The Philosophy Of

ĀKHYĀTA & ITS NATURE.

In Observance Of

Mīmāṃsā Nyāya And
Vedic Rituals. (Part-2)

मीमांसान्ये वैदिक कर्मसु च
अख्यात-तत्त्वशोधनम्.

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Tar. Sam. Tarka Samgraha
Tar. Tan. Tarka Tanjava (parts I & III)
TTv. Cin. Tattva Cintamani (Part iv, Vol. II)
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Patravishveswara suri
Manasa
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Gadadhara
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Arthavisesa tapyagrrhakvam dyotakatvam. (Nyā. Man.)
Abhedārīkśasambhandhena prakṛtyarthā prakṛtraka sābdabodhān prati pratyaya janyopasthitārhetuttvām. (Vai. Bhū.)
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Dhāttvarta).
Kvaccittu samabhivyāhita gata vṛtyuddbodhakattvām dyotakattvām.
Kriyanāmabhi nispattau samarthyaṃ sadhanam viduh. (Va. Pad.
Sadhanaṃ samuddeśa).
Nakevala praṅtitā prayoktavyā nāpi pratyayah (Ma. Bh.)
Namaḥthayorbhudevanyāsāvyutpannatvām. (Bh. Cint.)
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(Vai. Bhū.)
Prātipadikārthayorbhedenānvayabodhe vibhaktijanyopa sthitirhetuḥ
(Vai. Bhū.)
Prāmānīkam gauravaṃ na dosaya. (La. Man.)
Prakṛtiprathyayau saharthaṃ brāhaś tayostu pratyayarthaḥ pradhanām
(Tan. Vā.)
Prayogapraptipattibhyam kila sabdartha niscayaḥ. (Nyā. Man.)
Pararthabhidhanam Vṛttiḥ (M. B.)
Samabhivyāhītapadiṃ sakti vyanjakattvām dyotakattvām (La. Man.)
Sattvapradhanānāṃ nāmāṃ (Nir.)
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Adhikaraṇām
Anukūla
Anvaya
Avacchedakām
Avacchinnām
Avyaya
Ativyapti
Avyāpti
Anumāna
Abhava
Anvayavyāpti
Apoha

Abhedasambandha
Arthapatti
Ākāṅkṣā
Āśraya
Ākhyātām
Ākṛti
Āvapa
Dyotakattvam
Dravya
Dhātu
Gūna
Gaurava
Jāti
Jñānam
Karta
Karma
Kṛt

Kriyā
Kevalānvayi
Lakṣāṇā
Lakṣyarthā
Lāghavam

Substratum
Congenial to
Agreement
(the) Determinant
(the) Determined
Indeclinable
Over applicability
Partial applicability
Inference
Non-existence
Concomitance in affirmation
Negation of the objects other than the one concerned
Non-differential relation
Presumption
Expectancy
Substratum
Verbal affix
Configuration
Inclusion
Suggestion
Substance
Verbal root
Quality
Proxility
Universal
Knowledge or Cognition
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Object
Primary affix forming Verbal Derivations
Action
Exclusively affirmative
Implication or Secondary significance
Implied meaning
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A brief

This second part of the text deals with the semantics of Verbal Suffix 'Tiṅ' in Sanskrit.

The word Ākhyāta is a synonym to the 'verb' in English. In Sanskrit a verb word contains mainly two parts i.e. verbal root (Dhātu) and verbal suffix (Tiṅ). In the part-I of the book, the definition of root, classification, suffix classification, etc and their semantics is discussed as propound in the three main disciplines viz Nyāya, Māmaṁśa and Vyākaraṇa of Hindu scholarship. There it is established the root denotes the result (Phala) and action (Vyāpāra).

Besides these discussions, certain fundamental concepts such as Vyāpāra (action), Phala (result), Karta (agent), Karma (object), Samsarga, Abhihiita-anabhiita system, Transitiveness-intransitiveness etc. as viewed by Indian scholars, are also investigated to the advantage of the reader.

Now in this second part of the book the semantics of the Suffix Tiṅ is discussed with respect to the three disciplines said above.

I acknowledge with respect and sincerity the immense help I had from the various books both in English and Sanskrit. Of course it is true, that knowledge is nobody's property and more so of scholars. Knowledge is God. Knowledge is to be transferred continuously. So I received from my predecessors and now in turn I am distributing to the needy.

My thanks are to the proprietors and workers of the Nana Enterprises, who shared the labours in printing and bringing out this book from press to public.

Sincerely

The Author
Verbal Affix—Its Denotation

INTRODUCTION:

As regards the denotation of the verbal affix too, there exists a vast diversity of opinion among the various scholars. It appears as though every scholar, though belonging to the same school or to a different school of discipline, represents a school by himself. No scholar is less intelligent not to project a new interpretation, or to pronounce a new thought or a different view and thus to establish the validity of his statement over the views of others. Another peculiarity is that, some times scholars belonging to a particular discipline accept the verdict of another scholar belonging to a different discipline.¹

The verbal affix, that is enjoined after a verbal root to denote agent, or object or Bhāva and time besides number person and upagraha, is called 'L' (lakrab). Certain lakras, in addition to time denote modalities of the speaker. Such lakras are called moods. Thus to denote the subtle shades of difference in time or modalities Pāṇini used ten types of Lakras. Of course, all the Lakras denote agent/object/Bhāva in common, besides the particular time or modality. The verbal affix denotes the general meanings agent/object/Bhāva etc, on the strength of the Sūtra P. 3. 4. 69.² Thus according to the Grammarian, in the case of transitive roots the Lakāra denotes agent in the active voice and in the passive voice it denotes object. But if the root is intransitive then either an agent or Bhāva is denoted by the Lakāra. Such a construction of the sentence to denote Bhāva is called "Bhāve Pra-yoga".

¹ Vyāsatartha, a Logician supports the Grammarian's theory. All the latter Logicians, Mīmāṃsakas and Grammarians unanimously condemn the views of Manubarta and of the old Logicians.

² Lah Karmaṣaṇa Bhāve ca karmakebhyaḥ. (P.3. 4.69).
The ten lakāras are distinguished by the use of mute letter like Ātī N, etc.. The function of vowel mutes following ‘L’ is to distinguish affixes enjoined for particular tenses or modality. Of the ten lakāras, time denoting lakāras are only six viz. Laṭ (Presnt) Liṭ (Past not witnessed by the speaker) Lān (Past exclusive of today) Luṇ (Past in general) Luṭ (future exclusive of today) Liṭ (future in general). The remaining four lakāras viz., Liṇ (optative or potential + Preceptive); Loṭ (imperative) Lṛṇ (conditional) and Leṭ (subjunctive) have in common future time denoted. But in practice no importance is given to this time element but impartance is given to the modality denoted by them.

It is worth noting that in our actual language this affix ‘L’ (Lakāra) is not found after the verbal root. The affixes actually used are Tip, Tas, Jhi etc. These suffixes Tip, Tas, Jhi etc. for the grammatical purposes are considered to be the replacements of the lakāras. Hence all the meanings assigned to the lakāras are really expressed by the actual endings Tip, Tas, etc. Of course Pāṇini did not specifically say so, but it is so construed because of the maxim ‘A replacement has the same meaning as that which it replaces’.1

Grammarians Kauśabhaṭṭa argues the other way. He says it is the suffix Tip etc. has the denotative capacity. This denotative function of the Tip etc. suffixes is assumed to exist in the lakāra which is created for the sake of brevity.2 Thus lakāra is said to denote the agent etc. by the Sūtra P.3.4.69.3 Nāgęśa also favours this view (Vide P.L.M. P.138).

1. Sthānivadādeash.
2. Dyotakatātirūpam tibādisaktim tatsthānitvena kalpita lakāre Prakalpya Lakārh Kartari Karmāni caṇena vidhiyante. (Vai. Bhūṣā.)
3. Leṭ Karmāni ca Bhāvecākarmakebhyēḥ. (P.3.4.68.)
According to the Logician the significatory power resides in the prototype 'L' (lakāra) itself. Replacements like Tip, Tas etc. denote the meanings agent, object etc. only by recalling (bringing to mind) the lakāra that they replace. This argument is advanced to serve the purpose of brevity. The assumption that the singificative capacity exists in each of the replacements leads to prolixity, whereas the assumption that exists in the concerned lakāra itself, is much simpler. Thus the lakāra alone has denotive capacity and the replacements can convey meaning only by bringing it to the mind.

But this argument of the Logician is not acceptable to the Grammarian. Only that word which is actually uttered can be said to denote a meaning. It is not logical to assume that a non-uttered grammatical prototype denotes the meaning. The grammarian always has held the spoken language as of paramount importance. The grammatical prototypes have reality, only within the confines of grammar. Further the Bhāṣyakāra makes it very clear, commenting on the Sūtra P.1.1.68,1 "Meaning is understood from a word actually uttered".2 One may argue of achieving brevity in so far as only the original lakāra has the denotive function instead of all the replacements individually. Hence more brevity exists in assuming that the replacements denote meaning immediately upon being heard, rather than assuming that they first recall the lakāra to mind and then through this lakāra one gets the knowledge of agent etc. This process of Naiyaiyaka is a round about and inconvinient one.

Now as regards the denotation of the verbal affix, it is like this. The sage Pūṇini enjoins 'L' as verbal affix after the root; and Tiḥ is the substitute in its place. The Sūtras enjoined in this respect are Lah Karmāṇi ca Bhāve Cākrmakedhyāḥ (P.3.4.69) Kartari kṛt (P.3.4.67.) etc. All those scholars accept these formulas but they differ in interpreting them. So, speaking in a broad and general way, to the Logician, the import of the verbal affix is primarily

1. P.1.1.68 Svam rūpam sabdasya sabda samjnā.
2. Šabdenoccaritena arthogamyate, (Ibid M.B.).
kriti; to the Mimamsaka it is Bhavan which is different from the activity signified by the verbal root. But to the Grammarian the Tiḥ suffix signifies the substratum (agent or object) of activity or result denoted by the verbal root. All the scholars belonging to the different disciplines (i.e. the Logician, Mimamsaka and Grammarian) discussed all the pros and cons of the problem on hand in interpreting the various aphorisms to suit their own doctrines and tried to establish the supremacy of their own theories over the views of others.

Therefore in the following pages we shall now discuss the arguments and counter arguments adduced by the scholars against their rival schools of thought.

THE VIEW OF THE GRAMMARIAN—:

The Grammarian, having established as stated in the previous chapter, the meaning of the Verbal root to be activity and fruit; now, holds that the Verbal affix signifies the substratum—substratum of the activity (i.e. the agent), or substratum of the fruit there of (i.e. the object). Since result and action are denoted by the Verbal root, the substratum is fit to be the expressive sense of a word must be such as cannot be arrived at by any other means.

The meanings of the Verbal root and the suffix agree with each other by the relation of the qualified to the qualifier in general. It is like this. When the verb word is in active voice, the agent meaning of the suffix is an attribute to the action signified by the Verbal root; and the object meaning is an attribute to the result. And this result is an attribute of the action. When the verb is in active

1. Phala vyāpārayo; dhātur āṣraye tu Tiḥah smṛtah (Vai. Bhū. Karika 2)
   Āṣraye-Vyāpārāṣraye phalāṣraye ca, phalavyāpārayoh dhātulabhyatwāt, āṣraya mātramathāḥ, Ananya labhyaśa sab- dārthatvāt (Vai. Bhū. P.5.).
2. Ananyalabhyayah Sabdārthāḥ.
voice, the number meaning of the affix is an attribute of agent—
meaning signified by the Tha affix, but of the object when the verb
is in passive construction. As regards the Time meaning of the ver-
bal suffix; it is always an attribute of the action. Thus according
to the grammarian a verbal suffix signifies substratum (agent or
object) number, person, time and also upagraha. The person
meaning is an attribute of the agent or object when the sentence
is in active or passive construction respectively. And the verbal
import of the sentence, “Caitra cooks rice” (Caitraḥ tānduḷaṁ
paṇcaṭī), as explained by the Grammarian, would be “action of
the present time congenial to softening which (softening) resides
in the rice not different from the object” and which action has
one agent non-different from Caitra.”

Thus in the above sentence, the root ‘Pāc’, expresses the
action of ‘cooking’. The statement “Viklittyaṇukālā etc.” shows
that the fruit “Viklitti” is an attribute of the action expressed by
the verbal root “Pāc”. “Caitra Kartṛkah Pākah” and Tānduḷābhī-
na karmavṛttiḥ” shows that the subject “Caitra” is an attribute
of the action ‘Pāka’ and that the object “Tāndula” is an attribu-
te of “Viklitti” (result) of the action. Ekakartṛkah” shows
that the number meaning expressed by the Verbal affix is an
attribute of the subject Caitra. “Caitrabhinna eKa kartṛka and
tāndulabhinna karmavṛttiḥ” show the non-differential relation sub-
sisting between Caitra and the substratum of action etc.
Thus the grammarian holds that a verbal affix signifies the subs-
stratum (Āśraya) i. e. Kartā or Karman as the case may be.

It may be observed here in the verb word, the substratum
i. e. the meaning of the suffix (Pratyaya); is an attribute of the
action meaning of the root (Prakṛti). As such, it should not be
mistaken that it will result in contradicting the maxim ‘when the

1. Thānabhihitena Bhāvena Kalapuruspapagraha Vyajyante.
   (Bhāṣya on P.3.1.67).
2. Caitrabhinnaikakartṛkaḥ tāndulabhīna karmavṛtti viklītyanukāla
cartamanakāliko vyapāraḥ.
base and affix are conjointly uttered, then, of the meanings signified by the two, the sense (or the meaning) of the suffix should be predominant.  

According to the Logician, however, the meaning signified by the potentiality of the suffix is activity (Kṛti), which is different from the action signified by the verbal root. Similarly the Mīmāṃsaka holds that Bhāvana is the signified potentiality of the suffix, but not the substratum. The grammarian argues that, if we are to accept the above contention, then naturally we cannot maintain the system of Person agreeing with the agent, etc. The aphorisms "Yusmadymphapad..., Asmdyutta, sesprathamah" lay down clearly that the agent or the object signified by the suffix should be in the same substratum as the subject or the object concerned in the sentence. But if the agent or the object is not the expressed sense of the verbal suffix then the question of subsistence in the same substratum along with the agent or the object does not arise in all the three persons (1st, 2nd or 3rd person). Hence according to the governing aphorism "when not expressed" (Anabhihite), in sentences like Devadatta cooper (Devadattā pañci) according to the Logician (or the Mīmāṃsaka), the agent Devadatta has to take the instrumental case affix, since the agent meaning is not expressed by the verbal affix  and in sentences in the passive construction as "Pacyate Tāṇḍulah" and the like, the object rica (Tāṇḍulah) has to be in the accusative case, because, the object is not expressed by the verbal affix.

The Logician explains the aphorism 'Anabhihite' as when the verbal affix does not express the number-meaning of the agent or the object; but the grammarian rejects such an explanation, because the number meaning is not expressed by the primary and secondary affixes and by compounds and as such sentences like

1. Praṅti pratayau sahātham brātastayoh pratayārthasya pridhānyam. (Bha. C. P.79, and few lines).
2. Bhāvapradhānakhyātām.
3. Anabhihite (P.2.3.1,) and KartāKarayosttiyā (P.2.3.18).
"Devadattaḥ pācakāḥ" will not be rendered possible, and on the other hand sentences like "Devadattena pācakāḥ" will have to be formed. Consequently the agent not being expressed by the Nyuḷ affix in the word 'pācaka', the agent Devadatta is to be expressed in the instrumental case. And further if it is contended by the opponent that the agent is not expressed by the Verbal suffix, then he has to admit that the primary suffixes like "Nyuḷ" etc., also do not express the agent, because both the verbal affix and the primary affix are the substitutes in the same sense in the place of the Lakāra itself. Therefore it will be rational to accept that the agent or the object is the signified potentiality of the verbal affix.

Further the grammarian continues his arguments as follows:
The verbs "Pacati" and the like are found to agree with words such as "Devadatta" and the like which are used to specify the particular agent or object. And this is possible only if we accept the sameness of the substratum between the two. Sameness of substratum is possible only between two entities which are identical. Consequently, in the present instance, the necessary sameness of substratum could be obtained only if the verb word "pacati" in general denotes the agent Devadatta. The argument that the agent is indicated by the verb "pacati" in accordance with the "'Akṛtyadhikaraṇa Nyāya", is not correct; because, the agent in the sentence "Devadattaḥ pācati" cannot be indicated by the cooking (Pāka) which subsists in the rice. In fact the cooking can indicate only the number singleness inhering in the rice, but not a thing that inheres in another substratum. Thus it becomes evident that the word "'Pacati" and the like are denotive of the agent or the object.  

1. Tattu samānādhikāraṇyāt bhavati, samānādhikāraṇyām ca dvayorapyeśkasvayatve kalpyeta. (Tan. Var P. 930.)


3. Tasmāt pacati sabdādirvācakaḥ kartikāramanōḥ (Tan. Var. P.963)
Further the fact that the verbal affix denotes either an agent or an object can be established in another way. For instance let us observe the word ‘pākaḥ’ which is formed by adding the primary suffix ‘ghan’ to the root Pac. Here the affix ‘ghan’ speaks of Bhāva and not of the agent or the object. Hence in these cases the sameness of substratum (sāmanādhi-karaṇya) cannot be brought about between pāka (cooking) and Devadatta etc., but in cases like ‘Devadattaḥ pacati.’ we can explain the sameness of substratum between pākakarta and Devadatta on the lines of the statement ‘Devadattaḥ. Pācakāḥ’ where the Nyul affix signifies the agent. Thus the verbal affix denotes the agent or the object.

Further, let us observe sentences like ‘Devadattaḥ pacati, pacato Devadatta yajnadattau, pacanti Devadatta yajñadatta Viśnuguptāḥ’. Here it is observed that the number in the word expressing the particular agent is exactly the same as that denoted by the verbal affix. And we also note that a change in the number of the word expressive of the particular agent Devadatta etc. causes, a simultaneous and identical change in the number expressed by the verbal affix in the word ‘pacati’ and the like. And further, wherever we find such to be the case, we find the word to be actually denotive of the agent or the object. as in the case of the words ‘Paktā’ and the like, in connection of which also we have such usages as ‘Paktā Devadattaḥ Paktārau Devadatta yajnadattau, Paktāḥ Devadatta Yajnadatta Viśnuguptāḥ’. So also in the case of passive sentences (karmāṇi), we find such usages as ‘Pacyate odanaḥ, Pacyate odanasākau, pakvaḥ odanaḥ, etc. 2 Ṭhu: from all the above illustrations, it becomes evident that the agent or the object is the signified potentiality of the verbal affix.


2 Tacchabdopāṭṭa tadbhūtasamkhyaśabheda uvarantarāt. Tathaiva vacakatvām syat drśṭāntau tāvihāpica. (Tan. Var. Slok 1)
The grammarian further argues that unless we accept the denotational capacity to the verbal affix in expressing the agent or the object, there would be nothing to justify the prohibition of affixes of instrumental case and the objective case after the words Devadatta and Odana in the sentences ‘Pacati Devadatta’ and ‘pacyate odanah’, respectively. It is found that the rules of grammar lay down the prohibition of the nominative and the objective case endings after the words denoting the agent or the object in particular, in case this agent or the object is not denoted by other words, such as the verbal affix. Thus the aphorisms Karmanī Dvitiyā, Karṣikaṇa yostītiyā, under the governing sutra ‘Anabhihite’ can regulate the case affixes after the agent, object etc. Thus, in as much as we find that these affixes are actually prohibited it is possible to account for such prohibition only by accepting the rule that the verbal suffixes denote the agent or the object like the primary affixes.

Further if it is not accepted that Verbal affix signifies the agent or the object, it can not be explained how it (the suffix) could denote a particular property of the agent or the object in the shape of number. To assert that the affix does not denote the agent etc., but denotes their property involves contradiction. If as the Mīmāṃsaka contends, the subject is secured by presumption from Bhāvanā, then there is the contingency of the number meaning having to agree with the agent which is not an object of Sābdabودna. Consequently the number meaning which is expressed by the suffix has to qualify the expressed meaning “Bhāvanā” only in which case the change in number would have not been possible, because Bhāvanā is always single by nature (Ekākriyā) as in the case of sentences in impersonal usages. Hence in order to overcome this awkward situation, we must admit that verbal affix signifies the meaning agent or object etc. And for this reason also the verbal affix must be admitted as signifying the agent or the object.

Similarly in order to justify the qualifying nature of the adjectives, as in instances “Śobhānāḥ pacati” Śobhanah pacyate” etc. also we have to accept the denoting capacity to the Verbal affix in the agent or object. This becomes evident when we examine
the sentences "Śobhanaḥ Paktā" and "Śobhanaḥ pakvaḥ" and "Śobhanam Āsyate" etc. 1 Besides the meaning of the base, the number and gender of the adjective which are the expressed senses, qualify the number and gender of the agent which are expressed by the suffix in Paktā, Pakvaḥ etc. Therefore in the sentence "Śobhanaḥ pacati" the adjective "Śobhanaḥ" cannot qualify something which is not the expressed sense of the verbal affix. Where such an agent is not expressed by the suffix as "Āsyate", the verbal affix in the impersonal mood denotes activity (Bhāva) denoted by the root' but not the agent or the object. And hence its qualify is denoted by the indeclinable word "Śobhadaṁ as in the instances Śobhanam pacati'.

Thus from all the above observations, the grammarian asserts that the verbal affix denotes the Āsraya i. e. the agent or the object etc.

THE VERBAL SUFFIX—THE MĪMĀṂSAKA SCHOOL.

Of the two existing schools of the Mīmāṃsa doctrine, first we will examine the views of the Bhāṭṭa School, as far as it concerns the meaning of the Verbal affix. Even in this school different scholars expressed different views regarding the denotative potentiality of the verbal affix, and also tried to defend their own stand; but there is one thing in common to all of them, i. e. none of them accepts that the verbal affix signifies the agent or the object as propounded by the grammarian.

Among such Mīmāṃsa scholars Kumārilabhaṭṭa is the first and foremost person in refuting the grammarian. The various arguments advanced by him to refute the views of grammarians can be summarised as under.

VIEWS OF KUMARILA:

Kumarila opines that Bhāvanā is the signified potentiality of the Verbal suffix. After all, the meaning of any word is that which is not secured from any other source. And no other denoter is found to signify Bhāvanā than the verbal affix itself. Especially the time and other meanings secured from the Verbal affix are not found to be in invariable concomitance with Bhāvanā and are found to exist even without Bhāvanā.¹

Further Bhāvanā cannot be presumed either by time or by the agent etc., denoted by the Verbal affix; nor can it be presumed through the meaning of the Verbal root; because if it can be so presumed’ Bhāvanā has to become subsidiary to the agent meaning as contended by the grammarian. Just as in the case of words formed by adding primary affixes after a verbal root, e.g. pācaka, and the like. But as a matter of fact in strict adherence to the maxim “Bhāva pradhānamākhyātam” of the various meanings signified by the Ākhyāta (verbal affix) Bhāvanā is always cognised as the predominant element and hence we have to accept that Bhāvanā is directly signified by the Verbal affix itself.²

Moreover, of the meanings of the base and the affix, the affix-meaning should be more prominent. That is the maxim.² So in the present case, the important sense we get from a ‘Verb word as a whole’ is Bhāvanā. Therefore this Bhāvanā must be accepted as being signified by the suffix, failing which it goes against the said maxim. And then, the root and the affix are always found to appear in a definite order of sequence. And the knowledge of Bhāvanā comes only after hearing the verbal affix in the verb word. So this experience of ours also proves that Bhāvanā is the signified


potentiality of the verbal affix.¹ That is to say that there is an invariable concomittance between the verbal affix and Bhāvanā is cognised only when the verbal suffix is used. And hence the theory i.e. "Bhāvanā is the expressed sense of the affix" is established.

Another powerful argument to substantiate the mīmāṃsaka theory is the very explanatory sentence of the meaning of the verb word. For instance, the word ‘Pacati’ is explained as ‘Pākaṁ karoti’. (He does cooking). The verb word has two constituent parts viz’, the base ‘Pac’ and the suffix ‘Ti’. In the explanatory sentence also the meaning of the verbal base (root) which is to be accomplished is explained by the word ‘Pāka’ ending in an accusative case affix, and the meaning of the suffix ‘Ti’ is explained by the word ‘Karoti’. The sense that is conveyed by the word ‘Karoti’ is called ‘Bhāvanā’. And therefore it is logical to accept this Bhāvanā as the one signified by the verbal affix, because it is a universal fact that the sense or import we get on hearing a particular word, is the meaning of that particular word itself.

Now as regards the meaning the agent or the object, unlike the other meanings (factors) of the Verbal affix, it is presumed by Bhāvanā; because Bhāvanā can not be accomplished without the agent. Here the agent is cognised in a subdued form and hence can be accepted that the agent is presumed from the Bhāvanā, the denoted sense of the verbal affix. Of course it can be questioned as to how the agent Karaka alone can be presumed by Bhāvanā, when there are other Karakas also claiming to come up in its place. To this it is replied that the Karakas other than the agent Karaka are not found to be so concomittant with it, as the agent is. This fact also strengthens the capability of Bhāvanā to presume primarily the agent. Hence it is proved that the agent is obtained from Bhāvanā either by presumption (arthāpati) or by inference (Anumāna).²

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1. Tathā karma vatornityāṁ prakṛti pratyayāṁśayoh; pratyayāś- tivelaṁyāṁ bhāvanātmā avagamyate. (Tan. Var. P.348),
2. Yādṛśaśca guṇabhūtaḥ karta atrāvaghmyate na ādṛśena viḥa Bhāvanopapadyata iti arthāpatyā anumāṇena vā saktāgamayi- tum. (Tan. Var P.914, )
The Mīmāṁsaka continues to criticise the views of the grammarian in the following way:— The very fact that number is related to the agent only, also goes to prove that the agent is presumed by Bhāvanā. That is to say in instances like ‘gacchet’, we find that the number (meaning) is not secured by any other means of knowledge and as such it is to be accepted as the expressed sense of the suffix. Number being a quality can not exist independently and hence its ‘āśraya’ as the agent or object has to be presumed. But not Vice-versa. It is very unfortunate that the grammarian could not understand the spirit of the teachings of their sages Pāṇini, Patañjali etc. If we closely examine Pāṇini’s style of aphorisms dealing with this subject, it will be evident that these aphorisms dealing with the verbal affixes are to be construed as forming a single sentence so that any incompatibility can be avoided by reading all these aphorisms as a single sentence. So when we examine the whole set of the aphorisms dealing with the verbal affixes, from this view point, one thing becomes clear to us that whether the relationship between the words constituting the aphorisms mentioned in the said section is either by having the same locus or otherwise, the final purport is that the verbal affixes denote only the numbers oneness etc. as qualified by the agent or object as the case may be. This type of interpretation alone can avoid all the discrepancies and will be in keeping with the spirit of the section dealing with the verbal affixes. Thus it becomes established that the agent or the object is the result of presumption but not of direct denotation 1 And further Mīmāṁsaka always proves the potentiality of words or even sakti (capacity) with the help of presumption (Arthāpatti) only. This being the position, in the present case, this presumption is capable of being explained with the help of

1. Tasmād karturekatva ityevamādinā darsite kartikarma viṣṭa ekatvādayaḥ prayayavācyeyāḥ āṣastrnugataḥ. (Tan. Vār. P.926, 11.5-6).
Bhāvanā i.e., Bhāvanā cannot exist without an agent. Hence the notion that the verbal affix denotes the agent, cannot be accepted but should be discarded.¹

The Mīmāṃsaka contends that the stand of the grammarian can be set aside on another count also. The agent or object is not expressed by the Verbal affix. The verbal affix denotes Bhāvanā with which it is invariably concomittant. And it is also an accepted fact that which denotes something with which another thing is invariably concomitant, can never denote this latter as seen in the instance of Simsupa. The word Simsupa being denotative of the class (Jāti) Simsupa is incapable of denoting the individual treehood (vyaktī), the invariable concommittant of the former. Further, the verbal affix can not abandon its own denotable meaning Bhāvanā, just to express either the agent or object because these can be obtained even by other means like Arthāpatī or Anumāna. The agent or the object is cognised even without accepting a separate potentiality to it in the verbal affix. Further the agent or the object is a Kāraka just like any other Kāraka as instrument (karāṇa) etc. The Mīmāṃsaka finds no logic in the argument of the grammarian that the subject kāraka alone is expressed to the exclusion of all other kārakas like the instrumental Kāraka. Now let us take the word Āsyate. Here according to the grammarian also, the verbal suffix does not denote either an object or an agent. The verbal affix found in Pacati or Yajate’’ is just like the one found in Āasyate. And there is no logic in accepting the affix to denote Bhāvanā at one place and not to denote it at another place. If we are to accept the grammarian’s theory, it would contradict all the above mentioned arguments based on inference. Hence the Verbal affix cannot denote the agent or object.²

Kumārila now probes into the very roots of the arguments of the grammarian i.e. the sameness of substratum of the agent or the object and Vyāpāra, in Caitra. The Mīmāṃsaka questions,

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1. Tatra yadivācaka śaktyā astītvamanumīyeta tatah pūrvokten- 
   arthāptibhangena sarvapramāṇa anupapatteḥ anupalabdhi 
   virodhaḥ (Tan. Vār. P.932,).
whether such co-existence is directly denoted by the verbal affix or got through secondary signification. 1

Neither the Mīmāṁsaka nor the Grammarian can admit that such a co-existence is directly denoted by the verbal affix (śrāutaṁ). To the Mīmāṁsaka a verbal affix denotes Bhāvanā and to the Grammarian it is sakti (Potency) as such there is no possibility of direct denotation of co-existence, because one is vyāpāra and the other is a dravya.

For the grammarian a Kāraka is nothing more than a capacity and as such we do not find capacity (śakti) being expressed by the words Devadatta and the like, since they are found to denote substance (Dravya). Consequently; if the affix is accepted as denoting the Kāraka, it must be admitted that it would denote it only in the form of capacity and never in the form of a substance, because the substance is not the Kāraka. Hence in accordance with the law pertaining to the ākṛtyadhikarana, it must be admitted even by the grammarian, that capacity alone is the meaning signified by the affix but not the substance. 2 Thus, no co-existence with the word denotive of substance would ever be possible. Nor, do we find any word mentioned along with verb word, that could denote potency with which (word) there could be a directly denoted coexistence. Such a word denoting potency could only be one that ends in a Kāraka case affix, but in instances like "Caitreḥ pacati" there is no word found to be ending in a case affix. Thus the Mīmāṁsaka establishes that the directly denoted coexistence is not possible either for him or for the grammarian. 3

1. Tathāsamānādhikāraṇyām śrāutaṁ lākṣanikāṁ ca heturucyate. (ibid 933).

2. Note : Even if the kāraka be accepted to be a dravya, śakti has to be accepted as the attributive to it. Since without śakti, Vyāpāra is impossible, Hence according to ākṛtyadhikarana only sakti is signified and this sakti can not agree by the relation of identity with a word which signifies dravya Caitra etc.

3. Tatascavasthitāṁ sṛti sāmānādhikāraṇyasyodbhayorapaoosiddhātvāṁ' (Op. Cit.)
Now if we come to the second possibility i.e. the coexistence be one that is got through the secondary signification (laksanā) then in instances like the "boy is a lion" (Simho māna-vakah) you have to accept the coexistence of boy-hood and lion-hood in the boy inspite of the fact there exists no such idea of the expresser and the expressed (vācyavācakabhāva. And such an acceptance leads to the fallacy of Anaikāntikatā. 1 Thus it is established that co-existence can not be proved with the help of secondary signification.

Now as regards the citations of Paktā, Pācakā etc., quoted by the grammarian to prove his stand that the verbal affixes have denotational potency in the agent etc. the Mimamsaka says such an argument is not valid because words like Pacati etc. do not purport to signify sakti but because they agree with some other sakti, they should be construed as signifying the saktimat. Thus all the fallacies pointed out in the first few arguments of the grammarian can be extended even to the other arguments. For instance contrary to the contention of the grammarian we say that the verbal affix can not express the number of the agent. It is like this. Numbers always belong to substances but not to capacities. The grammarian admits it And as such numbers do not belong to Kārikas like the agent etc., which are of the form of capacities. 2 And if we are to hold that the verbal affix denotes the substance whose number it would express, then there would be a conflict of its not agreeing with a dravya as no grammarian accepts that the verbal affix is denotative of a substance. 3

1. Atha laksanaya samanādhikaraṇyavamvisesitam vā hetuḥ tataḥ simho mānaavaa ityādisvantareṇāpi vācyavācakabhāvam. samanādhikaraṇyam drṣṭamityanaikāntikatā. (Op Cit. P.934).
2. Śaktīḥ Sadhanam (M. B.).
Now as regards the contention of the grammarian that the Anabhibhitakara affix itself is a proof to establish that the verbal affix denotes agent or object, the Mīmāṃsāka replies as follows.

The contention that "other designations like karatka, karma are preceded in the verbal affix denotes the agent etc., is not a sound argument. Here it is to be noted clearly that, if the prevention meant by the grammarian, be the prevention of all other karatka (case) affixes, then the argument is subject to the fallacy of the unestablished (asiddha) in the given example "Devadatta pacati" the nominative affix too is a denoted karatka case affix.

Further the grammarian opines that the nominative and other case affixes, on account of, their being denoted by the verbal affix, then such dropping of case affixes is found even in the object etc., is not denoted by others, as in instances governed by the Sūtra "Ubhaya praptau karmayāyā". Here in sentences like "Devadatta pacati" are even Devadatta the genitive pertaining to the object does not denote the agent, but it prevents the seventh case affix from the agent. Thus the mere prevention of karatka affix as laid down by the grammatical rules cannot substantiate the contention that a verbal affix denotes agent or object.

Now to the argument of the grammarian that in instances like 'Devadatta pacati and Pacyate odanah Devadatta', the instrumental and accusative case affixes should have been appended after the words Devadatta and Odan respectively according to the governing aphorism "Anabhibhite" were not the agent and object denoted by the verbal affix, Kumarila replies that such an argument is not valid. It is clearly to be noted that enjoining a karatka affix is to bring the number meaning and the karatka meaning this being the position, in the present examples "Devadatta

1. Yadapi karatka vibhakteḥ pratibandhanām, taddapi yadi tattat sarvagya sattatatosiddham, prathamāya api anabhibhitakarakavibhaktitvā. (TM, V. 4, P. 335).
2. Udbhayapraptau karmayā (ibid).
pacati etc. 'the agent is found to be secured by Bhāvanā denoted by the verbal affix and the number meaning is secured by the verbal affix. Then what is left unexpressed? and what is that Which compels the grammarian to create another denotative potentiality in the verbal affix? Since the agent and the number are expressed directly or indirectly by the Verbal affix, the words Devadatta and Ódāna cannot take other case affixes. ¹

As for the argument of the grammarian that the verbal affix has to denote the agent or object since it (the verbal affix) signifies their particular qualification (number), the Mīmāṃsaka points out such an argument suffers from the fallacy of Anaikāntikatva as is clear from the instance of 'Sīmasūpa'. ² The word Sīmasūpa is not denotative of the class, tree, earthly substance etc. though it is found to denote a particular phase of these, the class Sīmasūpa. And just as in this case (1) we find that the denotation of the particular is not opposed to the non-denotation of the general. (2) In the case of the Eye also we find that its non-perception- ness of impermanence, is not opposed to its perception of colour. (3) Even according to the grammarian, the Verbal affix does not denote the generic element of 'substance' but denotes agenthood a particular phase of it in the form of the agent. So in the same way even without the denotation of the agent there would be nothing incongruous in expressing the number without expressing the Agent.

Further the argument of the grammarian that the expressed qualities cannot agree with the presumed individuals and therefore it is obligatory that the agent or object also should be expressed, is not tenable. ³ This can be answered following the

1. Sāmkhyāyāṃ karakevā dhirvibhaktyahī pravartate. Ubhayam cātra tatsiddham Bhāvanā tiṣṇvibhaktikāḥ (Tan. Vār. P.935) and also last but two lines.
2. Yattu tadvisēśabhidhānādālītī tatsīmasūpā śabdāṇiḥ anaikāntikām (Tan. Vār. P.940.)
3. Yadāpi gāmyāmānasya visēśā lie sambandhāḥ nāstī, atastat sambandha darśānā dabhidhānamīti (ibid.).
Aṣṭtyadhikarana Nyāya or Arūḍadhikarana Nyāya. In a statement like ‘Arūnāya ekahayaṇyā pingākṣyā somam kriyāti’, we find that the qualification Arūnāya (Redness) etc. agrees with the agent presumed by the Tīṇ suffix (of course through the medium of the cow).

Further the grammarian’s argument suffers from the fallacy of Anaṅkāntikatva. Let us examine the sentence “Madhurarasah snigdho sito guruṣca”. Here the madhurarasa (sweet taste), being a property, does not agree with other properties such as sneha and the rest. But all these properties exist in that particular object presumed by the phrase Madhurarasa etc… And certainly nobody would admit the word ‘Rasa’ is denotative of the substance directly. Similarly we can show another example where expressed meanings agree with presumed objects. For instance in the sentence “Aṣvasahasreṇa musitaṁ nagaram” (The city was robbed by a thousand horses), the action of robbing is connected with the raiders presumed by the word horses (aṣva). Thus Kumarila says all the arguments of the Grammarian are fallacious.

Now the opponent may question why in the case of verbs like Asti, Bhavati Jayate etc. no Bhāvana is cognised from the verbal affix and as such there can be comcomitance between the suffix and the Bhāvana; hence it cannot be admitted that Bhāvana is cognised only after hearing the suffix and consequently the affix cannot denote Bhāvana.

To this objection Kumarila replies that the objection holds good even to the grammarian who argues that Bhāvana is denoted by the root or the root meaning. So what the Mimamsaka argues is that, whenever Bhāvana is cognised, it is always expres.

2. Yattvastyādiparaḥ pratyayopi bhāvanāṁ jahāti tulyeṁ Dhatu samudayapakṣayorapyetat, Sarvathā Yatra pratyayate tatra tāvat pratyayārthatvatvam nisciye. (Tan. Vār. P.381.)
sed by the affix and where it is not cognised there is no scope for the discussion as to by what it is expressed.\(^1\)

Though Kumārila gives the above reply he does not seem to be satisfied with it probably because in the case of Asti, Bhavati etc. he has to provide for an exception. So now he offers an alternative argument to the opponent. In the case of the words, Asti and the like, also, there exists Bhāvana in the form of accomplishing the agent himself who is still in an unaccomplished state. And this Bhāvana cannot be distinctly cognised apart from the Agent.\(^2\) Though there is no functioning of the agent that can be specially cognised, the element of Bhāvana can be cognised due to the very innate potentiality of the affix itself... This Bhāvana has evidently generic nature present in both the birth of the individual (the former being Siddha) and the latter being sādhya.

The Mīmāṃsaka admits frankly the fact that Bhāvana is never cognised apart from the signification of the verbal root, but he humbly argues that the Bhāvana proper that is cognised in a general form covering many particular actions, is something entirely different from the action denoted by the root.\(^3\) That is to say, in all the particular actions viz. laying the vessel upon the fire, fanning etc., a common generic action in the form of Karoti (does) is always perceived. And among all these actions the mere action of "cessation from inactivity", the mere "moving" towards the performance of an action is what is meant by the word Bhāvana.\(^4\) And all the particular actions which inhere

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2. Astyādāvapi kartramīse bhāyve asthyeva hi Bhāvanā, Anyatrasaśabhāvattu na tathā sa prakāsate. (Ibid)
in the object as well as in the agent, become related to it (bhāvanā) either in the form of the instrument or in that of Process.

The Mīmāṃsaka here cautions us not to mistake in the above case that Bhāvanā is nothing more than a generic denotation of the verbal root'. No doubt Bhāvanā appears in a generic form but always in the form of "Something to be accomplished and never in the particular forms of the sacrifice etc." Yāga etc. also are called particular Bhāvanās because of their attributiveness in the form of Kāraṇatva etc.

Further, strictly speaking the Bhāvanā, signified by the verbal affix cannot be expressed in the same form by any other word. This Bhāvanā signified by the Verbal affix is entirely free from any element of gender and number. Thus the Bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsaka in general and Kumārila in particular asserts that the Verbal affix has potency in denoting Bhāvanā but not the agent or object which (in his view) can be had through presumption.

MĀDANA MIŚRA :

Mādana Miśra, a great Mīmāṃsaka, contrary to every other one, pursues an altogether different line dealing with the meaning of the Verbal affix. He says that "The activity, like blowing the pipe etc., in the form of activityhood, congenial to the fulfilment of the result is the meaning of the Verbal affix", and the result is the meaning of the root. He is so unfortunate that the theory pronounced by him has been severely criticised by the scholars belonging to every school or discipline. His views in detail have already been mentioned while discussing the meaning of the Verbal Root, as it is related to it (the meaning of the Verbal root).

1. Anyādevahi Bhagādau sāmānyam kāraṇatmakam
   Anyacca Bhāvanā nāma sadhyatvena vyavasthitam.
   (ibd P.383).
PÂRTHASÂRATHI MÎŚRA’S VIEW :

Kumarila did not specify whether Bhâvana exists in the form of activity in general as denoted by ‘Karoti’ or in the form of ‘effort’ (Yatna) as denoted by the word ‘Yatate’. So now Pârthasârathi Mîśra, an ardent follower of the Bhâtta Mîmâmsa school and the author of the Śastrâdipîkâ takes the responsibility of determining the character of this Bhâvana, whether it is of the form of activity in general as denoted by ‘Karoti’ or ‘Yatna’ (effort) as expressed by ‘Yatate’.

According to this scholar the verbal affix denotes ‘activity in the form of generality’ congenial to the fulfilment of the result which is called Bhâvana and is denoted by the verbal affix. He is of the firm opinion that there is nothing as Bhâvana over and above the meaning of the verbal root; but it is only a variation of the meaning of the verbal root. He analyses action, the meaning of the verbal root, as having two aspects in it; one is peculiar to the verbal root itself denoted by it as not having any activity in the accomplished form. The other is that which is found commonly in all the verbal roots. We can cognise it in its form from the sentence “He does” (Sah. karoti). It is in the form of accomplishment of something. Now let us observe the sentences, ‘He shakes, He sacrifices, He speaks’ etc. when we put the question. Kîm karoti, to each of these the answer is shakes, sacrifices etc. Now “Karoti” expresses an action and so the question ‘kîm karoti’ also expects an action in reply. And all the specific actions have in them a type of generic action. That is why when we put the question in terms of action in general, the reply “pecati” etc., speak of action in particular, not devoid of action in general. And this action in general is to be called Bhâvana and is denoted by the verbal affix. Thus it is cognised from the cognition of the verb (he) ‘does’.

1’ Aparaṁ tu sarvadhâtvarthânuyâyî karotipratyaya vedyâm kriyâtmakâm sadhyasvabhâvam anyotpâdânukâlatmakâm Ākhyâ- tabhidheyam... Tadeva bhavituḥ prayojakavyâpâro Bhâvanetvucvate”. (Sâś. Dip P.199).
Now the meaning of the verb ‘karoti’ is not effort (yatna) but activity (vyāpāra) only. Otherwise even the verb ‘karoti’ would become intransitive like the verb ‘Yatate’. Such a meaning i.e. a generic action is accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, because it is cognised in the presence of the verbal affix and it is not cognised in the absence of the verbal affix as in instances like ‘Pāka’. The activity, in particular actions like yaga etc., denoted by the verbal roots, gets syntactically connected with the meaning Bhāvanā denoted by the verbal affix, by the relation of karaṇa or karma according to the desire (Vivakṣa) of the speaker, taking the latter as objectness (Karmatva) as is seen in the instances ‘Pākāṁ karoti’ and yagena svargāṁ bhāva-yati and the like. The expressed sense of the affix is in the form of generality and when the question of particularity comes it is supplied through another means (i.e. root) but not by the verbal affix.¹

Pārthasarathi opines that the determinant of Bhāvanā is Vyāparatva in general but not Yatnatva. If we accept that Bhāvanā is of the form of Yatna as denoted by the Verb Yatate and also as the activity in general as denoted by the verb ‘karoti’, then the roots ‘Kr’ and ‘Yat’ become synonymous. So much so the root ‘Kr’ is also to be reckoned as intransitive like ‘Yat’; but in fact the root ‘Kr’ is transitive as it always speaks of something to be brought into existence. Further the root ‘Kr’ always has the expectancy of an object. And Bhāvanā has always an expectancy of the object, in the form of the activity, denoted by the Verbal root. That is why even in intransitive verbs like ‘Śete, Patati etc.’ we have Bhāvanā denoted by the verb karoti as ‘Swāpām karoti, etc...

Thus Pārthasarathi Misra concludes that the activity in general is the determinant of the Bhāvanā by being its theme and this Bhāvanā is always denoted by the verbal affix only.

¹. Tasyaśi vyāparasya viseṣarūpam pramanāntaraṇa vedyam na ākhyatena (Śās. Dip. P. 199,)


THE VIEW OF KHANĐADEVA

So far we have observed that the Mīmāṁsaka arguing against the Grammarians, takes it for granted that there exists something called Bhāvanā, denoted by the verbal affix. Now let us examine what actually is meant by Bhāvanā and the validity in accepting it, its nature and character. These aspects of Bhāvanā are lucidly explained by Khāṇḍadeva in his Mīmāṁsā Kaustubham.

According to the Grammarians the meanings of the root are the result (Phala) and activity congenial to it (Tadanukāla vyāpāra). Khāṇḍadeva raises a question as to what is meant by congeniality? Does it mean mere productivity (janakatvamatram) or engagement in general (Prayojakatvasadharāhāram va).\(^1\) Evidently it is not the former because even after the direct activity ceases, usages like 'he cooks' are rendered possible. Effort etc. exist in one's self, which effort produces the particular activity in the body which (activity) in its turn produces the particular result. The nature of productivity exists even after the activity ceases. It may not be urged that the word 'cooks' does not include that part of the meaning also because it is not experienced. For, we explain the word 'cooks' as Pāke Yatate, and hence Yatna is also included in the meaning of the verb word.

By not accepting the congeniality to produce the result as the determinant of the denoted meaning in the case of the word "cooks" and accepting efforthood and the nature of heating from underneath etc., by themselves as the determinant of the denoted meaning, if it is to be maintained that only those activities alone which are responsible for cooking, constitute the denoted meaning; and as such there is no overlapping, then the objector has to explain how the word 'Pacati' is explained as 'Pāke yatate' where 'Yatna' is separately spoken of from Pāka,

\(^1\) Mīmāṁskāastubham P.16, 2nd para.
and also he has to explain how yatna etc. are not included in the meaning of the 'pac'.

It may be argued by the opponent (Gramm. that, in the explanatory sentence 'Pāke Yatate' the root where conjointly uttered with Kṛt suffixes like Ghaṇi etc. denotes merely the result part and so the activity part is explained by the word Yatate etc.. But this argument lands us in many undesirable consequences. The one that we have to accept that the activity denoted by the concerned causal aggregate (Sāmagri) and the conjoint utterance of Ghaṇi etc., is an impediment to denote activity; Secondly, if Śakti is accepted in activity when the root is conjointly uttered with Tip, then, not only is there prolixity in the determinent of the denoter-hood, but also the acceptance of two separate cause-effect relations. Thirdly there is the contingency of the root appended with Ghaṇi etc. not denoting Vyāpāra, which is in common experience.

If, on the other hand, the grammarian argues that then the activity of the karaka is intended to be expressed by the root 'Pac' and hence there is no intention to speak of the other meaning, effort etc., and hence it is separately expressed in the statement 'Pāke Yatate', the Mīmāṃsaka rejoinds that in the explanatory sentence there is absolute necessity to accept the presence of 'effort' in the part of the Agent. Otherwise the word denoting the agent, cannot claim the nominative case affix because he is not the substratum of the activity denoted by the root. Nor can it be stated that some other activity in the agent is desired to be expressed by the word 'Yatate', since in that case the explanatory sentence 'Pāke yatate' itself will not be rendered possible. So from all these points the opponent has to accept that there exists in the verb word something in the form of effort etc. different from and independent of the activity expressed by the root. And that is called Bhāvana. Since the Verbal root denotes activity

1. Evam Tarhi pacati=Pāke yatate; Pākaṁ bhāvayati ityādiviva- rāntat yatādīnāṁ pākat prṭhakkaraṇena yatādīnāṁ paco samgrahānupapatteḥ (ibid P.17).
congenial to produce the result, one has to accept this Bhāvanā from which the said activity is produced. This Bhāvanā which the root fails to denote, is denoted by the verbal affix.

According to Khaṇḍa Deva effort-hood (Yat natvam) alone is fit to be the determinant of the potentiality of the Tiṁ affix. He does not accept the theory of Parthasarathi Miśra. According to Khaṇḍa Deva there is no single factor simple in nature worth to be the determinant of the meaning of the verbal affix because different verbs denote different activities and results. The explanatory sentence of Pacati is also formed to be Pāke yatate or Pakaṁ karoti. Taking all these factors into account it is prudent to accept (Yat natva) effort-hood alone as the determinant of the potentiality of the affix. Further the argument that karoti i.e. the root Kṛ does not denote 'yatna' (effort) is also not correct. For instance when a man is suffering from gout (vātaroga) there may be usages like 'Nāham spandāṁ karomi kintu vātarogenā mama dehasspandate' (I am not moving but my body moves (shivers) due to gout), from which it is evident that root karoti has the meaning of effort. Further it is parsimonious to admit that effort-hood is the determinant of denotative meaning-hood. Therefore, consequently, usages like 'Ratho gamanāṁ karoti etc' are explained by taking recourse to the secondary signification for the root Kṛ in the meaning 'congenial to movement'.

We have observed Parthasarathi arguing that if the root 'Kṛ' denotes 'effort' then it becomes intransitive because the root 'Yat' denoting effort is an intransitive root. So with the same 'effort', being denoted by both the roots, they become synonymous and hence the root Kṛ becomes intransitive. To this Khaṇḍa Deva replies 'it is not so.' It is an accepted fact that if the activity and the result denoted by the root subsist in the same substratum then the root becomes intransitive, otherwise transitive only. As

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regards the meaning of the root 'Yat', the result is the activity subsisting in Caitra and yatna concerned subsists in (him) the same substratum. Hence it is intransitive. But in the case of the root 'Kr' the result is in the form of production (upatkatti) which cannot subsist in the same substratum along with activity meaning. It is due to this peculiar nature of the particular roots, they become transitive or intransitive. So it does not matter even if we admit that the root 'Kr' denotes effort.¹

Strictly speaking, a root is said to be transitive when it has the definite expectancy of an object. Where such an expectancy is absent, the root is said to be intransitive.² (Of course the grammarians do not accept it.³) Here the expectancy is the inherent quality of the root word (Root) itself. That is why in certain instances there may be an expectancy of the object and in certain cases it is not. When we say 'karoti' the expectancy is kim karoti? This expectancy can be satisfied by the supply of the proper object word ghatam, hence the root 'Kr' is a transitive root. The form of the word denoting the object also should be 'ghatam' (Ghata-Am) with Am in its own form 'Am' (objective case affix concerned) but not its meaning e.g. Ghta karmatvam karoti does not mean ghatam karoti; though the affix 'am' may signify the meaning karmatva.⁴ Thus the root Kr does have the expectancy because we do not put the question 'kim yatate' but 'Kasmin yatate'. In the case of the roots 'Pac' and the like, though originally transitive by nature, if the speaker does not want to treat it as transitive by mentioning the object, it is treated as intransitive. Similarly it is found that certain roots originally intransitive, are


2. Vastutasu..., avivaksa viraha visista karmakanksa dhatutvam sakarmakatvam, tadabhvasca akarmakatvamityevam kaustubhoktalaksanam yuktam. (Bha. Rah. P.62.)

3. For details see First Part. Chapter 3-7.

4. This is what is designated swarupa yogyata for the affix.
treated as transitive, for example, the root 'As' when spoken with the words denoting time etc. are treated as transitive as in 'Māsamaste; Caitreṇa asya te masaḥ' and the like.

Therefore inspite of the fact the root Kṛ denotes yatna it does not become intransitive. it is not dependent on the mere meaning of the root. Hence the affix which is explained in terms of 'Karoti' also denotes 'Yatna' only but not activity in general. Of course in instances, like 'the car goes, he knows, desires etc. where 'Yatna' cannot be explained as the meaning of the suffix, we take recourse to secondary signification in activity in general, or in substratumness as the case may be.

THE VIEW OF PRABHĀKHRA :—

The Prabhākara takes an altogether different stand. As regards the denotation of the verbal root he admits that a root denotes both the result and the activity congenial to it. He is also of the view that there exists nothing specially as Bhāvanā either in the form of 'activity in general' or 'yatna' to be denoted by the affix. All this is included in the activity part of the meaning denoted by the root. Thus he agrees with the grammarian. But as regards the denotation of the verbal affix is concerned, he is of the opinion that where the sentence is an injunctive one there only the Tī suffix denotes Bhāvanā and in all other cases, he states, that the verbal affix denotes only the number meaning and the Tense meaning. Thus from the Tī suffix in 'pacati' we understand that the activity is of the present tense, and its agent is a single person (Vaitamana Kalikā Ekakartākāh vyāparah).

2. Yatra yatnasya bādah tatra anukūla vyāparasya āśrayatasya vā. Laksaneti drāṣṭavyam (ibid P.63).
1. Nanu kītyadikāṁ nākyatasyārthaṁ kintu kālaṁ samkhyā ca; Prakārāntaralabhyatvat (Śab. Śak. Pra. P.399).
In as much as it is concerned with the Agent or Object, the Prabhakara joins hands with the Bh\=atta M\=im\=amsaka, to the extent that the agent or object is obtained by presumption (\=aks\=epa). Therefore what is left to be accounted for is the number and tense only. So the Prabhakara advocates that the Verbal affix denotes this number meaning and the tense (Past present etc.) because this much only is not secured from any other source.\(^1\)

Further, non-acceptance of the Bh\=av\=an\=a as the denoted sense of the verbal affixes in any way does not obstruct usage. And the acceptance of the number meaning and tense alone as the denoted senses of the verbal affix, does not result in any wrong usage. And if it so urged that without yatna, no activity is possible it can be explained as secured with the help of presumption from the meaning denoted by the verbal root.\(^2\)

Now as regards the practice of putting a question with ‘karoti’ a word which denotes activity in general, and getting a reply with a word like ‘P\=ak\=ami’ (karoti) does not have way to establish the denotation of activity or Bh\=av\=an\=a by the verbal affix. As a matter of fact the question ‘Kim karoti’ is intended to know the particular type of the action one does. Because no one can be without any action at any moment. Hence the intention of the person who puts the question ‘Kim karoti’ is just to enquire into that particular action of the person. Therefore there is no possibility of denoting action of the form Does (karoti) by the verbal affixes which action is different from that denoted by the root.\(^3\) Now the question raised by the opponent is like this—the question and answer is possible where the action or effort lies in human beings or animals, because they can perform many activities. But we find in sentences like ‘Ratho gacchati’ also this type of questioning and getting the answer. Therefore the affix

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2. Pacati ityatra yatnadv\=istu dh\=atvar\=thena \=aks\=ep\=adity\=ahuh, (Tar. Tan. Part 3 p.75).
3. Tath\=a ca na sidhyati dh\=atvar\=hatirikta karots\=arthav\=acanan\=a \=akhya\=t\=anan\=a (Pra. Pan. P.425). Edn. 1962.
denotes action. But the Prabhakara asserts such type of ques-
tioning itself is irregular. 1

Now summarising the entire discussion on the denotation of the verbal affix in accordance with the Mimamsakas we arrive at the following observations.

1. Mandana opines that the activity congenial to the production of the specific result as signified by the verbal root, is the denoted sense of the verbal affix.

2. Prabhakara Mimamsakas accept only the number meaning and the tense meaning but not Bhavana as the denoted potentialities of the verbal affix. For the Bhavana is expressed by the Ti affix in the case of injunctive sentences only.

3. The Bhattamimamsakas in general argue that there exists some activity called Bhavana, different from that which is denoted by the verbal root, and this Bhavana besides number meaning and tense, is the denoted sense of the verbal affix.

4. Parthasarathi Misra, a Bhatta Mimamsaka, argues that the activity in the form of generality alone is fit to be accepted as the denotation of the verbal affix.

5. Khajadeva says that this Bhavana is of the form of Yatna and its determinant is effort-hood (Yatnatva), but not activity in the form of generality.

Thus all these scholars except Mandana Misra unanimously agree on the point that there exists something called Bhavana in the form of either activity or effort and it is the denoted potentiality of the verbal affix, with the exception of the Prabhakara as detailed above.

1. Gacchatiti cottare gamanatirikta vyaparahavan anupapattireva syat (ibid).
Refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka Theory:

The Grammarian does not accept this theory of the Mīmāṃsaka. They criticise this theory severely. Now let us examine their arguments in this regard.

If it is argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that the agent is somehow presumed by Bhāvanā denoted by the Verbal affix, we have to say such an argument does not pave way in establishing the arrangement for forms expressive of different persons (Abhidhāna vyavastha).

In the case of the passive construction the suffix denotes only the result, but not Bhāvanā. And if it is argued that Bhāvanā is expressed here also, then according to the Mīmāṃsaka since the agent is obtained by presumption, the word denoting agent cannot take the instrumental case. Hence wrong usages like ‘Caitraḥ Taṇḍulah Pacyate’ instead of Caitreṇa Taṇḍulah pacyate will result. Otherwise it is to be admitted that the verbal affix in the active construction denotes Bhāvanā and in the passive construction denotes the fruit.¹

And if the Mīmāṃsaka fears that if Bhāvanā is presumed by the agent or by the root meaning, it could be cognised only in a subdued form and may lose its predominance in the verbal import. The grammarian assures that there would not be such contingency. There is no impediment for the meaning got through the means of presumption to be the predominant factor. Otherwise if the Mīmāṃsaka argues that only the expressed sense will have the predominance over that of which is obtained through presumption, then all his efforts made in the Ākṛtyadhi-karaṇa to establish the universal as the meaning of the nominal

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2. Ākṣepa lāhasyapi prādhānyena bhāne bādhakabhāvāt. (Vai, Bhū. P.11).
base will go in vain. Here the idea is like this. In the parlance of Mīmāṁsaka the nominal base expresses the universal (Ākṛti or jāti) i.e. words like Cow, Horse, etc denotes cowness, corsesness etc. universals. But not the individual. But when we use the sentences like ‘Bring the cow’, ‘Take the horse’ we cannot bring cowness or horsesness. So the Mīmāṁsaka accepts that the individual is obtained through presumption. Thus the expressed sense is the universal, but the predominance is only to the individual which is obtained through presumption.

As for the argument of the Mīmāṁsaka, in the case of the primary affixes, the denotation of the agent by these affixes is enjoined by a special aphorism ‘kartaṁ kṛt’, so only in these cases Bhāvana is got through presumption; but in the case of the Tiṅ suffixes there is no such an aphorism specifically enjoining the denotation of the substratum by these affixes hence there is nothing to prevent us from accepting Bhāvana as the expressed sense of the suffix and the agent through presumption; the grammarian replies as follows: Even in the case of the affixes Tiṅ and the like, there is a specific aphorism ‘Laṅ karmanī ca bhāve cākara.
makebhyaḥ’ which enjoins the lakāras (Tiṅ affixes, Śatī Śanac etc.) only in the sense of the agent etc. Of course the word ‘in the sense of agent (Kartari) is supplied into the aphorism from the previous aphorism ‘Kartaṁ Kṛt’. Such being the case, we find no logic in discriminating between the kṛt and Tiṅ affixes on this point, because in both the cases the maxim that ‘the expressive sense of the word must be such as cannot be arrived at by any other means’ applies equally. Otherwise the Mīmāṁsaka suffers from the fault of partial acceptance. (Arthajñarātiyāta).

Further Nāgęśa question the validity of accepting Bhāvana as the denoted meaning of the verbal affixes and accepting the

2. Detailed discussion can be had in Ākṛtyadhikaraṇā of Purva-mīmāṁsā (Sutras 3.1-6).
agent etc. as the denoted potentiality of the $K_r$ suffixes. The agreement of the gender and number will be with the agent only in either cases (i.e. in accepting the agent as the denoted meaning of the verbal affixes or $K_r$ affixes or accepting the Bhāvanā as the denoted meaning of the verbal suffixes as well as $K_r$ suffixes.) In the latter case the gender and the number meaning agree with the agent obtained through presumption.

Further it is evident from the Bhāṣya on the sūtra ‘Bhāvādayo Dhātavah’ that the root ‘$K_r$’ denotes Bhāvanā. Since the meaning of the root $K_r$ is coextensive with the meaning of other roots, it is logical to accept that Bhāvanā is expressed by the root itself. And it is also admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka that the roots $K_r$, Bhū and As which are co-employed (Anuprayukta dhātavah) also denote Bhāvanā. So we can take that all roots express Bhāvanā everywhere i.e. wherever the root ends with the Tiḥ, $K_r$ or Samādi affix etc.

REFUTATION OF ŚABARASWĀMY’S THEORY :—

As for the objection of the Mīmāṃsaka that a critical examination of the Pāṇinian sūtras dealing with the verbal affixes leads us to conclude that the aphorisms above mentioned do not express the sense of the agent etc., but its number and consequently the agent cannot be the expressed sense of the verbal affix, the grammarian meets him with the following reply. The appellations “Ekavacan, Dvivacna, and Bahu Vacan1” relate to the substitutes Tip etc.. The aphorism DvyeKayoh.. etc., forms one syntactical whole only with the sūtra Tiptasjhi, etc., but not with Lahari, and there is no such word as ‘Kartari’ in the Vidhi Sūtra Tiptasjhi etcr which word may somehow or other be connected with ‘Dvi and Eka as adjectives of Dvita etc.. The Sūtra ‘Tip tasjhī’ predicates substitutes ‘Tip’ etc. for the Lakāras taught by the Sūtra ‘Lahkarmanī’. So there is no logic in saying that the word ‘Kartari’ qualifies the number (samkhya)

1. Kimca $K_r$dhātorbhāvenarthathvasya dṛṣṭāvena sarvatra dhātoreva tadarthatvam yuktam (ibid L.M. npb) P.38. and commentary Nāgēṣa bhāvaprakāṣa P.39. last few lines.
because the sūtra ‘Lah Karmapi’ where the word ‘Kartati’ is to be supplied has no word showing Number. Hence the interpretation given by the Mīmāṃsaka to the above mentioned sūtras is wholly improper.

Further the Grammarian questions the Mīmāṃsaka whether, if the affixes denote Bhāvanā and presume the agent etc., is it the qualified agent (qualified by Bhāvanā) or a pure agent that is presumed. According to Nāgasaṇā neither of it is possible. If we accept a qualified agent (Bhāvanā visiṣṭa karta or Kṛti visiṣṭa kartā) then it becomes predominant and Bhāvanā becomes secondary. The Mīmāṃsaka cannot accept this position. If the pure agent only is presumed then in the verbal import it cannot qualify the Bhāvanā since it is never found that a secondary meaning qualifies a primary meaning.1 We see that in sentences like ‘Ganghāyām ghoṣaḥ’ the denotive meaning of the word ‘Gangā’ qualifying the secondary meaning ‘bank’ (Tīra), but not vice versa. Nor the Mīmāṃsaka is at liberty to argue that in the above case i.e. Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ; there is a difficulty to accept the primary meaning and hence it qualifies the secondary meaning; but here in the case of the verbal affix it is not of that position. But this argument is not logical, because there lies the proliity in accepting different denotations.2

Further let us take the two aphorisms ‘Lah Karmapi ca., “and Lataḥ Satrśānapacāvapratthamā samānaḥdikaraṇe”’. When we read these two as a single sentence we get the meaning that the lakaras are enjoined in the sense of agent etc.. And the Satr etc. suffixes are enjoined in its (lakāra) place as substitutes. So these suffixes also denote the agent like the lakāras. This is accepted even by the Mīmāṃsaka also. Now the Grammarian says that in a similar way the verbal affixes which are enjoined in the place of lakāra, express the same meaning agent etc.. And we have no valid reason to reject this analogy.

2. Vyutpatti Kalpane gauravam (ibid).
Of course the Mīmāṃsaka may say that the suffixes ṣat and ṣānac denote the agent by being governed by the aphorism Kartari kṛt. But it is not logical. In that case in words like 'Pacyamānāḥ (Passive) and Śayyamāna (Bhave) we can not have ṣānac. And if the Mīmāṃsaka tries to argue taking recourse to the aphorisms 'Bhāva Karmanoḥ'; 'Tanānāvatmaneśpadam', that also becomes improbable. In that case, i.e. ṣānac, subject to the governing aphorism Bhāva Karmanoḥ has to occur in the case of transitive roots also, but it is not accepted by any one including the Mīmāṃsaka. Therefore the Mīmāṃsaka has to admit that the verbal affixes denote the agent etc.

Further the Mīmāṃsaka fails to explain these two suffixes ṣat, and ṣānac though they are enjoined in the place of lakāra and these suffixes do not have the number meaning as two etc., Similarly the Mīmāṃsaka cannot explain the meaning of the lakāra which is an object of the affix Am in words like Edhāṃcakre etc.. According to the Mīmāṃsaka this lakāra has to denote the agent as governed by the aphorism 'Kartari kṛt'. But it is not so. Further this lakāra denotes Bhava or object (Karma) also, depending upon the following root (Anuprayukta Dhatu) as in the words Edhāṃsā; Bibnaram bādhūvire etc..

Further Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita makes it clear in his Sabda Kausṭubha1 that effort (bhāvana) cannot be the denoted sense of the verbal affix as argued by the Mīmāṃsakas; for in words like Bhoktavyam, the meaning, Bhāvana, is cognised even without the verbal affix. That is to say, in the above instance, we have the expectancy of a Karaka and its coexistence with the verb kāroṭi as instanced in 'Kīṁ kartavyam? Bhoktavyam, Kīṁ kṛtvam-Bhuktāvam' etc.. And on the other hand if we accept the stand of the Mīmāṃsaka then we must have usages like 'Bhavati ghaṭām' on par with sentences like 'Ghaṭām Bhāvayati', Because both the sentences give a similar meaning. But nobody accepts the former sentence. In the instances "Ghaṭām Bhāvayati" the causal affix

1. Kince Bhāvayati ghaṭāmitivat tvanmae Bhavati Ghaṭmityaṁ syat tulyarthatvat (Sab. Kau. P.1.3.1.).
Nic expresses the meaning of the action of the potter, while in the sentence "Ghaṭaṁ Bhavati" the verbal affix expresses the same meaning. And the pot is the object in either case. It can not be argued that the causal affix 'Nic' expresses the meaning of the causal agent (Prayojaka) while the verbal affix denotes the meaning of the agent and thus there is no similarity between the two sentences cited above. If the word agent (Karta) means one who sets to action the whole circle of objects that are connected with the action, then 'Ghaṭa' is not such an agent. If, on the other hand, it is considered that the agent is the principal entity which has the action expressed by the verbal root, as advocated by (Bhartṛhari) the Grammarian, then what could be the sense of the verbal affix since the action has already been denoted by the verbal root? That is to say, in the former alternative the definition given to the agent does not cover the pot (ghaṭa) and in the latter case Bhāvāna becomes the meaning of the verbal root itself.

Further in the Mīmāṁsaka theory the formation of the word "Jyotistomayajīn" becomes impossible. The affix 'Nin' enjoined by the aphorism 'Karaṇe yajaḥ' becomes applicable only in accordance with the theory of the Grammarian because the root 'Yaj' as a root (Dhātu) express Bhāvāna and the root as 'Yaj' denotes 'Sacrifice' (Yāga) which latter serves as the efficient cause Karaṇa concerned. But in the Mīmāṁsaka theory this formation is not possible because the element expressive or Bhāvāna is not present in the root and as such 'Karmatva' cannot have agreement with it.

Another objection is that there cannot be the agreement of the number meaning denoted by the verbal affix with the agent

1. Yadi tu-Dhātunoktakriya nityaṁ karake kartteṣyate iti Bhartṛhari Pratipadita itya, pradhānyena dhātupatta vyāpāratva rūpaṁ karttvam tavāpi sammatam. Kastarhi idānīṁ-khyatarthāḥ (Śabda Kaustubha-under Śūtra 1-3-1, P.51).
presumed by the Bhāvanā, because these two are secured through different means of knowledge.¹

Further take the sentence "Caitraḥ pacati". Here everyone including the Mīmāṃsaka, accepts that there exists identity between Caitra denoted by the word Caitra and the agent denoted by the verbal affix. Now the Mīmāṃsaka's theory compels us to accept that this indentity (Samanādhi karāṇya) exists between the denoted sense of the word Caitra and the agent obtained through a secondary signification (Laksitakartra) of the affix i.e. agent obtained by laksanā. If the Mīmāṃsaka means this, then he has to forego several other tenets of his Śāstra like the (pūrvapakṣa of) Arunādhikaraṇa and Guṇādhikaraṇa etc.

ARUNĀDHIKARĀṇA AND THE GRAMMARIAN:

Arunādhikaraṇa is explained in this way. There is an injunction "Arunāyā Ekahāyanā Kṣaṭa Somam Kriṇātī" (one should purchase some with a cow red, one year old and tawny eyed). As the Mīmāṃsaka says the words Ekahāyanā and Kṣaṭa agree with the verb since they are Dravyas and they have the indentity of case relationship with the cow. But the word Arunāyā is not a substance but quality so it cannot independently agree with the verb. On this point the Mīmāṃsaka formulates his purvapakṣa that the arunāya agrees with every thing used for the purchase of Soma. There he clearly rejects the argument that the word Arunāyā denotes substance through implication and that substance obtained through implication agrees with Bhāvanā (verb). Thus taking it granted that a substance obtained through implication cannot agree with that obtained by direct expression, the Mīmāṃsaka formulates the pūrvapakṣa. At this point the Grammarian questions how the Mīmāṃsaka can take a different stand regarding the denotation of agent etc. by the affix and argue there that the agent obtained by implication can have agreement with that expressed by Devadatta etc. in sen.

¹ Nahi Śabdamaśabdenānvaṭī.
tence like "Devadattaḥ pacati". The Grammarian insists that he should take the same stand in both cases. So as regards the denotation of Agent etc. by the affix the Mīmāṃsaka has to accept the Grammarian's theory at least in his own interest. Otherwise the formation of the Pūrnapakṣa itself becomes less meaningful and illogical.1

Now if the Mīmāṃsaka comes forward to accept the 'identity of the subject or object with an entity obtained through (lakṣaṇa) secondary signification, then his explanation of the Guṇadhikaraṇa becomes improper, because in his final view the Viśvedevah secured by implication from the word Vajibhyah should agree with Viśvedevah secured by direct assertion from the word Vaiśvadevi, in which case the entire karma will have to be considered as one, much against his own theory.

Further Nāgasa urges upon the Mīmāṃsaka to explain both the Kartradhikaraṇa and Jānjabhyamanādhdhikaraṇa on the same lines; and there is no justification in following double standards. Nāgasa argues with the Mīmāṃsaka that there is no difficulty for him even if he (Mīmāṃsaka) accepts the agent/or object as the denoted meaning of the Tiṇ affix, in properly explaining the Kartradhikaraṇa and the jānjabhyamanādhdhikaraṇa.2 Hence the Grammarian's theory is more logical in explaining the Mīmāṃsaadhikaraṇas.

1. Kincaivāṃ daṇḍi pingakṣyādi padanāmapi sambhandhe eva śaktih, lakṣitena ca sambandhinā samānādikaranyāṃ syāditī Arunādhī karaṇoccedah iti samāse nirūpayīśyāmah.
2. For details vide L.M. (nbp) P.44 to 52. (Tīhartha)
Vyāsatīrtha's Support to the Grammarian:

Vyāsatīrtha, a neologist belonging to the Mādhyā school and author of the Tarka-Tanulava extends a staunch support to the grammarian's theory regarding the denotation of the verbal affix. He too advocates the theory that the verbal affix denotes the substratum i.e. the agent or the object.¹ because in instances like 'Caitra cooks rice (Caitrastanulam pacati) we find agreement between the number meaning denoted by the verbal affix and the agent Caitra; and in instances like 'rice is cooked by Caitra (Caitreṇa pacyante tanulah) the number meaning of the verbal affix agrees with the object 'Tanulama'. Such an agreement as witnessed between the number meaning and the agent or object is not possible unless the substratum is also accepted as the denotation of the verbal affix. Further if the number meaning agrees even with those, not denoted by the verbal affix, it should agree with even the object in the active voice and with the subject in the passive voice; thus giving rise to a wrong construction of sentences as "Tanulan pacanti" in the sense of 'Tanulam pacati' and Caitreṇa pacyate and Caitrena pacyate tanulah in the sense "Caitrena pacyante tanulah".

Of course the opponent (Logician) may argue that though the agent or object is not accepted as the denotation of the verbal affix there is no incongruity found in respect of the agreement of the number meaning with the agent, for, the number meaning agrees with what is syntactically connected with Bhāvana.

Bhāvana by itself is of the form of activity (Vyaṇapa), and hence does not have expectancy with that which possesses the activity. That being the case, in the instance 'Caitra cooks rice', rice, which is an object, possesses certain activity in itself. So Bhāvana of the form of activity agrees with mere Caitra (devoid of any activity) cognised from the word Caitra ending in the nominative case affix which does not possess any action. Similarly in the passive construction the Bhāvana leaves off Caitra, the agent, secured from the word Caitra (ending in

the instrumental case affix) as he possesses activity and agrees with rice (Tāmālulah) which is got from the word ending in the nominative case affix. Consequently on observation we find that, in each case the number meaning agree with that with which the Bhāvana agrees.

Vyāsatīrtha says such an argument (as above) of the Logician is not logical. The number though follows kṛti it cannot agree with the meaning denoted by the nominal base with which kṛti agrees. Of the two number meanings, one of the Sup suffix and the other of the Tiṅ suffix, the nominal base has the expectancy of the number meaning denoted by the Sup suffix, only. This being internal and close to it, readily agrees with the nominal base. Then the nominal base does not have any expectancy of the number meaning of the Tiṅ suffix to agree with.¹

So far Vyāsatīrtha supports the Grammarian. Now he goes a step further and accepts the movent (Spanda) favourable to the meaning of the root as denoted sense of the verbal affix, besides the agent or object and the number meaning. And this meaning agrees with the agent as subsisting in it.²

Nāgēsa's Criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka-View:—

Nāgēsa bitterly attacks the Mīmāṃsakas and goes deep into the very roots of the Mīmāṃsaka’s arguments. He opines that the Bhāṣyakāra Śabara and Kumārila have drawn such conclusions from the Sūtras of the sage, Jaimini, which the sage has never intended. Nāgēsa says that there is no specific sūtra of Jaimini stating that Bhāvana is different from action and it is denoted by the verbal affix. And further the Purvāntīmāṃsa.

śātra (2.1.1).1 never gives such an import, which was drawn by Bhāṣyakāra and others that Bhāvana is different from action (denoted by the root) and is denoted by the verbal affix. When we examine the said sūtra the word ‘Karmaśabdāh’ means words denoting action i.e. verbs like yajeta, Dadyāt etc. Here Bhāvārthāh means Kriyārthāh because Bhāva; Karman, Kriya are all used as synonyms. It is evident from the words like ‘Bhāvaprādhanamākyātām’ kriyapradhanamākhyātām.2 And as such this sūtra never speaks of any thing about Bhāvana as contended by the Mīmāṃsaka. Hence from the words Dadyāt etc. action alone is predominantly understood. That is the reason why these words are only used but not the nouns like yāga Dāna etc. Of course since action gets destroyed quickly and does not last till the result swarga etc. is attained, the Mīmāṃsakas can accept a new entity ‘Āparva, and deem it to last till swarga etc. (the desired object) is achieved. So it is evident that there is nothing in the sūtra which gives even an indication that Bhāvana is the meaning of the affix but not that of the root. Nāgēśa finds no reason why these latter Mīmāṃsakas try to establish something which has not been said by their sage. Of course now the Mīmāṃsaka may take his stand on the maxim ‘Pratyayārthāh pradhānām’.

Refutation of “Pratyayārthāh Pradhānām” :—

The Mīmāṃsaka argues that of the base and the affix conjointly uttered the meaning of the affix is predominant. Hence in a verb word also the meaning of the affix should be predominant and the meaning of the root should qualify it.

Nāgēśa says that the very notion “Pratyayārthāh Pradhānām” as a universal fact, itself is a wrong conception because this maxim is only a casual statement which fails in many instances.

1. Bhāvārthāh karmaśabdāh tebhyaḥ kārmapratīyeta əśvvartho vidhīyete.
2. L.M. (k.k.) P.774.
Bhaṭṭa Kumārila develops all his arguments based on this maxim. Nāgēśa says that is a high handed argument (Prauḍha Vāda). For instance let us take the word Aja, Chāgī etc., Here the suffix denotes feminity and the base denotes the substance. Here everyone admits that the Predominance is only to the meaning of the base but not to that of the suffix.

Nāgēśa puts a shrewed question as to what the Mimāṃsāka means by the maxim 'Pratyayarthah Pradhanam'. If it means that the meaning of the suffix is predominant then the maxim has failed in its purpose in the above cited examples. Or, on the other hand, if it means that whatever is predominant that should be the meaning of the suffix, even then the maxim does not apply, because in the above example the sense 'goat' is predominant but it is not the meaning of the suffix. Thus either of the interpretations of the maxim does not hold good.

He further argues that the question of Pradhāna and Apradhāna arises only when there is an agreement of the meaning of the base and the suffix. In words like Pakvavān the meaning of the root is the object Pāka (Karma kāraka) and that of the affix is the agent (Kartā kāraka). Thus they cannot have mutual agreement because both of them are Kārakas; These are expected to agree only with the meaning of the root. As such there is no agreement at all, much less a case of predominance of the one meaning over the other. It should not be urged that 'Sambandha Sāmanya' may exist between the two as 'Pākasya karta', for there is no yogayata in-as-much as they are only kārakas which cannot mutually agree.1 So this theory has no scope at all.

And in a word or sentence the question 'which is predominant and which is not' does not depend on the maxim’ That is what Pāṇini states in unequivocal terms in his aphorism P.1.2.562

which means "it should not be construed that the meaning of the suffix is predominant because the knowledge of Predominance or otherwise depends on actual experience." And if we accept the maxim than the Bhāṣya on the Śūtra P.1.3.1 cannot properly be explained.

Thus Nāgescā opines that this maxim is applicable only in the case of suffixes which have an expressed sense as in the case of Kṛt etc. And if we accept it, then in the case of Pācaka, Lavaka etc. there will not be any incongruity. As far as verbal affixes Tin etc. are concerned they are not expressive but indicative (suggestive) of their meaning. Hence their meaning is subserviant to that of the base. And suggestiveness to these suffixes is amply explained in the Mahābhāṣya at several places like "Kartari Karmavyātihāre" ‘Śesātkartari Parasmaipadām’ Hetumati ca, ‘Lah Karmanī ca Bhāve ca’ Karmakebhyaḥ etc. śūtras. Of course strictly speaking it is only the root that has a denotative potentiality in action, result, number, tense, and substratum. Such a potentiality in number, tense and substratum is suggested by the Tin suffix. It has been established in the Bhāṣya on Pāni- ni’s aphorism. "Hetumati ca" that a suggested sense cannot have predominance over the expressed sense. As for the meaning of the word Bhāva it is maintained by the Vaiyākaraṇa that it is only Kriyā but not Bhāvanā. This has been amply explained by Kātyāyaṇa also. So from the Bhāṣya and all other commentaries it becomes evident that
1. Bhāvanā is not denoted by the suffix but by the root alone,
2. The suffix denotes the agent or object but not Bhāvanā,
3. The maxim ‘Pratayarthaḥ pradhānām’ applies only in the case of Expressive suffixes.

Thus to conclude, it may be stated that the Mīmāṃsakas invented something which is not expressed by the sage Jaimini. To substantiate their incorrect-interpretation of their texts, they did not

1. Pradhānāṃ pratayarthaḥ iti Na karyaś, Arthasya = Arthava- bodhasya, Anyapramāṇāvat āt Vyupatyanusāritvāt iti tasyarthaḥ (L.M. nbp. P.75).
2. Bhāvādayo Dhātavah (P.1.3.1.)
hesitate even to misinterpret the grammatical aphorisms without studying the entire Mahābhāṣya. And further their interpretations land them in troubles as explained in Arunādhikaraṇa, guṇādhikaraṇa etc. But if they accept the grammarians' explanation there will be no infringement of their fundamental theories.

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN :-

According to the Logician there is something called 'Kṛti' a particular type of activity different from the action denoted by the root, but congenial to it, and this kṛti is denoted by the verbal affix, besides number and tense. Now we shall examine their arguments and counter-arguments.

UDAYANA'S THEORY :-

Udayana, the first among the neologists propounds that there exists two types of action in a human being. One is the external i.e. Physical activity (Cestārūpa bāhyavyāpāra) and the other is internal activity (Ātmānātāvyāpāra) such as thinking, desiring, making effort etc. This second type of activity is called yatna, kṛti, bhāvanā and all these words are synonymous. Udayana discusses all this in the 5th Chapter of his Kusumāñjali, while discussing the sense of potential mood affix.1 According to him the meaning of Vidhi is not effort (Prayatna) because effort is the potentiality denoted by all verbal affixes in general.2 The arguments, offered by him in establishing yatna or kṛti as the denotation of the verbal affix are the same as those already enumerated while discussing the Mīmāṃsaka theory. Udayana says that this 'Yatna' itself is otherwise called Bhāvanā by Mīmāṃsakaśa's and kṛti by the Logicians.

Of course, some like Pārthasārathy, argue that the suffix denotes activity congenial to that denoted by the verbal root

1. Under the kartika 8 i.e. istahāneranistapetaraparvite etc.
2. Nāpi tatkarāṇam prayatnāh, tasya sarvakhyāta sādhāranatvāt.
favourable to produce the result. Otherwise there is prolixity. To this Udayana reacts that neither congeniality alone nor activity congenial to, can be accepted as the denotation of the verbal affix. And there is also no prolixity in accepting effort-hood (Yatnatva) as the determinant of the potentiality of the verbal affix. Further it is evident that 'Yatna' is the denotation of the suffix on the basis of explanatory sentence 'He does cooking' (Pākam karoti). Otherwise we have to accept irregular sentences of the form "Pākena Odanam Karoti" on par with sentences like 'Kāstenā Pākam karoti', but it is not tenable. So from the explanatory sentence we are to accept something congenial to 'Pāka' as denoted by the root. And that something is 'Yatna' itself and nothing else, otherwise sentences like 'Pākena odanām karoti' are inevitable.

Now the question is whether the word 'Karoti' means mere 'effort' whose adjunct is effortlessness or effort having both effortlessness and congeniality (of action towards the result) as its adjuncts. In the former case the word 'Karoti' becomes synonymous with word 'Yatna' and in the later case there is prolixity. Therefore the opponent demands basing on the principle of brevity, to accept "activity congenial" as the denotation of the verbal affix, so that we need not take recourse to the meaning by implication in sentences like 'Ratho gacchati' etc., where effort in its form of effortlessness cannot be cognised.

Udayana refuses such an argument of the opponent on two counts: One is the established experience of ours in the usage that "such and such a thing is produced and such and such is not produced "Kṛtakata vibhāgena" and the other is the way in which agent-hood is determined by Pāṇini. For example from the sentence 'Ghataḥ kṛtah' (The pot is made) we cognise 'Yatna' existing in the potter in bringing out the pot into existence, but

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1. Kṛtakata vibhāgena kartṛpa vyavasthayā, yatna eva kṛtiḥ pūrva parasmin saiva bhavaṇā (Kusumānjali V.9.) Here the words Pūrvā refers to Logicians and Parasmin to Māṁsakas.
there is no such experience when we hear sentences like Ratho gamanam karoti. So it is evident only in such cases where 'Yatna' is specifically experienced we make use of the word Kṛtā (produced or made). We do not find such usage in the case of a sprout from a seed i.e. there is no usage as 'Amkuraḥ kṛtah Bijena' (Sprout is made by the seed). The reason is that no effort congenial for the production of the sprout is witnessed in the seed. Of course there may be congenial circumstances or conditions (Anukūla hetavah). Therefore, from such well-established usages it is evident that the meaning of the word karoti is kṛti. Otherwise if it denotes some congenial action in general, then in case of sprouting also, there exists some congenial action whatsoever it be; consequently we have to admit sentences like 'Bijenaṁkuraḥ kṛtah' which are far from experience. Further, the fact, that the word 'Kartṛ' ending in the affix 'Tṛ' and derived from the root kṛ, is found to denote the substratum of effort, also goes to prove the contention that the verb word karoti denotes the sense of effort (Yatna). If, on the other hand, it is accepted that the root kṛ is merely denotative of 'Kriya', then 'Kartṛ' being the substratum of Kriyā, all the kārakas would end only in kartkāraka; because every kāraka possesses some activity of its own which helps to produce the result. Thus it becomes clear that the verb Kṛ is denotative of the sense 'effort'. And all the verbal affixes are explained away with the help of the verb word 'Karoti' so that we can safely conclude that all the verbal affixes denote the sense of 'Effort' only.

As a matter of fact, Udayana says, an affix in general has a denotation in all the three factors combined together i.e. in a state of beginning and ending; effort and congeniality (Purvaparibhūtatvam, yatna anukūlatava samudāye saktīḥ). And it need not be doubted how the suffix can denote all these three meanings in sentences like 'Ratho gacchati'. There the suffix does not denote all the meanings (Samudāya) but has denotation in

1. Tena ca sarvamākhyata padam vivriyate iti sarvatra sa eyār-tha iti nirñayaḥ. (Nya. Ku. V.9).
I part i.e. ‘congeniality’ (Anukālātva) just as the word ‘Srotriya’ used to denote Brahmin.2

And in the case of insentient beings and usages as ‘He knows, desires, stays, etc. are all to be explained taking recourse to the secondary signification’, i.e. through implication. Therefore in the case of ‘Ratho gacchati’ also we explain by taking recourse to the secondary signification. Hence it is established that the affix has denotation only in Yatna and all other meanings which are required depending on the nature of the agent, can be had through implication.3 ‘Otherwise if you accept activity in general congenial to action, as the denoted meaning, then when a man is sleeping or taking rest, which is required for a later work, such as cooking etc. we are to make sentences as he cooks, because he has activity in general congenial to cooking. Thus when one possesses the effort congenial to cooking, we use the verb in the present tense as ‘Pacati’. When the effort is over we use the verb in past tense as ‘Apākṣit etc.’

Further the root Kṛ denotes activity (Kṛti) subsisting in the agent. And the agent is always a sentient being. And the meaning of the root ‘Kṛ’ in the word Kṛta is of the form of knowledge, desire and effort. If meaning of the kṛ is something different from any of these, we have to accept insentient objects also as being denoted by the word agent (Kṛta). And it cannot be argued that an agent is one whose action is primarily denoted by the

2. Here the idea is this. The word Srotriya strictly denotes a Brahmin who is well versed in Vedic texts. But it is also generally being used to denote a Brahmin even if he is not well versed in Vedic texts.
3. Na ca vṛtyantareṇaḥ api prayogam hasī bhavē sakti kalpanā ayuktā Anyayāsa瓣e karathatvamitisttēh (Kusumaṁjali V:9).
root or the affix, it does not matter whether the agent is sentient or not. Then, when such a root or suffix is not used, the person who is actually at work will not get the designation 'agent'. Nor it can be argued that agentness means 'possess an activity (suitable to) worthy of being expressed by the suffix', because the nature of such worthiness itself cannot be established.

Further Panini's aphorism 'Svatantra Kartā' (P.1.4.54) clearly lays down that the agent is one who is independent. The nature of the independence is nothing but the inherence of knowledge, desire and effort, i.e. kṛti. Therefore it goes without any doubt that one of these must be the denotational potency of the suffix. Thus on who is the substratum of all these three, can act independently and can be called an agent. Thus, the way in which we can arrive at the nature of the agent also testifies, to the fact that yātā or kṛti is the denoted meaning of the suffix.

Now as regards the argument that this yātā or kṛti is obtained through presumption. Udayana states that this cannot be presumed by the action congenial to the fruit, nor through congeniality, because this action in general congenial to the fruit or congeniality exists even in the action subsisting in insentient beings. Further there is no coextensiveness between congeniality and effort-hood. So it cannot be through congeniality.

Nor it can be presumed through number; because number subsists in substances that can be counted, but not in effort which is always single.

Nor it can be presumed through the agent. Every agent may not possess effort. So through such an agent effort cannot be presumed. And if the agent is one who has action, is it action in the form of activity (Yatna) or something different from it; because action may subsist even in insentient objects, but through such an agent effort cannot be presumed. And if it is accepted that action is of the form of Yatna, then it can be stated to be the denoted meaning.

Nor it can be presumed through the action denoted by the
verbal root. In sentences like 'Vidyate Ghaṭah' etc., the meaning of the root 'Vid' is Being and it is permanent. Being permanent by nature it does not comprehend any yatna. Hence through this also, Yatna cannot be presumed.

Now the question is if kṛti or yatna is the meaning of the affix, then in words like Karoti, Yatate etc., we must get the knowledge of kṛti twice in the explanatory sentence i.e. one denoted by the root and the other being denoted by the affix. To this, the Logician replies that in the above cases the suffix does not denote kṛti or yatna (except number and tense) but it is added after the root in accordance with the maxim 'Mere roots are not to be used' 'a non-word should not be used'.¹ So here the suffix is only just to get wordness i.e. grammatical correctness, just as the grammarian explains the validity of number meaning to Sup suffixes in words like Ekaḥ Dvau etc..

THE VIEWS OF GAṆGEṢA AND GADĀDHARA:—

Further some scholars are of the opinion that this kṛti is denoted by the 'L' (lakāra) but no by Tiṅ suffixes, which are enjoined in the place of 'L'. Though the lakāra is not found in the word the knowledge of it is obtained through recalling. Thus kṛti is the denotational potency, of lakāra. But Gadādhara does not accept this view, because the original and substitute are not definitely determined. He argues that the suffixes are not uniformly enjoined by different grammarians in the place of lakāra so they cannot make us recall the original 'L'. Further we have to create so many cause and effect relations to explain the system. Hence taking brievity into consideration, Yatna is the denotation of the substitute only but not of the lakāra.³

So far we have seen the Logician arguing to accept the secondary signification of the affix in sentence like 'Ratho gaccha-

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1. Na Kevalah prakṛtayah prayoktavyah; Apadam na prayuñjeeta.
3. ibid P.575.
The question now is whether to accept 'activity congenial to' as the secondary meaning of substratum-hood (Anukula vyapare, va Asraya va Laksana).

A section of the logicians (old) argue that it is logical to accept 'activity congenial to' as the secondary meaning so that the sentence 'Ratho gacchati' can be explained as 'Gamananukula vyaparanartha.' Gangosa Raghunatha Siroma-Ii upholds this view. But the later logicians like Gadadhara and Jagadisa favour the other view i.e. Laksana in substratumness (Asrayatva) as the secondary signification or by established implication (Niruddha Laksana).

If Asrayatva is not the secondary signification, then the following inconsistency arises. Suppose a person pushes the cart, the cart moves but the person stands. So when the cart is in motion, because the activity congenial to the running of the cart exists in the person also, we will be constrained to accept a statement like 'the man goes' when the cart is actually moving, but the man stands. But if we accept substratumness as the secondary signification, then, because the person is not the substratum of motion, such a contingency will not arise.

And now take the sentences 'Caitro janati,' yatate etc. where we cannot notice any activity that can be assigned to the affix to be expressed by implication. And even if it can be explained in these places, in sentence like 'ghato ghaatavam vidyate' (Pot-ness exists in the pot), here every one should accept implication in Asrayatva alone. Therefore instead of accepting different secondary significations at different places, it is better to accept substratumness as the secondary signification of the affix, in a uniform way. But however in sentences like 'ghato Naasyati' (the pot perishes), the suffix expresses the counter-positive of destruction by implication.

Rajacādāmaṇīmahkin, the author of the Manidarpāṇa accepts both the views. However he finally favours the view “Āśraye Laksāṇā”.

The View Held by the Author of the Ratnakoṣa:

Almost all the later logicians are unanimous on the point that the verbal suffix denotes kṛiti. And where there is a stultification in such a denotation, they accept secondary signification either in substratumness or activity congenial to the action denoted by the root.

Now, here is an instance where the logician falls out of the general tradition. The author of Ratnakoṣa, a logician himself is of the view that the verbal affix has its denotation in the sense ‘Utpādana’, and that agrees with the meaning of the verbal root by being its (of the meaning of the verbal root) thems (Viśayin) and with the meaning of the nominal base as its (Utpādana) substratum. By accepting such a denotation and argument, he is of the opinion, that the contingency of the use of the verbal affix being rendered secondary in the case of sentient entities like the car goes etc., can be avoided; because productivity (Utpādākāśa) of the meaning of the verbal root is commonly found alike in the sentient as well as the sentient entities. And on the other hand, if activity (vyāpāra) or effort (Yatna) be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, in instances like ‘Yatate Jānāti etc., there would be prolixity in accepting Laksāna in all such large number of cases. But by accepting ‘Utpatti’ as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, since there is a possibility for effort (Yatna) and knowledge (Jñāna) to be the objects of ‘Utpatti’, the affix is enjoined in the sense of productivity, which is

1. Jānāti icchati yatate ityādau jñānādyanukāla manassamyoge laksāṇā, Na caivam gamanasyāpi jānātiti prayogapattiriti vācyam. Tarhi Karotityatreva Jñānādhyāśraye laksāṇā astu” (Manidarpāṇa P.199.)
valid from the point of view of meaning because both yatna and knowledge deserve to be produced, but in a very few cases like Utpādayate we have to accept simple grammatical correctness to the affix. The advantage of this view over the other is that we can avoid secondary signification in the words like Jñātī, icchati, yatate, nidrāti etc.. Hence on grounds of Parsimony 'Utpādana' is to be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix. However this view is severely criticised by Vyasatīrtha.

The Logician's Criticism of the Grammarians' View:

The Logician is very critical of the Grammarians' theory. He argues that the Grammarians' argument that if substratum is to be accepted as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, in order to secure the agent and the object in instances "Pacati Devadattaḥ (Devadatta cooks), Pacyate tānulascaitreṇa" (the rice is cooked by Caitra)" etc., is not correct, because the agent and the object can be secured from the verb through syntactical relation. Therefore acceptance of such a potentiality for the verbal affix is to be rejected on the grounds of prolixity. As for the argument of the Grammarians pertaining to the governing aphorism "Anabhīhite" the Logician argues that the rule is to be interpreted to mean, when the number meaning of the affix is not denoted. The words 'Kartari' and 'Karmaṇi' in the sutras 'Kartari Kṛt' 'Laḥ Karmaṇica' do not express the agent and the object, but their properties (Dharama) agent-hood (Kartṛtva) and object-hood (Karmaṇa). The seventh case affix, in the words Kartari and Karmaṇi, is used in the sense of "being understood" but not in the sense of "being expressed". Again if agent etc. be the meaning, then the agents being different in each case their determinants also will be manifold; but if agent-hood, is taken as the expressed sense of the suffix there is no prolixity. Such an interpretation avoids all the contingencies urged by the Grammarians.

1. For details see P.60-63 of this book.
2. Anabhīhite kartari ityāderanabhīhitāyāṁ kartṛdī samkhyaśām ityatraiva tatprāyaditi dik (Māṇḍaraprāṇa P.120).
Now we can summarise the whole argument of the Logician as follow:

The meaning or the denoted potentiality of the verbal affix is yatna called Kṛti. The agent and object are secured through syntactical relation. The word 'Kartari' in 'Kartari Kṛt' means 'agent qualified with activity', but mere agent-hood (Kṛti) only. Acceptance of the agent or object as the denoted sense leads to proximity. The determinant of denotative potentiality is of the form of the Universal Kṛtitva. This is proved from the explanatory sentence Pacati. Pākam karoti, wherein Kṛti is exhibited as distinct from the action denoted by the verbal root. However in the case where there is stultification of Kṛti as in sentence like the 'Car goes' (Ratho gacchati) we accept secondary signification in the verbal affix in substratumness. The tense meaning agrees with Kṛti denoted by the suffix. The number meaning agrees with the agent or object as the case may be.

The Logician's Explanation - Passive Construction:

In the case of the passive construction i.e. in sentence 'Tandulaṁ pacyate Caitreṇā' etc. the result and the action (Vyāpāra) are denoted by the verbal root. And the action agrees with the result, being an attribute to the latter. The affix, denotes substratumness (Āsrayatva). The result meaning of the root becomes an attribute to the meaning of the verbal affix i.e. Kṛti. And this meaning of the affix, being an attributive of the word in the nominative case affix (but not qualifying another word) agrees with its meaning. The meaning 'Time' agrees with the action denoted by the verbal root. Thus the verbal import is of the form 'Rice is the substratum for the softening produced by action, of the present time, which (action) inheres in Caitra'.

Some Logicians of the earlier period opined that in the passive construction the root denotes activity qualified by the

1. Caitravṛtti vartamanakālikakṛtijanyavyāpārajanyakviklittyaśrayastandulah.
The determinant of which is result. The meaning of the affix is result. But their view is not correct, because in the verbal import we hear the result twice. In the practical experience it is not so. Hence the affix denotes substratumness.

The Logician's view in the Impersonal Construction:

The lakāras are enjoined, after an intransitive root, in the impersonal sense (Bhāve). What we mean by the word Bhāva here, is, the meaning of the root itself. For example take the sentence “Caitreṇa sayyate”. Here the verbal suffix does not have any meaning but simply repeats (by Anuvāda) the meaning of the root. The affix is only for the sake of grammatical correctness of the word. Since Bhāva is always unitary by nature, the affix always is in singular number but never in the dual or plural. Again the affix denoting Bhāva in such sentences is always in the third person. Thus the verb word is always in the third person singular number. Hence the suffix does not denote either the agent or the number in the agent. Therefore the agent always takes the instrumental case. The meaning of this instrumental case is attributive to the meaning of the root. Thus the verbal import of the sentence ‘Caitreṇa supyate’ is of the form ‘Caitreṇa uttāna swapah.’

Here we can easily note that there is a departure from the general stand taken by the Logician, that the prathamāntara is the main substantive in the verbal import of a sentence.

Refutation of the Logician's Theory:

The much argued Logician's theory was subjected to seve-

1. The verbal import is of the form 'Viklittyanukula vyāparajanyaviklīṭtyaśrayastanudulah.
2. Lahī karmāntica bhāve cākarmakebyah.
3. However the Bhāṣyakāra gives examples in plural number also "ustrasikāḥ sayyante", etc.
ral criticisms not only by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Grammarians but also by a section of Logicians themselves. Now in the following pages we will discuss them in brief.

Vyāsatīrtha's Criticism:

The Logician's theory received a severe criticism at the hands of Vyāsatīrtha, who was a good Logician among the Dvaita Vedāntins. He does not accept the general theory of the Logicians in so far it concerns the meaning of the verbal affix. Some of the arguments advanced by him against the Logician's theory deserve mention in this context.

According to Vyāsatīrtha, as already stated, the verbal affix denotes activity in general congenial to that denoted by the root; besides this, it denotes the substratum also i.e. agent or object as the case may be. We have seen that Gangesā, the author of the Tattvacintāmaṇi declares that the verbal affix denotes Kṛti or Yatna. But Vyāsatīrtha opines that this Yatna, obtained by presumption through activity in general, is the meaning of the verbal affix, because Yatna is the cause and Activity in general is the effect. So from the effort, we can presume the cause, but not viceversa. And the example 'Ghāṭaḥ kṛtah Aṁkuro na kṛ- tah' cannot be helpful to the Logician. Because usages like 'he makes a pot,' the seed makes the sprout' makes it clear such a division of Kṛta and Akṛta is made only with reference to the productivity involving physical activity, and in its absence, i.e. where physical activity is not found, we use Akṛta. Therefore the root kṛ denotes activity in general only but not yatna or kṛti. And

further even the word Kartā is not a derivative word but only a conventional (Rūgha).  

If it is argued that the word ‘Kartā’ is derived by adding the suffix Tṛc to the root Kṛ, then in that case the root Kṛ should not be accepted as denoting the sense ‘effort’ and the affix ‘Tṛc’ as denoting the sense ‘substratum’. If it be so the word ‘Kartā’ means ‘the substratum of effort (Kṛtyāśrayaḥ)’. Then consequently from the word ‘Pakta’ we get the meaning in the form of ‘substratum of cooking (Pākāśrayaḥ)’ but not the substratum of the effort of cooking (Pakakṛtyāśrayaḥ). Further the affix Tṛc is also not denotative of sense ‘effort’, because, in such a case the meaning of the ‘Tṛc’ cannot agree with the effort secured from the verbal root meaning through the relation of Viśayatva or Janakatva. In the word Pakta, if it be accepted that the meaning of the affix Tṛc i.e. Kṛti agrees with the meaning Kṛti of the verbal root through the relation of identity, then we get the cognition of the effort; but not of substratum of effort. If the meaning of the Tṛc Pratyaya is considered Kṛti, it cannot agree with ‘Kṛti’ the meaning of the root by any relation Viśayatva or Janakatva. If identity (Abhedānvaya) is accepted, then finally Pāka Kṛti alone is denoted by word ‘Pakta’ but not the agent of Kṛti; which is necessary to be accepted. Therefore there is no other way but to accept Kṛtimān as the meaning of the affix Tṛc. Thus from the word Pakta we get the import in the form ‘Pākakṛti’ but not the sense as one possessing the effort related to cooking (‘Pākakṛtimān’). Therefore to avoid such an inconsistency the Logician is forced to accept that the affix ‘Tṛc’ is denotative of the substratum of the effort. Then the word Pakta gives us the sense “substratum of the effort of cooking”. Then take the word” Pāka


2. Tathā ca pākakartetātra dhatoh kṛtirarthacat, tṛjarthena kṛtyāśrayaṁ sa kṛnte dhatvarthasya anvayaḥ syāt. Na hi kṛtyāśrayaṁ punaḥ svakṛtyanvayaḥ (ibid P.65).
Kartā”. Here if the meaning of the affix is “Kṛtimāṇaḥ, (as the Logician is forced to accept, as shown above) and the root Kṛ also denotes Kṛti then the meaning of Tṛc (Kṛtyāśrayaḥ) has to agree with the meaning of the root Kṛ (kṛti). But it is not possible, because the substratum of Kṛti (of others) cannot agree with its own kṛti for a second time. Thus it becomes clear that the word Kartā is conventional in the sense of kṛtyāśraya or kriyāśraya, but not derivative (Yaugikal) as urged by the Logician.

Now, as regards the argument of the Logician that in instances like ‘the car goes’ (Acetanasthale) the use of the verbal affix is to be explained by taking recourse to the secondary significance. Vyāsasūrtha replies that there is no such need, because in the same manner as the word ‘Ganga’ is found to have the potentiality in signifying the meaning in Tira (Bank) due to its frequent usage in that sense, in the same manner the verbal affix is not found to have the power of expressing the sense effort, and as such there should be necessity to accept laksāna in vyāpara etc. But in this view he says there is only one mode of explanation, because he accepts Dhātvartānukāla vyāpara which commonly exists in both the sensient and insentient objects. Hence the contention of the Logician that that the verbal affix has denotative potentiality in the sense ‘effort’ does not stand to logic.

RATNAKOSĀKĀRA CRITICISED :

As already mentioned the meaning of the verbal affix according to Ratnakosākāra is utpādanaḥ and that agrees with the meaning of the verbal root by being its theme (Viśayin) and with the nominal base meaning by being the substratum. But Vyāsasūrtha criticises it severally stating that if we are to accept the above contention, then in sentences ‘Caitrāḥ pacati’ etc., we get

an import of the form "Caitra is the producer of the production of pāka"¹ but not the "producer of pāka".²

Further in the case of non-sentient things also we get usages like "the sense organ knows" (indriyam jānāti, Čakṣurjānāti) i.e. the instruments are said to be producing the knowledge. And also in cases "Caitra ghaṭam jānāti", we have the doubt "whether Caitra possess the knowledge of pot or not", because even those which cannot possess knowledge i.e. Čakṣus etc. are said to be the substratum of knowledge. Therefore it is not possible to accept that the verbal affix denotes "Utapādanā" and it agrees with the nominal base meaning as the substratum.

THE MĪMĀMSAKA CRITICISES THE LOGICIAN —

The Mīmāmsaka differs with the Logician to the extent that the root Kr does not denote the sense of effort (Yatna); because even without intending to convey the effort (Yatna), there are usages found in instances like 'the sprout is made of the seed (Bijenāṅkuraḥ Khṛṭah) and Happiness is made by heaven' (Svargādīna Sukham) etc. Further in the instances, Karoti and Yatate; there can be no agreement between the meanings secured from the base and the affix, because, both the base and the affix denote the same meaning viz. 'effort (Yatna). Further it is an unnecessary redundancy. In order to avoid such a redundancy, the Logician has to admit that here either the affix merely restates (Anuvāda) the meaning of the root or that, only those affixes which follow the verbal roots not denoting the sense of effort (Yatna) will be denotative of the sense effort (Yatna).⁴

1. Caitraḥ Pākotpattyutpādaka itidhiḥ, na tu pākotpādaka iti. (ibid).
2. Utpatterākhyātārthatve tayā sama Caitrasya jānakatva rūponvaya iti.
3. We cannot speak of any effort on the part of the seed, in producing the sprout.
Further the use of the verbal affix in the case of non-sentient objects like the car etc. in sentences like "the car goes" (Ratho gacchati) is rendered secondary in its signification, because, the car, an insentient entity, is incapable of undertaking any effort. Similarly in instances like "He knows (janati)’, "He wills (icchati) etc., where no effort can be cognised, the use of the verbal affix will be rendered secondary in its signification. In order to avoid all these defects, the Mīmāṃsaka urges upon the Logician to accept activity (Vyāpāra) as the denoted sense of the verb Kṛ. Thus all the verbal affixes, denote the sense activity only but not Yatna or Kṛti as held by the Logician.

The Logician Criticised by the Grammarian:—

Grammarians like Jñānendrasarasvatī, Bāṭṭoji, Kaunṭabhaṭṭa, etc., in their respective works the Tattvabodhini, the Manoramā and tha Bhūṣṣaṇa etc. have amply and aptly refuted the theory of the Logician. Nāgeśa, also did not spare pains in reasserting the Grammarian’s theory and refuting the Logicians’ theory. In the following pages we critically examine their views in brief.

The Grammarian says that in instances like ‘Pacati’, etc., our normal expectancy is about the agent who does the act of cooking. In compliance with that expectancy, it is proper to take the expressive power of Lakāras to be the agent (Kartā), but not effort (Kṛti) as urged by the Logician 1 If the verbal import of the word ‘Pacati’ is taken as effort congenial to cooking (Pākānukūlākṛtāh) as urged by the Logician, then one’s expectancy would naturally be either in whom (Kasmin) or of whom (Kasya). The Grammarian replies that it is against popular experience; because when the word ‘Pacati’ is used, one is normally enthusiastic to know ‘who cooks’ but not in which or for whom unless otherwise warranted by the context.

1. Tattvabodhini p.318.
Of course it may be argued by the Logician that even by accepting the Grammarians' theory, there is no possibility for such an expectancy regarding the agent to arise because the knowledge of the agent is already clear in the import of the word ‘Pacati’.

But it is not acceptable. Though we know from the verbal import that the action has an agent, and it is one, yet we do not know who that particular agent is. Thus though the expectancy regarding the agent in general is satisfied, the expectancy with regard to the particular agent remains unsatisfied. Hence there is a possibility for the question “who cooks?”. Further the Logician cannot object that even after knowing that the action of cooking has Devadatta as its particular agent, the expectancy in which or ‘for whom’ still remains unsolved, for, the action of cooking (Pākakriyā) means ‘an action favourable to softening (Viklîtthyanukālavyapāra). The substratum of this action viz. Devadatta is its agent. And when the substratum of the action is decided upon, the expectancy “in whom” or “of whom” does not arise at all.

Further in instances like ‘Pacantaṃ Devadattaṃ paśya’ Pacamanasya Devadattasya dravyam; the primary affixes ‘Satṛ and Śanac’ in Pacantaṃ and Pacamanasya respectively, just like Tip etc., should denote the sense of effort (Kṛti) only. But it is not so, because it is undisputedly accepted even by the Logician that Satṛ and Śanac affixes are enjoined in the sense of agent only. And if we are to accept from the suffixes ‘Satṛ’ Śanac’ etc. too, we get the import of Kṛti only. Then, in the above given instances i.e. Pacantaṃ Devadattaṃ etc the Logician cannot accept the agreement of the meanings of the two words with the relation of indentity. So in order to admit that the meanings of the two words agree by the relation of “non-differential identity”, (relationship) the Logician has to accept the primary suffixes Satṛ etc. denote the agent only. Further the Logician cannot accept that inspite of the prolixity involved, he is prepared to accept that the primary suffix which comes in the place of the

1. Ekakarti kā pākakriyā.
2. Praughhamanorēmā; unber p.3. 69,
Lakāra denote the agent and the Tiṅ suffixes denote kṛti, because such a prolixity is not a prolixity when it is justified. But this acceptance does not save him. Because it is an accepted principle of both the Grammarian and the Logician that the ‘Sthāni’ alone is denotative but not the substitute (ādesa) which comes in its place. So the Grammarian questions what is the validity for the Logician to say that Āraṇa etc. suffixes alone, which come in the place of Lakāra, denote agent but not the Tiṅ suffixes and that these Tiṅ suffixes denote kṛti. Therefore the Tiṅ suffixes too denote agent etc, but not kṛti. Acceptance of many potentialities for a word is not proper.¹

Further the interpretation offered by the Logician to the aphorism ‘Anabhihite’ is also not correct. It suffers from the fault of partial application inasmuch as it concerns the words ending in primary and secondary suffixes (kṛt and Taddhita) and also in the case of compounds, because the number meaning is not found to be expressed by them. The Logician explains the above sūtra ‘Anabhihite as Samkhyānabhidhāne’. Consequently in instances like ‘Paktavyastandulah’ ‘Prāptodakogrāmaḥ’ etc., since the number meaning is not expressed (Anabhihite) naturally the aphorism ‘Karmāni Dvitiyā’ etc., operate and no scope is left for the nominative usage. It cannot be argued that by supplying a word like ‘Tiṅhati’ we find even in the instances cited above number is expressed, because, if the word supplied is not ‘Tiṅhati’ but ‘Sthita’, then the number meaning is not found to be expressed. Thus the interpretation of the aphorism ‘Anabhihite’ as given by the Logician is untenable² and the Logician has to admit ‘Anabhihite as Anabhihite Kartari’ etc.

Similarly even in the case of the Tiṅ affixes, kṛti cannot be the denoted sense and we need not accept Lakṣāna (implication) in instances like ‘The Car goes’ (Ratho gacchati) by accepting the ‘substratum’ as the denoted sense of the verbal affixes.

¹ Praujhamanorama under P.3.4.69.
² Tattvabodhini P.319, P.3.4.69 Tasmād anabhihite kartari ityadi vyākhyānamevābhyūpetavyam.
The incongruity anticipated by the Logician which forced him to accept a secondary meaning (Laksana) can be warded off, because though the car is an insentient object, there is nothing wrong in its having activity (Vyapta) like movement of wheels etc. congenial to going. Hence just as the primary affixes express the substratum, so also the Tin suffixes too denote the substratum. And there is no valid and substantiating reason to discriminate between the primary affixes and Tin suffixes.¹

Nagesabhaṭṭa, in his Laghumāṇijūsa gives a systematic criticism against the Logician’s theory. Though Bhaṭṭoji, Kaṃṭha-bhaṭṭa, Jñānendra etc. had amply refuted the Logician’s theory, it is Nāgasa who, finally completed the task.

The objection of the Logician to accept ǎśraya i.e. the agent etc as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, is based on the principle of prolixity. If the agent is the denoted potentiality of the verbal affix, then the determinant of this potentiality is agent-hood (Karṇkṛti) i.e. in other words it is kṛti only. Since kṛtis are many in number, there can be no single common determinant of the denoted sense of the affix. So the Logician argues that if ‘Kṛti’ is accepted as the denoted meaning of the affix, then the determinant of the potentiality, by being its them, is ‘Kṛtitva’ (activity-hood) which is singular in nature and common in all activities (Kṛtayaḥ). Hence it is logical to accept kṛti (Yatna) as the denoted meaning of the affix.

For the objection raised by the Logician, the Grammarians Nāgasa criticises him severely. He questions him when the Logician has no objection to accept Cumber someness (Prolixity), in the case of the determinant of the secondary meaning, as in instances like ‘Gangayam Ghoṣah’ then what prevents him from accepting the same even in the case of the meaning directly expressed. And when the Logician has accepted ‘Kṛti’ as the expressed sense of the verbal affix the Grammarian has gone one step.

¹. Taṁmat kartā tiṇa ca vailakṣaṇyaṁ durlabhamiti kartṛartha- katvamabhyupeyaṁ. (Tat. Bo. P.3.4-69).
forward and accepted kṛtyāśraya as the expressed meaning of the verbal affix in order to obtain Samanādhikāraya with the subject of the sentence. And further there is no hard and fast rule laid down in any philosophy that, when a more concise property (Laghudharma) is available, more proxil property should not be taken as the determinant of the meaning. And there is no logic in saying that a more proxil property is to be taken as the determinant of the potentiality, only in the case of secondary meanings. In fact the determinant must be such that it is free from all the faults such as over-applicability, partial applicability etc. Hence when the determinant does not suffer from any of the said faults, when it does not matter whether it is concise or not. Nāgāša does not accept that determinant-ness is a different category. He views it as ‘Svarīpa sambandha, not different from svarīpa anb that svarīpa is present even in a gurudharma.1

And further, the question of taking the concise property or the proxil one as the determinant, arises only when both are possible.2 And these two would be possible where the meaning of a word is settled either as the expressed or otherwise. But in the present case of the verbal affix, the very expressed meaning is under dispute i.e. whether the agent is directly expressed by the verbal affix or kṛti alone. Unless it is settled, there is no meaning in arguing about the nature (i.e. cumbersome or simple) of the “determinant”. And the Grammarian has not accepted kṛti as the denoted sense of the verbal affix, because to him it is denoted by the root itself.3

Nāgāša further argues that no actual heaviness is experienced by, such as, when carrying a load on the head. The only difference is that the Logician accepts plurality in the case of kṛti which is the expressed meaning, the Viśeṣya, and in the Gramma-

2. ibid
3. Prakṛte ca pratyayit kṛtitvena bobhāḥ savīvādāḥ. Dhatutah eva tadbodhāt. (L.M. (k.k.)
rian's view it is the visesa (ktyāsraya) which has plurality. It does not matter whether Visesa is manifold or Visesa is manifold. There is no deciding criterion as to which should be manifold i.e., the visesa or Visesa. Hence is the Grammarian's stand.

And as regards the argument put forward by the Logician, that from the explanatory sentence, (Pacati = Pakam karoti) it is evident that kti is the denoted sense of the affix: The Grammarian comments that the Logician is wholly mistaken and far from a logical stand. The Grammarian says that to him a root denotes both the actan (Vyaspara) and kti. And as such in the explanatory sentence the former is explained by the word 'Paka' and the later by the root Kt. Hence the explanatory sentence cannot be helpful to the Logician. Further the Logician cannot demand that all the meanings expressed by a single word need be explained by a single word only. If he insists on this point, it is harmful to himself, because he too explains that of all the meanings expressed by verbal affix (i.e., kti number tense), kti is represented by the root Kt in the explanatory sentence 'Pakam karoti' and the rest i.e., number and tense, by the suffix 'Ti' in Karoti. Thus there lies the fault of self-contradiction. Further the Grammarian says that, if we are to accept the Logician's principle, then we interpret it as "the meaning of the root shall be explained by the root only and that of affix by affix. Thus the root Kti stands for the meaning of the root 'Pac' only but not of the affix.

Further the Logician, taking it for granted that the root Kt denotes kti alone, develops his arguments. But in fact there is nothing to substantiate his contention and on the other hand there is much evidence against it. In insentient objects no effort (krti) is witnessed. And as regards the usages "Naham spandam karomi" etc., they are explained on the same lines as the sentences 'Kasthāni pakam kurvanti' etc., are explained by the Logician. He accepts activity in general to be denotation of the affix in these sentences i.e., Kasthāni pakam kurvanti etc. So also to the Grammarian Kti (Yatra) is denoted by karoti in sentences like 'Naham spandam karomi' etc..
Now as regards the argument put forth by the Logicians (author of Ākhyatavādā Siromani, Udayana etc.) that the usages like "Ghataḥ kṛtaḥ. Ankuro na kṛtaḥ," etc. is proof in support of his theory, the Grammarian says that by accepting kṛti (Yatna) as the denotation of the affix in some places, and in some other places the action in general, there is a possibility of sentences "Bijādina ankuro kṛtaḥ" (Sprout is made by the seed). And another argument of the Logician is that the root Kṛ denotes yatna alone but not action (vyāpara or Bhāvana) which is congenial to it, because, if it be so, every kāraka gets the designation 'agent' (Kartāsamjñāḥ). The Grammarian replies, that is an welcome feature in language and the Bhāṣyakāra, Patañjali accepts and allows such a possibility as in sentences quoted by him Sthāli pacati, Tandulaḥ pacyante svayameva, Kāsthāni pacanti etc.

For a while let us set aside these arguments and counter arguments of the Logician and the Grammarian with reference to the meaning of the root Kṛ and let us investigate the opinion of the Mahābhāṣyakāra in the matter.

The Mahābhāṣyakāra Patañjali, while commenting on the sūtra ‘Bhūvdayo Dhattavah,’ (P.1.3.1) lays it down very clearly that all the roots like Pac etc., have identity of meaning with that of the root Kṛ, i.e. the root Kṛ expresses only action in general (vyāpārasāmānyam), and the roots ‘pac’ etc., specify the particularity in action. Further the sentences ‘Kīṁ karotī’ gives an import to the effect ‘what is it he does’, thus the question has import in knowing the Particularity of the action. Here the samānādhikaranyā (identity) is explained in the form of generality to particularity.²

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1. Kathāṁ jñāyante kriyāvācinoḥ pacādayaḥ iti, yadesāṁ karotiṁ śamānādhikāranyāṁ (M.B. on P.3.1.3).

2. "Samānyavisesāṁ bhāvena samānādhikaranyāt kriya vīsesa vācinoḥ pacādayaḥ pratiyanta iti (Kaiyata on the above Bhāṣya)."
Now as regards the argument of the Logician that in sentences like "Vṛkṣo varthatā, (the tree grows) Rātho gacchatī (car goes)" etc., the affix has secondary signification in substratumness, the Grammarian objects that, it is far from any accepted principle because the substratumness, qualified by the growth and movement existing in the tree and the car respectively, has no direct relation with kṛti, the denoted sense (in the Logicians' theory) of the affix. And even if the Logician tries to explain through some indirect relation (Parampara sambandha), it cannot come under the scope of "śakya saksat sambandha". There is no secondary signification in the meanings which are indirectly related to the object i.e. we resort to secondary signification only in those cases (meanings) which are directly connected with the primary denotation. And this has been clearly explained by Mammata in his Kavyaprakāśa 'Prayojana na lakṣanā, sambandhaḥ bhavat' while dealing with Lakṣanā in words like gāṅga in "gāṅasyaṃ ghoṣah".1

Of course the Logician may argue that there is no hard and fast rule to accept the above statement of the Kavyaprakāśaḥakara which has its say mainly limited to poetics alone. It is true. Then Nāgāsa explodes his last weapon on his opponents. 'Grammar is the science which deals with words, their derivations, meanings agreements etc.. Hence one has to abide by its rules and its interpretations as given by the authoritative people in that science like Pāṇini Patañjali, etc.. And everything is clearly mentioned in this sthāna, which word, or suffix has a particular

1. Here the idea is this: in the sentence "Gāṅasyaṃ ghoṣah", the word Gāṅga has secondary signification in Tīra (bank) and the coolness, holiness etc. are obtained through suggestion (Vyanjana vyāpāra). But a question is raised why not we accept Lakṣanā for the word Gāṅga directly in the coolness and the holiness, and why we need this vyanjana. To this the answer is "Hetvabhāvat pavanāt vadau na lakṣanā; yogān phalena no, na ca sabdarthasya tatasya and "Saksat sambandha eva lakṣanā prayojaka iti bhavati" (Commentary on the above).
sense. Hence to use a word in a particular sense other than that permitted by this sāstra or vice versa (i.e. to assign a particular meaning to a word contrary to this sāstra) leads to confusion and the whole system of grammar becomes void. The meanings and explanations of words, suffixes and sūtras etc. as given by the Grammarian should be accepted by all and one should not create or assign meanings as one likes, taking recourse to primary or secondary significations. This is evident for those who are conversant with the Bhāṣya on sūtras like Pratyayabhiṣumyogadākhyāyām, ‘Parāśca’ etc. Otherwise, if one goes on creating and accepting secondary significations, then the sūtras ‘Kartikarmapoh kṛtī’ ‘vyatya yo bahulaṁ’ etc. become null, because there also we can resort to secondary signification, thus avoiding the actual meaning of the sūtras. Therefore the Logician has to accept the suffix as denoting the substratum of action of result i.e. agent or object.

In Pāṇinian grammar the arrangement of person (Puruvayavasthā) is governed by three sūtras ‘Yusmadyupapade samānadhīkaraṇe sthāninyapi madhyamah ‘Asmadyuttamaḥ Śese Prathamāśa’ i.e. when Kāraka (agent etc.) expressed by the affix has identity with the word Yusmad then the root takes the second person etc. suffixes. Similarly when the identity is with ‘Asmad’ it takes first person suffixes and in all other cases it takes the third personal affixes. This is possible only in the Grammarian’s theory, because to him the suffix denotes the agent or object kāraka. And this system fails if we accept the Logician’s theory that Kṛti is the denoted potentiality of the affix because there is no identity between the ‘Kṛti’ and ‘Yusmad’ etc. words.

And suppose the opponent argues that on hearing the word ‘Pacati’ without any word in the nominative there does not arise any doubt whether the agent is one or not. This is possible only when the number agrees with the agent. Unless the agent is expressed directly or indirectly (through secondary signification) the number cannot agree with it. Since Kṛti is denoted by the affix, there is no alternative except to accept secondary signification to the affix in the agent.
This argument of the Logician is based on the theory that the affix denotes $KR_{ti}$; but it is the very subject which is under dispute. And as already mentioned it is now here experienced that $KR_{ti}$ is the denoted potentiality of the affix. Further the Logician takes it for granted that on hearing the word 'Pacati' there is no doubt regarding the number meaning of ONE. But such a contention is also not correct. For instance, when one says $Ane\tilde{h}KR_{ti}$, definitely there arises the doubt whether the agent is one or not. (i.e., one or two or more). Hence it is better to accept that the suffix denotes the agent etc.

Further according to the Grammarian, on hearing the word 'Pacati' there rises an expectancy with reference to the particularity or quality of the agent in the form '$_{Ka}h$ or $KR_{i}sa\tilde{h}$', because to him (the Grammarian) the agent is already denoted by the affix. This is common experience. This is not possible unless the Logician admits that the agent etc., is denoted by the suffix. Otherwise the nature of the enquiry should pertain to $KR_{ti}$ i.e., in the form '$_{Kri}si\ Kri_{ti}h$'.

Further in words where suffixes are not found e.g., $Ajar\tilde{h}h$, Acakat, Ahan etc. the Logician explains that Yatna ($KR_{ti}$), number and tense meanings are being denoted by the verbal root and in other places they are denoted by the affix. Thus all these meanings are denoted by the affix in certain cases and by the root in some other cases. Thus it is a clear case of prolixity. But to the Grammarian all these are denoted by the root itself and the suffix is only indicative (Dyotaka).

Suppose the opponent admits that according to him too the affix is only suggestive i.e., all these meanings are suggested by the affix, then $KR_{ti}$ or Bhāvana, which you (Logician or Māmā-saka) argue as the expressed sense of the affix has to become attributive to the meaning denoted by the root contrary to your view because a suggested meaning, in the presence of an expressed meaning, cannot be a substantive. Otherwise the import '$P\tilde{a}kanu\tilde{k}la\ Kri_{ti}h$' where $KR_{ti}$ is substantive will not be possible.
Pāṇini has laid down the following aphorisms in his case system 'Anabhihite (if the agent or object not expressed) Karmanī Dvitiyā, Karṇkarana yostttyā etc.. Here the Logician explains the sūtra 'Anabhihite' as the 'number of the Agent or object not being expressed'.1 (by the affix Lakāra). Thus he tries to explain the case system. But he cannot absolutely maintain it. Because in instances like 'Caitraḥ Paktā', 'Caitraṇa dṛśto ghaṭaḥ' etc. the Kṛt suffix does not denote the number of the agent or object. Hence according to the Logician the word 'Caitra' and 'Ghaṭa' in the above sentences should take the instrumental and objective case affixes respectively, in which case the sentences become absurd. But according to the Grammarians the suffix denotes the agent or object itself, hence the said sentences are correct. And it cannot be argued by the Logician that the Kṛt suffix also, though there is no specific rule to that effect, denotes the number as well, by virtue of its nature.2 If we accept this argument of the Logician, then there will be no need to formulate sūtras like 'Kartari Kṛt' wherein it is clearly laid down that Kṛt suffixes are enjoined in the sense of agent i.e. Kṛt suffixes denote agent alone. Here also by accepting 'svabhāvāt tadva- cakatvam' we can drop the aphorism. Further these aphorisms are laid down to restrict a word in its denotation, otherwise there will be a state of chaos.

Of course the Logician may argue that in sentences like 'Caitraḥ Paktā', even the Grammarian cannot avoid instrumental case for the word Caitra, because the word 'Paktā' is a complex word (vṛtti padam). So the whole form has meaning but not parts and as such the agent cannot be denoted by the affix. And the Sutra 'Kart Karnaṁyosttyā' has scope for operation there too. To this the Grammarian Nāgėśa replies that it is grammar which governs or controls the behaviour of words i.e. it governs the base or suffix etc. to express certain meanings in certain contexts. And the Logician (or the Mīmāṁsaka) must be aware of the fact

1. Karṇkaranī lakāra vacye ityasyayamarthah-Tadgatasamkhya Vacyeti (Śabdacintamaṇi).
2. Anusasanaabhāvepi svabhāvāt tadva- cakatvam.
that of all the means to arrive at the meaning of a word, grammar is the foremost one. \(^1\)

And the Logician may argue that he is prepared to accept K\(_t\)t suffix to denote both the agent and number so that Anabhihite means ‘if the agent or the number of agent etc. is not expressed’. Thus in the instances ‘Caitraḥ paktā’; Dṛṣṭo ghaṭah\(_h\) Caitrenā etc. there will be no impropriety of case suffixes. But this proposition of the Logician is not genuine, because such an acceptance is a matter of prolixity. And even if the porlixy is tolerated by the opponent, since the necessary word-formation is explained, still it leads to too many undesirable results. \(^2\)

Further if ‘Anabhihite’ means when number is not expressed by the affix ‘then in instances like Caitraḥ iva Maitraḥ\(_h\) pacati’ etc., the number in Caitra is not expressed by the suffix ‘Ti’ the word Caitra is to be used in the instrumental case.

Further even in sentences like ‘Caitraḥ pacati’ etc. the theory of the Logician does not hold good because the number expressed by the suffix cannot agree with the word in the nominative because it is prevented by the number of the nominative case affix. Nor can it agree with K\(_t\)t. Hence in the sentence cited above the Logician cannot prevent the instrumental case affix for the word ‘Caitra’. It also cannot be argued by the Logician that the number expressed by the case affix is only for grammatical purity so that the number expressed by the Ti\(_h\) suffix agrees with the word in the nominative (Caitra in Caitraḥ Pacati) which (word) is not attributable to any other word. To this Grammician replies such as argument is far from logic because the base meaning and the number meaning are expressed by the same word, so the number meaning of the case suffix quickly agrees

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1. Vyākaraṇopamāṇa kośāpta vākyat vyavahāratasca, vākyasya seṣād vivṛtadvādanti sannidhāḥ siddhāpadasya vṛdhah\(_h\).
2. Saṃkhya kartrādyanyatarānabhidhāne ityarthe gauravāmī durjñeyatvam\(_a\) ca, Tadbhinna bhinnasyaiva anyataraṁ rūpatvāt (L.M.(nbp) Tiśārtha P.23).
with its base meaning whereas the number meaning, expressed by the verbal affix does not have such an affinity to agree readily with the nominative base meaning. But to the Grammarian the number expressed by the affix agrees with the agent itself (because to him, the agent is denoted by the affix) and to the Mimaṃsaka, too it agrees with the agent obtained through presumption. Thus the arguments of the Logician that the word ‘Cāitra’ etc. takes the nominative case, if its number is not expressed by the verbal affix, is not correct. Here the idea is this: According the sūtra the second and third personal or first personal affixes are enjoined when there is an identity between the kāraka agent etc. with the words yuṣmād, āsmād etc. But in the given instances no such word is there and ‘Parama tvāṁ,’ ‘Tvat kalpaṁ,’ ‘Ati tvāṁ’ are not the words Yuṣmād etc. So how can you justify the personal affixes? To this the reply given by Kālaya is that in the sūtra the word Yuṣmād means not only the word form yuṣmād but where the agent etc. expressed by the verb word has an identity with one possessing the meaning Yuṣmād word. Thus Ati tvāṁ does not have a meaning equal to that of the word Yuṣmād. In this the third person is justified. In other cases second person is justified.

Now as regards the validity of system of person in sentences like ‘Parama tvāṁ pacasi,’ Tvatkalpaḥ pacasi, Atitvām pacati etc., the Grammarian explains the word ‘Sāmanādhikaraṇa, in the sūtra ‘Yuṣmadyupapade samānādhikaraṇe etāninyapi madhyamaḥ (P. 1.4.105), as identity with action because of non-difference between the action and its possessor.1 Of course the Logician may argue that grammar is only to teach the purity of words but not to decide the meanings or give interpretations as he likes. But he is totally mistaken. Because it is clearly said by the Nyāyabhāṣyaśākara that ‘Padasamaya jñānartham vyakaraṇam saktigrāhakaṁ

1. Paretu yuṣmadi kriya samānādhikaraṇe iti vyakhyānam, kriya kriyāvatośca abhedat tatsulabham. (L.M. (kk) P.746,)
etc. 1 Therefore the Logician is not at liberty to interpret the aphorisms of grammar as he likes to suit his arguments.

Now the Grammarians argue that the explanation of the Logician regarding the denotation of agent object etc. by $K_t$ suffixes is not satisfactory.

In the Ākhyātavāda Siromani the argument put forward by the Logician as regards the meaning of the $K_t$ suffix is the experience of identity between the substantive and the attributive as in sentences like: ‘Caitro gantā, gato grāmāḥ’. Mitraḥ pekti, ‘gatām purām’ etc. And the other argument is the identity in number and gender as can be witnessed in the above words. These two arguments, as the Grammarians feel, cannot help the Logician, on the other hand they are more in favour of the Grammarians’ theory.

If experience is the authority, then, in the case of $Tīn$ suffixes too we have the same experience of denotation of agent, object etc., as in the case of the $K_t$ suffixes. So there also (i.e., in the case of $Tīn$ suffixes) the Logician has to admit the agent etc., as the denoted sense of the $Tīn$ suffix; because the very same logic applies there too.

And secondly, as regards the identity in number and gender the Grammarians point out that the Logician’s argument suffers from the fault of partial applicability. There are many sentences, where, in spite of the identity between the base meanings there is no identity in number and gender, e.g. Vedāḥ Pramāṇam; Gavo dhanaṁ, Jātvākṛtiivyaktayastu Padarthah (Nyāyasūtra) etc. Further there are instances where the $K_t$ suffix denotes mere activity e.g. ‘Paktā jātaḥ’ which means ‘pako jātaḥ’. Here the $K_t$ suffix does not denote the agent because of the saying “utpanne vidyāmāne va tathāprayogasāṁbhavana, kṛtyāsrayasyātmamā jananāsambhāve ca”.

1. Samaya pālanarthaṁ cedāṁ padalakṣyanāyāḥ, Vāc śa vyākhyānam vyākaraṇāṁ (Bhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtra 2.1-56).
It is not open to the Logician to argue that in such cases there is a possibility of forming sentence like ‘Caitre ganta’ instead of Caitraḥ ganta because Caitra being the substratum of kṛti the word takes the locative case. According to the Grammarian such usages can be warded off in the same way as the Logician wards off such usages in the case of Tiṁ suffixes i.e. the meaning of the kṛdanta i.e. kṛti agrees by the relation of substratumness with the meaning of the noun word which (word) is in the same substratum as in the case of the kṛdanta word. This kṛti has its substratumness in the denotation of the noun ending in the same case affix as that of the kṛdanta word. If the Logician argues that since no kṛdanta is used to denote kṛti therefore a kṛt suffix does not denote kṛti, but kartā etc.; on the same lines the Grammarian also argues that no Tiṁanta word is found used to denote mere kṛti so a Tiṁ suffix too does not denote kṛti but agent etc. Further in the absence of the denotation of the agent by kṛt suffix the Logician cannot argue that the case-system (Abhidhānabhidhāna vyavasthā) fails. We explain it if the kṛti is not expressed, then the agent takes instrumental as in the instance “Caitreṇa pakvas. tamālah” and where the kṛti of the agent is expressed it takes nominative as in ‘Caitraḥ pācakah’. Then the Logician may question the agreement of kṛti in sentences like “Bhoiktā tiḥpyati”, for that the Grammarian says in such stray cases we accept lakṣaṇā to denote agent. Thus the Logician cannot maintain that a kṛt suffix always denotes agent only but not kṛti. Hence the Logician has to admit that Tiṁ suffixes too denote the agent, object etc. which fact is cognised in the experience of the sages. And to the Grammarian, the kṛt suffix denotes agent object etc. based on the aphorisms ‘Kartari kṛt’ etc. If the Logician says that for him too, this aphorism authorises the kṛt suffix to denote agent etc.; what harm is there for him to accept the same dictation of the Grammarian in the case of Tiṁ suffixes too?

1. Ākhyatārthakṛteḥ prathamānta padopasthāpya iva kṛdarthā kṛteh kṛdanta samāna vibhaktikanāmārthe eva āśrayatayā avayasyavikāraṇā adosāt (LM (kk) P.746).
Further, in the passive construction, according to the neologician the activity क्रिया or कर्तिवर्ण is the denoted sense of the instrumental (त्रियार्था) and the suffix denotes the difference and the result. The non-denotation of the result by the suffix is deemed to be the non-denotation of the object (कर्म). But this view is not acceptable to the Grammarians, because he argues that when a question like ‘किम क्रिया’ is put, generally the reply is something like ‘पाच्या’. But to the Logician it is not possible to reply like that because for him, the root क्रि denotes यात्रा (क्रिति). To the Grammarians it is only action in general. So the expected answer is with reference to the particularity of the action. Hence the question and answer as above are possible only in the Grammarian’s theory.

Of course the old Logician may say that to him the क्रि is the denoted sense of the suffix even in the passive construction, so he has no difficulty in the question and answer cited above. It is true. But if he says so, there comes another difficulty. The Grammarians argue that in such a case the old Logician cannot justify the instrumental case in the case of the agent, in sentence like ‘कैत्र्यं किं क्रिया’. In the active construction, to the Logician, the agent is deemed to have been expressed, because its attributive (quality) i.e., number, is expressed by the affix. Similarly here also since his (agent’s) attributive i.e., क्रि is denoted, the agent is deemed to have been expressed. Hence the word denoting the agent ‘कैत्र्य’ cannot take the third case affix.

As regards the agreement of ‘Time’ meaning also the Logician’s theory suffers prolixity. Normally in all verbs the time factor agrees with क्रि denoted by the affix, but in the case of verbs like करोति, यत्ते etc., it agrees with the root meaning itself. Thus he has to accept two different ‘कार्य-कारण’ relations. But it is not the case with the Grammarian, because to him the time meaning always agrees with the meaning of the root only.

1. भेदाक्षरस्य चालन स कर्मक्ष्यतार्थाः (Vyu Vā. 142)
Further, if the Logician’s theory is accepted we cannot justify certain generally accepted propositions. For instance, when the effort, subsisting in Caitra, congenial to cooking (inflaming etc.) is withdrawn, and while the rice is boiling and the cook (Caitra) is standing, watching the rice, then if anybody puts a question “what does Caitra do” normally the reply is Caitra cooks (Caitraḥ pacati), but according to Logician’s theory this reply is not possible because the effort (Yatna) is not there i.e. the verb cannot be in the present tense and the reply must be in past tense, because the ‘Yatna’ is a matter of the past. But to the Grammarian there is no such difficulty. Because all that the cook does till the softening (Viklitti) is produced, comes under the meaning of the root. Since such an activity (vyāpara) is there in Caitra, a root, can take the present tense.

Now Nāgesa silences both the Logician and the Mīmāṃsaka with his shrewed arguments. The Logician and the Mīmāṃsaka based their theory that the suffix denotes Kṛti or Bhāvanā, on the explanation of the word ‘Pacati’ as ‘Pākāṁ karoti’. Nāgesa says that, if it be so, to him the explanatory sentence of ‘Pācaka’ as ‘pacati iti pācakah’ is an authority to show that the affix denotes the agent. The tenor of the argument is the same as that of the logician in the case of ‘pacati pākāṁ karoti’. In pācaka there is the root and the suffix. In pacati also there is the same root and the affix. The meaning we get from both the suffixes must be the same. And in the case of the word ‘pācaka’ you accept the suffix denotes the agent. On the same lines here also the suffix Tiṁ should denote agent only. Thus the suffix denotes agent etc. The import we get from the dissolved constituents of a complex word must be identical with (import) that we get directly from that word. We cannot and should not get different imports from the explaining words and the word explained. Hence the Tiṁ suffix denotes agent etc. but not Kṛti or Bhāvanā.

1° Kim ca kṛtau kartrvanvye pākesatyāṁ kāṣṭa jvalanādyanukūle yatne nāṣe, pacyaṁānamodanāṁ pasyati Devadatte pacati-tyanāpattih (LM(kk) P.747,)

Here, the Logician, of course may object that he cannot accept the explanation offered on the basis of 'Pacati' 'Pacakah'. He says the import we get from both the words is not the same even if it be accepted that the Tiṁ suffix denotes the agent. Because the import from the word 'pacati' according to the Grammarian is 'Eka kartikāpākakabhāvāna' i.e. here the agent is an attributive and the action is the substantive. But the import we get from Pacakah is Pākakarta i.e. here the agent is the substantive and the action is the attributive. Thus the relation between the substantive and attributive is reverse in the imports. Hence there is no identity in the import from the words explaining the complex word and the word explained.

This objection of the Logician is set aside by the Grammarian. He argues 'though the relation between the attributive and the substantive is reverse, it is not an impediment in cognising the object' as in the case of 'Āksikah' or 'Kūnibhākāra' or Citra-guhṛ etc.

However, Nāgēśa goes a step forward and argues that where the Tiṁanta word expresses the sense of complex word (Vyātipada) as in pacati-pacakah, there in the import of that word the kāraka is predominant and the action is subordinate; but if the verb word is an independent one i.e. does not form a part of the vigraha vākya, there the action is predominant and the kāraka is subordinate. In fact, Nāgēśa says, that 'the sense of the complex word is same as that conveyed by the constituents of the vigraha-vākya and there is no change in the substantive-attributive relationship.'

1. Tathāca visēṣāna visēṣya bhavāmye samānarthatva viraha api anyāmye vivaraṇatvam sakfinirṇāyaktvam ca samānarthatvat syaditī bhavah (Bhūṣana under kārika 34.).
2. Here the idea is this: Samasta padat citrabhinna gosvāminī svāmīvisēṣyako bodhah. Tadvigraha vākyat yatsambandhinyasćitra gāva iti visēṣyakāsa bodho jāyate. Tadvatprakṛtepi.
Thus the Grammarian establishes, with all these arguments, that a verbal suffix denotes substratum of the form agent or object but never does it denote kṣīti, yatna or Bhāvanā.

The Meaning of the Verbal Affix - A Critical Assessment :-

The whole discussion on this subject can be summed up as follows :-

Let us take a sentence like 'Caitra cooks'. Here from the verb word we get the various notions such as action (vyāpāra), result (phala) substratum (Āsraya) in the form of agent or object; Time (kāla), number (saṁkhyā) etc. According to the Grammarian, action and result are expressed by the root; hence the remaining are to be accepted as denoted by the verbal affix say Tin. Now as regards the denotation of Time and number there is no difference of opinion among the Grammarian, the Logician, and the Mīmāṃsaka; but as regards the substratums of action and result, denoted by the Ākhyāta they differ. The Grammarian, speaking in a general way, argues that in the active construction the verbal affix denotes the agent, and in the passive construction the verbal affix denotes the object. In the impersonal form of the verb, the meaning of the affix is simply the meaning of the root—'Bhāva' as it is called. The Grammarian argues that his conclusions are based on the authority of Pāṇini's sūtras like Lau Karmāṇi ca ..., Dvyekayoḥ ..., etc. and the Nirukta, and the Mahābhāṣyakāra's clarifications. Thus according to the Grammarian the import of a sentence like 'Caitra cooks' would be 'activity favourable to cooking having a single substratum non-different from Caitra. In passive voice too the import is activity (favourable to softening) which (activity) has for its substratum one non-different from Caitra (favourable to softening) and which result has rice as its

1. Eka Caitra bhinnāsrayako pākānukāla vyāpārah.
substratum. In sentence like ‘the pot perishes (Ghato Naśyati) the import is “activity favourable to disappearance” (Naśānukālo vyāpārāh). The activity mentioned here is nothing but the existence of a collection of materials of destruction which are of the nature of the counterpositives. With reference to sentences like ‘He knows (Jānati) similar is the import i.e. activity favourable to knowledge, is the meaning of ‘knowing’.

The Mīmāṃsaka and the Logician do not accept the above theory of the Grammarian.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka the verbal affix denotes Bhāvanā but not the agent or object. He opines that this Bhāvanā is different from the action denoted by the root, This Bhāvanā produces the action denoted by the root. Thus in the verbal import Bhāvanā is the primary substantive. He arrives at this conclusion based mainly on the explanation of the word ‘pacati’ as ‘pakaṁ karoti’. The word ‘karoti’ expresses the meaning of the suffix Tin’s ‘pacatī’. And according to the Nirukta, this is Bhāvanā (effort or activity) and it is primary. The agent or the object is obtained by presumption (Ākṣepa). The agent so obtained agrees with the word in the nominative by the relation of ‘identity’. Thus the import of a sentence like ‘Caitra cooks’ would be ‘effort (which exists in the agent—not different from Caitra) congenial to softening (Eka Caitrabhinakartī samaveta viklittyanukūla bhāvanā).’ In the passive voice the import is

1. Tandulāśrayika yā viklittīḥ tadanukūlo Caitra nīṣṭo vyāpārah. Vai, Bhu. P 28. Here it is to be noted that according to Dīkṣita and Kaundabhaṭṭa even in the passive construction, the activity part of the root meaning is the primary substantive. But according to Nāgāsa the result part of the root meaning is the primary substantive. This later view (i.e. of Nāgāsa) is more correct than the other one as it supplies the appropriate emphasis on the result part.

According to Nāgāsa the import in the passive is of the form “Eka Caitrāśriyikā yā vartamāṇabhāvanā tajjanya ekatandulāśrayika viklittīḥ.”
Effort which produces the result subsisting in a substratum not different from rice (Tandulabhinn-sritavakarmatva samanadhikara svaphalprayojikā bhāvanā). In the impersonal form of a sentence like 'Caitreṣa supyate' the import is of the form "Ebhāvanā of sleeping having Caitra as its agent (Caitrakartikā svāpaḥ)". The word Bhāvanā (effort or activity) has been explained as "the particular activity of a doer conducive something to be (being). This Bhāvanā is causal in form and as such is always transitive.

Further the Mīmāṃsaka takes the 'age old maxim' 'pratyayarthat pradhānam' as an authority for his theory. Reading this with the Nirukta words Bhāvapradānamākhyatām he arrives at the conclusion that the affix denotes mainly Bhāvanā. In fact from a verb word the action is primarily understood. But Mīmāṃsaka cannot accept the entire action to be denoted by the affix for the reasons already explained. So it appears he has taken action to mean physical activity. This physical activity is produced after some inner action (Antah vyāpara) and physical action (Bāhyā cestārūpa). This physical action is denoted by the root as (vyāpara) effort, the internal activity is called Bhāvanā and is denoted by the affix. And to substantiate it, he says the root Kṛ denotes it in the explanatory sentence Pākam karoti. Besides this, we find no valid reason or argument on the part of the Mīmāṃsaka. The Grammarian does not accept this argument of the Mīmāṃsaka. After all the explanatory sentence, according to Nāgėśa shows that both the internal and physical activities are contained in the root meaning itself. Thus the root Kṛ shows the action in general and the root 'Pac' denotes action in particular which cannot exist without the former. Since this internal activity is expressed by the root itself, there is no need to accept a separate denotation of it by the affix. Since agent etc. is not expressed by the root it is logical to accept that the affix denotes the agent

2. Bhaviturbandavānānuṅkālo bhāvaka vyāpara viśeṣah.
3. Vide refutation of the old逻辑ian's theory.
5. Ananyalabhyaḥ sabdarthaḥ.
etc.. Otherwise, the Grammarian argues that the Mīmanāsaka cannot satisfactorily explain Aruṇāadhikaraṇa, Guṇāadhikaraṇa, etc.

In fact Kumarila, the very propounder of the Bhaṭṭa school is not definite whether this Bhaavana is denoted by the root or the suffix or by the entire verb word. But however basing himself on the maxim of pratyayāarthapraadhānīya he says, let this Bhaavana be denoted by the affix. Kumarila mentions clearly that neither the Sūtrakāra nor the Bhasyakāra ever said that Bhaavana was denoted by the suffix. Though there is no logical reasoning (specific reason worth to be mentioned) in stating that the Bhaavana is denoted by the suffix, still it is conventionally accepted in the Śāstra that the suffix denotes Bhaavana. When we examine impartially it is clear that this convention has no approval or sanction of the sage, Jaimini or Śabara, the Bhasyakāra. The Grammarian establishes that his theory is based clearly on the Sūtras and the Bhaṣya of his sages. The Prabhakara school of Mīmanāsaka also admits that the suffix in general does not denote Bhaavana except in the case of the Liṅ affix.

Now according to the Logician the suffix denotes Kṛti (effort i.e. internal action), which is not different from the subjectness (kāryāntva). This in essence is not different from the Grammarian's viewpoint except for the fact that the former's view is less cumbersome in that subject is the substratum of activity. To the Logician the meaning of substratum which is essential for the import of the sentence, is supplied by syntactical connection. His argument is mainly based on two reasons 'Brevity vs. Prolinity'.

1. Kimcā "Bhaṇavā gāmyaṁānā ca ḍūtupratyaya sannidhau, kasya vacyeti vispaśtāṁ na kadacīt pratyaye " Bhaṇavā tu samudaya vyahiharaṁ samuditayorevartā ityāpi śakyaṁ vaktum. Tatha ca sūtrakara bhaṣyakarārābyām bhaṭārthā karmasābda iti samānādikaraṇyamevaśrītaṁ. Na bhaṭārthā. tvena pratyāhā kathitāh. Śāstre tu sarvatra pratyayartho bhavaṇeti vyavahāraḥ..... Yadāpi anyad viveka karāṁ naṣṭi tathāpi pradhaneyah pratyayarthadharmanārūpā namīyām pratyayarthā ityavagamyate. (Tan. Vār. on Sutra 2.1.1.).
When syntax itself can supply the meaning substratum (i.e. agent etc.), it is not judicious to accept potentiality in the affix in that meaning also. Thus according to him the import of the sentence in the active voice is "The substratum of activity favourable to cooking is Cātrā".¹ In the passive voice, however, the import is one where the object is the primary substantive and the activity qualifies the result.² The Logician fails to show any authority from the original texts to the fact that the affix denotes Kṛti but not the agent. He has no special argument except that of the Mīmāṁsaka in this matter. What is called Bhāvanā by the Mīmāṁsaka is called Kṛti by the Logician while sages like Jaimini and Gautama did not say anything regarding the meaning of the affix, but kept quiet, thus accepting Pāṇini's theory, their followers tried to deviate from their sages. They started to give their own interpretation and to substantiate their stand; they tried all the means at their disposal, but in many places they failed. And in some cases they fell in line with the Grammarian,

Now leaving aside the sanction from the sages, let us examine the arguments of the three schools at their face value.

Besides the meanings number and tense, according to the Logician and Mīmāṁsaka the verbal affix denotes effort (Kṛti or Bhāvanā) while to the Grammarian the affix denotes substratum i.e. the agent or the object. The Logician has to secure the substratum from other sources. To claim that the substratum of the effort is obtained through syntactical connection (sāmsarga) is not sound, because in a sentence consisting of one word like 'Pacati' there is no other word to speak of syntax if he argues that the number denoted by the affix supplies the substratum as one (Ekaḥ) etc. then he will almost become a Mīmāṁsaka who supplies the subject itself by implication. Further acceptance of two potentialities—one for the verbal root to denote physical activity and another for the verbal affix to denote effort involves

1. Viklītyanukūla vyapāravān caitraḥ.
2. Caitranāṭa kṛtijanya viklītyāśrayaḥ tāṇḍulaḥ.
(constitute) prolixity. Since the root denotes a part of activity i.e. physical activity, it is logical to allow the other part of the activity i.e. effort too, to be denoted by the root itself, so that we can secure the meaning of substratum from the verbal affix by direct denotation without resorting to other means. Further the Mimamsaka secures the agent through another means of knowledge viz. presumption (Laksana) and to the Logician it is through samarga. But neither of them is justifiable because all verbal import (Sabdabodha) comes under verbal testimony (Sabdapramapa) only.

The following are a few instances where the Logician fails to give a more reasonable and satisfactory explanation.

In sentences like ‘Kasthani Pakam kurvanti; Anakuro Na krtaa, Brihadina krta etc. the Logician cannot admit that the root K denotes effort (Krti). Such being the position it is a poor argument to say that the root K in the explanatory sentence ‘Pacati-Pakam karoti’ denotes Krti.

To the Logician the Tithi denotes Krti in some places and implies substratum (Ashraya) in some other places which is a matter of prolixity.

The identity of the word YuSmad with the meaning of the Tithi as laid down by the Sutra YuSmadyupapade etc. cannot be satisfactorily explained by the Logician.

And the AbhiJhana. Anabhidhana vyavastha also cannot logically be maintained.

And in the passive construction, the suffix does not denote Krti. So no reply can properly be given to the question ‘what is being done (kim kriyaate). Further to the Logician the meaning ‘Time’ agrees with the Krti in some cases and with the action (vyay-

1. Yusmadyupapade samanadhikara the sthaninyapi madhyama.
(P. 1.4.105).
para) in some other cases. It is a clear case of prolixity. And the Mīmāṃsaka also has his own drawback in answering certain questions put by the Grammarians in establishing the primary importance to that which is denoted by the suffix. Further it is only for the sake of primary importance that Bhāvanā is to be expressed by the Tin suffix, the Grammarians say even if it is not expressed by the Tīr suffix, its importance can be claimed on the basis of his own Jāti-vyakti sakti theory wherein he posits that even though Jāti is the denoted sense of a word for him, he has no objection to admit primary importance to the individual in necessary cases. Otherwise the Mīmāṃsaka fails to show any reason why the presumed Karta should not be predominant over Bhāvanā on the same basis of jāti vyakti theory.

The expressed number meaning has to agree with the unexpressed meaning, the agent. And also by arguing that the agent etc. is obtained by Aṅkepa or Lakṣamaṇa, the Mīmāṃsaka cannot explain fairly well the conclusions he arrived at in Aruṇādhikaraṇa, Guṇādhikaraṇa etc.

Further, in so far as it concerns usages like ‘The car goes’ pertaining to insentient substances the theory of the Grammarians can offer more satisfactory explanation than the other two schools, because to him (the Grammarians) activity (vyāpara) means both physical and internal activity. Thus in such a sentence, in the view of the Grammarian there is no need to resort to implication, whereas in the case of the Logician and the Mīmāṃsaka there is proximity in taking recourse to the secondary meaning.

Further if we keenly examine the verbal import of a sentence naturally there rises a doubt as to how far there is the necessity for accepting effort also in the meaning of the sentence, when there is the possibility of explaining the meaning of the sentence with the help of simple physical activity which is the meaning of the verbal root. Of course effort can be presumed along with knowledge (Jñāna) and desire (icchā).

Thus we can safely conclude that the theory of the Grammarian appears to be sound, because, in his theory the agent
is denoted by the verbal affix. The mental effort and the physical activity are denoted by the verbal root. And also the instances where this theory of the Grammarian needs exceptions are a few when compared with those of the Mīmāṃsaka or the Logician in their theory.

And again it is the Grammarian's theory alone that has the sanction of his sages while neither the Mīmāṃsaka nor the Logician has the sanction of his sages Jaimini or Gautama. Hence the verbal affix denotes substratum of the form agent or object as enunciated by the Grammarian but not Kṛti or Bhāvanā as claimed by the Logician.
TIME (KĀLA)

Introduction:

As already said, of the various meanings denoted by the Tīrṇa affix, after the agent/object, the important meaning is 'Time' element. The Time is a very peculiar entity which is beyond one's ken to understand or realise. So there are many speculations among the Indian scholars. As a matter of fact its philosophy is a very interesting one. However, we will review it in brief before discussing the Lākānārtha, through which this time element is generally made known in the verb word.

Time is a peculiar entity which drew the attention of almost all scholars and intellectuals of the various doctrines and philosophies and we observe that it is a common practice of one and all to say that time is the chief factor in bringing about existence, maintenance and destruction of things in the world. Therefore every intellectual began to think of time and tried to define it in his own fashion to suit his own philosophy. If we survey the entire literature on this subject we are to arrive at the conclusion that no one could definitely state what Time is; Time has defied a definition free of faults. There are people who do not admit any entity called Time at all while on the other hand there are people to whom time is the creator himself. Thus these two types of thinkers form the two extreme ends in between which all other philosophers appear to traverse.

Though the Grammarian looks at and deals with this time from an altogether different points of view, yet it is our duty to examine his views on this subject and the views of others as well. Before analysing the views of different philosophers, the derivative import of the word 'Kāla' is to be ascertained.

1. Sānkhya šāstra does not admit time as a separate and independent entity while the Bhagavadgita says 'Kālohaṁ loka kṣayakṛt pravṛddhah'. (Bhagavadgita XI-32).
We come across the verbal root "Kala" in the First conjugation in the sense of to sound, count and again in the Tenth conjugation in the sense of movement, throw, count. Taking these meanings into account, the derivational import of the word Kala is given by Śūrūta as "Kalayati, Kalayasthi va Kalah". Dallanaçārya the commentator explains the said śūtra as follows: - Kala is that which does not remain static even in its minute form. It is Kala because it throws all beings into misery and joy or because it counts the days of every creature or to be in short, because it destroys everything gradually.

Vaiśeśika System:

According to this system kala is Nitya Vibhūrakñāna, i.e. eternal (omnipresent), preveding (Vibhu) and single-partless (Akhåma) in character. Conventional notions as moment, minute, day, year etc. are derived by abstraction. The activity of the sun, the moon etc. is super imposed on it and is divided into parts, only to conduct our worldly transactions, but in truth it is one. Śankara Miśra holds that the relations of time are constant and irreversible. A clear distinction between time and direction is displayed in the Vaiśeśika treatises. There it is said that space (Dik) deals with coexistence and time with successions; i.e. space deals with visible objects and time deals with things produced and destroyed or rather with action. The Vaiśeśika Sūtras regard time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.

1. Kala-sabda samkhānayo - Bhāḍigama; - and kala gatau, kepe, samkhyaene ca - curadi gama.
2. Śūrūta samhitā 1-6-2.
3. Sa kalaḥ sūkṣmamapi stokamapi kalām bhāgām na liyate gatimatvāt sisto na bhāvayati. Anyetu na liyate ityatra kalīyate samkhayaye iti pathiṃti. Vyakhyānyanti ca. Kaliyate samkhayate iti kalāh. (Nibandhana samgraha, the commentary of Dallanaçārya on the above Sūtra.
5. Janyamatram kriyāmatram vā kalopādhitāḥ mūrtamatraṁ digupādhitāḥ. (Siddhānatā candrodaya).
The Sāmkhya View:

The Sāmkhya Philosophy does not admit the existence of a separate entity called Time. This philosophy enumerates only twenty-five original Tattwas in all. Time is not mentioned among them. They do not admit even space (Dikṣā) among these. They argue both time and space are only manifestations of Ether (Ākāsa). 1

Vacaspāti Mīracondemns the Vaiṣeṣika theory regarding time. He says that the Sāmkhya Philosophers hold those superimposed positions alone on which the Vaiṣeṣikas depend for the division of the time which may be the direct causes for the reference of "future" etc. Hence away with the useless Time". 2

Therefore in the Sāmkhya theory another element in the shape of time is not admitted.

Nyāya System:

The physical concepts of Nyāya and Vaiṣeṣika are almost the same. In the Nyāya system Time is the uncommon cause of all experiences as past present and future. It is the special cause of the cognition of priority and posteriority, simultaneity, non-simultaneity and of the notions 'soon', 'late', etc.

In the Nyāya system Time is considered as one of the nine Dravyas and it is stated to have the qualities of number (Sāmkhyā) content (Parimāṇa) separateness (Prthaktva) conjunction (Samyoga) and disjunction (Viṣyoga).3

1. Dikkalāvakaśat.
2. Vide Vacaspāti Mīra's Tattvakaumudi on Sāmkhyaśāstra p.33 "kalaśca Vaiṣeṣikamete ēko....etc."
3. Sāmkhyādipancakam kaladiśoḥ.
Time is defined as the special cause of statements like past, present etc. It is a special cause (Asādhāraṇakārana); because without the notion of time, usages like "This is past, future etc. are rendered impossible. The Muktavali defines it as the producer of the produced (objects) and the substratum of all the worlds.

Now the Logician argues that time is nothing but the very cause to which such a conception of order is traceable. The existence of the cause is as real as the existence of the effect. All the order referred to in this connection is in respect of activities (Sādhya) but not in respect of things made (Siddha vāstu). Thus the special cause of the order of things appears to be space and that of activities is time. This Time cannot be replaced by Ether (Ākāśa).

Some Logicians like Ramakrishāndhvarin, the author of Śikhāmani hold that time is perceived as a qualification of objects of perception. There is nothing as such sooner or later, before or after apart from events and actions. Hence time is a form of experience and is perceived by the sense organs as qualification of objects and actions. Thus time is substantive reality.

Raghunātha Śiromani in his work argues that time is nothing different from God.

Yoga System:

According to the Yogasūtra, Time is an independent basic constituent. Though the followers of the Yoga system closely follow the Sāmkhya system, they accept Time but not (Dik) Space.

1. Atśādi vyavohāra hetuḥ kālaḥ (Tarkasamgraha).
2. Janyānāṁ janakah kālaḥ Jagatmāśrayo mataḥ, Paratvadhi hetuḥ kṣaṇadhiḥ syād upādhatḥ. (Muktavali-verse 4.5).
4. Dikkalau nesvarādatīrīcyete Mānābhāvāt. (Padarthatattvā. nirūpānām)
Yoga says like an atom, the minimal limit of matter, a moment (kṣaṇa) is the minimal limit of time. Further a moment is defined as the time taken by an atom in motion in order to leave one point (i.e. its place) and reach or occupy the next point.¹ This moment is so infinite small that it cannot come under the purview of perception of ordinary persons but its perception rests upon the sequence. Further this sequence of the uninterrupted succession of moments is called Time. And the division of time into minutes hours days etc. is only by a mental process. No two moments can occur simultaneously because there can be no sequence between things which occur at a time (simultaneously).

Here it must be noted that Grammarians accept this theory of the Yoga system because its author Patañjali is the author of the Mahābhāṣya. Further it may also be because the time aspect has been sufficiently dealt with in the Yoga Sāstra, much is not said about it in Mahābhāṣya.

These moments are not visible to an ordinary eye, but Yogins with their intuitive knowledge (yogaardṛṣṭi) could cognise them and their succession. And this succession of moments is divided into days, months etc. by superimposing the activity of the Sun, Moon etc.. That is the number of moments that lapse from Sunrise to Sunset is counted and is called a ‘day’ and from Sunset to Sunrise, night. Thus the succession of moments conditioned by these activities gives us the concept of time, which an ordinary man feels perceivable. In this way time is eternal, pervading and single.²

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsa View:

As the Yoga system, this system also accepts the independent existence of time. To them it is a substance (Dravya). This is one of the eleven substances.³

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1. Yogabhasya on Yoga sutras 3-52
2. Detailed exposition in Yoga Bhāṣya under III-13, III-52.
3. Pīthivyaptejo vāyurākāśakāla digatma manasābda Tamāṃsi.
But Nāgaiśa opines that Time is not a substance but it is only a mutation of Māyā. He quotes Devipurāṇa as “Vibhubh nityo athire kalovastha tasyatu hetuḥ”. Another quotation he gives is from the Rāmāyaṇa wherein “Kānapuruṣa” addressing Rama says “O Rama! Killer of enemies. I am your son when you were the Brahman in the form of Being (Sattvagopa brahmacarha). I am born of Māyā. I conduct the creation, maintenance and destruction.”

The Advaita View:

In the Advaita Philosophy also time is considered as a power of Brahman. This universe which is the illusory form of Brahman is devoid of sequence. But the universe appears as having sequence i.e. there the manifestation of Brahman is irregular but this creation which is the result of such irregular manifestation is regular. That is everything in this world undergoes a regulated change as Birth, existence, growth, change, decay and destruction. It is to be noted that all these modifications do not manifest themselves simultaneously or in the reverse order. This is due to the ability of suspension and permission effected by time power. Thus Time is the power of the form of Avidyā of Brahman. A similar statement we find in the Bhagavadgītā also; wherein Lord Krishna says that he himself is the Time causing the creation, maintenance and destruction of the entire cosmos.

The Grammarian’s View:

Now coming to the theory of the Grammarians it is observed that neither Pāṇini nor Kātyāyana has defined time or dealt

with its philosophy. Both these sages use the word “Kāla” in many of their sutras but nowhere did they define it. It may be that they have accepted “Kāla” as was accepted by the then scholars of different disciplines. Whether it is a substance (Dravya) Power (Sakti) a unitary whole (Akhaṇḍa) or otherwise, it is an undisputed fact all disciplines accepted a factor or indicate the difference in the nature of any activity, such as a completed (past) action, continuing (Present) action or an action to be effected (future) etc. Therefore the Grammarians as will be shown later, are satisfied with the notion of time to indicate the tense distinctions. Further Āstādhyāyī is mainly a “Prakriyāgrantha” i.e. concerned with the explanation of how a particular word is formed to give a particular meaning. Hence these sages might have not felt the need to investigate into the philosophy of Time.

The View of Patañjali:

Among Panḍāniṇians Patañjali is the first person to define Time in his Mahābhāṣya. According to him Time is that which is seen as a cause for the growth or decay of objects. And this time when in close association with some action such as the movement of the Sun gets the designation of day, night etc. i.e. Time being delimited by the movement of the Sun gets the name day and it, in turn, when repeatedly counted, gets the name month, year etc. 1

Thus Time is that which causes (or through which) things or objects to come into existence and undergo the six types of modifications.

Again, Patañjali commenting on a Sutra P. 4.2.3 says that Time is eternal. Thus reading the comments on P. 2.2.5 and P. 4.2.3 put together we deduce that Time, according to Patañ-

1. Yena mārtināṃ upacāyascapacayaśca laśyate tām kālamahuh, Tasyaiva hi kāyaṁ kriyāṁ yuktasyaharitī ca bhavati ratriritica. Kāyaṁ kriyāṁ, Ādityaṅgatyā. Tayavāsakṛdāvityā māsa iti bhavati. Samvatsara iti ca. (M.B. on P.2.2.5).
1. Nityaśi Kālanakṣatra. (M.B. on P.4.2.3).
jali, is an eternal entity which causes birth, growth and decay of objects. The movements of the Sun, the Moon etc. are superimposed on it and are called day, month, year etc.. As already said, Patañjali dealt with Kāla in his Yogasāstra in detail.

The Bharṭarhari's Philosophy of Time:

Among Grammarians, next to Patanjali, it is Bharṭarhari who dealt with the philosophy of Time. The learned author devoted an entire chapter “Kāla Samuddeśā” in his Vākyapadīya to explain Time in all its subtleties. There he gives an account, not only of his own discipline, but of other disciplines as well. His views are not different from that of Patañjali. The basic conception of Time is in the form of a sequence of moments (Kṣaṇa) continuous and all parvading (Vibhu). His views can be summarised as follows:

This time notion is made use of not only by Grammarians but also by every common man in his daily life. This is the basic cause for all the six types of modifications that occur in every object.

This universe is similar to a mechanical puppet whose movements are controlled by time representing a puppet operator. Every movement of each and every object including the planets, that is to say in short, of the entire cosmos, is controlled by it. Just as a director of a play controls and directs every movement of an actor, so does time. In every object in this world there exist diverse forces which can bring various changes in it. For example let us take a seed. In it there exists a force (Sakti) which causes sprouting. another force causing flowering, another force budding, and another force causing fruit and in like manner a number of forces exist in it. But all these forces do not act simultaneously. If so, there will be nothing but a simple state of chaos. Then naturally there arises a question “what is that which prevents or controls all these forces and regularises them to act and withdraw one after the other giving place to the next?” The reply is “it is that supreme power ‘Time’. In the absence of such regularisation in the form of suspension and permission (Pratibandha and Abh-
yanujña), all the six states may occur simultaneously or in an irregular way as fruit, sprout, flower, stalk etc.¹ Though time is single, itself is manifoldly divided by differences resting on alien activities. The true nature of a substance cannot be explained without any super imposition. Just as due to the inheritance of the genus cow (Gotva) etc., the reference to ‘cow’ etc. are understood, in the same way, with regard to time, reference is also made to “Time of creation, time of existence, time of destruction” etc. due to the contact with activities such as creation etc.. But the differences of commingled activities are considered to be its peculiarities. Divided by them, this term “TIME” effects different fixed limits. For example the super imposed division by the activity of closing and opening of eye-lids time regulates the reference to Kṣaṇa, lava etc..²

Bhartṛhari explains that time is similar to a water machine (Jalayantra). Here the wheel in its cyclic rotations allows only some pots to take water, and some others pots remain empty. Similarly Time as it rotates allows only a few of the material causes existent in the beings, to operate while it prevents others. Another important fact is that this time follows an order or the law of sequence in permitting or prohibiting these causes. Thus by permitting and suspending (abhyanujña and pratibandha) these material causes from operation. Time, causes or drives objects to undergo change. Hence only, it is called Kāla.³

LIMITED INDEPENDENCE :—

In this mundane world it appears as if every one acts independently of his own accord. But it is not so. Hari says that

1. Utpattau ca sthitau caiva vināse caapi tadvatāṁ,
   Nimittāṁ kālamevāhurvibhaktenatmanā sthitāṁ,
   Tamasya lokayantrasya sātradhāram prakṛṣate,
   Pratibandhābhyanujñābhyaṁ tena viśvam vibhajyate.
   Yadi na pratibandhāyat pratibandhaṁ ca notṣpjet,
   Avasthaṁ vyatikōryen paurvāparyavāvakṛtaḥ. (V.P.3-9.3,45).
2. Samsargaṁ tu ye bheda viśesastasya te mataḥ,
   Sa bhinnasthaṁ kālo bhāṣya kalpate. (V.P.3-3-8).
one can transgress the limitations imposed by Kāla (Time). Take a bird or a cow tied with a long rope to a post and left in a field. It can move as it likes but only within a limited circle i.e. to the extent the rope permits. So also every object in this world moves freely and independently only in that limited circle as is permitted by Time. It is the case not only with animate objects but the inanimate ones also. A building, a table, chair or anything can hold its parts fast only for a limited period, may be, it is a few years, decades or centuries.

Time gives permission to such material causes which bring strength to these beings and then some other material causes which keep the strength for a limited period. Then this time with draws permission to these and permits other material causes which destroy the object. Thus every thing which comes into existence in this creation (including planets) has to disappear one day or other and till such time its movements are governed by time.

Division of Time:

Time has an eternal course through suspension and permission. Being divided by this it obtains the form of sequence. As already said it is due to the difference of super imposition of alien activities with regard to a person or an object which possesses the states of existence and non-existence. This single Time is called beginning, functioning and completion time. And again this time having activity as its super imposition becomes past future and present which are divided into eleven forms. Amongst these, past Time is of five kinds, Future time is of four kinds and

1. Protibadhaśca yastena citra viśvasya vṛttayah,
   Tāssem evanujanatī yathā tantuḥ saunikaḥ. (V.P.3.9.15).
2. Vak. III-9.37. Ekābasadhīr akāraīr vibhaktāḥ pratipadyate
   Past P. 3.2.110, P 3.3.102, P 3.2.111, P 3.2.115, P 3.3.132.
   Future P. 3.3.13, P. 3.3.164, P. 3.3.15, P. 3.3.135.
   Present P. 3.2.123, P. 3.3.131.
present is of two kinds. Thus all together there are eleven divisions. Of course this division of time into past, present, etc., is an act of mental fabrication but in reality time is single. Thus just to make clear of the distinction of the activities; this division of time is taught. In reality time is unitary, but it is called past when the activity is finished. When the activity is expected it is called future and when the activity is present in the form of a flow of moments, it is called present. Thus this three-fold division of time is possible. This is all apparent.

Power of Time:

There are three powers of the single and undivided time which remain firm. They are called present power (Vartamānaśakti), past-power (Bhūtaśakti) and future power (Bhavīyatsakti). Thus by coming in contact with them all the existing beings appear and disappear.¹

Of these three powers, two powers i.e. the past... and future powers effect concealment of existing beings, while the present power makes the form of beings visible.²

Now a question may be asked why does not the remanifestation of beings covered by past power take place in the same way as that of those covered by future power and present power? The answer is like this. Future power does not obstruct present power which is associated with creation i.e. in the presence of capable cause future power gives permission to bring an object into perception and it (Future power) retreats from there. But the past power is not of such a nature.

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1. Ekasya śaktayātisrāh kālasya samavasthetah, Yatsaṁbandena bhāvānām darsanādarsane satām. (V.P.3-9.49).

2. Dvābhyaṁ Sa kila saktibhyāṁ bhāvānāṁ bhānāṁ Varnatmakah, Śaktistuvartamanākhyā bhāvarūpaprakāsini, (V.P.3-9-50).
Now some scholars opine that time has only two powers effecting, Suspension and Permission. The state of an object i.e. controlled by either the past power or the future power is the same i.e. invisibility. And (that) the state of an object controlled by the present power is visible. Thus there is only one power both in past and future courses characterised by suspension; belonging to time. The second power of time is characterised by permission effect the manifestation of beings.¹

But this is not correct. There is a fundamental difference in nature between the Future power and Past power. The beings or objects which are under the sway of the Future power can be brought into existence through present power. But those which are under the sway of the past power cannot be brought back into existence. Thus these three powers are distinct in their nature.

Now Bhartṛhari sums up different views on the real state of time according to their sources. Some call it Šakti, some Ātma and others a deity (Devata) and some others call activity itself, is time.²

However according to Bhartṛhari, Time is an independent power of Brahma³ This has already been established in the Brahmakanda. Due to the experience of objects (being) created, maintained and destroyed through a series of causes, it should be admitted that there is a time power. Thus it is appropriate to accept that time is the independent power of the self-existing spirit (Brahman).

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1. Dve eva kalasya vibhoḥ keśāmicitcitchaktivartmanī, Karoti yābhyaṁ bhavāmunmiṁana nimilane. (V.P.3-9-56).
2. Šaṅkyatmadēvatāpakṣe bhinnāṁ kalasya darśanaṁ. V.P.3-9-62.
3 Kalākhya evatantrasyaktiḥ Brahmaṇaṁ iti tatrabhavadbhartṛhe-
   rerabhiprāyah. For mere details Hejaraja’s Commentary on V.P. 3-9-62 63,64. ibid.
Review:

Thus the views of Bhartṛhari regarding the time can be summarised as follows:

Time is single, all pervading and eternal. Its physical form is a kṣaṇa (moment). These moments continuously shoot out from Brahman. They are not visible to the naked eye of a common man. Only people possessing supernatural vision can see time in its naked subtlety. Hence the great sages, in order to facilitate the notions of time to an ordinary man, perceived successive flow of the moments, in the mind. They divided the flow into bits as Lava, Pāla, Muhārta, day, week etc. with the help of the activity of the objects such as Ghati Yantra, Sun's movement etc. duly superimposed on time. Time is different from activity and is delimited by it.

Time is the material cause for the birth, existence and destruction of this mundane world. The notions such as Past, Present and Future are mental fabrications only. Time has many powers as "Pratibandha, abhyanujñā, krama, jara, bhūta, bhāvīṣyat and vartāmana etc.

Reality of Time:

Time is the creative power. Time and its powers are the real so long a man is under the influence of Avidya (illusion). All these time divisions etc. are only with reference to a common man who is under the spell of ignorance (Avidyā). But once a man attains true knowledge (Brahmajñāna or Vidyā) the entire universe is recognised as mere illusion. Thus the Time which is the first creation of Maya Šakti (Avidya) disappears together with the entire Universe. (Vak. III.9-62-72).

The View of Kaiyata:

According to Kaiyata, time is not different from activity.
It is unitary and eternal. He looks at time as the activity of the Sun which is well known among the people. All other activities are referred with respect to this (sun's) movement. Further in our daily life we find people use words day, week, month etc. to denote time; which (i.e. day, week, month etc.) is nothing but repeated activity of the Sun. Hence Kaiyata states that a particular known activity (of the Sun etc.) itself when it delimits action produces a knowledge of another activity, is called time.

Kaiyata does not favour the view that Time is something different from activity. This type of distaste is clearly indicated by him while commenting on the Bhāṣya on P.3.2.84 (Bhūte). There he says some people say that time is eternal and is the cause to permit or suspend the existence, growth and decay of objects, and there such usages as month etc. and past, present, future are the interrupted limitations of the Sun’s activity superimposed on it. But others (Anye) say that the famous activity of the Sun, which is the cause of differentiating other inferior activities, and spoken as day etc is Time". Here from the word 'Kechit' we can understand that the statement under this caption is not acceptable to the author. Thus from the Pradīpa on P.3.2.84 it is clear that Kaiyata favours the theory that famous activity of the Sun is Time. Similar views are expressed by him while commenting on the Bhāṣya on P.4.2.3. etc.

It is observed that long before Bharṭṛhari, there existed a section of people who looked upon Time as nothing different from the Sun’s activity. Hari records their doctrine also in his

1. Tadyuktāditi. Kaśṭu nityo vyāpiceti (Pradīpa on M.B.4.2.3).
2. Iheti-Prasiddha parimāna kriyaiva kriyāntara paricchedat kāla ityuktam. Ta iti tāsāmeva kālarūpatvāt kālasya ca kriyādhikarāvatvāditi bhavaḥ. (Pradīpa under M.B. on P.3.2.123. Vartamane Laṭ).
Vakṣyapadīya. And Kaiyāṭa appears to be a follower of this section of people.

Views of Later Grammarians:
Dīkṣīta and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa:

Even among Grammarians there exists a difference of opinion regarding the conception of Time. Dīkṣīta and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa opine that time is not different from action (Kriyā), while Nāgēśa disagrees with them. Now let us examine the views of Dīkṣīta and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa.

According to these two Grammarians Time is not experienced as something different from actions. There is nothing called Time which has pastness, presenteness or futurity. It is only action which is spoken of as past, present or future. Therefore there is no proof to accept time as different from action. Further by accepting Time as a separate entity, we have to create its determinant also, which is a matter of prolixity. And also they argue that their theory is in conformity with that of the Bhāṣyakāra. They quote Bhāṣya on P.3 2.123. Bhāṣyakāra expresses a doubt as to “how to justify the use of different lakaras (Tenses) in the case of eternal objects like mountains, rivers, Ātman etc. which have neither a beginning or an end”, because they do not have such activities as commenced and not completed etc..

Now Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa argues if there is Time which is different from action, then there is no need for Patañjali to entertain such
a doubt how to justify the different tenses, because they can be justified taking the time factor only into account. Therefore this entertainment of doubt, confirms that Time is not different from action.

And peculiarly the reply to the above doubt also confirms the view that Time and action are one. Patañjali solves the problem by saying the activities of the then existing kings are taken into account, and super imposed on these objects. Since the activities of these kings have a beginning ending etc. due to their superimposition, use of different tenses is justified. Thus if Time and Action are different, they argue, there is no need for Patañjali to take the actions of the then existing kings into account to justify the use of different tenses. Further Kaundinya quotes Kaiyata on this.1 Kaiyata says that as the state of kings varies, it is a past, future or present owing to kings that are gone or are to come, or are in existence. It the is difference in their states that causes a difference in the state of mountains etc. Thus time is but a collection of activities. As a matter of fact or practically time is not some thing different but action only.2

THE VIEWS OF NĀGEṢA :-

Nāgase does not agree with the views expressed by Kaiyata, Bhattoji Dīksita and Kaundinya. According to him Time is definitely different from action. It is a delimitar of action. He accepts the tenets of the Yoga Sāstra as far as they are concerned with Time. He fully falls in line with Bhartṛhari.

Nāgase defines Time as that continuous flow of Kṣaṇa which are but a very momentary which is manifestation or modification of Prakṛti. These moments continuously flow out from

1. Evamava siddhānta bhāṣyam kaiyātopi vyācāste.... Tatra rajāṁ sthitī bhātādi bhedena bhinnā Parvatādi sthiyadeh bhediketi kriyaatāpatvam Kalatraiva yogaśca upapadyate ityarthah”. (ibid).
2. Vastutah kālo natiriktaḥ, kimtu kriyaiva, (ibid).
Brahman and so Time is eternal. The words lava, pala, day, night month etc. denote different numbers of moments or to say a certain number of moments is called Lava or minute, and a certain number of minutes a day etc. And these moments are mentally perceived and are differentiated with the help of various activities.

Refutation of Kāiyāta’s Theory:

Nāgāsa gives a bitter attack to the doctrine of Kāiyāta and his followers viz. Dīkṣita and Kaundinya. He says that if we accept their theory there is the unwelcome possibility of a statement like ‘The pot exists in the sun’s activity’ on the lines of statement ‘The pot exists in Time.’

This theory of theirs receives a severe criticism from Nāgasa. Nāgasa argues that it is an accepted fact of all discipline that an action lasts for at least three moments. If time and action are one and the same then the statement Trikṣuṇāvastayī Kriya becomes nonsensical. So this notion of moment is not possible in Kāiyāta’s theory. Of course it may be argued that the very contact with the later place is the destroyer of the contact with the previous place. Therefore the activity limited by it can be construed as Moment (Kṣaṇa). But the argument is not valid. If the activity limited by the contact with later place (uttaradesa sāmyoga vacchinnā kriya) is itself a kṣaṇa, then the argument suffers from the following defect—


Any activity limited by the contact with later place exists in three stages viz. Firstly the activity limited by the antecedent negation of disjunction, Secondly activity limited by antecedent negation of loss (Nāśa) and finally the activity limited by this loss (Nāśa). All these three stand in swarāpa sambanadhā, because antecedent negation also lasts till such time.

Thus the activity limited by the contact with latter place cannot be reckoned as a moment, because it takes at least three moments. And suppose it is argued that this "uttaradesa Samyo- gavacchinna kriyā is different from the above three types, then the very concept that activity is time does not arise. Therefore it must be accepted that time is different from action.

Even if the argument that special activity i.e. the activity limited by the contact with the the later place, is Kṣaṇa, is some how maintained still there lies another defect in Kayata's theory.

This is as follows: In a single moment a number of activities limited by the contact with later place—may occur. And if each activity is a kṣaṇa then a number of kṣaṇas occur in a single kṣaṇa which is absurd. In a single moment a number of activities may result but not a number of moments. And we do not have such an experience. Further this activity of the Sun, which they call time, can be limited by the activity of some other object in which case it (the Sun's activity) loses its eligibility to be

1. Visistakriyā vaśēṣya visēṣaṁ tattvamandharīpate
   trayaśāmapi sthiratvena kṣaṇa vyavharāsambhavat.
   Yadi visistamatiriktaṁ tarhi paribhāṣamātramevātirikto na
   kāla iti. (L.M. (kk) P.847).

2. Nanu visistvam jñānaviśēṣeṁ. Tat jñānam tattvamagrya-
   dhīnām kadacideva bhavati. Tathā ca vijātiya jñāna viśēṣa
   viśēṣaḥ karma, tajjanya vibhāgaprāgabhāvau kṣaṇaśabdaprā-
   yoga viśeyavyaruceśāha. (Kūcika-Commentary-L.M.
   (kk) P.849).
It should not be contemplated which action can delimit the Sun’s activity because the creator’s activity delimits it. It is well established through many Vedic scriptures that creator himself is the time (iśwarasyāpi kāla niyāmakatvāna kālav-yavaharaḥ sṛtyadiṣu prasiddhah).

Therefore the theory that Time is action itself cannot be accepted. And “it is also a single unit but differently referred owing to the various adjunctives” is also not correct as already shown.

Now regarding the Bhasya concerning the usage of different lakāras with respect to eternal objects, Nāgēśa claims that bhasya was misunderstood by them. It has been already stated that Kauṭāyabhaṭṭa etc. opine that the Bhasya on Vartamane Lat, is in favour of them. According to them if there is anything called time, as distinct from action, then there is no need for Patañjali to raise a doubt. Even if a doubt is raised it should have been replied as “Rajñāṃ ye kālāste tiṣṭhateradhi karante” instead of taking recourse to activities as (Rajñāṃ yāh kriyāh taḥ tiṣṭhateradhikarama). Thus the very way of doubting and the way in which the doubt is cleared, clearly shows that the Bhasyakāra is of the opinion on that Time is not different from action.

Nāgēśa refutes the above argument. According to him the words ‘Yāh kriyāḥ’ mean the time-divided activities i.e., the activities of these kings duly qualified divided by Time. Thus the time-qualified-actions are superimposed on the (existence of) mountains, self etc. and appropriate tenses are used. Of course it is true that Bhartṛhari says “well known actions like those of kings, cooking etc. have dissimilar parts. Through association with them, actions having similar parts are diversified.”

Nāgēsa explains here the association (Sahacarya) comprises of time (Kāla-

1. Sūrya kriyāparimānatvasyāpi kriyantraḍau svikāre anavasthā pattēśa. (L.M. (kk) P. 848 last line).
2. Prasiddhabheda vyapara virūpavayavakriyāḥ, Sahacaryeṣe bhidyante sarāpavayava kriyāḥ (V.P.3.8-81).
ghaṭita), i.e. here the words 'those activities' (Yā kriyāḥ) refer to time which divides the activities of the kings.¹

This argument of Nāgadeśa is in concurrence with the Harikārikas which states 'Every being is altered through alien activities but the soul of this being is not changed. Therefore the standing of mountains etc. is altered through an state'.² And the commentary of Helāraja clearly states that a division of Time is applicable even to long standing objects like mountains, rivers etc. on account of a difference of existence caused by their relation with the existence belonging to other things associated with them.³ The activities such as self-maintenance (Ātma sattā) and the standing of mountains etc. and their component activities similar in all the three times and hence their difference cannot be determined. Therefore the state of the three times i.e. past, present and future their sequence, the nature of their accomplishment which subsists in the activities of the kings are attributed to the standing of mountains.⁴

Another objection to accept the theory of Kauñśabhaṭṭa is as follows: If kāla and kriyā are one and the same, then activity cannot be the differentiator of itself, and it is also not in conformity with Bhartihari's statement time is the dividing factor of activity.⁵

Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika Theory:

As already stated in the Vaiśeṣika theory time is one undi-

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1. Tatra kriyāpadasya tatparicchedaka kālaparatvena. Tadāya kalāśya parvatadiśhitvatmasattvayām cārope ityāśayāt. (L.M. (kk) P.848,)
2. V.P. 3-9-80 Paratobhidyate Sarvām.
3. Parvata nadyānāmāpi....bhinnā iti paropādhiritvayuktameve. (Helāraja on V.P. 3-9-80).
4. Ibid Helāraja on V.P.3-9-80.
5. Kriyābhedaya kālastu sāṃkhya sarvasya bhedikā (V.P. 3-9.2-2). Kālo'namārtta kriyāparicheda hetuḥ (ibid Helāraja).
vided i.e. (Single) eternal and all pervading. But Nāgęṣa does not accept this theory. According to him Time is the basis (substratum or the determinant) of action. A single and unitary Time cannot be an attribute or adjunct to different activities. More over usages such as ‘Now the pot exists (idānīm ghaṭaḥ) will not be possible because it is not possible to call that Akhaṇḍa-kāla in terms of Khandas such as ‘Now, then etc.’. Thus the continuous and the well known activity of the Sun also cannot be the basis or the adjunct of other activities, because, if an activity can be a limitor of another activity then by accepting another activity to qualify this Sun’s activity, it can be shown that the movement of the Sun cannot be called Time. 1 Therefore it is not reasonable to say that Time is eternal, all pervading and unitary. And in support of his statements he quotes the Bhāṣya under Sūtra P. 2.2.5.4

Thus Nāgęṣa establishes the existence of Time distinct from Action. It is in the form of Kṣaṇa and is the creative power of Brahman.

EVALUATION:

Thus summing up the views of the Grammarians we can say according to them Kṣaṇa the infinitesimal bit, is the real form of Time. This Kṣaṇa is most unstable and perishes in the next moment. But this does not mean it is nothing. Definitely it is a substance (Dravya). These moments continually shoot out from the Creator. This continuous flow of moments follows a sequence. It is the basis of every object for its existence or otherwise. This sequence of moments is cognised mentally and is divided into day, night etc. by super imposing the activities of other objects such as the Sun, Moon etc.. This mentally perceived time is divi-

2. P.2.2.5, Kalaḥ parimāṇina. And also ‘Yena mūrtinām upacayāpacayāṣca....samvatsara iti ca bhavati’ (M.B. on P.2.2.5).
ded in the intellect as past, present, future etc., to suit our daily transactions. This type of Time distinctions are indicated by using different lakāras.

Now on a close observation of the various theories and doctrines as propounded by the various disciplines, we can deduce the following facts:

1. All the philosophers did unanimously accept the notions past, present and future (the distinct mental fabrications) of actions and hence justify their usages like Gacchati, Agacchati, Gamiśyati etc.

2. They differ on the point whether Time is to be reckoned as a separate entity (substance Dravya) or not.

3. Whether Time is in the form of the sequence of the infinitesimal bits called moments (Kṣaras) or is it one single unitary whole.

4. Whether time and activity are one and the same or not.

Now it may be questioned what the true nature or philosophy of time is? Strictly speaking it is not the duty of a Grammarian to investigate into this type of philosophy of Time. It is sufficient for him to accept the notion of Time based on which the different stages of the actions as past action, present action and future action can be expressed. In this connection it is worth noting what Bhartṛhari says on this point. "Whether it is only something having an existence in the mind or whether it has an existence outside the mind, expression in words is not possible without recourse to the notion of Time."

Therefore it is enough for a Grammarian, without going deep into its philosophy, to accept Time as generally accepted by society at large to explain the usage of different words such as Abhūt, Bhavisyati, Bhavati etc. to indicate different activities in different stages. And this Time notion is the basis for all Tense distinctions in any language.

1. Jñanānugetāṣektiṁ va bāhyam va satyataḥ sthitam, kālātmamanāśritya vyavahartāṁ naśakyate. V.P. 3.9.58.
AGREEMENT OF TIME (KALANVAYANIRUPANAṆAṆI):

According to the Grammarian the Time element expressed by the Tin suffix agrees with the action denoted by the root; by temporal relation (Kalikasambandha). The authority for such a conclusion is the sutra of Panini "Vartamāne Lat" (P.3.1.183). Thus the sutra read with the governing sutra "Dhatoh" (P.3.1.91) gives the meaning 'when the root meaning is intended to be expressed in the present tense, the suffix Lat is enjoined after the root'. The root denotes both action and result. So the question arises with which of the two the time element agrees. The Grammarian says that the time element agrees with the action denoted by the root, so that the import is that the Lat suffix is enjoined after a verbal root when the activity denoted by it is intended to be expressed in the present time.

If we say that the tense part agrees with the result part then the import of the sutra runs: 'When the result exists in the present time, then the suffix Lat is enjoined after the root.' Thus when Caitra is cooking and the result 'Viklitti' (softening of the rice) has not yet come into existence, we cannot say 'Caitra cooks', because the result is not present at that time. Similarly though the action of cooking is completed and the result exists, then we have to use the sentence 'Caitrah Pacati' but not 'Caitrah Apaksit'. Hence in order to avoid such an inconsistency we should not interpret that 'the Lat suffix is enjoined after a verbal root when the result exists in the present time.'

In a like manner we can argue that the time element cannot agree with the karaka (agent or object) because whenever the cook Caitra is there without performing the act of cooking we have to use the sentence "Caitrah Pacati" which usage is against experience. Further, such usages as "Caitrah Apaksit", "Caitrah

1. Phalasya Vartamanatve dhatoh Lat syat iti bodhaṁ.
2. In the import of the sutra in the present instance runs as Kartuh vartamanatve Dhatoh Lat syat.
Pakṣyati etc. will not be rendered possible when Caitra is present. Hence if the time element agrees with the action, whenever the action of cooking is in the present time, then the suffix Laḥ is enjoined after the root; when the action is completed then the root gets enjoined with the suffixes like Liṭ or Laḥ etc.. Thus we can explain, the usages like ‘Caitra cooks’ etc. properly in accordance with experience. Therefore taking all these probable wrong usages into account, the Grammarian decides that the time element agrees with the action denoted by the root. Thus so long the activity of cooking exists we use the sentence “Caitraḥ Pacati”. When this activity is completed we use the sentence “Caitraḥ Adikṣīt”. When the activity is to be brought into being, we use Caitraḥ Pakṣyati (Caitra will cook) etc.. And it is also logical that the time element should agree with action which is primary among all the meanings expressed by a verb word.¹

Appaya Dīkṣita in his ‘Siddhāntaleśa sangraha’ argues that at least in certain cases the time element should agree with the result part of the meaning denoted by the root.² It is like this : A man is suffering from the disease ‘Vāta’, He cannot stand. But he makes an effort to get up. So in this stage, because there is an activity of the form of effort, there is every possibility of making a wrong usage as ‘Ayaṁ uttiṣṭati’. So Appaya Dīkṣita contends, that if we accept the agreement of the Time element with the result, since no result is produced in the above said case, there will be no possibility of making wrong usages as “Ayaṁ uttiṣṭati”. This argument of Dīkṣita is not logical, Nāgėsa says, because the speaker cannot find the effort existing in the diseased person, there will be the possibility of making a usage as ‘‘He does not stand”. Even if he infers that the diseased man has that effort, then the sentence will be of the form Ayaṁ uttiṣṭati, kintu phalam na jayate. But normally in such cases the sentence will be of the form “‘He tries to get up (Uthānaya yataṭe).³ Hence even in such cases there is no need of the time factor to agree with the result part.

¹ Gauḍa mukhyayoh mukhye kārya saṁpratyaḥ.
² Siddhānta Leṣaśamgraha- Chapter IV-2,3.
³ Ata eva tatra uthānaya yataṭe ityeva prayogaḥ. (L.M,p.15, L.5).
The View of the Mīmāṃsaka: —

It is an undisputed fact that time element agrees with that meaning which is primary among all the meanings denoted by the verb. So the Mīmāṃsaka argues that the time element agrees with Bhāvanā, because to him Bhāvanā is predominant among all the meanings denoted by a verb word. Further, since Bhāvanā and Time are expressed by the same Tin suffix, on the law of frugality, there can be an agreement between them (Ekapada-bhīdhanat). Khāṇḍa Deva says that the time element generally agrees with kṛti the meaning of the Tin suffix. However in the case of verbs like 'Janāti', 'Karoti' etc., the time element agrees with substratumness (āsrayatva) which is denoted by the suffix. And in the case of 'Nasyati' the time element agrees with the counterpositiveness of destruction (Nāśa pratiyogitva). In the case of the negative sentences like 'Caitraḥ na pacati', the time element agrees with Bhāvanā by the relation of counterpositiveness of the absence at that particular time, or may directly agree with Bhāvanā.

Now since the Grammarian does not accept that there is something called Bhāvanā being denoted by the suffix he does not accept the Mīmāṃsaka theory. The Grammarian points out that in instances like 'Janāti', when Caitra does not possess the knowledge, because there always exists substratumness, wrong usages as 'Caitraḥ janāti' will result. Further when Caitra remains quiet without any action, simply observing the boiling rice, then the popular usage 'Caitra cooks' will not be rendered possible since there is no kṛti or Bhāvanā at that instant. Most probably to avoid the said faults, Khāṇḍa Deva seems to have reluctantly admitted the agreement of the Time element with Bhāvanā through the action denoted by the root. However his final decision is

1. Atra sarvatara kṛti sabdo bhāvanaparaḥ (Bhā. Rah. P.51.).
2. Naḥ samabhi vyahare ṭukalaiṇabhave pratiyogitva sambandhena (saksādeva va) tasyameva (Bhā. Rah. P.51.).
that the time factor agrees directly with Bhāvanā as is stated in his Rahasya, which is a later work.

The View of the Logician:

It has been observed that according to the Logician the Tiṅ suffix denotes kṛti but not the agent or object; and this kṛti is primary with reference to the other meanings expressed by the verb word. So the Logician argues that the time element directly agrees with kṛti itself. Of course, in cases where the Tiṅ suffix does not denote kṛti as in the sentences "Ratho gacchati, Caitrah jañāṭi, karoti" etc., the time element agrees with the meaning of the root viz. action (Vyāpāra), and through it agrees with the word in the nominative by the relation of substratumness. Thus from the sentence 'Caitrah pacati' we understand that the kṛti exists in the present time (Vartamanakālikī kṛtiḥ). Further in the absence of kṛti in Caitra, though there exists Vyāpāra of the form of 'flame being in the contact of the pot etc., popular usages like 'Caitrah na pacati' are rendered possible. And when we say "He cooks" there will not be any doubt, whether there is an effort or not in Caitra congenial to cooking.¹

As already said in the case of 'Jañāṭi' the time element agrees with the meaning of the root for the reasons already mentioned.² In the case of verbs Nasyati and the like as in Ghaṭo Nasyati etc. Raghunatha, the author of the Didhiti, is of the opinion that it is better to hold that the meaning, counterpositiveness (Pratiyogitva) of the verbal affix cannot agree with the present tense denoted by the Laṅ suffix, inasmuch as Dhvamsa is present in both the time present and future. Hence he proposes that the Laṅ affix in such cases be endowed with an additional meaning 'utpatti' with which the time element denoted by the affix may

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1. Ayaṁ pacatītyukte idānīmayāṁ pākayatnavān na va iti samāya nivṛtth (Vyu. Vā. P.595).
be made to agree. Gadadhara does not favour this suggestion of Raghunātha, to create an additional meaning ‘utpatti’ in the Lāṭ affix and he prefers ‘utpatti’ to be a relation instead of the expressed sense of the Lāṭ suffix.2

The Grammarian points out that there lies prolixity in the theory of Logician, because in some places like ‘Pacati’ the Time element agrees with kṛti and in some instances like ‘Janātiv’, ‘Nāsyati’ etc. the Time element agrees with Vyāpāra the meaning of the root. Thus we have to create two cause and effect relations3 which is a matter of prolixity; Hence if it is accepted that the Time element always agrees with Vyāpāra, the meaning of the Root, then we need create only one ‘cause and effect’ relation.4 Thus in view of brevity, the Grammarian’s claim that the “Time element always agrees with Vyāpāra the meaning of the Root,” appears to be more reasonable.

3. Ākhyātarthā kālaprakāraka bodham prati viśeṣyataya Ākhyātartho kṛti jñānam karaṇam. Ākhyātarthā kālaprakāra- ka bodham prati viśeṣyataya dhātujanyopasthitā karaṇam.
4. Ākhyātarthā kālaprakāraka bodham prati viśeṣyataya dhatu janyopastitī karaṇam.
PERSON (PURUṢA)

A verb word, besides expressing Being (Vyāpāra) as process, conveys certain other notions such as Time, Person, number and aspect. Of them the time notion has been dealt with in the foregoing pages. Now we discuss the notion ‘Person’.

On a close observation we find that Pāṇini did not use the word ‘Puruṣa’ in its technical sense anywhere in his Aṣṭadhyāyī. He simply used the words ‘Prathama, Madhyama’ and Uttama. The earlier grammarians used this word Puruṣa in its technical sense. The word ‘Puruṣa’ originally stands for the ‘Supreme self’ or active consciousness (Caitanya) which exists in every object, though it is not distinctly experienced in some cases. The Philosophy of ‘Person’, as viewed by the grammarian is explained by Bhārtṛhari in his Vākyapadīya. The earlier grammarians used the words ‘Pratyakta and Paratva’ to denote the same that is denoted by the words ‘Uttama and Madhyama’. The word Pratyakta means the supreme consciousness which invariably exists in everyone i.e. Jīvatmaṃ. And this notion is called Uttamapuruṣa. Thus when the Tīṅ suffix can suggest this notion that the action (denoted by the root) is being co-inherent with the ego-sense in the self, (denoted by the first personal pronouns Aham etc.) i.e. the speaker himself, then it is a case of uttama puruṣa. Hence we use the first personal suffixes to convey this sense.

Similarly by ‘Paratva’ is meant that the action, denoted by the root is being co-inherent with the ego-sense, not in the speaker but in the one addressed. So when this notion is to be con-

1. Tiṇastṛiṇi prathama Madhyamottamah, Asmadyuttamah; Yūsmadi madhyamah, śeṣe prathamaḥ. V.P. 3-11.1 to 9.
2. Pratyakta Parabhāvāscapyupadhi karti, karnamoh, Tayoh stutiviseṣeṇa vacakau madhyamottama. (V.P. 3-10.1).
3. Pratipuruṣaḥ pratiniyataṃ vancati cestata iti pratyah, antaryāmi jīvatmaṃ. Tadbhāva uttamapuruṣa vacyorthah.
veyed we use the Second Personal suffixes. Pratyakṣa i.e. the fact of being co-inherent with the ego sense, and Parabhava, i.e. the fact of being different from that are both normally possible only in sentient beings. Thus Pratyakṣa as a notion is an attribute of the agent or object as suggested by the Suffixes (Mi, E) in the words Pacami or Pacye.

Now as regards the second person suffixes, they also indicate that the person addressed by the speaker is the substratum of this ego-sense along with the action denoted by the verbal root concerned. The fact that this ego sense is being co-inherent with the one who is addressed by the speaker (denoted by the second personal pronoun Tvain etc.) is a property of the agent or object and is suggested by the words as Pacasi or Pacyase. Where such a fact that the ego-sense is co-existent with the speaker or the one addressed, is not definitely known (or is not intended to be conveyed) the third person suffix is used. Here the suffix denotes the agent or object but is not capable of suggesting whether the agent or the object is associated with the ego-sense i.e. sentiency. The fact that the agent or the object is sentient or not is to be known through some other word but not through the suffix. For example in ‘Bhavān gacchati’, the 2nd suffix does not indicate whether this ego-sense is coexistent with the agent or not, but that fact is known by the word ‘Bhavān’.

The supreme consciousness or egosense which exists in the agent who is the speaker himself is denoted by the first personal pronouns, I We etc.. Similarly the supreme consciousness or ego-sense, which exists in the agent who is different from the speaker, but one who is addressed, is denoted by the second

1. Madhyama vyacyaḥ sa hi karttikarma vīseṣat abhūtah. Praśna-
divisaya bhavopagamanā yogyah svatmanah paraḥ svavacakat
pārvavād bhinnat pratiyate. (Hararaja uhdhr V.P.3.10.1).
2. Ata eva Karttikarma vīseṣat avat puruṣasya bhavavisayatanas-
tati, tatra lakare madhyamottamayoraprayogah. ... Pratyakṣa-
parabhavauto sabdantaraprayogavaseyau. (Hararaja on
V.P. III-10-1)
Personal pronoun 'thou', 'you' etc. Hence where such ego sense is indicated by the verbal suffix itself then the words denoting it as I, or you are not used in the sentence.

Now it may be questioned whether if the third personal verbal suffix does not denote the consciousness existing in the agent then, how is it, on hearing the verb 'Jānati' etc. we are experiencing that the agent is a sentient being. To this, it is replied that such an experience is caused not by the verbal suffix, but with the help of the word 'to know' whose agent is a conscious being. Thus the meaning of the root (like jīna, Buddh, Cit, etc.) itself can only be the attribute of a sentient Being. When the root itself does not mean something which is the property of a sentient Being, the Third Person suffix cannot denote sentiency as in "Kułam patati".

Now, one may question the usage of the Second Person suffix in the Vedic sentence 'Śruti grāvārah (Ol Stones! Listen) where the agent of action (hearing) is something insentient. Helaraja explains this as a case where sentiency is attributed to insentient entities. The first and second person suffixes can express either type of sentiency, be it real or attributed as associated with the Ego-self (Pratyakta) or with the other (para). Hence in the present case, the speaker attributes sentiency to 'stones' and thus the usage of the second person suffix is justified. But this explanation of Helaraja is not acceptable to Nāgēśabhaṭṭa.

Nāgēśa explains this instance in a different way in his 'La. ghu Mañjusā'. According to him there is no attribution of sentiency to anything. The Bhāṣyakara explicitly states that everything in this creation is sentient in itself. In some objects this sentiency is clearly visible and in some other cases as in stones etc.

1. Sva, parādhiṣṭhānaṁ bhāvikamadhyāropitaṁ va abhyāmābhidiyate kātyākarmopadhibhūtāṁ. (Helaraja V.P. III.10-2).
3. Sarvasya cetanatvat (M.B. under P. 3.1.7).
it is not visible. But when the speaker specifically wants to draw
the attention of the hearer to this particular notion also, he uses
second or first person suffixes. Similarly when he wants to avoid
this particular notion of ego-sense, the Third person suffixes are
used as in the sentences "Bhāvan gacchati" and the like. Thus
the Third Person suffix does not have any reference to this notion
of sentiency or otherwise. Of course there are some persons who
are of the opinion that the Second Person suffix is used only to
draw the attention of a person. But this opinion is not correct,
because, such an experience is not there from sentence like 'Tvam
pecasi'.

Thus to conclude, the first person verbal suffix denotes the
agent or object in whom the action or the result denoted by the
root coexists along with the Supreme ego-sense that can be de-
denoted by the first person pronouns. Similarly, the second person
verbal suffix denotes the agent or object in whom the action or
the result denoted by the root co-exists along with the ego-sense
that can be denoted by the Second Personal pronouns i.e. one
different from the speaker. But the third personal verbal affix
does not speak of the ego-sense that can be denoted by the word
'I' or 'you' etc.. Hence we cannot say whether there is sentiency
or not in the agent or object denoted by the verbal affix. One
thing is to be noted. The notions of Ego-sense i.e. conscious-
ness or sentiency are attributive to the agent or object, yet they
do not have a place in the verbal import.
NUMBER (SAṂKHYĀ)

Of the various meanings denoted by the verbal (Tiṅ) suffix, number is one. Now one may ask "what is number and how is a knowledge of it produced". To this we find many replies. Strictly speaking, there is nothing called Number which can exist independently. Number is a mere mental conception or abstraction. We always speak of number with respect to things as one thing, two things etc., Hence the Vaisēśikas define number as a quality residing in a substance. Number can never be perceived apart from the things where it is found. Every object in this world is single in itself but only when it is in company the question of number arises. Thus the notions two, three etc. arise when there is multiplicity of things. Excepting unity the rest of the numbers exist in more than one thing. Number qualifies not only substance but also another number as one-hundred, two-hundred etc.. The word 'Number' does not stand for or represent any particular numeral but it is a common name given to all numerals like one, two etc.. Not only this, number can be thought of as a substance sataṁ, sate, sataṇi etc.. Number helps us to introduce distinction in things.

Bhartṛhari records different views regarding the nature of Number.¹ Some scholars opine that unity or oneness is the basis of duality etc., because if we want to make a distinction among the objects, this knowledge of unity precedes all such distinctions. Without this oneness other numbers such as two etc. cannot come into existence. In this connection Hari records two views. According to the Vaiśeśika the two unities are the source of duality etc.. Some other scholars view that duality etc. is a collection of two unities etc. related to each other by the peculiar relation called 'Paryāpti'.

Geneally speaking 'Number' is defined as the special cause of counting.² Annaṁbhaṭṭa defines it as the peculiar cause of

1. Vide V.P. 3-2-1 to 32.
2. Gaṇana vyavahare tu hetuḥ saṃkhyābhīdhiyate (Muktāvali Verse 106).
the usage one-ness etc. 1 This number concept results from the ‘Apaksābudhi’ of the form ‘this is one, this is one’ etc. Of course the Grammarian is not concerned with the question whether number can really be perceived apart from the things in which it is said to inhere. After all numerals present us some property to help us distinguish things. As a matter of fact number really belongs to substances (Dravyas); but it is the peculiarity of language which presents ‘numbers’ as existing in other things different from Dravya, such as qualities, universals and non-existence etc., otherwise it would not have been possible for us to make usages as ‘twenty four qualities, two universals, four non-existences’ etc..

ABEDAIKATVA SAMKHYA:

Besides the number ‘ONE’ the philosophers accept another peculiar number ‘Abhedaiakatva-Samkhya’ i.e. ‘the number one in general’. The nature of this number is well explained by Hari. 2 In compounds like ‘Rajapurusa’, the first number (Rajan) expresses sattva i.e. a substance which is concrete. So it must have a number, but no particular number is understood. Hence it is accepted that it expresses “number in general”. From this, deepening on the context, any required number can be made out. Hence this is called “undifferentiated singular number” 2. Some other scholars explain the nature of this number in a different way. Just as the singular number excludes duality, plurality, and duality excludes plurality and singularity etc. in the same manner the ‘Abhedaikatva’ excludes all particularities i.e. singularity etc.. Thus it is viewed as possessing the common property of all numbers. Only the context decides what particular is denoted by this. Thus in other words it is looked upon as a kind of universal.

As already said the Grammarian is not concerned with matters like, whether numbers are real or not, whether there is really plurality or singularity in a particular object etc.. He is mainly

1. Ekavādi vyavahāra hetuḥ samkhyā (Tar.Sam).
2. V.P. 3-14.99 to 105.
concerned with the notions which help in explaining the word-forms. Thus with this brief note on the philosophy of 'Number' now let us examine the nature of number expressed by the verbal (Tr̥) affix.

Now, as already accepted, number is a quality. Hence the number expressed by the Tr̥ affix has to qualify a substance; so much so the question is what is that which the number qualifies, or in other words what is that with which this number agrees. On this point also diverse opinions exist in the scholarly world.

The Logicians decide that number expressed by the Tr̥ suffix agrees with 'the word in the nominative case which (word) is not an attribute to another.'

However, some scholars among the Logicians argue that the Tr̥ suffix has no denotation in the singular number but only in dual and plural numbers.

Among the Mīmāṃsakas a section argues the number expressed by the Tr̥ suffix qualifies or agrees with the agent or object (as the case may be) obtained by presumption through Bhāvanā. The other section argues that this number agrees with Bhāvanā itself.

Even among the Grammarians some are of the opinion that the number meaning agrees with the agent or object meaning expressed by the same Tr̥ suffix, while some other scholars are of the view that this number agrees with 'Activity' (Vyāpāra) expressed by the verbal root after which this Tr̥ suffix is enjoined.

The View of the Logician:

According to the Logician the Tr̥ suffix denotes kṛti besides other meanings. And this Kṛti agrees with the word in the nominative (which is not an attributive to any other word); because it (the Kṛti) cannot agree with any other kāraka as they do not
have the expectancy of action or Kṛti. Hence the number also, being expressed by the same Tin suffix agrees with the same thing with which the Kṛti agrees. Thus Kṛti and number agree with the same entity which is an attribute to another.

Hence in the case of sentences in the active voice e.g. Caitraḥ Tanḍulaṁ pacati, the Kṛti agrees with the meaning of the word Caitra, in the nominative. So the number also agrees with it. But in the passive voice i.e. in sentences like “Caitreṇa pac-yate tanḍulaḥ” Kṛti agrees with neither the word in the nominative (Tanḍula) which cannot be the substratum of Kṛti, nor can it (Kṛti) agree with the meaning of the word Caitra in the instrumental case the expectancy of which is satisfied by the meaning of the instrumental case affix. Similarly in instances where non-sentient things are agents, as in sentences like “Ratho gacchati”, Kṛti expressed by the Tin suffix cannot agree with word in the nominative. This being the position how can we explain the agreement of number expressed by the Tin suffix. To this it is replied that in the passive voice, Kṛti agrees with the word in the nominative, not directly, but through succession (Paramparayā). Strictly speaking number agrees with the substantive of ‘Yatna’. This may be in the form of Yatna or Vyaparāṇa. Thus in the active voice, Kṛti agrees directly with the word in the nominative (i.e. agent). In the case of the passive voice, it agrees with the meaning of of the word (Tanḍula) in the nominative of course through succession (Paramparayā). Similarly we can explain the agreement of number meaning with the word in the nominative in the case of sentences like Ratho gacchati grāmam, Rathena gamyate grāmaḥ etc. where yatna agrees with Rath, Grāma respectively. Hence the number meaning expressed by the Tin suffix along with yatna agrees with the Ratha, grāma respectively.

2. Ekapratyaya vacyatva niyamat (ibid).
3. Caitreṇa pacyate Tanḍulaṁ ityatra caitra vṛttii yatnajnaya vyaparajanyā phalaśrayastanḍulaḥ pratyayate iti yatnasya paramparayā tanḍula eva vīsesyāḥ (TTV. Cin. P.838).
vely. Hence the number meaning expressed by the Tiṅ suffix along with yatna agrees with the word in the nominative only either directly or indirectly as explained.

In the case of impersonal sentences like Caitraṇa supyate, gaganena sthīyate etc. there is no word in the nominative with which yatna can agree. Hence Kṛti agrees with the meaning of the root itself, so much so number also agrees with the meaning of the root only. Thus the Logician explains the system of agreement of the number meaning of the Ttṅ suffix.

Now the question before us is like this. Of course in sentences like Caitraḥ pacati the word in the nominative does possess Kṛti so it has a natural expectancy of Kṛti to agree with it. But this word (Caitra) does not have the expectancy of number since the number expressed by the ‘Sup’ suffix agrees with it, whence this word does not have any further expectancy of another number. Therefore how does the number expressed by the Tiṅ suffix agree with the word in the nominative. To this we find various replies from different scholars (Logicians).

Gangeśa records the opinion of certain scholars as arguing that Tiṅ does not express number at all; it is not possible to say that the Sup suffix does not denote number; because in sentence like ‘Caitraḥ Rāja (caitra is a king) we have the knowledge of number even in the absence of the Tiṅ suffix. If it is suggested that the verb word ‘Asti’ is supplied then undesirable results will have to be accepted. But this argument of these scholars is refused by Gangeśa. Gangeśa points out that the Sup and the Tiṅ suffixes express the same number and hence only it is the identity (Samanādhikārāṇya). What we mean by Samanādhikārāṇya, is having the same number expressed by the Sup and Tiṅ suffixes but existing in different place.

Another solution to the problem on hand as suggested by some other scholars is like this. They, the modern scholars, argue that the Sup suffix denotes the number of the base, whereas the Tin suffix denotes the number of the meaning of the word in the nominative. As such there is no irregularity in the agreement of the number meaning denoted by the Tin suffix with the meaning of the word in the nominative. This is possible due to the inherent nature of the two; and if you ask what is the meaning of the word in the nominative, it is Kartā or Karman. Further in sentences in the impersonal form like Caitreṇa supyate etc., the number meaning of the Tin suffix does not agree with anything i.e., even with the meaning of the root, because though there may be two or more acts of sleep yet no dual or plural number is found in usage. Thus the Tin suffix is only for grammatical purity of the word since simple roots should not be used.

Raghunātha Siromāni and Jñānakinīth Bhaṭṭāchārya3 endorse the views of these modern scholars as explained above.

Gadadhara, the author of the Vyuppattivāda argues that the Tin suffix does not express the singular number since it cannot have agreement with the word in the nominative (in the singular number). For instance in sentences like ghatostī (The pot exists) the singularity in the pot is understood from the number expressed by the Sup suffix itself. Of course it cannot be argued vice-versa; because in sentences like 'Caitreṇa dṛṣṭo ghaṭah' we have to admit that the nominative suffix in the word 'ghaṭah' denotes the singular number. Gadadhara accepts that the Tin suffix denotes dual

2. Ākhyātavāda siromānī P.924-33.
and plural number because in sentences like Maitro Caitraśca gacchataḥ; Caitraḥ Maitraḥ Devadattasca gacchanti etc. There is no Sup suffix to produce the knowledge of plural number, we have to admit that this knowledge is produced by the verbal suffix Tiṁ. Thus in the verb meaning the duality or plurality as expressed by the dual or plural number of the Tiṁ suffix agrees with the base meanings of Caitra, Maitra etc. by the relation called paryāpti but not with action, the meaning of the verbal root. Further the singular number as expressed by the Tiṁ suffix is only for grammatical purity.¹

Of course as regards the agreement of the number with the word in the nominative, where kṛti also is found to agree, there is no difference of opinion between Gadādhara and others.

Gadādhara's view—"that the Tiṁ suffix does not denote the singular number i.e. the singularity of the singular number expressed by the Tiṁ suffix does not find place in the verbal import or does not have an agreement with the word in the nominative, hence it does not express singular number"—is not logical. It is much porlx. To explain the verbal imports of different sentences we have to create different kāryakāraṇa bhāvās. Hence in view of brevity, as suggested by Raghunātha Siromāni² and others it, is better to accept that the singularity of the singular number expressed by the Tiṁ suffix agrees with the subject or object in the nominative affix.

1. Caitra maitrapadottara subekavacanāṁ caṭra sādhutva matrāṁ thakatvāṁ nirarthakameva; caitramaitradvaye subekavacanāṁ thāikatvasya bādhitatvena avayāsambhāvādityanusanandheyaṁ. (Ādarśa Commentary on Vyu. Vā.)

2. Caitro Maitraśca gacchataḥ ityādau vinaśpi tādāṁ supama dvitvādipratyayāt. laghavādēka vacanatvādinaiva ekotvādau saktatvaccā. (AKV. Sir).

Tatha ca ayātamākhyātaikavacanādepapi ekavacantvādīsu saktya ityarthah. (ibid Comm.)
Thus according to the Logician the number meaning of the Tiṅ suffix agrees with a word in the nominative, which (word) is not an attribute to another word but a substantive of Kṛti or vyāpāra either directly or indirectly as the case may be. It is judicious that the attributes expressed by the same word should agree with the same substantive.

THE VIEW OF THE MĪMĀ(NS)AKA:

The Mīmaṁsaka does not accept this stand of the Logician that the number meaning of the Tiṅ suffix agrees with the word in the nominative. He is of the opinion that the number expectancy of the word in the nominative is satisfied by the number meaning expressed by the Sup suffix enjoined after the nominal base. Further it is proper in all respects that the Sup suffix being very close to the nominal base, the number meaning expressed by it readily agrees with its base meaning even before the number meaning expressed by the the Tiṅ suffix could agree with the base meaning. Further in sentences like "Sthālyāṁ pacati" (He cooks in a pot) Kāsthain pacati (He cooks with fire-wood) Kāḍirāṁ vīryakāmasya yūpam kuryāt etc., where the word in the nominative is not available, there is no impediment in having the verbal import. Hence it is not open to the Logician to argue that the knowledge produced by the word in the nominative is the cause of the verbal import in which Kṛti is a substantive. Nor can it be argued that the word in the nominative will be supplied into the above sentences. If it be so, the Mīmaṁsaka says instead of supplying the word denoting the agent, it is better to admit that the number agrees with the agent obtained through implication by the same suffix which expresses the number. Thus the argu-

1. Tiṅupāttaikatvāḥ saṁkhyā tuvadanyāviśeṣanibhāte prathamaṁ tōpadopāthicaye Caṅra da vāśrayasāmbandēna anvētī tuvadavivadām (Bha. Rah.)
2. Ekāpadopāttaṁ meka viśeṣyakatva mautsargikamitinyāyāt.
ment of the Logician that the number agrees with the word in the nominative or with the substantive of the Kṛti etc., is refuted. 1

Further in the Mīmāṃsaka system Bhāvanā is the main substantive in the verbal import of a sentence. So all the meanings of other words have to agree with it but not with the word in the nominative. To the Logician, the agent or the object is not obtained either by denotation or presumption but by syntactical relation. So the Mīmāṃsaka argues that since Bhāvanā is the primary substantive and the number is expressed by the same Tīn suffix which expresses Bhāvanā as well, it is logical that the number meaning agrees with Bhāvanā directly or through the agent or the object which is obtained by presumption (Ākṣepa).

Now if the Logician demands the Mīmāṃsaka to accept that Bhāvanā also agrees with the substantive of the number on the basis of the maxim. "The meanings expressed by the same word should have the same substantive" and also in view of brevity in creating a single cause and effect relation in the verbal import, the Mīmāṃsaka (Khandadeva) is ready to concede the demand and accept that both the Bhāvanā and the number meanings expressed by the same Tīn suffix agree even with agent or object which is obtained through presumption but never does the number agrees with a word in the nominative. 2 Thus Mīmāṃsaka in general accepts that the number meaning of the Tīn suffix agrees with the agent or object obtained through presumption.

Khandadeva however differs on this general line and prefers to hold that the number expressed by the Tīn suffix directly agrees with Bhāvanā only. His argument is very simple. Since

2. Ekapadopattānamica visesyakatva mautsargikamiti nyāyena, Ekakāryakaśābhāvaklpana lāghvānurodhenā ca; yadisaṁkhyāvyāsyā Bhāvanāuaya ityāgraḥ tādā astvākhyaṃ labhyā eva kartṛadau ubhyāṃvayaḥ. Na tu prathamāntapadoparaprayaṃ. (Bhā. Rah.)
Bhāvanā is the primary substantive in the verbal import, naturally the number agrees readily with Bhāvanā which is expressed by the same suffix instead of waiting for the agent or object to be obtained through presumption. He finds no reason to overlook the primary substantiveness of Bhāvanā.1 And this number agrees with Bhāvanā with the simple relation of subsisting in the same substratum (Samānadikāraṇya sambandha). Otherwise there results prolixity in creating too many kārya-kāraṇa bhāvas in different instances.2 Hence the number agrees with Bhāvanā only.

The View of the Grammarian:

The Grammarian also does not accept the theory of the Logician mainly on the basis of prolixity in creating various cause and effect relations to explain the agreement of number in different sentences. According to the grammarian the Tiṁ suffix besides number, expresses the substratum (agent or object) but not Bhāvanā or Kṛti. Number also is an attributive to the agent or the object.

Now one may be inclined to accept the agreement of the number expressed by the Tiṁ suffix with its base meaning just like the number expressed by the Sup suffix which agrees with its base meaning. But Dīkṣita and Kaumālabhaṭṭa do not accept this suggestion. They opine that it is logical to admit the agreement of the number the ‘Āśraya’ due to the force of closer expectancy between the number and āśraya than between the meaning of the root and the number of the suffix.3 Kaiyata also expresses the same view.4 According to the Grammarian recalling of the sub-

1. Bhāva pradhānamiti smṛtisāmakoe pramanābhāvāt (Bha. Rah.).
3. Dhatvarthāpekoṣayasātyasāttyatiṣayasattvatpratyā–yārthe, dharmabhyeva pratyayārthasāmṛkhyaḥ anvayo yuktaḥ (TTV, Dar.).
4. Vide Pradīpa on the Bhāṣya on P.2·3.1.3 ‘Pacatiti karturekavim Tiṁabhīhitamiti prathamānasyādityarthaḥ.’
stratum of the meaning of the Tiṅ suffix is the cause of the verbal import wherein the number (meaning of the Tiṅ) is the attribute.1

According to the Logician, the number has to agree with the word in the nominative. But this theory fails in sentences like ‘Candra iva mukham dṛṣṭyaṃ’ because there are two words in the nominative. Similar is the case in sentences like “Devadattaḥ bhuktvā vraja-vat” etc.. So to avoid inconsistency, the Logician qualifies the word in the nominative as ‘not being an attributive to another word’ (Anyāviseṣanibhūta). Further in sentences like “Caitra! Maitrah grāmam grcchati” the Logician in order to avoid the agreement of the number with Caitra, has to further amend his definition by adding another word ‘Sambuddhyanta-bhinna’. Even then the Logician cannot properly explain the number meaning agreement in sentences like „Caitra! Grāmānaye” Thus to avoid these irregularities, the Logician has to bring in many adjectives qualifying the “word in the nominative”. But the Grammrian, as explained, is free from such a prolixity. Thus this theory of the Grammian in general is more logical, simple and is nearer to experience. However Nagesabhaṭṭa differs from this general line of thought.

THE VIEW OF NĀGEṢA:

According to Nāgeṣabhaṭṭa the number meaning expressed by the Tiṅ suffix agrees with the meaning of the verbal root; i.e. in the active voice it agrees with vyaṃpara and in the passive voice it agrees with result. Further it is not proved that the number expressed by the Tiṅ suffix is attributive to karta or karman in the sense of which the Lakāra is enjoined; even by reading the sutras Lak. Karmanī-cā. Dvyekayoh etc. as a single sentence. Nor one can repeat the words karmanī etc. because there is no such an authority governing the repetition. Hence it is proved that the number does not agree with the meaning of the Lakāra. Thus the number naturally has to agree with its base meaning (Root meaning); so

1. Ākhyātārthasamkhyāprakārākarakakrabodhe Tiṅarthārṣrayopasya sthitāh
   karaṇanrtya eva karyakaraṇabāvah.
there will be similarity in the behaviour of Sup and Tiṅ suffixes i.e. just as the meanings of the sup suffix agree with their base meaning; so also the meanings of the Tiṅ suffix also agree with the root meaning, after which it is enjoined.

Further to the Grammarians, the primary substantive in the verbal import of a sentence is vyāpāra, denoted by the root. Further among the various meanings expressed by a verb word action is primary and agent, or object, number etc. are all attributives. Now, since agent, number are attributes they should not agree between themselves. Further it is more rational that the agent and number should agree with the same thing. Otherwise we will be failing in adhering to the maxim. “Suffixes express meanings which duly agree with their base”.

Nāgābhaṭṭa claims the support of Kaiyata, Hari, Helārīja etc. for his theory. Kaiyata while explaining the Bhāṣya on the Śutra “Sārvadhatute yak”, says that “by superimposing the number of the subject or object on the action, we find the action also is diverse”. And the number of the Tiṅ suffix expresses this diversity of the action. Here one may question since action is one, how can there be number agreement with it. That is why, when we say ‘Pacanti’ there will not be any doubt about the number of agents. Further Hari also clearly mentions “Though action is one, it is diversified by the number subsisting in the means (agent or object) when it is expressed by a verb word”. Helārīja while commenting the said Kṛṣṇa says in unequivocal terms that the verb expresses action as qualified by the number

1. Guṇāḥnāmeca parārthatvat.
2. Ekādopāttaṁ āmeke viseṣyakatva mautsargikamiti nyāyaṁ.
4. Ata eva śadhanena dvitvasamāṅśayā kriyāgata śāmkhyāropasya śadhanagato śāmkhyājīyam na nimittatvat. (L.M. (nbp) P.134 last few lines).
5. Ekātvepi kriyākhyate śadhanāśtraya śāmkhyāyā, Bhidyate na tu liṅgākhyo bhedastatra tadāśritah. (V.P. 3-12-16).
of the substrata of the means which is a power and not by number of the power (sakti) only. Such is the nature of the capacity of words to convey their meaning which is not a matter to debate.

Further the statement ‘Hataśāyikāśṣyyante etc., of the Bhāṣyakāra also strengthen the theory of Nāgėśa. Further Pur-arāja the commentator also expresses that the action denoted by the root is diversified, because of its relation with the Kārakas (agent or object) expressed by the suffix.¹

Now if any one asks how action being one, it is possible to superimpose diversity on it, Nāgėśa replies it is in the same way as the qualities like Rūpa, Rasa etc differentiated by number which also is a quality. Thus when a quality (which is not a dravya) can be spoken of as possessing number what harm is there if action (which also is not a dravya) is spoken of (by superimposition) as possessing number. Thus Nāgėśa opines that the number meaning of the verbal affix (TiH) agrees with the meaning of the verbal root.

A Critical Appreciation:

When we examine the views of the Logician, Khaṁādeva and Nāgėśa it is observed that they followed a particular principle viz., the suffix meaning should agree with the primary substantive in the verbal import. To the Logicia the word in the nominative is the primary substantive, so the number meaning agrees with it. But this theory suffers from heavy prolixity as explained and hence not acceptable.

Khaṁādeva follows the same view held by the Logician and argues that number agrees with Bhāvanā which is the primary substantive in the verbal import of the Mīmāṃsaka. And he has also an advantage that Bhāvanā and number are expressed

¹ Pratīyāvetatārakabhede tatsambandhat dhātvarthe kriyāyā api bhedaḥ pratīyate, yathā pacataa pacanti iti. (L M (nbp))
by the same suffix. But the question is whether there is anything called Bhāvāna apart from Vyāpāra.

Nāgeśa also, on the same lines, argues that the number meaning expressed by the Tiṅ suffix agrees with the meaning of the root, which is the primary substantive in the verbal import of a sentence. As already explained, Nāgeśa has scored many points over the others in justifying his theory and also in poring the weak points in the theories of others. In fact when we say two or more persons are cooking, every individual agent has an activity in him. Thus this diversity of the activity only is expressed by the number meaning of the verbal affix. It is very apt when viewed from the point of logic and has the sanction of the Bhāṣyakāra, Hari etc. grammarians as well. Thus without prejudice to the sanction of the sages, the Bhāṣyakāra and other authoritative commentators, it is more justified to accept the number meaning expressed by the Tiṅ suffix, agrees with the meaning of the verbal root.
Introduction:

We know that in Sanskrit a verb word reveals a number of meanings both expressed and suggested. Further we know that a verb word is made up of many elements such as root, suffix, prefix, infix etc. Such being the case the grammarian fixes the various meanings that are either expressed or implied, to each of these elements. In doing so the verbal suffixes i.e. Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada express the Agent (Karta), the Object (Karma) or the Action itself (Bhava) Tense (Kāla) Number (Samkhya) and Person (Puruṣa). Besides these meanings these verbal endings, by implication, express a peculiar shade or change of meaning of the root. This is otherwise called the sense of Upagraha.

"Upa ghṛnātīti upagrahah". The change revealed in the meaning of the verb either extolling, or restricting, or altogether changing its original meaning, by these Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada suffixes, when they are replaced one by the other, is called upagraha. In fact this word is not found either in the Nirukta of Yaska or in the PratiśaKhyas. Pāṇini did not use this word in his Astadhyāyī But it is a word which was already popular in the times of Pāṇini Patañjali and Katayana.

However we come across this word in Mahābhāṣya at four places under the śūtras P.3.1.40, 3.1.67, 3.1.85 and 3.2.127.4

1. P.3.1.40 Kṛpācānuprayuyjyae Liti. (Bhāṣya) Niśthaparasya anuprayoge purusopagrahau visṛṣṭau śyātām.
P.3.1.67 Sārvadhātuke yak (Bhāṣya) Tinabhīhitena bhāvena kalapurusopagrahah vyājayante.
P 3.1.85 Vyatyāyo bahulaṁ. (Bhāṣya) Supti upagraha linganaranām.
P.3.2.127 nāu. Sat (Vat) upagraha pratiṣedhāsca. (Bhāṣya) Upagraha pratiṣedho vaktavyah.
According to the Kāśika on P.6.2.134 this word is found in a variant reading of that Sūtra current in those days and the grammarians earlier to Pāṇini used it in the sense of a word ending in Sixth-case (Ṣaṣṭyantam Padān). This word is not used in this sense (ṣaṣṭyantam) in grammatical literature, but was considered as a technical term used by pre-Pāṇinian grammarians. Helārāja commenting on the Vākyapādiya clearly states the above fact.2 This word seems to be very popular during the period of even Kaiyata. Neither Kātyayana nor Patañjali felt any need to explain this word ‘Upagraha’. Even Kaiyāṭa explains this word only once and then he equates it with Ātmanepada.3

Different Explanations:

Now let us see what this Upagraha is.

The Bhāṣyakāra says it is one of the several meanings of a verbal suffix. According to him besides other meanings the tense, person and Upagraha are the meanings denoted by a root ending in a verbal suffix, while a root ending in a nominal suffix (kt) cannot denote these meanings.4

According to Kaiyata upagraha is of many forms like the fruit of an action being enjoyed by the doer or the other.5

Nāgęśa explaining the Bhāṣya on P.3.1.85, says that upagraha suggested by the suffixes in the place of Lakāra indicates the self enjoying the fruit or otherwise. As this indication is made

2. Upagraha iti pūrvācāryaih abhyupagaṭah pūrvācārya prasiddhopagraha sabda vacyaih ayamarthaih vyavahṛtyate (Helārāja on V-P. 3.12.1).
3. Upagrahasyeti atmanepada Saṁjñayaih ityarthah (Pradīpa on P.3.2-127).
by parasmaipada and Ātmanepada suffixes, by implication (Laksanaya) upagraha means those suffixes which convey the sense whether a thing is being done for one's ownself or for others.1

Khândadeva also explains this word in his Bhāțta Tantra Rahasya in a similar way. The meaning of this peculiar upagraha in the form of Ātmanepada etc. (i.e. Parasmaipada) is of the fact whether the fruit of the action is enjoyed by the doer himself or by others.2

Jinendra Budi, the learned commentator on the Kāśika explains this word in a more lucid way. For him it primarily means an action or a peculiarity in action suggested by the verbal suffixes. As these suffixes are Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada, the word is secondarily applied to these suffixes.3

The words “Upagraha viśēsa” occur several times in Sābara Bhāșya and in each case it means a particular voice (Active, Passive or Middle).4

However this word, or to be precise, the various meanings that are given to the word caused great confusion. And in course of time, it became difficult to understand what the word UPAGRAHA actually means and its scope. According to Helārāja this word became an “Alaukika” in the sense, it was not understood by an ordinary man or scholar.5 Thus this word which was very popular during the period of Pāñini, Kātyāyana and

1. Upagraho lādesavyangyaḥ, Svārthatvādiḥ, iha tatpratitiṃttī parasmaipadātmanepade upagrahasabdēna lakṣhaṇyocayate. (Udyota on P.3.1.85).
2. Upagraha Viśeṣarūpasya Ātmanepadādeḥ arthaḥ, Kartgāyamitvādiḥ. (Bha. Rah.)
3. Lādesavyangyo kriya viśeṣo mukhya upagraha, iha tadvyatirikta nimittatvāt parasmaipadatmane padayo rūpagraha sabdo vartate. (Kāśika on P.3.1.85).
5. Idānim Ākhyaṭarthamupagraham vicārayitum, svarūpasya alaukikatvat pradarṣayati. (Helārāja on V.P. 8-12-1).
Patanjali, might have become too baffling to understand or might have lost its currency; so it could not properly be understood by latter grammarians. Hence Bhatrharī took up this task of explaining it fully and devoted an entire section in his Vākyapādiya to this (Kāṇḍa III - Section 12-Upagarha Samuddeśa).

It is to be clearly understood that the word upagṛaha is not the name of any particular or single meaning denoted by the Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada suffixes; but it is the particularity of the meaning caused by enjoining these suffixes after the same root. If this peculiarity of the meaning is expressed by any other element in the verb-word then that peculiarity does not come under upagṛaha. Another fact is that this peculiarity which comes under upagṛaha is said to be suggested or indicated (Dyotita) but not expressed (Vācyya) by verbal endings. After Bhatrharī, this topic was concisely but clearly discussed by Nagesa in his Laghu Mañjūsa. All the latter grammarians who dealt with this upagṛaha, have in fact explained it either by elaborating or abridging the theme of Bhatrharī. Therefore now let us examine what Hari says on the subject.

Hari defines upagṛaha as that "which is understood as the peculiarity of the meaning caused by enjoining the various suffixes (Parasmaipada and Ātmanepada)."

As already said, this word upagṛaha suggests a number of meanings (ideas or notions). As Hari says, in some places these are in the form of means (Sādhanā) and in some places they are attributive to the means. Here the word "means" stands for agent or object etc. And the attribution for example, may be in the form of meaningful utterance etc. (Vyaktavāk).

2.3. Kvacitsādhanameva sau kvacittasya viśeṣanām, Sādhanāṁ tatra karmādi vyakta vāca viśeṣanām. (V.P.3-12-2).
Now take the words Pacati, Pacyte, Bhāyate. In the word Pacati, the Parasmaipada suffix "Ti" indicates the agent. In the word Pacyte, the Atmanepada suffix indicates the object and in the word Bhāyate, the Atmanepada suffix indicates the impersonal action. Thus in these three words the sense of agent, object and the impersonal action are called "Upagraha". These modes of expression are called Active, Passive and middle voice. Thus these two kinds of suffixes imply three different notions. Keeping this in view Panini enjoined two Śāstras "Bhāvakaranōḥ" (P.1.3.13.) Śvaritaśītaḥ Kartrabhuprāye kriyāphale (P.1.3.73) to enjoin Atmanepada suffix after the root and another Śātra "Sesaḥ kartari Parasmaipadem" (2.3.78) to append Parasmaipada suffix to roots where the Atmanepada suffix does not have scope.

Before going into further details, we have to note a few things here. Panini divided all roots into three groups (1) those which always take Parasmaipada suffixes (Parasmaipadins) (2) those which always take the Atmanepada suffixes (Atmanepadins) and finally those which take both the suffixes (ubhaya-padins) as the case may be. Normally a root of one group does not take the suffixes of another group unless some special purpose in the form of suggesting some distinct meaning or different shade of the meaning of the root is to be served. This is possible in two ways. Sometimes by adding a prefix (upasarga) to the root. This upasarga influences the meaning of the root and causes the change of suffix. In such cases, this special meaning conveyed by the presence of the Upasarga, which effects the change of the original suffix (Atmanepada, or Porsmaipada) into the other, is not considered as Upagraha. But many times the roots take the other kind of suffixes to suggest a peculiar notion or sense, independent of upasarga. All such special meanings or notions which are indicated by the change of the kind of suffix alone, but not due to the influence of an upasarga, are called upagraha.

Attribute as Upagraha:

Keeping these things in view, now let us see how an attribute is considered as upagraha. For example take the
the words Brahmanah Sampavadante. Here the root Vad (to speak) is normally parasmaipadini. But when it denotes an attributive to the agent, the root takes Atmanepada suffix. The above sentence (Brahmanah Sampavadante) means 'these brahmins who have an intelligible utterance, speak together'. This intelligible utterance is a qualification of (an attribute to) the agent 'Brahmanah'. It may be noted here this special notion (intelligible utterance) is not the meaning of the upasargas Sam or Pra or both put together but exclusively that of the Atmanepada suffix. This idea is conveyed by Pānini in the Sūtra P.1.3.48.1 Hence this "intelligible utterance" is upagraha. Thus even an attribute becomes an upagraha.

**Meaning of the root as Upagraha:**

Similarly in some cases activity, the meaning of the root, itself is considered as upagraha.2 That is a particular root which normally takes a particular type of suffix (Atmanepada or Parasmaipada) to denote a particular sense, takes the other type of suffix to denote something different from what it normally means. For example let us take the sūtra P.1.3.32.3 The root 'Kr' normally takes the Atmanepada suffix when the fruit of action accrues to the doer and the Parasmaipada suffix when the fruit is enjoyed by others. But it (the root Kr) always takes Atmanepada suffixes only where it (the root) gives the meaning of "to divulge", or tease, revile, serve, use violence, cause change,... etc., irrespective of the fruit of the action being enjoyed by the agent himself or by other person.

Another example is the case of the root 'Ni'. The root 'Ni' takes Atmanepada suffixes only when used in the sense of "to guide, so as to render a person guided worthy, to lift up, to make

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1. P.1.3.48, Vyaktavacham Samuccārane.
2. Dhatvrathadviseśayuktaḥ kvacidupagrahaḥ, Dhatvartho gandhanadiḥ syah vyatiharā viseśanām. (V.P.111-12-4)
3. Gandhanavakṣeṣāna sevana, sāhasikya, Pratiyatna prakatha nopayogeśu krnah. (P.1.3.32).
one a spiritual guide... etc. 1 no matter even if the fruit of the action is enjoyed by others. We can cite a number of instances where the roots always take only a particular type of suffix. 2

Vyatihāra as Upagraha:

Sometimes two or more persons may exchange their work to be done and discharge it. Or at times one may discharge the work of another person, which he is not expected to do i.e. a work not worthy to be done by one may be done by one. All these ideas are known as 'Karma Vyatihāra'. For example one cuts grass which work is to be done by the servant (Vyatilūnte') This idea "that one is discharging the work of the others" is indicated by the Ātmānepada suffix. This notion also comes under Upagraha. 3

Mutuality as Upagraha:

The idea of mutuality (one with the other, among themselves) also is indicated by the Ātmānepada suffix, though the root normally takes the Parasmaipada suffix. When these notions are to be indicated the Parasmaipada suffix is replaced by the Ātmānepada suffix. For example Sampraharante Rājānaḥ = kings fight among themselves.

Here one may question whether the preposition and the root put together give the changed meaning of the root. In other words the expression of the idea has a lexical rather than a morphological significance. But whatever it be, the traditional view is that the particular notion is revealed through the Ātmānepada suffix. Thus all these special ideas or notions such as means, or

1. Sammananotsanjana cāryakaraṇa jīvānabhiḥ ti vigaṇana vyayaṣu Niyaḥ (P.1.3.36).
2. Spardhayamānaḥ (P.1.3.31) etc.
action, or attribute of action etc., are indicated only in the presence of the Ātmanepada suffix. Hence they all come under upagraha.

Samvidhāna as Upagraha:

Sometimes the Ātmanepada suffix indicates samvidhāna, means 'making arrangements' to perform a certain action to achieve the concerned fruit or result which is intended to be enjoyed by the agent himself; which idea normally and in short is given in the Paninian Sūtra 'The fruit of the action accruing to the agent'. This aspect is governed by Panini's Sūtra P. 1.3.72.1 As I already mentioned Panini enumerated about two thousand simple or pure roots (sūdha Dhatavah). I prefer to call them as simple roots because in the following chapters we discuss about the complex roots (Sanādyanta dhatavah) which involve complex formation (vṛtti) and also integration of meaning (Ekarthībhāva). These two thousand roots are divided into three categories. (1) Those which always take the Parasmaipada suffixes (2) those which always take the Atmanepada suffixes and lastly those which take both the suffixes as the case may be. Now it is a matter to be considered, as far as the Aṣṭādhyayi is concerned, whether these two words viz., Ātmanepada and Parasmaipada are used in their etymological sense2 or purely as technical terms; to differentiate the two groups of verbal endings, Tip tas, jhi, Sip, thas, tha, mip, vas mas on the one hand, and Ta ātām jha, Thas, Āthām, Dhvām Id vahim Mahīn on the other hand. Again what is a technical term? It is that which is used to indicate or express a special sense, generally, other than its etymological sense; or a sense which is different from the popular one as conceived by the people. When we examine the above two thousand roots, from this angle we arrive at the conclusion that the said two words viz., Ātmanepada and Parasmiipada are purely technical.

1. Svaritaṁitaḥ kartrabhīphpāyē kriyāphale (P.1.3.72).
2. Parasmaipadyate Yasmāt tat parasmaipadāṁ smṛtaṁ, Ātmanepadyate Yasmāt tadevatmanepadāṁ. (Katānta Vyākaraṇa 3-7-79).
Otherwise let us accept temporarily that these words are used in their etymological sense. Then it results that an Ātma-nepada suffix is enjoined when the fruit of the action is enjoyed by the agent himself. And a parasmaipada suffix is enjoined when the fruit of the action goes to one other than the agent. This being the case, let us extend it a bit further. Now for every root denoted by the root there exists a certain result also. So all these two thousand roots have their own activities and also concerned results. So there is a possibility for every root to take both kinds of suffixes i.e. the roots take Ātmanepada suffixes when the fruit is intended to be enjoyed by the agent himself and Parasmaipada suffixes when the fruit is to be enjoyed by others; in which case all these two thousand roots must become Udbhaya-padins. But it is not the case in Pārśvanāya, wherein only 140 verbs are classified as ubhaya-padin: and others are divided into categories as Ātmanepadi-roots and Parasmaipadi-roots. In classical Sanskrit unless and otherwise specified Ātmanepada roots always take Ātmanepada suffixes irrespective of the fact whether the agent enjoys the fruit or not. Similar is the case with the Parasmaipada roots. For example, when one goes to a town to join a job i.e. the fruit of his going is to join the job which is enjoyed by himself only, there cannot be the usage Gacchate. Pure roots which take Ātmanepada suffixes are enjoined after them with Anudatta vowel or ṛ-kāra at the end as a mute letter and ubhaya-padins are uttered with Swarita as mute or a-kāra as a mute. And the rest of the roots take the Parasmaipada terminations. Now the question before us is why did Pāṇini write two different sutras to enjoin the same Ātmanepada suffixes to the roots. Is there any difference in the meaning suggested by the Ātmanepada suffixes so enjoined by these two sutras. Then comes the answer in the affirmative. The Ātmanepada suffixes enjoined as governed by the āṭṭra P. 1.3.12 (Anudattaḥ Ātmanepadām) cannot suggest this special meaning "Samvidhāna, while those roots which take Ātmanepada suffixes

1. P. 1.3.12 Anudattaḥ Ātmanepadām.
2. P. 1.3.72 Swaritaṁśṭham kartrābhūpāya kriyaphale.
3. P.1.3.78 Śesatkartari Parasmaipadām.
following the sūtra P. 1.3.72 can suggest this special meaning through their Atmanepada suffix.

It may be asked from which words in P. 1-3-72 this particular import is obtained. It is answered that the two words 'Kartrabhipraye kriyāphale' give this particular meaning; i.e. for this particular group of verbal roots the Atmanepade suffix is enjoined when it is intended to convey the import that the agent "makes arrangements" for the performance of action with an intention to enjoy the resulting fruit there of for himself.

And these roots take the Parasmaipada suffixes when they are not intended to convey that particular sense.

Now it may be asked that since every action requires its own of arrangements on the part of the doer (Agent), then how is it that only a particular group of roots is said to convey this idea through the Atmanepada suffix, and why not this Atmanepada suffix in the other group of roots. It is replied that though every action requires arrangements on its part, only certain roots can convey this particular sense. All roots are not capable of conveying this particular meaning. Strictly speaking roots sometimes present action in such a manner as to imply that the agent makes arrangements so that the ultimate fruit accrues to himself, while at other times they present in such a manner as to imply that the ultimate fruit goes to somebody else. This is due to the natural power of words (Śabdaśakti) which is not a matter of Logic. Therefore Pāṇini has listed out such roots and marked them with Svarita or Ṛ-kāra as mutes.

Therefore every root cannot convey the notion of making arrangements through its Atmanepada suffix. But wherever it is indicated, it is indicated through the Atmanepada suffix only. Hence Samvidhāna comes under the scope of upagraha.

Ta eva vijñāsyamah, Yeṣām kartrabhiprayam akrarabhiprayam ca kriyāphalamasti tebyah atmanepadam bhavati.....
Tathā jatiyakāḥ khalvācaryena svaritanijitaḥ pāthitaḥ ubhayavantaḥ. (M.B. on P.1.3.72).
Point of Interest:

It may be asked that be the intention of Pāṇini, then it would be sufficient to write kārtrabhprayē kriyāphale without saying svaritātiya. Yes, it is true it would be sufficient to say "kārtrabhprayē kriyāphale". The Bhāṣyakaṇāra also has clearly accepted this stand. But one thing is to be noted that only a few experts in the science of language or those who are well versed in the nature of language (vṛttijñā) alone can know which particular root is capable of conveying samvidhāna and which other is not; but what about a common man who is not an expert in the science of language but follows the words of the teacher (vachānusarasamāh) Therefore it is to help such persons, who cannot themselves find out by examining which root is susceptible to convey and which is not, the learned sage Pāṇini read all such roots either with a swarita accent or nā-kāra as mute. (at the end). Bhartṛhari also confirms this opinion.

Causal Nic and Upagrasa - Samvidhāna:

Another point we have to differentiate is between the meanings of causal Nic and that of the atmanepada suffix indicating Samvidhāna. The whole problem is as follows:-

A causative Nic (hetuvat Nic) expresses the sense of some one causing or inducing another to act and get a particular thing achieved. Making arrangements or Samvidhāna also implies that somebody causes another to act, so much so, some confusion prevailed among scholars to the extent that causal Nic and Atmanepada of Samvidhāna are synonyms and are interchangeable.4

1. Svaritātiya iti śakyamakartuṣa (M.B. on p.1.3.72).
2. Yuktaṁ Punaryat vṛttinimittako nāmanubandhaḥ syāt...... vṛttajñā hyacaryo anubandhānāsajjate. (M.B. ibid).
4. Keśāmcit kartrabhprayē nicā saha vikalpate, Atmanepadmanyeśām Tadarthāprakṛtīrtyataḥ. (V.P. 3-12.6).
But as a matter of fact they are not synonyms and cannot be interchanged.

Now let us examine the imports we get from the two words Yajate and Yajayati. From Yajate we understand that the agent (Karta) is making arrangements to bring Yajña into being, the fruit (Heaven) of which he wants to enjoy. In the course of making arrangements he may appoint or order (cause, induce) some one to be the priest and perform Yajña for him. Here the agent acts on his own intention and nobody induces him.

From the word "Yajayati" we understand that someone is inducing another to bring about a sacrifice (Yajña). Here it is not known whether the instigator wants to enjoy the main fruit or the instigated one enjoys it. Another fact is that Praśa (prompting or command) is the expressed sense of the causal nic while samvidhāna is only a suggested sense of the ātmanepada suffix.

Here it is to be noted that besides the roots having Swarita or Ś-kara as mute, all nijanta roots are also ubhayapadins. And from the Sutra Niçaśca (1.3.74) by reading the words kārtvabhirprayāṃ kriyā phale into it, the whole sutra amounts to saying "that these causal nijanta roots take ātmanepada suffix when Samvidhāna is implied, i.e. Yajate gives the meaning (import) that one is inducing another to bring about an action with an intention to enjoy the main fruit of the action for himself. Similarly from the word "Yajayati" we get an import that one instigates another to act, where in the main fruit is not enjoyed by the instigator.

Thus causal nijantas, swaritets, and nīt roots are all udha. yapadins and take ātmanepada suffixes when Samvidhāna is implied (suggested). Therefore the meaning of nic does not come under upagraha. Some people, being unable to make out this distinction between what a word expresses directly and what is suggested from the context, bring out this confusion, viz. that the ātmanepada termination and nic have the same scope and are interchangeable. This whole confusion has arisen from misunderstanding the famous usages vapate, krinṣīva, Dhatte, Cinute etc. These words depending on the context are interpreted as vapayati
krāpayati, dhāpayati, and cāhayati respectively. Here the causal sense is from the context but not what the ātmanepada suffix suggests. As such nīc and ātmanepada are not synonyms, that is why Bhartrhari expresses his displeasure at such confusion and says it as 'keśānchhimnate'\(^1\) Strictly speaking the above word means only Samvidāna. If sentence context requires a causal sense, then the meanings should have been given as vāpayate, dhāpayate, chāyayate in which case there will be no confusion.\(^2\)

Suppose it is accepted that both nīc and ātmanepada are synonymous and are interchangeable then there result some irregularities. This causal nīc is enjoined after any root (Parasmaipada or ātmanepada or even a complex root etc.) to express the sense of causation. But the ātmanepada suffix is enjoined after only certain roots. A nījanta root takes both ātmanepada and Parasmaipada suffixes, alternatively to convey either Samvidhāna or some other meaning. Therefore if nīc and ātmanepada are synonyms the sūtra-Nicasca\(^3\) becomes redundant. Hence in view of the above impropriety it is to be accepted that nīc and ātmanepada suffix indicating Samvidhāna are not synonymous and also not interchangeable.

We will now consider one more peculiar case and then wind up the discussion on the 'Upagrahā'. Consider the following sentence. "The Employer and the employee are cooking" Here the employer is making arrangements to enjoy the food for himself and the employee is cooking to get his fee. Thus the question before us is 'Are we to use ātmanepada suffixes after the root taking into consideration the action of the employer or to use Parasmaipada suffixes taking the action of the employee into consideration?' A root cannot take both the suffixes at the same time to express two different meanings.

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1. Kesāṁ cit kartrabhipraye Nica saha vikalpyate (V.P. 3-1-26).
2. Krinisva, vapathe, dhatte cinoti cinutepica. Āpta prayoga dṛṣyante yeṣu hyarthobhidhiyate. (V.P. 3-12-7).
3. Nicasca (P.1.3.74).
Bhartṛhari, answers this question suggesting two alternatives. 1 If the speaker’s intention is to give importance to the employer’s action, then the root takes the Ātmanepada suffix (pachete). If speaker’s intention is not to give importance to anybody’s action, but is only to make a casual reference that they are working together then the root takes only Parasmaipada suffix, or even if the speaker wants to stress on the action of the servant, then also the root takes Parasmaipada suffix. Then the sentence is “Swāmidāsaṛu Pacateḥ”.

Another alternative is, because an employer is always superior to the employee, his action alone will be superimposed on the employee also and an atmanepada suffix is enjoined to the root as pacete. Hari justifies this alternative by taking recourse to our daily usages as Chatriyo yanti etc. 2

Conclusion:-

Reviewing the above, we can say that upagraha is not the name of any particular root (meaning). It is the name given to the difference in meaning brought about by a change in the suffixes viz., Ātmanepada or Parasmaipada, as suggested by the terminations. The several notions suggested may be enumerated as mens’ action, attribute, Samvidhāna etc. The Upagraha is always only a suggested sense of the Tīh suffix Also of the many ideas which come under upagraha some can be expressed by verbs only while some others e.g. the idea of somebody doing the action of somebody else, or of mutuality of action etc. can be expressed by nouns also. 3 These particular suggested senses are called ‘Aspect’ by modern linguists.

1. Yatrobhau svāmidasau tu prarabhete sahaśāriyāṁ.
   Yugapaddharmabhedenā dhatustatra na vartate. V.P.3.12.19.
   Yatra prativīdhanarthah pacistratatmanepadāṁ,
   Parasmaipadamanyatra saṁskaradyaḥbhidhayin. V.P. 3-12-20.
2. Samvidhātusca Sannidhyādāsc dharmonuṣajyaṭe, Prakṣasab-
   dasya Sannidhyānyagrodhe plaksata yathā. (V.P.3-12-21).
3. Rajānāḥ sampraharāṇāṁ kurvanti.
It is not peculiar to Sanskrit verb only to have upagraha as one of its meanings. In many other languages in the world, grammarians have recognised that verbs denote many notions apart from the actual tense. Jesperson, as quoted by Sri K.A. Subrahmanya Iyer, deals with this topic in his book "Philosophy of Grammar", where he brought in the following notions under the 'aspect'.

1) The tempo distinction between the iorist and the imperfect. 2) The distinction between conclusive and nonconclusive. 3) That between duration or permanent and punctual or transient. 4) That between finished and unfinished. 5) That between what takes place only once and what is repeated or habitual action. 6) That between stability and change. 7) Between the implication or non-implication of a result.

Sri K.A. Subrahmanya Iyer, in his work 'Bharti hari-A Study of Vākyapadiya' says to this list can be added the distinction between the result going to the doer or to somebody else, and upagraha may be looked upon as the Sanskrit word for "ASPECT".

Here it may be concluded that Upagraha may be treated as a part and parcel of 'Aspect' as viewed by Jesperson.

VIKARĀNA SUFFIXES

Of the various suffixes that are enjoined after a verbal root, some twenty one suffixes are grouped and named as Vikarāna suffixes. The word Vikarāna is etymologically explained as one which causes change or modification in the verbal root to which it is appended.¹

Pāṇini did not name these suffixes as Vikarāna suffixes. In fact he did not use this word at all in his Aṣṭādhyāyī. This is a technical word used by the predecessors of Pāṇini. Though Pāṇini used many technical words of his predecessors in his work he did not make use of this particular term; but simply enjoined the respective suffixes. It is the Bhāṣyakara who used this word in the Mahābhāṣya² and since then all the later grammarians of this school used this word to represent those twenty one suffixes.

Now it should not be argued by pointing out that in the present Dhatupātha at the end of every gana we find the word “Iti Śabvikarānaḥ, Bhvādayah, Śyan Vikarāna Divādayah” etc.; so Pāṇini used the word “Vikaranam”. These sentences at the end of the gana pātha are not those of Pāṇini, but of later grammarians who added them for clarity. Not only these sentences but even the meanings of the roots are read along with them by later grammarians like Bhīmasena etc. just to facilitate an easy and clear understanding to the students.³ Thus “Vikarāna” is a technical word used by the predecessors of Pāṇini and was later adopted by the Pāṇinian school of grammarians to denote a certain type of suffixes.

Patanjali gives us a clue to understand the nature and the position of Vikarāna suffix. While commenting on P.3.1.314 he says that the suffix “Ām” falls in between the root and the suffix (Tīṁ) like a Vikarāna.⁴ From this we understand that the Vikarāna

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1. Vikaroti vikarayatitī vā vikarānaḥ.
2. P.3.1.31, Āyādaya Ārdha dhātuke vā.
3. Vide Bhāṣāna Kārika “Sarvanavyayādīuām”. (Kārika 10)
4. P.3.1.31 Āyādaya Ārdha dhātuke vā.
5. Ām madhye Patisyati yatha Vikaraṇastadvat.
suffix is one which follows the verbal root. Here the root means either a primary root or a derivative or even a secondary root.


Vikaranas Meaningful or not:

Now let us consider whether these Vikaranas suffixes have any meaning or not. The whole issue is discussed in Mahābhāṣya on the sutra "Sarvdhatuke yak".

Vikaranas are expressive of Sense:

Some scholars are of the opinion that these Vikaranas suffixes are meaningful and they express the sense of Agent etc. In support of their argument they quote the very sutras like 'Kartari Šap', 'Sarvdhatuke Yak', "Bhavakarmāch Yak" etc. They bring an analogy of the interpretation of the Sūtra 'Kartari Kṛt' which is explained as the kṛt suffix comes in the sense of Agent. On the same analogy the sūtra 'Kartari Šap' is to be explained as 'the suffix Šap comes in the sense of Agent.' Similarly the suffix 'Yak' is enjoined in the sense of Bhāva or object (Karma) when the root is followed by a Sarvdhataka Lakṣaṇa. The words Kartari, Karmāṇi Bhāve in the Sūtra Lah Karmāṇi ca ... ... (P.3.4.69) do not give the sense of agent, object etc. The meaning of the Locative is "in the context of (Viśaya Saptamā)." Therefore the Vikaranas suffixes 'Šap' etc. are meaningful and they denote the agent object etc. And this is the reason why in words like gacc-ha, vada, brāhi etc., where the Tiṅ suffixes are not seen, the sense of agent etc. is denoted by the Vikaranas Suffix and the Tiṅ suffix denotes other meanings number, Tense, Person etc. In places where these Tiṅ suffixes are elided the sense of Tense etc., are understood by recalling that suffix. Of course in places where the Vikaranas suffix is not at all enjoined i.e. in Liṅ and Liṭ, the sense of agent etc., is expressed by the Tiṅ suffix; but in
cases where this Vikaranā suffix is elided, there again by the process of recalling it, the sense of agent etc. is understood. And further if we were to accept that the agent, object etc. are the expressed meanings of the Lakāra, then the inconsistency of the number meaning of the suffix arises. Therefore, the Vikaranā suffixes are significant, and have semantic importance in the import of a verb word.

Vikaranā Suffixes are not significant:

The arguments stated above emphasising the denotative capacities of the Vikaranā suffixes, are weak and unstable. They can be countered in the following way:

First of all let us see what this "meaning" is, or, to be more precise, how are we to decide that a particular sense is that of a particular word. It is often done by the method of positive and negative concomitance (Anvaya Vyātirekabhāvāh) i.e. if a particular sense is caused by the presence of a word and if that knowledge is not caused in the absence of that particular word, then we say that the particular one is the meaning of that particular word.

Now when we examine the Vikaranās applying this technique we find that they do not have any definite meaning of their own; because the meaning of the verb word is found to be independent of this Vikaranā suffix. The presence or absence of a Vikaranā suffix in a verb does not cause any special import. Normally by hearing a verb word we get a knowledge of Agent or Object person, time, number etc... This knowledge is not effected whether the verb word comprises the Vikaranā suffix or not. For example the verb forms of roots belonging to the second and third conjugations; Liṅ and Āśriliṅ forms of any root do not have any Vikaranā suffix. But we get the import of subject, person, number etc. from these verb forms.1 Similarly we get the same import from the verb forms which have the Vikaranā suffix.2 Thus it is

1. Ati Juhoti, Babhāva, Gāmyāt etc.
2. Bhavati, Agachat etc.
evident that either the presence or absence of a Vikaran suffix does not obstruct the knowledge we get from a verb word.

And if we were to accept the interpretation of the Sutra ‘Kartari Sap’ as given above, then there will be no coherence between Lah Karmapi Ca.......and Kartari Sap. It is clearly stated in the Bhasya that the agent, object etc. are the meanings of the Lakara itself and it is also asserted there that we cannot do away with the Sutra Lah Karmapi etc.. Therefore the word Kartari in the Sutra ‘Kartari Sap’ does not mean “in the sense of agent”.

Hence the Vikaran suffixes do not have any meaning of their own to express.

The View of Patanjali :

This question of the denotative potentiality of the Vikara suffixes, is thoroughly discussed by him while commenting on the Sutra “Sarvadhatuke yak”. The Bhasyakara states that instead of accepting two suffixes viz. Vikara and Ti to express the agent etc., at different places, let there be only one suffix (to express the agent etc.) in all the verbs and also let that one suffix be Ti only. In fact this simple statement contains a rich argument. It may be explained as follows :

1. Neither the Vikar suffix nor the Ti suffix is present in all the verb words. Though the absence of the suffix due to elision is same in both cases, the Vikar suffix suffers from an additional defect that it is not at all enjoined in certain Lakaras (Li and Li).

2. In the case of elision a recourse to the recalling of the elided suffix, is inevitable in either case.

1. Idam Vicaryate. Bhavakarmakartara Sarvadhatukartha va syu vi kara hi hastheti....Eva ca krtva ekapakshibhihata mevedam bhavati, Sarvadhatukartha eveti. (M.B. on P.3.1.67).
So if we accept that Tīn suffixes alone are expressive of the agent etc., at least we will be free of the defect of non-enjoinment of the suffix in certain Lakṣṇas.

In Liṅ and Liṭ, the opponent also has admitted, that it is the Tīn suffix which denotes the agent etc.

Hence taking brevity into consideration it can be construed that the Bhāṣyakāra clearly affirms that the Vikaranā suffixes are not significant.

The Views of Bhāṭṭoji and Kaunḍabhaṭṭa:

Bhāṭṭoji and Kaunḍabhaṭṭa are of the view that the Vikaranā suffixes are suggestive but not expressive. This is made clear in the Vaiyakarana Bhūṣana (and Bhūṣana Sarva), and that Vaiyakarana-mattonmajjana. They too agree that Kartṛ Karman or Bhāva are the expressed meanings of Tīn suffixes, but, when a doubt arises whether, in sentences like Devadattaḥ pacati, the Tīn suffix expresses Kartṛ or Karman etc., then to clarify the position these Vikaranā suffixes help us. If Śap is the Vikaranā suffix, then we have to know that Kartā is expressed by Tīn and if yak is the Vikaranā, then it is Karma or Bhāva that is expressed b Tīn. And in places where the Tīn suffix is elided e.g. Gaccha Piba etc., the sense of agent is expressed by recalling the suffix. Such possibility of recalling the Vikaranā Śap, Yak, etc., is not possible in Liṅ and Liṅ. They further opine that, at the most, when the Tīn has to express the agent, the fact is indicated (suggested) by Śap. It is the same case even with other suffixes like Yak, Cin etc. They are only suggestive (Tatparyagrahahakāḥ).

1. Phala vyapārayostatras phale taṅ yak cinādayah, vyapare śap śnamādyā stū dyotayantyasrayanvayam (Vai.-Bhu Karika-3).
   Tatha ca sarvadhatukasya kartṛtvā vasyakatve,
   Śabādīnāṃ dyotakatvā matram kalpyate lāghavāditi. (ibid)
THE VIEW OF NĀGEŚA:

According to Nāgęśa, the Vikarana suffix limits the expressive sense of the Tin suffix. Normally a Tin suffix denotes either agent or object or even an impersonal sense. Thus in a sentence like 'Devadattaḥ pacati', the Vikarana suffix restricts the meaning of the Tin suffix and allows only the sense of agent to be denoted by it and not the object. Thus the Vikarana suffixes are indicative by restricting the meanings (agent, object, impersonal sense) of the Tin suffix.¹

Nāgęśa continues his argument that the Bhāṣya 'Sārvadhatu kārthāḥ Kartārdayaḥ' means that the Agent etc. (i.e. object, impersonal sense Bhāṣya) are merely suggested by it (i.e. by the Sārvadhatuka suffix). And in that case the Vikarana suffixes are only to grant grammatical correctness to the word. Nāgęśa says that, if we accept that Vikarana are meaningful, then they are meaningful to the extent of suggesting them, but not expressing them (Agent object etc.).² He says both the theories are valid, since they are only indicative. After all it is due to (the nature of the power of) the word (Sabdasakti) that in some places (in some words) the suggestion of the meanings is made by the Sārvadhatuka-tukas in association with the Vikarana suffix. And in some words this Sārvadhātuka suggests it even without the Vikarana suffix.³

Thus in the view of Nāgęśa Vikarana are either to grant simply grammatical correctness of the word or to be meaningful through their suggestiveness.

1. Dyotakatvaṁ caśāṁ tinśu kartrādhyarthathā matra niyāmaktvena bodhyāṁ (Brhat sabdenudu Sekhara Vol.3, P1593).
3. Tatra sabda śakti svabhavat kvacidvikaranā sahitasya taddyotakatvaṁ .... .... Kvacit tatsahayyenaarthathā Pratīteḥ arthavatvayavānāropi. (ibid P'781).
The purport of all this is that neither the Sarvadhatu-ka, nor the Vikarna denotes the meanings of agent, or object etc. They can only suggest them which are, really speaking, the meanings of the root itself.

REVIEW:

Regarding the meaning of the Vikarna suffixes it is observed that there are three theories. (1) Vikarna have no meaning except for the fact that they are for grammatical correctness of the word. (2) Vikarna denotes Agent, object etc. (3) The Agent, object etc., are the meanings of the Sarvadhatu-ka and the Vikarna is a dyotaka in the absence of the Tin suffix.

Now after a close examination of the various arguments put forth by the respective scholars, it can be observed that each has some point and logic in his argument. But of all the theories, it seems the first one is more logical. Vikaranae do not have any expressive meaning. The sense of agent, object etc., are the meanings of the root alone but not of the Sarvadhatu-ka or of the Vikarna suffixes. The reason is that we get the import of the agent etc., even in the absence of Vikarna or Tin suffix in some cases or when even both are present.

It is also not sound to accept that in places where these suffixes are dropped, the import of the agent etc. is caused by recalling the dropped suffix (i.e., by a Lupta Smarna dvara bodhah). This argument, as stated by Nagesā, is refuted by Bhāgvan Patañjali in the Mahābhasya. The reason is that a man who does not have a knowledge of this “lopa” and “Lupta Smarna”

1. Tatra “kutsite (P.5.3.74): Bauṣya bahuvacanaṁ (p.1.4.21, ityādi sūtrastha bhasye pāñcaka paksasyāiva siddhantitātvena, suptiñām dyotakatva pakṣe eva Bhasya sammatāḥ, (P.290- Tattvadarśan).”

2. Lupta smaranadbdhah iti tu ekasēṣa satro pratyaya laksana-karyasiddheḥ lopahālatvam vadaḥ Bhasyakarana tirastitam, Lopamajñatāṁ tatha bodhanāpateḥ. (Lagh. Mañjūsa (k.k.) Part 2, P.719.)
etc. also gets the same import as one who has this knowledge. Hence in getting the knowledge of the agent etc. neither the suffix (existent or dropped) nor a recalling of it (smarana) is the cause. It is purely due to the natural power inherent in the word (Śabdasaktisvabhāva). Hence it is reasonable to accept that all the meanings i.e. agent or object, activity, time, person and number are the meanings of the root alone; and the suffixes simply reveal or indicate them. Hence the arguments of Nāgārjuna are laudable and are close to the reality.1

Jagadīśa, the author of the Śabda Śaktiprakāśa, also is of the same view that Vikaraṇa suffixes are not having any meaning.2

Thus it may be established that the Vikaraṇa suffixes do not have any meaning of their own.

Now it may be a point of interest to know why they are used if they do not have any meaning or in what way they help us. To this we reply they serve in contributing to the grammatical correctness of words (Pada Śādhutva Sampādanārthaḥ); and secondly these Vikaraṇa suffixes from Śap to Śna help us in dividing the roots (about two thousand) into different conjugations.

1. Tatra śabdasaktisvabhāvat Kyacidvikaranasahitasya tadvyottakvam, kyacidkevala sārvadhatukāsyāpitā (ibid P.781).
2. Śap syan ādi vikaraṇo numādyāgamaśca prakṛtyādīnām sahayopi svārthosthitidvāra yena tamādaya caturādi vidhāḥ sārthopsthitidvāra yena tamādaya caturādi vidhāḥ sārthakāḥ syat. (Sab. Śak. Pra. under Kārika-6).
TENSES AND MOODS

Introduction:

In the last chapter we arrived at the conclusion that there is something called 'time' with reference to which we can differentiate actions as past, present, future etc.1 This time element is denoted by the verb word as an attributive to the action denoted by it. The Indian Grammarians adopted a system to convey besides this time element, some additional knowledge i.e. the mental state or mood of the person speaking. Thus each of these notions of time and mood (or modality) is conveyed through a different suffix called 'Lakara' enjoined after the verbal root. Though Time is unitary in itself, it is spoken as distinguished like past, present, future etc. by superimposing particular actions on time. The pastness etc. exists only in activity. Thus when an activity has its means nearby and its emergence is expected, then time having such an activity mentally conceived and super imposed on it, is called Future time. Similarly when there is an action which has been begun and completed, and when it is super imposed on time, the particular time which is the substratum of such an action is called past time. Likewise the present is the time which is the substratum of an action which has begun but not completed.2 Thus Time having activity as its superimposition becomes past, future, present etc. This division is purely a mental concept. Time, though broadly divided as past present and future, in daily life people are found to use eleven types of time division, in describing the various activities. This fact is recorded by Bhrtrahark who says that past is of five kinds, future is of four kinds and present of two kinds. Thus altogether there are eleven divisions of Time.3 How is this possible? It is explained as follow.

One type of broad division of Time is Adyatana Anadyatana and Sāmānya.

Adyatana:

Adyatana means "Today" i.e. the day in which the person speaking exists. Generally speaking it is a period of twenty four hours. Of course there exists difference of opinion as regards the concept of Adyatana. Some scholars are of the opinion that Adyatana means a period from Sun-rise to Sun-rise. Some are of the opinion that Adyatana denotes the period beginning with the period beginning with the latter half of the previous night and including the first half of the following. Some other scholars define Adyatana as a period beginning with the last quarter of the previous night and ending with the first quarter of the following night. Thus Adyatana in general means the day on which one is speaking or acting.

Anadyatana:

From the very word it is clear that what is not Adyatana is Anadyatana i.e. the period exclusive of the day in which one speaks or acts. Hence Anadyatana does not mention specifically whether it is past or future, it may be either, but what it specifically denotes is "not the day when one is speaking or acting." Hence there can be Anadyatana Bhaviṣyat (Future exclusive of today).

Sāmānya:

It refers to the time where a specific mention of the time aspect i.e. Adyatana or Anadyatana, is not made. That is, the

1. Ahna mubhayatordharātramāsodāyatah kālaḥ (Padamanjari under Sutra P.3.2.15).
2. Ekasya rātreścaturtho yāmō divāsca sarvo Dvitiyāyāsa rātreś prathamo adyatana ityāhūḥ. (Pradīpa on M.B. under P.3.2.110.3).
speaker does not attach much importance to the particular period but to action only referring to future or past in a casual (or general) way. Thus when we apply these differences to past, present and future, there result eleven kinds of time divisions. The eleven divisions are explained by Helatija as follows:


Of these eleven divisions Adyatanabhūta is generally denoted, not by a lakāra, but by Niśṭha suffix vide P.3.2.102. Adyatana bhavisyat is denoted by a mood suffix Liṅ vide P.3.3.164. The remaining time divisions are denoted only by five different suffixes called lakāras. Besides these time divisions, with respect to the past exclusive of today (Anadyatana bhūta) there is another subdivision as unwitnessed by the speaker (Parokṣa, anadyatanabhūta) as governed by P.3.2.115. This is denoted by a separate suffix. Thus there are mainly six types of time denoting suffixes (Lakāras).

Besides these six lakāras denoting the Time, the Sanskrit Grammarians accepted another four lakāras which, mainly refer to indicate the mood of the speaker; i.e. whether he commands, requests, anticipates, gives benediction etc. Of course all these four Lakāras more or less, relate to future tense only, but the importance is not for the time element but to the mental state of the speaker. In all these four types a mild sense of desire appears in common. Thus in Sanskrit verbal system there are six time-denoting and four mood-denoting lakāras totalling to ten Lakāras.
Each Lakāra is differentiated physically from the other by adding some special mute letters which have some special operational purpose in grammar. These ten Lakāras are named as 1. Lat., 2. Lit., 3. Luṭ, 4. Līt, 5. Leṭ, 6. Loṭ, 7. Laṇ, 8. Liṇ, 9. Luṇ, 10. Lṛṇ. Of these the fifth one i.e. Leṭ is used only in Vedic language and as far as classical language is concerned it is obsolete. But the Liṇ suffix is subdivided as Vidhi Liṇ and Asirliṇ, Thus again in the classical language, by omitting Leṭ and accepting two Liṇ suffixes, again the total number of lakāras comes to Ten. With this background now let us study each lakāra in detail.

LAT :

Panini enjoins this suffix Lat after a verbal root to denote present tense of the action denoted by the root.1 When the action is in the present tense; the Suffix Lat is used but not when the result denoted by the root or the agent is in present time. If the time notions are with respect to the Agent, then whenever the cook is present (available) even without any act of cooking we have to use the present tense as "He cooks" (Pacati). And similar is the case with respect to result expressed by the root. This reasoning applies even to the past tense or future tense. Hence if we can decide what is meant by "present time" we can decide the other two times i.e. past and future. Let us examine what is meant by presentness (Vartamanatva) of time.

The Bhāṣyakāra dealt with this topic while commenting on the Sūtra P.3.2.123; Hari in the Vākyapadīya-kālaśamuddeśa verses 81 to 102; Kaunḍabhaṭṭa in the Bhūṣana-Lakāraratha nim-aya, Nāgēsa in his Laghu maṇjusā-Tinarthavāda. All other disciplines also discussed the matter in their works.

Normally a student of Grammar when asked to define Vartamanatva says "the fact of being begun but not yet completed. This is how Kaunḍabhaṭṭa defines it, i.e. when an

1. P.32.123, Vartaman-e Lat.
activity is commenced and is being continued till the result is produced (or not completed) we say it is the presentness.\footnote{Pr\text{\'}arabdhaparisam\text{\'}aptatv\text{\'}am vartam\text{\'}anatv\text{\text{\'}}am (Vai. Bhu. under verse 22).} For instance let us examine common experience. A boy starts going to school and studying at the age of six and continues till he gets a degree. If any one questions him what he does, he replies ‘I am studying’. Similarly an employee says he works in the office from say ten a.m. to five p.m. In all these cases neither the student sticks to his books always reading without taking rest; meal, sleep etc. nor does the employee from Chit-chatting with co-workers or going on short relief for tea etc.. Yet we use the present tense only in such cases e.g. ‘he studies (is studying)’ etc.. We do not consider the intermediatory activities as separate activities which cause breaking the main activity of studying. Here the presentness is justified because as the Bh\text{\'}asyak\text{\'}ara says the result has not been achieved.\footnote{Ny\text{\'}ayyatv\text{\'}a vartam\text{\'}anakalata, Kuta\text{\text{\'}}? \text{\text{\'}}\text{\'}r\text{\'}ambh\text{\'}anapa\text{\text{\'}}avargat. (M.B. on P.3.2.123).}

Now the opponent raises an objection that in such cases as above (one studies etc.) we should not make use of the present tense because the main activity is broken and also because, when an intermediatory action begins, the previous action ends. So in all such cases only a past usage is to be made and present tense is to be used only in instances where present action actually exists (i.e. without any break) such as one writes, or eats etc..

This is replied in two ways. One is already explained that all the intermediatory activities such as taking bath, dressing, eating, sleeping etc. are but parts of the main activity ‘study’. Further these intermediatory activities are aids in helping continuance of the main action till the result is obtained. Similarly what the opponent thinks as a real present action; without breaks, such as eating, writing etc is not a single action. The opponent must note even the action of eating consists of many intermediatory actions such as drinking water, Chit-chatting with...
action of falling has ceased.” And similarly the conception of time as future arises only when the action of falling is about to happen. Consequently the conception of present time results when the action of the thing is perceived as going on at the time. Further if a man does not have the knowledge of an action as going on at the time, he can conceive nothing as having ceased or as going to happen. Another important thing is that both in past and future the object is devoid of action but in the present we apprehend the actual existing conception of the object and action. Thus unless we have this conception of the object actually associated with action (i.e. present) the conception of other two types of time (Past and future) would not be possible. Hence the existence of present time established.

We find a similar argument in the Mahābhāṣya also. There the Kṣaṇabhāṅgavādin argues that time is of the form of kṣaṇa. In this universe, matter exists in its state only for kṣaṇa and perishes in the next kṣaṇa. Hence there is nothing as Vartamanakāla i.e. an activity of the present time, because matter perishes in every second kṣaṇa as such there is no inherent cause (samavaya kāraṇa) as a result no activity can be produced. Similarly another intelligent Mīmāṃsaka also says though we accept that matter is permanent i.e. does not change at every moment, one cannot explain the existence of present time of action. He says Time is of the form kṣaṇa. Thus only a single kṣaṇa is actually perceived but not the previous one (which has already lapsed) nor the following one (which has not come into being). Thus Anupala-bṛhi is the authority in establishing the absence of presentness of action and hence of the presentness.

These two types of objections are replied to as follows: Here the unity of activity is the aggregate of moments and this aggregate is achieved by mental fabrication. To be more clear we say that the moments possessing the regular priori-posterior relation and producing a result are called activity. Due to

1. Vāstyaśana’s N.B. on ii.1.40.
2. Helaraja on V.P. 3.9-89.
others, or lifting the hand from the plate to the mouth and eating swallowing etc. And as such there is no real activity which is truly present. But, just as in the case of the load to be carried by two men, the third man who gets in there by chance is also considered as one of the load carriers, in the same way all these intermediary actions are deemed to be a single unit and hence the usage of the present tense is justified.

Now the opponent raises a very fundamental objection that there is nothing as presentness. There is only either pastness or futureness, because a thing may be either existent or non-existent. Hence there is no possibility of the third alternative. We came across a similar discussion in the commentary on the Nyāya Sūtras. There Vātsyāyana, the commentator of the Nyāyasūtras refutes the madhyamika theory which says that here is no present time apart from the past and future. Here the opponent argues that if the past is defined as that which precedes the present and the future as that which succeeds it, then there can be no past or future even, because there is nothing as present. So, if the Grammarian tries to define past and future with respect to present, such definitions are not possible. For instance consider an object falling. When the object falls we have the time taken by it traversing a certain distance and the time will be taken by it in traversing the remaining distance, and there is no intervening distance which the object can be said to traverse at the present time. Thus the space traversed gives the idea of past tense and the space to be travelled gives the idea of future and as such there is no third space which could give rise to the present time.¹

Of course the objector raised the objection intelligently, but he has overlooked a fact that time is manifested by action but not by space (adhva). Vātsyāyana establishes present time as follows: the conception of time as past arises only when the

1. Helaraja on V.P. 3-9.84.
2. N.B. ii.1.39.
the difference in the result we differentiate activities too. It is immaterial whether the moments are both existent and non-existent because we define presentness as the incompleteness of a commenced activity. The aggregate of moment alone is capable of producing an effect. Thus activity or presentness etc. is to be inferred from the fact a person being at one place now, exists at another place after some time. Thus both activity as well as the time are the results of mental abstraction or fabrication. This is one way of establishing the presentness of time and action as a pure mental fabrication. The Bhsyakara now proves in a different way that there exists real present time and activity.¹ He says that there is real present time and activity in a subtle state. It cannot be perceived due to its subtlety just as one cannot see the movement in the Sun at every moment but can infer that he moves because he reaches the other extreme point (from east to west). Further if it cannot be perceived it is due to some impediments like distance, or minuteness etc. Because a thing cannot be perceived (due to the defect in a person) it is not logical to argue that the thing itself does not exist. For instance observe a dry lotus stalk. It has fine threads inside, we know it. Now if the stalk is burnt one sees the external stalk burning but cannot see the inside threads burning. It does not establish that all the fine threads are unburnt. Thus though it cannot be seen there exists real time and activity. Hence the presentness of activity is defined as an action which has been begun but not completed. And the substratum of it is called present time.

Ngeṣabhaṭṭa defines present time as the substratum of activity begun but not completed.²

The Mīmasāsaka defines Vartamana as a time non-different from the time expressing the Laṭ suffix.³ The Logician also defi.

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1. Astivartamanakālaḥ ...Adityagatīvannopalabhyate etc. (M.B. on P.3.2.123).
2. Bīsasya nāla iva dahyamāna etc. (ibid).
3. Prārabdhaparipramaṇa kriyārayātvam vartamanatvam.
4. Laṭuccaraṇa kālabhinna kālatvam. (Bhā. Rāh.).
nes present tense in a similar way that present time is one which
is the substratum of the utterance (of the Laṭ suffix). Thus in
order to express this present time, the suffix Laṭ is enjoined after
a verbal root.

The Mahābhāṣyakāra, alternatively defines presentness as
one different from the pastness and futurity. Some scholars like
Pancoli commentator on the Bhūṣṇārasa etc. are of the opinion
that this definition is not free from faults, because it suffers from
the fault of mutual dependency. It is like this: When one is
asked to define presentness the answer is in terms of the
other two (i.e. pastness; and futurity). Similarly when one is
asked ‘what is pastness’ the reply is in terms of the other two
(i.e. present and future). Similarly futurity also is defined. Thus
there is the fault of a mutual dependency in the definitions. Hence
Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa prefers the other definition viz. Prārabdhaṁparis-
māpta kriyātvāṁ vartamanṭvāṁ. This contention of the scholars
is untenable. The alternate definition offered by the Mahābhāṣ-
yakāra is free from any fault. Here we define the pastness as
‘the property of being the counter-positive of consequent abse-
tence at the present time or it can be defined as’ the property of
an action which the counter positive of the absence existing in
the present.

Similarly the future tense also can be defined as ‘Having
the property of coming into existence in a time which is the
counterpositive of the prior absence existing in the present. Thus
definition given by the Mahābhāṣyakāra is free of the fault
i.e. mutual dependency.

1. Vartamānakālaśca tattatśabdaprayogādhikaraṇaṁ kālayupah
   (Vy.Vā.).
2. Atre vāśabdānasthāyām (Anādare). Pūrṇoktāpekṣayā asyaiva
gurutvāt. Kimcāivāṁ bhūtavādapi vaktum śakhyataya
   anyonyāśrayāpattih. (Prabha on Vai. Bhū. Sā.)
3. Vidyamāna dhvamsa pratiyogītvāṁ bhūtavāṁ or Vartamāna
dhvamsa pratiyogīryopalaksītvāṁ bhūtavāṁ.
4. Vartamāna prāgabhāvapratiyogīsanyotpattimāvatvāṁ.
Further the present tense suffix, as opined by Gagabhaṭṭa, is used after a verbal root to indicate a habit, continuity of action, in the sense of near future of past etc. The last type of present-ness is from a secondary signification. However this type of present usage i.e. in instances where the state of this present time is extended to the nearby future or past time, is ratified by Pāṇini sutra P.3.3.131. Thus present tense, as already stated is of two types.

1. Apravṛttau parścaiva vṛttau Vṛttaeva ca. Nityah pravṛttah sāmipye vartamanāscaturvidhaḥ. (Bhā. Cīn.).

* * *
This suffix Lit is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate a time (associated with an action) which is past, and exclusive of today and not witnessed by the speaker (parokṣa). This suffix Lit excludes the other two suffixes used to indicate past time exclusive of today. Thus to use the Lit suffix three conditions are laid down. Omission of any of the three results in the fault of over application of the definition on other times. If the first condition i.e., that it should express past, is omitted out, it will also apply to future exclusive of today. If the second condition i.e., exclusive of today, is dropped out then it would also apply to past pertaining to today. If the third condition i.e., not witnessed by the speaker, is not there then it would apply to past witnessed by the speaker also. Thus all the three conditions are necessary to give the precise use of Lit.

Adyatana as already explained is the day accompanied by (a) of the night that is past + 1/2 of the night yet to come or (b) 1/2 of the night that is past + 1/3 of the night yet to come or (c) from sunrise to sunrise.

As regards the Parokṣa (imperceptibility) the Bhaṣya-kara records many views such as (a) one hundred years ago (b) one thousand years ago (c) two or three days ago or (d) even obstructed by a wall etc., However "not being witnessed by the speaker" is a common factor among all these different alternatives. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa defines Parokṣa as "the property of not being the object of knowledge" such as "I perceive" that resides in the mind of speaker.

1. Parokṣa Lit-P.3.2.115.
   Bhāṭa, anadyatana parokṣarthan vṛtterdhatoh Lit syat.
2. M.B. on P.3.2.115.
3. Parokṣayatvam prayokti vṛtti saksatkaram ityetaśa viśayatataśalijnanā eviśayatvam (Vai. Bhu. P.75.)
The other disciplines also accept the use of the Ṣūrya suffix as governed by P.3.2.115. Thus the sentence ‘Caitraya ṭapāca’ gives us an import that the activity of cooking is past; and is not a matter of today (Adyatana) and that the speaker also did not witness the agent while cooking. Thus to put in other words that knowledge (that Caitra cooked something sometime exclusive of today) possessed by the speaker is not obtained by direct perception but through some other agency.

Now let us examine the import of the sātra. There it is said ‘when activity is not witnessed by the speaker, as one of the conditions for the use of Ṣūrya suffix.’ Here are doubts whether action is visible at all. It is made clear by the Bhāṣyakāra at many places that action is so minute that it cannot be seen but is to be inferred. Further the activity denoted by the root has many intermedinatory activities of which each exists one or two mome{n{s only. Thus no real activity is denoted by the root, but it denotes the total of such intermedinatory activities mentally fabricated as a single unit. Hence when the activity is not at all perceptible, the use of the phrase ‘Paroṣa’ is purposeless.

To this objection Kaubhadhatta author of the ‘Vaiyakarana Bhusana’ gives a two fold reply. He interprets that Paroṣa refers to the agent associated with the action. Thus though action is not perceptible its substratum is perceptible. Hence the word Paroṣa means ‘when the agent associated with activity is not actually witnessed by the speaker (Sādhanaparoṣa)’ However he does not feel satisfied of this reply. He fears of the fault of prolixity because in such a case the word ‘Dhato’ is to be explained as ‘of the substratum of action which is denoted by the root’. But if he can explain Paroṣa as referring to activity then there

1. Liśarthopi bhūtanadyatanatva viśisṭa paroṣarūpāḥ (Bhā. Rah.) and Atītyam anadyatanatvam paroṣatvam ca Liśarthāḥ (Vyu. Va.).
2. Kriyānāmeṣyamatyantaparidṛśṭa śakya pindibhūtā nidarsayitum Śasā vanumanagamyā. (M.B. on P.1.3.1).
will be brevity in explaining the word ‘Dhātuh’ as of action expressed by the root.

Hence he prefers the interpretation that “when the action is imperceptible”.1 Now one may ask about the objection raised in this connection. So Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa replies that the words of the Bhāṣyakāra are to be carefully understood. The Bhāṣyakāra means that “mentally conceived as a whole the individual constituent activities arranged in a temporal sequence, conceived as whole is not visible; but the individual component is perceptible in its component form. Otherwise the stamen Pasya Mṛgo dhavati (Behold the animal runs), cannot be justified. In the above sentence the object of verb Drṣ (see) is the action of running. Though ‘running’ as a whole is not visible, its component parts such as moving fast both the legs, neck etc. can be visualised. Thus though activity as a whole (Samudayakriya) is not perceptible it is perceptible in its constituent parts (Avayava kriya). So taking this into account, we can justify the use of ‘Parokṣa’ in the sūtra. Thus Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa prefers Kriyāparokṣatva to Sadhana Parokṣatva.

There is another reason for Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa to accept Kriyāparokṣatva. This facilitates an easy justification of the usage of Lith in the first person. Since it is decided that Lith is to be used only when the action or the means of achieving that action is not perceived by the speaker, it becomes evident that Lith cannot be used in the first person. Whatever one does must be perceptible to oneself and thus the condition of imperceptibility is not fulfilled. But Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa does not totally accept this version. One may not be aware of what one does when one is absorbed in something i.e. under the influence of liquor, erotic intoxication etc. Thus there is scope for one not to perceive one’s own activity and then is inferred from its result. Thus the famous usage in Śisupalavādha is justified.2

1. Idāṁ tvavadvheyām. Kriyāyā eva parokṣye liṅgatyartho laghvat. (ibid P.75.)
2. Bahu jagada purastāttasya mattrkilahām. (Śisupalavādha.11.39)
Nāgaiśa says that the root ‘Dṛṣ’ has the meaning of knowlegde in general (jñāna sāmānya) but not perceptibility with eyes (Cākṣusā pratyakṣa). He suggests that the root ‘Dhāvṛ’ denotes only result but not activity, in which case the objection of the opponent can be set aside. Otherwise this objection cannot be answered because any action whatever it be (Avayava or samudṛya) is in turn a group of smaller components only and as such it cannot be visualised. If any one says he is perceiving an activity, it is not the activity that one perceives but constituent parts of the result continuously brought into existence by the activity: in a temporal sequence, which finally remains as a substance or only a mental impression. Bhartṛhari also confirms the view that there is no pure activity that can be seen and every thing has still parts in it self. And in this case of Paśya Mṛgo dhāvati the real object is running (Dhāvana) but the animal gets the objective case being a perceptible means (substratum) of the activity of running.

Now there are certain instances where the action cannot be admitted as unseen by the speaker but he (the speaker) uses Lit in the first person. For instance Udayana, author of Kīrāvalī, says “Vyatene kīrāvalīmudayanaḥ” Here Udayana being the author of the Kīrāvalī cannot say that his work is unperceived by him. In such cases how is to justify the usage of Lit in the first person.

To this question excepting a few persons like Vardhamāna, Upāyakāra and his followers, other scholars like Nāgaiśa justify the

1. Avayava rūpeṇa samudāya rūpeṇa ca apratyakṣetyarthah, Paśya mṛgo dhāvati ityādi prāyogah tatphala samyogadarśana-bhiprayeṇa. Defera jñānasamānye lakṣaṇā (Uddyota on P.3.2.102 Vartika 3).

2. Na ca vicchinnarūpapī Soviramānivartate, Sarvaiṇa hi kriyānyena samkīrṇaivaśopalabhyate. (V.P.3.9.83).

3. Na hyatra mṛgoḥ karma. Dvitiyaprasangadīti saranakriyāvā karma. Tasyāśca sādhana pratyakṣatāyam pratyakṣaśabhimānak Paśya iti darsanakriyopattih (V.P.3.8.51, Helārāja)
Nāgāraja, who always strictly follows the Mahābhāṣya-kāra, does not agree with the theory of 'Kriyāparokṣya' proposed by Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa. Kriya is always imperceptible, be it in its component form or its aggregate singleness. What one means as component part of the main action has, in turn, many component parts in it. Thus if one goes on analysing what is thought of as an 'Avayavakriya' it, in turn, becomes a samudrayakriya with respect to the component parts in such an 'avayavakriya'. Hence no activity can be perceived. That is why the Bhāṣyakāra says 'action, totally imperceptible (Atyantāparidṛṣṭā) is not possible to show'. Further if a constituent part of an action is visible the Bhāṣyakāra would have not said "Sāvānumānagamyaścā an action is always to be inferred from its result". Hence even intermediary component parts of an action are not at all visible.

Further the Bhāṣyakāra says that Parokṣatva is an attribute to the result. Though activity is not perceptible the result is perceptible. So as it is generally admitted that if the result is not witnessed, it amounts that activity which produces that result also is not witnessed. Thus Lit can be used after a verbal root in the instances where the result is not actually witnessed by the speaker. Thus the Sūtra amounts past, exclusive of today, result not witnessed. When the result of past action exclusive of today is not witnessed by the speaker, then to indicate that sense the Lit suffix is enjoined after the verbal root.¹

Thus Bhāṣyakāra does not make any mention of the non-witnessing of constituent activities (Avayavakriya). As such, Nāgāraja contends that Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa is mistaken in his conclusion "idamtvavadheyam etc.".

Now one may question how Nāgāraja can justify the usages 'Behold' the animal runs (Pāśya Mṛgadāvati).

¹. M.B. on Parokṣa Lit P.3.2.116.
usage accepting the superimposition of imperceptibility. They accept superimposition because they explain the intention of Udayana as to convey the ease, quickness etc. with which he has completed the work (i.e. with such a speed) that he (Udayana) himself feels it as unperceivable. Thus he completed the act of writing the book.

Vardhamana and others do not accept it and they justify the first person usage on the jñāpaka of the sūtra P.7.1.91. That is Pāṇini says that in Lit the first person suffix behaves optionally like a Nīt. Therefore if Lit is always to be used in Parokṣa, then this sūtra becomes purposeless. But it is not admissible that Pāṇini writes purposeless Sūtras. Hence these scholars define Parokṣatva as "having agent-hood different from that of the speaker. But as the Sūtra Nāluttamōvā accepts Lit usage in the first person also; it is said to remind us that Lit is possible to be used even if there is no Parokṣya as defined above.3

To justify the usages of Lit in the first person on the plea that P.VII.1.91 reminds us of such usages, is not correct. A sūtra reminds us of something when it becomes inapplicable (Vyartha). But in the present cases the sūtra VII.1-91 has its utility in many other places where Lit is justified without any restriction of Parokṣatva, e.g. Atyantapahānave ca. And in the case of Luṅ, and Laṅ. Lit also is enjoined by the Sutra P.3.4.6. So in all these instances the Sutra "Nāluttamōvā" applies. Hence we cannot take recourse to jñāpaka presuming that the sūtra becomes purposeless. Thus in the instances Vyātene kiraṇāvalātmudayanāsattarke Tejomayīṃ, we have to justify by accepting superimposed imperceptibility (Parokṣatva). But Bhūṣanakāra does not justify the usage and says 'Ayuktameva' (it is irregular).

1. Vyātene kiraṇāvalātmudayanāsattarke Tejomayīṃ.
2. P.7.1.91, Nāluttamōvā.
4. Vārtika 5 on P.3.2.115.
5. P.3.4.6, Luṅ Laṅ Litēh (Chandasi).
LUṬ

This suffix Luṭ is enjoined after a verbal root to denote that the action expressed by the root is neither past, nor present. But it refers to a time exclusive of today (Anadyatana). We have already explained the words Adyatana, Anadyatana, Vartamana, Bhūta and Bhavisyat.

The word ‘Bhavīṣat (future)’ is defined as ‘having the property of coming into existence in a time which is the counter positive of the prior absence existing in the present.’ Thus the sentence ‘Sva ganta’ means an activity (of going) which comes into being tomorrow. Thus this suffix excludes that particular (relative) futurity which may be like this. One may say in the morning ‘my father comes in the evening’. Evening is a future time with reference to the morning time. Hence this suffix Luṭ does not speak of such futurity but expresses ‘futurity exclusive of today’.

This suffix Luṭ is enjoined after a verbal root on the authority of Pāṇini Sūtra P.3.3.15. Further this suffix is used where both adyatana anadyatna future is mentioned as in sentence “Adya śvo vāgamīṣyāta”. Thus it denotes two types of future.

Lṛt

This suffix Lṛt is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate ‘the future in general’. That is here the speaker is not concerned whether the futurity belongs to this day or not. He just wants to convey the futurity of the action. Thus Lṛt can be used to express future pertaining to this day. And it is also used after a root to express future when there is action. That is why Kaundabhaṭṭa says ‘future in general’.

1. Vartamana prāgabhāvapratiyogi samayotpattimāna. (Vai. śāhū. karika 22)  
2. P.3.3.51, Anadyatane Luṭ.
Pāṇini enjoins this suffix after a verbal root through a Sūtra P. 3.3.13.1

However sometimes Luṭ is used in the sense of Lṛt when the speaker wants to convey worry or disgust. For instance a lady is walking too slowly. Then one may exhibit his worry "at this rate when will she reach" meaning when she would reach the goal. Here no reference is to the particula futurity but Luṭ is used. Such cases are justified on the authority of the Vartika "Paridevane Śvastani Bhavisyantarthe".3

L E T

This suffix Lṛt is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate the same sense, to express which, Liṁ is enjoined after a verbal root. The suffix Liṁ4 is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate injunction (Vidhi), assigning a duty [nimāntana], accord permission to do as one likes (Āmantraṇa), a respectful command (adīśa), request [Prarthana] etc.. The Liṁ suffix expresses inducement. The separate mention of the four meanings is just for the sake of clarity of the basic meaning.

This suffix Lṛt is enjoined on the authority of the Sūtra P.3.4.7.5 The use of this suffix is limited to the Veda only and in classical Sanskrit the usage of this suffix is not found.

1. P.3.3.13 (Lṛt Seṣe ca).
2. Iyem nu kadāgnta yaivam pādau nidahaṭi.
3. Paridevanam = anuṣoceanam. Śvastani is the technical name of old Grammarians what Pāṇini now calls Luṭ. Similarly Bhavisyanti is synonymous to Lṛt.
4. P.3.4.7 Liṁarthe Lṛt.
5. Vidhi nimāntana mantraṇa adhisṛṣṭu sampraṣnapraarthaneṣu Liṁ P.3.3.161. The meaning of Vidhi is separately discussed in the following pages.
LOT

The suffix Loṭ is enjoined after a verbal root in the same sense as the suffix Liḥ i.e. Vidhi etc. and also Benediction (Āṣī ṇ) Benediction means the wish of the speaker that a certain 'good may happen'. This suffix is enjoined by two sutras i.e. P.3.3.1731 and 3.3.162.²

LAṈ

It has been already explained that the suffix Luṭ is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate the future exclusive of today. Now this suffix Laṅ is its counterpart in the past tense. It is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate "the past exclusive of today" (Anadyatna bhūtakala).

As already said pastness is the nature of being the counter positive of consequential absence of existing in the present time.³ This pastness refers to action and root to the locus of that action. Thus interpreting we can modify the definition of pastness as the nature of an action which is the counter-positive of the consequential absence existing in the present time.⁴ Thus this suffix indicates the pastness exclusive of today on the authority of the Sutra P.3.2.111.⁵

1. P.3.3.173 Āṣī ṇ Liḥ Loṭau.
2. P.3.3.162 Loṭ ca.
3. Vidyamanadhvamsa pratiyogitvaṁ bhūtavāṁ.
4. P.3.2.111 Anadyatane Laṅ.
5. Vartamaṇadhvamsa pratiyogi kriyopalaksitaṁ bhūtavāṁ.

* * *
LIṆ (VIDHI—VĀDAH)
(Meaning of the Potential Mood)

In this world we find that, when a person wants another to act, he conveys his intention in the form of either an order or a request. In Sanskrit Language this order or the request is conveyed by using a verb word ending in a potential mood affix or an imperative mood affix etc.. As already established, this order or request is not the meaning of the verbal root hence it is of the suffix. The medium of conveying this intention is of two types i.e. with the help of classical sentences or Vedic injunctions. Whatever it be, it is further observed that immediately on hearing such a verb word one does not act. It is only in certain cases he acts and in some other cases he does not. For example, when we order a person “to eat poison-mixed food, or to bring the Moon, or run through the streets. one does not act; but when we order or request for a cup of water, or to read a book or to perform a certain yāga, one may act immediately. So it is evident that a mere hearing of a verb-word ending in a potential mood affix or imperative mood affix is not the cause in inducing a person to act. Besides this, there is something which actually causes one to act. Now “what is that something” is the question which engaged the attention of many scholars belonging to various disciplines particularly Tarka (logic), Mīmāṃsā, and Vyākaraṇa (Grammar). Now in this chapter we will examine their arguments and conclusions briefly.

LOGICIAN’S VIEW

Usually we find on hearing a verb word ending with a potential mood affix, one is induced to act. In so getting induced, the hearer must necessarily possess three types of knowledge; viz, (1) that the particular object (for which one induces him to act) is capable of being achieved through effort, (Kṛtisadhyatva) (2) that the particular activity (to perform which one is induced) is the means to attain the desired end (iṣṭasādhanatva) (3) that (the particular activity) does not entail any serious untoward effects (Balavadanistīnanubandhitva). For instance when we say
Bring the Moon: the heifer does not act, because he does not have any of these knowledges. To be clear, he knows pretty well the Moon is not within his capacity to bring the desired object (the Moon): he does not have the means to achieve it, and also he knows that under no circumstances his means may result even if he tries to bring the Moon. Hence he does not act. Similarly when we order "Eat the poison-mixed food" one does not act because he knows well that such an act (eating the poison-mixed food) brings him an undesirable or undesirable evil effect (death).

Therefore the Logician is of the opinion that a knowledge of inducement to act was a three-fold meaning. i.e. the knowledge of the fact (1) of not-entering any serious evil effects (2) of capability to attain the desired object by effort and (3) of the means to attain the desired end.

All these three types of knowledge are the signified potentialities of the Lú affix. This suffix has the denotative capacity signified equally in all these three meanings in the same way as the word "Uskavantu" signifies both the Sun and the Moon simultaneously. We can not decide due to lack of a deciding criterion, which of the three meanings is principal and which is attributive. Therefore the Logician accepts that all these three meanings are signified simultaneously by the potential mood affix. Of course this is the generally accepted theory of the Logician. But there are many Logicians who differ from this view. So we will examine some of their views in the following pages.

General View:

Now it may be argued that the desired objects, say heaven (swarga), food (adana) etc., are many, and the means to achieve them, say sacrifice (yaga), cooking (vaha) etc., are many in number. So, if we accept signification of this suffix in each of these, then it will be a matter of proximity and also there prevails confusion. Therefore the common characteristic of the nature of "being the

1. Balavadanishatananubadhitvam, krtisadhayatvam, istasadhanaive ca vidhyarthah.
object of desire (istasadhanatva) and desiring to be attained by effort (kritsadhyatvam) are treated as the meanings of the Lith affix. And the nature of not entailing serious untoward effects is also denoted by the Lith suffix. It is but judicious to treat the same as the meaning of the affix and not the individual objects of the desire or the individual means to achieve objects.

Of course one may question, because the Lith suffix denotes istasadhanatva in general; how the specific object desired and the means to achieve it are known from a sentence like “swargakamoyajeta?” And also why an irregular import, as swarga is the desired object and Paka is the means to achieve it, is not caused. In reply to this the Logician says that no such sort of wrong import is caused, because, normally the meaning of the root after which the Lith affix is added indicates the means to achieve the desired object. And the noun word nearer to it (i.e. from the compatibility) gives the object desired. Thus from the sentence “Svargakamoyajeta” it will be evident that svarga is the desired object and the means is the activity in which the sacrifice is the object. Similarly in the sentence “Udbhida yajeta pasukamah” (one desirous of cattle should perform Udbhid yaga), the desired object is Pasu (cattle) and the means is the activity in which the sacrifice called ‘udbhid’ is the object (istasadhanatva) is also the meaning of Lith affix.

Now, are we to accept all these three as the meanings of the potential mood affix. The Logician replies in affirmative. He justifies his stand as follows:

Here is a sentence “Mandalim kuryat” (Make circle). This is a sentence of Buddhists who normally sit in a circular form to contemplate on God. But to those who are not Buddhists, to pray or to sit in a circular form is not the desired object nor is the means to achieve anything. So on hearing that sentence we are

1. Istatvam samab hivyahita padopa sthapita-
   Kamana visayatvam. (Vyu. Vâ.).
not acting due to lack of \textit{ist\textasciitilde{a}dhanatvam}. But on hearing a sentence like ‘Bhojanam Kuryat’ one acts because he has the knowledge of \textit{ist\textasciitilde{a}dhanatva}. Thus from concomitance in agreement and its absence (Anvaya vyatireka) we have to admit that \textit{ist\textasciitilde{a}dhanatva} is the meaning of the \textit{Li\texttilde{n}} affix. Similarly from the fact one does not act on hearing a sentence like “Bring the moon” or “Eat the poison-mixed food” it becomes evident that the other two types of knowledge i.e., \textit{k\texttilde{r}tis\textasciitilde{a}dhyatva} and \textit{Balavadanista ananubandhitva} are also to be accepted as the meanings of the \textit{Li\texttilde{n}} affix.

In sentences like “Swarga k\textit{a}mo yajeta” the \textit{Li\texttilde{n}} suffix denotes all the three meanings i.e., Swarga the desired object and Yaga is the means of the achievement of the desired object, the fact that it is also capable of being produced by effort (\textit{K\texttilde{r}tis\textasciitilde{a}dhyata}) and it does not entail any untoward evil effect. Therefore one, being equipped with the knowledge of the above three types, naturally, acts on hearing ‘sentences like swargak\textit{a}mo yajeta’. And all these three meanings agree with the meaning of the verbal root.

Again in sentences like “Syenena yajeta” the \textit{Li\texttilde{n}} suffix denotes only two meanings i.e., \textit{ist\textasciitilde{a}dhanatva} and \textit{k\texttilde{r}tis\textasciitilde{a}dhyatva} and these two meanings agree with the meaning of the verbal root. It does not signify the third meaning; because, by killing another person, one gets sin which is an entailment of serious untoward evil. So it cannot be accepted as the meaning of the affix in inducing a person to act.

Now let us take a negative prohibition like “\textit{Na kal\textasciitilde{a}j\textasciitilde{n}a bhak\textasciitilde{s}ayet}” (one should not eat kalanja). The \textit{Li\texttilde{n}} suffix does not signify all the three meanings in this case, but only one that is “\textit{Balavadanista ananubandhitva}”. And this one meaning agrees not with the meaning of the verbal root but with the meaning of negative particle \textit{Na\texttilde{n}}. On the other hand if we are to accept all the three meanings as the denotations of the \textit{Li\texttilde{n}} affix, the negative particle has to express the absence of all these three meanings. But as far as Kala\textasciitilde{n}a bhak\textasciitilde{s}ana is concerned, it gives satisfaction (\textit{Tripti}) the desired object; and is also achievable. So we
cannot speak of their absence. Therefore, in order to prevent one from eating Kalañja, the Liṅ denotes only Balavadaniśṭa ananubandhitva which agreeing with the meaning of the negative particle Naṅ, gives an import of the absence of the same. In other words it causes the knowledge of entailing a serious untoward effect. So one desists from acting (i. e. eating Kalañja).

Some Logicians are of the opinion that, in the case of negative injunctions, both istsaśadhanatva and Balavadaniśṭa ananubandhitva are the expressed meanings of the Liṅ affix and the former is qualified by the latter. And the verbal import will be of the form Balavadaniśṭa ananubandhitva visiśta istsaśadhanatva abhāvat-. But Gādādhara does not accept this. He says there is no criterion in treating one of the meanings qualified.

Thus the potential mood affix denotes three meanings in sentences like “Swarga kāmo yajeta” two meanings in sentences like Șyenabhicarāṇ yajeta and one meaning in the negative injunctions like “Kalañjam na bhaksayet”. Thus we can conclude the Logicians’ views in general with respect to the denotation of Liṅ suffix.

1. Na Kalañjam bhaksayet ityadi niṣedha vidheḥ pramṇyaanau-rodhataḥ balavadaniśṭa ananubandhitvasya vidhyarthatva praveśah (Vyu. Vā.)

2. Vastutasu visiśtasaktau viśeṣya visiśara bhave- vinigamanāvirahat prthageva balavadaniśṭa ananubandhītavah vācyatvam. (Vyu. Vā.)
THE VIEWS OF JAYANTABHATTA

Jayantabhatta, who belongs to the section of the old Logicians, explains the meaning of \textit{Līn} affix in a different way. According to him \textit{Vidhi}, the meaning of the \textit{Līn} affix, is an activity otherwise called \textit{Śabdabāhavanā}, conveyed by the \textit{Līn} affix. The character of \textit{Vidhi} is to exhort a person to work (\textit{Apravṛttā pravartana}). Of course various doubts such as whether the word form \textit{Līn} itself exhorts or the activity or \textit{kṛtisadhyatva} or \textit{iṣṭasādhanatva etc.} have been raised. Hence Jayantabhatta says that by the grace of \textit{Vidhi} alone the relationship between the desired object and its means is made known to us. This relationship is made known by stating such and such is the fruit for such and such an action. Thus \textit{Vidhi} exhorts a person to act. As regards the non-applicability of this postulation, i.e. inspite of exhortation of this nature we observe people do not act. Jayantabhatta replies that those who have implicit faith in the \textit{Vidhivyākya} do act. What is meant by “Exhorting a person to act” is just to produce a knowledge in him that he is directed to act. One may actually act to achieve the fruit, or may not act due to other impediments such as shortage of funds etc. Similarly in the negative sentences the \textit{Līn} suffix causes the knowledge that doing such and such an action produces evil effects. Of course we find many people indulging in such prohibited acts without caring for the evil results. Hence it may be doubted that \textit{Vidhi} can neither make one to act nor can it prevent one. So much so Jayantabhatta pleads that having that knowledge is different from performing the induced action. He claims that the \textit{Līn} affix causes the knowledge that such and such an action results in such and such a result. Once such a knowledge is understood by the hearer it

1. \textit{Līnarthavagame satitpravṛttirdrisyate iti tatrāpi Līn vyāparaḥ prabhavati; sa c iyaṁ līnadvīyāparaḥ śabdabāhavana nāmakheyo vīdhirituyucyate sa eva ca pravartakah.} (Nya. Man.).

2. \textit{Tasmādesa visīsthaḥ sadhyasādhana sambandhah āvidhipra-sada labhya eva bhavati.} (ibid)
means he is exhorted by ‘Vidhi’ to work. Whether he actually
gets himself to work or not is a different thing but he has the
knowledge that he is induced to work. Thus to have such an
understanding is different and performing such an action is
different.

Here some people may argue that a person, suffering from
hunger, eats a particular thing only on knowing it satisfies his
appetite. One desirous of good health, on knowing from the
doctor that Āmalaka gives good health, eats Āmalaka. Thus from
these instances it is evident that it is the knowledge of Īṣṭasādha-
natva alone that exhorts a person to act. To this Jayantabhaṭṭa
replies that the opponent is thoroughly mistaken. Strictly speak-
ing it is the ‘word’ which conveys that such and such is the
means to attain a particular result, actually exhorts a person to
act. By the word ‘word’ in the previous sentence, it is not the
mere word form. In causing knowledge a word is an instrument
(Karaṇa). An instrument is a kāraka. Kāraka means one associ-
ated with a certain activity. And this activity known as Sābdī-
bhāvanā, subsisting in the Liṅ suffix, is called Vidhi, and it alone
exhorts one to act. Thus according to Jayantabhaṭṭa the Liṅ
suffix means a particular (Sābdī) activity which can exhort a person
to acti.

THE VIEW OF UDAYANA:

Among the old Logicians, Udayana is the most powerful.
He is recognised as the last among that generation and also a
source of inspiration to the beginning of a new generation. Ac-
cording to Udayana “Vidhi” means the intention or desire (icchā)
of the speaker. He does not accept any of the said three mean-
ings (i.e. Īṣṭasādhanatva etc.), either individual or as one quali-
ified by the other two, to be the denoted potentiality of the Liṅ

1. Anyohi pravartanavagamaḥ, Anyasya bahyo vyaparaḥ.
    Evidvidhivasādeva sādhyasādhanabhava dhṛthā,
    Sa hi prathama nirvṛtteta preranaajñānānapārvikā.
    (Nya. Man.),
suffix. He opines that the said three meanings can be presumed or inferred; on knowing the intention of the speaker. Udayana presents many detailed arguments in the fifth chapter of his work ‘Nyayakusumāñjali’. He puts forth five reasons to reject the Īstasādhanatva etc. as the denoted potentiality of Vidhi. According to him (1) this Īstasādhanatva is inferred through the knowledge of the speaker’s desire or intention. (2) This knowledge of Īstasādhanatva etc. is already known from Arthavāda passages like ‘one gets relieved from death or Sin by performing Asvamedhayaga’ etc. Therefore no additional purpose is served by accepting Īstasādhanatva etc. as the denoted meaning of the suffix Liṅ. (3) And also there are usages as ‘because it is the means to achieve my desired end, I do it etc. both in the first person and second person. (4) We observe that the intention of the speaker alone is made known to us by this Liṅ suffix. Either in a command (Ājñā) honour (Adhyāsaṇa), permission (Anujñā) question (Samprasaṇa) request or benediction (Prārthana), we find that the intention of the speaker is made known and no Īstasādhanatva etc. is understood. (5) The fifth object is that in the instance of prohibitive or yikalpa injunctions Īstasādhanatva etc. cannot be the meaning of the Lin affixed e.g. take the sentence Brāhmaṇaṁ na hanyat (one should not kill a Brāhmaṇ). If we accept Īstasādhanatva as the meaning of Lin affixed, then from the above sentence we get an import to the effect that ‘act of killing a brahmin, is not the means of achieving the desired object: but never do we get an import of the form ‘the act of killing a brahmin is the means to some undesired end (Anīstasādhanam). It cannot be said that whatever is not Īstasādhanā automatically becomes Anīstasādhanā.

Another objection as pointed out by Udayana is—if Īstasādhanatva is the denoted sense of the Lin suffix and one acts only on having such a knowledge, one should act on hearing even a sentence like ‘sacrifice is the means to achieve Heaven (Yāga)’.

1 Hetutvāt anumāṇāccha madhyamadau viyogataḥ, Anyatra Klpta sāmārthyaḥ nīśedhanupa pattiḥ. (Nya, Ku, V.14)
svargasādhanam). But no such inclination is found on the part of the hearer of that sentence. Hence Īstasādhanatva cannot be the meaning of 'Vidhi'. Udayana gives very lucid, strictly logical arguments, refuting the theory of Īstasādhanatva as the meaning of the Līn affix.

Thus taking all these points into consideration, Udayana rejects Īstasādhanatva or in fact any other meaning such as Kṛtiśadhyatva etc., as the denoted potentiality of the Līn affix. So we can conclude that according to Udayana, the Līn affix denotes the 'Desire' of the speaker in the form of inducing a person to act in certain cases or to prevent him from acting in some other instances. And the so called Īstasādhanatva, Kṛtiśadhyatva etc. are inferred from this 'Desire' of the speaker.¹

The Views of Gangeśa, Pakṣadhara Etc.:

The neologists like Gangeśa, Gadādhara, Pakṣadhara do not accept the above views of Udayana or Jayantabhaṭṭa. Nor do they admit that the Līn suffix denotes all the three meanings (i.e. Īstasādhanatva etc.) simultaneously. They think it is a matter of prolixity. Further they do not accept that the Līn suffix denotes each meaning individually, because in such cases we can get only a particular knowledge, devoid of other meanings at a time. Hence they suggested to accept only two meanings, the third being an attribute to Īstasādhanatva. Hence Gangeśa defines Vidhi as 'being the means of achieving the desired end in conjunction with the meaning of not producing a strain more than that which inevitably accompanies it (the desired end), as well as being capable of being achieved by effort.²

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1. Vidhirvaktrabhīpiyāḥ pravṛtyādau Liṅdibhiḥ, Abhidheyonumeyā tu karūrīṣabhyupāyata. (Nya. Ku.).
Similarly Pakṣadhara Miśra, with a slight modification in the definition of Gangesa, states that Vidhi is 'being the means of achieving the desired end in conjunction with the meaning of not producing a strain which is not necessarily associated to the production of the desired end.'

Gadadhara, who closely follows Gangesa defines Vidhi on similar lines. According to him Vidhi means "Being capable of being achieved by effort" as well as 'being the means of achieving the desired end' in conjunction with the meaning of not entailing any untoward effect." Thus these scholars prefer a qualified potentiality to the Liṅ suffix.

Now when we try to explain the sentences like Na Kalaṁ-jam bhaksayet' etc. in accordance with any one of the definitions, there results a fault of the meaning of word Naṁ agreeing with a part (syntactically connected) of the meaning of the Liṅ affix; i.e. Balavadanīśa ananubandhitva a part of the meaning of the Liṅ affix with the meaning of the word Naṁ. But Pakṣadhara Miśra replies to it, that is not a fault so much to worry about, because such type of partial agreement is seen in many instances as Caitramata, Caitranapta etc. Gadadhara also is of the view that there is no partial agreement at all. In the verbal import we do not get any knowledge which speaks of 'the absence of not entailing any untoward effect'. Here also the meaning of Naṁ being substantive agrees with the total meaning of the Vidhi suffix and which in turn qualifies 'Eating'". Thus the verbal

1. Kūtisādhyaatve sati istotpattyantarī yaka dū kha ajana-katva visiṣṭa sa dhanaṁtvam.
2. Kūtisādhyaatvam balavadanīśa ananubandhitvasahitam istasārchanatvam ca. (Vyū. Va.)
4. Balavadanīśanubandhitvaysīhasadhanatva visiṣṭhaśya vācyatve visiṣṭabhavasyaiva sābdabodheśhānam....etc. (Vyū. Va.).
import of a sentence "Na Kalanjanam bhaksayet" is of the form
"Eating of Kalanjia is possessed of the absence of istasadhana
the means of achieving the desired end) as qualified by" not
entailing any serious untoward effect. From this the entailment
of evil effects is inferred. In this way according to Gadarhara
the negative knowledge of the absence of a serious untoward
effect culminates in the sense of the positive inference of its entai-
ling serious consequences. As a matter of fact, either an induce-
ment or prevention is not directly denoted by the Vidhivakya.
It is understood, not directly but in succession (Paramparaya).2

This acceptance of qualified potentiality to Vidhi suffix
does not solve the problem of proximity to the Logician, because
in sentences like "Syema bhicaran yajeta" the Logician has to
forego the qualified potentiality in Kritisadhyatva and istasadhan-
натва.3

THE VIEW OF JAGADISA:

Jagadisa is very critical of the qualified potentiality to the
Lih suffix. Hence he gives an alternative definition "whichever is
the attributive in the knowledge which (knowledge) is the cause
of the desire of the inducer to act is called vidhi."4 And this
Vidhi is of the form of (1) Being capable of achieving the desired
end through effort (kritisadhyatva) (2) Being the means of achiev-
ing the desired object through effort (istasadhanatva) (3) Non-
entailment of an untoward serious evil effect (Balavadanista
nubandhitva). All these three are the denoted potentialities of

1. Kalanjabhaksaam balavadanistananubandhitva visista-
sadhanatva abhavat.
2. Pravartakamiva nivartaka mapi janam srutivakyat parampra-
valva Na tusaksat (Vyu. Va).
3. Ibid.
4. Vidhistu...pravartaka cikrsayam yat prarakajjanasya
the Vidhi suffix, of course all individually; but not a qualified knowledge of any of these three in any way.

Now Jagadīśa criticises the theory of accepting a qualified potentiality in the Līṅ affix. The opponent may argue that by accepting such a qualified potentiality in the Līṅ affix the invalidity of sentences like “One should beat water” (jalam tadayet), etc. can be proved. But this is not a proper argument because here one has to create six types of Kāryakāraṇa bhavas to justify the six types of potentialites which results by changing the three meanings as attributives and substantives alternatively. And even if it is admitted that “justified prolixity is not a matter of fault”2 still an injunction like “Śyenenaḥbhicaran yajeta” cannot properly be explained. And it cannot also be maintained that in such cases the Līṅ suffix denotes the meaning of Iṣṭasādhanatva alone through implication.3 Therefore Jagadīśa re-affirms that the Līṅ affix has denotational potentiality in all the three meanings individually. And whichever meaning suits the particular context, that meaning alone should be considered as the expressed sense of the Līṅ affix in the particular instance.4

The Views of Vyāsatīrtha:

Vyāsatīrtha differs from all the afore said scholars. He argues that Iṣṭasādhanatva alone, without being qualified by any other attributes, is the meaning of the Līṅ affix.5 He does not accept Kṛtisādhyatva and Balavsdaniṣṭānanubandhitva as the

1. Thus to him Yajeta signifies yaṅgaḥ kṛtisādhyah iṣṭasādhanam Balavsdaniṣṭānanubandhi ca. However, Krishnakānta, the commentator on the Śabdāsaktiprakāśa defines Vidhi as ‘Pravartaka cikīrṣājanakatvāvacchedaka prakārataśrayatvam, (ibid).
2. Prāmāṇikara gauravāṁ na dosāya bhavati.
4. Yadrāpaḥ nyayadhiḥ tanmatraprakāraṇa saktijñānataḥ apekṣāya laghutvena tatprakāraṇa saktijñānataḥsvaiva tatra hetuvat. (Śa. Ṣa. Pra.)
meanings of the Lim suffix. He does not admit the desire of the speaker (iccha) as the meaning of Vidhi. He refutes the various arguments put forth by Udayana in refutation of istasadhanatva etc. as the meanings of Vidhi.

Vyasatirtha says that, if the intention of the speaker (Vakturabhipraya) is the meaning of Vidhi, then there are many instances where one does not act even on knowing the intention of the speaker, because he has no interest. And interest comes only from the knowledge of istasadhanatva. If it is argued that one acts after presuming the knowledge of istasadhanatva etc. from the intention of the speaker (as in the case of son taking food on the desire of the father), then better accept istasadhana-tva as a direct denotation of the Lim affix instead of presuming it from something. Any way, it is an admitted fact that one acts only after possessing the knowledge Istasadhanatva, but the question is whether this knowledge of Istasadhanatva is obtained through presumption from the intention of the speaker or directly from the denotation of the Lim affix. This being the position it is always better to have it through direct denotation rather by presumption.

And now as regards the five main arguments put forth by Udayana to negate istasadhanatva, Vyasatirtha says that the same arguments can be advanced against his (Udayana's) theory as well. The arguments can be summarised briefly as under.

1. Hetuvat:

Udayana points out that whenever a question is put as "Why do you do it, the reply that is generally given is of the form because it is the means to achieve my desired end" (istasadhana-tva). Thus istasadhanatva is a reason which is outside the meaning of the Lim affix and not included in its body of denotation.

If Udayana advances such a reasoning, with a similar reasoning one can negate the "Desire" as the meaning of the Lim affix. When we put a question "why do you do it," the reply is
in the form of "because it is intended (or desired) by my well-wisher (idam kartavyam āptabhipretatvāt). Hence 'Desire' also cannot be the meaning of Liṅ suffix as īśtasadhanatva is for Udayana.

2. Anumānaṇacca:

Udayana's second objection is that the said īśtasadhanatva is already understood from Arthavāda passages like "one gets relieved from death or sin (Brahmāhātya) on performing an Āśvamedha sacrifice." Hence there is no need to accept īśtasadhanatva as the meaning of Liṅ affix.

In refuting this argument, the opponent says, even so argued "Desire" also can be understood or inferred on the same lines, from the Arthavāda passages.

3. Madhyamādau Viyogataḥ:

The third objection of Udayana is that there are usages as "This is the means to achieve my desired object." Let me do it, etc.... So in such cases it is not possible to say the Liṅ suffix in first person (Kuryāṁ) and second person (Kuryaḥ) denotes īśtasadhanatva. And it is only the desire of the speaker that one understands from the verbs 'Kuryāṁ' and 'Kuryaḥ'. So much so the Liṅ affix does not express īśtasadhanatva.

This objection is replied to like this. In the case of first and second person also there is nothing improper in the Liṅ suffix denoting īśtasadhanatva; to achieve one's own desired end.

4. Anyatraklptasāmarthyaḥ:

The fourth point in favour of Udayana is the Pāṇinīyan aphorism Vidhīnimatrāmantrānādhīśtasampānnapraṇāhanēsu Liṅ (P.3.3.161), in which all the various meanings denote a sort of the desire of the āpta (of the speaker) in common. There is no valid reason to overlook this common character and accept only īśtasadhanatva as the meaning of the Liṅ affix.
To this objection Vyāsaṭīrtha rejoinds that just as he (Udayana) includes Ṛpatva in the potentiality of the Līṅ suffix, he (Vyāsaṭīrtha) also would include icchā in the meaning as such there is nothing wrong with his definition.

5. Niśedhanupapatti:

We have seen Udayana arguing that in injunctive sentences prohibiting a person the Līṅ suffix cannot denote Iṣṭasādhnatva.

Vyāsaṭīrtha does not accept this contention. He replies that in the negative injunctive sentences he would like to accept Lākṣaṇa as “being the means of producing an evil end” and as such there is nothing fallacious in accepting Iṣṭasādhanatva as the meaning of potential mood affix. ¹

Thus Vyāsaṭīrtha concludes that the Līṅ suffix denotes “means of achieving the desired end”.

Now as regards the qualified potentiality of the form “being the means of achieving the desired end by effort in conjunction with the non-entailment of an untoward evil effect” scholars opine no special purpose is served by such an acceptance. It, in no way, helps in inducing a person (to act) to perform Yāga and the like. The knowledge of Iṣṭasādhanatva itself serves the purpose. Nor can it be argued that, to ward off the entailment of untoward serious effects, such a qualified potentiality is to be accepted, because it cannot be established that the performance of Yāga results in an untoward evil effect. Further it does not pave way for the prohibitive injunctions like “Na Kalaṁ bhaktasyet” because such a knowledge can be had even by other means such as arthavāda sentences etc... Nor does it (the knowledge of qualified potentiality) help in preventing a person, who is fully aware of the evil resulting from adulterating due to lust etc., from indulging in such activities.

¹ For further details Tar. Tan. Part 2, etc.
Further it is not the means which induces one to act but it is the knowledge of being the means to achieve one's desired fruit. No one acts even if one has the knowledge of the means by which others get benefited. 1

Now as regards the kṛtisādhyatva as a meaning of the Liṅ affix, it is not necessary to consider it as one of the meanings. The capability or incapability to achieve a particular thing rests in the person and it cannot be made known by the Liṅ affix. We find many people desiring svarga and also knowing the means to achieve it, do not act for various reasons such as shortage of funds etc. i.e. incapability which cannot be made known by the Liṅ affix.

Similarly the other one i.e. Balavadanīṣānanubhndhitva also cannot be the denoted sense of the Liṅ suffix because this can easily be inferred from previous experiences etc. Thus Vyāsatīrtha concludes that the Liṅ affix denotes īṣṭasādhanatva but not other meanings.

Thus the various views prevailing among the various Logicians regarding the denotational potentiality of the Liṅ affix can be summarised as under:

1. Logicians Jagadīśa and his followers accept signification to the Liṅ in all the three meanings viz. īṣṭasādhanatva, kṛtisādhyatva tva, Balavadanīṣānanubhndhitva;
2. Jayantabhaṭṭa and his followers accept Vyāpāra of the form of Śabdibhāvana as the signified potentiality of the Liṅ affix.
3. Udayana and his followers are of the opinion that the Liṅ suffix signifies mere intention of the speaker.
4. Gangeśa, Gadādhara and others accept only qualified potentiality to the Liṅ affix.
5. Vyāsatīrtha firmly pleads that īṣṭasādhanatva only is the signified potentiality of the Liṅ affix.

MEANING OF THE Liṅ AFFIX

MĪMĀṂSA SCHOOL

As among the Logicians, so among Mīmāṃsakas too, there prevails a diversity of opinion regarding the meaning of the Viḍhvī affix.

Maṇḍana Miśra advocates Iṣṭasādhanatva only as the denoted sense of the potential mood affix.

Parṇāsārathi Miśra, though he finally falls in line with Maṇḍana, advocates Abhiddhābhavatva as the meaning of the Liṅ affix.

The Prabhākaraṇas enunciate that Kāryatā Apūrva or Niyoga is the meaning of Liṅ.

Khaṇḍadeva tries to establish Pravartanatva or icchatva as the meaning of the Liṅ affix.

Thus there prevails diversity in deciding the meaning of the Liṅ affix. Hence in the following pages we will examine them in detail.

Kumārila-bhaṭṭa is the first among the Mīmāṃsakas who opined that Iṣṭasādhanatva is the meaning of the Liṅ affix, but not Kṛtisādhyaḥ or Balavadaniṣṭhānanubandhitva. This theory is followed by Maṇḍana who devoted an entire booklet “Vidhīviveka” to prove this or to justify Kumārila. Of course every one admits that Liṅ denotes pravartana only but what is the nature of this pravartana is the question. To this Kumārila and Maṇḍana propound that it is Iṣṭasādhanatva only. Because it is generally found people act only after possessing the knowledge of Iṣṭasādhanatva. And people do not act in the absence of such
knowledge. Thus by the process of Anvaya-vyatireka we can establish the meaning of the $\text{Li}_n$ affix, to be $\text{Istasadhanatva}$ only. The details of arguments are more or less similar to those of the Logicians who argue $\text{Istasadhanatva}$ as the meaning of the $\text{Li}_n$ affix. This knowledge of $\text{Istasadhanatva}$ is conveyed by the elders in non-vedic sentence. But since Veda is Apsarūṣeyya there is no person to convey this knowledge and hence it is conveyed by the $\text{Li}_n$ affix.

Parthsarathi Miśra, takes a different stand. He opines that "Abhidhabhāvana" is the meaning of the $\text{Li}_n$ affix by which $\text{Istasadhanatva}$ is inferred. Abhidhā is nothing but the significative capacity of the $\text{Li}_n$ (affix) which signifies pravṛtti or the effort for achieving some object. This Abhidhā is also called Bhāvana because one gets the incentive to act on hearing the verb word ending with $\text{Li}_n$ affix. The $\text{Li}_n$ words in Veda express this significative force by which pravṛtti or Arthabhāvana is known. However in his Nyāyaratnamalā Parthsarathi Miśra changer his opinion and finally accepts $\text{Istasadhanatva}$ only as the meaning of the $\text{Li}_n$ affix.

The View of the Prabhākaraś:

Prabhākara Miśra enunciates that verbal knowledge is obtained by youngsters only through conversation. Let one command the others to do some thing. The youngsters, who

1. Puṁso nesṭābhhyupāyatvāt kriyāsvannya pravartakah pravṛttihetum dharmam ca pravadanti pravarthnām, Karturistābhhyupāye hi kartavyamiti lokadhīḥ, viparīte tvakartavyamiti tadvīdayat tataḥ. (Vi. Vi. Karikas 29, 30).
2. Abhidhīyate ityabhidhā pravartanaḥ, Saiva ca puruṣa pravṛttim bhāvayaḥ pravartanaḥ Bhavana mahuriti. (Nyā. Rat.)
observe the elders to command the other to do something and when the others thus commanded act accordingly, they learn that particular activity is the meaning conveyed by the sentence. Thus the meaning of the Liṅ in that sentence is learnt by youngsters as Kārtya (that which is to be achieved by duty) since people do act on hearing the words with Liṅ affix used by elders. This is otherwise called Niyoga, because one gets oneself engaged (Niyuktā) in performing the action, thinking "This is my duty, so I have to get myself engaged in doing it". This Niyoga or Kārtyātā cannot be known by any other pramāṇa hence it is called Aparva also. Thus in the Prabhakara school the meaning of the Liṅ affix is Kārtyātā or Niyoga or Aparva all of which are synonyms.

This theory is further explained very lucidly by Śālikānātha in his 'Prakārāṇa pancika' from which we can have a very clear idea of this kārtyātā.

Śālikānātha says one acts after possessing the knowledge of Kārtyātā only. Iṣṭasādhanatva is different from Kārtyātā. Now the question is what is this Kārtyātā or what is that which actually induces one to act. Is it Iṣṭasādhanatva or Kārtyātā. The knowledge of Iṣṭasādhanatva cannot be a cause in inducing a person to act, because this knowledge of Iṣṭasādhanatva exists in related even to the past or future things. That is why a person who took his meal does not eat immediately though he has the knowledge Iṣṭasādhanatva of the form 'Taking meal satisfies one's appetite'.

Further Kṛtisādhyatva also is not the meaning of the Liṅ affix, because we do not find people, eating the food mixed with honey and poison, though there exists Kṛtisādhyatva. It is due to the absence of the knowledge of Iṣṭasādhanatva. Here the person

1. Tacca pramāṇāntarāparvataya apārvamitica, svatmani purusāṁ niyunjānāṁ niyoga itica khyāyate. (Nya. Rat.).

2. Also Vide explanatory notes of A. Subrahmanya Sastry. (Pra, Pan. P.431, 432).
does not have a knowledge of ḫaryatā. One looks for the means, only after deciding that he has to do a particular thing. Because on hearing the Līn-word, he understands there is Kāryata in it. Thus īstasādhanatva is only a means while Kāryatā is the end. Hence the means and the ends cannot be one and the same. Therefore Kāryatā is the Happiness which, one gets on performing certain action, which is different from īstasādhanatva which helps one to bring in the action into being.

It may be argued that normally one feels, a knowledge of īstasādhanatva itself is the knowledge of Kāryatā. It is true that is how one looks at īstasādhanatva. But there lies some difference between the two. As already said one is the end, the other is the means. It is only after knowing the Kāryatā that one thinks of the means to undertake that particular action. Thus it is the knowledge of happiness that is otherwise called Kāryatā. We observe people acting after possessing the knowledge of the quantum benefit or happiness they get by performing a particular action and then only decide whether it is worth doing or not. This worthiness of activity (kṛtyarhatvam) is the Kāryatā. And this knowledge is caused by Līn. Hence it is its (Līn) meaning. Thus Īśalikānātha refutes the view that īstasādhanatva is the meaning of the Līn affix. Kṛti is nothing but ‘effort’ existing in a person. So this Kāryatā is that which can be achieved through this effort and also it must be primarily be that for which this effort is used. This character of primiriness is mentally cognised, whereas the final result is directly perceived. So the knowledge of Kāryatā is arrived

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1. Sukham hi sarvah kāryataya avaiti,
Na tasya phalasādhanatam apekṣate. (Pra. Pan.)
(and also Explanatory notes on P. 429).
2. Ātapi samihita sādhanātiriktasya sukhasya kāryatā.
   (Ibid P. 429).
3. Tathā ca kṛtisādhyatve sati kṛtinirāpitoddesyata salitvamiti
   kāryasvarupam parihitisthati. (Pra Pa. 422).
4. Sa ca (Kṛtiprādhanatvam ca) manasaprtyakṣa vedya iti
   visiṣṭa prayojanatapi prayatnasya prayyakṣa vedyaiva,
   (Pra. Pan. P. 431,).
by means of manasopratyaksā and anamāna put together. Thus Śalikanātha, having refuted Īstasadhanatva, kṛtisadhyatva, and the Balavadaniśtanubandhitva, proves that Kāryatā is the denoted potentiality of the Liṅ affix.

Refutation of Prabhakara's theory:

This theory of the Prabhakaras is unfortunately put to severe criticism by one and all. Śalikanātha has adequately replied to all the possible objections, still his theory could not gain much popularity. It cannot be established that one acts only after possessing the knowledge of Kāryatā. If by Kāryatā is meant kṛtyarhata then it is generally observed that people say "we do not know whether it is worthy to do or not, but we act due to this doubt only." Thus it is clear that Kāryatā cannot be the cause in inducing a person to act.

Further even if it is accepted that Kṛtyarhata is Kāryatā, yet of what from is it? Naturally it assumes that form for which one strives i.e., Happiness or at least absence of unhappiness. If it be so Parthasarathi Misra says that in sentences like "Bring the cow" (Gamanaya) there is nothing like that happiness or the absence of unhappiness in bringing the cow for which he strives. Hence in these sentences the Vidhi (Liṅ) denotes Īstasadhanatva only. Therefore even in the Veda also Liṅ denotes Īstasadhanatva only. 2

Now Parthasarathi Misra refutes that Apūrva also cannot be the meaning of the Liṅ affix. He brings a very peculiar argument. Apūrva is only an intermediary state, just like the flame. We say the firewood is the means of cooking. We never say the flame is the means. As a matter of fact the atoms of flame enter

1. "Na vidmāṁ kimidāṁ kāryamakāryam va" iti vadanti Sandehādeva Pravartamaher iti. (Nya. Rat)
2. Tatha ca vede apyapūrvasya....apūrvamabhdhadhāna Liṅ saṁhita sadhanatameva abhdadhyāditi...Kalpaniyam syāt. Nya. Rat.).
the rice and cause Viklitti. So it is argued that Virenovad is not the means for cooking. Such a contention contradicts the popular usage. Hence it is better to accept istedhanatvā only as the meaning of the Līn affix and Apārva is only an intermediary action.

Vyāsārthā, author of the 'Tarkalakṣaṇa' puts some fifteen questions enquiring what is meant by 'Kāryatvā'. And refutes every possible reply. His firm contention is that 'Kṛtisadhyatvā of any type cannot be the Kāryatvā which is said to be the meaning of the Līn affix.

Every scholar like Dīkṣita, Kauṭābhṛttā, Nāgasaśa refuted and said that Apārva or Niyoga cannot be the meaning of the Līn affix. Now according to the Prabhākara, 'only the means which directly precedes the desired object and is not the same as the desired object, can be the goal of action'. Thus only Apārva which is a means directly preceding Heaven (Svarga) in the link of causation (i.e., sacrifice, apārva-Heaven) can be a goal of action and therefore it is the meaning of the Līn. Kauṭābhṛttā now objections to this argument of the Prabhākara on the basis that there is proximity involved in this. Further he says that it is more simple to say that just a knowledge of the property of being a means to the desired end' is sufficient as an instigator. Hence the additional tagging 'only that means which directly precedes the desired object' is unnecessary. And it has no support. Thus

1. Sarvaloka prasiddhi virodhāt, kṣetraḥ paścattī nirvādā. pravogadāsanat. (Nya, Rat.).
2. Tena śāntihaya tyeva apārvasya, karmayastā vṛyaparavatām (ibid).
3. Tā. Tan. Vol.2, on words. Here the commentary runs as 'Kimidaṁ kāryatvām Kṛtisadhyatvām va, svakṣisadhyatvām vā......tadeva va iti panca dhavikalpyādyam nirahakāryatvam hi, ityādina' (ibid.)
4. Na tu avyayāhītaṇām ajñānanām taṁ, Gauravat, Manabhaṇuvacchā.
Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa, Vyasatīrtha Parthasārathi, Mandana, Kumārila etc. are of the opinion that Lin denotes only lītāsādhanaṁ. The knowledge of it only induces or engages a person to act.

The Views of Kaṇḍadeva:

Kaṇḍadeva does not admit the Lin affix to denote lītāsādhanaṁ kṛtādhyatva and Balavadaṇīśṭānanubandhitaṁ as its potentialities. He fears the fault of prolixity. Further in engaging ones self to perform sacrifice or cooking, the knowledge of entailment of an untoward effect (Balavadaṇīśṭānanubandhitaṁ) is only an impediment in ones own way to act. And the absence of such an impediment by its very existence is the reason in engaging ones self in the act of cooking or performing a sacrifice. Further in explaining the verbal import from the injunctive sentences in the presence of a negative participle, we have to create as many as seven cause and effect relations which is a matter of high prolixity.

Now Kaṇḍadeva takes up the word “Balavadaṇīśṭaṁ” and discusses its meaning. He does not accept the Logician’s explanation viz. “Not producing strain which is more than the minimum required without which (strain) the desired object can not be achieved” (īṣṭotpattāntāriyakāriṇakṛdūkhārdhika dukhajāraḥkātvam). He argues that Cāitra, in spite of the fact of possessing the knowledge of Balavadaṇīśṭānanubandhitaṁ, may not act on hearing the sentence “Śwarga kamo yajeta” because of the fear of spending money or due to laziness. This is a common experience. Thus the ‘knowledge of the fact of not entailing any serious untoward effect’ cannot be a cause in invariably engaging in action. Similarly the knowledge of Balavadaṇīśṭaṁ cannot be a cause in making one desist from action (like Kalaṁjabhakṣāna or paragamaṇa). We find people are indulging in sinful acts though they

1. Ato balavadaṇīśṭaānubandhīṣva jīvānaṁ pravṛttibandhakaṁ, tadabhavasā svarūpasannāvya karaṇāṁ. (Bhā. Rah.).
2. ibid Para-2.
are aware of the evil and ill-effects such as 'going to hell'. In this way, the Niñánaśaka, both by the affirmative and negative inference argues that a knowledge of Balavadanisatánubandhitva need not be accepted as the meaning of the Lin affix.

Further Khángadeva explains the word "Balavadanista" as that which is "the object of great aversion". And this aversion is not directly perceptible since it is a particular gens which can be inferred from the result alone. This aversion is the result of his actions in his previous birth. Therefore, some one may engage himself in performing yoga and some one does not in spite of all the possibilities. Similarly in the case of eating Kalanji or in performing the Sámya sacrifice one does not act if he has no aversion; but where such an aversion does not exist one naturally gets induced in performing such sinful acts. Since this knowledge of Balavadanista has failed in prohibiting a person from indulging in sinful acts, we need not accept potentiarity for the Lin affix in it (Balavadanista-nubandhitva).

Now the Logician apprehends that unless Balavadanista-nubandhitva also is accepted as the denoted meaning of the Lin affix, even the classical sentences like Trítiyamá kalanjama bhaksayet become valid and contradicts the Vedic injuction "Na kálájam bháksayet". If Balavadanista-nubandhitva is not accepted as the denoted potentiarity of the Lin affix, then the suffix denotes only the remaining two meanings. These two meanings i.e. kalahá and istásadhánvá are easily explained in the case of the non-vedic sentence 'said above hence the sentence 'Trúkáma kalanjama bháksayet' becomes valid and authoritative. But it contradicts the Vedic injunction. So the Logician argues this Balavadanista-nubandhitva is to be admitted as the denoted potentiarity of the Lin affix. To this Khángadeva replies that the Logician apprehends such an incongruity.

1. Ato aníṣe Balavadánta-uktiśekha-svastiyayetvam, autkátyam ca jativíseṣah phalaikennyáh. (Bha. Rá.:)
from his stand point i.e. taking it granted that the Liṅ suffix has denotational potentiality in all the three meanings. However, since the Mīmāṃsaka (Khandadeva) does not admit any of these three as the meaning of the Liṅ affix, the fault pointed out by the Logician does not arise in his theory.1

According to Khandadeva the Liṅ suffix denotes Pravartana (action of inducing) i.e. the action of inducer conducive to undertaking of the person engaged. And this knowledge of “Iśtasādhanatva” is only an inferential one. In injunctive sentence like “Śvarga kamo yajeta” etc. where Iśtasādhanatva is not known through any other means, the same is conveyed by this Pravartana through inferences. In the case of prohibitive sentences, this pravertation in conjunction with the meaning of Naṁ conveys “Aniśtasādhanatva” (property of being the means of achieving the evil ends) through implication.2 And also in certain cases this pravartana does not imply either Iśtasādhanatva or Aniśtasādhanatva but conveys the “absence of anśtasādhanatva”, as in instances “Hutāyaṁ vapāyāṁ Dīśitaṁya anāmasniyāt”. Thus the Baliavadaniśānanubandhitva cannot be the meaning of Liṅ affix.

Khandadeva now refutes the argument that “Kṛtisādhyatva is the denoted potentiality” of the Liṅ affix; because this can be known through other means such as experience (Lokatah) or presumption.3 For instance the meaning of the root say ‘pac’ (in pacati) agrees with Kṛti denoted by the suffix “Ti” by the relation of Anukūlatva (congeniality). Kṛtisādhyatva is also cognised in paka, by presumption (Samāna samāvitur saṁvedyataya). Thus the knowledge of Kṛtisādhyatva is secured by presumption but not by direct denotation by the Liṅ affix.

1. Pravartana Viḍhyarthavādimate tadānapatth. (Bha. Rah.)
2. Ato na tavaḥ balavadaniśānanubandhitvām liṅarthah. (Bha. Rah.).
Iṣṭasādhanatva also cannot be the denoted potentiality of the Līṅ affix. Here we find Khaṇḍadeva following the path of Udāyana, who says 'Āptecca' is the meaning of the Līṅ affix. Rather he prefers even 'Vyaparative' as the meaning of the optative affix. If Iṣṭasādhanatva is the meanings then the sentences like 'Idam te iṣṭasādhanaṁ, tasmat tvam kau; Ācarya prerītoham gamanayami etc. cannot be justified. In the first sentence, Iṣṭasādhanatva is clearly expressed by separate words and also is given as a reason to act, but not as a means; so if the Līṅ affix is to express the same it becomes redundant. And in the second instance, if one engages himself on knowing Iṣṭasādhanatva, he should say ‘I, having known that, bringing the cow is my Iṣṭasādhana. I am bringing the cow’ but not as ‘I, being ordered by my teacher bring the cow’. Thus these accepted usages prove that Iṣṭasādhanatva cannot be the meaning of the Līṅ affix. It is clear here that inducing agency exists in the teacher etc., and that is conveyed through the Līṅ affix.

Further, when one is at cooking, knowing that there is his Iṣṭasādhanatva therein, we have to use the (wrong) sentence as ‘saḥ pacet’, because he has the knowledge of Iṣṭasādhanatva even at that time. But popular usage refuses to accept it, as we know. Hence Iṣṭasādhanatva cannot be a cause for one’s activity.

Thus having refuted all the arguments of the Logicians and others Khaṇḍadeva states that ‘Pravartanatva’ is the meaning of the Potential mood affix. This Pravartanatva ‘only results as the purport of the Paninian Śūtras P.3.3.161; 3.3.156, 3.3.162, 3.3.185 etc. Pravartana means activity congenial to employment. Congeniality means productivity, i.e. here it means the property of engaging (Prayojakatva). And this pravartanatva is the denoted

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2. Pravartanatvam ca-praṛttvānukilavvyāparatvam anukīlātvam ca janaḥkātvaṁ (Janakatvamātrapravyojakatvam). (Bha. Rah.)
potentially of the Liṅ affix in both the classical and Vedic sentences.

Though Khaṇḍadeva agrees unwillingly that icchā is the meaning of the Liṅ affix, he does not feel satisfied with such a conclusion. The desire, by its very existence, cannot be a cause in inducing a person to act because even in the absence of the desire one may act under illusion of the existence of desire.¹ Further if desire itself can induce a person by its very existence then the optative affix (Liṅ) becomes purposeless. Nor can the knowledge of such a desire be the cause in inducing a person to act. Strictly speaking even Pravartanatva cannot be the signified potentiality of the Liṅ affix because it is prolix on the one hand and also on the other it can also be secured even otherwise, i.e. the meaning pravṛtti is secured from the verbal affix in general (Ākhyāta) and the sense of Prayojakatva is secured by syntactical relation.

Now Khaṇḍadeva finally concludes that the determinant of the potentiality of the Liṅ affix is Vyāparatva (activity-hood) which is common to both pravartana and nivartana; and this kind of Vyāparatva is equally applicable to both the Vedic and the non-vedic injunctions.² Thus the meaning of the Liṅ affix denotes activity subsisting in the agent who induces one to act (Pravṛtti prayojaka vyāpara.).

Now one may question, that as far as classical (Laukika) sentences are concerned, since there is a person who speaks, we can accept the Liṅ express either the desire of the speaker, like "Let us act" or at least pravṛtti prayojaka vyāpara etc. But in Veda there is no person speaking So how are we to explain these meanings with respect to Vedic Liṅ? To this Khaṇḍadeva is

1. Vastutastu loke necchāyāḥ svarūpam pravṛttim prati karanatvam (Bhā, Rah.)
2. Atāḥ ubhyasaṁdhāraṇyena vyāparatvameva sakyatvacchedakām. (ibid).
ready to accept Ishvara as speaking there or he says that he accepts Lakṣaṇa in Alaukiaprämaṇa.\(^1\)

Kamalādeva further says that this is evident from the purport of the sūtras P. 3. 3. 156, P. 3. 3. 153 etc.\(^2\) However in so far it concerns the Veda, since there is no person to the Līn suffix Mīmāṃsakas accept that the Līn affix conveys it through implication.\(^3\)

The potential mood affix has two characteristics and it differs from all other tense suffixes. The suffix Līn has in it 'Sufficiency (Ākhyatatva) and also potential mood-hood (Līntva).

Therefore on hearing a verb word ending with this suffix, we get an import or knowledge of two types of activities viz. Kṛti and prerana. The knowledge of Kṛti results from it (Līn) being a verbal suffix in general and the knowledge of prerana (an activity of inducement in general) results from Līntva: This prerana activity is attributable to the Kṛti.\(^4\) Thus the import we get from the word 'Yajeta' is of the form 'an activity in the form of performing yāga which has prerana as its attributive' (vāparavatī yaga kṛtiḥ). We should not expect that the activity denoted by Līntva stands substantive in the import, because of all the various meanings expressed by the verbal affix, Bhīvanā is primary, so says the Mīmāṃsaka. Further the knowledge produced by the affix (Ākhyatapadajanyopasthitih) is the cause with respect to the

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2. Hetu Hetumatorliṅ (P.3 3.156).
Kāmapraivedane kecā (P.3.3.159).
iti ityādyānam etan eva hetvadau pracurarājye na pravartanātvasyaiva śakya vacchedakaṭvam Pravartanatvam ca pravrttyanukūla vādapatvam. Anukūlatvam ca janakatvam (Bhā. Rah).

3. Vedetu alaukiaprāraṇāyām. laksana. (Bhā. Rah)

4. Paścadakhyatopasthitakṛtau tasya svavisaṃyakajñānaviśeṣa-janyo anumitaprāyojyata samārge na tatvam anupasthitenaivaṃvayati. (Bhā. Rah.)
determinant of verbal import in which the meaning of mood (Liṅvatva) is attributive.¹

In conclusion we can say that Khaṇḍadeva has suggested three alternatives as the meaning of the Liṅ affix. 1. Pravartana, 2. Being the object of the desire of a person in non-vedic sentences, and being the object of transcendental activity in the case of Vedic sentences, 3. Finally an unanalysable entity of the form of desiredness (icchātva or vyāparatva),² and the final determinant of the meaning of the Liṅ affix is icchātva which is unanalysable in character.

1. Lakṣaṇarthaprakāraka śabdabodhatvā vacchinnam prati arthaṣṭhāvānā visesāyata sambandhena śaṅkhyatapada janyaḥ sthitiḥ kāraṇam. (Bha. Raḥ.)
2. Vyāpararūpah akhaṇḍadharmā evanatiprasaktah, Liṅādipada śaṅkhyatavacchedakah. (Bha. Raḥ.)
THE VIEW OF THE GRAMMARIAN

The Grammarians like Dīkṣita, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa etc. have closely followed the Mīmāṃsakas. Bhāṭoji in his Sābad-kauśtubha and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in his Bhūṣāna, argues at length that īstasādhanatvā alone is the meaning of Līṅ affix but not either Kṛtisādhyatvā or Balavadaniṣṭa-anubandhitvā. The arguments are similar to those of the earlier Mīmāṃsakas. He argues that the very sūtra P.3.3.161 is very clear in exposing the meaning of the said suffix. Accordingly Pravartana only is the meaning of the suffix and the rest of the words in the sūtra refer to the different shades of the meaning “Vidhi” (Pravartana). He quotes Bhartihari in his support who says that engagement (Pravartana) is found common in all the four meanings given in the sūtra and the remaining three meanings may be considered to be a mere explanation or elucidation of the first meaning ‘Vidhi’. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa defines Pravartanā as the determinant of the nature of the subject of knowledge which produces activity. And this is there in the īstasādhanatvā, hence is signified by Līṅ affix.

THE VIEWS OF NĀGEŚABHAṬṬA :

According to Nāgēśa engagement (Pravartana) is an activity favourable to undertaking, subsisting in the engager (induces) and is of the form of the word including affix of the potential mood etc. The engager is one who independently pronounces the word ending in the potential mood- affix. He too is of the firm opinion that Balavadaniṣṭa-anubandhitvā cannot be admitted as the meaning of Līṅ affix. It is evident from our experience that inspite of knowledge i.e. telling lies, coveting others’

1. Astipravartanārūpamanusyaṃ caturṣvapi Tatraiva Līṅ Vidhātavah Kīṃ bhedasya vivakṣaya (Vai. Bhū under karika-23)
2. Pravartanatvāṃ ca pravṛttijanaka jnana visayatavaccedaka- tvam. Tacca īstasādhanatvāṃya astīti tadeva vidhyarthāh. (Bhu. Saā. - (Karika.23)
3. Pravartana pravṛttyankūlo vyāparah pravartakanisṭhaḥ. Līṅadighatita sadbaprayogarūpaḥ. (LM (kk) P.958.)
wives etc. The serious evil effects, persons blinded by lust undertake adultery. Further if we are to accept it as a meaning, then one would not undertake things which are to be achieved with great difficulty. The word 'serious' (Balavat) in the word "Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva" conveys no definite meaning as there is no definiteness about the engagement in any particular activity being either causing less or more pain. Therefore Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva cannot be the meaning of Liṅgānī.

Nāgārjuna, besides this type of logical arguments always takes recourse to the 'Mahaḥ Bhāṣya' and deduces his conclusions accordingly. Therefore Nāgārjuna refutes the theory that desire (ločana) is the meaning of Liṅgānī. As already said 'activity in the form of inducement favourable to undertaking' is the meaning of the Liṅgānī. Patanjali mentions it very clearly that engagement (Viḍhā) means inducement (pravartana). Nāgārjuna commenting on the Bhāṣya under the sūtra P. 3. 3. 161 makes it clear that Vyāpāra means pravartana only i.e. an activity favourable to undertaking. Hence the argument that Nyāya is the knowledge of Īstasādhana is refuted. This interpretation of Nāgārjuna has the sanction of the Bhāṣya on the Sutra, 'Hetumātica'.

Nāgārjuna quotes the Bhāṣya on P. 3. 1. 26, from which it is clear that pravartana alone is the meaning of the Liṅgānī suffix. Take the sentence "Prcchatu ma bhavan". Here the opponent asks why 'Nic' (causal verb word) is not used whence the sentence conveys pravartana. To this the Bhāṣyakara replies 'since the sense is conveyed by the Loṭ suffix'. From this argument, it is clear that

1. Bhāṣya - "Vyāpāraneti Pravaratetyarthāṁ, etena Niyogih Īstasādhanaṁ jñānanamitī parastām. (Udyota on P.3.3.161.)
the meaning of the suffix Loṭ and Nīc is the same, i.e. Prerāṇā. Of course it is an admitted fact in all the disciplines that the suffix Nīc expresses ‘Prerāṇā’. Hence the suffixes Loṭ etc. (Liṅ, Tavya) express the same meaning. Since the suffix Loṭ is enjoined in the place of Liṅ suffix it goes without saying that the Liṅ suffix also expresses the same ‘Prerāṇā’ which is an activity. And the argument that Īṣa-sadhanatva is the meaning of the Liṅ (i.e. Loṭ, tavya) affix goes against this Bhāṣya. So Īṣa-sadhatva cannot be the meaning of the Liṅ affix.

Further Vatsyāyana, the great commentator on the Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama, also is of the opinion that Vidhi means Niyojya. Of course Niyojya is nothing but, as explained by Nageśa, Pravartana of the form of activity favourable to undertaking and it (Pravartana) subsists in the inducer. That is why even Khaṇḍadeva finally accepts that ‘Pravartanatva’ is the signified potentiality of the Liṅ affix and it is no different from an activity favourable to undertaking. Thus Nageśa and Khaṇḍadeva conclude that the meaning of the Vidhi is an activity in the form of inducement. Rather an unanalysable property of the form of activityhood only, free of over application (Anatiprasakta) is the determinant of the potentiality of the Liṅ affix.

1. Loṭ ca (P.3.3.162).
2. Vidhi Niyojana (Nyāyabhaṣya on 2-1-68).
3. Niyojana pravartana pravartakaniṣṭah pravṛtttyanukulō vyāparah, etadeva preṣanam, (Udyota on M.B. under P.3.3.161,).
4. Vyāpāratvārāpokhaṇḍadharma eva anatipraṣaktah Liṅa dipada-
sakya tavacchedakaḥ (ibid)
LUÑ

This suffix Luñ is enjoined after a verbal root to indicate past in general. That is, the speaker does not want to give any special importance to the nature of pastness whether it pertains to today or some other day in the past. That is why it indicates past in general. This is the counter part of Līt which is used to indicate future in general. This is enjoined on the authority of P.3 2.110. Further this suffix is used after a verbal root where the combination of both Adyatana and Anadyatana is mentioned by the Bhāsyaśāstra. And also this Luñ suffix is used where the future is treated as past as governed by the Sutra P.3.2.132. Thus Luñ denotes three types of past tense.

LRÑ

This suffix LRñ is enjoined after a verbal root where there is reason for affixing Lin, when the non-completion of action is to be understood. The reasons for affixing Lin affix are such as cause and effect etc... Thus LRñ is otherwise called the conditional mood. It comes in the conditional sentences in which the non-performance of the action is implied; either as past or future or where the falsity of the antecedent is implied.

Now observe the sentences suvṛttsṛṣcedabhāvisyat Tādā subhikṣāmabhāvisyat (if there had been good rain then there would have been plenty of food). It is implied that there was neither good rain nor the consequent abundancy of food. Similar are the

1. P. 3. 2. 110 Luñ.
2. Adya ca hyasābhukṣmaṁti vyāmisre luñeva yeṁaṁ vyatēṁ syat (M.B. on P.3.2.111.)
3. P. 3. 2. 132 Asamsayāṁ Bhūtavacca.
4. P. 3. 3. 139. Lin nimitte LRñ kriyatipattau
5. P. 3-3-156 Hetuheitumatorliñ. P. 3-3-157 Iccharhasu Lin lotau.
6. It usually corresponds to the English plu-perfect conditional.
sentences "Yadi kamalakāṁ āhāsyam na sakāṁ parābhāvīṣyat (if thee had called Kamalaka (which they did not) the cart would not have been upset). 'Abhokṣayat bhavān ghṛtena yadi mat samipamāgamiṣyati'.

In all these instances the time element refers to past or future. The sentence Yadi Kamalakāṁ etc. really gives the sence that both the actions 'the calling' and non-upsetting' which are the incidents of past or future time and which are related as cause and effect do not materialise.

CONCLUSION:

Professor Bohtilingh says that "In a conditional sentence which would require a Potential according to P. III. 3.156 the conditional tense is used if the sence is that of future time. when the action is not complete". Here the professor speaks of only future; but usages are found pertaining both to past and future.2

Another important thing to be noted is that these suffixes are occasionally used to express a sense different from that which they normally express. For instance the suffix Lat with the word 'Sma' denotes pastness, exclusive of today and unwitnessed by the speaker i.e. where normally the suffix 'Liś' is to be used.1 Similarly we find a number of usages in the works of great poets and scholars where the strict adherence of these rules pertaining to tenses is not found. Pānani has made allowance to cover such usages but if any specific instance cannot be justified either through an acceptance of superimposition of the particular tense meaning on another meaning or by applying the Sutra "Dhātu sambandhe pratyaśāh" (P. 3.4.1) then such a usage can be treated as an incorrect usage. Of course this concession is to be

1. Vide Sab. Sak. Pra. and also Nyāyakosa.
2. Lat sme (P. 3.2.118) and Aparokṣa ca, (P. 3.2.119).
exercised only in case of inevitability to justify the usages of great scholars where such a resort would reveal some more subtle shades of meaning besides the pure tense meaning. After all, the Grammarian says in a high Philologic note that "All words denote all meanings". And as Kauṭāyana says that Grammar does not limit the denotative function already existing in the words. For different meaning if a grammatical statement enjoins (to the suffix etc.) such a meaning, this is treated it as correct. Thus explanation of the various meaning for various suffixes as presented heither to is but to point out the generally accepted and well settled traditions in the language. All that has been explained here is only a brief survey but it is not exhaustive.¹

1. Mūlam tvetaddik pradarsanamatram. (Vai. Bhū.)