The Philosophy Of

ĀKHYĀTA & ITS NATURE.

In Observance Of

Mīmāṁsā Nyāya And Vedic Rituals. (Part-1)

श्रीरामार्कवे० शैक्षि० केन्द्र० ए

आख्यात-तत्त्वशोधनम्

Dr. Vedula Subrahmanyanam,
Reader in Sanskrit,
ANDHRA UNIVERSITY.
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नीमांसायेबं वैदिक कर्मसु प
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वेदविश्लेषण वर्णपूर्वस्मिति श्री गोतमगुरुनाथप्रवृत्ति

विेवाेवयोगद्वायवान्विति विषयारण्यादायकसंयुक्तां देशे मूर्त्तिप्रभावम् प्रमाणपत्रम्।

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मन्नूणा विषये बंदवंत्ववेद्यम्। मन्नूणाग्रन्थः न केबल ध्याकरणावर्त्ता यथा प्रतिपादित्यत । किंतुवनुकूळतया, प्रतिकूलत्या व न्याय शास्त्रायः, मीमां । ज्ञानाशास्त्रायः व प्रतिपादित्यत। वाचिकोत्ते सीमामशा शास्त्रुः, होपयोत्त। । सीमामशा शास्त्रवर्ष प्रवाहः आश्रयोयिं धर्मः प्रबोधयति। बलः मन्नूणा । धन्मृतल धर्मःप्रवाहः लोकः आदित्ययते।

एवमेकार्यगतोत्ति मन्नूणाग्रन्थः वैयारण्यः न पढ़ते। तत् हेतुः। मन्नूणाग्रन्थेन शास्त्रायः विचार एव। सर्व शास्त्रायः परिचितः विना मन्नूणा । ग्रन्थः न जायते। बलः वैयारण्यानां विप्रकृत्ता संबंधित।

एवं सिद्धते वर्तमानः विजःकृतीं संरुपःः धार्मिकविवाहालये संस्कृत । विमाणे प्रविष्टत तस्मयावसायायां सविचे, प्राणायणे पाणिनीमध्यीत । गृहे त चतुः निभाता। अतःन ततः तत्व विषये प्रतिज्ञा यो, हि (Ph. D) पद्धतिं कल्पव। । अभ्यासार्थक अनुभवी रीढ़ (READER) पद्धतः विषये। चिंता विषये एततः शिल्प नुनववाणी वेदां वनकूलमे हेतुः ध्यानप्रकरणामणि वसीधः निजाधिकायः तत्त्ववर्त्ती। ध्यानरुपः शास्त्रवर्ष प्रतिज्ञा प्राणायणे मन्नूणायां धार्मिकप्रकरणं स्वीकृत । धार्मिकावशेष तत्वशेष धर्मः प्रवाहः सागरसाधनं धार्मिक। एतत्वस्ये ततः नव । व्यक्तये मीमांशा । प्रवाहः महामायायः संथोध्ययविषयोः विन्दवित।

प्रवेशःप्रवेशः धार्मिकविषयायः मा हृदयार्थः। धार्मिकावशेषः परिशीलयः । तत्क्रमः पद्धतिः विक्षेपणः पद्धतिः। विवरण रीढ़प्रक्रिया धार्मिकप्रक्रियायः हेतुः विषये प्रतिज्ञा हेतुः परस्मार्थः। चेन विषयेविवाहालये प्रतिज्ञाप्रथायेपुरूषः धार्मिकावशेषः “धार्मिकतत्वशेषः” प्रवर्तनः पपथिताः प्रवाहः कुर्वित्त।

एतदेशः नववाहः कुर्वित्त। कुर्वित्त एवं प्रवाहः प्रश्नः नाना। समानते। महत्त्वः एतदेशः नववाहः कुर्वित्त। परिधागः धार्मिकप्रकरणाय विषये । महामायाविश्वविषयाय दूरं विचारक्षणीति धामः।

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Sincerely
The author
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ĀKHYĀTA & ITS DEFINITION

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Prof. V. Subba Rao
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Saunaka
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ĀKHYĀTA - A DEFINITION.

The present work is captioned as "Ākhyāta and Its Nature" so it is obligatory first to define what the word Ākhyāta denotes. This question arises, because the word Ākhyāta has been used by various scholars since the remote past in different senses. Hence in the following pages the various views of the scholars, mainly belonging to Tarka, Mīmāṁsaka and Vyākaraṇa schools of thought are investigated and presented in brief.

We know that in this world every kind of knowledge is conveyed mainly in the form of sentences. A sentence is defined as a group of words syntactically connected, which gives a complete sense. Among such words, the verb is the most important one. In Sanskrit language the verb word generally consists of two parts viz., the root and the suffix. There exists a great deal of difference as regards the connotation of the word Ākhyāta in the opinion of the Mīmāṁsaka, the Nyāya, Yājñavalkya and Vaiśeṣika. Both the Mīmāṁsaka, and the logician argues that the word Ākhyāta connotes the Tīh suffix alone. Among the grammarians a section argues that the root alone is connoted by the Ākhyāta while another section urges that both the root and suffix together (Tīhanta) is to be called Ākhyāta. Now let us examine their various arguments.

PRE-YĀSKA PERIOD:

In the remote past i.e. long before Yāska, it appears that grammarians like Sakatayana, Gārgya etc., used this word Ākhyāta in the sense of the 'Root'. This is evident from the Nirukta statements as Sakatayana holds that all nouns are derived from the verbal roots.1 Šākapūni, another grammarian is also of the same view. Yāska quotes Šākapūni as saying that the word Agni is derived from three Ākhyātas.2 Here the word Ākhyāta is doubtlessly synonymous with the root.

1. Sarvāni nāmānākhyatajaranīti Sākatāyanah, Na sarvānasīti Gārgyah (Nir. 1-12)
2. Tribhya ākhyātebhyo jāyata iti Šākapūniḥ (Nir. 7-14).
In the Ṛgveda Pratisākhya also we find the word Ākhyāta defined one comprising a root and expresses bhāvam. Here some commentators read the word 'Sadhātuḥ' as two words i.e. Sa dhatuḥ and thus conclude that the word Ākhyāta stands for the root. But others read the word, Sadhātuḥ as a single word and interpret that only inflected verbal root is to be connoted by the word Ākhyāta. Thus the definition runs "that is an Ākhyāta which denotes 'becoming or action and it comprises the root'. It is only a complete verb word that comprises the root. Otherwise if the definition is to connote only a root or suffix, then the word "comprises a root" (Sadhātuḥ) in the definition is superfluous.

YĀSKA'S DEFINITION:

The great sage Yāska has defined Ākhyāta in his work Nirukta as a word which has activity as its primary sense. This definition has unanimously been accepted by all the scholars belonging to the various disciplines besides the three mentioned in the beginning. Yāska further clarifies the meaning of the word Ākhyāta as a word denoting activity having a beginning and an ending. This definition is required in order to distinguish the verb from verbal nouns like Pāka, Rāga etc. This is all what Yāska speaks about the word Ākhyāta and no specific answer can be found here to the question on hand.

THE VIEW OF THE MĪMĀ_MSBĀKA:

According to the Mīmāṁsaka, the word Ākhyāta connotes only the suffix Tin. The authority for such a conclusion is based on the definition given by Yāska i.e. "Bhāvapradhānamākhyātam". To him a verb word denotes Action, result, Bhāvana, number person and time. Of these Bhāvana is primary. And this Bhāvana is denoted by the Tin suffix. Hence the Tin suffix is called Ākhyāta. This Bhāvana is primary because it is responsible for

2. Bhāvapradhānamākhyātam. Purvaparībhātam Bhāvamākhyātenācaste. (Nirukta 1:1)
the production of the action denoted by the root. Further there is a maxim that when a word which has a root and suffix as its parts, gives a certain import, in that import the meaning of the suffix is predominant.1 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa makes an elaborate discussion on this topic in his ‘Tantra Vārtika’ in Bhavartadhi karana. There he says that the relation between the accomplished and the means of accomplishment always has Bhāvana as its substratum2 and Bhāvana due to its importance is always denoted by the suffix. Further as quoted in the Vaiyākarana Bhūsana he has come to the extent of saying that even if you struggle for the whole life period, the meaning of the root cannot be predominant 3 Thus a root cannot be called Ākhyāta Hence it is the Tin suffix that is to be connoted by the word Ākhyāta.

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN:

The logician also argues that it is the suffix which is called Ākhyāta. According to his theory the meaning of the Tin suffix is neither agent nor object as argued by the grammarian but it is activity not different from subjecthood, otherwise called kṛti. And this kṛti is the most important of all the meanings signified by the suffix. Hence he concludes that the suffix Tin and the word Ākhyāta are synonyms. 2

Thus the word Ākhyāta is used in these two disciplines to connote the Tin suffix only.

It is a matter of great surprise that the word Ākhyāta was not defined either by Pāṇini or Kātyāyana anywhere in their works. Pāṇini used this word only once in his Astādhyāyi i.e. in one of

1. Parkṛti pratyayau sahārtham brūtah tayoḥ pratyayārthah prad dhānam. (Sabara Bhashya)
2. Śādhyasādhana Saṁbandhaḥ Sarvdābhiḥvanāśrayaḥ (Ibid)
4. Tinākhyātayoh paryayatvat (Sab. Sak. Pra.)
his Sutras. The word Ākhyāta is a nominal base after which the taddhita ṭhak suffix is added. So from this instance we cannot make out the view of Pāṇini regarding the question on hand. And again we come across this word in the Vārtika "Ākhyaṭamākhyāṭena kriya sātaye" under Sutra P. 2. 1. 72. Of course here the word Ākhyāta denotes a complete verb word as is evident from the examples given "Asnītapibata, Khādatamodata etc. Here Asnīta and Pibata are complete verb words compounded together.

SOME OTHER GRAMMARIANS:

Even in the later period many grammarians used the word Ākhyāta to denote suffix, or the root or inflected verb word. Āśrava Varman, the author of Kātaratra Vyākaraṇa and Jivagoswamin, the author of Harināmāmṛta Vyākaraṇa have used the word Ākhyāta to denote the verbal suffix. Chandrakirtti, the commentator of Kātartra Vyākaraṇa commented the word Ākhyāta to mean the suffix and also an inflected verb word. The Prayoga Ratnamālā (Vyākaraṇa of Puruṣottama recognises Ākhyāta as a suffix.

Thus from all the above observations we are to understand that the word Ākhyāta had an un-restricted usage to denote either a Suffix or a Root or a complete verb word. Therefore among the later grammarians Bhāṭṭoji Diksita and Kauṇḍa Bhāṭṭa have taken a definite stand refuted the arguments of the Mīmāṁsakaśas and the Logicians.

1. Dvajrdbrahmana ... Ākhyatāt ṭhak (P. 2. 1. 72).
2. Mayūra vyāmsakādayāśca (P. 2. 1. 72).
3. Ākhyāyante kathyante arthatah nispadyante bhvādhīmamsāmpāni yena tadākhyātamā. Athvā ākhyānti āchakṣete kartir vyāpārāmyākhyātah.
4. Asamyak pradvihīnyena nīrākānsasatven asādhyatvena vā khyātah pratipāditah pachanaṭīdirūpāh kriyāh kālakartṛtvādirūpo arthāsca anena iti ākhyātam pacatyādirūpam.
5. Vibhakti taddhitākhyātakṛtāścā pratyayāḥ (1. 172).
THE VIEW OF BHATTOJI AND KAUNDAHATTA:

Of the various meanings denoted by a verb word, action (Vyāpāra) is the primary one. And this part of the meaning is denoted by the root. Hence, on the basis of the Nirukta maxim “Bhāvapradhānāmākhyātam” Dīksita and Kaundahatīta argue that it is the root that is connoted by the word Ākhyātā. In further support of his stand, Kaundahatīta quotes the Nirukta which states that all nouns are derived from Ākhyātas. As it is unanimously accepted by all schools of philosophy that nouns are derived from verbal roots but not from suffixes, in the above statement of the Niruktākaṇḍa the word Ākhyāta should denote the Root only.

And again Kaundahatīta quotes Patanjali in support of this theory. He contends that according Patanjali also, the word Ākhyāta and the Root are synonyms. Patanjali while commenting on the Sūtra Unādayo Bāhūlam (P. 3. 3. 1.) makes the statement ‘Sarvam nāma dhātujamāha Nirukte’. According to the Nirukta, the statement is ‘namāni Ākhyātajāni’. Here the replacement of the word Ākhyāta by the word Dhatu, Patanjali, gives strength to the argument of Kaundahatīta that Ākhyāta and the Root are synonyms. Further he stresses on the etymology of the word Ākhyāta. It is called Ākhyāta since the most important part of the meaning is expressed by it. According to the grammarian, action is denoted by the Root alone. And also referring to the definition of Noun and Verb as given by Yāska, they argue just as the word ‘Noun’ refers only to the nominal base, but not to the complete noun word, so also the word Ākhyāta, denotes only the verbal root. Thus according to Dīksita and Kaundahatīta the words Ākhyāta and Dhatu are synonyms.

Now we are left at cross roads regarding the connotation of the word Ākhyāta. But on a close examination of the above views, with reference to the authoritative books of the respective

1. Tatra nāmānyākhyātajānīti Sākatāyano nairukta samayasca (Nir. 1-12)
2. Atra ākhyāyata sarvā pradhānibhūto arthah aṇena iti vyutpatyā Dhāturākhyātapadeno cyate. (Vai. Bhu. P. 44.)
schools and also the Nirukta, it becomes clear that the authors have entertained divergent views. It is peculiar that the sages who originally propounded the various schools, viz., the Sūtra-kāras, the Bāṣyakāras and the Vartikakāras are all very clear in their conception, according to whom the word Ākhyāta means an inflected verb word only but not either the root or the suffix. It is like this....

Firstly from the authority of the Nirukta, it can be concluded that the word Ākhyāta is a verb word fully inflected with the suffix, since it is one of the four categories of words. Further all the examples given by Yāska are inflected words as Pacati, Vrajati etc. Also the word Ākhyāta has been further classified as one denoting the process of an action which has a beginning and an ending. Thus according to the Nirukta neither the Root alone, nor the suffix alone can be denoted by the word Ākhyāta.

The sage Jaimini has defined the Ākhyāta words as those that denote action; and it is further stated that verbs are those words which on their origination i.e., utterance, have no object; 1 that is to say that Ākhyātas are those words which denote the action of bringing something into being. This type of comprehension cannot be had through the suffix (Tīn). This view has been amply explained by Śabara in his commentary on the Pūrva mīmāṃsā sāstra in various places. 2 And the examples given are also inflected verb words as Yajati, Dadhāti, Juhoti etc.

Regarding the arguments based on the maxim "Prakṛti pratyayau ...etc., Śabara has himself made clear its scope of application. He says that it is the argument of the Pūrvapākaśin who thoroughly misunderstood the very interpretation and application of

1. Jaimini - Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras 2-1.1-1, 2.4. Bhāvatarthā karma sabdaḥ ..., Yeṣāṁ tūtpattau arthe sve prayogo na vidyate anyākhyātāni ... etc.
Śabaraḥ āśya on Sūtras 2.1.1, 11.1.22; 3.4.13 etc..
that maxim. Šabara himself concedes that the maxim applies only in the case of nouns like Paścaka, Lāvaka etc., derived from the verbal roots. Thus according to the sage Jaimini and Šatara the Bhāṣyakāra, the word Ākhyāta means only the inflected verb word but not the Suffix alone.

The sage Gautama, the propounder of the Nyāya school, also defines Ākhyāta as one which ends in a suffix. And Udyotakāra the author of the Nyāyavārtikas has commented that there are two types of suffixes, viz., Sup and Tip. That which ends in the verbal suffix (Tibādi) is called Ākhyāta and gives Pacati as the example.

Vātsyāyana, commentator on the Nyāya sutras, also expresses the same view. This being the position, it is not proper on the part of the later Logicians to argue that the word Ākhyāta means only the suffix. Hence the views of these later Mīmāṃsakas and the logicians are not consistent with the fundamental tenets of their respective doctrines as laid down by the respective sages and interpreted by the authoritative commentators. Hence the word Ākhyāta does not connote the sense "Suffix (Tīn)".

Nāgesa who is the final authority on Sanskrit grammatical semantics, refutes the theory that "The Ākhyāta connotes Root only" as propounded by Bhaṭṭoji and Kaunḍahhatā. Nāgesa, in his Laghumāñjuśa establishes that the Ākhyāta is always a full-word and has the predominance of action, or to be more precise "Ākhyātā is one which ends in a suffix capable of giving

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1. Yattu Prakṛti prayayau sāharthāṁ brūta iti. Tat karma nimittaṁ nāmapadesu pācaka, lāvaka ityevamādiśu (Sab. Bha. on IXI.1-1.24).
2. Te Vibhaktyantāṁ padaṁ (Nyāya Sutra 2.2.60).
word-hood and produces a definite expectancy". 1 Here it is to be noted that Nāgasa leaves Ākhyāta as a word which always ends in a suffix and produces a definite expectancy, but does not restrict by defining it specifically as Tīkṛanta, as is done by the Nyāyavārtikākāra.

Nāgasa argues that the word Ākhyāta defined in the Nirukta refers to one which ends in a verbal suffix and produces a definite expectancy of bringing something into existence. Thus the designation Ākhyāta is not barred in the case of words like Edhitavyam; gatvā etc., Accordingly it is neither the root nor the suffix that can be called Ākhyāta. This does not mean that words like Paśaka etc., come under the Ākhyāta category. Of course it is true that from the root part of the word "Paśaka" there arises the expectancy but not from the word which ends in the kīt. suffix. 2

Further the Ākhyāta always be one which ends in a suffix. This is evident from the Vārtika "Ākhyātam Ākhyātena kriyāsa- tatyate" where the examples Paśaka-bhṛjjata, khādata-modata etc., are all full fledged verb words. 3 And from compounds of this type, popular understanding is of activity only. Since this type of compounding is not possible between either mere roots or mere suffixes. Ākhyāta means a verbal root ending in a suffix.

Further, according to the Nirukta, the Ākhyāta is a word, and according to Paśāini a word is that which ends in a Sup or Tip suffix. 4 Here it may not be urged that the words Nāma and Ākhyāta in the said Nirukta statement refer to the nominal base

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1. Tatra Ākhyāta sabdena niyamato jankāmksam vibhaktyantam (L. M. (nbp) P. 90, ).
2. Paśaka ityādāvekadesārthasya tadākāmksatva Api vibhaktyantārthasya na tadākāmksatvam. (L. M. (nbp) P. 90, ).
3. Under the the Sūtra Mayūra Vyāmsakādayaśca (P.2.1.72).
and the verbal root forms only but not to full fledged words; for Durga in his Nīrūkta commentary says that these four viz., action, time, tense and number are the meanings of the Ākhyāta and of the four, action is more important. 1 Here action (Bhāva) means both activity and result. Thus by a verb in the active voice like Pacati the predominance of action is understood; and by a verb in the passive voice like 'Pacyate' the predominance of the result is understood. And all the above four meanings are there only in words like Pacati, Pacyate etc., which always end in a suffix. Neither, the mere root nor the mere suffix possesses these four types of meanings.

Further if the root alone is considered to be the Ākhyāta in view of its Bhāvārtha, then the definition as given by Kaundīabhātta over-applies in the case of impersonal forms of the full headed verbs like 'śīyā' etc... Similarly in the case Pācaka, Rāga etc., words, there will be the flaw of in-applicability of the definition of Ākhyāta given by Kaundīabhātta. Since the meaning of the suffix is prominent and not Bhāva, it cannot be maintained that Bhāva is predominant in such cases. Of course the opponent may argue that in the case of words like Pācaka, Rāga etc., there is no compatibility hence the predominance of the meaning of the root cannot be cognised. 2 But where such compatibility exists, as in the case of verb words (Tiṅanta) the predominance of the root-word is cognised. Thus it is the matter of compatibility that decides the importance of the meaning, but not the fault of designating the root with the word Ākhyāta. But this argument of the opponent is not sound: If a word possesses predominance of a particular meaning in the presence of a particular suffix and looses its predominance in the presence of a different suffix, then the


2. Nanu Pācaka ityādau dhatubhāgasya Pradhānyena, bhadhakatva abhāvepti, tete vca Tānta dhatukatvamastavyevi, tado-gyatvāt Ākhyāta taksanānā tatra ma-svyaptam (L.M. (nbp) Tīṣartha P. 93,
predominant nature of the meaning of that word cannot be said belonging to it. Thus when we say that the Ākhyāta has Bhāva as its predominant meaning, it should not depend upon some other variable suffix for its predominance. Hence by accepting that the word Ākhyāta connotes the complete verb word such defects do not crop up.

Further in the Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa’s definition, the very fact that, he gives prominence to Bhāva than to the other meanings (of the suffix), is enough proof of his acceptance that the entire verb word is called ‘Ākhyāta’. Otherwise the word ‘Pradhāna’ (in Sarvaprādhānibhuto arthah) in his definition serves no purpose. Nāgāsa further states that the nominative usage of the word ‘Sa. dhātuḥ’ in the definition given in the Rk Prātisākhya is actually to be construed in the instrumental as interpreted in the concerned commentary. Then the definition means “That is an Ākhyāta, which comprising a root, expresses the action”. ¹

Further Bāṣya on the Sūtra ‘Praśeṣaṁśayāṁ Rāpap’ ² also is in support of Nāgāsa’s contention. The argument put in there by the Bāṣyakāra would have not been possible if he (the Bāṣyakāra) had accepted that the Ākhyāta was mere root or a mere suffix. Thus it is evident that the Bāṣyakāra also is of the opinion that the word Ākhyāta stands for full-fledged verb word. However, only in two instances like Nāmanyākhyāta jātani and Luptākhyātesu, the word Ākhyāta does not denote a verb word but denotes the root and the kṛdanta (as illustrated by Nīksausambhiḥ) respectively by implication (Upacārat). ³

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1. Dhyātusahātena yena bhāva mabhidadhāti tadākhyātamiti tadaṁī (L. M. (nbp) Tinārtha P. 93.).
2. Kriyāprādhānamākhyātam, ekāca kriyā yataḥ kriyāmāpṛteśe tīnācāte (Bāṣya on P. 5.3.66).
3. “Luptākhyātesu” jaśeṣeṣtmāntravartike kṛti Ākhyāta pa-
daprayoga upacāraditī bodhyam (L.M. (nbp) Tinārtha P.90.)
Further Nagesa claims certain advantages if we accept his definition. Accordingly not only the words ending in Tiya suffix, but also the words like Gatya, Bhaktavya, Edhama etc., can be called Akhyatas as they primarily denote action.

CONCLUSION :-

Now taking into consideration the various definitions and examples as given by the Nirukta, the sages Gautama and Jaimini, and the Bhasyakaras like Vatsayana, Sabara and Patanjali it appears prudent to accept that the word Akhyata connotes a Tiñanta in general 'rather strictly speaking' a word ending in a suffix capable of giving word-hood and producing a definite expectancy. It is not a mere root as argued by Kaundabhatta; or a mere suffix as argued by the latter Logicians and the Mimamsakas. Thus an Akhyata is a fully inflected verb word like Pacati, Vrajati etc.

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1. Dhātusahītena yena bhāva mabhidadhāti tadākhyātamiti tad- darthah (L. M. (nbp) Tiṅertha P. 93;).
2. Kriyāpradhānamākhyātam, ekāca kriyā yatḥ kriyāmāpṛṣte tiṃācaśe (Bhāsya on P.5.3.66).
3. “Luptakhyāteṣu ca” iti samarthasūtraṇābhavānī kṛti Ākhyāta padaprayoga upacārādhitā bodhyam (L.M. (nbp) Tiṅertha P. 90.)
Further Nāgāraja claims certain advantages if we accept his definition. Accordingly not only the words ending in Tiṃ suffix, but also the words like Gātā, Bhoktavyām, Edhām etc., can be called Ākhyāṭas as they primarily denote action.

CONCLUSION :-

Now taking into consideration the various definitions and examples as given by the Nirukta, the sages Gautama and Jaimini, and the Bhāsyakāras like Vāteśayana, Śabara and Patanjali it appears prudent to accept that the word Ākhyāta connotes a Tiṃa in general 'rather strictly speaking' a word ending in a suffix capable of giving word-hood and producing a definite expectancy. It is not a mere root as argued by Kaundabhaṭṭa; or a mere suffix as argued by the latter Logicians and the Mīmāṃsakas. Thus an Ākhyāta is a fully inflected verb word like Pacati, Vrajati etc.

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# Chapter II

## Section-1

**ROOT—DEFINITION—CLASSIFICATION**

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The Root-Its Definition
And Its Classification

The Indian grammarians in their quest to study the nature of Sanskrit language, did not satisfy themselves with the analysis of language into sentence of different types. They further divided the sentence into the various parts of speech viz. Noun, Verb etc. They observed that even these words, though they appear to be single in form, can be divided further into their component parts. They identified these component parts, as is stated in the Bhāṣya, by following the process of Anvaya and Vyatireka. There Patanjali says that the division of a word into the component parts viz., stem and suffix and the determination of their meanings is possible by applying the technique of 'agreement and negation' (Anvaya and Vyatireka). Following this process, they stripped off all the component parts from a verb-word and they arrived at an irreducible unit which they called Dhātu (Root).

The very word Dhātu has a great significance in it. In the science of grammar Dhātu is also called 'Prakṛti', which word is familiar to any Indian Philosopher as the one out of which in the course of evolution, the entire universe has come into existence. So also a 'Dhātu' is like primordial matter, the chief element which when modified in different ways gives rise to the world of words (Sabda Prapanca). Besides verb words, a fairly large number of nouns too are found to have been derived from these verbal roots. This study of language has its origin in the Brāhmaṇas and seems to have reached its zenith during the period of Yāska. Already by that time there had existed the views among scholars that all the nouns are derived from verbal roots and they tried to explain their derivations.

2. Sarvāṇi nāṁ nyākhyatājanīti sakaṭayano nairukta samayasca (Nirukta 1.4-1).
One may question if the component parts of a word have their own meanings why are they not used independently in a sentence. To this it is replied that the relationship between the root and the suffix, the component parts of a verb word, is innate and is established according to usage. Patañjali makes it clear in the Mahābhāṣya that in spite of the fact that the root and the suffix are accepted to possess their own independent meanings; still as a result of this innate relationship, neither the stem nor the suffix is allowed to have an independent usage in the language. 1 The veteran logician Jagadīśa also says that the relationship existing between the Prakṛti and the Pratyaya is one of interdependence, because the conjoint utterance of the stem and the suffix alone is said to be significant. 2

In the etymological language (Nirukta) this technique, involved in the formation of a word by the harmonious combination of the Prakṛti and the Pratyaya; is called 'Sastrakṛtydyogāḥ'. Thus the science of grammar is nothing but a compendium of such principles as would show the processes or both the permutations and combinations of the various parts of the words. Thus a verb word is analysed into its component parts and they are named as Dhatu (Root) and Partyaya (the formative affix). In Sanskrit it is observed that primarily there are about two thousand roots (Dhatu). So we have to find out the generic nature or the common characteristic among them, so that we can call any crude form possesssing that particular characteristic, a root.

DEFINITION OF ROOT:—

In Pāṇini's Astādhyāyi, we do not find anything specifically as a definition of the root as we find in the case of word, etc. 3

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When one puts a question 'what is a root', normally a student of the Pāṇinian school, replies quickly 'a root is that one which is found in the list of roots read by Pāṇini. Pāṇini instead of strictly defining the root states that the forms Bhū VĀ, etc., are roots.¹ We find another aphorism that the forms ending with suffixes 'san' etc., are also roots (sanādhyantā dhātavaḥ).

Here one is inclined to feel that the aphorism 'Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ' cannot be a strict definition; because it is a list of forms. A definition is that which enunciates a special characteristic which exists in all those forms, so that these can be distinguished from other words which have the same form (Ānupāvri) e.g. the word 'Ghāta' denotes a 'a pot'. And this form is also found in the list of roots. So the question arises 'how are we to distinguish the verbal root from a nominal base.'

Patañjali, the Mahābhāṣyaṅkara takes up this question and discusses it under the sutra "Bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ". There he offers three alternative definitions. In the first instance, he defines a verbal root as "one which signifies action."² Another definition he puts forth is 'the verbal root is one which signifies Bhāva',³ and the final alternative is "the verbal root is that which is read out by Pāṇini in the list of roots", but however he says that the statement "Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ" is the definition and the sutra "Bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ" can be replaced by it.

Let us see what the sutra means. The word "Bhūvādayah is treated as a Bahuvrīhi compound and is dissolved as Bhūvau adi yeṣām te." Here 'Bhūvau is a dvanda compound of Bhū and VĀ; similarly Adi also as Adīscā Adīscā. One Adībh is read with Bhū, in the sense of "beginning with" and the second 'Adībh has the sense of 'similarity' and is read with VĀ. Thus the whole sutra Bhūvādayo

¹ Bhūvādayo Dhātavaḥ (P.1.3.1.).
² Kriyāvacano Dhātuḥ (M.B. on P.1.3.1.).
³ Bhāva Vacano Dhātuḥ.
dhātavāḥ is explained as "Roots are those which begin with Bhū (in the list of roots read out by Pāṇini) and those that are similar to Vā (to blow) (in denoting activity). Thus for an entity to be called a root two conditions are to be satisfied, 1. It should be read by Pāṇini in his Dhātupāṭha (i.e. Bhādi list) and 2. It must also denote action. 1 Unless we explain the word Bhāvādayah as above, we cannot properly account for the word ‘Vā’ in the sūtra. Here the opponent may argue that of the two conditions stated above, the first one (i.e. a root is that which is read in the Dhātupāṭha) itself can be a definition but not the other part of it. But it is not so. Of course it is true that the Bhāṣyakāra and the Vārti-kāra explain the word ‘Vā’ as to ensure auspiciousness, 2 but they again give an alternative explanation. Unless the second condition is also laid down, forms like Yā, (which is also a pronoun) and Vā, also a particle (Nipāta or Aavyaya) etc., will have to be treated as roots. It may be argued that when two words of the same form are available, one individually uttered (Pratipadokta) and the other derived with the help of grammar (Laksanā) then only the former one should be taken into consideration but not the other one, 3 and as such there will be no question of pronouns etc. to be treated as verbal roots, but still the trouble continuous with prefixes like ‘Su’ and prohibitory particles as Mān or Mā. Consequently words like Māti, Mimite etc., may result in the sense of prohibition etc., 4 since Mān the particle is read in the sense of prohibition (niṣedha).

Some may suggest that depending on the meaning of the word, it can be decided whether it is a verbal root or not. But this argument also is not sound, because these meanings are not given by Pāṇini or Kātyāyana, but by later grammarians like Bhima.

1. Itham ca kriya vācakatve sati gaṇapadhitatvam dhātutvam paryavastam (Vai. Bhū. karika 9).
2. Bhāvādayam vakāroyam mangalārthaḥ prayujyate (Ibid).
3. Laksanapratipadoktayoh pratipadoktaayaiva grahanām.
4. Tatha ca samicīna varjanādyarthe śavati, Mimite mātityāpa-ttiḥ (Ibid).
sena, etc. The meaning of each root as shown there, is only indicative but not exhaustive. Some times a single root may have different meanings, some of them may be revealed only in the presence of an upasarga etc., e.g. īsītati and upatisītati. And the purpose of giving the meaning is just to show that they denote activity. 1 Therefore the second condition viz. 'which denotes activity' is essential in the definition of the root.

Similarly, in the absence of the phrase "being one read in the list of roots" the Prākrit verbs like Ānavedi, Vaṭṭedi etc. may be treated as Sanskrit verbs since they denote activity. Further particles like Hiruk (Varjane) etc. which speak of activity but are not found in the Bhvādī list, will have to be treated as roots. Therefore to avoid either type of inconsistency the two phrases are required in the definition.

Some may doubt that this being the definition, roots like Stambh which are found only in the Paninian aphorisms but not in the Gaṇapātha and classical roots like Culumpa etc. fail to get the designation of root, but one need not entertain such a doubt, because the addition of mute letters etc. indicates that these also are roots. Infact Panini himself says that this list is only indicative but not exhaustive; which means, "besides these roots any other root found in usage is also to be accepted". Thus strictly speaking those forms which denote activity are defined as roots.

The Bhāṣyakāra also confirms this view and he defines the root as "Kriyāvacanoc dhatūḥ" and he replies to all possible objections. While commenting on the said sutra, he says the Prākrit roots can be excluded by being guided by the usages of scholars. 3

2. Kriyāvācikatve sati gaṇapāthisatvam dhatutvam.
3. Siṣṭaprayodāpavayatyādīnāṁ nivṛttirbhaviṣyati (M. B. on P 1.3-1).
Then if we are to accept this definition, the roots As, Bhā, Vid cannot be treated as verbal roots, because no activity is found to be denoted by them. Activity implies movement; but here there is no movement at all. Hence a separate aphorism is to be formulated to bring them under the designation of roots. The Bhāṣyakāra refutes this argument and states the above definition itself is competent to designate them as verbal roots. The arguments can be summarised as follow.

**WHETHER ‘AS’, BHU, VID ETC. ARE THEY VERBAL ROOTS:**

Now having defined a verbal root as one which signifies action and also is read in the list of roots enumerated by Pāṇini: we are put a question whether the forms As, Bhā, Vid, etc., are verbal roots. In these cases activity is not signified by them: i.e. on hearing these words we get an import neither of activity nor of sāmāṅśādikaraṇya with the root ‘kr’ as Bhavāṇāṁ karoti etc. To be more clear, when we put a question ‘what does one do (kīṁ karotī) we do not know an answer with any of these verb words asti, bhavati etc. ¹

Secondly in the case of verb words like ‘Pacati’ etc. when all the accessories (Sādhanās) are present, sometimes only, in the presence of a particular action, there is the use of the form ‘Pacati’ (He cooks) and some times (i.e. when such an action is not present) it is not there. But in the case of the verbs ‘Asti, etc., this is the case: because no such restriction is found to be existent in the case of these verbs.

And further, in the case of the verbs ‘Pacati’ etc., we find that the intensity of activity is being denoted by the

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¹. Kīṁ karotīti prasne astyādibhitāḥ Pravacanāḥ bhāvadakriṣṇena- nātvanīśāmiti manya-te......Naivamastītārāmiti. (Pradīpa under P 1-3-1.11).
suffix 'Taram' added to them as instanced from the usage 'Pacatitesam' (he cooks intensively); but no such usage as 'Astitaram' etc., is found in the case of these verbs (Asti) etc. Thus it becomes evident that these verb words differ from verbs like Pacati etc., and hence the above definition, given to a verbal root, does not cover these roots, as such it (the definition) suffers from the fault of partial applicability (Avyapti dosa). So there is need to formulate a separate aphorism to confer root-hood to these also.

REFUTATION OF THE OBJECTIONS:

The Bhasyakara refutes the above objections. As for the first objection raised above, the Bhasyakara suggests that the root may be defined as "one which signifies action in general" with or without movement" (Bhavavacano Dhatun) in which case all these 'astis, bhavati' vidyate etc. come under the scope of this definition. There is a difference between the imports signified by the two words Kriya and Bhava. The word 'Kriya' denotes activity to be accomplished through the instrumentality (sadhana) of movement, while the word 'Bhava' on the other hand, denotes the same activity to be accomplished through an instrumentally involving movement or no movement. 1

Kavyata equates Bhava with Kriyamatra i.e. action in general. But this 'action in general' is different from the meaning of the root 'kr' which also means "action in general".

The idea of "Bhava" is made clear further by Kavyata himself by referring to the Sutra "Bhava (P. 3.3-18). There it is said that suffixes like 'ghan' etc. are added to roots like Pac etc. in the sense of Bhava to form the words Paka etc. There are two elements in the word 'Paka' viz., the root Pac' and the suffix 'ghan'. The root element expresses the

1 Kriyasadeh saparipandesa sadhana sadhyartho sadhba Bhavastubha saparipandaparinayanayata sadhanasadhya itibhavan (Udyaeta under P”I-3-7).
special type of action of the form ‘cooking’ etc. The suffix part expresses the ‘action-in-general’ and two coexist in the same thing. It is to be noted here that the ‘action in general’ expressed by the suffix is not in the form of something to be achieved (Sadhyya) but as a thing achieved (Siddha) and this very ‘action-in-general’ is expressed by the roots As, Bhū, Vid etc. as sadhyya but not Siddha. Of course roots like Pac can express both these actions (i.e. action in particular like cooking and action in general) as Sadhyya only and these two coexist in the import of the root. Thus all roots signify action in general (Bhāva) as is evident from the usages “Bhavati pacati, Bhavati pakṣyate” etc. Here Bavati stands for Bhāva (action in general) and pacati for action in particular. Here the action in general is nothing but existence or being (sattā or Atmabharana) and it is found in everything, be it a finished product (Siddha) or a thing achieved (Sadhyya). Thus the expression ‘Bhavati pacati’ ultimately means “Existence, the agent of which is the same as that of cooking”.¹ This “Existence is the meaning of the root Bhū and is inherent in the meaning expressed by every other root. And the meaning of every other root is only a variation of the meaning of the root ‘Bhū’ and so it (Bhāva vacano dhātuḥ) is said to be the definition of a root. By so defining the root As Bhū, Vid etc., can also be designated as roots because they all express just this ‘Existence’. Further this Existence is exclusively affirmative (Kevalānvayi). Therefore, it is coextensive with all.² Thus

1. M. B. edited by Keilhorn-Part I P. 258
2. Bhāvanā-lakṣāṇā-bhāvasya sattāraṇapatvāt, sattayaścā kevalānvayitvena sārvasamanādhikaranaṇatayā Bhāvavacana iti laksāṇamaṇa kvāpyavyaṃpatamiti uttarabhāvyatappayeto (udyota under M. B. on P. 1.3. 1-12).
the definition "Bhāva vacano dhātuḥ." confers root- hood not only on roots like Pac etc., but also on As, Bhū, Vid etc., and presents them as verbal roots.

The Bhāṣyakāra examines the same question with respect to the other definition, i.e. "Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ." Even according to this definition, he says, the forms As, Bhū etc., become designated as verbal roots. It is to be noted that every activity differs from every other activity in as much as its speciality in its employment (Pravṛttivisesa) of the agent is concerned: and strictly speaking this 'speciality in employment' is called activity. Such difference in the employment can be found in the case of these roots as between 'Asti' and Mriyate. In 'Asti' the activity of self supporting is found and in 'Mriyate' the activity of abandonment of the above activity is observed.1 Thus we find in the meaning denoted by the word 'Asti' a particularity in its employment (Pravṛttivisesa) of the form of 'self supporting' (Atmabharaṇa) as against the particularity in employment of the form Atmatyāga denoted by the verb 'Mriyate'.

Further Patanjali makes this very clear by giving a striking example. He says that one's behaviour towards plain rice is quite different from one's behaviour towards rice with meat in it. Of course we use the same verb 'eats' (Atti) in regard to both of them. Similarly we observe that on the occasions when we use 'Asti', the behaviour of the people concerned is different from that when the word 'Mriyate' is used.2 Thus it is clear that the roots As, Bhū, etc. signify

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1. Astāvatmabharaṇa rūpa pravṛttir mriyatau tatyāga rūpā (Pradipa under M.B. on Pr1.3.1-16).
2. Anyathā hi kārakānyastau Pravartante, Anyathā hi Mriyatau (M. B. on P. 1.3.1, ibid )
a process (Kriyā). Thus even if we accept the definition ‘Kriyā-vacano dhātuh’ the form As, Bhā Vid etc. can be designated as verbal roots because due to the difference in the employment of Sādhanā’s concerned.

And as regards the the sameness of the substratum (Sāmanādhikarāntya) of the words ‘Asti’ etc with the root ‘kṛ’, it is our common experience, that when the question ‘what does one do (kim karoti) is asked about the one who is on death bed, we get the reply he exists’ (Asti). Similarly the cognition of the intensity of the meaning signified by the verbs ‘Vidyate’ etc. is brought out by adding the suffix ‘Taram’ as in the sentence ‘Vidyate tārāmiha dhānyaṃ’ (Intensive existence of the corn is here).’ Thus it becomes clear that either of the definitions ‘Kriyāvacano dhātuh’, ‘Bhiva vacano dhātuh’ covers the entire world of roots As; Bhā, etc., and neither of the definitions suffers from the fault of partial applicability.

Further the Bhāskyakāra takes recourse to the ‘Nirukta’ to prove that the words Asti, Bhavī etc., are denotive of Bhāva. In the Nirukta it is said, that Jāyata, Asti Viparinamate etc., are, the modifications of becoming (Bhāva). Of those six modifications (Vikaras) of becoming (Bhāva), Asti is one. Here some may question ‘what is the action denoted by the word ‘Tistati’ (stands) Vartate (exists) etc.? To stand means to be static. Activity denotes a state of dynamism. Therefore the verb Tisthati representing a state opposit to that of dynamism cannot be grouped with other verb words like Gacchati etc. which denote activity. But this argument is not logical. Let us take the case of a person who is walking. There is a particular type of action subsisting in him which keeps the body in motion. Now when one asks him to stop, naturally the person brings another type of action into force which is opposite to the previous action and the man comes to halt. And even then he continues the same action to keep the body static. Otherwise the body would be in motion. So this type of activity which keeps

1. Prakāra pratyayopi dṛṣṭyate, vidyate, tārāmiha dhānyaṃ
   (Pradīpa under M.B. on 1-3-1:11.).
the body at rest' (Nivartanārāpa kriyā) is the denoted meaning of the verb words Tiṣṭhati; 'Vartate etc. Thus the activity existing here is internal but not external which can directly be inferred. Thus all such words are covered by the definition 'Kriyāvaca no dhātuḥ' etc.

Now to prove that the verb words 'Asti' 'Bhavati' 'Vidyate', Jānati, etc., fall under the scope of the definition given to the verbal root, the Bhāṣyakāra finally gives an alternative argument taking recourse to the usage of elders. He argues that unless activity is denoted by these words (Asti etc.), the verbal suffixes indicating past, present or future states, activity could not have been appended to these roots. But in the day to day usage of elders, we find these roots in all the tenses e.g. "Asti, Abhāt, Bhavisyati, Ajānāt etc." Thus it becomes evident that all the above roots viz., Asti, Bhavati etc. denote action and hence the definition 'Kriyāvaca no dhātuḥ' itself holds good and covers all the verbal roots.

CLASSIFICATION OF ROOTS :-

The roots in Sanskrit are broadly divided under three classes viz, Primary roots, derived roots and aphoristic roots.

1. Primary Roots :

The sage Pāṇini listed out almost all the roots numbering about two thousand. This list of roots is generally known as "Dhātupātha". And the roots listed herein are called simple roots or primary roots.

Now as regards the classification of primary roots, it is observed that normally every root takes a particular suffix after it, before it takes the verbal affix. Such an intermediary suffix is called Vikarana suffix. This Vikarana suffix plays an important part in the division of primary roots into ten major groups called Ganas. The basis for such division being the particular Vikarana suffix which is responsible for, manā, the formation of the concerned active-present-stem
when followed by a sārvadhātuka affix. The grammarian's choice of this basis of classification is very natural, because to quote Whitney "the present system is the most prominent and important part of the whole conjugation, since from the earliest period of the language, its forms are much more frequent than those of all other systems together". Therefore all the roots which take the same Vikarana suffix are grouped together and that group is named after the first root that tops the list of that group. Thus, for example, some of the entire number of roots take after them, the Vikarana suffix 'Śyan', they are all grouped together. The first root in this group being Div, this group (gāna) is called Divīdi gāna i.e. a group of roots of which the first one is Div.

In the case of some roots e.g. Adādi and Juhotyādi groups, we do not find the Vikarana suffixes, but the roots in Juyotyādi group have a peculiar common feature, which is not found in the Adādi group, in forming the verb word. The Juhotyādi group of roots takes reduplication before taking the verbal suffix. But the Adādi group does not get reduplicated. Thus taking some special nature, which is common among a number of roots, into account, these two thousand roots are divided into different gānas (groups). The following table shows it clearly.

### CONJUGATIONAL TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conjugation No. and Name (round about)</th>
<th>Vikarana Apparent</th>
<th>Vikarana Actual</th>
<th>Verb form (3rd per. Sing.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bhvādi 1035</td>
<td>Śap A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bhavati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Adādi 72</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Atti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Juhotyādi 24</td>
<td>Śyan Ya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Divyatī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Divādi 140</td>
<td>Śnu Nu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sunoti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Śvādi 35</td>
<td>Śa A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tudati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Tūdādi 156</td>
<td>Śnām Na</td>
<td></td>
<td>Runaddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Rudhādi 25</td>
<td>U u</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanoti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Tanādi 10</td>
<td>Śnā Na</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kīnāti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Kryādi 61</td>
<td>Śap A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Corayati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Curādi 410</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Thā sārvadhātukām (P.3.4,113).
2. Whitney's Sanskrit grammar - Article 600;
Form the above table it is evident that the 1st, 6th and 10th conjugational roots take practically the same suffix ‘A’ after them, before taking the actual verbal suffix. So the question before us is how to divide them. It is true that they take the same ‘A’, but there exists certain difference in the formation of the stem and the verb word. For instance the Vikaranā suffix in general (and this of the 1st conjugation) is introduced as ‘Sap’, while that of the 6th conjugation is ‘śa’ only. The verbal base of the 1st conjugational roots after taking the Vikaranā suffix, has the anudatta accent on the last vowel and this fact is indicated by adding the ‘P’ (pakara) to the suffix as a mute letter. But the verbal base of the 6th conjugation does not possess this feature. Thus those two groups are separated.

The Vikaranā suffix for both the first conjugational roots and the tenth conjugational roots is ‘sap’ only. But there lies a peculiarity in the behaviour of the tenth conjugational roots. These roots invariably take the suffix ‘Nic’ after them, and thus after becoming a Nijanta the root takes the Vikaranā suffix ‘sap’. This Nic forms a part and parcel of the verbal base in all lakāras (tenses and moods). It should be noted that Nic is not a Vikaranā suffix. Of course some roots of this class optionally take Nic and this Nic does not have any meaning of its own but is appended only for the sake of grammatical purity.

The roots of the third conjugation differ from other roots in as much as they get reduplicated before they take the verbal affix. Thus based on some particular or special characteristic e.g. svara, similarity in functional behaviour (Prakriya samya) etc. which is common among some of them, the roots have been classified into various conjugations to facilitate an easy understanding of the verbal system in Sanskrit for the reader.

1. Anudattau suppitaue (P.3 1.4).
2. S.K. on P.1.3.74. “Nicascā Iditkaranaṁ nichh Pākṣikatve lin. gamī, And also the Gama Vartika “Adhṛṣādvā”. And also S.K. on P. 7.3.35 - Artihrītī Pūn bau—Nītkarana samarthyat Nijvikalpoṁ. And the gama sutra “Aśvodeha sarkarmakat” etc.
2 Derived Roots :

There is another type of roots. They are popularly known as Derived roots or complex roots. There are certain suffixes, Sans etc., twelve in number having their respective meanings. Some of these suffixes are added to simple roots, and the resultant form is again treated as a fresh verbal root. Similarly, some other suffixes are added to either nouns or nominal stems, and the resultant derived form is treated as a fresh verbal root. The causative (Yijanta) the frequentative (Yañanta) the denominative (Nâmadhâtu) the Desiderative (sannanta), etc., roots come under this group. For example, Jigamisâ (to desire to go). Putriya (desire to possess a son) Abhatajeya (to act like an ornament) etc., all these forms have the designation 'root' sanctioned by Pâñini through a separate aphorism P. 3.1.52.1.

3. Aphoristic Roots :

A third variety of roots are those which are found only in the aphorisms of Pâñini but not read in the Dhâtupâtha, e.g., Skanbhu ju etc. Scholars opine these roots also might have been originally read in the Dhâtupâtha but later on lost from it. Of course the reasons for such a drop-out is beyond comprehension.

Besides such a broad and general division, taking different stand points of grammar into account, these roots have been variously divided again into sub-groups.

1. These roots are divided as monosyllabic and polysyllabic. The criteria for such a division is the number of vowels contained in a root (Ekâka and Aneka). This division has been made by Pâñini in order to facilitate certain grammatical operations.

1. Śaṇādyantādhātavah. Discussed in detail in the second Part of the book.
2. Ekaco dvē prathamasya. Ekaco uddeśo anudattaḥ (P. 1.7.2.10).
2. Ātmanepadi and Parasmaipadi Roots: The verbal suffixes are of two types. They are called Atmanepada suffixes and Parasmaipada suffixes. Of the eighteen Tiṅ suffixes enlisted in the sātra the first nine i.e. Tip, Tas, Jhi, Sip, Thas, Tha, Mip, Vas, Mas are called parasmaipada suffixes and the remaining nine suffixes i.e. Ta, Ātāṁ, Jha, Thās, Āthām, Dhvām, Id Vahiṁ Mahīṁ are called Ātmanepada suffixes. Of the two thousand verbal roots some roots always take after them the parasmaipada suffixes only and such roots are called Parasmaipadi roots, and some others take the remaining set of the suffixes and are called Ātmanepadi roots. These Ātmanepadi roots are read with an anudatta accent at the end or with ‘ṅ’ as a mute letter. However under special circumstances an Ātmanepadi root may take parasmaipada suffixes giving rise to a slight difference in the meaning of the verb. Sometimes the reverse is also possible. There are some roots which take either set of suffixes alternatively and such roots are called Udbhayapadins. When the speaker wants to convey that the result produced by the activity, is intended to be enjoyed by the agent himself, then those roots which end with a Svarita accent or with a mute letter ā; take Ātmanepada suffixes. For example ‘Pacate’. Here the Atmanepada indicates that the agent is cooking for himself but not for others. But the verb ‘Pacati’ indicates that the agent cooks for others. These roots taking Atmanepada suffixes are further subdivided as svaritets, Nīts, Anudatttets.

1. Tip Tas Jhi, Sip Thas tha mip vas mas, Ta Ātāṁ Jha Thāsā-thāṁ Dhvāṁ Idvahiṁ Mahīṁ (P. 3.4.78) and Thāpānā vātma- nepadam (P. 1.4.100.)
3. For details Vide Ātmanepada prakriya—Parasmaipada Pra- kriya, as given separately in S.K.
4. Svaritaṁtaḥ kartrabhīpraye kriyāphale (P. 1.3.78).
3. Some of the roots are called sets i.e., they get augmentation of the letter 'i' (lāgama) and others which do not get this augmentation are called Anīts.¹

The above two classifications are purely from the point of view of grammatical operations.

4. Transitive - Intransitive Roots:—Another very important classification of these roots is based on their capacity to take an object or otherwise. Generally the roots which have the capacity to take an object are called Transitive roots (Samārika Dhatuś) and others which do not have this capacity to take an object are called ‘Intransitive roots (Akarmaka Dhatuś). This capacity is the result of their natural denotative capacity (Sabda-sakti svabhava). It should be noted clearly that it is the verbal root that takes an object or not but not the verb word. Thus the transitivity or intransitivity lies in roots only.²

Generally it is said that a root is transitive, if the result and activity denoted by it, subsist in different substratums. If the activity subsists in the same substratum as that of the result, then the root is said to be intransitive. For instance observe the root Pac. Here the activity in the form of supplying heat etc., exists in the (substratum) agent, say Caitra and the result i.e. Softening (Viklīṭi) exists in a different substratum i.e. rice. Hence this root is transitive. In the case of the root jīv (to live), both the result holding life (Prāṇadhāraṇā) and the activity congenial to hold them in the body, exist in the same substratum Caitra etc. Hence the root is said to be Intransitive.³

¹ Vide Verses in S. K. under the Sutra P.7.1.5
² Transitivity-intransitivity (See Chapter IV of this book).
³ Jayaramabhattacarya classifies transitive roots as follow, i.e.
   1. Roots possessing single object;
   2. Roots possessing two objects but denoting single activity.
   3. Roots possessing two objects and denoting two activities (Nyayakosa P.390).
How Transitive Roots Become Intransitive :

It is observed that in Sanskrit many transitive roots become intransitive and vice-versa under some peculiar conditions. These can be summarised as follows:

1. A transitive root becomes intransitive when it is not used in the original sense. For instance the root Vah is transitive in the sense ‘to bear’ but it becomes intransitive when used in the sense ‘to flow’ Nadī vahati.

2. Some roots which include the meaning of the object also in the root meaning become intransitive e.g. Jīv (Jīvati).

3. Some roots are by usage treated as intransitive e.g. ‘varṣati’. Here actually the object water (Jalam) as in Megho jalam varṣati; but the object ‘water’ is too well known by long usage, to be specifically mentioned; and hence in such cases the root is treated as intransitive.

4. Again a root becomes intransitive if its object is not desired to be expressed as in sentences like Mātuḥ smarati.

It may be noted that sometimes intransitive roots too become transitive by the addition of a prefix (upasarga) as in the case of Bhū with ‘Anu’ prefixed to it. Similarly sometimes transitive roots also become intransitive on the addition of a Prefix as in the case of ‘Samgacchate’.

Generally all those roots meaning ‘being born, existing, changing, decaying, perishing’, and roots meaning standing, sitting, fearing, feeling shy, keeping awake, playing, shining etc., are intransitive.²

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1. Dhātorthāntaravītteḥ Dhātvarthenopasangrahāt, Prasidhe-ravivakṣataḥ karamāno akarmikā (V. P. III-7-87).

1. Vṛddhi kṣayabhaya jīvita maranam lajja sattā Sthiti jāgaramām Šāyana kridā ruci diptyarthāḥ dhātugamām tamakarmakāmahuḥ.
ROOTS TAKING TWO OBJECTS :-

Normally a transitive root takes only a single object i.e., in a sentence there will be only one single word denoting the object. This word may denote a single individual as the object or even more, but there will be only one word denoting the object in a sentence. Now observe the sentence “Aśvaṁ. gāṁ gajaṁ ca dadāti”. Here one may think the root ‘Dā’ is taking three objects, but it is not so. But in all these cases the root takes only a single (type of) object. Then naturally arises a question what is it that we mean by ‘a root having two objects.’ Ḍeva replies this in a more technical way.1 This to explain in the words of my learned professor, having an object means “to have the nature which is the determinant of the nature of substratum of collective extensity of objectness which is the theme of the one understanding.”2

In the (above cited) sentence “Aśvaṁ gāṁ ca dadāti” though we find two words as objects they can be compounded into a single ‘compound word.’ Hence roots having such objects two or more in number should not be treated as ‘Dyikarmaka’ (having two objects) for our present purpose. Thus here also the word denoting object is one only. But there are sentences where such a compounding is not possible. The verbal roots of such sentences are said to be taking two objects e.g. Balīṁ vasudhāṁ yācate caitrāḥ.

It is peculiar that in Sanskrit a very few roots take two objects as in English. If we observe these sentences in the English language “Give him food; I wish you all success”. Here we find the verbs ‘give’ and ‘wish,. have each two objects. Similarly in Sanskrit too, some (a very few) roots take objects as in the sentences “gāṁ payaḥ deogdhi Rājānāṁ yācate vasudhāṁ; Pitāṁ panthānāṁ prcchati” etc.

2. The Phil. Sent. - Pts., P. 120.
As already said there are only a few such roots which can take two objects and they are enumerated in the following verse.1 There it is said the roots Duḥ, Vāc, Pāc, Danā, Rudh, Pṛc, Ci, Brū, Sāsu, Ji, Mānth, Mus (tosteal), Nir, Hr, Kṛṣ, Vah, and also others having their signification, e.g. Bhās, Vāc etc. take two objects.2 In the cases of the first twelve roots from Duḥ to Mus the nouns payh, vasudhām etc. are principal objects and words gām, Rājānam etc. are secondary objects because these secondary objects, depending on the speaker's volition can be put in other cases like ablative etc. as in the sentence goh dogdhī payah etc.

In accounting for the phenomena of possessing two objects some scholars explain 'that in these cases the root has two activities so that each object agrees with the respective activity. Thus we can explain and account for the roots taking two objects OR this phenomenon is sanctioned by the Sūtra "Akathitām ca".3

IMPORTANCE OF MUTE LETTERS :-

As already said every simple root is read with a particular sign i.e. ending in a particular accent or ending with a particular mute letter. Thus the accent helps us in classifying the root as a Parasmaipadi root or Atmanepadi root. The mute letters ū, n also serves the same purpose. Besides these two mute letters there are many other mute letters such as i, u, r, n, etc. Generally a mute letter indicates a particular peculiarity in the grammatical observations. For instance the roots which have 'i' as mute get 'n' (Num) as an Āgama.4 Thus Pāñini added these mute letters either to a root or suffix to indicate a particular peculiarity in the concerned grammatical operations.

1. Duhyācpac danā rudhī pracchi ci brū sāsu ji māth musām, Karmayukṣyādakathitām tatha syānnihṛksvahām (S.K. Sl. 539).
2. Mānāvakām dharmām bhāṣate vakti.
3. For a detailed discussion see Chapter IV of this book).
4. Idito num dhātoh (P.7.1.58). Oditasca (P.8.2.45) Udito vā (P.7.2.56).
REVIEW AND CONCLUSION :-

Summing up this subject we can conclude that according to the grammarian a verbal root is one which signifies activity or process. The various definitions viz. Bhūvādayo dhātavah, Kriyāvacano dhātuḥ Bhāva vacano dhātuh have the same import.

The Mīmāṃsaka also accepts that a verbal root signifies activity and the Tin suffix denotes Bhāvanā.

The Logician too accepts that the verbal root denotes action favourable to the result.

Thus almost all scholars belonging to various disciplines and schools, excepting Manḍana, have accepted the definition of the root as given by the grammarian.

As regards the various types of classification there is no trace of objection. Thus "A Verbal root in Sanskrit signifies activity". There are nearly two thousand primary roots in Sanskrit. The verbal roots in general are classified as :

1. Primary roots—into ten conjugations.
2. Derivative roots.
3. Aphoristical roots.
4. Transitive roots and intransitive roots.
5. Atmanepadin and Parasmaipadin.
7. Setṣ—Aniṭ roots.
8. Roots taking a single object and two objects.

X—X—X
Chapter II
Section-ii

SUFFIX

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INTRODUCTION:

Of the two components of a verb word i.e. the root and the suffix, we have discussed in the foregoing pages about the root, its classification etc. Now let us study the suffix, its definition and classification etc. in general.

The word Pratyaya (suffix) is derived from the verbal root "ihi" (to go) prefixed with upasarga 'Prāti'. Thus it means which goes towards (a root). Apart from this meaning this word is used in Prātiṣākhya and their commentaries in the sense of a subsequent word or sound; but many other grammatical treatises define it as one which follows the Prakṛti.1

To quote Sri K.C. Chatterji - "In the Vājasaneyi Prātiṣākhya' this word is used both in the sense of "following" and in the sense of "suffix". In Caturārddhāyīki (Atharva Veda Prātiṣākhya) it (the word Pratyaya) is used in the sense of a suffix but in its commentary the word is used in the sense of "the subsequent". In the Taṭṭtirīya Prātiṣākhya this word is used in the sense of 'augment' in "Akurva itica Pratyaya parah". In the Śrauta Sūtras and the Nirukta it is used in the sense of "certainty of meaning". From the Prātiṣākyas it would appear that Pratyaya at one time included suffixes, prefixes, infixes, and augments. The word "Pratyaya" is used in this sense only once by Pāṇini in the Sutra "Anuditsaravānasya cāpratyayaḥ (P.1.1.69)".

According to Jagadīśa, "That particular entity which is different from the Prakṛti, and is a nipāta, and is enjoined in a certain meaning possessed of the capacity of either Śakti or [nirūḍalaksana], is a suffix in that particular sense. There incidentally Jagadīśa quotes Bhartṛhari whose (alleged) definitions is not acceptable to him. As quoted by Jagadīśa, Hari defines a suffix as follows: When two wordforms

1. K.C. Chaterji’s ‘Technical terms of Sanskrit Grammar’ Part 1
are in juxtaposition, the former expecting the meaning of the other with which its own meaning can agree; then the former one is called Prakṛiti and the following one is called Pratyaya (Suffix).  

In the Pāṇinīyan system, we find this word ‘Pratyaya’ is used in a limited sense of a suffix. A thorough and systematic discussion was made by the Vārtikakāra and Pāṇinjali, the Bhāsyakāra while commenting on the sūtra ‘Pratyayah’ (P.3.1.1). Pāṇinjali takes the etymological sense and tries to define the Pratyaya. He gives the etymology of the word as on which makes us cognise its meaning. The word is explained in a causal meaning, ‘one which causes a special or particular import distinct from the base to which it (the Pratyaya) is added. Kaiyāta explains the from as ‘Prati+in+nic+ Aç’. Here the Aç suffix is added in the sense of agent-hood. But Nāgese opines that the word Pratyaya need not be explained as a causal form but a simple form with an implied causal sense. Hence the word is explained as one which produces or gives an important sense or special import. Hence the derivational explanation is of the form ‘Pratyeti iti pratayayah’.

Now if we accept the first definition in the causal sense then there arises an inconsistency that certain suffixes which do not have any meaning such as ‘Kan, An, Ka etc.’ are not covered by the definition, because they do not cause an import of


2. Yastamarthāḥ sampratyaya yatiti sa pratyayah. p.3.1.1.8.


4. Yastu tāstu antarbhaviḥ nyarthāḥ pratyayah iti vaktumucitām (Udyota on P.3.1.1)
any kind. So the Bhāṣyakāra offers an alternative explanation to the word Pratyaya as one the sense of which is rendered intelligible by the base itself to which it (the pratyaya) is enjoined. To put in other words, this suffix, due to the nature of its meaning being expressed by the base itself is treated to be meaningful and hence is called a Pratyaya. Now if we accept this explanation, the other suffixes which are expressive, or not, also are covered. So the Bhāṣyakāra advises us to accept both the explanation. Thus these two explanations, i.e one with a causal sense and the other in the passive construction, cover all types of suffixes both expressive and suggestive.

The author of the Nyāsa on the Kāsika on P 3.1.1 defines a pratyaya as "Pratiyanti anena arthām iti Pratyayah" i.e. people understand the meanings through this. And the meaning is of two types one is the sense in which the word is used (i.e. lokatāḥ) in the society and the other is as fixed in a technical way limiting it to that particular śāstra (Śāstratāḥ). If it be so, neither type of the meaning is signified by the suffixes like Ka, Kan, An etc. because the base gives the same import with or without the said forms. Therefore they can not be counted as Pratyayas. But to this the Nyāsaśakāra replies that where the meanings are not specifically mentioned then they have the same meaning as that of their bases. Bhattoji defines it as one that is enjoined.

1. Yadi pratyāyanti iti pratyayah, avikādinām pratyayasyamjñīḥ na prāṇnoti Nahite kincit pratyāyanti (M.B. on P 3.1.1.)
2. Evaṁ tarahi pratyāyata iti paratyaḥ (M.B. on p.3.1.1).
5. Aniristtārthā svarthe bhvantitiyamānāva ṣāptavacanāt samadhyamya. Tamaṭtarapi svarthe pratiyanti tere api pratyayaḥ ityalamanavistarama. (Nyāsa On p.3.1.3 last few lines)
6. Pratiyate vidyāyate iti pratyayah.
A pratyaya (suffix) always follows a base, but that does not mean that whatever form comes after a base is recognized as pratyaya. In as much as the Paninian grammar is concerned with, only those forms, which are enjoined by or specifically mentioned in the various aphorisms as pratyayas, and those which are governed by the Sutra “Pratyayah” are called Pratyayas. The aphorisms dealing with the various pratyayas are spread over three chapters i.e. from the Sutra P. 3.1.1, to P. 5 4,160 of Astådhyåyå.² In these three chapters, besides the suffixes, some other forms such as Ágama, Ádesa are also mentioned but they are not denoted by word pratyaya because they do not come within the jurisdiction of the governing sútra P. 3.1.1. Thus this word Pratyaya is having a limited etymological meaning just like the word Päñkaja.

TYPES OF SUFFIXES:

In the above said chapters of the Astådhyåyå about 401 pratyayas are enumerated. They belong to different categories. They can broadly be divided into (1) those appended to the nominal base and (2) those appended to a verbal root or base.

These suffixes enjoined after a nominal base (prätipadika) are of three types in general. They are:

1. **Sup Suffixes**:

These are twenty-one in number and are generally known as case suffixes. They are enjoined after the nominal base to indicate the relation with which that word agrees i.e. the verbal root (generality), i.e. the relation being Agent-hood, Object-hood, Instrumentality etc.

2. **Stri Suffixes**:

These are nine in number. These are enjoined, subject to certain rules, after nominal bases to indicate the femininity (even

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1. Paraśca (P.3.1.2).
2. Pratyayah P.3.1.1, Niṣpravānśca.
verbal) existing in the being denoted by the concerned word.

**Taddhita Suffixes:**

These are about two hundred in number. These are enjoined after nominal bases to derive the different nominal bases in different meaning, such as Apatya, Gotra etc. These suffixes are known as secondary suffixes.

Thus the total number of suffixes enjoined after a nominal base is about two hundred and thirty.

The suffix enjoined to after a verbal root or base are of five types, viz:

1. **San etc. affixes:**

These are twelve in number. Some of these are enjoined after nouns; some are enjoined after nominal bases and some others are enjoined after the verbal (simple) roots. Thus the composite unit (Samudaya) so formed, now behaves like a regular verbal root and takes after it all lakaras. Tin suffixes Krt suffixes etc. Such roots are called "Derived or Complex" roots,

2. **Vikarana Suffixes:**

These are twenty one in number. These suffixes are enjoined after a verbal root but before the Tin suffixes. These are enjoined to indicate the various (grammatical) modifications in the formation of the concerned word.

3. **Krt Suffixes:**

These are about one hundred and ten in number. These suffixes are enjoined after the verbal roots in different meanings such as Karta, Karman etc. so as to form nominal bases. These suffixes are known as primary suffixes.

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1. Vide Chapter IV-Section iii of this book.
4. Lakāras:

These are ten in number. These are enjoined after a verbal root to denote the substratum of the meanings of the root, time, number etc., besides some other meanings.

5. Tin affixes:

These are eighteen in number. These are enjoined as Ādese in the place of Lakāras. Hence they denote the same meanings (but with their own restrictions) as the concerned Lakāra in which place they are enjoined.

Thus the suffixes enjoined after a verbal root or base are one hundred and seventy one in number. Besides this division, the suffixes falling under the governing sutra “Dhātou” are further divided as Sarvadhatuka suffixes and Ardhadhatuka suffixes. The Tin suffixes and those having the letter ‘S’ as “idvarna” (mute) are called Sarvadhatukas1 and the rest of the Pratyayas are called Ardhadhatukas. The total number of suffixes enumerated in the above said three chapters (3rd, 4th and 5th) of the Astādhyya comes to round about four hundred and one.

Classification of Suffixes:

All the above suffixes are broadly classified into two groups viz (i) Expressive (Vacaka) (ii) Suggestive (Dyotaka) or Swarthuka. This division is based on the nature of the modification in the import we get from the combination of the base and the suffix (Prakṛti-Pratya samudaya).

Expressive Suffixes:

The expressed sense of a suffix is defined as “That particular or special import which we get by adding the suffix to the

1. Tin śīt Sarvadhatukam. P.5416
base and which (particular sense) is not recalled from the base in the absence of that particular suffix (i.e. by following the process of ‘Anvaya and Vyātisraka’). That suffix which possesses this character is called an expressive suffix. Thus an expressive character of a Suffix is determined.

Suggestive Suffixes : (Dyotaka) :

Certain suffixes are classified as suggestive suffixes. They do not have any meaning of their own, but it is accepted that the base itself has many meanings of which some are popular and some others are not. Therefore the suffix when added to the bases restricts the meaning of the root and reveals only a particular meaning. Now this property of revealing is defined as Dyotakā. This may be of two types, one is to leave the popular meaning; the other is to accept relevant meaning,1 as the context warrants. It is also defined as the property of the suffix by virtue of which, the inherent or latent meaning of the base is revealed,2 in its presence. Some other explain Dyotakatva as Śaktvāḍhāya. Katva i.e. the property of being that which brings out the capacity (of the denotative function proper to the signifier) or as tātparyagrāhakatva i.e. the property of being the conveyer of intention (of the speaker). Such suffixes as tara, tama, iyas etc. are called dyotakas.

SELF-SUGGESTIVE (ĀTYANTASVĀRTHIKĀH) Suffixes :-

Now there are certain suffixes, e.g. Ka, An, Kan etc. which when added to the base, the composite whole (Samudāya) gives an import which is identical with (or not different from) that of the base to which these suffixes are added. For instance the meaning of the words Prajñā and Prajñā is the same.

2. Svasamabhivyāḥ tapadaniṣṭa śaktyudbodhakatvam dyotakatvam (Śabdaratna under P.2.2.6).
Here the suffix \textit{A\textsubscript{n}} is added to the base Prajñ\textit{a}. There is no difference in the meaning of the resultant word. Similar are instances like \textit{Avirevāvīkā}, \textit{Corā}, \textit{eva cauraḥ}, \textit{Vaya eva vāyāsa} etc.\textsuperscript{1} Such suffixes are called Atyanta svārthikas. In this connection the remarks of Bhaṭṭoja on P.5.4.28 are worth mentioning in which he justifies the suffixnessa to these suffixes also.\textsuperscript{2}

As a matter of fact, strictly speaking there is no such a special class as ‘Atyanta svārthikas’ mentioned by the Bhāṣyakāra or others. But it is a conventional name given to those suffixes which are rendered meaningful by the maxim ‘Anirdīṣṭāḥ pratyāyāḥ svārthāḥ (bhave)’.\’

Now it is worth noting that the discussions of the Bhāṣyakāra on the āstras ‘Hetumatica’ and Strīyām etc. reveal that he accepts the fact that some of the suffixes are expressive and some are suggestive even. Bhaṭṭoja and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa accept both the conventions. Nāgęśa too accepts this.

Thus to conclude, in the parlance of the grammarians a suffix is that which is designated as suffix by Pāṇini and thus the word is a Yoga-\textit{nāḍha} one.

\begin{itemize}
\item P.5.4.28 Avekhaḥ, P.5.4.29 Yavadibhyah kan etc,
\item Na Caivaṁ Aveḥ Āh ityādinaṁ samāśāntanāṁ ca pratyayā samijnā na syat, anarthakatvādītyacām svārthikā api pratyayarthanārthavatāḥ. (Śabdakaustubhām on P.3.1.1).
\end{itemize}
Chapter III

CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

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ACTION (VYĀPĀRA)

In the last chapter we discussed how to differentiate a root from what is not a root and arrived at the conclusion that a root is one which expresses action (Vyāpāra). Hence it becomes necessary on our part to have a clear idea of action or activity as expressed by a verbal root. The earliest definition of a verb word as given by Yāska in his Nīrukta is "The verb word is one which primarily signifies Bhāva." He further continues that this Bhāva constitutes six types of modification.

As regards this Bhāva diverse opinions existed. As explained by Durgācārya, some looked upon it as different from Kriyā. And Kriyā comes into being for the sake of Bhāva. They admit that action is invisible but is inferred from the Bhāva which is the particular condition brought about, by it. So action is the secondary meaning signified by the root, as compared with Bhāva which is primary. That is why Bhāva is said to be the primary meaning of the verb (Bhāva pradhānaṁ). A thing is subordinate to that for the sake of which it comes into being. Therefore when we say that Bhāva is the meaning of the root, it is nothing but saying that this action in the form of 'cooking' brings about a particular condition of change, say softening in the case of rice. This action diversifies itself being associated with each of the different accessories (Kārakas) of the action. Thus according to these scholars Kriyā is a process and Bhāva is the result of it; of course, both are expressed by the verb itself.

Even among the Nāruktas, there is another section which views the verb (ākhyāta) as one which signifies action, that is to say, no difference is made between Kriyā and Bhāva; the alle-

1. Bhāvapradhānamākhyātām. (Nir. 1.3).
2. Jayate, asti, viparītamañate, vardhate, vinasyati iti sadbhāvavikāraḥ.
ged result of the process as viewed by the former school. To them the words Bhāva, Karma, Kriyā, Dhātvartha are all synonyms (Anarthāntaram). This is the primary one of all the meanings expressed by a verb word. To be explicit, it is the root that expresses action (Kriyā). The sense in which a word is frequently used that sense is said to be the meaning of that word.1 In the word Ākhyāta action is predominant, while it is subservient in the accessories (Kāraka).

This action is a process through which something (the result) is brought into existence. It is called a process because it contains various parts arranged in a temporal sequence. For example when we say that "one cooks" (Pacati) his activity includes all the intermediary activities such as supplying heat, blowing wind, keeping rice in a pot, adding water etc. Thus keeping the predominance of this action in a verb word, Yāska gives "Pacati, Vrajati" etc., as the examples of an "Ākhyāta".

Patañjali tries to explain what is meant by Kriyā in a very simple and striking way. Action is a property. Action and movement inhere in something or other. And there is no such thing as action or movement not associated with an object in which it inhere. For instance examine the sentence "Caitra goes". In fact there is nothing as his going apart from his presence at different points at different times. And the person that goes, Caitra, his starting point (say Pātaliputra) and the place of destination (say Prayāga) all these may be present at a certain moment yet one does not say "Caitra goes", But at another moment we may say "Caitra goes" i.e. some new factor must have come to enable us to make such a statement as "Caitra goes". There this new factor is action. To put in other words that factor which inhere in the object and is responsible for its presence now at one point and at another point after some moment is called action. This action is not directly perceptible but at the same time, it is to be inferred from its effects. This action is different from the accessories which accomplish action, either directly or indirectly.

It is also different from the objects in which it infers. It is not perceptible but can only be inferred. 1

Patañjaliji further clarifies the nature of this action (Kriyā). He says ‘action is the special mode of behaviour of the accessories’. 2 This definition is so flexible that many different scholars could interpret it in their own way to suit their own discipline. From the above definition it is not definite whether all accessories have the same activity or each has its own. But we can logically conclude that all the accessories can possess some activity of their own as is evident from the designations agent kāraka etc. The activity of each differs from that of the others. Now one may ask if the root is defined as one which signifies action, if so it has to signify all the various activities of the different accessories. This is true but however only the activity of the agent or object is primarily signified. Hence they are understood with the help of the verbal affix at the end of the verbal root. This is how a section of scholars conclude. 3

Some other scholars who argue that action and its result called Bhāva are one and the same, interpret the statement of the Bhāsyakāra to their advantage. To them the word “Pravṛtti viseṣaḥ,” means Pravṛittiṁ viseṣaḥ. They say that action is a particular (viseṣa) or rather a distinct result of the activities of all the accessories. In the case of the root “Pac” the “softness(“ of the rice after cooking is the result achieved by the activities of

3. Prādhanaat tu karttikarmacorlakṣaropatadvayaporationa eva Lāntat pratiyata ityekriyamatam. (Helārāja on V. P. 3-8-1).
all the accessories. Thus to them action is of the form of result.

A few scholars are of the view that the word “Kāraṇam” in the above statement refers only to the agent and the object as the case may be and hence their behaviour alone is called action (kriyā).

There is another section of scholars who explain the above statement of the Bhāṣyakāra in a different way. They offer more logical interpretation and draw more agreeable conclusions.

According to these scholars Kriyā is activity in general but not any particular activity. Therefore this activity in general would be found in every accessory. The bringing about the ultimate result is the common thing found in the activity of every accessory. Thus the word “Prāvṛtti-viśesah” refers to this common feature subsisting in every accessory. The peculiarity (Viśeṣa) lies in bringing about the ultimate result. The word “Prāvṛtti” refers to movement only. But by adding the word “viśeṣa” the entire word signifies something other than mere movement. Thus the action signified by the root “Paṭ” has the various other activities denoted by the different accessories with the aim of achieving the result. Hence that action of general nature having sequence in it and which is understood from a verb word is called “Action”. Action is a process and this idea has been there since Yāska’s time.

The View Of Bhartṛhari:

Bhartṛhari brings out the implication of the statement of Patañjali. As already stated process means something which has parts in it arranged in a temporal sequence but not coexistent. So one may doubt how there can be the idea of a single action arising from parts or moments. To this Hari replies that the moments or parts come into existence to serve a single purpose

1. Anyetu viṣeṣapade bharam kṛtvā ... phalabhāta kāraṇa pravṛtteḥ kriyeti vyācaksatā (Ibid 11.9-10).
i.e. to bring out the result. All these parts are mentally united in one act of cognition. Thus the parts exist for the whole. Strictly speaking, action is one a whole and is conveyed by the root. On the basis of its parts, we can observe its sequence. Verbs like ‘Pacati’ ‘Paṭhati’, Gachati’ etc., stand for that collection of parts which is conceived by the mind as a unity, though some of the parts of the activity lie far behind in the sequence. Each one is as essential as any other part to produce the ultimate result.1 Since the result is one all the parts lead us to the idea of oneness of the action.

Another thing is, as we experience it in our daily life, that at the very first moment of the act of working we use the words He cooks; though many other parts have yet to come into existence. It is so, because we have the ultimate result in view; and the whole is superimposed on each part. But strictly speaking a process has some parts already over and some parts yet to be accomplished. We can directly perceive only those parts of process but never the process as a whole. So the statement that action which is an aggregate of different moments is directly perceptible holds good as far as particular moments are concerned. The oneness of action denoted by a root is as true as the “Torch-wheel” (Alāta cakra).

Now just as pouring water etc., are parts of the action “cooking”, in the same way, even pouring of water etc., have parts of their own. Now if we go on analysing every part, we reach a stage when the part cannot be further subdivided. As a matter of fact this is the actual action. But neither can a root speaks about it, nor can we make use of it in our daily life. Such an atomic action is perceptible only to sages but not to the common man. And Hari says that such a final subtle entity cannot be named ‘Action’. As expressions and usages are concerned, action is something having parts “a process”. To be more explicit,

1. Gubhātairavayavaḥ Samūhaḥ kramajanām, Budhyāprakalpitābhedaḥ kriyeta vyapadiṣyate. (V.P. 3-8-4).
2. Indriyairanyathā praptu ... parikalpyate. (V.P. 8-8-8).
a grammarian is not concerned with the fact whether action has actually parts or not,1 but whether the verb presents it as such or not.

Hari records another view regarding the form of action. According to this section of scholars "that final part of the activity soon after which the result is produced, is said to be the actual action as denoted by the root."2 The other parts of the action are also said to be denoted by the root by Adhyāsa, as they are helpful to the final activity.

THE VIEW OF THE JĀTIVĀDIN :-

So far we have explained the views of the Vyaktivādin who treats that action is an individual one. Now according the jātivādin all the words denote the universal, existing in all the individuals. A universal is something the existence of which is proved by the unity of our cognition. Now as far as action is concerned, the idea of cooking continues though the agent and object of cooking change or vary. So they argue that there exists the universal called action, inhering in different indivisible actions and the root expresses this universal. This universal is really eternal but it appears to be a process i.e. something to be brought about and to have the sequence through its indivisible parts of different moments of an action.3

Here also some people opine that the universal subsisting in the last part is the actual action. When the individual is brought about the universal also is construed to have been brought about.4

THE VIEW OF THE MIṂĀMSĀKA :-

Hari records another view which according to the commen-

1. V.P. 3-8-11.
2. V.P. 3-8-15.
3. V.P. 3-8-20.
4. V.P. 3-8-21.
tator belongs to the Mīmāṁsaka. According to this view action is a "Pravṛtti" and does not exist in particular any where. It is an eternal force. The result is brought about by this Pravṛtti in co-operation with the capacities of the accessories.¹

**THE VIEW OF BUDDHISTS :**

The Buddhists accept the individual, appearing in the mind as action. A section of them think that the universal appearing in the mind, is action. Another section of them think that the existence (sattā) inhering in the individual i.e. appering in the mind, is action.²

**THE VIEW OF BHAṬTOJI :**

Bhattoji says that there is no difference among the imports of the various words like Vyāpāra, Bhāvanā, utpādāna, kriyā etc. They are all synonyms. To him all the activity both external and internal (which is otherwise called Bhāvanā or krti) put together is denoted by the root alone. He defines action (kriyā) as non-different from the Bhāvanā in the form of action congenial to bring into being (the result). To speak broadly it is what the opponent call the meaning of the root kr.³ Kauṭībhaṭṭa also follows the same theory.⁴ Thus to the grammarian all types of activity which is responsible to bring into being some result appears as a single unit and is denoted by the verbal root itself.

**THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN :**

According to the logician, "the non-inherent cause of any

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¹ V.P. 3-8-36 and also Pravṛtti Vīśeṣah kriyati Mīmāṁsakaḥ (Nyayaśāstra P.248).
² V.P. 3-8-24.
³ Kā punah kriyā? Ucyate - Karotyarthabhūta utpadānāpara-paryāya utpatyunkāla vyāpārāraḍpā Bhāvamaiva kriyā. (Śa. Kau. on P.1.3.1 Bhāvādayodhātvah).
contact. (Samyoga) which is itself different from samyoga is called action. Generally speaking, action is divided as external activity and internal activity. The logician argues that only the external activity is called kriya, and the internal activity is called kr
ti. The Mimamsaka says that this internal activity is called Bhavan. According to these two schools, the root denotes only external activity which can exist either in a sentient or an insentient object. According to them this activity is called vyapara. Kr
ti exists always in sentient beings and gives rise to action (vyapara) which can externally be perceived. Kr
ti being internal cannot be perceived.

SUMMARY :

On studying the various arguments we can sum up them as under.

1. A section of Nairuktas opine that kriya is something which comes into existence to bring Bhava into being.

2. Another section opines that the words kriya (action,) and Bhava signify the same thing i.e. process.

3. According to Pata
djali action is 
ha or kriya or vyapara. The Bh
dyakara says 
ha, cesta etc., are synonyms. Hence it becomes evident that the grammarian does not accept the external activity and the internal activity to be different and to be expressed by different words as vyapara, and Bhavan
 or krti. Action is the peculiar mode of behaviour of accessories. It cannot be directly perceived but inferred. Action has parts arranged in a sequence. All the parts are mentally cognised as one single unit and is called a single activity. This is what the later grammarians follow.

1. Samyogabhinnatve sati samyogasama vyakaranatvam.
2. Cetana cetanasadharapadharma vyaparah, krtistu atmanishtha (or) Kr
tistu antarangika cesta, Bhyavyaparastu kriyadayah.
4. Some scholars opine that the last part (moment) of the activity immediately preceding the result is the vyapara signified by the root. But it is superimposed on the whole and the whole is superimposed on it.

Besides the above prominent views, Bharṭhara, in the kriyasamuddeśa of his Vākyapadīya, records many other views which are of minor importance.

X—X—X

RESULT (PHAŁA)

A result is produced after performing a certain activity. Now the question is what is meant by result. Are this result and the result as explained in grammar one and the same? These are the questions for which an answer is to be sought.

In the language of a common man result is that to achieve which, one acts. For instance one cooks to have a meal; one sacrifices to achieve Heaven. Thus Bhojana and Swarga are the results of the respective actions. Along with some primary benefits, there may be some secondary benefits also. But as far as the word Result is concerned it applies only to the primary benefit for which one acts. The Mahābhāṣya yakāra expresses the same view while commenting on the sūtra P.1.3.72.1 that Swarga is the fruit of the action of sacrifice. Bharṭhara also records the same view in his Vākyapadīya. This is true as far as our daily life is concerned. But concerning the science of grammar it is not so.

In grammatical parlance a root denotes action and result. The substratum of this result is the designation object (Karma). So if we accept Bhojana or Swarga as the result of the actions of cooking or sacrifice respectively, then the person who eats or

1. P.1.3.72, Swaritamūttaḥ kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale.
2. Yasyārthasa praśideyartham arabhyante pacādayah, Tat pra-
dhanām phalāṃ tēsam na labhādi prayojanam. (V.P.3.12.18).
who enjoys heaven has to get the designation of ‘Karma’. But it is not like that in grammar. In the sentence Tandulam Pacati, rice is the object kāraka. Therefore the grammarians define the ‘result’ of an action denoted by a root in a different way. It is peculiar that none of the three sages i.e. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Patañjali specifically defines the result as denoted by the root. However the Bhāsyakāra commenting on the sūtra P.3.1.261 gives us an indication. Here the Bhāṣya is “what is the primary meaning of the root Pac?” It is softening of rice”. Thus it is evident ‘softening’ is the primary meaning of the root and hence is the result. This is produced by the activity denoted by the root ‘Pac’. From this it is deduced that ‘Result is that which is intended finally to be produced by activity’ i.e. the entire activity is considered as one unit both being the meanings denoted by the same root.

Kaunjahatā defines the result as one which is denoted by a root and which is the attributive of the other meaning of the root. That is in verbal import the meaning of the result part is an attributive of the activity part of the meaning, both being denoted by the same root. Thus in sentences like ‘Caitraḥ pacati’ the verbal import is “an action, having Caitra as its substratum and qualified by the result softening (Viklittyaṃkālavyāpārāḥ). In the definition the word ‘tad’ is very important i.e. both the result, and action should be denoted by the same root. Thus though the result denoted by one root becomes an attribute of the activity denoted by another root, that former cannot be designated as fruit. Observe the sentence “Paśya Mṛgo dhāvati”.

1. P.3.1.26r Hetumatica. (Bha). Kaḥ Paceḥ Pradhanārthah? Ya asau Tandulāṇām Vikliṭīn. In the Bhāṣya Viklitti is said to be primary from the view point of the person who acts. But for the purpose of grammatical operations action is primary and the result is substantive.

Here Dhāvana (running) denoted by the root Dhāvṛ, is an attributive to the meaning of the root ‘Dṛṣ’ but not to that of the Dhāvṛ. Hence it is not the meaning of the root. Thus though the animal is the substratum of running, it does not get the Karmasaṃjña.

Now one may urge in the case of the passive construction of sentences like “Tāndulah pacyate” the result is primary and activity is attributive; and as such softening cannot be called “Result”. In order to avoid this defect Dīkṣita adds the words “in the active voice” (Kartṛpratyaya samabhivyāhare) to the definition given above.¹ Strictly speaking, according to Dīkṣita and Kaunabhatta, even in the passive construction the verbal import has activity as primary.² However in Karma kṛdanta words such as “Pakvaḥ Tāndulah” we meet this inconsistency. Hence Nāgesa does not accept activity as the primary entity in the import of a sentence in the passive construction. He says there also, as in Karmakṛdanta, the result is primary.³

Thus finally it is evident that the phrase “in the active voice” is to be included in the definition. By adding this phrase it results that “of the meaning of the root which ever is attributive to the other, in the active voice— that alone is the result of that particular root”. Thus even in sentences in the passive voice objecthood (Karmatva-) is not barred. Hence is the final definition.⁴

2. Tāndulah pacyate = Tāndulanist a vikliṭtyanukālo vyārah.
3. Tāndulah pacyte caitrāpeti karmalakāratu...phalaviseṣyako bodhāh (L.M.K.K. P.832).
4. Kartṛpratyayasamabhidāne, taddhātvarthrha viṣeṣāhāve sati taddhātvarthatvām phalatvām.
THE VIEW OF HARIVALLABHA :

Harivallabha, the author of the Darpana, a commentary on the Bhāṣṣaṅgaṇāra defines result as that entity which "while being the meaning of a root, is produced from the meaning of that root". In the definition "being produced" means "being the object of the knowledge in which producedness (Janyaṭva) is the attribute." The clause "which is the meaning of the root" is to prevent over-application of the definition on "Separation produced by action denoted by the root gaṁ" etc. The phrase "being produced from the meaning of the root" is to prevent over-application of the definition of the result on activity (vyāparsa). For example in sentences like "Tandulam pacati" the activity is of the form of blowing wind etc... Since it is not produced from the result vikṛtti, the definition does not over apply on activity. Thus he holds his definition is more justified.

This contention of Harivallabha that activity is not produced from the result denoted by the same root, does not appear to be correct. No activity is accomplished without deciding the fruit to be achieved. Thus the fruit is first conceived in the mind and activity is produced from this knowledge. Hence Harivallabha's contention that "because Vikṛtti (result) does not produce activity" is not correct. Thus even Harivallabha's definition suffers from the fault of over-application. This is the view of the Tattvadarsinikāra on the lines suggested by Nāgesa.

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3. Phalasyāpi kriyājanakatvam, Tatjñānapūrvakāṃ kriyotpādanat. (L.M.K.K. P1202) and also 'TTV. Dar. P.16' para2.
Nāgēsa’s Definition:

Nāgēsa defines result as follows:

“Result is that which being produced from the meaning of the root when conjoined utterance as suffix in the active voice, possesses attributiveness as described by the substantiveness subsisting in the meaning of the same root.” This definition is different from that given by Dikṣā. Here the phrase “being produced from the meaning of the root” is added just to avoid resulthood either to the mere contact or division in the case of the root ‘Pat’ etc. The meaning of the root ‘Pat’ is “contact produced from division.” Here mere contact is not the result because it is not attributive to activity. Division is also not the result because it is not produced from the meaning of the root.

Harivallabha criticises this definition and says “Tṛcchātyam” (Meaningless). He says the meaning of the root ‘Pat’ is neither separation nor contact. It is very clearly stated in the Pañcāpātha Pat gāthā. Therefore the meaning is gati i.e. activity favourable to contact with a latter place. Hence division of separation is the meaning of the fifth case (Vṛksat param patham). Further if we are to accept contact produced by division as the meaning of the root (Pat), then this contact produced by separation from the former being not perceived, cannot be activity. So the root ‘Pat’, which does not have activity as its meaning, loses its eligibility to be called a root. Therefore according to Harivallabha, the definition given by Nāgēsa, and

1. Taddhāthavatthu jenyāvate sati, kartṛpratāya samabhivyāhared, Taddhāthavatthu nītha viṣayanām prakārakatavatvāṁ phalatvam. Vībhage gajaya samyogadātā phalatyasthe; vībhage semyo gayoḥ phalatva varāhāyobhayām. (L.M. (NBP) - P. 15).
HARIVALLABHA CRITICISED:

In the commentary ‘The Tattvadarśanī’ on the Bhūpadhāraṇa, we find a reply to Harivallabha’s criticism. The author of the Tattvadarśanī refutes Darpanakāra as follow:

According to Darpanakāra, in sentences like ‘a leaf falls from a tree’ the meaning of the fifth case is separation (Vibhāga) and the object from which a thing is separated is called Avadhī. Now Tattvadarśanikāra says that if we accept the above contention of the Darpanakāra, then there will be a serious setback to our accepted (import) contact produced from separation having the tree as its Avadhī. Further in sentences like ‘A leaf gets separated from the tree (Viśksat parīm vibhājate)’ the verb is redundant, since its meaning is conveyed by the fifth case.

In such cases, suppose you say that the meaning of the fifth case is only ‘limit’ (Avadhī) then enough of this Aradhjaratīyata. Hence we cannot find fault with the definition of result as given by Nāgeśa.


3. For more details TTV. Dar. P.17,18.
It is to be noted here that the above definition given by Nāgėśa is not satisfactory for him, as it suffers from non-applicability in sentences like “He knows the pot” (Ghaṭaṁ jānāti). In this sentence the meaning of the root jīnā is visayatā (the result). This is a substance. Now some scholars do not agree that this result is produced by jīnāna. Of course some others admit that visayatā is produced from jīnāna. Concerning them there is no trouble and in their opinion Visayat aget s karmanva. But in the case of farmer section of the scholars, the definition of result is not applicable.1

**FINAL DEFINITION :-**

Hence to ward off this defect, Nāgėśa gives another definition free from the phrase “being produced from the meaning of the root.” The definition, given previously is according to the opinion of elders (Pṛṇaṁ mate). His final definition is “result is the meaning of the root which (Meaning) is the substratum of the attributiveness as described by the substantiveness which subsists in the (other) meaning of that root itself in the active voice”.2

Harirāmasāstrya, author of the commentary, Kāśikā on the Bhusanāsāra gives a definition similar to that given by Nāgėśa formerly.3

Of course result is generally defined as one produced from the activity part of the meaning of the root.4

1. Because here Visayatā is not produced from the activity meaning of the root jīnā.
2. Phalatvaṁ ca krt-pratyayassamabhivyāhare, taddhātvārthan-iṣṭha visesyaṭanirūpita prakārataśraya tabdhātvartvathvāṁ. (L M KK. P. 1204)
3. Hari Ramasastry defines Result “Taddhātvathva Janyatvesati taddhātvathvan- iṣṭha visesyaṭanirūpita prakāratavatvāṁ phalatvam”. This definition is not different from that of the former definition given by Nāgėśa and hence has the same defects as pointed out there in.
4. Ṛṣ̤hūtvathvavacchinna vyapara-janyatvāṁ.
AGENT (KARTĀ)

Now, having examined the nature of action and result denoted by a verbal root, we examine the nature of their substratum i.e. agent (Kartā) and object (Karma). Generally speaking, one who performs the action is called the agent of the particular action. Not only one who actually does the work, but the one who employs others at work and gets it done is also called ‘agent’. But as far as it concerns the science of grammar, ‘an agent is one who is independent’ as defined by the sage Pāṇini, vide Śāstra P.1.4.541 Into this śāstra the word ‘Kārake’ is read in, from the previous śāstra. Thus the whole śāstra gives the meaning “one who is independent in performing action, gets the designation ‘Agent’”. Here action means the action denoted by the verbal root. Of course in a sentence a number of activities, subsisting in different kārakas, help in bringing about the result. For instance take the sentence “Caitra cooks rice with fuel for Maitra in a pot”. Here each kāraka i.e. Caitra, rice, fuel, pot etc., bring in some action peculiar to them to produce the final result. Thus every kāraka is the substratum of its own activity part. So much so, there arises a doubt as to which should be designated as agent (kāraka.) To this Kaiyata replies that particular kāraka who is independent in employing other kārakas is called the agent (kartā). But normally a root is deemed to express the action subsisting in a particular kāraka who is independent in regulating the other kārakas to act in an appropriate way so as to enable to achieve the desired fruit. Thus in a sentence like “Caitraḥ tāndulam kāsthaiḥ sthālyāṁ pacati” Caitra alone becomes the agent because it is he who can control the other kārakas. Thus his action alone is denoted by the verbal root and this action is primary (principal) with respect to the actions of other kārakas. However, if the speaker intends the root to denote that particular action subsisting in any other kāraka as primary with respect to others, then that particular kāraka becomes the agent as in the sentence “Firewood cooks rice in the pot”. This is vouchsafed by the Bhāṣyakāra who states when the action

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1. Svatāntaram kartā. P.1.4.54.
subsisting in the pot is deemed to be primary and is denoted by the verbal root. it becomes independent, but when the activity subsisting in Cātra is denoted by the root, then the pot is dependent.

Another peculiarity is that, if the speaker desires he can treat a verbal root as denoting the activity subsisting in any of the kārakas viz., object, instrument or locus besides the agent, in which case that particular kāraka is treated as the agent and we construct the sentences like "Firewood cooks" etc., the pot cooks rice; rice gets itself cooked etc. Generally other kārakas as stated are mentioned as agents, by superimposing the independence on them and thus case emphasis etc., with which the action is being done is expressed. Another peculiarity is, if the root is transitive it remains transitive when the instrument or the locus is treated as agent, but when the object itself is treated as the agent as in the sentence "Tandulaḥ pacyate svayameva" the root becomes intransitive, since the object itself becomes the subject of activity. This type of construction is called "Karma kartprayoga i.e. a sentence wherein the object itself is treated as the agent. And such construction of sentences is governed by the aphorism P.3.1.87."

THE VIEW OF LOGICIAN:

The logician does not admit the grammarians point that the substratum of the action denoted by the root is the agent. He argues that the substratum of kṛti denoted by the verbal suffix alone is to be called agent. The etymological meaning of the word "Kāra" itself is the authority for such a conclusion. Here the root "Kṛ" denotes kṛti and the suffix 'ṛc' denotes substratum.

1. Sthālisthe yatne kathyamāne sthāli svatantrā, Kartṣṭhe yatne kathyamāne paratantrā. (M.B. under P.1.4.23.)
2. We must note that under no circumstance does a verbal root denote the activity subsisting in the Sampradāna or the Apadāna kāraka. Hence there is no possibility of these kārakas to be denote as agent in any kind of construction of a sentence.
3. P.3.1.87, Karmavat karmāṇā tulyekriyāḥ.
Hence his contention is justified. Thus an agent must be a sen-
tient being only. But there are many usages where insentient
objects are used as agents e.g. Ratho gacchati; Kulam pipatisati
etc. In order to justify agent-hood in the case of such insen-
tient objects, he takes recourse to the secondary signification or
conventional implication (Niraśha Laksana). Thus he justifies
such usages as "The pot cooks" etc. Udayana also argues that
an agent is always a sentient being and he is the substratum
of the activity (kr̥ti) denoted by the root kr̥.  

However the grammarian does not accept this definition of
the logician. The logician comes to the above conclusion ta-
king it for granted that the root ‘kr̥’ denotes kr̥ti. But it is not
so. The root ‘kr̥’ denotes mere action in general. Hence there
is no need to resort to conventional implication.

Of course one may urge how the grammarian can justify the
usages like "Ratho gacchati" wherein the insentient objects are
agents. The reply is that they superimpose sentiency on the
non-sentient objects. This is evident from the Bhāṣya on the
sūtra P.4.1.27. It should not be considered that one resorts to
implication and the other resorts to super imposition. Super-im-
posing is not a fault but has the sanction of the Bhāṣyakāra,
whereas the logician cannot resort to implication as it is pro-
hibited in the case of affixes.

1. Yadyapi svanatra vyāpāramatra eva tr̥tiyāderanusāsanam,
tathāpi lāghavāt kr̥tīrūpe eva kartvē tr̥tiyādeḥ saktiḥ. Acetana
vyāpāre niraśha laksanaiva (Vy. Vā.).
V-9) Independence means inherence of knowledge, desire
and activity (kr̥ti) (Ibid Commentary Prakāsa).
5. Na Vibhaktau laksanā.
THE VIEW OF KHANḍADEVA :-

Khāṇḍa Deva finds fault with the definition that "the substratum of action, denoted by the root is called agent," as given by the grammarian. He points out that in the case of a negative sentence like Caitra does not cook (Na pacati), the import is the absence of activity in the agent. Thus when the verb is conjointly uttered with the negative particle "Na" the said agent Caitra is not the substratum of the action denoted by the root 'pac'. Hence the nominative affix of Caitra cannot be justified. Hence Khāṇḍa Deva gives another definition. Of course speaking in a general way, the Mīmāṃsaka defines the agent as the substratum of Bhāvanā denoted by the suffix 'Tiṇ'. This view is expressed by Khāṇḍa Deva in a more technical way, so as to avoid the general faults like over application etc.

According to him "an agent" is the substratum of the meaning recalled by a word (Padopasthāpya) with which (meaning) the gender etc., does not agree (Lingānanvayin) and which meaning is delimited by the meaning of the verbal root (Dhātvartha-vachinna).1 The word Lingānanvayi helps in preventing agenthood to the substratum of the Bhāvana obtained through words denoting an object, person, substance etc. Further in the passive voice the result is not expressed either by the suffix or by the root but is obtained by syntactical relation. The word Padopasthāpya prevents agenthood taking such meaning into account.

Thus in the sentence Caitra pacati, the substratum of Bhāvana is the agent. In a sentence like Caitra Pācayati, the substratum of the inducement denoted by the Nic suffix is the agent.

Further in the instances of kṛdanta sentences like "Caitraḥ Pācakaḥ paktā" etc., the kṛti (Bhāvanā) which has no gender, is

1. Yad dhātvarthāvacchinna lingānanvayi Padopasthāpya arthāśrayatvat yasya tasya tatkārttvam. (Bhā. Rah. P.107)"
expressed by the suffix and Caitra, being the substratum of it is the agent. Similarly in sentences like “Caitrasya Pākaḥ” the ghaṇī suffix expresses kṛti by implication. Thus the said definition holds good in the case of various sentences like Sthāli pacati; Ghato bhavati; Paṭau na bhavataḥ etc.

This definition also is not satisfactory. According to this it results that an agent is one who is the substratum of Bhāvanā denoted by the Tīn suffix. But people generally comprehend the agent as the substratum of the action denoted by the root. So this definition is contrary to popular experience. Further in some sentences the agent is the substratum of the meaning of the casual suffix; in some other cases it is the substratum of activity, a secondary meaning of the kṛt suffix. Thus there is no uniformity in the apprehension of the agentness. Further in instances like ‘Caitrasya Pākaḥ’ acceptance of kṛti or Bhāvanā as the secondary sense of the ghaṇī suffix goes against all the accepted norms. It is unanimously accepted by almost all the scholars that Bhāve ghaṇī suffix does not possess any meaning but is used after a verbal root for the sake of grammatical purity in denoting the meaning of the verbal root itself as something already produced (Siddha). Resorting to Lakṣānā in the case of Tīn affixes etc. is not admissible.

Most probably taking all these things into account, Khanda Deva does not seem to have been satisfied with this definition. So he offers an alternative definition that “principle agenthood is the property of being the substratum of Bhāvanā.” But this definition is also not free from faults. As such he finally concludes that in fact Agenthood, Objecthood etc., are all un-analysable entities (Khandaṇḍopādha).

THE VIEW OF NĀGEṢA :-

In view of the several defects pointed out in the different definitions, Nāgeṣa offers his own definition to the word ‘Karta’

1. Na vibhaktau lakṣānā.
2. Athavā kṛtyāṣṭryatvameva mukhyakarmatvāṁ, Anyatra kartaḥ vyavahāro bhakta eva diṣṭavyaḥ.
and interpretation to the word "Svatantra" in the aphorism P. 14.54: The word 'Svatantra' in the said śātra, is to be explained as one who engages the other kārakas the action of which is related to the meaning of the root; or the independence, as stated in the śītra is 'being capable of controlling all other kārakas in their actions. Only Caitra, the agent, can do that but not any one of the other kārakas. Thus the independence of an agent (person) means being capable to act (bringing something into being) or not to act (restrain or) prevent something coming into being as he desires. Thus both the employer and employee gets the designation of agent in sentences like Paccayati Maitra, Caitra etc. Of course in the case of insentient objects, such an independence is superimposed on those objects and they are treated as agent, because it is an accepted fact that a verbal root always expresses the activity subsisting in the one designated 'agent'. This is due to the peculiar capacity existing in words. However in casual sentences, substratum of the activity denoted by the nić suffix, as well as the substratum of the activity denoted by the original non-casual root also get the designation agent. This view has the sanction of Bhartṛhari also.

Thus the agent is one who controls all the other kārakas, the activities of which are subordinately related to the action expressed by the root in producing the result.

   This kārka is said to be that of Bhartṛhari. But in the present day available texts it is not found as explained by the Prof.K. V. Abhayanakar, in the book Vākyāpādiya edited by him.
3. Šabdāsaktisvabhāvāt.
4. V.P. 118 = 7-99, 100.
OBJECT (Karma)

Having defined the nature of the agent, let us examine what the word object (Karma) stands for. In Pāṇinian grammar an object is that what is most desired by the agent, (to be achieved through his activity). The word ‘desired’ means related (Sambadhāṁ) indicating the cause for one to act. Thus the Śūtra gives the import “an object is that accessory related to the agent” i.e. related with the action subsisting in the agent. The relation between the action and this accessory is being the substratum of the result produced by it (action). Thus in a sentence like “Caitra cooks rice”, the activity subsisting in the agent is of the form of blowing wind etc., and the result produced is softening. This subsists in rice. Hence rice gets the designation ‘object’. Therefore taking all this into consideration an object is normally defined as “the substratum of the result produced by the action subsisting in the agent denoted by the root”.

Now one may urge that in sentences like “He goes to Village” (grāmam gacchati), the result is ‘contact with the later place.’ Now ‘contact’ always rests in two entities. As such here besides the village the agent also is the substratum of the contact. Hence he also has to be designated as object, in which case sentence like “Caitraḥ Caitram” gacchati” are rendered possible, which, in fact, are irregular. To this grammarian replies that it is true that Caitra gets the designation agent, as well as, object. But in the Pāṇinian system, the aphorism enjoining agent designation is later in order to that enjoining the object designation. Hence Caitra gets the agent designation only which stultifies the

1. P.1.4.49 Karturipsita tamam Karma.
As such there is no possibility for the much feared wrong construction of sentences as “Caitrah caitrāṁ gacchati” etc. As far as enjoining of case affixes is concerned, the guiding factor is only the designation of the accessory as agent, object etc.

The word ‘Most’ (Tamp) in the definition of the object given by Pāṇāni has a definite importance. Observe the sentence “Caitra prevents the boy from fire” (Caitrah bālam agneh vārayati). Here the word “prevents” denotes an action congenial to the absence of action congenial to contact. Here activity conducive to contact lies in the boy and action congenial to its absence lies in Caitra. Now the word “Most” indicates primariness. Here the action subsisting in Caitra is primary. The result produced by this action is “the absence of contact of the boy with fire”. And this subsists in the boy. Thus the boy gets the designation object. Otherwise the boy would have got the Apādana designation on the authority of the Sutra3 P.1.4.27 which is latter, the former being the one which enjoins the karma samjna.

Thus an object is the substratum of the result produced by the action subsisting in the agent. Thus action is denoted by the verbal root. Besides this general definition, there are many special circumstances under which other Karakas also get designated as object.4

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1. Here the idea is this. Caitra is excluded from being an object only by a grammatical rule which designates him as subject (or the agent of action) which designation negates the designation “object” and also prohibits two designations simultaneously as per the sutter Vipratisedhe param kāryam (P.1.42) and Ākadrādekhā samjñā (P.1.4.1).
2. Samyogānukāla vyāparābhāvanukāla vyāpara vārayatyarthaḥ.
3. P.1.4.27 Vāraṇārthaṃ emancipāḥ.
THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN :-

Though every one accepts that the substratum of the result is the object, still the logician feels that a faultless definition is to be given. So he defines an “object as the substratum of the result which is the determinant of the nature of the meaning of the root and which result does not subsist in the same substratum as the meaning of the root.”¹ Thus in the sentence ‘Caitra cooks rice’ the result “Softening” which is the determinant of the meaning of the root, subsists in Tandula which is not the substratum of the meaning of the root.

The words “not being the substratum of the meaning of the root” in the definition are included in order to avoid over application of the definition on roots like vs (varṣanē) where the object (water) is included in the meaning of the root itself. Similarly the clause “which does not subsist in the same substratum as that of the meaning of the root” helps us in preventing the designation ‘object’ to Caitra in the case of sentences like ‘Caitra goes to the village’. The clause “which is the determinant of the meaning of the root” helps us in preventing the designation ‘object’ to both the tree and the ground in sentences like “A leaf falls from the tree on the ground”. Hence the logician is confident that his definition is perfect.

However this definition of the logician is also has its own defects and has been criticised. The grammarian opines that in sentences like “Caitra goes to the village” the object-designation to ‘Caitra’ is prevented by a mere aphorism and we need not bring in all the clauses and make it much more cumbersome. Further the given definition does not apply satisfactorily in the case of casual sentences. For instance take the sentence “Caitra causes Maitra to go to the village (Caitraḥ Maitraṁ grāmāṁ gamayati) and Caitra causes Maitra to cook rice (Caitraḥ Maitreṇa Paṣaceñati tan-
dulaṁ). The said definition cannot equally account for the accusative case in one sentence and instrumental in the other sente-

¹ Dhātvartānadhikarānātive sati dhātvarthataśvacchedaka phala sālitvām (Vy. Vā.)
nce. A similar discrepancy creeps in sentences like 'Ghatam Jansati' etc. To explain these, the logician has to resort to implication etc..

THE VIEW OF MIMĀMSAKA :-

The Mimāmsaka accepts that objectness is the meaning of the accusative case suffix. The objectness is of an unanalysable character (Akhaṇḍopādi). The meaning of the nominal base agrees with objectness. The relation of the object with activity (Bhāvāna) is that of being the theme (Udāsyaatva) or favourability to the root meaning which it indicates. Thus he finds a solution for all the defects hitherto pointed out.

Resorting to such definition as unanalysable entity etc., should not be accepted normally. There must be some rational means to explain things. There fore Nāgastha offers his own definition in this connection.

THE VIEW OF NĀGASEA :-

According to Nāgastha that thing which is the subject in the intention of the agent, is known as object. The nature of "being subject in the intention" is of the frame of being the substratum of the result existing in a locus different from that of the activity caused by the activity denoted by the root and which activity subsists in the agent. The 'subject in the intention' means the object desired by one to achieve and that is nothing but the result only. Hence its substratum becomes the object.

However in the instance 'car goes', etc., one may question how an insentient thing like car can desire to have an object. To

1. Atah uktayuktyā lāghyvāt karvimakhamāndopādi rāpameva dvityārthāh. (Bhā. Rah)
3. Karttāgata prakṛta dhātvartha vyāpāraprayojya vyāpāravyadhi- karaṇa phalāsyaatvena karturuddesyatvam. (L.M. (kk))
this Nāgeśa replies that in such instances it will be treated that the Uddeśyatva is superimposed on the car and hence the definition.

Now in view of the various definitions the definition given by Nāgeśa seems to be more logical-Resorting to ‘implication’ in the case of case affixes etc. is a fault. Further, Nāgeśa’s definition applies in all cases like causal and non-causal etc.. Thus speaking in a general way the substratum of the result denoted by the root is the object with respect to the activity denoted by the same root. Nāgeśa says after all as far as it concerns grammar, an object (Karma) is one to which that particular designation is enjoined by the various Pāninian aphorisms.¹

SAMSARGA (SYNTACTICAL CONNECTION)

In the language of the Logicians, the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians, the word ‘Samsarga’ means syntactical connection between the meanings signified by words in a sentence. According to the logician the meaning of the sentence is the relation existing among the various substances recalled by the different words in it. This syntactical connection between the words has a peculiar property. This syntactical connection brings in some additional meaning which is not signified by any of the words. For instance observe the sentence “Caitraḥ pacati”. Here the word Caitra means Caitra only. Pacati denotes ‘activity of cooking’ (Pākakṛti). Thus these two meanings as they stand bear no relation to each other. But the actual verbal import of that sentence is of the from “Caitra is the substratum of effort of activity (kṛti) conducive to softening.” Thus in the verbal import an additional sense of substratum hood (Āśrayatva) and conducive ness (Anukālatva) is heard. This additional meaning is not that of either of the words. It is secured through syntactical connection (samsarga-galabhya).

¹ Tatra karmatvaḥ Vyākaraṇa-sāstrē-bodhitakarma-samjñatvam.
Further the Maṁśaka also admits that in sentences like "Caitraḥ pacati" the non-differential relation between the subject and the noun in the nominative is secured through "Samsarga" only. Even the grammarian cannot do away with this samsarga. He too resorts this import in explaining the non-differential relation between the noun in the nominative case and the agent meaning of the verbal affix. The import is, Activity having a substratum (agent) non-different from Caitra.

Thus all the meanings comprising the verbal import cannot be denoted or connoted by the words actually present in a sentence. Certain meanings such as substratumness (Āśrayatva), favourability (Anukūlatva) etc., are accepted as supplied by syntactical connection itself. All the scholars accept that these meanings should not be attributed to any one of the words in the sentence, because, when the meaning could be secured through the very combination of the words, there is no logic in burdening the constituent word with the same meaning. After all it is a matter of frugality.

Thus Samsarga means syntactical relation among the meanings signified by different words in a sentence. And through this samsarga some additional meaning denoting certain relationship is considered to exist between the meanings of the words in a sentence. It may be noted that the followers of the Anvitābhidhāna theory, i.e., Prabhākara, however regards this 'syntactical connection' also as the meaning of the word.

ABHIHITA-ANABHIHITA.VYAVASTHA :-

The word 'Abhihita' means 'expressed'. Anabhihita means "Not expressed". This system (Vyavasthā) relates to the

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1. Anaya labhyasya Padārthatvāt.
3. This system is popularly known as "Abhidhānakabhidhānavyavasthā"
enjoining of case affixes to words. In a sentence each Kāraka is related to action denoted by the verb with a particular relation, such as, of agent-ness, object-hood, instrumentality etc. And this relation is generally indicated by the case affixes enjoined after the word denoting the particular Kāraka. Thus the accusative case affix after a particular word indicates that, that particular accessory agrees with the verb word as the object of the action. Similarly instrumental case after a particular word indicates that that particular accessory agrees with the verb word as an agent or an instrument. In a similar way we can explain other relations also.

Here, the sage, Pāṇini restricts that these accessories take the respective case affixes to indicate the particular relation, provided such relation is not already expressed (or made known) by other means, otherwise the word denoting the particular accessory takes the nominative case affix only which affix is enjoined in the sense of the Pratipadika. Generally these relations can be expressed by the Tiṅ, Kṛt, Taddhita suffixes or by a compound even besides the case affixes. 1

Now let us examine this system with respect to the agent and object Kārakas. Take the sentence "Caitraḥ Tandulaḥ pacati". Here the grammarian contends that the agent denoting the kāraka (Caitra) takes the nominative case affix on the authority of the Sutra2 P.2.3.1; because to the grammarian agentness is already made known by the Tiṅ affix on the authority of the Sutra3 P.3.4.69. Otherwise the word Caitra would have taken instrumental case affix on the authority of the Sutras P.2.3.1 and4 P.2.3.18. For example in the sentence "Caitreṇa pacyate Tandulaḥ " the Tiṅ suffix does not denote the agent, hence the word Caitra takes the instrumental. The Tiṅ suffix denotes the object, hence the word denoting the

1. Abhidhānam tu pāyena Tiṅ kṛt taddhītasamāsāṁ.
2. P.2.3.1 Anabhihite.
3. P.3.4.69 Laṁ Karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyāṁ.
4. P.2.3.18 Karto karantavyosūtiyā.
object' (Tandula) takes the nominative case affix. Thus the grama.
mahāvīma states that unless it is admitted that the verbal affix
denotes the agent, and object, we cannot justify the nominative
and objective case affixes in the case of words Caitra and Tan-
dula, in the above two cited sentences.

The Logician contends that this abhidhāna-anabhidhāna
system does not relate to the expression of agent and object by
the verbal affix but to the number qualifying the agent or the
object, because the knowledge of agent or object is secured by
Samsarga for him.

The Māṁsaka contends that the word 'Abhihitā' does not
mean 'Expressed' but it means 'Made known' (Bodhita or Ākṣi-
pta). Hence he argues that the Tip suffix denotes Bhāvanā and the
agent or object is secured by presumption with the help of
Bhāvanā.

Thus these three schools interpret the Sutras, "Anabhihitā", in
their own way to suit their own theories. The merits and
demerits of these interpretations are discussed in relevant places
in this book.

TRANSITIVENESS—INTRANSITIVENESS :

Generally speaking, a root is said to be transitive if the
activity and the result parts of the meaning denoted by the root
have different substrata. For instance, in the case of the root
'pac' the activity in the form of blowing wind etc., exist in the
agent 'Caitra', and the result 'softening (Vikriti) exists in a
different substratum 'vice'. Hence the root 'pac' is designated
transitive. Likewise a root is said to be intransitive if the activity
and the result denoted by the root exist in the same substratum.
For example the root 'Jīv' denotes the result of the form holding
life (Prāṇadhāraṇā) and activity conducive to it. Both these
result and activity subject in the same person. Hence the root
is designated 'intransitive'. Similarly the root 'Swāp' (to sleep)
is also intransitive, where the activity is of the form of sleeping
(i.e. lying on the bed etc.) and the result is of the form 'rest' to
body. These two viz’ activity and result exist in the same person who sleeps. Hence this root also is designated intransitive.¹

Thus now on generalisation Transitiveness of a root may be defined as the nature of a root whose fruit (result part of the meaning of the root) subsists in a focus different from that of the activity denoted by the same root.² Bhāṭojjīdikṣita favours this definition of transitive and intransitive roots.³

Kumarilabhaṭṭa defines transitive root in a different way— which is severely criticised by the latter scholars. According to Kāmarila there is no difference whatsoever in the action (Bhāvanā) expressed by both transitive and intransitive roots. But in a case where the root meaning is always directly concerned with a certain objective, the root is transitive; whereas in a case where the connection with an objective is only indirect, through the medium of the Bhāvanā, the root is intransitive.⁴ For instance, in the case of the root ‘to sit’, to lie down, the objective is not always directly cognised and as such they are spoken of as intransitive; whereas the roots ‘to cook’ etc., are always accompanied by an objective, which is directly connected with it, through the actions of softening etc., and as such these are spoken of as transitive.

The view of Helārāja seems to be almost the same. He says that some actions have connection with the agent alone; they have no expectancy for an external result of the action. Such are

1. For a list of generally intransitive roots and how transitive roots become intransitive. Vide Chapter II - Section.1.
2. Svārtha vyāpāra vyadhikarana phala vācātvam sakaramakatvam. Tatsmāṇadhikarana phalavācakatvam ca akarmakatvam.
3. Phalavyāparyorekanisthāyāmakarmakāh, Dhūtustayordharmibhede sakarmaka udāhṛtaḥ.
4. Śākṣādavyabhicārenā dhatvartho yatra karmabhāk, Sakarmakah sa dhatuḥ syāt pāramparyetvakarmakah.
   (Ṭām. Vār. Sutra 2.1.1).

Āsana sayanādau hi na niyamenā nantaryena Vedām
taditi va karma nirūpyate. Tenākarmaka abhidhīyante. (ibid).
the actions expressed by स्त्र, अस etc. roots. Here the result (Bhāvya) of action is not different from Bhāvanā, and hence अस्ते is equal to असनाम कारोति and there is no expectancy expressed by the question "what" (किं) connected with an external result of action. When there is such an expectancy, the verb becomes transitive owing to its having an object consisting of an external result of action.

However, Boddhoji and Kaumālabhadhave do not agree with the above view of the Miṃśaka. They argue that if 'Nirūpyate' in the definition means 'is used' (Prayujyate) then the definition is open to the fault of mutual interdependence (Anyonyārasya); for, it comes to this that when the object is used the verb is transitive, and a transitive verb is that which has an object used. If 'Nirūpyate' means 'expectancy (अकांक्षयते) and a verb is called transitive or otherwise when there is on invariable expectancy of an object or otherwise as the case may be, then the definition suffers from the fault of Aavyāpti. Because on hearing the verb words like 'gacchati', the immediate natural expectancy is who (goes) or to where but not 'what for'. So much so if we accept Kumārila's definition these roots like गच्छ etc. are to be treated as intransitive.¹

Nāgeśa also supports Kaumālabhadhave in refuting Kumārila's theory.

Khandadeva accepts neither the definition of Kumārila nor the general definition.² He argues that if it is meant a root is transitive when it denotes an action existing in a locus different from that of the result, then it does not apply in the case of roots like 'pāc' etc., which are treated as intransitive by not desiring to express the object.³ Nor can we say that a transitive root denotes

2. Phalavyadhihikarāṇa vyāaaravāca kavatvām hi dhātossakarmaka-tvām, Kriyāpealayoreka vṛitti vādakarmakavatvām.
   (Mr. Kau. on 2.1.1.5).


such action, the result of which exists in a different substratum. If it be so there is the fault of prolixity. Hence he offers another definition. He defines “transitiveness is the nature of the root having expectancy with an object qualified by the absence of not being desired to be expressed by the speaker”. For instance the root kr, if treated as a transitive root; has always the expectancy of an object. This property of being capable of expecting an object is peculiar to the word. So much so the root yat, in spite of its meaning being the same as that of kr, does not possess this property of expecting an object.

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa accepts this definition of Khaṇḍa Deva. Thus he feels the revised definition does not over-apply in instances like “Neha pacyate, bhujyate” etc. Bhāve sentence. Because Bhāve lakāra is possible only in the case of intransitive roots. But the root Pac, Bhuj etc. cannot be considered as root having the result (subsisting in a different substratum). Nor can we say these roots Pac etc. in the above sentences are different from the roots Pac etc. in sentences “Tāṇḍulam pacatī” etc. If we treat them as two different roots then the popular experience “This is the same root” is not possible. And Kaiyaṭa expresses the same view. Therefore to justify the above Bhāve sentences we have to admit the adjective “Avivakṣāviraha” in the definition. Not though the root ‘Pac’ is naturally has the expectancy of the object, since it is not intended to be specified, we treat it as intransitive and justify the Bhāve sentences as “Odanasya pacyate” etc. Similarly the roots Ās etc., though by nature they are intransitive, when there is a close connection with time etc.

1. Kiṃ vā phala vyadhikarāntvena vyāpāra vācakāta abhipretya
   Na Dvitiyopi. Phalavyadhikarāntvasya vastusvabhāvatā
   labhyatvena vācyatāṁ nākāre gauravaśc. (ibid).

2. Avivakṣā viraha visista karmāṅkāṇaṁ dhatutvam akarmakat
   vam. (ibid).

3. Pradīpa on Bhaṣya on P.1.4.52, last few lines. (M.B.)
as in sentences "Māsamāsyate Caitreṇa" etc.,¹ are treated as transitive.

Nāgasa Bhatta does not accept any of the above definitions. He refutes the theory of Kumārila on the same lines argued by Kaundabhatta. We cannot define a root to be transitive, on the utterance of which, there always arises the expectancy of an object. Because on hearing the word 'Gaccha' the expectancy is to where or by what means. So this definition cannot be accepted. Nor we can accept what is not transitive is transitive, because intransitiveness is not defined. Further even transitive roots become intransitive under some special circumstances i.e. when used in a different meaning etc..

Even the modified definition of transitiveness i.e. by adding the word 'Avivakṣāviraha' etc. is not perfect. In sentences like Mātun Smaraye (i.e. Bhāve prayoga) we cannot say that the root does not have the result part of its meaning; because such postulation contradicts the Bhāṣya on the Sutra² P.2.3.52. Khandadeva and Kaundabhatta suggested 'not to treat the roots as having the result' so much so the roots become intransitive and the Bhāvī usage like 'Neha pacvaye, Mātun Smaraye' etc. are justified. Now Nāgasa says that if the root is treated as not having result, then the question of its substratum does not arise. Consequently the word 'Māta' cannot be an object. Unless it is an object³ enjoining of sixth case affix by volition(Karmanah śeṣatvena vivakṣā) is not possible. But the Bhāṣyakāra says that the usages 'Mātun Smaraye' etc. are justified on treating the word 'Mātr' as the substratum of the result denoted by the root. So the addition of the word 'Avivakṣāviraha' to the original definition

1. Ata eva odanaṁya pacyata iti bhāvepi prayogah, Āsādi dhātunāṁ ca svārāpēkākarmakākāmāpi māsādi kālayoge karma sākṣāsaṅkatvāt sakarmakatvāt Caitreṇasyate māsa iti prayogyapapattih. (Bhā. Rah.).

2. P.2.3.62 AdhīgarthadāyESAṁ karmēni.

does not solve the problem, further it results in wrong conclusions which go against the Bhāṣya.

Further the word "Avivakṣataḥ" the Karika Dhatorarthāntare...etc., become superfluous. If the contention of Bhartṛhari is in favour of Kaumārabhaṭṭa's definition, he would have not included the word 'Avivakṣataḥ' in his Karika. So the said definition of Kaumārabhaṭṭa goes against the declarations of Hari, Hence the definition is not acceptable. Nāgeśa further opines that even the phrase "Avivakṣa viraha visiṣṭha" is added to the original definition, still the fault of over applicability continues, because we recognise that it is the same transitive root which has been used, though in certain places it is used to denote result qualified by the absence of "not being desired to express".2

Now having refuted the other definitions, he gives a definition by modifying the original definition of Transitiveness etc.. He says that "the non-denotation of the fruit as subsisting in a substratum different from that of the action is intransitiveness.3 This non-denotation is due to two reasons. One is due to the result subsisting in the same substratum as that of action as in the case of roots like Svapīti, Jivati Tisṭhati etc.. The second reason is due to the absence of the result as in the case of roots like Asti etc.. Nāgeśa is of opinion that this definition of his covers all the roots which denote mere action or mere result. However, Nāgeśa is not satisfied with this definition also because he feels that this cannot satisfactorily explain the transitiveness etc., in sentence like "Svargamadhisete etc., Adhyāsīṭa Bhūmayaḥ" etc.. Hence he gives a final definition as "being possessed of a meaning which agrees with the meaning of one (object) as

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1. Dhatorarthāntare...Prasiddheravivakṣataḥ Karmano 'akarmikā kriyā. (V.P. 3.7-87).
3. Yadva vyāpāra vyadhikarana phala vācakatvābhāvo akarmakatvam.
declared by the grammatical rules." This definition covers all the intransitive roots to which transitivity was assigned, or vice versa.

But normally a root is said to be transitive when the fruit and action denoted by the root exist in different loci and the root is intransitive when its meanings exist in the same house.

Proximity to meaning is not acceptable. The root may refer to the meaning of the transitivity of the action. Hence the absence of "not being able to express".

Now having defined the concept of transitivity, etc.

The second case is the non-connotation of the fruit as exceeding the action. This non-connotation is the case of fruits like "As well as". The second case is the case of fruits like "As well as". However, none is not acceptable, whereas the second case is. Hence he gives a final definition as "being possessed of a meaning that one (object) as..."
Chapter IV

Section-i

MEANING OF THE ROOT

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MEANING OF THE ROOT

INTRODUCTION :-

In the chapter "The Root and its Definition" the nature of the root has been discussed at length based on the Mahabhasya. There it has been asserted that a root is one which denotes action and result. Patanjali explained this while commenting on the Sutra "Bhavadayo Dhatavah". Now in this chapter we will examine the views of various scholars belonging to the schools of Mimamsa, Tarka and Vyakaran. The credit of discussing and deciding the meanings of various words, suffixes and their relation goes to the Mimamsaka. It is the duty of the Mimamsaka to explain the Vedic scriptures. Hence in their effort to explain these scriptures, the Mimamsakas have to discuss the semantic aspect of words and their meanings. Later on taking these theories into consideration the grammarians, the logicians and various other scholars basing on their own logic and reasoning, developed, modified and presented these semantic themes according to their own philosophies. However, the credit goes to the Mimamsaka who first initiated the semantic study of a language.

Today, for us, the available old Mimamsaka's theory regarding this semantic study, is that of Mandana Misra and his followers. So hereunder let us examine the theory regarding meaning of the root and the suffix and also examine its merits and demerits.

THE VIEW OF MANDANA MISRA :-

According to Mandana Misra, a root signifies the result or fruit (Phala) alone, and activity which produces this result is denoted by the verbal affix. Thus each root signifies its own result peculiar to itself. For example the meaning of the root 'Pac' (to cook) is but softening (vikritti), of the root 'Gam' (to go) is but "contact with latter place (uttaradesa samyoga)"; of the root Tyaj (to leave) is but "separation from the former place" and
so on and so forth. The result is attributive to the activity part in the active construction of the sentence. The time element, meaning of the affix, agrees with the activity (vyāpāra) part, being expressed by the same word. Hence when the activity of cooking is completed we say "Caitra is not cooking" (Caitrah na pacati) and when the activity is not completed we say Caitra is cooking (Caitrah pacati). It is the fault of prolixity that prevents Mandāna from accepting both result and action as the denoted potenti- lities of the root itself.

According to this theory, Transitiveness of a root is defined as the denotation of result subsisting in a substratum different from that of activity1 signified by the suffix. Similarly "Intransi- tiveness" is defined as the denotation of the result subsisting in the same substratum as that of activity signified by the suffix. Agentness is defined as the character of being the substratum of activity. Similarly we can define Karmatva etc. without any difficulty. One thing is to be noted here. According to Mandāna, it is not the Tīh suffix alone that expresses activity, but other suffixes like the causal Nīc, Lyuṭ, ghaṇ etc. also express activity. Hence it is that in the sentences in causal construction "Deva- dattena Pācayati Caitraḥ" and the like, it is possible to admit both Devadatta and Caitra as the agents, they being the substru- tums of activity denoted by the causal suffix (Nīc) and the Tīh suffix respectively. Similarly wrong constructions such as "Grāmo gamanavān" etc. can be avoided.2 Here the word 'Gamana' signifies the result 'contact' denoted by the root (gam) and also the activity denoted by the Bhave Lyuṭ suffix. Thus though the village possesses the result, 'contact', as it does not possess activity such improper usages as grāmo gamanavān are not ren- dered possible.

1. Vyāpāraśraya vyadhikaraṇa phala vācakatvam sakaramaktvam.
2. Here the idea is this. Since the meaning of the root 'Gam' is Samyoga, we can make sentences Grāmo gamanavān on par with sentences like Grāmaḥ samyogavān. Hence there is a possibility of constructing wrong sentences.
But Gāgābhaṭṭa is not satisfied with this reason to avoid wrong constructions as 'grāmo gamanavan'. He opines that there exists a certain activity in the village also being connected by the relation of coming nearer. Therefore he suggests the root has denotation in "the result" described by activity expressed by the affix, in which case the much-feared wrong constructions can be avoided. Further roots like Ās, Bhā, Vid etc. are popularly used in the sense of result and no activity is clearly indicated in these words. The meaning of the root Kṛ is production (utpatti) and the activity in the form of effort, congenial to such production is denoted by the suffix. Therefore the roots Kṛ and Yat are not synonyms and the root 'Yat' also cannot be transitive.

Further if we do not accept that the suffix Ghaṇ etc. denote activity also, there result wrong usages as 'Pāko vidyate, Pac-yartho vartate' etc. on par with regular usages 'Viklītiḥ vartate'. But if we accept activity to be denoted by the root besides Bhāva etc., since activity is not present in Pāka such wrong usages can be avoided.

Māndana argues the very explanatory sentence 'Pākaṁ karotī' of the word 'Pacati' shows that the meaning of the root 'Pac' is result (Pāka) and the activity denoted by the suffix is represented by the word "Karotī". Hence it is evident that the root denotes result alone.

According to him, Kṛt suffixes too denote activity besides agent or object. One may question how Māndana could accept that both the agent and the activity are signified by the kṛt suffix. In that case it is good enough to accept both result and activity to be denoted by the root itself. But Māndana replies that the number of various kṛt suffixes is round about a hundred only

1. Tathātve api nirūpakatvādi sambandha visesaḥa vartamanasyaiva phalasya vacaktvāngikarāt. Anyathā abhimukhya- sambandhena samyogānuṅkaṁ kriyayāṁ grāme' api satvat vyāpāravacītve api Tulyo dosaḥ (Bhā. Cin. p.77)
whereas the number of primary roots alone is nearly two thousand. And added to it, if we take the derived roots also into account, then it will be innumerable. Hence it is definitely parsimonious to accept both agent or object and activity to be signified by the fewer kṣet suffixes than accepting result and activity to be denoted by the innumerable roots.

Further Mandana claims that his theory has the sanction of the age old Mīmāṃsā maxim "of the meanings denoted by the root and the suffix in a word, the meaning of the root is attributive to that of the suffix. And the meaning of the suffix is primary." In the case of a Verb word, between result and activity, it is activity that is prominent. Therefore according to the above maxim, it is logical to accept the prominent meaning to be the expressed sense of the suffix. Hence activity is to be signified by the suffix alone and in no case by the root. For example on hearing words like Pacaka, Aupogava etc., we have an import where the suffix-meaning is primary, and that of the root is attributive. Similarly in words like 'Pacati', 'gacchati' etc., also the activity which is primary is signified by the suffix. Hence the remaining part viz. 'result' is to be signified by the Root.

Thus according to Mandana result alone is the meaning of the root and activity is the meaning of the Tīh suffix enjoined after the root.

A Critical Examination and Refutation Of Mandana's Theory:

At the outset Mandana's Theory appears to be very logical but on a close and critical analysis many defects have been pointed out by various scholars in the above theory. That is why even Khamadeva and Parthasrathi Misra, who belong to the same Mīmāṃsā school as Mandana, discard this theory of Mandana and propound a new one. Of course, in refuting Mandana's theory neither Logicians (old or modern) nor Grammarians have spared any effort. Before examining the new theories propounded by

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1. Prakṛtyā pratyayārthāh brūtāh taye tu pratyayārthāh prādhnām.
several other scholars, let us consider the various defects pointed out in \textit{Māṇḍāna}'s Theory and the way in which his followers tried to defend the theory: but failed.

The main objections as pointed out by various critics and replies in defence can be summarised as under:

The opponent, grammarian argues that the theory of \textit{Māṇḍāna} is contrary to the \textit{sūtra} 3.4.69 which clearly states that the affix denotes the agent or object but not action. This is clear from the words \textit{Kartari}, \textit{Karmani} etc., Hence the theory is defective.

But this objection is replied to by \textit{Māṇḍāna} that the words \textit{Kartari, Karmani, etc.} do not speak of the agent or object. But the locative case affix denotes \textit{Viśaya} (i.e. the locative case affix is \textit{Viśya saptami}). Therefore the words denote primarily the property in the form of agentness (\textit{Kartṛtva}) objectness (\textit{Karmatva}) etc. Just in the same way as the words \textit{Dvi} and \textit{Eka} in the Sutra\textsuperscript{2} P. 1.4.22 denote twoness or oneness (\textit{Dvitva}, \textit{Ekatva}) but not the two and one. Thus the \textit{sutra} \textit{Laḥ karmani ca} \ldots{} \textit{etc.} does not contradict \textit{Māṇḍāna}'s theory.

Another defect in the theory of \textit{Māṇḍāna} is, we have to accept the signification of activity in the various suffixes as in the words \textit{Pacati, Pakṣyati', Pakvāṇ} etc. and it is a matter of prolixity. So it is parsimonious to accept the denotation of such activity only in the verbal root say 'pac' which is common in all the words. But this objection is not sound, because the same fault of prolixity exists in the opponent's theory too. \textit{Māṇḍāna} argues that in words like \textit{pacati}, \textit{gacchati}, \textit{jayate} as the roots are different the same prolixity exists here also. Further the number of suffixes is far less than the number of roots. So it is parsimonious to accept activity to be denoted by the suffixes; failing which either the prolixity or parsimony is same to both the opponent and propounder.

1. \textit{Laḥ Karmani ca Bhāve Cākarmakebhyaḥ} (P.3.4.69).
2. \textit{Dvyekayordvivacanaikavacane} (P.1.4.22).
Another defect in Maṇḍana’s theory is that, if the suffix denotes action, then the same action is to be denoted by the same suffix in all the verbs. Thus the verbs Pacati and Gacchati should express the same activity, but this is contrary to experience. Hence it is essential to accept activity as the denoted potentiality of the root only but not that of the suffix. Then in words like Pacati’ Gacchati etc., the difference in action is explained as due to the difference in the root. And the suffix denotes the substratum, uniformly in all the verbs. But this objection can be set aside very easily. The affix denotes action, but the action varies according to the result denoted by the root. That is to say in a conjoint utterance of the root and the affix, the affix denotes action congenial to produce the particular result as denoted by the root concerned. So there is no scope to the suffix to express the same action in the words Pacati and Gacchati.

Another defect that is much urged by the grammarians in the theory of Maṇḍana, is that the generally accepted system of Transitive and Intransitive arrangement is disturbed. The grammarian and the later Mīmāṃsakas and Logicians accept that root denotes both action and result. So their definition of transitivity and intransitivity of a root, contains the phrase “the activity which is the meaning of the root” similarly the result which is the meaning of the root. But Maṇḍana’s definition does not contain these phrases. Hence the grammarian argues unless we accept that result and action are the denoted potentialities of the root itself we cannot properly explain the nature of transitive and intransitive roots. Hence Maṇḍana’s Theory fails here.

But this objection also cannot be taken seriously. Here Maṇḍana’s followers argue that the principle involved in the system of Transitive and Intransitive nature of roots is the existence of result and action in separate substrataums or in the same

substratum. So it does not adversely affect his theory though the result and the action are expressed by the root and the affix separately. The word "Śvārtha" is added by those who admit both result and action as signified by the root itself. Hence the word "Śvārtha" can safely be dropped and as such there is nothing wrong with Māṇḍāna's theory.

Further, Māṇḍāna explains the transitivity of the roots jñā, 'ich' etc. as in sentences Ghaṭāṃ Jānāti, Icchati, like this. Here one may mistake that the activity in the form of knowing and the result in the form of objecthood appear to be subsisting in the same individual, hence the roots jñā etc. are to be treated as intransitive. To this Māṇḍāna replies that activity, which is the meaning of the affix, in the form of knownig exists in the individual by the relation of 'Samavāya'; whereas the result Viṣayata, which is the meaning of the root subsists in the Pot, by the relation of being its theme. Similarly in causal sentences like 'Ghaṭāṃ Bhāvayati' too the pot gets Karmasamjñāna, because it is the substratum of the result which (substratum) is different from that of the activity denoted by the suffix Nyā.

Now the opponent argues that in spite of this explanation, the system of Abhidhāna-Abhidhāna is adversely affected. If we are to follow Māṇḍāna's theory, then wrong sentences like Caitreṇa pacati (instead of Caitraḥ pacati) and Tandulam pacyte (instead of Tandulah pacyte) are rendered possible; since the agent and object are not expressed by the Tiḥ suffix in the above instances. Thus Māṇḍāna's theory lands us in constructing wrong sentences as illustrated.

But the followers of Māṇḍāna set aside this objection. They argue that since action and result cannot exist independent of a substratum they must rest in some substratum which is otherwise called the agent or the object. Thus the agent and the object can be obtained indirectly i.e. by presumption (Ākṣeṇa). Hence the sutra "Anabhihite" can be interpreted as "Ānākṣepe" so that

1. For details see Chapter III.
it becomes clear that if the agent or object is not obtained through presumption, then the word denoting agent or object takes the instrumental or accusative case affixes as the case may be. Hence Mandana argues that his theory does not suffer from any defect.

Now the grammarian takes advantage of such an argument of the Mimamsaka and points out the impropriety in his argument. He says, as in the Akṛtyadhikarana, here also the individual (agent or object) obtained through presumption gets predominance over Bhāvanā, the expressed sense of the verbal affix which is much against his stand.

Another irregularity in Mandana's theory is that if activity is expressed not only by the Tit suffix but also by other suffixes such as ghanī, kṛt etc. besides other meanings. Then in the case of kṛt suffixes the agent can be obtained through presumption from the activity denoted by the kṛt suffix. So much so in the Sutra 'Kartari kṛt' the word Kartari becomes redundant. And again sentences like 'Caitrasya pākan' become irregular. In the above

1. Vide Mimamsa Sūtra 1.3-9:33 and Śabara-bhāsya.
2. L.M. (nbp) - Titarthanīmaya - P:38
3. Apadām na prayuñjita; Na kevala pratyaḥ prakṛtaya api.

Note: According to Akṛtyadhikarana; words like cow, pot etc. denote genus i.e. cowness, potness etc. (jāti), but not the individual entity cow, pot etc. However the individual is obtained through presumption (i.e. by Akṣepa), because genus cannot have an independent existence. In certain places this individual gains predominance over the expressed sense 'genus'. Hence Nāgāraja argues that in the present case also on the same lines, the agent obtained through presumption should be considered predominant with respect to the expressed meaning Bhāvanā; unfortunately the Mimamsaka has no reason to put forth why the grammarian should not draw such a parallel conclusion on par with Akṛtyādhikarana. Nor can he accept the grammarian's view point; because to him (the Mimamsaka) Bhāvanā is more predominant over any meaning expressed by a verb word.
sentence according to Mandana the agent is known from the suffix 'Aka' itself by presumption, because to Mandana the Bhāve ghaṇī denotes action also and hence Cātra cannot take the sixth case affix, but should take the nominative case. Hence the gramanian argues that agent or object should not be presumed. So much so, the suffix does not denote action but agent or object etc., Further if Ghāṇī, Luyīt, etc., denote action also, then the sitra 'Bhāve' (P.3.3.18) is not necessary. And also it is an admitted fact in all disciplines that (Bhāve) ghaṇī does not possess any meaning except reiteration of the meaning of the root after which it is enjoined or that it secures grammatical validity and make it a word.

Another defect in Mandana's theory' is that causal sentences like Guruḥ, sisyābhyaṁ, Pācayati etc. cannot be formed. In such sentences as above, it is evident that there are two types of activities denoted by the sentence, one is that of the inducer, signified by the causal affix (Nic) and another is that which subsists in the induced (Śisyā). Now it is accepted by one and all that Nic denotes the activity subsisting in the inducer (here the teacher). So the remaining activity subsisting in the two students is, according to Mandana should be denoted by the Tiṅ affix. If it be so here arise three types of inconsistencies.

(a) Since the Tiṅ suffix is in singular number does it presume two agents or one agent? And since the induced agents (two pupils) are obtained through Ākṣepa, then according to Abhidhāna. Anabhidhāna system (Ākṣepa-Anākṣepa system) the word Śisyā cannot take the instrumental case affix but should take the nominative affix only.

(b) Secondly, the number meaning of the Tiṅ suffix i.e. singularity has to agree with the number of the substratums in which the activity denoted by the Tiṅ affix subsists.

(c) Thirdly, since the inducing agent (teacher) is not obtained by Ākṣepa from the activity denoted by the Tiṅ suffix, the word denoting the inducer (Teacher) has to take the instrumental case affix but not the Nominative. Of course it may be argued that the inducer is obtained by Ākṣepa from the activity denoted by the
causal affix, yet the first two defects cannot be avoided. Thus if we are to accept Mandana’s Theory, construction of a sentence like “Guruh sisyab pascayati” etc., cannot be rendered possible. The grammarian argues that in his theory these sentences are rendered possible. According to him the root denotes the result as well as activity congenial to it. The suffix denotes the agent only. So in the above sentence the agent is the Teacher, because he is independent. He is expressed by the Tin suffix. So the number agrees with the word and the word “Guru” takes the nominative. So much so since the other agents (pupils) are not expressed by the Tin suffix, the word ‘sisya’ takes the instrumental case affix.

Khandadeva in the Bhāṭṭarahasya argues that, if we are to accept Mandana’s theory, then usages like “Gamyarthaa janya samyogār rayo grāmaḥ” are rendered impossible. Because according to Mandana the meaning of the root gam (gamyarthaa) is samyoga (contact). And there can be no samyoga janya samyoga. So Khandadeva insists to accept that the root denotes action also, congenial to the result in which case the sentences of the above nature are rendered possible.

Another defect in Mandana’s theory is that wrong constructions like “Gamanār rayo grāmaḥ” are rendered possible because the Lyup suffix reiterates the meaning of the root only. And the meaning of the root is Samyogār. Just as we say Samyogār rayo grāmaḥ, we can say gamanār rayo grāmaḥ. Though such sentences can be avoided in the manner already explained, still we will not be in a position to prevent the construction of sentences of the form “Gamyarthavān grāmaḥ”. And the grammarian says that, if we accept activity also to be the meaning of the root, then, as the village is not the substratum of action in the form of walking, there will be no possibility to make such incorrect statements ‘Gamanār rayo grāmaḥ’ in his view.

Further if we accept Mandana’s theory, there would be no need to accept or create Aparva as the final means in achieving

1. Svatantrah kartā (P.1.4.54).
Heaven (Svarga). The various activities like Yāga etc., are momentary; hence the Māmāñśaka feels that, from such momentary activity, it is difficult to explain the achievement of heaven which is in another world; and that too, after the death of the performer. They want a thing which can last till the performer gets the result "Svarga". Hence they created Apārva which gets destroyed only after delivering the result of the sacrifice to the performer. Of course this Apārva comes into play immediately after the completion of the sacrifice.

This being the position, here Kauñśadeva argues that if a long lasting means, which can deliver the desired object to the performer of the sacrifice, is required, it is unnecessary to create and accept Apārva. The very meaning of the root "Yaj" is long lasting. This meaning i.e. the result denoted by "Yaj" itself can be a means. The result denoted by the root "Yaj" is destruction of one's own ownership (Sva-satadhvanśa) and dhanatāpateḥ; because once a thing is destroyed, that destruction is eternal, as that thing can never be obtained; of course a new thing may be obtained but not the one destroyed. Thus the destruction is eternal. So this can be taken as a means instead of a separate entity Apārva. But the very fact of creation of Apārva speaks implicitly that mere result cannot be the meaning of the root, but activity also is considered as the meaning of the root.1

Jagadīśa in his Sādāśaktipraķāśa while refuting Māndana's Theory, says that if we are to accept it (Māndana's theory) then just like sentences 'saṁyogo guṇah' so also we will be obliged to accept sentences like "gatirguṇah" because here the root Ācārya signifies mere result in the form of contact (saṁyoga) and it is a gua and this 'Bhāve-ktin' suffix in 'Gati' simply restates (by Anuvāda) the root meaning. Thus 'Gati' and Saṁyoga become synonymous.2

1. Satadhvanśaksākyasya phalasya yajipadārthatve tasyaiva phalabhābhavanakaranātvena svargaśādhanatāpateḥ. Sthayīna.tasmādeva svargotpatte apārvakalpaḥ anāpattesa. (Bhā. Rah.)

2. Phalasya dhatvarthatve saṁyogo guṇa iti vat. gatirguṇo anē. kāśārita ityādi prayogatattesa. (Sab. Sak. Pra)
The grammarians also put forth some more arguments justifying activity to be the denoted potentiality of the root and refuting the theory of Madhava Misra. Let us examine words like 'Pakvavan' etc. This word is explained as 'Pakam krtavan'. From this explanation we understand that the meaning of the base is the object Karaka (Karmakaraka) and that of the suffix is agent (karit karaka.) Thus the meanings of both the base and the suffix being karakas cannot agree with each other. If there is no agreement how can there be a question which of the two meanings is primary i.e. agreement is possible between the two karakas only through some activity. The cause and effect relation, which (relation) determines the importance of the suffix cannot be established. Hence activity also must be accepted as the meaning of the root.¹

Further, the system enjoining 'krt' suffixes also, establishes that activity also is the meaning of the root, as already shown, in words like 'Pakvavan' 'Pacanyam' etc. The krt suffixes are enjoined in the sense of karmakaraka etc., Hence, unless the base denotes activity the meaning of the krt suffix cannot agree with that of the root. Of course Madhava asks us to accept both activity and karta or karma etc. as the meanings of krt suffix itself, but if we are to accept two meanings in the case of krt then the grammarian argues that it is better to accept two meanings to the root itself, which is common in all the above words instead of accepting the activity to be denoted by different suffixes like Tin, Krt etc..

Further, the samasa system enjoined by the sutra 'karti karane krti bahula' (P 2.1.32) is also another proof in asserting that activity should be accepted as the denoted potentiality of the root itself because in cases like Nakhi bhinnah, Nakhabhinnah, Hartrastah etc. If activity is not accepted as the signified potentiality.

¹. Evam ca pakvavan ityatra pakha karmakaraka krtavat arthah kartikarakan. Tatosca Vaksyamanitya anmayasambhavat pra-krti pratyayartho anvaya niyamasyaiva abhaye kva pradhanyak bodhaka ukto niyama (Vai. Bhû.)
ility of the root, then they cannot get kāraka samjña, in the absence of which (designation) there can be no instrumental case etc.; whence the compounds of the type cited above cannot be formed by the said sūtra (P.2.1.32). Hence activity also is the meaning of the root.

And now coming to the age old Mīmāṁsaka maxim ‘Prakṛti-pratyayo Pratyayārthah Pradhānām’ etc., the grammarian proves that it is not universal from any point of view, but can be applied in only a restricted sense, in a restricted field only as explained elsewhere. Also the Bhāṣya ‘Dvyarthah paciḥ’ under Sūtra Bhāvādayo Dhatavah clearly states that both activity and result are denoted by the root itself. Otherwise the sūtra Bhāvādayo Dhatavaḥ would become incompetent to define ‘root’. Hence activity and result should be accepted as the meanings of the root.

At this stage the logician belonging to old school comes forward and argues that we may accept activity and activity alone as the meaning of the root, but not the result as enunciated by Māṇḍana Miśra. However, the later Mīmāṁsakas and logicians and grammarians refute this theory and establish that both result and activity congeneric to the result are the denoted potentialities of the root. The following pages explain in detail the theory of the old logician-school and refutation of the same:

1. Second part of the book; Chapter-1
MEANING OF THE ROOT - THE LOGICIAN :-

Among the Logicians also, there exist two different opinions as regards the meaning of the root. The old logicians like Ratnakśakti hold that the root denotes 'action' alone and the result is expressed by the accusative case affix.1 The modern logicians are of the opinion that the root expresses both action and result or action qualified by result.2

THE VIEW OF THE OLD LOGICIAN :-

According to the old logician, the result is expressed by the accusative case affix. To him the word "Karman" in the Sutra "Karmāṇi Dvitiyā" expresses the property of 'being the object' (i.e. karmatva). Karmatva means being the substratum of the result. Since the root expresses action, the result is denoted by the accusative affix. According to the old logicians, the relation of the producer to the produced between the action and the result which are syntactically related is obtained by expectancy.3 Though the import with reference to the result in general is derived from the case ending, the import with reference to it in particular is derived from the recalling of the activity expressed by the particular root. Hence one does not get the same import from the sentences Grāmam tyajati and grāmam gacchati. Here both the roots Gam (to go) and Tyaj (to leave) express the same meaning activity (spanda), but with regard to the former the movement has reference to production of contact subsisting in the town, etc., and with regard to the latter it has reference to production of separation subsisting in the town etc. Similarly though the roots Gam and Spand denote the same activity, there will not be wrong construction of sentences like "grāmam spandate", because here the town is not the substratum of the result denoted by the root 'Spand'.

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In the case of the passive constructions of sentences like "Tāṃḻuḷaḥ pacyate" etc., the result is expressed by the Tiṅ Suffix, and in sentences like "Pakvaḥ Tāṃḻuḷaḥ" the result is denoted by the Niśṭhā suffix. As regards the transitiveness or otherwise of a verbal root, a root is said to be transitive if the activity (expressed by the root) and the fruit (denoted by the accusative suffix) subsist in different substrata. Since the roots Gaṁ. Tyaj denote activity (spanda) and the root "spand" also denotes the same, it should not be mistaken that they are synonyms and that the root "Spand" also is transitive like the other. In the case of the root "Spand" there is no expectancy of the result to agree with activity, as there is no such import. It should not be argued that words having the same meaning possess the same type of expectancy. If it be so from the sentence "ghaṭam ānaya" and from the words "ghaṭaḥ karma-tvāṁ ānayanaṁ kṛtiḥ" one must have the same understanding, but our experience is not such. If the expectancy depends on the identity of meaning, than on the peculiarity of understanding then there would have been usages like "ghaṭam yatate" on the analogy of the sentence "ghaṭeṁ Karoti", because the roots Kṛ and Yat denote the same meaning "kṛti".

Now, as regards the words "Gamanam. Tyāgaḥ" etc., the opponent points out the contingency of their being synonyms, since both the words denote "activity". And there is no co-utterance with a word in accusative suffix and as such there is no possibility in differentiating between their meanings. To this objection the old logician rejoinds that in such exceptional cases, a secondary signification to the root as qualified by the specific result is accepted. Such a secondary signification is based on the very import caused on hearing such words for a long time or we accept Niṁś.

1. "Phalānvita vyāparabdhaḥ dhaṭtutvasyaiVa Tanniyaṁakā. tvāt. (Vyū. Va.)"
THE VIEW OF THE MODERN LOGICIAN:

The modern school of Logicians does not accept the above theory of the old logician. The modern logician argues that both the result and activity congenial to produce that result, are the meanings of the root. Thus the result or objectness is defined as 'being possessed of a result which determines the meaning of the root.' The accusative case suffix denotes vyāpatumness of the result), which agrees with the result part, the expressed meaning of the root. By accepting this theory, there is no ambiguity between the roots like Gaṁ Tyaj, Spand etc., because the root Tyaj denotes an activity congenial to separation from the former place. Similarly the root Gaṁ denotes an activity congenial to the contact with the latter place. The root Spand does not denote such an activity as congenial either to the contact with the latter place or separation from the former place, hence there cannot be any identity between the three roots. According to this school the object of a particular verbal root is that which is the substratum of the result which is the determinant of the nature of the meaning of the root, and not simply the substratum of the result, the meaning of the root on hand. So much so we can avoid usages of sentences like Rama goes to the former place (place already left behind by him while starting i.e. Ramaṁ pārva-deśāṁ gacchati).

Now, as regards the agreement of the result, a part of the

1. Karmapratyayaamabhivyahita tyagaga ganasaśi padasya; tattv atraphalavacchinna vyāpāre anādi tatparyam kalpyate. Na tu kevala vyāpāre (Vyu. Va.)

Nirūtta laksanaśi svārasikāprayogat (ibid).

2. Taddhātvartvatvāvacchedaka phalasālivam karmatvam, Na tu kevala prakṛta dhatvartha phalasālivam (ibid).

root-meaning, with the nature of the subsistent i.e. Ādheyaṭva (which is the meaning of the case ending), it is accounted for by a peculiarity of understanding (Vyutpattivaicitrya). 1 Gadadhara is of opinion that this theory of the modern school viz., the meaning of a root is activity qualified by the particular result, is fairly acceptable in case of sentences in the active construction. But so far as the sentences in the passive voice are concerned e.g. "Tandulaḥ pacyate", the result is the meaning of the verbal affix (passive), in which case, in the verbal import of the sentence cited above, the result part of the meaning of the root appears twice (i.e. Rice is the substratum of softening produced by the activity favourable to softening). 2 If this is against to experience then, Gadadhara says, we cannot but accept two potentialities for the root, one in the result and the other in the activity. In this case the meaning of the verbal affix is only substratumness (Āśrayatva). Of course Raghunātha Śīromaṇī does not accept a qualified potentiality (pha-lāvācchinnā vyāpira) to the root for fear of the fault of agreement with a part of the meaning of a word, which constitutes incorrect understanding. 3 Of course this has already been replied to by Gadadhara by stating that such an agreement is possible due to "peculiarity of understanding".

Now let us examine the two theories. The old school claims parsimony in its own theory and accuses of prolixity in that of the modern school. According to the old school, the root needs to express activity alone; whereas in the new school, the root needs two potentialities to denote result and activity (which produces the particular result). It is true that instead of creating a new potentiality in a large number of roots, it is parsimonious to accept a single potentiality (denoting the result) in the accusative case

1. Here the question is how the meaning of a word can agree with a part of the meaning of another word, because "Padārthaḥ padārthenanvety na tvekadesaṇaḥ" (iti niyamaḥ).
2. Viklittyanukṛta vyāparajānya viklittyaśrayaḥ tandulaḥ.
3. The Philosophy of Sentence and Its Parts". P.113, and the foot note on P.114).
suffixes, which are far less in number. And the relation between the result and activity is obtained by a peculiarity of understanding.

Further the old logicians are not in a position to explain their theory absolutely in all cases. Their theory fails in many places like *Gamanā* Tyāga etc., wherein they resort to secondary signification or conventional implication or Anādi tatparya etc., which is a proximity. Further even the old logician has to accept that the accusative case affix denotes subsistence (*Adheyatva*) in sentences like *Gramamādhyaśte, gramam adhīshete, gramam samyunakati* etc. In these cases the accusative case affix does not denote the result. But to the modern logician *Adheyatva* is an unanalyzable property (*Akhanda Dharma*). So he does not have the difficulty. Thus the modern logician establishes the superiority of his theory i.e. that “the verbal root expresses both the result and the activity congenial to that result”, over that of the old school.

THE VIEW OF MIMĀMSĀKA:

Excepting Mandana Misra, Mimāmsakas in general accept both activity and the result produced by it, as the meanings of a verbal root. Here activity means that which subsists in the body in the form of blowing fire etc. i.e. external or physical activity only but not internal activity (*Mimamsaka, or Atmapāta vyāpāra*). To the mimāmsaka, the latter activity of the form of effort is denoted by the verbal affix and is called Bhavā. By accepting result and activity congenial to it, as the denoted meanings of the root the mimāmsaka opines that he can avoid all the defects pointed out in the theory of Mandana and the old school of logicians as well.

Khamḍa Deva differs slightly from these Mimāmsakas. According to Khamḍa Deva the meaning of a root is of the form of an unanalyzable entity (*Akhandaopādi*) subsisting in the activity

1. *Adheyatva* akhamḍa, samyogdi sama sarvatvam samyogatadavyacchinne, tadavacchinneva saktī kalpyate ityatra vinigamakasamāhavat. (*Vyu. Va*).
helping to achieve a particular result. It is of the form of cookingness (pākatva) etc., which is a matter of experience the existence of which is responsible for its denomination ‘cooking’ (pāka) etc.. According to him the entity ‘cookingness’ etc., exists only in the activity helping to achieve the result. Effort is denoted by the verbal affix but not by the root.

Khaṇḍa Deva is not in favour of the modern school of logicians. He does not admit qualified potentiality (Viśiṣṭāsakti) as the meaning of the root. If this be accepted, Khaṇḍa Deva argues that it will have to be maintained that the root has three meanings i.e. activity coupled with result (Phalavacchinna vyāpāra), in sentences like “Caitrah Tandulam pacati”; and activity (vyāpāra) and result (phala) in sentences like “Pacyate Tandulah” etc.. Further we have to accept all these just to account for sentences like “Gamanajanya samyogasyayog gramah” (The town is the substratum of the contact produced by going) etc., where ‘Gamanajanya’ means the act of ‘going’ and not the result, because if the word ‘going’ here means contact itself (the result), then it will not be possible for another contact to be produced from this contact. It is evident that the determinance of potentiality is more cumbersome as three potentialities are suggested by the logician.

Another defect in the logician’s theory as argued by Khaṇḍa Deva is this: The result part of the meaning of the root “Gañ” (to go) is separation from the former place as also contact with the latter place. Each one of these is the result of the activity of going. Thus there is a possibility for wrong constructions of the form “Caitrah Pūrvadeśam gacchati” (Caitra goes to the former ground). To obviate this defect, if the logician contends that the comprehension is in the form of contact only (i.e., not separa-

1. Ato anubhāyamānām pākatva yāgatvādikameva tattatphalo-
padhāyakatavadd vyāpāra vṛttā akhaṇḍopādhirūpasāmānyaṃ
pacādipada saktyāvaccchedakām. (Bhā. Rah.)
2. (Ground left by him while walking) where actually the
meaning is that Caitra contacts the latter place and not the
former place.
tion) is to be the meaning of the root, even then wrong sentences like "The serpent goes to the tree" (when it goes from its trunk to the top) will be rendered possible even when the serpent is already on the tree (near the trunk) and when it is only going up the tree. Indeed such sentences are incorrect.

The view of the Grammarian:

The grammarian does not accept either of Mandana's theory or the theory of the old logicians. As regards the meaning of the verbal root according to Drisita and Kaundalbhatta both result and action are the meanings of the verbal root. This argument is based upon the observation that the roots read by Pāṇini denote the result part as well as action as laid down in the Sutra "Bhūvādayo Dhatava, " In this connection it is to be noted that in the activity favourable to the fruit (phalānukāla Vyāpāra) and the fruit produced by activity (vyāpārajanyām phalam), the sense of "being favourable" and "being produced" are supplied by syntactical relation (Samsargamaryadaya) and as such "result and action" happen to be signified by the root. One need not doubt as to how there could be a syntactical connection between the two meanings recalled by the same root; because it is exactly the same way as for the logician kṛtisādhya and iṣāsādhanatva expressed by the one Liha affix possess syntactical connection. It is due to a peculiarity of understanding (vyutpttivaicitrya). If this not be the case, then, in conjunction with the usage of the passive affix the comprehension of the result as determined by activity will be rendered possible only by admitting such a second potentiality also for the root and this is more cumbersome. Thus in a sentence like "Caitra Pacati" the root 'Pac' has potentiality in its activity meaning like "Supplying heat", "Blowing Wind" etc. and in its result part of the meaning like "Softening" (Vikli..."
ktih)—both the meanings separately. And in the case of the passive construction the result part of the meaning is qualified by the activity part. The relation of the produced to the producer subsists between the result and the activity parts of the meaning. Between these two meanings—the activity part is the principal substantive and the result part is only secondary.

According to Nāgeśabhaṭṭa the meaning of a root is “activity favourable to result coupled with effort”.¹ The potentialities of the root in the two meanings are separate i.e. activity qualified by the result (in the active voice) and also the result qualified by the activity (in the case of the passive voice.)² He does not accept mere result and activity as the signified potentialities of the root; because in such a case there is a possibility of agreement of result and activity by the relation of subject to predicate. As a general rule two objects recalled separately get connected with each other by the relation of subject to predicate.³ Hence in order to prevent such an agreement we have to bring in some external agency, which again is a matter of prolixity. Thus he argues that the result qualified by action and action qualified by result are the two potentialities of the root. The knowledge of the particular meaning is produced by the usage of the affix in the passive or active sentences respectively. Of course it is a bit cumbersome, but the prolixity is justified and hence it does not amount to any fault.⁴

Nāgeśa argues that accepting result and action, separately as the meanings of the root, constitutes prolixity. It is like this—The import wherein the result is attributive to the action is caused by the root conjointly uttered with a suffix indicating the active voice and the import wherein the—activity is attributive to the

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1. Phalanukulo yatnasahito vyāpārah. (L.M. (nbp),).
2. Phalāvacchinnavyāpāre, vyāpārayuccinna phsle dhatoḥ pṭhak śaktih.
3. Pṛthagupasthitayoh Tatha anvayautsargikatvāt. (L.M. (nbp))
4. Prāmāṇikagauravyaṁ tu na dosya iti nyayāt.
result is produced by the root conjointly, uttered with a suffix indicating passive voice. Thus we have to admit two different cause and effect relations. Further we have to create two different potentialities in the root. And more proximity lies in accepting a specific qualified relation between the particular root and the concerned meanings. Of course without accepting such a relation we cannot have the import, because an import cannot be produced from words unrelated. Hence from any point of view, Nāgāraja asserts, that it is not logical to accept two different meanings to the root. He advocates only a qualified potentiality of the form “activity qualified by the result (in the active voice) or the result qualified by the activity (in the passive voice) as the meaning of the root.”

Now, as regards the theory of the old Logicians, Grammarians also refute the same almost on the same lines as the modern Logicians and Māmsākṣas. Some more defects in the theory of the old logicians are as follows: According to the old logician the result is the meaning of the accusative case affix. If it be so there are many instances where other case affixes are also used in the place of accusative case affix. For example the fourth case affix in the sentence Grammay gacchi. And the fifth case affix in the sentence Prasadāti Prekṣate etc. the accusative case affix also is used in the sense of other karaka affixes as in the sentences “Adhīṣṭet Vaikuntham etc.”

Further many kṛt suffixes are also enjoined in the sense of object. Thus if we are to accept result as the denoted meaning of the suffix denoting object, we have to accept this meaning in the case of a number of different suffixes as Sup, Tin, Kṛt, etc. Hence it is more parsimonious to accept result also as the meaning of the root itself, instead of creating each time a new denotational potentiality in each of the numerous suffixes belonging to various kārakās, kṛtās, etc.

1. For further details vide L.M. (nbp).
2. Adhīti Vyākaraṇa.
Further, in sentences like ‘Pacyate taṇḍulaḥ svayameva’ i.e. in the karma kartṛ usages the old logician cannot but admit result as the meaning of the root, otherwise the very construction of such sentences will not be possible. Again the definitions given by him to Transitiveness etc. suffer from the defects of partial applicability or non-applicability as can be observed in the case of causal sentences with intransitive roots as in Bhāvayate ghaṭam Caitraḥ, Edhayate ghaṭam Caitraḥ etc. In these cases the opponent has to admit that the result is denoted by the root only. After all the result is that which is an attributive of activity, the meaning of the root. Then in the above cited sentences there are two different activities, one denoted by the root and the other denoted by the Nic suffix. Here the activity denoted by the root is attributive to that denoted by the suffix Nic. So naturally the former is the result of the latter.

Thus, in view of the above mentioned innumerable defects, pointed out by the modern logicians, māṁsakas and grammarians the theory of the old logicians cannot be valid.

To sum up the following are the various views regarding the meaning of the verbal root:

1. Mādhyānta’s school advocates that result alone is the meaning of the root.

2. Ratnakosakṛt etc. belonging to the school of old logicians claim that the root denotes only activity and the result is the meaning of the accusative case affix.

3. The later māṁsakas like Khanda Deva are of the opinion that the meaning of a root is of the form of an unanalyzable entity (Akhandopadhi) subsisting in the activity helping achieve a particular result.

4. In general all the Māṁsakas, Logicians and Grammarians accept both result and action as the meanings of the root.

5. Gadādhara says that in general a root denotes an activity as
determined by the concerned result. But in the passive construction, he admits that the root denotes both result and action.

6. Nāgāsbhāṭṭa argues that a root signifies only a qualified potentiality of the form of activity qualified by the result or Vice versa.

Chapter IV

Section-ii

Contents :-

Meaning of the roots taking
wo objects 100-106
MEANING OF THE ROOTS TAKING TWO OBJECTS

Let us examine sentences like 'Gopah gāṃ dogdhi payah;' 'Rajānam Vasudhāṃ yaçate', 'Pitaraṃ penthanam prochati', 'Ajām grāmaṃ nayati etc.. In all these sentences we find the verb word has two objects. Further in these sentences the words Gāṃ (Cow), Rajānam (king) Pitaraṃ (Father) etc., are used in the accusative case, thus denoting objecthood. As a matter of fact an object is the most desired one of a person as laid down by the sutra1 P.1.4.49. But in the present instance, cow is not the most desired but milk. And the cow is only a point of separation of milk from it or a substratum of milk. Same is the case with the words Rāja, Pitr etc.. Hence how are we to explain the objecthood in them i.e. the substratumness of the result part of the meaning denoted by the concerned verbal roots. To explain this, we have first to decide what the root denotes. In the case of these roots, scholars follow two methods to explain the nature of the root as possessing single activity denoted, or two activities denoted.

Now let us examine the theory, taking for granted that the root denotes a single activity: Take the sentence "Gopah gāṃ dogdhi payah" (The Milkman draws milk (from) the Cow). Here the root 'Duh' denotes only a single activity (Vyāpāra) i.e. action favourable to the flow (of milk). The accusative case affix (enjoined after the word 'cow') denotes separation which agrees with the 'flow' by the relation of the producer to the produced. The meaning of the base (cow) agrees with 'Separation, being its substratum. Thus the verbal import is of the form 'The Milkman (Gopah) is the agent of action congenial to the flow subsisting in the milk which is favourable to the separation subsisting in the cow'. Now one may question how the cow being the substratum of separation can get the accusative case, but only apādānatva. To this it is replied ablativeeness is to be construed only in such cases where the separation is syntactically connected with the substantive of the knowledge produced by

1. P.1.4.49 Kartuṛpsitataṃ karma.
the root as in cases like "The leaf falls from the tree" (vyāsāt parāsmā vibhājate). In the present case the separation is not syntactically of such a type. Thus the cow does not get apādāna samjña. Hence now the cow is the substratum of the result, separation, hence it gets the designation object.

Gadādhara prefers to accept the root Duh to denote 'action congenial to the flow (of milk) determined (qualified) by separation, and the accusative case suffix enjoined after the base 'cow' denotes 'Locus hood' which syntactically agrees with separation.

On this account it may not be objected that even in the present case (Gām dogdhi payaḥ) the objecthood for the word cow is secured with the help of the definition viz.: An object is the substratum of the result determined by the meaning of the root; and not with the help of the Sūtra "Akathitam ca;" for as the author argues that by the phrase "determined by the meaning of the root" is meant a direct adjective of the substantive in the knowledge produced by the meaning of the root (i.e. Vyāpara). In the present case; however, the separation (vibhāga) does not directly agree with vyāpara which is the main substantive of the root meaning; but with the flow (Kṣēraṇa) which is different from it. And hence the distinction between the Akathita karman and the ordinary karman.

Now another point to be decided is whether the cow becomes the principal object or not. Though the cow is the substratum of 'separation', determined by the meaning of the root, it is not treated as principal object (Pradhanakarman). Of course it is true that the principal object is defined as the substratum of the result determined by the meaning (activity) of the root. And the principal result is that which is directly attributive to the

1. Dhātvartha vyāparaṇvita vibhāga eva apādānatvām. (Vide Ādāra commentary on the Vyutpattivāde).
2. Vastutastu vibhāga vacchinna ksaraṇaṇukulo vyāpāro duhyarthah, Gopadottara dvitiyārthāśca vibhāganvayinī vṛttireva. (Vyu. Vā.).
activity, which is expressed by the verbal root as the substantive. 1 Hence in the present case, the “Separation” subsisting in the cow is not directly attributable to the ‘flow’ which itself is an attributive to the activity congenial to it (flow). Hence the cow is not the principal object, so much so, when the speaker intends to express the cow as the substratum of separation, as explained, the cow becomes the object. And such an objecthood is ratified by Pāṇini sūtra “Akathitānca”. 2 However, if the speaker is of the opinion that the root ‘Duh’ denotes mere action congenial to the flow, and the cow is treated as the point of separation, but not as the substratum of the result, then the cow gets the designation Apādaṇa, and takes the fifth case (Ablative) affix. 3 Thus when we admit that the root denotes only one action, the object cow etc., governed by the sūtra P.1.4.51 is treated as secondary object (gaṇaṇakarman) and Milk etc., which is governed by the Sutra P.1.4.49 is treated as the primary (Pradhāna Karman).

There is another explanation to justify the two objects in the sentences like ‘Gām dogdhi payah’. Here, some scholars admit two activities to be denoted by the root. Hence two objects are possible as they are the substratums of the respective results. Now in the given case “Gām dogdhi payah”, the root denotes “activity (Subsisting in the milkman) congenial to the activity (subsisting in the cow) congenial to the separation of milk existing in the cow”. 4 From the sentence ‘gām dogdhi payah’ we generally understand that cow releases milk and the milkman

2. P 1.4.51. Akathitam ca
3. Gadāara alternatively accepts three potentialities to the root each in “Separation, Flow, and Activity”. One gets the verbal import through Syntactical relation. In the passive construction, a peculiarity of expectancy their relation of attributiveness etc., gets altered. [Vyū. Vā.]
4. Duheḥ antas sthita drava-dravya vibhāgānukula vyāpāranukula vyāpārah.
(gopa) causes the cow to release milk (Gau\textsuperscript{h} paya\textsuperscript{h} tyajati; Gopak\textsuperscript{a} gava\textsuperscript{a} Tyajayati). Basing on the experience we admit two activities denoted by the root. Thus the cow being the substratum of the result produced by the activity existing in the gopa, gets the designation object governed by the sutra P.1.4.49. And milk also being the substratum of the result produced by the action subsisting in the cow, gets the designation object on the authority of the same sutra P.1.4.49. Now, if both the objects are governed by same sutra, then which of them is primary and which is secondary. To this it is replied here the cow is the primary object. Here primary object-hood is defined as “The sentence being in active construction, an object (Karman) is said to be primary (principal) if it is the substratum of the result, which (result) is directly attributive to the principal activity subsisting in the agent expressed by the verbal affix."

It may be questioned why we are particular in deciding that a particular object is primary (Mukhya) or secondary (Gau\textsuperscript{a}). To this we reply, that when such sentences as these (gām dogdhi paya\textsuperscript{h}) are changed into the passive voice, we have to decide which of the two objects gets changed into the nominative case. As a general rule it is always the principal object that is expressed by the verbal affix (Tā) in the passive, where the primary object is in conformity with the definition given above. But however in the case of objects governed by the Sūtra P.1.4.51, generally

1. The roots duh etc. are treated as inherent causal roots. Antarbhātanijarthānām duhādīnām nijantatavat. Siddham Pūrveśa-karmatvām nijantam niyamastathā. (VP. 3–7.73)
2. P.1.4.49, Karturṣiptatāmām karma.
3. Pradhāna karmatvanca, kārtpratyaya samabhivyahāre kartṛni-stha pradhāna vy vyāpāra vīseṣaṁ phalaṣṭayatvāṁ (La. Sa Se.)
the secondary object gets changed to nominative.1

Generally, the roots Duh. etc., are treated as roots taking two objects, and objecthood for cow etc., is ratified by the sutra P.1.4.51. Hence let us examine what this Sutra explains. According to this sutra, in a sentence where the object (Karmāṇa) is associated with another Karaka, generally Apādāna or Sampadāna or Adhikaraṇa if the speaker does not intend to express the apādānatava etc., existing in that karaka, then the speaker can treat it as Karmakaraka. Thus strictly speaking this karman (object) is a secondary object (gauna), because it loses its karmatva if the speaker does not want to treat it as Karman. Thus in the sentence ‘Gāṁ dogdhī payah’ the word ‘cow’ is a secondary object. If the speaker so desires to convey that the cow is the point (limit) from which milk is separated, he uses fifth case affix as ‘goṁ payah dogdhī’. The accusative case affix after the ‘cow’ denotes Ādheyaṁva (locushood) but not mere relation in general (Sam. bandha śāmānya) as opined by Bhaṭṭoji.2 Further the word ‘Akaṁthita’ means ‘when not intended to express’ but not ‘apradhāna’ as opined by some scholars.3 If we accept the meaning ‘apradhāna’ then there will be no scope to treat the ‘cow’ as apādāna, because it is always an apradhāna karman. Hence sentences of the form ‘Goṁ payah dogdhī’ would have not been possible at all.4

1. Gaunekarmanī duhyādeḥ pradhāne niḥṛṣvahāṁ, Buddhī bhaksārthayoḥ śabdakarmanāṁ ca nijecchayā, Prayojyakarma- nyanyesāṁ nyantāṁ tādayomataṁ, Hṛkornijecchayā kim vā, prayojyā bahudaśibhiḥ, Lakṣyam drṣṭvā nirayotra kartavyo bhāsyaparagaiḥ. (Udyotā under P.1.4.51.II.)

2. Tathā ceha sāsthitvasaṁbandhamātraṁ dvitiyārtha iti sthitam. (Manorama on P.1.4.51). But Nāgasa refutes this in his Laghu śabdendushekha ram on this sutra. Tattat sāstrabhāve sarvatra sāsthirāpyūtyārvāsāṁ tadapavādatvena, tadapavādatvamātrena sambandhārthakatvāṁ na yuktam... etc.

3. Akathita śabdottāsamkīrtitaparabh. (La. Śa. Se.)

4. Apradhānacanana akathitaśabdopādāne tu apradhnasampadāna samjñāte bādhivā duhyādiṣu karmasamjñaiṣvā svāditi asamkīrtitāmakathitamiḥ asritam. (Pradipa under P.1.4.51.).
Another important point is that it is not open for us to treat every apādāna kāraka etc., as objects on the plea that we do not intend to express the ablative-ness etc., in them. Further all the roots do not take two objects. The roots with two objects, are listed out as Duh, Yāc Pac etc.¹ In the case of the roots Duh, Yāc, pac etc., the other (apādāna etc.) kāraka is associated with the object (Milk etc.) before the activity denoted by the root is brought into being. But in the case of some other roots, the other kārakas (apādāna adhikarana etc.) are associated with the object, only after the action denoted by the concerned root is brought into being.² The Mahābhāṣyakāra listed out only eight roots, Duh, Yāc, Rudhi, Prath, Bhikṣ. Cīn. In respect of these roots; that kāraka which is associated with the Karman (of course obtained on the authority of P.1.4.49) before the action, denoted by the concerned root is brought into being; is called Akathitaḥ. With regard to the roots Br Śās the apradhānakarma is related with primary object only after the action denoted by the concerned root comes into being.³ By following this convention, we can avoid karma samjña to the vessel into which the milk Śās drawn, though the vessel is associated with milk. The various kārakas that can be treated as objects are governed by the Sūtra P.1.4.51⁴

The mention of the roots as made by the Bhāṣyakāra does not mean that they are only eight in number. It is only indicative of the peculiar nature of roots that can take two objects. That is why by the time of Bhāṭṭoji etc., the number of these roots increased. Dīkṣīta clearly mentions that the list is not exhaustive but all the roots having a similar nature are also to be included. He quotes many instances where different roots like, Gad, Bhāṣ, Dadh with the upasarga ‘abhi’ etc., take two objects. The Bhāṣya-

1. Duḥ yāc pac daṇḍ rudhi pracchi ci br śāsu jī math muśām, karmayukṣyadakathitām tatha eyānntīhṛṣvahām. (S.K. under Sl. 539).
2. Karmayuktvāṁ, dhātvartha vyāpārātprak, tadānantaram vā tatt sambaddhātvāṁ. (La. Sa. Śe.)
4. P.1.4.51 Akathitām ca. P.1.4.49, Karturīpsita tameśa karma,
kāra favours such an interpretation as is evident from his own usages of the root "Cudī" as aдвikarmaka root.¹

When the sentences in the active voice with verbs like दुह etc., with two objects are changed into passive voice the secondary object (governed by सूत्र P.1.4.51) alone gets expressed by the verbal suffix and hence takes the nominative case affix. However in the case of roots नित, ह्र, क्र्ष etc., it is only the primary object (say goat, etc.) that takes the nominative case affix.²

Thus we can explain the meaning of the roots taking two objects. Depending on the standard usages we have to decide whether a particular root is aдвikarmaka or not and accordingly determine the meaning of root.³

1. "Ahamapidamacodyām codye" iti Tadṛjasūtrabhāṣye prachchī paryāyasya Cuderapi dvikarmakatvadarsanāditi bhavaḥ evaṁ ca nāthatyādayo bahavo dvikarmaka bodhyaḥ.
   (Manorama on P.1-4.51)
2. Gauḥ karmāṇi duhyādeḥ pradhāne nīḥ kṛṣvahāṁ.
3. Laksyam dṛṣṭvā nirayotra kartavyotra bhāṣyaparagaiḥ. (ibid)
Chapter IV

Section-iii

COMPLEX ROOTS AND THEIR MEANING 107-125

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INTRODUCTION:

The sage Pāṇini introduces a group of eleven affixes, popularly known as "Sanādi Suffixes" in the first quarter of the third chapter of his book "Aṣṭādhāvyuḥ". One more suffix "kvip" is added to the above list by Kātyāyana, the Vārtikakāra. Of these suffixes some are enjoined after the simple (verbal) roots, and some are enjoined after nouns. The speciality of these suffixes lies in that, that when they are added either to a simple root or a nominal base or a noun (as sanctioned by the various aphorisms) both of them (i.e. the Root or the nominal base or the noun; together with the suffix) becomes a single complex unit. In order to facilitate this unit to behave like a simple verbal root, Pāṇini confers root-ness on it by a special aphorism. Hence this complex unit takes after it all the lakāras, or Tiṅ suffixes, kṛt suffixes etc., to form verbs or nouns. Since this kind of roots are derived from other sources they are called derived roots or complex roots.

This technique of forming verbal roots is technically called Dhātuvaṣṭī, one among the four techniques used by the Indian grammarians to formulate various complex words. This complex formation has rendered great service in improving the status and flexibility of the Sanskrit Language. The system of forming the Desiderative, Frequentative, Denominative roots etc., has greatly contributed to the expressional faculty of the language and lengthy ideas can be expressed through one single word or phrase. Since this is a "Vṛtti", before enjoining the suffix to the root etc.,

1. From the Sutra "Guptikābbhāṣaḥ San" (P.3.1.5) upto and including the Sutra "Kamerāḥ" (P.3.1.30).
2. Sanādyantā dhātvāh (P.3.1.32).
3. According to Nāgasaṃśa the techniques (vṛttis) are only four viz., kṛtvṛtti, Taddhītvṛtti samāsvṛtti and dhātuvaṣṭī. To him Ekāśa vṛtti comes under samāsa vṛtti only. For details vide L.M. (kk)
we have to ensure ‘Sāmarthya’, i.e. Ekārthībhāva etc. as in the case of other vṛttis.1

Each of the Saṃādi suffixes has its own meaning and generally this meaning is the substantive with respect to that of the root etc., after which the suffix is appended. These roots, being derived from other sources, are not enumerated among the two thousand simple roots of Pāñjini. Another interesting feature of these suffixes is that the same root when joined with different suffixes in turns forms different complex roots with different meanings. For instance the word Putrakāmyati (Putra + Kāmyac + Ti) gives the meaning “one desires a son for one’s-self” and the word Pru-triyati (Putra + iva + Ti) gives the meaning “one treats the other as one’s own son”. Thus lengthy ideas can be compressed and expressed through a single word. Similarly the idea that one desires to go; or read can be expressed through a single word Jigamisati or pipaṭhi- sati etc., Thus brevity is the main basis in forming such complex roots. This being the case, now we examine the meanings signified by these suffixes in detail.

Now, as already stated, these suffixes are twelve in number viz. 1. San, 2. Kyac, 3. Kāmyac, 4. Kyañ, 5. Kyas, 6. Kvip 7. Nic. 8. Yañ, 9. Yak, 10. Āya, 11. Íyañ 12. Niñ.2 Of these suffixes Kyac, kāmyac, Kyañ and Kyas are enjoined after nouns. The sixth one “kvip” is enjoined after nominal bases. Nic is enjoined after a verbal root and also after a few nominal bases. The first and eighth viz. San and Yañ suffixes are enjoined after roots only. The ninth one ‘Yak’ is enjoined after the roots and after the nominal bases enlisted in ‘Kaṇḍvādi Gana’. The tenth one Āya is enjoined after five roots only. The suffix Íyañ is enjoined after a single root “Ṛti”. The last suffix Niñ is enjoined after a single root “kamu” and also after three nouns. As already stated, before enjoining these suffixes to their respective bases

1. For details Vide ‘The Philosophy of a Sentence and Its Parts’ Chapter VIII.
2. San Kyac kāmyac kyañ kyañ o’thācāra kvip Niṣañau tathā, Yagāya iva niñ ceti dvādaśāmi sanādayaḥ.
we have to ensure that there is capacity (samarthya) in these to give a single combined meaning (Ekarthibhāva). In the absence of such a samarthya (Ekarthibhava), complex formation is not justified. Thus with this background let us examine each suffix and the respective complex root in more detail.

1. "SAN" SUFFIX.

In the form 'San' the letter 'N' is a mute and the actual suffix is 'Sa' ending in the vowel 'A'. The mute letter 'N' indicates that the first letter of the complex root is udatta and the rest are anusuttas, as governed by P.6.1.1971.

The San suffix is of two types. With respect to certain roots it is a suggestive suffix and in the sense of Desire or Suspicion it is an expressive suffix. Thus this suffix is popularly called Swārtha San in the suggestive sense and 'icchā san' in the expressive sense. When the suffix is enjoined to a root, the root gets re-duplicated. 2

Swārtha San:—

The San affix is enjoined after seven roots-only,3 by the Sūtras P.3.1.5, and 3.1.6.4 Here the suffix does not denote any independent sense of its own but brings out the peculiar meaning inherent in the root itself, after which the suffix is added. Thus the verbal forms are jugūpeate, titkṣate etc.

Icchā San:—

The San suffix in the sense of "desire" can be enjoined

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1. P.6.1.197, Namityādīrṇityām.
2. Sansāho٤ (P.6.1.9),
3. P.3.1.5 Guptikidbhya٣ San.
4. P.3.1.6 Mān.bhaddanśānbhyo Dirghascabhyasāya.
after any Root' and is governed by the Sūtra P.3.1.7.1 To append this suffix in this sense after a verbal root certain conditions are to be satisfied. We know the meaning of the suffix ‘San’ is desire. Naturally a desire has an object to be achieved, So this suffix is to be appended to a root, when the meaning of the root itself becomes the object in the desire. Again the agent of the action denoted by the root and that of the desire must be one and the same. For instance let us take the sentence ‘Rāma desires to go’. Here the person who desires and the person who wants to perform the action denoted by the root ‘Go’ are one and the same i.e. Rāma. So to convey this sense the ‘San’ suffix is appended after the root ‘Gam’ and the sentence is ‘Rāmaḥ jīgamīṣati’. Thus the verbal import is ‘Rāma is the agent of going which is the object in his desire’. But when one desires another person to go (or to do), then to convey that sense we have to use a sentence only as ‘caitraḥ Maitrasya gamanam icchati’; but suffix should not be appended to the root. Hence sentences like ‘caitraḥ Maitrasya jīgamīṣati’ are wrong constructions.

Further, when the object in the desire is qualified by another word like ‘He desires to go quickly’, then also the root cannot take this San suffix after it, because there is no Sāmarthya.2 The idea is to be conveyed through a sentence only. Another peculiarity that this suffix can be appended to any root (simple or complex) but not the one already ending with the San suffix in the sense of desire. 3

San - in the sense of āsankā :—

This suffix is appended to a verbal root in the sense of suspicion or expectation. This complex root with a San after it, does not convey the sense of desire, but conveys that the agent suspects or anticipates some undesirable happening to himself. Besides the sense of ‘Desire’, we have to admit this meaning

1. P.3.1.7, Dhātoḥ karanāḥ samānakartkāt iccāyām.
2. Savīṣeṣaṃamasamartthāṃ (M. B. under P.2.1.1).
3. Sannantāt na Sanīṣyate.
"Asanka," also, to the suffix in order to account for usages like "Sva mumursati, Kumala pipatisati." The usage of this suffix in this sense also is sanctioned by Katyayana, the Vartika-akara. Thus the sentences Sva mumursati, or Kumala pipatisati are to be explained. The dog suspects its own death of the bank anticipates its own fall. But taking the spirit of these sentences into account it is generally explained as the speaker anticipates the death of the dog or the fall of the bank etc.

2. KYAC (YA)

Of the suffixes enjoined after a noun to form a complex root, kyac is one. In the form "Kyac" the letters K and C are mute and the actual suffix is "YA". The mute 'K' is for the sake of bringing Kyac and Kyan into one unit and denote the both by a single word 'Kye' as in "NaK kye (P. 1.4.15)." The use of the mute 'C' is to make the suffix as one having two mute letters; so that the word 'Kye' is in 'NaK' Kye denotes both the suffixes Kyac and Kyan."

This suffix also is enjoined in the sense of desire, just like the Sam Suffix. The Sap suffix is enjoined after a verbal root, and the meaning of the root, action is the object in the desire of the agent (the desirer), while the Kyac suffix is used after a noun which (Dravya) is the object in the desire of the person who desires it for himself only. This suffix is enjoined after the noun as governed by the Sutra P. 3.1.8. Thus when Putra desires to have a son for himself then the word Putra denoting the object in the desire takes the suffix Kyac and the sentence is : 'Cautra hitrayati'. When the object desired is meant for another and not for person

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1. सामान्यतः सांवकात्वीयत् (Vartika under P. 3.1-7)
2. This type of explanation is inevitable, because this suffix is enjoined in this sense subject to the other condition 'Samanakartakat'. But this Vartika is refuted by the Bhāsyakara.
3. Ekanubhaveda grahane dvyanubandhaksya grahaham na, iti nisadhah paramitā.
4. P.3.1.8 Supa Atmanēh Kyac.
who desires, the suffix cannot be appended after the noun word denoting the object, but the whole idea is to be expressed in a sentence as Guruḥ Siṣṭṭyaḥ Putram icchati."

It is to be noted that when the desired object is qualified by another word then the noun word, denoting the object of the desire, cannot be appended with the suffix Kyac to convey the sense. Let us consider the sentence "Caitra desires a beautiful son for himself". Here the object 'son' is qualified by the word 'beautiful'. Hence the word 'Putra' cannot take the suffix Kyac, and the whole idea is to be expressed through a sentence as "Caitra, sundaram putram Ātmanah icchati", but never as "Sundaram putriyati". Thus the verb word "Putriyati" gives an import of the form an activity of the form of desire which has son as its object."

The Kyajanta is always an intransitive root since the object is included in the meaning of the verbal root itself.¹

3. KṣMYAC (KṢMYA)

The next suffix, enjoined after nouns to form complex roots is Kṣmyac. This operation is governed by the Sutra "Kṣmyaccā".² This affix also, like 'Kyac', denotes the desire of a person wishing to possess something for himself. Thus when one desires fame for oneself, the idea is conveyed by the complex verb 'Yaśas Kṣmyati'. Hence this suffix is appended to noun word denoting the object in the desire of the person desiring.

In the word Kṣmyac, the letter 'C' is a mute and the actual suffix is 'Kṣmya'.

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1. Dhātvarthenopasaṁ grahāt. However, in the sense of sexual intercourse, roots like 'Āśvasyati, Vṛṣasyati etc. are found to be transitive as in usages jāram Vṛṣasyati bandhaky; "Raviratha hayānasvasyanti dhṛvam vadhvāḥ... rathāṅgavaham gami, ... Vṛṣasyati sampati." For details vide Pa. Vā. Ra.

2. P.3.1.9 Kṣmyaccā.
4. KYAN (YA)

In the form 'Kyan' the letters K and Ń are mutes. The real suffix is 'YA' only. The mute Ń indicates that the complex root 'Kyan' is suffixed after it. The mute 'K' is for the sake of grouping 'Kyan' and 'Kya' together and denote by 'Kye' as in the Suffix 'Nah Kye'.

This suffix 'Kyan' is enjoined after different nouns and crude forms (Pratipadikas) in different meanings. So let us examine the same.

(a) In the Sense of "Behaving like":

This suffix is optionally enjoined, in the sense of "Behaving like", after a noun denoting a person with whose behaviour the behaviour of another person is compared. Thus when we want to say that Caitra behaves like Maitra, the suffix is enjoined after the word Maitra and the complex verb "Mitrāyate" gives us an import "behaves like Maitra". Here also the object of comparison is qualified by another word this suffix is not enjoined. Thus the enjoining of this suffix is governed by the rule P.3.1.112.

(b) In the Sense of "To become what it was not Previously:

This suffix 'Kyan' in the sense of "becoming that, what the thing or person previously was not", enjoined after the crude forms (Pratipadikas) like Bhṛsa etc. enumerated in Bhṛṣadī Gana. The operations are governed by the Sūtra P.3.1.12.3.

Thus the verb 'Bhrśayate' gives us an import that it has become much which it was not previously. Similarly from 'Sighṛāyate' we understand that it was not swift previously but now it becomes swift. Similarly 'Sumanāyate' gives an understanding.

1. Sāviseṣānām vyttma.
2. P.3.1.11 Karuṭti kyaṇ salopaśca.
that a person who was not kind previously is now becoming kind.

(c) This suffix Kyan is appended to the words Romanthya (ruminating) and Tapas (Austerity), when they are used as object of the action of repetition and performance respectively. Thus the verb 'Romanthayate' gives us an import that it (a cow etc.) ruminates very frequently, and Tapasyati means 'performs Austerity'. The operation is governed by the sutra P.3.1.15.1

(d) In the Sense of Emitting:—

This suffix Kyan is enjoined after three words Baspa (vapour) usma (Heat) and Phena (Froth), in the sense of emitting, when these become the object of action emitting. Thus when we want to say it emits Baspa etc. we add the suffix to these words and the complex verb is of the form Baspayate, usmAYate and Phenayate. The operations are governed by the Sutra P.3.1.16 and the Vartika under it.2

(e) In the sense of "To feel or Experience":—

This suffix Kyan, in the sense of "feeling or experiencing" is enjoined after the words Sukha, Dukha etc. as enumerated in Sukhadi gana; when the pleasure or pain belongs to the agent himself.3 Thus the verbs, Sukhayate Dukhayate etc. give us an import that "one feels happy, or one feels unhappy etc.. However this suffix is not enjoined after these words when the agent himself is not the enjoyer as in sentences "Caitraḥ Maitraya Sukham Vedayate", etc.. Thus when one knows the pains or pleasures of others this suffix is not enjoined.

(f) In the sense of "Exerting Dishonesty or Sin":—

This suffix, Kyan, in the sense of exerting dishonesty or interested in doing sins and the like, is enjoined after a few words

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1. P.3.1.15 Karmaṇo romantha tapobhyāṁ varticaret.
2. P.3.1.16 Baspoṣmāḥbhyaṁ udvamanē. Vartika-Phena casti vaktavyāṁ.
likewise, *kastya* etc. as regulated by the *Sūtra* P.3.1.14 and the *Vārtika* thereunder. Thus the verbs *kastya*, *kakṣaya*, *kocchayya* etc. give us an import that *one tends dishonesty*, or *one is interested in doing sins* etc. The words enumerated in the *Vārtika* are more or less synonyms having the ultimate sense evil or sin.

(g) In the sense of "Making":

This suffix *kyaṅ*, in the sense of "making", comes after the words *sabda*, etc., as the object of action. Thus instead of saying *sabdyaṅ kastyaṅ*, we can say *sabdyaṅ*, similarly *kalahayaṅ*, etc. These operations are governed by the *Sūtra* P.3.1.17 and also the *Vārtika* thereunder.

Thus, this suffix *kyaṅ* is enjoined after different words in different senses as explained above. These verbal forms are very frequently used in the language by the poets to beautify their works.

5. **KYAŚ (YA)**

In the form *kyaś*, the letters *k* and *s* are mute and actual suffix is *ya*. According to Bhāṭṭojī the mute *k* serves no purpose and *s* indicates that the complex root is a ubhayapadī.

This suffix *kyaś* is added after certain words *Lohita* etc. in the sense of "Becoming what the thing previously was not". And these words should not have already taken the suffix *cvī*.

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after them before taking Kyaś. This sense is obtained by the Anuvṛtti of the word ‘Achveh’ from the previous sātra.

Thus when an object, originally being not black (Lohita) now becomes black, then to convey this idea the suffix Kyaś is appended after the word Lohita. Thus the complex roots Lohitāya, etc., are formed. The import we get from this verb is ‘one which was not originally black is now becoming black’.

Further this suffix is added, after the words ending with ‘Dāc’ suffix, in the sense of ‘Making a sound similar to’. Thus Paṭapaṭa; a word formed by taking Dāc suffix, takes after it the Kyaś suffix, and the verb Paṭapatāyate gives an import that ‘one makes the sound similar to Paṭapaṭa’. Similarly Gaḷaṭaṭayate etc. are formed.

6. Kvip

This suffix ‘Kvip’ is a very peculiar suffix and at the same time it is a very important one. It is appended after any nominal stem in the sense of ‘Behaves like’ (Ācarartthe). The peculiarity of this suffix lies in the fact that the whole suffix elides immediately, without bringing any physical change in the nominal stem but gets the designation verbal root to it. Thus, when we want to express the idea that Caitra behaves like Kṛṣṇa, then this suffix is appended after the object of comparison i.e. Kṛṣṇa. As the suffix elides immediately, the nominal base Kṛṣṇa now becomes a complex denominative verbal root ‘Kṛṣṇa’. Thus the complex verb ‘Kṛṣṇati’ gives us an import ‘one behaves like Kṛṣṇa’ i.e. one’s say Caitra’s behaviour is similar to that of Kṛṣṇa.

The usage of these verbal forms in the Poetic literature beautifies the work.

As already said the suffix is introduced by Kātyāyana, the Vārtikakāra but not by Pāṇini. Bhagavān Pāṇini, reads a suffix

1. Kamalati vadanam yasyādy syedantyadaka mṛte labhah Śalvalati romavaliḥ adbhuta Sarasaśa balāḥ (Rasagangadhara).
"Kvip", among the kṛt suffixes. That 'Kvi' is added to any verbal root, just to convert it into a nominal stem. There also the entire 'Kvip' suffix gets elided, and now the verbal root becomes a nominal stem and takes after it all the 'Sup' suffixes, e.g. Liṭ, Liha, Liha, Raṭ-Raṭau-Raṭah etc. So taking this fact into account it appears that Katyāyana, the Vārtikakara, has extended this technique in the reverse order changing any nominal stem into a verbal root; of course in the sense of 'behaves like,' (Ācarartha).

7. NIC (I)

Of all the suffixes this suffix Nic is a very important one. This suffix is suggestive after certain nouns and verbs. As an expressive suffix it is enjoined after any verbal root. In the form Nic, the letters N, C are mutes and the actual suffix is ‘I’ only.

NIC - as a suggestive suffix:—

This suffix Nic is appended after certain nouns, Munda, Mīra etc., as governed by the Sutra P.3.1.21 in the sense of 'making,' taking, showing etc. On adding this suffix to them, they become derived roots. Thus the verb Munda�ati gives us an import 'one shaves (the other). Halayati gives the sense one takes Hala etc. 2

Similarly this suffix is enjoined after some specific nominal bases and all the simple verbal roots enumerated in the Tenth conjugation, by the Sūtra P.3.1.25. Here also the suffix is said to be suggestive. The words from Satyapa to cūra are nominal stems, while Curadi stands for the roots of the Tenth conjugation. Thus

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2. For details Vide Kārikāvṛtti on P.3.1.21

on adding this suffix the derived verb 'Satyapayati' gives the import 'one speaks truth (satyamācaṣṭa) etc.' Thus the Nic suffix, enjoined by the two sutas P.3.1.21 and 3.1.25 is treated as a suggestive suffix.

Nic as an Expressive Suffix:—

This suffix Nic in the causal sense is enjoined by the Sutra P.3.1.26 (Mūtumati ca). Now we know in our experience that one employs, induces or causes another person to perform a particular activity to achieve a particular result. This activity existing in the employer or the inducer is expressed by the suffix Nic. This suffix can be enjoined after any simple or derived root, any number of times depending on the number of agents directing or causing one the other to act; but in the final verb word only one Nic suffix remains and all the others elide; but the words denoting these inducers and the induced remain in the sentence, all in instrumental case, except the word denoting the first agent who begins employing the others to act. Thus the suffix added to the simple root Pac, gives the forms 'Pāci' the derived root; thus the import we get from the derived verb 'Pācayati' is of the form 'one gets (rice) cooked (by another). Similarly from the sentence 'Caitraḥ Maitreṇa yaṣayati' the import is 'Caitra causes, (induces) Maitra to perform the sacrifice'. In the sentence 'Caitraḥ Maitreṇa Pusyamitreṇa Yaḥayati' though there are two employed agencies only one Nic suffix remains in the verb.

In the sentence 'Caitraḥ Maitreṇa pācayati' Maitra is the substratum of the action of cooking, but this vyāpāra is the result of the activity subsisting in Caitra, the inducer (Prayojaka); yet Maitra does not get the designation of Karman and consequently the objective case. The reason is simple. As a matter of fact Maitra is the substratum of the result of the activity expressed by the Nic and also the substratum of the activity denoted by the root Pac. Thus, there is a scope to Maitra.

3. For the meanings given by the nominal stems after becoming roots—Vide Kasikāvīttī on this Sutra P. 3.1-25.
to get both kartṛ samjña and karma samjña. But kartṛ samjña, being later, (para) he gets only kartṛ samjña but not karma samjña. But as this kartṛ is not expressed by the Tina suffix, the word Maitra cannot take the nominative case; thus it takes the instrumental case affix.¹ Caitra being the agent of activity signified by the causal suffix Nice, is expressed by the verbal affix and he gets the Nominative case. Thus in the active voice the words denoting prayojaka always take the nominative case affix and the words denoting the induced persons (Prayojya) always take the instrumental case.

However, in the case of certain roots as specified in the Sūtra P.1.4.52² the employed agency (Prayojya) gets the karma samjña and hence rests in the accusative case. Thus when the non-causal sentence 'Satrabh Sa śvargaṁ gacchanti (enemies go to heaven)' is changed into a causal form the subject Satrabh changes into object and the sentence is of the form 'Haribh Satrūn śvargaṁ gamayati' (Hari causes the enemies to go to heaven). Though the words 'Satru' etc. are the induced agency, they take accusative case but not instrumental in accordance with the Sūtra cited (P.1.4.52). Here the Karma samjña is enjoined to 'Satru' in order to facilitate the passive construction with the word 'Satru' in the nominative case.³

Now let us observe the sentence in the active like 'Caitraṁ tanaṁ paccayati'. When this is changed into a causal passive construction the original object alone gets changed into the nominative and the original and induced agents take the instrumental cases. Thus the sentence in the causal passive construction is of the form 'Caitreṇa Maitreṇa tanaṁ paccayati'.⁴

1. Kartṛ karāḥ yosītriṣyā (P.2.3.18).
2. P.1.4.52: Gati buddhi pratyaśasārtha sadbākarma akarmakāṇā- vamanikarta sānu.
3. Satrabh Hariṁ śvargaṁ gamanye. This is probably because the satrūs are both karta and karma with reference to the activity and result subsisting in them. But as the satru is not avatānta, it does not get kartṛ samjña.
According to the grammarian the न्वि suffix expresses the activity subsisting in the employing agency i.e. which causes the other to act to bring the particular activity congenial to the particular result. This prompting or inducting agency may be a human being or even an inanimate object. For instance ‘भिक्षक वसयति’ (Alms cause on to live) कार्यो अग्नि पाठयति (the fire from the dung cakes causes one to read).

The nature of its employment is of different varieties. Sometimes it may be in the form of command or polite request, or even of the form consent.

Thus the causal root ‘पति:’ denotes an activity of the person who induces another to bring in an activity congenial to the production of the result ‘विक्लित्ति’ subsisting in the object ‘ताप्लुिा’.

8. YAṆ (YA)

In the form Yaṅ the letter ṃ is a mute which indicates that the complex root takes अतमनुपाद suffixes. This suffix is enjoined after the simple verbal roots in the sense of totality of action (क्रियासमर्थिला) crookedness (कृत्लिय) and censure (गर्हित) as specified in the concerned sutras.

In the sense of ‘Totality of Action’ (क्रियासमर्थिला) :

This suffix is enjoined by पतिन after any root which has a single vowel and begins with a consonant to suggest the sense of ‘frequency or intensity’ of action signified by the root. Thus when we want to convey that ‘one cooks again and again (or

2. Anumātyādityād abhedaḥ apadesānugrahāyorupadānām. (Tat. Bo. under P.3.1.26).
frequently), the suffix Yaṅ is added to the root ‘Pac’ and the derived verb ‘Papacyate’ conveys that sense. Thus the complex verb (frequentative) ‘Jajwalyate’ gives us an import that ‘one shines very brilliantly. It should be noted that this suffix is appended to a single root without a prefix (upasarga). Otherwise reduplication to preposition also is to be affected.1 And if we consider the whole (upasarga and dhatu together) as a single unit and consider it as the root then it has lost the character of having a single vowel’.

Katyāyana, the Vartikakāra, however, states that this suffix is added after some specific roots which have either more than one vowel or a vowel in the beginning,2 to convey the same sense of ‘Kriyāsamabhīhāra’.

In the Sense of Crookedness :—

Pāṇini enjoins this suffix after the roots having the meaning of movement (Gati) to suggest the sense of ‘crookedness’ (Kauṭilya), and in the case of such roots, the suffix Yaṅ never suggests the sense of ‘Kriyāsamabhīhāra’. This is evident from the word ‘nitya’ in the aphorism.3 Thus the derived verbs Camkramyate (kram + yaṅ + te) and Vavravyate (vraja + yaṅ + te) etc., gives an import of the form that one moves crookedly. However, if the sense of ‘frequency or intensity’ of the action of this type of roots (gatyarthatvā) is to be conveyed, then separate words like Bhṛṣāṃ or purnaḥ puṇaḥ etc., should be used with the verb e.g., Bhṛṣāṃ kramati, pūṭaḥ puṇaḥ vrajati etc.

1. Dhatupasārasamudāyasya kriyāvisesāvagati hetutvā, tato yadi pratiyaya syat tataḥ sopasārgasya dvivacanaṁ prasajyeta, (Prajūpa on P.3.1.22.)
2. Sāti, satri, mātri, ati, ati, anotibhyo yaṅ. For the details of the verb form and meanings vide Kāśikāvṛtti on P 3.1.22
In the sense of 'Ceasure':—

Pāṇini enjoins this suffix after certain roots to suggest the sense of 'censuring the action (Bhāvagṛha). 1 Thus the root 'Lupa' (cut) when added to this suffix forms the derived verb Lo-lupya.tate and gives us the import of the form 'one cuts badly'.

YAñ. LUK FORMS:—

This suffix yañ elides itself after certain roots as governed by the Sūtra P.2.4.74. 2 Still the remaining entity itself is treated as a complex root and is enjoined with the verbal suffixes. This elision results in giving very peculiar forms. For instance take the simple root Bhā. Its yañanta form in the present tense third person singular number is 'Bhobhya.tate'; but its yañ luganta forms is either 'Bobhayiti or Bobhoti'. Of course these forms are not now frequently used by poets except to indicate their proficiency in grammar.

Thus yañ is a suggestive suffix. It generally suggests the petition or intensity of action denoted by the root after which it is appended. It also suggests under certain conditions either crookedness in motion or censure of action, denoted by the root concerned.

9. 'YAK (YA)

In this suffix 'Yak' the letter 'k' is a mute, and the actual suffix is 'YA' only.

This suffix is enjoined by Pāṇini after the words listed under the name 'Kāndvādigāna. 3

2. Yaño aci ca P.2.4.74.
3. Kāndvādibhya yak, P.3.1.27.
As regards the meaning of this suffix there exists differences of opinion between the old grammarians and the modern grammarians like Bhattoji etc. The old grammarians like Katkakrama agree of the view that the words read in this gana are all nominal stems and the suffix is enjoined after them in the sense of making (katham). Thus the verb 'Kendrayate' is explained by them as 'Kanda karou utkendrayate.' However this opinion is refuted by the modern grammarians.

According to the modern grammarians the words in this particular gana are treated either as nouns or verbal roots as the speaker intends. When they are treated as verbal roots they always take after them this suffix, before they are appended with Tin suffix just like correlative roots which take Nic suffix after them. This is how the modern grammarians argue. They further supplement their arguments that the root-hood to these words is indicated by the mute 'k' in the suffix 'Yak,' so that when this suffix is added to them no Gun or Vrddhi takes place. And the reading of words 'Kanitt' with an elongated vowel discloses that these words are nominal stems. Therefore, when these are treated as verbal roots, they always first take the suffix 'Yak' and then the Tin suffix. In this sense the suffix is purely suggestive.

30. AXY

This suffix is enjoined after only five roots viz., Gupa, Dhapa, Vicchi, Pani, Pani, in the sense of the root only. Thus the derived root is of the form Gopayya and the verb Gopayati gives us the import that 'one protects.' These roots take Parasvamadhyam suffix after them.

1. Ebhyo dhatubhyo nityaṃ yak vyayam svarthe (S.K. on P.3.1.27). For details vide Tattvabodhini commentary, Satabdvadikhyam etc. on P.3.1.27. Ubhayam Kendraydini, Dhatasva Pratipadikarni ca. (M.B. under P.3.1.27.)

11. ṢVAṆ (ĪYA)

This suffix is enjoined only after a single root Ṛṭi (to reproach or pity). This root is not read in any of the ten conjugations, except in the Sūtra P.3.1.29.¹ Such roots as this are known as aphoristical roots (Sautra dhātu). This suffix does not have any sense of its own but is enjoined in the sense of the root itself. The derived root Ṛṭiyā always takes the Ātmanepada suffixes. Thus the derived verb Ṛṭiyate gives us an import that 'one shows contempt or reproaches'.

12. NIṆ (I)

In the suffix Niṁ the letter N and ō are mutes and the actual suffix is 'ś' only.

This suffix Niṁ is enjoined after only three nominal stems and one simple root. The nominal stems after which this suffix is enjoined are Puccha (tail), Bhāṇḍa (Pot) cīvara (Rag). But on adding this suffix to them the derived roots have different meanings. They, as said by the Vārtikakāra are,²

1. In the sense of 'lifting up (the tail) or throwing it) about. Thus the derived verb utpucchayate, means 'one lifts up the tail, Paripucchayate means 'one throws about the tail'.

2. the derived verbal root Bhāṇḍa (Bhāṇḍāya) means to accumulate pots. Thus the derived verb 'Bhāṇḍāyate' means 'one accumulates pots'.

¹ P.3.1.29 Ṛṭeyāṁ Ṛṭih sāutraḥ ātmasādiyam ṣyāḥ svārthāḥ. Jugupsāyamayāṁ dhāturitī bahāvahūḥ kṛpayāṁ cetyeke-S.K. under P.3.1.29).
3. The derived verbal root ‘civari’ (civarāya) means to ‘wear or acquire’ rags. Thus the derived verb ‘civarāyate’ gives us an import that ‘one accumulates or wares rags’.

It is to be noted that all these meanings are spoken of those of the concerned derived roots only and thus the suffix is only suggestive of these meanings.

This suffix is enjoined only after a single verbal root ‘Kamu’ (Kāntau, kāntiriccha) in the sense of the verbal root only. Thus the derived verb ‘Kamayate’ means ‘one desires.’

Thus the introduction of these Sanskrit suffixes enriches the language to convey very subtle ideas with the utmost possible brevity.
Chapter IV

Section iv

UPASARGAS

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PREPOSITIONS (UPASARGĀH)

We have accepted that the word Ākhyaṭa means a fully inflected verb word (Tīhanta). And we find some verb words are prefixed by a particular entity called Upasarga (preposition). Since it also forms a part of the verb word let us have a discussion about its meaning, whether it is suggestive or expressive in nature.

Durgācārya explains this word in his commentary on the Nirukta as one which, on its association (or on being prefixed to) with verb or a noun generates a particularity (Viśesa) in the meaning of the following word (to which it is prefixed).1 The Bṛhaddevala also defines Upasarga in a similar way as introducing modification in the meaning of the nominal or verbal base.2 The Rk Prātisākhya endorses the same view.3 Peculiarly enough Pāṇini defines that the words Pra etc., which do not denote a substance (Dravya) and when in juxtaposition with the words denoting activity are called Upasargas.4 Patanjali, the Bhāṣyakara, maintains that Upasarga is one which brings about some speciality5 in the verb meaning. Kātyāyana explains Upasarga as one that when prefixed to a word denoting action, it expresses the special character of the action. Bharata Muni, the author of the Nāṭya Šastra also is of a similar view.6

1. Upetya nāmākhyaṭatayorarthasya Viśesāṁ Srjantyutpadayanti iṁ upasargāḥ (Durga under Nīr. 1.3).
2. Upasargastu vijñeyāṁ kriyayogena vimsatiḥ Vivācayanti tēnḥyarthāṁ Nāmākhyaṭa vibhaktiṣu. (Bṛḍ. 2-93)
3. Upasargō viṣeṣaṁ (Rk. Prā. XII-25.)
4. Upasargaḥ kriyavoge. P.1.4.59; Pradyah kriyavoge upasarga samjñā gati samjñāśca syuh. (S.Kr. under P.1.4.60.)
5. Kriyāviṣeṣaka upasargah. Upasargāśca punarevamātmakah yatra Kriyācaci sābda prayujyate tatra kriya viṣeṣaṁāhuh. (MB. 1.3-17)
6. Prādiṇiṣārthayuktam dhātvarthamupā srjanti ye swārthaiḥ. Upasargaḥ Upadīṣṭaḥ. (Nāṭya Sastra XV-26.)
Thus it is observed that an upasarga brings out a particularity or peculiarity in the meaning of the verb word to which it is prefixed. To this extent there is no difference of opinion among scholars. But the question before them is this:

1. Are we to hold that the meaning, obtained after prefixing the upasarga to a verb word is, as that of the upasarga itself or not.

2. Are we to accept that the entire meaning we obtain from the verb word (including the upasarga) is, as that of the verbal root itself and this upasarga is only a helper in comprehending that particular meaning denoted by the root just like a candle which helps us in picking up the required object from a group of objects lying in darkness. Or

3. Are we to consider that the entire meaning is that of the upasarga only and the root is a mere tatparya grāhaka that which makes us arrive at the import.

Thus to say in brief the question before the scholarly world is whether these upasargases are vacakas or dyotakas.

**The Meaning of Upasargases in General - A Discussion**

Regarding the nature of prepositions there are two divergent opinions since the remote past. This is evident from the statements recorded by the sage Yaska in his work, ‘The Nirukta’ the earliest available work, both on grammar and etymology. According to these statements Śākatāyana, a great grammarian holds that prepositions can not express any sense of their own but they simply serve to reveal the sense inherent in the word to which they are prefixed. On the contrary, the sage Gargya holds that the upasargases have an expressive sense, and different Upasargases

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1. Na Nirbuddha upasargā artham nirantaritī Śākatāyanaḥ. Nadiśhāya uvocet kanmopa samyogā dyotakē bhavanti. (Nir. 1-3.).
have different meanings. These two diverse theories have such a strong reasoning behind them that, through all these ages the scholarly world is divided in opinion and takes sides with one theory or the other. Yāśka himself upholds the view of Gārgya. Katyāyana and Patañjali follow the sage Sakatayana and fortify his views with their arguments. The latter grammarians, and the Logicians with a few exceptions, follow the theory that Upasargas are only revealers (Dyotaka) but not expressors (Vācakas). The arguments of different scholars advanced in support of their viewpoints are presented in brief hereunder.

THE VIEW OF SĀKATĀYANA:

According to Saçatayana prepositions, independently i.e. when they are not prefixed either to a noun or a verb, cannot express any sense, just in the same way as the letters taken out of a word, cannot express any meaning. Just as the different qualities like colour etc., of an object are revealed in the presence of a burning candle, in the same way a different meaning originally inherent in the word itself is made clear, or revealed where the particular word is prefixed with an Upasarga. Thus upasargas are only revealers.

Kātyayana follows Sākatayana's theory and strengthens it with his own argument that the nature of the preposition is to suggest the particular character of the action. Patañjali also supports and clarifies the contention of Kātyayana. He says that the verbs have many meanings and accordingly the same root e.g. "Stha" expresses both the meanings viz. stoppage of motion and the action of motion also. But the prepositions simply manifest the meaning to be denoted by the verb. Hence the nature of a preposition is to make explicit what is implicit in the root itself.

1. Uccāvaca Sah Padarthā bhavantī Gārgyaḥ, Tadya esu padar-thāḥ prha∪rime Tannamākhyatayorartha vikaranam (idid).
2. Ibib Durga's Commentary.
3. Kriyāviseṣeṣaṃ Dhātuh (M.B. on P.1.3.1).
THE VIEW OF BHARTRHARI:

Bhārtrhari specifically deals with this matter in detail in his *Akhyanātī*.* 1 At the very outset he offers three alternative solutions to the problem on hand. 1 The first alternative is that the prepositions with their juxtaposition suggest a specific peculiarity in the denotation of the verb, which peculiarity of meaning is not manifest from the root in the absence of the upasarga. For example, consider the word ‘Prapacati’.* 2 Here the sense intensity is due to the preposition ‘Prā’, and this preposition suggests what is not expressed by the mere root.* 3 The second solution is to accept upasarga as expressive of meaning. For instance, let us take the word ‘Pratisthate’. Here the root ‘Stā’ originally denotes ‘stoppage of motion’. But with the addition of the preposition we get the meaning of ‘being in motion’. Hence this meaning is due to the preposition but not that of the root and as such the upasarga are significant by nature.* 4 The third alternative is that the prepositions are used as auxiliaries because it is the preposition and the root together that denote the meaning one in conjunction with the other. In fact, the verbal root inclusive of the preposition becomes the verbal root.* 5 However Bhārtrhari finally decides that upasarga are revealers of the special meaning implicit in the root to which they are prefixed.* 6 He established following the two kinds of inferences. The syllogism concerned is this: The word ‘Prā’ suggestive of sense; since it is the word ‘Prā’ just like the word ‘Prā’ which is found in the aforesaid verbs like ‘Prapacati’.* 7 Thus by the inference of particular nature (Viṣayatattavānta), it is established that all prepositions like ‘Prā’ that have common character with the aforesaid ‘Prā’ which has the nature of suggesting the sense, are only suggestive of sense, *

1. V.P.-II.183 etc., Upasagarāṇaṃ bāndhakāṃ vījāyante praparādini.
2. V.P.-II.190 Savācako viṣeṣām.
3. V.P.-II.192 Aprayogesāṁ tabhyāmanarthakaṁ.
4. ‘Prā’ labhodvayacakāḥ, prasabdattāḥ, pūrvodita pacyādātā prasabdattā.
Similarly with the help of inference of generic nature (समान्यतो द्वेष) it can be established that the verb has different meanings. The syllogism in this regard is, in the following way. The root 'Sthā' has different meanings, since it is a root, like the root 'Yaj' which is accepted, as having different meanings, by both the parties. In this way with the help of inference of a seen generic nature (समान्यतो द्वेष) it can be established that the other verbs having a common character with the root 'Sthā' have different meanings. Thus since it is established that a root has many meanings, the root 'Sthā' can denote the meaning 'Stoppage of motion' and also 'the act of motion'. The preposition 'Pra' merely serves to reveal the particular sense. Hence Upasargs are only revealers (Dyotakas) but not signifiers (Vacakas).

THE VIEW OF KAUNDABHATTA AND BHATTOJI:

The later grammarians also followed the same theory and brought forth some more arguments to establish that the upasargs are mere revealers of the meanings of the words to which they are prefixed. They showed many instances that become incongruous in the acceptance of the view that the prepositions are significant. In the instance 'Prajayati' we get the comprehension of 'Distinguished victory'. This meaning 'Distinguished victory' is not the meaning of the preposition. If it were so, it, not being the meaning of the base to which the verbal affix 'Ti' is enjoined, the sense of the verbal affix (Ti) would not be syntactically connected with it (the meaning of the upasarga). For; the rule is that 'Terminations express their own sense syntactically connected with the sense of the base'. Further, in the instance 'Praśthate', it will not be possible to get the sense of motion, because the root 'Sthā' signifies 'Stoppage of motion' while the whole word comprehends 'motion'. Now if it is argued that 'Pra' has the sense of 'Distinguished' (as in the case of Prajayati)
then the word "Pratīṣṭhate" should signify "Distinguished stoppage of motion" but it is not the meaning concerned. On the other hand if it is accepted that the upasarga 'Pra' denotes 'absence' then in the instance 'Prajayati' also it should mean the same 'absence'; and as such in the present case the word should signify 'Absence of victory' but in fact it is not so. Hence accepting different meanings to the 'upasarga' at different places and creating various cause and effect relations to explain its agreement with the base, is a matter of prolixity.1 Nor can we accept that the upasarga and the root together form a new root, so that the new comprehension arising from such words can be treated as that of this new root; because no such formation is sanctioned by any grammarian, nay even Pāṇini. Therefore Kaṇḍākābhāṭṭa etc., argue that it is better to keep in line with Kātyāyana and the Bhāṣyakāra and accept that a root denotes many meanings2 but the preposition determines the particular meaning of the root suitable to the context. This nature of the preposition, revealing the meaning of the following base or word, is called 'Dyotakatva'.3

Further, in the instance 'Upāṣyate Guru' the like, let us accept that 'worship' is the sense of the preposition.4 In that case the root "Ās" cannot be used in the passive construction, because the root is intransitive. And no authority sanctions to enjoin lakāra after a preposition. So worship cannot be the meaning of the preposition. As a second alternative let us accept that the entire unit "Upās" be the root. But no such root or Ās with the combination of the preposition is read in the Dhātupāṭha. Hence 'Upās' not being the root by itself, no lakāra can be appended to it. If it be argued that the list of the roots is not

1. For details of argument vide Vai. Bhu.
2. Anekārthakāni Dhātavaḥ (Dhātenāmanekārthavāt). Bahvarthā api dhātavo bhavanti, (M.B. on P.1.3.1)
3. Dyotakatvā ca sva samabhivāyata padanīṣṭha śākyutbodhakatvām.
exhaustive but indicative, even then, there will be difficulty in the grammatical operations such as reduplication in Lit etc. and adding the augment ‘at’ in the case of Lakṣaṇa like Lāh Lūṅ Ḭrīṅ etc. But no such forms are found in the language. Hence the composite unit ‘Upas’ cannot be accepted as the root. Now let us take the only other alternative that the root ‘Ās’ only denotes the meaning ‘worship’ and the preposition is merely suggestive of the sense. In such a case the above mentioned inconsistencies do not arise. Therefore in view of all the advantages, it is better to admit that the prepositions are mere revealers (Dyotakas) and the root alone denotes the particular meaning.

Further, if the prepositions are accepted as expressive of sense, then we have to use them independently to denote the same sense as Bhāyān Pra to denote Bhāyān Prakāśaḥ and similarly ‘kjīśo ni’ in the sense of ‘kjīśo niscayaḥ’. But there are no such usages in vogue. And this type of incorrect usage will not be possible, because for the grammarian the prepositions have no meaning but they are simply suggestive. If it be held that it is judicious to give two different meanings to each of the two words on the grounds of parsimony, then on the same principle let the root itself have a secondary meaning in it i.e. ‘distinguished victory’ is the meaning of the root ‘ji’. Therefore the prepositions do not possess any denotive power in them.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa concurs with these arguments. He quotes the Rk pratiṣākhyā wherein it is stated that “The Upasargas are twenty in number and are expressive when conjointly uttered with other words”. From this it is evident that upasargas inde-
pendently cannot denote anything, hence non-denotative; but because they bring in some change or peculiarity in the meaning of the word following them, they are called revealers (Dyotakas). Thus all the grammarians accept that upasargas are revealers (Dyotaka) but not signifiers (vacaka).

THE VIEW OF MIMAMSAKA :—

The Mimamsakas are also of the same opinion that the prefixes are mere revealers. This is evident from the statement of Kumarilabhatta. He says that though the words are divided into four kinds viz., Nouns, Verbs, Prepositions and Particles, yet it is only the first two that are taken into consideration because, it is only with regards to the denotation of these and not that of prepositions and particles, that certain doubts are found to arise.1 specially prepositions and particles do not, by themselves, serve to denote any substance and they only serve to manifest the meanings of Nouns and Verbs which are really expressive. This line of thought of Kumarila is followed by all the latter mimamsakas.

THE VIEW OF THE LOGICIAN :—

The logician also argues that Upasargas cannot have any independent denotation of their own but simply reveal of the peculiar meaning inherent in the following word.

The author of the "Mandarpana" argues that the prepositions are not denotive. The argument of a few scholars who propose that the prepositions are denotive and the concerned root itself is the Tatparyagrahaka, leads to absurdity. For instance in the word ‘Pratishtate’ if the preposition alone is denotive and the root is Tatparyagrahaka, then the ‘effort’ meaning, denoted by the Ta suffix, has to agree with that of the preposition but not with that of root (because the root meaning is not primary), and

such an agreement is not in common experience. Hence it is to be admitted that root alone is denotative but not the preposition. Of course it may be urged that "in the present instance the root denotes "action contrary to movement" and the 'effort' meaning of the Tāṁ suffix agrees with it and the preposition 'Prā' denotes its absence and thus there is no irregularity of the agreement". But this argument is not wise, because in such a case the verbal import we get from the word Pratīsthate will be of the form "one possessing the absence of effort whose (effort) theme is the activity opposed to going not of the form where the meaning of the root is attributive to yatna" as in the case of the import from the word Gacchati.¹ And the former is contrary to our experience. Hence upasargas are not denotative of any meaning but only suggestive.

Some people argue that the root Sthā in the instance Pratīsthate denotes the opposite meaning "movement" by implication (Laksana) and the preposition is only a tātparya grahaka. But this argument also is not logical because in such a case, in the sentence "Ghato Na", it may be argued on the same lines "the absence of ghata" as the meaning of the word ghata itself and Na is only a Tātparya grahaka, but no body accepts this. Hence it is not wise to accept denotational potency to prepositions.

Jagadeśa clearly says that prepositions are not denotative of any meaning.² Even the Mañikāra is also of the same opinion.³ Thus according to logicians in general an upasarga is non-denotative of sense.

2. Pradāyastupasargad Na Sarthakaḥ. Sarthakaschennipatapi (Sā. Sa' Psa.).
3. The view of the Mañikāra was contradicted by the author of Tarkatāndava (Tev. Tān. P.107-108).
UPASANYAS AS SIGNIFIERS:

In the foregoing pages we have observed how the various scholars tried to establish that upasanyas are revealers (Dyotakas). Now, the various arguments of scholars justifying signification of the prefixes are summarised hereunder: As already said Gargya is the earliest known scholar favouring the theory of signification of the prefixes.

THE VIEW OF GARGYA:

Durgacarya, elaborating the theory of Gargya, observes that a peculiar modification of the sense occurs in the meaning of the verb or noun when the preposition is prefixed to them, but in the absence of these prepositions no such modified sense is comprehended from the pure verb or noun. Thus it is clear from this fact in 'affirmation and negation' that the prefixes are signifiers. Whatever additional sense is observed that additional sense is to be accepted as the meaning of the preposition. Just as a noun word or a verb word has many meanings, in the same way, a single preposition can have many meanings. Thus the preposition Pra etc. are found to denote the meaning intensity (Bhrśatva) even independently.

Now as regards the argument that 'the prepositions when they are detached from the noun or the verb do not convey any meaning, just like the letters constituting words' also is wrong; because it cannot be accepted that the individual letters are without meaning. On the other hand it is observed that letters have a capacity of signifying objects. It is just like the particles of clay possessing indiscriminately the potentiality of making the clay jar.

1. Vijayutamapi namākhyātābhyaśāmiti tadyathā, 'Pra' ityādi. karmanī bhrśāthe ityabhidhāne saktirasteyamā. dyupalakātāvāyam. (Durga under Nir. 1-3.5)
2. Yatpuḍaṭṭādoktaṁ vanaṇāṇi - anabhupagamati ayuktām (Durga under Nir. 1-3-5).
and when they constitute the jar, the potentialities that were latent in them, become manifest and the jar becomes manifest, so also, all the letters constituting a word possess the potentiality of denoting meaning in general (without any specification) and when they combine to constitute a word they denote a specific meaning. Further a word consisting of meaningless letters cannot be meaningful just as the cloth, made of yarn which is not white, cannot be white. Thus this simple argument that letters are not individually meaningful leads to a great undesirable consequence. Therefore, it is to be admitted that letters have meanings, so also these prepositions also have their own meaning.

Further, the argument that 'like the lamp, which makes us perceive the various objects existing in a dark room, the prepositions too bring out the different meanings latent in the word that follows them' cannot be accepted. The lamp, having its own illumination, while helping us perceive the various objects, makes itself also perceivable by its illuminating potentiality. Likewise, prepositions too have their own signification and thus they do through their own substratum viz., the noun or the verb.1 Thus from the above arguments it is clear that the prepositions are meaningful and are expressive of sense. Further it should not be urged that the peculiarity in the meanings signified by the noun or verb in combination with the preposition, is the signification of the particular noun or the verb itself, because it is a matter of experience that one capable of discharging his own duties does not require the help of another person. But here the noun and the verb are in need of the help rendered by the preposition to signify a particular meaning. Hence it can be concluded that the particular meaning denoted by the word should be that of the element other than the noun or the verb. In the present context, that element is none other than the preposition itself. Hence it is proper to conclude that the preposition signifies a particular meaning which qualifies the meaning of the following noun or

1. Evam Upasargaḥ arthavantopi santaḥ svārthābhidhāna saktimaneke prakāram vidyāmānāmapi svārthābhidhāna sakti yadhā rabhāte namākhya te pratyāyyabhivyānajayeyuḥ. (Nir. 1.3.5).
verb and in some cases, it can change the entire meaning of the verb and signify a new meaning as in the case of "Pratikyate". Hence, Gargya concludes that the prepositions signify particular actions and the verb expresses action in general.

Vyasatirtha, the author of the Tarkatandava vehemently opposes the view that prepositions are mere ayotakas but not vācakas. He states at length to establish that prepositions are signifiers (vācakas) of certain meanings. The various arguments put forward by him are as follow:

Take the word 'Prajyata' which means "one has a profound victory". The root 'ji' denotes victory. So the additional sense of 'profound' is understood only after prefixing the upasarga 'Pra' to the root 'ji'. Therefore, the additional meaning is that of the preposition 'Pra'. Similarly, the other prepositions are also significant of their particular meanings. The author of the Mani argues that prepositions have the nature of suggesting the meaning concerned i.e., upasandana which means delimiting the potentiality of the verbal root. But Vyasatirtha does not accept this view of the Manikara. He argues that signification like intensity etc., to the prepositions 'Pra' and the like, is observed by the process of inclusion and exclusion (Avāpa.udvāpa), as we find in the case of words 'go' etc. The meaning intense victory is comprehended from the root 'ji' which has a fixed signification "victory" only in the proximity of the preposition 'Pra'. It cannot be urged that the entire sense "intense victory" is the meaning of the verb "jayati" itself. This type of argument involves prlixity. For in sentences like Suklaṃ Gamanaya, (bring the white cow) we have to admit that the word 'cow' itself indicates "white cow" and the word white (Sukla) is only suggestive. Thus you cannot attribute any signification to a qualifying word; it can be treated only as a

1. Tasmadupapannamupasargasya kriyavinersarthah, kriyasamanayamakhyatayati. (Durge under Nir. 1.3.5).
revealer and the entire qualified meaning is that of the qualified, which, none with commonsense accepts.

Further, if it cannot be argued that since prepositions are incapable of denoting meaning by themselves, they are accepted as suggestive of sense; because, if ‘not being capable of denoting meaning independently’, alone be the criterion for being meaningless, then even words like ‘Ca’ ‘iva’ ‘Eva’, the base, the affix etc. should be admitted as meaningless. This cannot be admitted. So the contention “that which ever cannot give an independent signification is suggestive or meaningless” is wrong. Now it may be questioned that if prepositions are considered expressive, can a simple preposition express the meaning for itself, and why does it require the combination with the verb etc. To this the author replies that the preposition never requires the help of the verb to signify its own meaning. But it requires the presence of a verb just to have the appellation “upasarga”, since preposition-hood (upasargatva) is enjoined in the presence of a verb only; just as the base and the affix need mutual help for their own correctness of form according to the maxim “neither the base alone nor the affix alone is to be independently used,” it is better to admit that by the process of “inclusion and exclusion” the word ‘Pra’ in the instance “Prajayate” signifies intensity and the verb ‘Ji’ signifies victory.

Further one may argue that the root ‘Sthā’ normally is fixed in the meaning “stoppage of motion”, but it denotes “the action of motion” by secondary signification, when it is preceded by the preposition ‘Pra’ because there exists incompatibility (virodha) with the expressed meaning. Similarly in the instance ‘Prajayate’ the meaning “intense victory” is the meaning got through the secondary signification when the root “Ji” is preceded by the preposition ‘Pra’. Thus there is no need to accept a separate

1. Na copasargasyāpi saktatve dhātvapekṣā na syāditi vācyāṁ, Prakṛti pratyaśabhyāṁ pratyaya prakṛtyorivopasargena sādhutvārthameva dhātorapekṣāṁ nārthabodhanārtha manapekṣāt. (Tar. Var. Vol.iii)
signification for the prepositions”. But this argument is not logical, because in instances like “Anubhāvatī” and “Pariśamati” etc., there is no relation consistent with the signed meaning even in the form of incompatibility (virodha). And if it is tried to establish some sort of relation with the signed meaning, let that be adopted in the case of the word “Pra” also and let it signify the act of motion in the instance “Pratikṣhate” through secondary signification. Further the question of taking recourse to secondary signification arises only in instances like “Gangāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ” where both the words together are treated as a single sentence and they express a unitary meaning. But it is not the case with upasargas. Hence this argument is untenable. Therefore Vyāsa-tīrtha concludes that prepositions are expressive and they signify their own meanings.¹

Mahimabhaṭṭa, author of the Vyaktiviveka, also is of the same view. His line of argument is also more or less on the same lines of Āvāpa-udvāpa or Anvaya-vyatireka. Further according to him the opponent may argue that roots like ‘pac’ etc. are denotative of action in general. It is an accepted fact that generality includes particularity.² Consequently on the comprehension of generality, the particularity also amounts to have been apprehended, but their specific nature of the particularity is revealed only in the presence of the upasarga. Therefore in the instances like ‘Prapacate’, the particularity of the meaning in the form of “intense cooking” is made known by the root in the presence of the upasarga. Thus it is better the opponent holds to accept the suggestiveness of the prepositions negating expressive capacity to them.

Of course every word denotes a particularity and generality. These two are like the two sides of a coin. But the speaker’s enthusiasm is not satisfied by denoting that much of the particularity in the meaning. He wants to further qualify this

¹ Tasmād upasargaḥ svārtho saktāḥ eva. Oopit p.108.
² Nirvīṣeṣam Na sāṁnyāsāṁ bhavecchaśavisāṅavat.
particularity by other words which we generally call adjectives. For instance the word 'cow' denotes the generality 'cowhood' and also 'an individual cow' in particular. But we qualify it by using an adjective as a white or, black etc. So also in the case of verb words, though some particularity is expressed by the verb word itself, an upasarga qualifies that particular nature of the activity as quickly, frequently etc. This additional sense of qualification is expressed by the upasargas like Pra etc. Now with the help of concomittance in 'Affirmation and Negation', it can easily be proved that the exclusive (or additional sense of) particularity in question is secured from the prepositions like 'Pra' etc. but not from mere verb words. Thus it is established upasargas are signifiers. Otherwise in instances like 'Nīlotpala' the word 'Nīla' becomes an indicator (Dyotaka), because the word 'Utpala' itself denotes both generality and particularity. As a result, the relation of 'the qualifier to the qualified' which is actually experienced between the two meanings of the words Nīla and Utpala will be rendered impossible.4

And as regards the arguments that upasargas are dyotakas Mahimabhaṭṭa says that it is due to misunderstanding of the fact or ut most they can be treated as suggestive of the meaning (dyotakas) only in a secondary sense i.e. to serve some grammatical operations etc. But by that a word cannot lose its expressive nature.3 Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes that the upasargas are expressive.


Among the Mimamsakas, Gagabhatta, the author of the Bhattacintamani, is also in favour of the view that the upasargas are expressive. He rejects the other view on the ground of proxility. If it is argued that the upasargas are suggestive, then one has to admit two potentialities, (primary and secondary) for the root—one in the absence of the preposition and the other in the presence of the preposition. Further a separate suggestive potentiality for the preposition is also to be accepted. And such an acceptance leads to proxility. Thus in view of the various arguments put forward, it is better to accept that the prepositions are all expressive of sense.¹

Another scholar Sítikantha, the author of the 'Tarkaprakāśa', expresses a peculiar view. According to his opinion some of the prepositions which do not convey any meaning through primary denotative power are suggestive of sense, as in the instance "Pra sāte". And where they are found to convey some meaning through a pramāṇa there only such prepositions are said to be expressive as in the instance "upakumbhaṃ". Thus it seems he opines that there is no hard and fast rule regulating the expressive capacity or suggestive capacity to upasargas. Therefore such a conclusion arrived at, with the help of usages avoids all the difficulties in determining the nature of the prepositions.²

JAYANTABHATTA'S VIEWS:—

Jayantabhatta, the author of the Nyāyamanjari, also is of similar opinion. He says that prepositions prefixed to a verb word, attribute some peculiarity to the meaning of the verb, and

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1. Anyeto Dhatau śaktijakṣayoh upasargasmabhivyāhara, tadabhāva hetukatvāya, upasargānāṃ dyotakatvaśkeṣa kalpanayaāṃ gauravat, vācakataiva yukta. (Bha. Cin. 

agree with it as a qualifier. Of course in certain cases an upasarga may entirely change the meaning of the verb and give an opposite meaning as in Pratisthate. Even then the Upasarga, only qualifies the meaning of the root by particularising it from the various meanings denoted by a root. Further Jayantabhatta says that the meaning of the preposition can be decided by following the process of "Anvaya-Vyatireka". And as regards the fact that such an understanding is caused by a preposition by being expressive or suggestive is immaterial. Thus Jayantabhatta seems to admit that prepositions have their own meanings.

In view of the various arguments presented for and against the denotation of Upasargas, it is better to accept expressive meaning through a pramana. Otherwise we can safely conclude that they are suggestive.

Here ends the meaning of verbal root (Dhatu). now let us investigate the meaning of the verbal affix (Pratyaya) in the second part of the book.

THE END OF PART-I


2. Tadagame tatpratiteh tadabhave tadagrahat. Te tu kim Vacakah sarve tadavagatimupadadhati kim va iti.kimanena? (Nyayasamajjari P.299).