you can make ‘svarga’ to be ‘yaga sadhya’. Yaga would require svarga, and svarga would require yaga. As such, the Prabhakara cannot make out the ‘sadhyaavta’ to be ‘siddhavat’ (as if proven).

Arguing from another angle - Do we apprehend the ‘sadhylata’ from the word ‘svarga kama’ (desirous of heaven), or from the meaning? It cannot be the former, for it is not specifically mentioned. For ‘svarga kama’ means that all those who do not desire ‘svarga’ are excluded. The viseshana here is intended to exclude other possible agents (adhikarins), and not to mention the ‘sadhylata’. It refers only to the required specific doer and not to the object of the desire. It cannot be the latter also, for there is no pramana to show that the ‘sadhylata’
is apprehended from the meaning. Even though jivana is not a ‘sadhya’ (in ‘yavajjivam agnihotram juhuyat’), yet it is a viseshana for the adhikarin. Likewise, there can be the viseshatva for svarga etc. which are not ‘sadhya’.

So far we have argued after accepting that ‘svarga’ is only an ‘adhikari viseshana’, and not a ‘sadhya’. Now, we have to point out that ‘kamana’ also is a ‘siddha svaram’ (an existent) for it is already there; and this is the ‘viseshana’ of the ‘adhikarin’. And ‘svarga’ is only the ‘viseshana’ of ‘kamana’.

‘Svarga’ can have only a relation with the ‘adhikarin’ through ‘kamana’ - it has a parampara sambhandha. Even if it is the ‘viseshana’ of the ‘adhikarin’, you cannot have the relation between the ‘phala’ and the ‘dhatarth’a.

Take the following :-
Adhyetu kamo bhakshyam caret;
parastri kamah prayascittam kuryat;
grama kamo bhunkshva.

One who is having his studies (adhyayana) is to beg his food. The begging is not the ‘sadhya’ for ‘adhyayana’. Yet, for the act of begging, the proper ‘adhikarin’ is one who is studying. Likewise ‘svarga’ is not the ‘sadhya’ for the sacrifice. Yet it can and does involve the ‘adhikari viseshanatva’ for the act of sacrificing (yaga niyoga). It need not be the ‘sadhya’ but to have the act, we require S. Thus there is no ‘phala dhatv artha sambandha’ here.

Strictly speaking, even kamana cannot be the qualification of the agent (adhikari viseshana). Take the case of ‘darsapurna nasa’ for the ‘svarga kama’. When there
is no relation between the niyoga (act) and the person (doer), we have ‘ayaga’; and when there is a relation between an svarga kami and the act (niyoga), we have ‘anyayoga’. Now is the ‘svarga kamana’ given to exclude the ‘ayoga’? or to exclude the ‘anya yoga’? Both are impossible.

The word ‘svarga kama’ cannot be the ‘vyavachedaka’ (factor of distinction) for the ‘asamyoga’ (non-conjunction) between the ‘darsapurna masa niyoga’ and the person for the relation with the doer is already established by the ‘nitya vidhi’ (categorical imperative).

Nor can it be a ‘vyavachedaka’ for the relation between this ‘niyoga’ and some other person who does not desire ‘svarga’; for, that would conflict she ‘nitya vidhi’ viz., the ‘darsapurunamsa vidhi’.

One may argue that the word ‘svarga kama’ may not be a ‘vyavachedaka’ for the ayoga or for the anyayoga so far as the ‘nitya vidhis’ are concerned. But it may be a vyavachedaka in the ‘kamya vidhis’.

Even this is not possible. You cannot bring in the difference between the ‘nitya’ and ‘sukamya’ vidhis, as far as the ‘niyoga’ is concerned. The ‘niyoga’ of the ‘darsapurna masa’ embraces all its ‘angas’; and the ‘niyoga’ here is ‘avisishta’ (unspecified). There is the same ‘niyoga’.

If there is no difference between the two ‘niyogaa’, how is the difference between the ‘nitya’ and ‘kamya’ vidhis to be explained? When a ‘kami’ (one having a desire) performs the rite, it is a kamya vidhi; and when a jivanadivisishta adhikarin’ performs it, we have a ‘nitya vidhi’.

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This is all the difference. It is a difference due to the difference between the ‘adhikarins’.

Thus the word ‘svarga kama’ does not offer the ‘adhikarin’, but only the ‘phala’. From ‘maitravarunah praishyat’ we set the ‘praisyanu vada’; and this brings the ‘danda sambandha’, whence we have ‘dandi praishan anvaha’. The ‘dandi’ comes as a ‘viseshana only. Likewise the word ‘svarga’ is not ‘visishta purusha para’ (related to a particular agent), but only ‘viseshana para’. As such the word ‘svarga kama’ refers only to the ‘phala’. And by implication the ‘svarga kama’ becomes an ‘adhikarin’.

**Objection:** Let this be so. But how is the ‘niyoga’ not the meaning of the sentence?

**Reply:** The ‘phala vacara’ has its syntactical relation with the ‘sadhana vacane’, and not with the ‘niyoga’. When we say ‘ishta sadhanata’, one asks whose ‘ishta’ (desire) it is. Then we get that it is the ‘ishta’ of the ‘svarga kama’. From this we apprehend svarga and ask: What is the ‘sadhana’? The answer is given in ‘lin’ etc. Thus we are able to explain it without assuming the ‘niyoga’. Hence the ‘ishta sadhana’ zone is the ‘lin adi Sabdartha’ and this is the injunction; for ‘lin arthatva’ is no other than the ‘ishta sadhanatva’ which is ‘kriti yogya’ (appropriate for the act.)

**STATEMENT OF ANOTHER OBJECTION**

But there is another school of Mimansa which accepts the ‘dhatv artha phala sambandha’ through arthapatti. In the absence of this ‘sambandha’, they argue, it is impossible to have a specific ‘adhikarin’ and the ‘anvaya’ (syntactical relation). To facilitate these, we have to assume that sambandha, they argue thus:
If the vishaya and the doer are absent there can be no ‘niyoga a bhidhana’ (mention of the injunction). As such we should say that the ‘niyoga’ which is ordained is one that involves both the object and the doer. Thus, one is the realised and the other is the realizer—‘paraspara nirvartya nirvartakata lakshana sambandha siddhi’. Otherwise there will be the ‘anupapatti’ of not having a specific ‘adhikarin’ and the ‘anvaya’.

If there is no ‘kartri karmanvaya’—ie., if there is no ‘nirvartya nirvartakata lakshana sambandha’, the result is as follows: We recognise the ‘niyoga’ through ‘kriti sadhyata’. It does not directly have the ‘kriti sadhyatva’. As such we have to say that when there is the ‘yaga nivratti’, there is the ‘niyoga nivritti’. You cannot argue that in the absence of the ‘anushthata’ there is the ‘yaga nivratti’; and that thus there is the ‘Nirvartya nirvartskata lakshana anvaya’ between the sacrifice and the doer.

Can there be the ‘phala viseshanavaya’ when there is the syntactical relation between the object (vishaya) and the doer? Yes. The ‘tattv artha’ has its ‘anvaya’ with ‘svarga kama’; and as such we should say that there is the anvaya with svarga. Otherwise there can be no visishtanyaya.

Even when we have the relation between the phala and the ‘dhatv artha’, how can we have ‘sadhya sadhanata’? The answer: The two are not ‘sama pradhana’ as in ‘dar-
sapurna masa\(^{\text{a}}\); for, here one is desired and the other is not so desired. Therefore, the ‘anvaya’ would have to be ‘guna pradhana bhavana’\(^{\text{b}}\). Therein ‘avarga’ being the desired is ‘sadhyā’ and since ‘yaga’ is of the nature of an act, it is a ‘sadhana’. Thus we get the ‘sadhyā sadhana bhava’.

**Reply to this Objection:**

That the impossibility of ‘visishtanvaya’ (specific relation) necessitates the acceptance of ‘viseshanvaya’ is a faulty and needless argument. The injunctions relating to ‘jivana’, ‘dohataha’ parastic kaawa etc. have the ‘viseshanas’ with which we find the ‘anvaya for the ‘yaga’ . Is this ‘angatayaa anvaya’? Or another? If it is the former, the maxim ‘prakrtivadvikriti kastavya would tell us that there must the ‘atidesa (induction) for it in the ‘vikriti’. The vikriti, there would have to be performed throughout the life. And the ‘yavajjiva anusthana’ is opposed to ‘kartvyatva’; for we would get in the vikritis, in commands like ‘yavajjivan caryam’ nirvapet.

If, on the other hand we are to take it as ‘uddesyat-vena anvaya’, even jivana too would have to be ‘karma sadhya’. Jivana’ is ‘karmantara adhina’ and it cannot be the ‘sadhya’ for the present act.

In this view also, it is impossible to have the ‘dhatv artha phala sambandha’. And we cannot accept the ‘linady
arthatva' of fered by this view. The word 'svarga kama' has its anvaya with the 'phala'. The 'linnadi padas' expresh the injunction which is the means of realizing the 'preyas'. With such a general 'lia or pada' does the word 'svarga-kama' have its anvitabhidhana? 'svargakama' is a visesha pada (specific expression) while the 'lin' etc., is a 'samanya pada' (general expression).

Objection: The relation between the 'yaga' and 'svarga' is arrived at fro~ 'sabda'. In this sabda bodha we do not find the culminatson (paryavasana) of the 'linad bodhits samanya'; and to say that because of this aparya-vasana samarthyha we should recognise 'viseshanvay' is not proper.

Reply: 'Lin' etc., give the knowledge of the means necessary for the realizatiou of sreyas. It is the 'samanya sadhana' that is apprehended by 'lin' etc., It involvas an 'akanksha' and the 'akankshitartha' (necessarily related meaning) is given by ihe word 'svarga kama'. When such a thing takes place, the 'lin' becomes 'pradhana'. And the 'aparyavasana samarthyha' of the 'lin' eta would make us recognise or accept the 'phala visesha'. We thus assume that the word 'svarga kama' is 'phala visesha para'; for the 'padantara tatpayya' is dependent upon, or determined by, the 'vidhy akanksha'. Hence from the 'vidhi samarthyha' we speak of the 'phala saubandha'.
**Objection:** If the meaning of the ‘lin’ is ‘ishta sadhanata’, how can you explain the instrumental case in ‘jyotistomena’ etc.? For the ‘lin’ it is said to express the ‘karanata’ for the sacrifice. When the ‘karma karaka’ is not expressed (anabhihita) by ‘lin’, ‘krit’, ‘taddhita’ and ‘samasa’, then only, the instrumental case is valid. Here ‘lin’ expresses the ‘karana’ in which case the instrumental is ‘jyotishtomena’ is not valid grammatically.

**Reply:** There is no such invalidity. Yaga gives only the ‘samanyabhidhana’, while the word ‘jyotishtomena’ gives the ‘viseshabhidhana’. For the ‘viseshabhidhana’ we do require the instrumental case there. ‘Lin’ express only the ‘dravya tyaga rupa paga samanya gatam karanatvam’. And the ‘karanatva’ which is ‘yaga visesha gatnm’ is expressed by ‘jyotishtomena’.

**Objection:** Now, ‘vishyaa’ is that which is not expounded by anything other than this. And in the aphorism we do not find anything that expounds the ‘vishthsaya’. So, how do we have the ‘vishaya pratipatti’ (vishaya saddhi)?

**Reply:** Brahman cannot be known by any other pramana save by this sastrra. As such by implication we get the ‘vishaya nirdesa’ (indication of the aim or object.)
Vivaranam

When the question – from what or whence do we have the Brahma jnana which is 'mokshasadhana' –, when this question arises, we reply that by implication only this sastra can give it. Thus Sankara has shown Brahma jnana to be the vishaya' of this sastra. After the desire for liberation has arisen, this inquiry into Brahma jnana should be undertaken. In this form of upadesa we are given both the 'vishaya' and 'prayojana' of the Vedantas. Yet Sankara has shown the implication of the first aphorism and explained that which is presupposed is the very basis of this implication. Thus he explained the avidya-tmaka bandha. And to fulfil his pratijna. he proceeds to explain all this in the sutras that follow. And in order to interpret the sutras, he next gives the reason for first taking up the 'prayojana' and 'vishaya' in the words — 'Vedanta mimamsa sastrasya vyacikhyasitasya idam adim-mam sutram — adhato brahma jijnasa'.

Objection: From the 'samanya lakshana' itself we come to know the 'vishaya'; and we learn of the 'prayojana' from the fourth chapter. Then how do you say that these two are indicated or suggested by the first aphorism?

Reply: 'When Sankara speaks of it as 'adimam sutram', he means that it is the beginning of the sastra. As such, at the very beginning both the 'vishaya' and 'prayojana' must be indicated by way of 'pravrtyy angata'.

Objection: But is it improper to derive many a meaning from one sentence of the aphorism?
Reply: No, for it is a 'sutra'. Any meaning that is uprekshita by the 'sabda samarthya' or by the strength of its meaning, all that is the meaning of the aphorism. And all this 'artha kalapa' is understood and desired from the inherent power or strength of the aphorism. Thus, because it is the beginning of the sastra, because it is the first aphorism we are able to derive from it the 'vishaya' and 'prayojana' and he is able to explain that which makes the 'vishaya' and the 'prayojana' possible. The bondage of the self is called avidya; and it is implied by the vishaya' and 'prayojana'. Having exhibited all this, Sankara proceeds to show the 'sutra Samarthya' for all this. Accordingly, he now begins to comment on the aphorism word by word.'.

Here ends the first Varnaka in Panchapadika and in Panchapadika Vivaranam.
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