GLEANINGS FROM THE

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Sri Ramanuja laid down six great commandments. Of them, the first commandment is that every Srivaisnava shall read and propagate the SrIbhAsya.

On the face of it, it may look rather odd for someone to direct his disciples to read his own work, rather than directing them to read the works of his predecessors and preceptors.

But it is not for nothing that Ramanuja issued such a commandment. First, it is not of his volition that Ramanuja composed the bhAsya. He wrote it only to fulfill the wish of Yamuna, who desired that the Brahmasutra-s of Veda Vyasa, be commented upon and projected in their proper light, so that people could know the true inner spirit of the Upanisad-s. Only then they could adopt the proper means to mukti.

Hence Ramanuja recommended the study of SrIbhAsya, not because it is his work, but because it is the true guiding light to the aspirant, for liberation.

But how far his commandment is followed today, is a big question. It is certainly not because of any apathy or even unwillingness on the part of the present day people to the study of SrIbhAsya today. It is in fact a matter of great solace that people still feel the need to take to the study of great old treasures like the SrIbhAsya. But unfortunately, they are greatly handicapped, because of their lack of knowledge of Sanskrit.
While we pray to the Almighty and also endeavour, in what little way we could through our centre, to promote the study of Sanskrit and also specialised subjects in it like Nyāya, Vyākarana and Mīmāṁsā we also try to bring out treasures from great works like the Śrībhāṣya in other languages, especially in Tamil and English in order to cater to the need of people, who lack a knowledge of Sanskrit but have a heart, nay, a burning desire to learn classics like the Śrībhāṣya.

With that in mind, we are now publishing the work “Gleanings from the Śrībhāṣya”, which is an attempt to present the cardinal tenets of the Rāmānuja school, based on a study of the Śrībhāṣya.

The work originally formed the Doctoral Thesis of the author, approved by the University of Madras.

We now feel glad to bring it out as our publication, seeing its merit, and also in accordance with our commitment to encourage young scholars to do research in Viśiṣṭādvaīta.

We hope that our readers will receive it well and encourage us to bring out more such publications and serve the cause of Viśiṣṭādvaīta.

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Chairman
Viśiṣṭādvaīta Research Centre
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PREFACE

The Philosophy of Râmânuja marks in a way a resurrection of the Upanishadic teachings, after the advent of the Idealistic and the other schools.

In fact, immediately after the establishment of the Advaita by Śaṅkara, serious and vehement attempts were made by philosophers like Bhâskara to dislodge it from the place of importance it assumed. But such attempts could not succeed because the alternate philosophies offered were either equally unsatisfactory or still worse. Their failure perhaps enhanced the prestige of Advaita more.

It ultimately took a Râmânuja to check the spread of this idealistic theory, question its validity on the basis of both logical reasoning and scriptural exegesis and offer a concrete alternate philosophy that meets the demands of the head and the heart, at once. And his philosophy has not only come to stay, but also has spearheaded the birth of numerous other schools, that seek to establish the supremacy of God and the reality of the world.

Being such a great school, it is but natural that the school of Râmânuja has been studied in detail and given systematic exposition by great scholars like Prof. S.S.Raghavachar, P.N. Srinivasachari and others.
Nevertheless, a clear presentation of the basic philosophical position of the Râmânuja school, based on a study of his Śrībhâṣya, in contradistinction to the views of rival schools, as presented in the Śrībhâṣya, remained much of a desideratum.

In addition, there were also attempts, of late, not only to offer defence against the attacks by Śrībhâṣya on Advaita, but even to criticize the Śrībhâṣya.

Such works have received befitting replies from great stalwarts like Uttamûr Veeraraghavacârya, D.T.Tâtâcârya, et. al.

But what is of importance to us is that a study of some of the criticisms shows that there is either a general lack of understanding or an unwillingness to understand Râmânuja in his true spirit.

Hence an attempt is now made in this work to present the basic philosophical position of Râmânuja, as could be gleaned from his Śrībhâṣya.

It is nothing but sheer grace of God that made it possible for me to learn the Śrībhâṣya at the lotus feet of the late Śri.U.Ve.Velukkuḍi Varadâcârya Swâmy, an unparalleled exponent of the philosophy of Râmânuja, in recent times. In fact, his stimulating lectures on the Śrībhâṣya were one of the predominant causes in inspiring me to take up a study of the Śrībhâṣya, for my Doctoral thesis.
Subsequently I had the good fortune of learning the Śrībhāṣya along with its commentary, the Sṛutaprakāśikā at the lotus feet of His Holiness, the present (45th) Pontiff of the Ahobila Mutt (while His Holiness was in his pūrvāśrama) and also under Śri U.Ve.Purisai Kṛṣṇamācārya Swāmy and Śrī U.Ve.Chetlur Śrivatsānākācārya Swāmy.

My present study under Śrī U.Ve.P.M. Cakravarty Ācārya Swāmy, a peerless master in Nyāya and Vedānta has also been of immense help in a more thorough understanding of the Rāmānuja school and in my revising some of the portions of my thesis.

I pay my homage and reverential prostrations to all these illustrious Ācārya-s.

The present work originally formed the thesis for my Doctoral Degree, approved by the University of Madras.

The thesis was prepared under the general guidance of Dr.N.Veezhinathan, Professor and Head, Department of Sanskrit, University of Madras. I thank him for the broad plan he suggested and also for his valuable criticisms.

I was greatly benefited by the writings of numerous authors, but it is impossible for me to name them all.
I am extremely beholden to my esteemed guru Prof. M. Narasimhachary, Head of the Department of Vaishnavism, University of Madras for his invaluable suggestions and for his kind Foreword.

My good friends Śrī. C. Râghâvan and Dr. N. Sujâtâ and my wife Smt. S.Ushâ were of immense help during the preparation of the thesis. I am ever indebted to them.

I am greatly indebted to Prof. Anantan, Prof. of English, R.K.M. Vivekananda College, who went through the entire manuscript and offered invaluable suggestions.

I am also immensely thankful to Dr. M.A.Venkatakrishnan, Reader, Department of Vaishnavism, University of Madras, who helped me in numerous ways during the publication of this work.

In spite of all these, but for the efforts of Prof. K.V.Varadarajan, Prof. of Economics, R.K.M. Vivekananda College it would not at all have been possible to publish the work. Being the son of Sri. U.Ve. Kârapaṅgâdu Venkatâcârya Swâmy my guru’s guru, he was very keen to see that the work on Śrībhâsyā is published at the earliest. I pray to God for his and his family’s well-being
I am extremely thankful to Śrī S.V.S. Raghavan, Chairman, Viśiṣṭādvaita Research Centre, for undertaking this publication.

I am also extremely thankful to Śrī. U.Ve.A.Krishnamachary of Śrī Vaishnava Śrī for giving free access to his computer at any time I wanted.

My cousin Śrī. S.Ramesh and my good friend Śrī. P.T. Srinivasan, were of immense help during the preparation of the thesis. I record my deep sense of gratitude to them.

P.NARASIMHAN
CONTENTS

FOREWORD
PUBLISHERS' NOTE
PREFACE
ABBREVIATIONS

CHAPTER 1

PROLOGUE 1-20
1.1. ABOUT THE UPANIŚAD-S 1-2
1.2. THE NEED FOR MĪMĀṂSĀ 2-3
1.3. ABOUT MĪMĀṂSĀ 3-4
1.4. ABOUT BRAHMASŪTRA-S 4-6
1.5. THE BRAHMASŪTRA-S - AN OVERVIEW 7-16
1.6. THE BHĀṢYA-S OF ŚAṆKARA AND RĀMĀNUJA 16-18
1.7. A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE WORK 18-20

CHAPTER 2

NATURE OF REALITY 21-110
2.0. INTRODUCTION 21-22
2.1. APPROACH TO REALITY - THE ADVAITA VIEW 23-31
  2.1.1. THE NIRGUṆA AND THE SAGUṆA TEXTS : RELATIVE STRENGTH 28-29
  2.1.2. THE APACCHEDA NYĀYA 29-31
2.2. POLEMICS OF THE ADVAITINS 31-45
  2.2.1. PERCEPTION DOES NOT COMPREHEND DIFFERENCE 31-32
  2.2.2. CRITIQUE OF DIFFERENCE 33-34
2.2.3. ILLUSORINESS OF THE WORLD ON LOGICAL GROUNDS 34-36
2.2.4. EXISTENCE IS KNOWLEDGE 36-37
2.2.5. PERCEPTION ELUCIDATED 37-38
2.2.6. KNOWLEDGE IS INVARIABLY SELF-MANIFEST 38-39
2.2.7. KNOWLEDGE IS ETERNAL AND ESSENTIALLY UNDIFFERENTIATED: SOME ARGUMENTS 39-42
2.2.8. SELF-DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTENT OF I-COGNITION 42-45

2.3. THE OBJECTIONS 46-78
2.3.1. ATTRIBUTELESS BRAHMAN - AN IMPOSSIBILITY 46-47
2.3.2. SABDA DOES NOT PROVE A NIRVIŠEṢA VASTU 47-50
2.3.3. PERCEPTION COMPREHENDS ONLY A SAVIŠEṢAVASTU 50
2.3.4. NIRVIKALPAKA AND SAVIKALPAKA PRATYAKṢA DEFINED 51-52
2.3.5. ANUMĀṆA CANNOT COMPREHEND A NIRVIŠEṢAVASTU 52
2.3.6. IN DEFENCE OF DIFFERENCE 53-55
2.3.7. ON THE IDENTITY OF SAMSTHĀNA, JĀṬI AND BHEDA 55-59
2.3.8. ILLUSORINESS-UNINTELLIGIBILITY OF THE ADVAITIC ARGUMENTS 59-61
2.3.9. SELF-LUMINOSITY OF KNOWLEDGE - RĀMĀṆUJA'S VIEW 61-64
2.3.10. ON THE ETERNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: UNTENABILITY OF THE ADVAITIC VIEW 64-66
2.3.11. THE SELF IS THE CONTENT OF I-COGNITION 66-70
2.3.12. JṆĀṬRTVA EXPLAINED 70-78
2.4. NATURE OF REALITY
2.4.1. THE RĀMĀNUJA VIEW
2.4.2. CONCEPTION OF ONENESS
2.4.3. CREATION OF FORMS AND NAMES -
   THE TEJODHIKARĀṇA
2.4.4. INTERPRETATION OF THE SCRIPTURAL PASSAGES
   2.4.4.1. PASSAGES THAT NEGATE DULATITY -
   EXEGESIS OF SUDARŚANA SŪRI

CHAPTER 3
THE NATURE OF THE SOUL
3.0. INTRODUCTION
3.1. THE SĀṆKYA VIEW
   3.1.1. REFUTATION OF THE SĀṆKYA VIEW
3.2. THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW
   3.2.1. REFUTATION OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW
3.3. THE ADVAITA VIEW
   3.3.1. REFUTATION OF THE ADVAITA VIEW
3.4. RĀMĀNUJA'S VIEW
   3.4.1. THE SOUL IN RELATION TO BRAHMAN
   3.4.2. THE SOUL AS ETERNAL
   3.4.3. THE ATOMIC NATURE OF THE SELF
   3.4.4. THE SOUL AS A KNOWER
   3.4.5. THE SOUL AS AN AGENT
   3.4.6. AGENCY OF THE SOUL DEPENDENT UPON GOD
   3.4.6.1. FREEWILL AND FATALISM
   3.4.6.2. AN OBJECTION
   3.4.6.3. A FURTHER OBJECTION
3.5. IS ŚĀNKARA'S VIEW FAVOURED IN THE
   BRAHMASŪTRA-S? - A REVIEW
CHAPTER 5

THE NATURE AND MEANS OF LIBERATION 192-234

5.1. INTRODUCTION 192-193

5.2. ŚAṆKARA’S VIEW 194-204

5.2.1. THE NATURE OF LIBERATION 194-195

5.2.2. THE CONCEPT OF ŽĪVANMU KT I 195-196

5.2.3. MEANS OF LIBERATION 197-204

5.2.3.1. KNOWLEDGE - THE SOLE MEANS TO LIBERATION 197-202

5.2.3.2. THE ROLE OF KARMA 202-204

5.3. RĀMĀNUJA’S VIEW 204-234

5.3.1. THE NATURE OF LIBERATION 204-213

5.3.2. MEANS OF LIBERATION 213-218

5.3.3. SENTENCE MEANING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE MEANS TO LIBERATION 218-220

5.3.4. CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF ŽĪVANMU KT I 221-222

5.3.5. DO UPANIŠAD-S ADVOCATE JñĀNA AS DIFFERENT FROM DHYĀNA? 222-225

5.3.6. THE ROLE OF KARMA 225-231

5.3.7. IS LIBERATION POSSIBLE HERE? 231-234

EPILOGUE 235-238

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 239-247

ANUBANDHAḤ (APPENDIX) (QUOTATIONS IN SANSKRIT) 247-266
CHAPTER 4

THE NATURE OF THE WORLD

4.1. INTRODUCTION 149-150

4.2. THE NYĀYA THEORY OF CAUSATION 150

4.3. THE SĀNKHYA THEORY OF CAUSATION 151-152

4.4. THE ADVAITA THEORY OF CAUSATION 152-154

4.5. RĀMĀNUJA’S VIEW 155-183

4.5.1. CREATION IS DESTRUCTION  
DESTRUCTION IS CREATION 158-160

4.5.2. DEFINITIONS OF SATTVAS AND ASATTVAS 160-163

4.5.3. CAUSE OF THE WORLD- RĀMĀNUJA’S  
REFUTATIONS OF OTHERS’ VIEWS 163-167

4.5.4. THE CAUSE ACCORDING TO RĀMĀNUJA  
167-174

4.5.5. CAN CAUSALITY OF BRAHMAN BE REPUDIATED? 174-183

4.5.5.1. CAN CAUSE AND EFFECT BE  
ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT? 175-177

4.5.5.2. DOES MATERIAL CAUSALITY OF BRAHMAN  
INVOLVE CONTRADICTION? 178-181

4.5.5.3. CAN THERE BE A PURPOSE FOR BRAHMAN  
CREATING THE WORLD? 182-183

4.6. IS THE WORLD A MERE ILLUSION? 183-191

4.6.1. ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM MĀYĀ:  
THE SANDHYĀDHIKARĀNA 186-191
ABBREVIATIONS

A.S. - Adhikaranâsaśārâvali
Ait. Up. - Aitareyopanîśad
B.G. - Bhagavadgītā
B.G.B.R. - Bhagavadgītâbhâṣya of Śrī Râmânuja
B.S. - Brahmâsūtra-s
B.S.S.B. - Brahmâsūtrasaṁkarabhâṣya
Br.Up. - Brhadaranyakopanîśad
Ch.Up. - Chândogypopanîśad
G.S. - Gûdhârthasaṅgrahâḥ
J.S. - Jaiminisūtra-s
Kaṭh. Up. - Kaṭhopanîśad
M.S. - Manu Smṛti
Muṇḍ. Up. - Muṇḍakopanîśad
Nr.Tâp. Up. - Nrîsimha Tâpaniyopanîśad
Pra. Up. - Pṛaśnopanîśad
S.B. - Śrîbhâṣya
S.K. - Sâṅkhya-kârikâ
Ś.P. - Śrutapraṇâśikâ
S.T.K. - Sâṅkhya-Tattvâ-Kaumudî
Sub. Up. - Subalopanîśad
Śvet. Up. - Śvetâśvataropanîśad
Tai.Ānand - Taittâriya Ānandavalli
Tai.Ār.Pur.Sū - Taittâriya Āraṇyaka - Puruṣa Sûkta
Tai.Nâ.Anu - Taittâriya Nârâyaṇa Anuvâka
V.P. - Viṣṇupurâṇa
V.S - Viśistâdvaitasiddhih
CHAPTER I

PROLOGUE

An attempt is made in the present work to present the philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja as could be gleaned from the Ś Śrībhāṣya, his celebrated commentary on the Brahmasūtra-s. The Brahmasūtra-s lay down the principles of interpretation of the Upaniṣad-s. Hence the Ś Śrībhāṣya too, in the ultimate analysis, seeks to give the philosophy of the Upaniṣad-s.

1.1 ABOUT THE UPAŅIṢAD-S

The Upaniṣad-s form the concluding portion of the Veda-s, which are believed to be revealed and eternal. The Veda-s thus possess two unique characteristics - nityatva and apauruṣeyatva. Since the Upaniṣad-s constitute the concluding section of the Veda-s, they are also referred to as Vedānta-s. Generally the term Veda is used to refer to the section excluding the Upaniṣad-s and the term Vedānta to denote the Upaniṣad-s, though they from a single unit and share common characteristics. The Veda-s and the Upaniṣad-s are also known as Pūrvakāṇḍa or Karmakāṇḍa and Uttarakāṇḍa or Brahmakāṇḍa respectively. As the names themselves suggest, the Karmakāṇḍa deals predominantly with the various sacrificial rites (Karma-s) and the Brahmakāṇḍa with Brahman, the Ultimate Reality.

The Veda-s which thus are divided broadly into Pūrva and Uttarakāṇḍa-s are mainly concerned
with the four-fold ends of human endeavour (purusārtha-s) namely, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. While the Pūrvakāṇḍa primarily deals with the first three goals, the Uttarakāṇḍa is chiefly mokṣa-oriented.

Further the Brahmakāṇḍa or the Upaniṣad-s indulge also in philosophical inquiries such as the nature of the soul, of God, etc. They mainly speak of the entity called Brahman which, according to them, is immanent everywhere and is the source, the sustainer and the redeemer of the entire universe and also is its absolute controller.

1.2 THE NEED FOR MĪMĀŚMĀ

The plurality of the Upaniṣad-s and the complex and diverse topics dealt with in them make it difficult to know their exact significance, which thus calls for a systematic inquiry into them. Similarly the Veda-s also need to be inquired into in order to determine their chief import. Such an inquiry is known as Mīmāṁsā.

The term mīmāṁsā which means inquiry involves a sense of reverence in regard to the subject inquired into (pūjya viṣaya vicāro mīmāṁsā). The mīmāṁsā regarding the pūrvakāṇḍa is called the Pūrvamīmāṁsā or Karmamīmāṁsā, and that concerning the Upaniṣad-s is called the Uttaramīmāṁsā. The latter is known by several other names also, such as Śārīrakamīmāṁsā, Brahmamīmāṁsā, Brahmaṇasūtra-s, etc., but the name Brahmaṇasūtra-s has gained much popularity, by which name only the treatise shall be referred to in the present work.
There are reasons for the work being called by each name. Since Brahman forms the subject matter of the work, it is called *Brahmanīmāṃśā* and as it is aphoristic in style it is designated as *Brahmasūtra*-s. Regarding the name *Śarīrakamīmāṃśā*, however, there is a bit of controversy, which incidentally, could be settled only if the authentic purport of the work itself is determined.

The controversy is in respect of the sense of the term *Śarīraka*. Śaṅkara construes this term as conveying the soul, which abides in the *śarīra* (body), which in the ultimate analysis is Brahman itself. As the soul dwells in the *śarīra*, it is called the *śarīra*, and the *mīmāṃśā* concerning it is called *Śarīrakamīmāṃśā*.

According to Rāmānuja, however, the term *śarīra* stands for Brahman, to whom the entire universe consisting of sentient and insentient entities forms the *śarīra* (body). Hence Brahman is called *Śarīra*, and the *Śāstra* speaking about the *śarīra* is called *śarīraka* (Here the suffix *ka* is derived from the root *kai-*śabde). And the *mīmāṃśā* in the form of *śarīraka* is called *Śarīrakamīmāṃśā*.

Thus the major divergence in the views of the two great philosophers is reflected in the very interpretation of the name of the work, on which both have written renowned commentaries.

### 1.3 ABOUT MĪMĀṃŚĀ

The *mīmāṃśā* *śāstra*, functions through evolving several maxims or *nyāya*-s, thus enabling
one to determine the meanings of passages of the revealed texts, through their application.

That is, a particular vedic passage is taken up for inquiry and its true purport is established, thus paving the way for interpreting passages of similar nature. This, in brief, is the function of mīmāṃsā.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā, composed by sage Jaimini, consists of twelve chapters or adhyāya-s. And the Uttaramīmāṃsā, authored by sage Bādarāyaṇa, consists of four adhyāya-s. There is also another work consisting of four chapters said to be composed by sage Kāśakṛṣṇa, called as Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa or Devatāmīmāṃsā, which comes in between Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā. But the work does not seem to be extant in its original form at present, though a work by name Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa has been published by the Madras University.

1.4 ABOUT BRAHMASŪTRA-S

The Brahmasūtra-s represent the culmination of philosophical inquiry carried on in the Vedāntic tradition. They seek to give the philosophy of the Upaniṣad-s in a systematic manner. They are composed in the aphoristic style and it is doubtful if it is possible to understand their meaning without the aid of any commentary. They have been handed down by tradition, and unless the tradition is known, it is almost impossible to have an understanding of them.

Hence the work has been commented on by several well-known preceptors, and each one of them claims that his particular commentary alone
is the authentic one, and not the others'. Thus it is rather difficult to judge the most authentic interpretation of it.

Nevertheless, the unanimity of almost all commentators on the general drift of the sūtra-s and the topics dealt with therein, make it possible to determine to some extent, what could be the real purport of the sūtra-s.

Two of the basic presumptions of the Brahmasūtra-s seem to be that

(1) the Veda-s are eternal; and,
(2) the purport of all the Upaniṣad-s is one and the same.

In other words all the Upaniṣad-s speak with one voice and advocate one philosophy.

With these basic premises, the sūtra-s set out to prove Brahman as the causal principle of the universe, as enunciated in the Upaniṣad-s. Brahman is said to be the absolute controller of the universe; it has infinite powers and perfections, and is the ultimate goal of human endeavour.

It appears from a study of the Brahmasūtra-s that intense debates and discussions have raged among sages of the ancient times regarding the view of the Upaniṣad-s on several issues and results were arrived at. And in order to facilitate easy remembrance, they were recorded in the form of aphorisms as was the wont of the ancient Indians. This could be derived from the fact that, at times, contrary views are stated as the views of other sages, mentioning their names.
The Brahmasūtra-s is a well-knit text divided into four chapters, each chapter, in turn, consisting of four pāda-s (quarters) making it sixteen pāda-s, altogether. And each pāda further consists of several adhikarana-s, and the adhikarana-s themselves consist of one or more sūtra-s. An adhikarana is one which discusses a specific topic with possible or actual prima facie views called the Pūrvapakṣa and finally arrives at the right view called the Siddhānta. It proceeds on the following basis: a doubt is presented due to the existence of two contrary views - the pūrvapakṣa and the siddhānta. The pūrvapakṣa view is duly considered in the light of all the arguments in its favour and those against the siddhānta. Then the former is finally rejected refuting each argument, thus establishing the siddhānta view firmly. In the process, a maxim or a nyāya is evolved which serves as a guiding light in the interpretation of other passages of similar nature.

And each adhikarana is well connected with its previous one. That is, the discussion in each adhikarana leads naturally to another which is taken up in the next adhikarana. And depending upon the nature of the discussion, there are one or several sūtra-s in each adhikarana.

Though there is broad agreement, among the bhāṣyakāra-s in regard to the number of adhyāya-s and pāda-s, there is vast disagreement among them regarding the numbers of adhikarana-s and sūtra-s. This is the result of combining or splitting of sūtra-s, omission or addition of them by the various bhāṣyakāra-s.
1.5 THE BRAHMASŪTRA-S - AN OVERVIEW

Now we shall see the broad topics dealt with in the Brahmasūtra-s, according to Rāmānuja, which generally are in agreement with Śaṅkara.

The Brahmasūtra-s, as has been stated earlier, consists of four chapters. The four chapters are divided into two couples (dvika-s), the first two forming one dvika, and the rest, the other. The first dvika, called the siddhadvika, speaks about Brahman as the cause of the world. The next dvika, called the sādhyadvika speaks about the means of liberation and the nature of liberation.

The first chapter in the Brahmasūtra-s is called the samanvayādhyāya. It is so named because, it shows that the import of all the Upaniṣadic passages that speak about the cause of the world either directly or indirectly, is Brahman. In other words, the chapter seeks to prove that all the kāraṇavādīvākyā-s have got perfect agreement (samanvaya) in proving Brahman. Throughout the chapter, two streams of arguments are countered. One stream is that the world has for its cause prakṛti or pradhāna and another is that it is a sentient being. Through the process of exegesis it is proved that neither prakṛti nor jīva, (either a bound one or a released one) could serve as the cause. Even specific deities like Indra also could not become an explanation for the world process, who themselves are included within the world, and thus are subject to creation. Hence it is only Brahman, which is all-pervasive and
endowed with innumerable excellences and free from all defects, that is the sole cause.

The first four sūtra-s of the first chapter, however, form a separate section and are highly significant. They provide the necessary orientation towards the study of the Brahmasūtra-s. Special attention is paid to this portion called the catussūtri by many bhāṣyakara-s, who expound their system of philosophy, within these four sūtra-s.

The first sūtra - athāto brahmajijñāsā commences the work with the specific reference to Brahman, which forms the central topic of the entire work. The sūtra presupposes an objection and answers it. The objection is that scriptures are not capable of conveying Brahman, as it is an existent entity. That is, the view of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school is that scriptures are meant to prescribe what is to be done (pravṛtti) and what is to be avoided (nivṛtti), thereby serving some purpose. They are thus incapable of conveying something, which is an existent entity, and not of the form of any activity. This view is refuted in the first aphorism which forms an adhikaraṇa in itself. It affirms that scriptures are capable of conveying an existent entity and in fact the entire scripture is meant to convey only Brahman and not any activity. Every karma prescribed in the Karmakāṇḍa, is indeed a form of worship of Brahman, whose essential nature is set forth in the Upaniṣad-s.
PROLOGUE

The second aphorism \textit{janmādyasya yataḥ} refutes another objection that Brahman is incapable of being known, for want of a definition. And so, an inquiry regarding Brahman could not be commenced. This objection is set aside by giving the definition of Brahman as the source, sustainer and redeemer of the entire universe.

The third aphorism, \textit{sāstrayonitvāt}, which constitutes another \textit{adhikaraṇa} by itself is significant. There arises an objection that the definition given in the previous \textit{adhikaraṇa} is more of the nature of an inference and hence \textit{sāstra} is reduced to the state of re-statement (\textit{anuvāda}), as it only speaks about what is already known from another \textit{pramāṇa}, namely, inference. \textit{Sāstra} could become significant only if it gives rise to knowledge about something that could not be known through another \textit{pramāṇa}. If not, it will be rendered futile as none will take recourse to it, since it would teach only what is known through another \textit{pramāṇa}.

This objection is refuted in the present aphorism, on the ground that Brahman could be known only through \textit{sāstra}-s and not through any other source. \textit{Anumāna}, which is the process of inferring something through what is observed, could at best show only which is similar to that which is observed. It is incapable of establishing an entity which is totally different from the seen and unseen objects of the world, which is at once immanent in the world and yet transcends it. Thus
the sūtra lays down a very important principle that the only source of knowledge regarding Brahman is sāstra-s and that Brahman has to be admitted in the way in which it is portrayed by them. The result of this view is that, as Brahman could not be proved through any other pramāṇa, so it could not be disproved either, by the latter. This view is very clear from the maxims arrived at from the adhikarana-s wherein the author of the sūtra-s uses the expression śabāt and identifies the import of the scripture to be Brahman.

The fourth aphorism discusses the purpose of Vedāntic study. The pūrvapakṣin here again is the pūrvamāṁśaka, according to whom, only an activity (pravṛtti) or abstinence (nivṛtti) could serve some purpose. Sāstra-s indeed become purposeful only by making known some activity which accomplishes some purpose. Brahman being already accomplished, cannot become the purport of them, since it could serve no purpose at all.

The said objection is refuted by the author of the sūtra-s, by stating that Brahman is the fruit in itself. To be engaged in activity at all times, cannot indeed be a fruit for anyone. It is in fact, the other way round. The ultimate fruit for anyone is to get relieved from every obligation to perform any activity whatsoever. But the fruit could not be attained as long as one is in this transmigratory existence, and the only way to attain it, is to attain Brahman, the attainment of which constitutes release from bondage.
In this way Brahman constitutes the highest goal of human endeavour. Hence it could well become the purport of scriptures. It is thus that the entire scripture has Brahman as its primary import, and the adhikaraṇa itself is designated as samanvayadhikaraṇa to signify this aspect.

The actual inquiry in the Brahmaṣūtra-s thus commences only from the fifth sūtra. The four pāda-s in the first chapter take up for detailed investigation, passages that seem to convey insentient matter or a sentient soul as the cause of the world and establishes finally that it is only Brahman that is actually spoken of in these passages.

The division of the first chapter of the Brahmaṣūtra-s into four pāda-s, is based on the strength of the passages that seem to convey entities, other than Brahman. It starts with discussing passages with less force and proceeds to discuss passages with more and more force.

The first pāda is named aspaṣṭatarajīvādi-lingakapāda. As the name itself suggests the pāda discusses those passages which could only very vaguely be construed to convey the jīva or matter as the cause of the world. The second pāda is called the aspaṣṭajīvadīlingakapāda, wherein the vagueness is lessened but still it persists. The third is called spaṣṭajīvadīlingakapāda, wherein comparatively there are more marks in the passages to construe them as conveying jīva or prakṛti. The fourth is called chāyānusāripāda wherein the
degree is increased. They seem to be more in favour of being construed as indicating jīva or prakṛti as the cause.

In all these pāda-s it is conclusively proved that Brahman alone is the true import of all the passages. It thus emerges that Brahman is the sole cause of the universe without depending upon an extraneous efficient cause. It is both the material and the efficient cause of the world.

The view arrived at in the first chapter is re-confirmed in the second chapter, by a thorough examination of all the actual or possible arguments against the view that Brahman is the sole cause of the world. A study of this chapter gives intellectual conviction that Brahman alone is the cause of the world.

The four pāda-s in this chapter are named respectively as smṛtipāda, tarkapāda, viyatpāda and prāṇapāda.

In the first pāda, it is established that the causality of Brahman could be countered neither by the texts that are not in conformity with the Veda-s, nor by mere argumentation.

In the second pāda, the author of the aphorisms rejects the views of the schools that are opposed to the view that Brahman is the cause of the world, by pointing out the untenability of their views on the basis of pure reasoning. Thus the pāda is justifiably named tarkapāda.
PROLOGUE

The third and fourth pāda-s too, re-confirm the view arrived at in the first chapter. The view that Brahman is the cause of the entire universe is sought to be objected on the ground that there are entities which do not become the effects of Brahman, like the ākāśa or the ātman. Further the vedāntic passages themselves, are contradictory among themselves, and so they cannot be relied upon. These objections are dispelled, and it is established that there are no entities which do not become the effects of Brahman; nor is there any contradiction among the Upaniṣadīc passages themselves.

The third chapter is called sādhanādhyāya. Herein the means of liberation, namely, the various Brahmavidyā-s (meditative exercises) along with their aṅga-s (subsidiaries) are set forth. Since the practice of the meditative exercises requires a sense of deep detachment from worldly goals and an intense desire to attain Brahman, the first two pāda-s of the third chapter are devoted to generate in the mind of the aspirant, these two factors.

The first pāda, called the vairāgyapāda highlights the miseries which the soul experiences in its various states, as long as it is in transmigratory existence, with a view to turn the mind of the aspirant away from worldly pursuits which confine the soul in bondage.

The second pāda, called the ubhayaliṅgapāda, speaks of Brahman as the abode of innumerable auspicious qualities, and as opposed to all that
which is inauspicious. This is emphasized in order to arouse a desire towards Brahman. Thus in this pāda, Brahman is said to possess two unique features (ubhayaliṅga) - akhilaheyapratyaykātkatva (being the antithesis of all that is detestable) and kalyāṇaguṇaikatānatvā (being the repository of all virtues).

The third pāda is the guṇopasamhārapāda. The chief task of the pāda is to discuss the various meditative exercises and identify whether they are identical or different. Since the Upaniṣad-s are many in number, and the meditative exercises prescribed in them vary, there arises a need to discuss whether they are one or different. The result of the discussion is that, if it is proved that a particular Brahmavidya in a particular Upaniṣad is identical with the one in another Upaniṣad, then in that case the qualities enunciated in both the Upaniṣad-s in respect of that vidyā have to be meditated upon. In other words, if it is determined that, the same Brahmavidya is spoken of in two Upaniṣad-s, then the qualities that are omitted in one Upaniṣad, have to be added from the other. This is called guṇa upasamhāra, by which name the pāda is known.

The fourth pāda is called the aṅgapāda wherein the various accessories for the performance of Brahmavidya are set forth.

The last chapter is called the Phalādhyāya. The fruits that ensue from the practice of the Brahmavidya-s, are discussed in this chapter. And
PROLOGUE

incidentally, the first pāda of this chapter called avṛttipāda, continues the discussion of the third chapter itself, discussing further about the mode of practicing the Brahmavidyā.

There may arise an objection, that it should have been included in the third chapter itself whose specific function is to discuss the means. It is answered that it is with a specific purpose that this is discussed in this phalādhyāya. That is, the practice of Brahmavidyā means getting deeply engrossed in the meditation of Brahman and practicing it more and more intensely till it ultimately ripens to such a level as to result in a brilliant vision of God, which is as good as a perceptual cognition itself, called pratyakṣa-samānākāra. The pursuit of meditation with loving devotion gives rise to abundant joy, as the aspirant attains the vision of God, similar to that of perception. He therefore desires that this state must continue and hence looks for continuing it more and more. Since there is experience of joy, unbounded in nature at this state, the latter, although a means of liberation, becomes an end in itself. And in order to highlight this aspect, the discussion on meditation is included in the phalādhyāya.

The fruits of the Brahmavidyā are discussed from the second pāda onwards. The second pāda is entitled utkrāntipāda, which discusses the mode of departure (utkrānti) of the soul from the body, by the grace of God, after entering into the nāḍī
called mūrdhanyanādī. The sense organs including mind and the prāṇa-s lapse back into their sources and merge with the soul first. The soul then passes through the specific vein on the head, proceeds in the Path of Light and reaches the abode of God.

The third pāda is called the gatipāda, and it speaks about the path the soul travels to attain the world of Brahman.

The fourth pāda, known as muktipāda, discusses the nature of mokṣa that the soul attains and the work concludes with the profound declaration that the soul, once liberated never again returns to bondage - anāvṛttih sabdāt anāvṛttih sabdāt.

This, in brief, constitutes the subject-matter of the Brahmasūtra-s.

1.6 THE BHĀSYA-S OF ŚĀNKARA AND RĀMĀNUJA

The greatness of the Brahmasūtra-s could well be testified to from the numerous commentaries that are written on it. In fact, as far as the Vedāntic tradition is concerned, its authority is next only to the Upāniṣad-s. But of all commentaries, the bhāṣya of Śāṅkara and that of Rāmānuja stand out prominently.

Śāṅkara’s bhāṣya is the earliest available commentary, which is held in high esteem for its depth, subtlety and lucidity. It sets forth the philosophy of Advaita, according to which the one and only Reality is Brahman, which does not admit
of any difference whatsoever. It does not admit even of qualities within itself, not to speak of the existence of things apart from It.

Rāmānuja’s bhāṣya, in contrast, offers a no less important commentary, which easily matches with Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya in its grandeur and depth, and is acclaimed for its forcefulness, philosophical perfection and logical acumen. The philosophy expounded by Rāmānuja came to be known later on as Viśiṣṭādwaita. Rāmānuja himself does not refer to it by that name. Unlike Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja has not commented on the Upaniṣad-s but yet has not left out any of the principal Upaniṣadic text uncommented, either in the Vedārthasāṅgraha or in the Śrībhāṣya.

The uniqueness of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādwaita lies in the fact that it takes a comprehensive view of the entire gamut of scriptures without involving contradiction, or giving up the primary meaning. Rāmānuja himself sets this as his specific task in the Vedārthasāṅgraha:

\[
tatra nānārupāṇām vākyānām
avirodhaḥ mukhyārthaparityāgasca
yathā sambhavati tathāiva
varṇanīyam; varṇitaṅca\]

It has to be mentioned, however, that Rāmānuja is greatly influenced by his grand preceptor Śrī Yāmuna who almost set the path for his disciple. Rāmānuja owes a great deal to his grand preceptor in the formulation of his own system and also in regard to the criticism of

1. Vedārthasāṅgrahaḥ, p.179
Advaita. The concepts and criticisms of Yāmuna, found in his Siddhitraya and other works, are greatly developed by Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya, and other works.

The aim of the present work is to present the philosophy of Rāmānuja, as culled out from the various adhikarana-s of his Śrībhāṣya. The work is divided into four chapters (besides Prologue and Epilogue), which deal respectively with the Nature of Reality, Nature of the Soul, Nature of the World and Nature and Means of Liberation. Rāmānuja offers his views on all these concepts after an examination of other views, which are proved to be unsatisfactory on the ground that they are opposed to the spirit of the scriptures, and also lack logical coherence. And of all, Ramanuja takes up the views of the Advaita school for a very detailed examination in the course of the discussion of the first sūtra. Hence a study of Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita will not be complete without a study of Advaita.

Hence this work presents the views of Advaita and their examination by Rāmānuja, along with the latter’s exposition of his own views.

1.7 A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE WORK

We shall now give a brief outline of this work.

The second chapter is chiefly based on the first adhikarana of the Śrībhāṣya. In this adhikarana, Rāmānuja’s main thesis is that the spirit of Advaita contemplated in the scripture, lies not in discarding
difference of every sort but in accommodating it within the oneness of Reality. Reality, which is Brahman is not without qualities as conceived by the Advaitin, but is a repository of all the virtuous qualities. Thus the second chapter is devoted to proving the oneness of Brahman in the wake of difference. It further discusses at length the nature of Brahman, as having the entire universe consisting of the sentient souls and insentient matter as its body. The discussion about Brahman is taken up first, as it is Brahman which ensouls the world and makes the world what it is and also constitutes the final goal of the soul. This leads to a discussion about what constitutes the essential nature of the soul, and this is taken up in the next chapter.

In Chapter III, the views of some other schools on the nature of the soul are first discussed followed by Rāmānuja’s criticism of them on the grounds of logical inconsistency and also contradiction with scriptures. This is followed by a detailed exposition of the view of Rāmānuja.

The soul, which is a sentient principle has the world which is insentient, for its purpose. In other words, the world subserves the purpose of the soul, and hence the discussion about the nature of the world is taken up in the next chapter.

The ultimate goal of the soul constitutes freedom from the travails of bondage and remaining in a state of bliss forever without any trace of misery. This indeed is mokṣa or liberation, and hence the nature of liberation and its means are discussed in the fifth chapter.
It was stated earlier that Rāmānuja has formulated his school after a thorough examination of the Advaita school. A point of significance that may be noted here is that Rāmānuja’s criticism of Advaita, is not confined to that of Śaṅkara alone, but covers a host of many other Advaitic thinkers such as Maṇḍana Miśra, Sureśvarā, Vīmuktatman, Sarvajñatman, Prakāśatman, Vacaspati Miśra and others, all of whom were not always in agreement with one another on specific issues. A study of the Śrībhāṣya shows that Rāmānuja is fully conversant with the teachings of the above Advaitic preceptors too.

Another fact that is to be taken note of is that the system of Advaita has not remained static, or at least it was not allowed to remain so, by rival philosophers. It had to defend itself against numerous attacks from a host of philosophers who arose from time to time. Consequently, it had undergone several changes and many of the views propounded by earlier ācārya-s were either given up, or modified or revised in the wake of objections raised. Hence it may seem that some of the objections raised by Rāmānuja are baseless, when viewed in the light of the modified version of Advaita. But an acquaintance with the ancient classics of Advaita, especially those prior to the time of Rāmānuja, would give no room to any such misgivings.

In the following pages, we shall deal with the concepts of Viśiṣṭādvaita as could be gleaned from the Śrībhāṣya.
CHAPTER II

NATURE OF REALITY

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Is Reality, an undifferentiated unity, which admits of no duality in any form, or does it admit of duality in itself without compromising its basic oneness? Is the world that we are exposed to through our sensory experience, a mere illusion, or is it also real and existent in its own right? Are we ourselves (namely the jīva-s), who inquire into these aspects, mere apparent diversifications of the Ultimate Reality, being essentially non-different from it, or do we have distinct identities for ourselves?

These are very fundamental philosophical questions and the schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja stand sharply divided on these issues. While the Advaita of Śaṅkara takes up the former alternatives on all these issues, the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja subscribes to the latter ones.

It is rather strange that both the schools, which claim to have been based upon the authority of the scriptures maintain mutually conflicting views on every major philosophical issue.

In the Upaniṣad-s, which are the chief source texts for both the schools, the major problem that is faced is the
relation of one to many. The Upaniṣad-s at some places\textsuperscript{1} refer to Reality as a transcendental, supra-relational unity, beyond all divisions, change, activities, descriptions, etc., and at other places\textsuperscript{2} speak of it as a being endowed with infinite powers and perfections, having within Itself, the world and the souls as its modes (prakāra-s); and, it remains as their inner self (antaryāmin) controlling them.

Further some texts of the Upaniṣad-s\textsuperscript{3} speak of Brahman as the material cause of the world. A material cause, as is well known, is that which undergoes change. But certain other texts\textsuperscript{4} identify Brahman as one which is not subject to change. The contradiction is obvious.

Again, some texts of the Upaniṣad-s point out that the soul at the state of liberation remains as Brahman itself, while some other texts declare that it only attains utmost similarity with Brahman, thus becoming Brahman-like, and not Brahman itself.

The great Ācārya-s who recognize the contradictions outlined above treat them to be only apparent, and not real, and are chiefly concerned with resolving these apparent contradictions in their commentaries and arriving at the true import of the Upaniṣad-s.

1. 
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Mund. Up., I.i.6, Svet. Up., VI.19,}
\item \textit{Kaṭh. Up. II. iii, etc}
\end{itemize}

2. 
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Svet. Up., VI.8,19, Tai. Nā. Anu., XI,}
\item \textit{Br. Up., II.vii, Mund. Up., II.7, etc.}
\end{itemize}

3. 
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Tai. Ānand., VII.1, Tai. Br., II.viii.9.15, etc.}
\end{itemize}

4. 
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Svet. Up., VI.19, etc.}
\end{itemize}
2.1 APPROACH TO REALITY -
THE ADVAITA VIEW

In his commentary on the aphorism,

\[ na \ sthānato \ 'pi \ parasya \ ubhayaliṅgam \ sarvatra \ hi^{6} \]

Śaṅkara makes a pointed reference to the existence of two sets of Upaniṣadic texts - one referring to Brahman as possessed of attributes and other as free from all attributes.

He is of the view that Ultimate Reality cannot be viewed to have both the above aspects, each one opposed to the other\(^6\). It might be said that Reality acquires the qualities because of association with some limiting adjuncts. Śaṅkara argues that in that case it must be admitted that the qualities are not intrinsic, but are only extraneously presented. So we have to take that Reality is free from any quality. It is instructed with the view that it may be realized. And that aspect of Reality as endowed with attributes is instructed with a view that it may be meditated upon\(^7\).

Further the Chāndogya text

\[ sadeva somya idam agra āsīt ekameva advitiyam\(^8\) \]

states that Brahman, the sat, is free from difference from insentient objects; it is free from difference from another entity similar to it and it should not be viewed as different owing to the different factors such as knowledge,

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5. B.S. II.iii. 11
6. \( na \ hyekāṁ \ vastu \ svata \ eva \ rupādiveśopetaṁ \ tadviparītāṁ \ ceti \ avadhārayītum \ śakyam, \ virodhāt-\) B.S.S.B., III.ii.5.
bliss, etc., as they constitute its essential nature. This text shows that Reality is free from any duality whatsoever.

The Brhadāraṇyaka text,

neha nānāsti kīcana; mṛtyossa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati?

clearly sets forth that there is no duality in Reality; it further proceeds to state that he who sees difference will experience phenomenal existence continuously.

The same Upaniṣad states elsewhere that the world consisting of the seer, the seen and the act of seeing, exist only as long as there is duality as it were. For the enlightened, however, when all these become the unitary ātman, the notions of the seer, the seen and the act of seeing cease to exist.

yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paśyati; yatra tu asya sarvam ātmaiva abhūt tat kena kam paśyet tat kena kam vijāniyāī
t

The Viṣṇupurāṇa too, the Advaitin states, emphasizes the fact that Reality is one only, and the notion of difference is only illusory. For example the passages,

jñānasvarūpam atyanantamimalām paramārthataḥ
tameva arthasvarūpena bhrāntidarśanataḥ sthitam
paramārthastvamevaikah nānyosti jagatahpatel
tasyātmā paradeheṣu sato'pi ekamayam hi yat
vijñānam paramartho hi dvaitino atathyadarśinah

11. V.P., I.ii.6.
12. ibid., I.iv 38.
13. ibid., II.xiv.31
state that Consciousness is indeed the ultimate; those who perceive difference, perceive only what is illusory. Another text of the same Purāṇa,

so 'haṁ sa ca tvāṁ sa ca sarvametad
ātmasvarūpam tyajā bhedamoham

instructs that one should give up the cognition of duality, as everything else given in perception is only an expression of the consciousness which is only one.

The Bhagavadgītā text

kṣetrajñam cāpi māṁ viddhi sarvakṣetresu bharata

declares that the cognizer in every physical body, namely, the soul is none other than the Reality.

From the above it will be clear that the texts of the Upaniṣad-s, the Gītā and the Purāṇa emphasize that ultimate Reality is free from all differences, the soul is none other than Brahman, and the world of objects is illusory in the sense that it does not have any independent existence apart from Brahman. Other passages which speak about the essential nature of Brahman (called the sodhakavākya-s) negate in it either directly or indirectly all attributes, change, activities, etc. For example,

nīskalam nīskriyam sāntam niravadyam nirañjanam

The Taittāriya text

satyam jñānam anantam brahma

states Brahman to be changeless, of the form of knowledge, and infinite. This text is particularly significant in that it

14. ibid., II.xvi.23.
16. Śvet Up., VI.19.
implies through the application of the principle of sāmānādhi karanya and through the use of the word ananta that Brahman is the Partless Ultimate. It is thus: sāmānādhi karanya implies identity; if attributes are admitted with respect to Brahman, then there will have to be admitted difference between Brahman and the attributes and also among the attributes themselves. The consequence will be that identity - the spirit of sāmānādhi karanya will be lost. Again, the word ananta in the above text means that Brahman is infinite, in the sense that it is not conditioned by space, time and objects. It comes to this that Brahman is all-pervasive, eternal and not conditioned by objects. When it is said that Brahman is not conditioned by objects it amounts to admitting that the objects of the world given in perception are non-real. If they are held to be real, then Brahman would be conditioned by them, and as a result the expression infinite used in respect of Brahman will lose all its significance. Thus this text -

satyam jñānam anantam brahma

does not declare that Brahman has changelessness, knowledge and infinitude as its qualities; on the other hand, it states that these constitute its essential nature. It further implies the illusory character of the world. It emerges from the above discussion, that according to the scriptures, Ultimate reality is Brahman, which is pure, homogeneous, constant, unchanging, free from attributes, activities, etc. It is pure knowledge and bliss, and is without a second and the world of difference is only an illusory appearance.

The world of illusion is projected by a primordial ignorance called severally as anṛta, māyā, ajñāna, etc., as stated in the following scriptural texts:
anṛtena hi pratyūḍhāḥ
māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt māyināṁ tu maheśvaram
indro māyābhīṣa pururūpa īyate
anadi māyayā suptaḥ yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyate
ajñānena avṛtam jñānam tena muhyanti jantavyah

And to remain as Brahman after getting freed from avidyā is what is known as liberation and the chief role of the Upaniṣad-s lies in imparting this truth.

Liberation which is Brahman is attained as it were, through the removal of avidyā by the knowledge of Brahman - the only being. The Chāndogya text for instance, states that one who realizes Brahman, the only one, never again experiences phenomenal existence.

na punar mṛtyave tadekaṁ paśyati
na paśyo mṛtyum paśyati

The Taittāriya text -
yadāhyeva esa etasminnadṛṣye 'nātmye'nirukte
anilayane 'bhayam pratiśṭhāṁ vindate atha
so 'bhayangato bhavati

also confirms the view that he alone whose mind is centered upon the Being, which lies beyond the scope of sense-organs, which is free from embodiment, transcends speech and which requires no support, crosses over fear in the form of transmigratory experience.

18. Ch. Up., VIII.iii.2.
22. B.G., V.15.
23. cf. B.S.S.B., Adhyāśābhāgyam
Also the *Mundaka* text -

*brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati*²⁶

states that he who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman.

And the *Svetasvatara* text -

*tameva viditvā'tti mṛtyumeti
nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate*²⁷

which points that the knowledge of Brahman is the sole means of liberation is explicit in precluding any other factor being viewed as the means to the latter.

From the foregoing discussion, it would have become clear that according to the Advaitin the *sruti* texts speak of Brahman as of the nature of consciousness, bliss, etc. The world of duality is non-real, and it is on this basis that Brahman is referred to as infinite too. The texts that clarify the nature of Brahman such as *satyam, jñānam*, etc., which consist of words in co-ordinate predication, speak of the identity of the essences; and these senses constitute the essential nature of Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman is the sole means to liberation which is nothing but the soul getting rid of illusion and remaining in its natural state as Brahman.

### 2.1.1 THE *NIRGUNA* AND THE *SAGUNA* TEXTS: RELATIVE STRENGTH

So far we have presented the *Advaita* view that Brahman is the only reality, the *jīva*-s are non-different from it and the world of duality is only an illusion. This view would render invalid the entire ritualistic section of

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the _veda_-s, and also a substantial part of the Upaniṣad section. The ritualistic section of the _veda_-s prescribes ritual acts which are obligatory, occasional and propitiatory (nītya, naimittika and kāmya); and, in order that these may become significant what is necessary is difference among the agent of ritual acts, the act of carrying them out and the results that ensue from them. If difference were held to be illusory, the ritualistic section of the _veda_-s would not be applicable at all and therefore would become invalid. Further in the Upaniṣad section too, the texts that speak of Brahmān as endowed with attributes are to be treated as invalid, as the relation of attributes to Brahmān is based upon difference which is considered to be illusory.

The result of the above argument is that when the _veda_-s as a whole are admitted to be authoritative there is no valid reason to treat some portions of them to be invalid or non-authoritative.

The Advaitin argues that treating one text as more valid than the other is quite in conformity with the accepted canons of interpretation. In the _Pūrvamīmāṃsā_ it has been determined that, when there is a direct conflict between two scriptural texts, that which is the latter, would prevail over the former. This is called the _apaccheda-nyāya_. According to this, that which is _para_ (the latter) is always more powerful than the _pūrva_ (the former). We shall now explain the maxim in some detail:

2. 1. 2. THE _APACCHEDA NYĀYA_

_The Pūrvamīmāṃsā-stra -_

*paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyam prakṛtivat*\(^{28}\)

discusses the passage

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\(^{28}\) *J.S., VI.v.54.*
yadyudgātā pacchidyeta adakṣiṇaḥ sa yajñah saṁsthāpya tena punar yajeta; atha pratiḥartā sarvavedasam dadyāt.

In the jyotistoma sacrifice, the priests should hop around the sacrificial altar, each holding the waist-cloth of the priest in front. If the udgātā - the priest who chants the hymns of the Sāmaveda - lets go the waist-cloth of the priest in front of him, then to expiate this, the sacrifice should be completed without giving any sacrificial fee to the priests, and the entire sacrifice has to be performed again. If pratiḥartā - the priest who chants the hymns of the Rgveda - does so, the sacrifice should be completed by giving the entire wealth of the sacrificer as the sacrificial fee. If the two let go the waist-cloth successively, then the sacrificer should conclude the sacrifice by adopting the latter atonement, and the former shall be annulled by the latter.29

Thus the maxim says that in case of a direct conflict, that which is the latter shall prevail over the former - paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyam.

Applying the same maxim it could be seen that in the case of the ritualistic section of the vedas and the texts that speak of Brahman as free from difference, the latter being subsequent ones (para) shall overrule the former (pūrva), since a direct conflict is involved between the two, as was referred to earlier. And similar is the case with texts that speak of Brahman as endowed with qualities. These also are in conflict with the nirguna texts, due to which they are invalidated by the latter, which being the paraśāstra, become more powerful. And the nirguna texts are accepted to be subsequent ones because, in order to negate guṇa-s in Brahman, there should first be a

29. Adapted from The Saṁkṣepasārīraka of Sarvajñātman, p.458.
possibility of their occurrence, which could not be known by our ordinary sense faculties. This is supplied by the texts that speak of Brahman as endowed with attributes (saguṇa texts). Hence the nirguṇa texts become the subsequent ones, due to which they are treated as more powerful than the saguṇa texts by the apacchedanyāya.

Thus it comes to this: scriptures teach attributeless Brahman as the Ultimate Reality, and the world consisting of sentient and insentient entities as mere illusions.

2.2 - POLEMICS OF THE ADVAITINS

From the foregoing discussion it would have become clear that according to Advaita, the final import of scriptures is the attributeless Brahman - a transcendental entity, and the only Reality. The world consisting of cit and acit is only an illusory appearance. The acit or the insentient matter is neither real nor an absolute nothing, while the sentient soul is not different from Brahman.

Great Advaitic thinkers like Maṇḍana Miśra, Vimuktātman, Vacaspati and others seek to substantiate the Advaita view outlined above, on the basis of reasoning, some of which we shall presently see.

2.2.1. PERCEPTION DOES NOT COMPREHEND DIFFERENCE

In the previous section, we referred to the Advaita view that the final import of the scriptures is the non-dual Brahman - the sole Reality. But perception gives us a knowledge of the manifold objects which are taken to be sat in experiences such as ghaṭaśasan, etc. This contradiction between perception and śruti needs to be resolved.
According to some teachers of Advaita, there exists no conflict between sruti and perception. It is because, perception comprehends only the sat-element, and not the object characterized by difference. It is thus: there arises the knowledge of objects of the world to us such as “The pot is” (ghatassan), “The cloth is” (patassan), etc. But the rise of the knowledge of pot is dependent upon the knowledge of its difference from all other objects. This is because, when an object is comprehended correctly as that particular object, there is no doubt of the form ‘whether it is a pot or not’; nor is it cognized erroneously as ‘this is not a pot’.

This is possible only when the object is cognized as different from all other objects. Thus the cognition of pot is dependent upon the cognition of its difference from other objects. But perception is a unique process, in which there are no two moments, and hence it could not have grasped both the object as well as its difference from other objects. This is because comprehension of difference requires comprehension of the object (the vastu) and also the object from which its difference is known (the pratiyogin). But this is not possible as perception, being momentary, does not last that long so as to reveal the object and also differentiate it from other objects. Hence it must be admitted that perception does not comprehend the object either, as it has already been shown that an object could be comprehended only when its difference from other objects is known, which has been shown to be impossible. Hence it must be admitted that in instances like “The pot is”, “The cloth is”, etc., perception comprehends only the “pure being” (sanmatra), represented by the word “is” and never the individual objects. The comprehension of objects is rooted on illusion, and not on perception.

30. vide Brähmasiddhi, Part I, p.45 See also Advaita Vedānta, p.150
2.2.2 CRITIQUE OF DIFFERENCE

The concept of difference, according to the Advaitin, is a pseudo one. It is thus: difference or bheda may be accepted as of the nature of the object itself or as the property of the object. If bheda is accepted as the object itself, i.e., if difference from other objects that exists in pot, is treated as of the nature of the pot, then whenever there is reference to pot, there should be reference to difference as well, which however is not the case. It may be said that due to the absence of recollection of other objects, which are the pratiyogin-s of difference, there is no reference to it. But this is not sound because according to the present view the object and the difference are accepted to be one and the same. Hence it must be held that just as objects like pot, etc., are referred to without any reference to any pratiyogin, so difference too must be referred to without any reference to any pratiyogin. If this position is not admitted then one cannot say that difference constitutes the essential nature of the object, wherein it is present. Moreover one would have to view that the words ghaṭah and bhinnah are synonyms, like the words hastah and karah, which however is not the case. Hence the view that the object itself is of the form of difference is not tenable.32.

It cannot also be held that difference is an attribute (dharma) of the object, on the following grounds:

if difference is a dharma of an object, then the two must be accepted as different from one another, for, otherwise it will amount to subscribing to the view that both are the same - the view, which has already been shown to be unsound.

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32. ibid., p.97-98.
Now if the object - A (say) and difference - B(say) are different, then another difference - C (say) between the two must be accepted. And this second difference - C must again be accepted as different from A, for the two cannot be the same on the grounds mentioned earlier, and so on, \textit{ad infinitum} (anavasthā). It could be seen here that each preceding difference cannot be proved unless the subsequent difference is proved. But as there is no end to the process, no difference stands proved, as every subsequent difference depends upon the subsequent one and this goes on in an endless manner. Thus difference cannot be viewed as a \textit{dharma} of an object, because such a view involves the defect of \textit{anavasthā}.

The defect of \textit{anyonyāśrayaṇa} too precludes the possibility of viewing difference as a \textit{dharma} of an object. It is thus: in order that an object may be known as different from all others, its specific class characteristic (jāti) should be known. But the class characteristic itself could be known only if difference from other objects is known. Thus, as each one is dependent upon the other, it is not logically possible that either could be known. Thus difference cannot be proved both for want of \textit{pramāṇa}, and also due to its logical untenability\(^3\).

\textbf{2.2.3. ILLUORINESS OF THE WORLD ON LOGICAL GROUNDS}

A question that would suggest itself, from the above discussion would be as follows:

\begin{quote}
when it is said that the objects of the world given in perception could not be comprehended by it, and difference by itself is an impossibility, the logical
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{3} ibid., p.98
corollary would be that the world is not real. But on that account can the world be dismissed as unreal and totally non-existent like a hare’s horn? If not, what then is its ontological status?

The Advaitin does not definitely hold that the world is something similar to a hare’s horn, for otherwise it would not be possible to explain the fact of its being perceived. Hence, applying the criteria of reality and unreality, the Advaitin argues that one has to conclude that the world cannot be determined either as a real or as an absolute nothing, but is only an illusory appearance.

The criterion of reality, according to the Advaitin, is unsublatibility in the three divisions of time. And the criterion of unreality is imperceptibility in the three divisions of time, like the hare’s horn. However the objects of the world, are perceived, but are not constant and abiding (anuvṛttā). On the other hand, they are variable (vyavṛttā) and sublated (bādhita). To this extent they cannot be viewed as real.

To be explicit: the objects of the world like pot, cloth, etc., are perceived to be sat as ghaṭassan, paṭassan, etc. These objects have specific features enabling one to attribute names and forms to them. Thus pot is characterized by potness, and cloth by clothness; and each is different from the other. Now potness of pot is not common to all things and hence it is non-real. Similar is the case with clothness, etc., which too, being not common to all things are non-real34. What is common to all things is existence (sat). All objects are perceived to be existent entities as in experiences of the form ghaṭassan, etc. Now applying the criterion of reality, it is seen that existence (sat), which

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34. *ibid.*, p.99. *See also* Concept of Vyāvahārika in Advaita Vedānta, p.206
alone abides \((anuvṛtta)\) in all and remains unsublated, is real, while factors like potness, clothness, etc. which are variable and unabiding \((vyavṛtta)\) are non-real or illusory.

Illusoriness is defined as that which is given in perception, but is sublated by valid knowledge. A clear example is that of a rope, that is perceived diversely as a serpent, or a fissure on the ground, or a stream of water. Here it is seen that one thing is perceived diversely as several other things which, however, are not abiding, but are sublated by subsequent cognitions. What is unsublated is the rope, which alone is real. Those which are variable like serpent, fissure, etc., are illusory appearances\(^{35}\).

Similarly, in the case of the objects of the world like pot, cloth, etc., each is shown to be variable and the only abiding entity is existence. Hence every object of the world is illusory.

2.2.4 - EXISTENCE IS KNOWLEDGE

An objection arises at this stage: the above argument shows that perception comprehends only existence \((sat)\) and that alone which is unsublated is the reality. Now if existence is accepted to be perceived, then it becomes an object of knowledge; and to that extent it will have to be viewed as different from knowledge. The result will be that it will not be possible to hold that knowledge alone is the reality and that there is nothing apart from that.

The Advaitin, however, holds that this unwelcome position does not arise at all. It is because, \textit{difference} as an entity, as has already been explained, is an impossibility. Reality is essentially undifferentiated\(^{36}\) and it is not

\(^{35}\) \textit{Ś.B.}, I.i.1. VOL.1 (part I) P.99

\(^{36}\) \textit{supra}. pp. 39-42
possible that there could be any trace of difference in it. It cannot be said that the sat element is different from anubhūti or knowledge, by being the content of the latter. It is because it has already been proved that difference as such cannot be the content of perceptual cognition and also does not stand logical scrutiny. Hence the possibility of sat element becoming the content of anubhūti is far removed. We are thus forced to admit that the sat element is non-different from anubhūti.

Thus Brahman, which is infinite and of the form of knowledge, is the only Being that remains existent at all times and at all places. Nevertheless, existence is not a quality of Brahman, but is Brahman itself. The objects of the world, which are illusory, derive their existence from the underlying reality, and they do not have any independent existence. According to Advaita, knowing an object does not mean acquiring new knowledge, which is not possible. Knowledge is one and that is Brahman. Hence knowing an object constitutes the removing of the veil of avidyā that conceals reality.

This requires a discussion on the process of acquiring perceptual knowledge and it will show that perception does not point to the difference between the knowing subject and the object known, but rather is a process of unifying the consciousness conditioned by the mind and the one conditioned by objects.

2.2.5 PERCEPTION ELUCIDATED

According to Advaita, notions like subject, object etc., are external constructions and are not basic realities. The subject is consciousness conditioned by mind, which is a product of māyā and is called pramātrcatāntya. The object is consciousness conditioned by pot and the like,
which is called \textit{viṣayacaitanya}. Due to the operation of \textit{avidyā}, the one all-pervasive consciousness becomes apparently divided as subject and object. Now perception is the process through which the mind flows out to the place of the objects, removes the veil of \textit{avidyā} and brings about a contact between the object and the subject. Once this is achieved, consciousness conditioned by the object, is manifested; and this manifestation is called perception\textsuperscript{37}. Hence empirical knowledge is a process of revelation rather than acquisition\textsuperscript{38}. There is brought about a unification of consciousness which constitutes the process of knowing. But as knowledge or consciousness is one with existence, as stated earlier, there is no question of the two being different or existence becoming the object of knowledge. As Brahman is existence as well as knowledge, revelation of knowledge essentially involves the revelation of existence; and the two - existence and knowledge - are not different.

\textbf{2.2.6 KNOWLEDGE IS INVARIABLY SELF-MANIFEST}

Knowledge, according to \textit{Advaita}, by virtue of its being knowledge, is essentially self-manifest (\textit{svapprakāśa}). Knowledge necessarily implies a knowing subject and a known object. Knowledge reveals objects of the world. Objects of the world are not known just by virtue of their mere existence, but by being cognized. Hence they are called \textit{jāda} or insentient, whereas knowledge is self-luminous or \textit{svapprakāśa}. Thus a clear distinction can be made between the two - a revealing knowledge and an object revealed. In other words, the objects of the world need an

\textsuperscript{37}. \textit{Vedāntaparibhāṣa}, pp.31 - 36

\textsuperscript{38}. Concept of \textit{Vyāvahārika} in \textit{Advaita Vedānta}, p.174
aid, knowledge, in order that they could be known. But
the same is not applicable to knowledge itself. It does not
stand in need of an aid to know itself; for, otherwise, it
would become similar to objects of the world. Further it
cannot be said that knowledge becomes the object of
(another) knowledge like the objects of the world; for, that
would mean losing its character of being knowledge itself.
Hence just as a lamp reveals itself without depending upon
any other luminous body, so also knowledge reveals the
objects of the world and remains self-manifest, not
becoming an object of another knowledge\(^{39}\).

2.2.7 KNOWLEDGE IS ETERNAL AND
ESSENTIALLY UNDIFFERENTIATED
-SOME ARGUMENTS

The fact that knowledge is self-manifest (svaprakāśa),
and that it never becomes an object of another knowledge
necessarily leads us to another fact that it must be eternal.
In fact the author of the Īṣṭasiddhi, in the very opening
verse of his work sets forth the specific nature of
knowledge or consciousness, which according to Advaita,
is the ultimate reality.

\[\text{yānubhūtirajā' Meyā' nantā' nandavigrahā}
\[\text{mahadādijagānmarā citrabhittim namāmi tām}^{40}\]

He also puts forth several arguments to show that
knowledge is not subject to origination, and hence it has
to be accepted as eternal.

Knowledge, which is called anubhūti, is accepted to
be self-manifest. If it were not eternal, then it has to be

\(^{39}\) S.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) p.100.

\(^{40}\) Īṣṭasiddhi, Maṅgalaśloka.
accepted to be originated at a particular point of time, before which (time) it will have to be admitted as non-existent.

Now the problem is: the antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva) of anubhūti, if at all could be known, could be known only through anubhūti, which alone is capable of knowing. But anubhūti itself, cannot be present to perceive its own prāgabhāva, for, if it were present, then there can be no question of its non-existence. And if it were not really existent then there is absolutely no question of the comprehending of its own non-existence. Nor is it possible that its non-existence could be known through some other pramāṇa, for there is no other pramāṇa that could comprehend anubhūti. That is, if at all the prāgabhāva of anubhūti is to be known through a pramāṇa, then what is required first and foremost is that anubhūti must be comprehended by the pramāṇa. But anubhūti being svaprapakāsa, does not come within the range of any other knowledge. It comes to this that anubhūtīprāgabhāva too, cannot be comprehended by another pramāṇa. Thus as it is not possible to prove the prāgabhāva of anubhūti, it has to be admitted as un-originated and hence as eternal. It is because, all other bhāvakara-s or changes in an object, namely, existence, growth, transformation, decay and destruction are absolutely dependent upon origination - the first change. The impossibility of origination - the first change-in the case of anubhūti precludes the possibility of other changes in regard to the latter. Anubhūti, therefore, is eternal[41].

Further an analysis of the nature of anubhūti shows that it must necessarily be undifferentiated. The fact that it is not subject to origination shows that it does not admit of differentiation in any form. All that is manifold is

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41. Ś.B. I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), p.107
necessarily subject to origination. Anubhūti has been shown to be un-originated and so it does not admit of manifoldness.

yannānābhūtam tadanuppanāṁ na drṣṭam
api tu uputtimadeva drṣṭam

It comes to this: anubhūti is like nothing. In other words, there is nothing similar to anubhūti, from which it may be viewed to be different. Thus there is no sajātiyabheda for anubhūti.

Further just as rūpa, etc., (which are the characteristics of objects like ghaṭa, etc.,) could not be postulated in regard to anubhūti, so also the characteristics like internal distinctions (svagatabheda) too found in the objects could not be attributed to anubhūti. It is because rūpa, etc., and also bheda are objects of knowledge, and so they could not characterize knowledge. Thus svagatabheda also is not possible in anubhūti. It has already been shown on the strength of śruti texts that, consciousness is the only reality and that there is nothing else (vijātiyabheda) apart from that. Hence anubhūti being devoid of all types of distinctions, is necessarily un-differentiated.

The author of the Iṣṭasiddhi succinctly sets forth the above, in the following lines:

na ca svatassiddhasya prāgabhāvādayaḥ svato anyato vā siddhyanti; ato’jā, ato’syā nānye’pi bhāvavikārāḥ; janmāditvāt teśām. cetyanaṁ ca na ciddharmatvaṁ rūpādīvat; ato’meva, nāsyā meyo dharmo’ pyastītyartaḥ; ato’nantā. antasyāpi meyatve ataddharmatvāt, ameyatve’pyananyatvāt

42. Š.P. on Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), p.108
43. ibid., p.108.
44. Loc. cit
na tadvattā citaḥ. kālatastāvadānanyam siddhāṁ janmābhāvat. ata eva deśato vastuto 'pi. anyathā
ghatādivat janmapraṇāṅgāt. nāhyajaṁ vibhāgyamasti .... janmābhāve nānye 'pi
bhāvavikārāḥ syuh, ataḥ kuṭastham sadaikarūpaṁ
vastu svatassiddham iti⁴⁵.

To summarize this part of the discussion: Ultimate Reality is Brahman, which is pure consciousness and which
is of the form of existence and bliss. It is eternal and self-
manifest and transcends all sorts of differentiations,
namely homogeneous, heterogeneous and also internal.
The soul in its essential nature is none other than the pure
consciousness. It is not a knower and is not the content of
I-cognition. We shall now discuss the nature of the content
of I-cognition.

2.2.8 SELF DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTENT
OF I-COGNITION

Sri Padmapāda in his Pañcapādika states:

ahamitī tāvat prathamo'dhyāsaḥ⁴⁶

The notion of I is the one that precedes every other
adhyāsa. And this aham-pratyaya is the basis of
knowership and all other subsequent adhyasa-s. Actually
the I-cognition has two constituents - the idamāṁśa and
the anīdamāṁśa⁴⁷. In the cognition of I, it seems that one
knows oneself. But knowability is a characteristic of
external objects and not of the self. The self is knowledge
and could not become an object of knowledge. Hence

⁴⁵. Iṣṭasiddhi, p.1
⁴⁶. Pañcapādika, p.31
⁴⁷. ibid., pp.85-86
what is known in I-cognition is the *idamāṁśa*, which is the *antahkarana*, a product of *avidyā*. Thus the soul, being pure knowledge, never becomes a knower, and knowership (*jñātrtva*) is quite extraneous to it.

It cannot be said that the self is perceived to be a *jñātā* in instances like ‘I know’, etc. It is because, these are not valid cognitions, but are erroneous ones like shell-silver. In fact we have knowledge of the form ‘I am a man’, etc. But this does not mean that the self is a human being. Such characteristics which remain far-removed and totally unrelated to the self are superimposed upon it. So is the characteristic of *jñātrtva*. An analysis of *jñātrtva* itself shows that it cannot be inherent to the self.

*jñātrtva* stands for agency in respect of the act of knowing (*jñānakriyākārtrtvam*). In fact, to know means to have a change of state. It is because, the notion that the self knows would never be significant unless there is a change of state. One must accept some change, on the basis of which alone one could differentiate the previous and subsequent states of knowing. But, according to *Advaita*, change is incompatible with eternity, which is the nature of the self. There can be either change or eternity, but not both. Hence in the case of the self, as *jñātrtva* involves change it must be accepted to belong to the *antahkarana*, the insentient component of the content of I-cognition, which alone is capable of undergoing change. Further, just like colour, etc., which are given in perception, *kārtrtva* too, which is equally so must be extraneous to the self.

And in instances like deep-sleep and swoon, there is a clear absence of the I-cognition and yet the self shines forth by itself and *Upaniṣad* declares it to be *svayaṁ-jyotiḥ* or self-luminous.

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Further, barring the Cārvaka school all others admit that the self is an entity that is totally different from the body. The body is inert, while the self is self-effulgent. The body is an object of knowledge, while the self is purely knowledge. Now if it is held that the self in a kartā or an object of I-cognition, then it will amount to attributing all the properties of the body to it which will in turn efface the self-hood of the self.

Kartṛtva is only a state of being the substratum of movement or volitional effort. When we say 'a chariot goes' agency is attributed to the chariot in respect of the act of going. But it is only a figurative usage. A chariot cannot have free-will and act by itself.

If, on the other hand, we say 'Devadatta goes' the usage is primary and a valid one. But here, the physical movement (kriyāśrayatva) and the volitional effort on the part of Devadatta to move, with a specific purpose in view (prayatnāśrayatva) - these two are involved. Here too, it can be said that kartṛtva in the form of physical movement (kriyāśrayatva) belongs only to the body, as the self, which, being pure Brahman is infinite and cannot serve as a substratum of movement. But kartṛtva in the form of prayatnāśrayatva has necessarily to be admitted in the case of the self, as the body being inert cannot think by itself and act.

The Advaitin, however, holds that the agency in the form of being the substratum of volitional effort also cannot be attributed to the self. It is because, volitional effort on the part of the self would imply change in the essential nature of the self. Further, it is clear that the inert body becomes the agent for one form of action - the physical movement. And if the self is admitted to be the agent of another form of kartṛtva it will be similar to the physical body, as both forms of kartṛtva involve change. Hence
volitional effort must belong to the internal organ - antahkarana, whose kartrvra is superimposed upon the self and the conscious - element of the self is superimposed upon the antahkarana, which alone initiates the world process49.

In the same way, jnâtrvra too can never be the property of the self, which is as much extraneous to it as the body itself. The content of the I-cognition, therefore, is only the jnâtâ and not the pure self.

Since jnâtrvra is only an attribute of the mind, and since mind is not active in the states of deep-sleep and liberation, the latter is free from the notion of jnâtrvra. Deep-sleep in fact vouches for the absence of the ahampratyaya even while one is in transmigratory existence, because that is what is one’s natural state when all extraneous acquisitions recede and the self shines forth in its pure, unsullied form. But as this is not caused because of the annihilation of ignorance, there arises all the illusory notions like jnâtrvra, etc., once the soul comes back to the waking state. In the state of moksa, however, which results after strenuous efforts, the seed of all illusions is completely annihilated. It is because of this that during the states of deep-sleep and moksa there is absence of jnâtrvra and the I-cognition, as these are external acquisitions and not inherent features.

To sum up: the self is nothing but pure consciousness, which is Brahman, which is self-manifest. It is not a knower; nor is it the content of the I-cognition, as these features are extraneous to it. It is Reality devoid of all qualities or attributes. Owing to the illusory avidyâ, it appears as a knower, known objects etc; and this is the logical significance of the scriptures.

49. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp.342-343.
2.3 THE OBJECTIONS

2.3.1. ATTRIBUTELESS BRAHMAN - AN IMPOSSIBILITY

According to Rāmānuja, the assertion that something is devoid of qualities is the same as saying that it does not exist. In his view, a Reality devoid of any characterization is an impossibility. Even the Advaitin is under obligation, according to him, to prove that Reality as conceived by him, is quite different from that accepted by other philosophical schools. And this the Advaitin could do only by accepting specific properties that characterize it.

For instance, the Buddhists hold that kṣaṇikavijñāna is the Ultimate Reality, whereas according to the Advaitin, Reality is eternal and not momentary. According to Vaiśeṣika-s the self is sentient (jāda) and manifold, whereas according to the Advaitin, Ātman is svaprakāśa and one.

And it is through these characteristics - nityatva, ekatva and svayamprakāśatva, that the Advaitin, must differentiate the Reality as conceived by him from that accepted by others. Hence there is no way to deny characteristics, as Brahman is characterized by atleast the said ones. It might be said that nityatva, ekatva and svayamprakāśatva are not characterizations over and above the substratum (known as Brahman) but are Brahman itself. In other words, they are seeming dharma-s but are not disparate from Brahman.  

50 Padmapāda observes in his Pañcapādikā (p.23)
änandaḥ viśāyanubhavaḥ nityatvam iti santi dharmāḥ
apṛthaktve'pi caītanyaḥ pṛthagiva avabhāsante.
This, however, cannot be maintained because if all these are Brahman itself, then it would amount to treating nityatva, ekatva and svayamprakāśatva as identical. Nityatva means eternity, ekatva oneness and svaprakāśatva self-luminosity. One cannot be the other and hence these are specific properties that characterize Brahman\textsuperscript{51}.

In fact there is no pramāṇa that could point to an attributeless Brahman, including even one’s own intuitive experience. According to Rāmānuja, to cite pramāṇa-s in respect of an attributeless Brahman, is itself a contradiction; for all pramāṇa-s give rise to knowledge of an object only as associated with specific characteristics\textsuperscript{52}. It is through pramāṇa-s that we get knowledge about the objects of the world. Hence Rāmānuja first makes a detailed examination of the nature of pramāṇa-s to show that no pramāṇa can be adduced to prove a nirviśeṣavastu.

\section*{2.3.2. ŠABDA DOES NOT PROVE A NIRVIŚEṢAVASTU}

Rāmānuja first proves that the inherent nature of śabda as a pramāṇa is to provide us with the knowledge of an object associated with some specific characteristics. He then takes up select texts from śruti, smṛti and purāṇa, which fall under the category of śabda-pramāṇa and proves that they convey only an entity endowed with characteristics. Šabda-pramāṇa functions in its aspect of being a group of sentences. A sentence is only a group of words, and word is only a unit of a stem and a suffix. Stem and suffix have different meanings. Hence the word-meaning cannot be anything but a complex entity. When it is thus clear that a word could convey only a complex

\textsuperscript{51} Ś. B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (part I), p.143

\textsuperscript{52} ibid., p.114, pp.142-143
entity, it goes without saying that a sentence which is a group of words cannot convey anything but a complex entity. Hence sabda as such, cannot give us the cognition of an attributeless entity.

Now the Advaitin argues that, according to the maxim yatparassa sabdarthaḥ, we have to hold that the purport intended to be conveyed, is the criterion in determining the import of a sentence. Hence sentences like so 'yam devadattah convey a non-relational sense, namely, the bare entity in the form of Devadatta.

In the words of Prof. R. Balasubramaniam53, “The sentence means that Devadatta who is seen in this place, at this time is identical with Devadatta who was seen in that place at that time. The identity is in respect of the person concerned and not with regard to place and time which are the determinants of the person. The place where he was seen earlier is different from the place where he is seen now. Similarly the time when he was seen earlier is different from the time when he is seen now. It is absurd to say that Devadatta as qualified by one set of determinants (i.e., Devadatta-of-the-past time-and-place) is identical with this Devadatta as qualified by another set of determinants (i.e., Devadatta-of-the-present-time-and-place). The meaning intended to be conveyed by this sentence is oneness or identity of the person concerned”.

The above view proceeds on the following assumption54; the sentence so 'yam devadattah, consisting of words in co-ordinate relation conveys the sense of identity. But the primary senses of saḥ and ayam are complex entities, and so there cannot be any identity

54. Paramārthabhūṣaṇa, p.343.
between the two. If identity between the complex entities is insisted upon, then one will be forced to admit the identity of the adjectival features also, of the complex entities, which, however, is an impossibility. The adjectival features are abandoned and the substantive features alone are taken into account.

The view set forth in the above paragraph, however, does not hold good. It is not an invariable rule that the identity of complex entities requires identity of the adjectival features as well. For example, in instances like the expression nilo ṣaṭah, etc., it is obvious that there cannot be identity between the two adjectival features - nilatva and ṣaṭatva, and hence the viṣeṣaṇa-s have to be dropped, in accordance with the above view. But that proposition is not accepted by the Advaitin either. If that is accepted, then it would suffice to cite any instance of sāmānādhikaranya as evidence for portraying a nirviṣeṣavastu and there is no need to cite the specific instance of so’yam devadattaḥ.

Further, in the instance of so’yam devadattaḥ, when we observe the intention of the speaker and also the subsequent sense understood by the listener, it is not seen that there is any non-relational sense. Here the intention of the speaker is to convey the sense that the person Devadatta, who is seen in the present time at the present place, is the same as the one seen at a different time in a different place. It is not absurd to say that that Devadatta as qualified by one set of determinants (i.e., Devadatta-of-the-past-time-and-place) is identical with this Devadatta as qualified by another set of determinants (i.e., Devadatta-of-the-present-time-and-place).

If Devadatta is said to be present at two places at the same time then it would be absurd. But he is said to exist at two places at two different points of time. It is an
observed fact and also is the sense that is intended to be conveyed by the speaker. If the adjectival features are to be abandoned, then it would be against the intention of the speaker. Moreover, it is not noticed to be so in ordinary experience. The existence of one and the same person at two different places is possible, at two different times. If it is not accepted that the same person could exist at two different points of time, then it would amount to accepting the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists. But, the Advaitin accepts that, at the empirical level objects of the world are enduring and not momentary. Hence the passage so 'yam devadattaḥ conveys the sense of identity of the person seen at a different place and at a different time. The adjectival features need not be dropped. That is, one need not resort to secondary signification.

It comes to this that the expression, so 'yam devadattaḥ does not convey the sense of bare identity which is not the function of words in co-ordinate relation either.

2.3.3. PERCEPTION COMPREHENDS ONLY A SAVIŚEŚAVASTU

Rāmānuja accepts the classification of pratyakṣa into two types as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. But he holds that both the types of perception comprehend only saviśeśavastu-s. In regard to savikalpakapratyakṣa, there is no disagreement with reference to the fact that it comprehends only a differentiated entity. But in regard to the content of nirvikalpakapratyakṣa, there is divergence of opinion among philosophers. The Advaitin holds that the content of nirvikalpakapratyakṣa is nirviśesa. Rāmānuja argues that it is only saviśeṣa.
NATURE OF REALITY

2.3.4 NIRVIKALPAKA AND SAVIKALPAKA PRATYAKŠA DEFINED

According to Rāmānuja, among a class of objects, when an object is cognized for the first time, it is nirvikalpakapratyakṣa.

\textit{nirvikalpam ekajātiyadravyeṣu prathama-piṇḍagrahaṇam}^{55}

And the cognition of objects of the same class subsequently is savikalpaka.

\textit{dvitiyādipiṇḍagrahaṇam savikalpakamityucycate}^{56}

The distinction between the two lies in the fact that when an object is perceived for the first time, it is perceived as something new without any reference to its having been seen before. In the case of cognizing an object of the same class subsequently, there is a sense of familiarity. It is cognized as belonging to the specific class, in addition to there being the cognition of the object itself. In fact, in the case of savikalpaka, the familiarity caused is because of the fact that the object with all the attributes is cognized in the nirvikalpaka itself. Hence even in nirvikalpakapratyakṣa an object is cognized only as saviśeṣa as that is what is testified to by direct experience also. In fact, in ordinary experience, an object devoid of all attributes is never discerned. Whenever an object is cognized, it is cognized as that particular object and it is because of the perception of its specific configuration. Thus there is no doubting the fact that, whenever an object is perceived, it is perceived with specific viśeṣaṇa-s. What is at issue is whether it is perceived as a familiar one and as a known object, or as a totally new object. There,


Loc. cit.
however, is no denying the fact that even when an object is perceived as totally new, it is perceived with its specific configuration which is jāti, for, even that (jāti) is to be grasped only through indriya-s. And without the grasping of jāti, it is not possible to ascertain an object as it is. Thus even nirvikalpapakapratyakṣa involves reference to an object as associated with specific features (saviśeṣa)⁵⁷.

Thus, in the scheme of Rāmānuja, there is no qualitative difference between the two types of perceptions - nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, as both comprehend only a differentiated object (saviśeṣavastu). This, in fact, is more in accordance with experience.

2.3.5. ANUMĀNA CANNOT COMPREHEND A NIRVIŠEṢAVASTU

Anumāna, as the name itself suggests, is a pramāṇa that comes into operation after pratyakṣa. There is first the knowledge of the hetu in the pakṣa through pratyakṣa from which the presence of the sadhya is inferred. Hence if Brahman is to be proved as nirviśeṣa, then a hetu, in Brahman should be cited to prove that it is nirviśeṣa. But the very fact of the presence of a hetu in Brahman will make it saviśeṣa and hence it is not possible to prove Brahman to be nirviśeṣa through anumāna. As Rāmānuja puts it, the assertion that something is nirviśeṣa because it is of such special nature, is similar to the one that one’s own mother is barren.

vastugata svabhāvaviviśeṣaiḥ tadeva vastu
nirviśeṣam iti vadān jananīvandhyātva
pratijñāyāṃiva svavāgvirodham api na jānāti⁵⁸.
Hence anumāna could not prove a nirviśeṣavastu.

⁵⁷. ibid. pp. 117-120.
⁵⁸. ibid. p.123.
2.3.6 IN DEFENCE OF DIFFERENCE

According to Rāmānuja, it is not only that there is no pramāṇa in regard to an undifferentiated Brahman, but also that difference as an entity, cannot be dismissed as illusory. Difference is sought to be dismissed as a pseudo-concept, by the Advaitin, on two grounds: One is: perception comprehends pure being alone (sanmātra) and is incapable of comprehending difference. Another is: difference as a concept cannot stand the test of logical scrutiny.

Rāmānuja’s chief objection is directed against the view that perception comprehends the pure being alone. According to him, it is neither experienced, nor can be proved to be so. If the whole of pratyakṣa comprehends the pure being (sanmātra) alone, then there is no need to classify it as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. Even according to the Advaitin, the content of savikalpakraṭyakṣa is only a differentiated object (saviśeṣavastu). Hence it is contradictory to say that pratyakṣa comprehends only an undifferentiated being.

Further, if difference is not cognized, then how does one in need of a horse turn back on seeing a buffalo? Hence the fact that there is an experience of difference through pratyakṣa cannot be denied. It is no argument to say that it is experienced but it is only illusory. This is because, it cannot be similar to instances of illusions like shell-silver; for, the experience of difference is never contradicted like that of shell-silver; on the other hand, it is seen to be confirmed again and again. Further, in the case of perception of difference, no defect is noticed in the sense-organ and there is the knowledge of bheda, when all the conditions for the rise of knowledge are satisfied - conditions which are absolutely independent of the
knowing subject. And this knowledge, by virtue of being knowledge, is self-valid and there is no valid reason to deny its validity. Hence when there is neither defect in the sense-organs nor sublation at a later state, there is absolutely no reason to dismiss bheda as false.

It has been pointed out that difference as a concept cannot not be proved because of several logical difficulties. First, difference, it has been contended, cannot be of nature of the object itself (vastusvarūpa), nor can it be its specific attribute (dharma), for, there arise difficulties to either of the two views. But according to Rāmānuja, though difference is not of the nature of the object (svarūpa), it is its dharma. That is, when an object is cognized, it is cognized as being shaped in a particular fashion. And this specific disposition is called the saṃsthāna, which alone is responsible for cognizing an object as a distinct one. In fact, according to Rāmānuja, what is known as jāti, is nothing but saṃsthāna, for there is nothing known as jāti apart from this, which is ever perceived.

It has been pointed out earlier that if difference is a dharma, then it ought to be different from the object and that difference again should be different from the object, and so on, ad infinitum. Hence difference cannot be proved, as it is associated with the defect of infinite regress. But now difference is held to be nothing but saṃsthāna or jāti, which is capable of distinguishing the object from others as well as distinguishing itself (svaparanirvāhaka). This is similar to colour making an object

59. B.S.S.B., I.i.4
60. Viśiśṭadvaitasiddhiḥ. p.215
61. infra. pp. 33-34
62. infra. p. 34

54
visible and remaining itself visible without the need for any other aid. Hence there is no question of the defect of infinite regress.

Again it was observed earlier, that difference could not be proved due to anyonyāśrayana. That is, difference could be comprehended only when jāti is comprehended, and the comprehension of jāti is dependent upon the comprehension of difference. The defect of anyonyāśrayana is clear. Hence, difference could not be proved. According to Rāmānuja, however, there is no room for anyonyāśrayana at all, as both jāti and difference are one and the same.

2.3.7. ON THE IDENTITY OF SAṂSTHĀNA, JĀTI AND BHEDA

Our observation of the world shows that there arises the notion of commonness among several objects of the same kind like cows, dogs, etc., and also the notion of distinction of like objects from unlike ones. This, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s, is due to the function of jāti or sāmānya. According to them, it is due to jāti that there arises the notion of similarity among objects of the same class and also the idea of distinction among objects of different classes. Hence they accept it as a separate category and define it as nityam, ekam and anekānugatam (eternal, one and all-pervasive).

Whereas according to Rāmānuja, it is true that there arises the notion of similarity and distinction in the above manner, it is not necessary to postulate a separate entity known as jāti for the purpose specified above. It is the specific configuration of called saṃsthāna that causes the notion of similarity among objects of the same class and that of distinction of the object belonging to one class from
that of another. Apart from samsthāna, there is never noticed anything known as jāti, as claimed by the Nyaya-Vaisesika-s.

samsthānatirekino'nekeṣu ekākāra buddhi-bodhyasyādarśanāt63.

Hence, according to Rāmānuja, the postulation of a separate principle known as jāti is quite unwarranted on the ground mentioned above. Further, samsthāna is accepted even by the advocates of jāti and hence jāti becomes superfluous, as its function is carried out by samsthāna itself. Hence the fact is that, what is known as jāti is noting but samsthāna itself, and not something apart from that, as no such thing is observed in common parlance.

atirekavādepi samsthānasya sampratipannatvācca
samsthānameva jātiḥ64.

Samsthāna is defined as the unique configuration of an object, which has to be reckoned for each object.

samsthānam nāma sva-asādhāraṇam rūpam iti
yathāvastu samsthānam anusandheyam65.

Further, there arises the notion of bheda only upon the comprehension of jāti and here again there is observed nothing known as bheda, as a separate entity. Hence bheda is nothing but jāti itself.

Now, the following objection suggests itself: jāti cannot be equated with bheda, for the simple reason that bheda is relative, while jāti is independent. That is, the word bheda expects some pratiyogin to convey its meaning, whereas jāti conveys its meaning independently.

63. S.B., I.i.1., Vol.1 (Part I), p.126
64. Loc.cit
65. ibid., pp. 126-127
But, according to Sudarṣana Sūri, this difficulty does not arise. That is, even according to those who admit bheda as distinct from a jāti like gotva, the abhāva of abhāva (non-existence of non-existence) is accepted to be without any need of a pratiyogin, or else the process will involve the fallacy of infinite yog. Further, it is not observed in common experience too. Similar is the case with bheda, which is said to be nothing but jāti. What is to be noted here is that gotva, etc., which are class-characteristics distinguish an object irrespective of whether they are viewed as jāti or bheda. When there arises specific usage as bheda with respect to something else, there arises the need for a pratiyogin; and when there is no such usage, there is no such need also. Thus, it is only the verbal usage that makes the difference, while the object remains the same and discharges the same function.

Another objection may arise, and it is as follows: if jāti and bheda are one and the same, then whenever there is reference to jāti (like gotva), there should be reference to bheda as well, for both are the same. Rāmānuja’s reply to this is that, there does exist such a reference, in as much as there is reference to gotva. And what is referred to as gotva is nothing but the distinction of the object from all other objects. Once the distinct configuration of the object such as gotva is apprehended, there is observed the absence of the knowledge or verbal usage about any other object. The notion of identity (abheda) after all could be removed only through the apprehension of bheda.

Hence, according to Rāmānuja, when an object is perceived as the particular object, it is perceived through its specific saṃsthaṅa, which alone, in the final analysis,

67. Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) pp.128-129

57
is jāti, as nothing apart from it is neither observed nor needed. Further, as this itself serves as the distinguishing feature of the object, samsthāna or jāti itself is bheda as here too nothing known as bheda is apprehended apart from this. When there is the specific intention to express the distinction of one object from another as ayam asmāt bhinnah, there arises the usage bhinnah and never independently. Nevertheless bheda remains perceived. It was noticed earlier that as pratyakṣa is momentary (ekakṣanavarti) it is not possible for it to grasp the object as well as bheda within that one moment. But in the wake of the above clarification that bheda is nothing but jāti itself, even granting that pratyakṣa is momentary, bheda stands comprehended. This is because, as pointed out earlier, when an object is grasped it is grasped along with its samsthāna and hence the very fact that the object is grasped as such, proves that bheda is comprehended, as bheda is nothing but samsthāna or jāti.

In fact, according to Sudarśana Sūri, it is sheer dogma to hold that pratyakṣa is kṣanika. That there is the apprehension of bheda separately cannot be dismissed as illusory, on the ground that pratyakṣa is kṣanika and hence cannot remain as long as there is recollection of the pratiyogin. This is because, from what is observed, any jñāna should be admitted to persist as long as it is needed to carry out its function. Hence in the present case, even if there should be some delay caused due to the time taken for recollection, pratyakṣa should still be admitted to remain that long. But as bheda has been proved to be samsthāna or jāti itself, even granting the pūrvapakṣa view that pratyakṣa is kṣanika, bheda is proved to be grasped.

68. infra., pp. 31-32
pratiyogismaranakṣṭavilambe satyapi jñānasya
yāvatkāryasiddhi sthiratvāṁ kalpyāṁ, tathāpi
pratiyoginirapekṣa jātyāderbhedatvena eka-
kṣaṇavartitve'pi pratyakṣasya, bhedasya
sugrahavitāṃ dūrotsāritam iti bhāvanā70

To sum up: the notion of commonness that arises
among several objects of the same kind has led
philosophers like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s to postulate a
separate entity called jāti, which is seen as a unifying
concept. Again as each object is seen to be distinct, it was
argued that there should be some aspect called bhedā,
which is responsible for the notion of difference. But,
according to Rāmānuja, it is samsthāna or the specific
configuration which does the function of both. That is, in
as much as it produces the notion of commonness, it serves
as jāti and as it distinguishes the object, it serves as bhedā.
Hence apart from samsthāna then is nothing known as
jāti or bhedā, as neither of the two is warranted nor
corroborated by observed facts.

2.3.8. ILLUSORINESS - UNINTELLIGIBILITY
OF THE ADVAITIC ARGUMENTS

It was earlier contended by the Advaitin that an
examination of the nature of the objects of the world shows
that they cannot be held to be real or an absolute nothing
but have to be treated as illusory.

This is because, that whichever is variable
(vyāvartamāna) and sublated (bādhita) is not real and that
which is unchanging (anuvartamāna) and unsublated
(abādhita) is real.

70. Ś.P. on Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) p.123.
But, according to Rāmānuja, the concepts of bādha and nivṛtti are thoroughly misinterpreted by the Advaitin. When there is a direct conflict between two cognitions, then, one is subject to sublation and another sublates. That is, if something which is seen in a particular place at a particular time is found upon subsequent verification, not to have been present at the same place at the same time, then there is conflict between the two cognitions, and the one which is valid and consequently powerful, sublates the other. On the other hand, that which is found at one place at a particular time is not found at another place at another or at the same time, then there is absolutely no conflict between the two, and hence there is no question of one getting sublated by the other.\(^7\)

In the instance of shell-silver, silver which was found at a particular place at a previous time is subsequently found to be stultified. That is, when verified later on, it is noticed that silver was never present in the place where it was found at the time when it was perceived. Hence the cognition of silver is sublated by the subsequent cognition and so silver found in shell is said to be illusory. But ghaṭa, paṭa, etc., cannot be said to be illusory because of the fact that they are never noticed to be not present at the place where and at the time when they were perceived. Thus as the objects of the world like ghaṭa, paṭa, etc., are not illusory, it cannot be contended that pure being alone is the Ultimate Reality.

Another contention that existence (sat) itself is knowledge (anubhūti)\(^7\), also can be seen to be not valid. It was contended that if existence were said to become an object of knowledge, then the two will have to be accepted

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71. Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) p.132
72. infrà. pp. 36-37
as different which will end in accepting bheda as a padārtha. But as difference as an entity has been shown to be impossible, there cannot be difference between sat and anubhūti and hence both have to be accepted as one and the same.

But, as explained earlier, according to Rāmānuja, bheda cannot be negated. And in the case of sat and anubhūti the difference between the two is given in perception and is never sublated. And there is no valid reason to show that difference is illusory. Hence it is not proper to hold that the two - sat and anubhūti, are the same.

Thus when sattva is something which is cognized through knowledge, it is not proper to equate the sat and knowledge. Further, as sattva becomes an object of knowledge it is not possible to undo the difference between them. Thus anubhūti itself is not existence.

2.3.9. SELF-LUMINOSITY OF KNOWLEDGE – RĀMĀNUJA’S VIEW

Though Rāmānuja subscribes to the fact that knowledge is self-manifest, yet, he differs from the Advaitin’s view that it is invariably self-manifest and never an object of another cognition. According to him, knowledge is self-manifest, at the time of revealing objects of the world to the self. But it is not a sine qua non that it should be self-manifest at all times, for that is not only opposed to experience but also lands us in several difficulties. From the specific activities of other, like appropriating or avoiding the objects of the world, it is inferred that they have got knowledge about those objects. Hence the knowledge of other people is only paraprakāśa to others. Even in one’s own case, one’s past knowledge
is not svaprakāśa at the present time, for it is known at the present time as past knowledge as aham ajñāsaśam. Hence it is not proper to say that anubhūti is necessarily svaprakāśa, by virtue of its being an anubhūti?³³

Again, it was observed earlier that anubhūti cannot be objectified. That is, if anubhūti itself is apprehended by another anubhūti, then not only will its svaprakāśatva be lost, but also it will become similar to the objects of the world, with the result that it will become devoid of its character of being anubhūti?³⁴

But this is an obviously absurd proposition. It is a matter of experience that the knowledge of others is not directly experienced by us but only indirectly inferred. Hence those are not svaprakāśa to us. Similarly our own past knowledge is not directly experienced in the present time and hence is not svaprakāśa at the present time. And on this account they do not lose their character of being knowledge.

According to Rāmānuja there is no justification to hold that knowledge is essentially svaprakāśa and never paraprakāśa. Seen in the larger perspective of the conduct of the worldly affairs, it is seen that, it is through language that men communicate their experiences, ideas, etc. But if knowledge is held to be essentially svaprakāśa, it may not be possible to grasp the relation between words and meanings because words are the tools for communicating knowledge, and this means that knowledge is paraprakāśa. Hence if knowledge is said to be never paraprakāśa, words will never is efficacious to convey one's ideas, etc., and hence, observes Rāmānuja, the entire process of verbal

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74. infra. pp.38-39
communication will be eliminated from mankind\textsuperscript{75}. Hence, according to Rāmānuja, \textit{jñāna} is \textit{svaprakāśa}, no doubt but, at the same time the fact of its being \textit{paraprakāśa}, could not be gainsaid.

That knowledge is invariably \textit{svaprakāśa} is cited as an evidence to show that knowledge could never become an object of another knowledge. And it is contended that if \textit{jñāna} becomes an object of another \textit{jñāna} then it will lose its character of being \textit{jñāna}, for \textit{jñāna} is a manifesting factor and objects are manifested. The manifesting factor itself cannot become manifested.

But, according to Rāmānuja, it is wrong to say that, that which is experienced is essentially an object, and that consciousness can never partake of the nature of an object. According to him to be conscious, is to be conscious of something. That is, \textit{jñāna} reveals itself only when it reveals some object. At other times it remains only as a potency of the self to apprehend objects, and is not \textit{svaprakāśa} at that time.

\begin{quote}
yattu \textit{jñānasya svayamprakāśatvam uktam tadviśaya- prakāśanavelāyāṁ jñātuḥ ātmanah tathaiva; na tu sarveśāṁ sarvadā tathaivyeti niyamo'sti\textsuperscript{76}.
\end{quote}

Hence, knowledge is that which manifests itself to its substratum, as and when it is present or that which manifests its objects to its substratum.

\begin{quote}
anubhūtitvam nāma vartamāna daśāyāṁ svasattayaiva svāśrayāṁ prati prakāśamānātvaṁ; svasattayaivā svāvīśaya sādhanatvam vā\textsuperscript{77}.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{75} S.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) p.134.
\textsuperscript{76} Loc.cit.
\textsuperscript{77} Loc.cit
In as much as these characteristics remain unaffected, it is immaterial whether consciousness becomes an object of another consciousness or not. The fact of consciousness being apprehended by another would in no way affect the characteristic of consciousness and render it insentient.

In fact objects of the world such as ghaṭa and the like, are insentient, not because they become objects of knowledge but because they are incapable of manifesting themselves or others. Thus when there is direct perceptual evidence of jñāna being comprehended by another, it is not justified to hold something contrary to this position on the basis of false logic.

2.3.10 ON THE ETERNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: UNTENABILITY OF THE ADVAITIC VIEW

It was earlier pointed out that consciousness has to be accepted as eternal. This is because consciousness being self-manifest and being an object of another consciousness cannot be proved to be subject to origination.

It is thus: jñānābhāva can never be known. It is because in order that there may arise a cognition of the absence of an object, it is necessary that, that object must be known. Hence in order to have the cognition of jñānābhāva, we require the cognition of the jñāna. Since jñāna is present, it cannot be negated. To get over this difficulty, if it is argued that jñāna is not known, then one could not negate knowledge at all. So, it is not possible to prove jñānābhāva. And this suggests that jñāna is not subject to origination. This in turn precludes the possibility of the five other vikāra-s like existence, growth, transformation, decay and destruction. Hence jñāna is eternal.
But, according to Rāmānuja, it is rather strange to hold that, the antecedent non-existence of jñāna could not be comprehended, for it is well comprehended by jñāna itself. The rule that anubhūti should be present in order to grasp its abhāva is a self-imposed restriction, not warranted by facts. That is, it is not a rule that jñāna could comprehend only objects that are present simultaneously: for, then it would become impossible for it to comprehend past and future objects. It is observed only in the case of pratyakṣa, which operates through sense-organs, that it grasps objects that are present at the time of its functioning. But this rule cannot be applied in the case of jñāna as whole; for it is observed in the case of recollection, inference or yogipratyakṣa that objects of different times are apprehended\(^78\).

Another contention of the Advaitin is that as consciousness is not subject to origination, all the other vikāra-s also are naturally precluded in respect of it and hence it is eternal. But, according to Rāmānuja, this inference cannot be drawn as it lacks correspondence elsewhere. For instance, prāgabhāva which has no origination is accepted to be subject to destruction. If it is held that it is applicable only to positive entities and not to abhāva, still the rule fails in the case of avidyā, accepted by the Advaitin. That is, avidyā, according to Advaita, is not originated at a particular point of time, but still it undergoes all the vikāra-s and is eventually destroyed when there dawns the right knowledge. Hence non-origination cannot be cited as a cause to deduce that something is free from vikāra-s or that it is eternal\(^79\).

\(^78\) ibid p.136.

\(^79\) ibid., p.141
Yet another contention of the Advaitin is that, consciousness, by virtue of being unoriginated does not admit of differentiation within itself or without. This again is rejected by Rāmānuja, on the ground that the distinction of consciousness from the body, sense-organs, etc., cannot be denied. Ātman, in fact is essentially differentiated from them. It is no argument to say that that differentiation is only illusory and not real, for such a distinction (as real differentiation and illusory differentiation) is untenable in the scheme of Advaita, because of the fact that there is no such thing as real differentiation, according to Advaita. What is more, observes Rāmānuja, if avidyā is not accepted to be really different from Brahman, then it will tantamount to saying that Brahman itself is avidyā.

avidyāyāḥ ātmanah paramārthato vibhāgābhāve sati vastuto hyavidyaiva syādātmā

2.3.11 THE SELF IS THE CONTENT OF I-COGNITION

It was pointed out earlier, on the basis of several arguments, that according to Advaita, Ātman cannot be the content of the I-cognition. And the Advaitic contention centered mainly on three arguments:

(i) if the self knows itself as I, then there would arise the defect of the self itself becoming the subject as well as the object of the knowledge of I, which, however, is an impossibility;

(ii) if the self knows itself as I, then, there will result change or vikāra, as knowership essentially involves change; and,
(iii) the I-cognition never continues in the states of deep-sleep and liberation, which testifies to the fact that the notion of I is not intrinsic to the self.

Actually the cognition of ‘I’ involves the larger question of knowership itself, and according to Advaita, knowership is an acquired feature and not the essential nature of the self. Thus the Advaitin contends that the I-cognition is the foremost of all adhyāsa-s, and it does not belong to the self.

But, according to Rāmānuja, the content of the I-cognition is the self, which is a whole and does not consist of analyzable constituents as idam and anidam. The self represented by ‘I’ is not illusory, but a real and an ultimate entity in itself. The Advaitin holds the subject-object combination as wholly impossible, and therefore feels that he is compelled to explain the same as consisting of two elements\textsuperscript{82}.

According to Rāmānuja, however, it is improper to say that the ‘I’ is not the self, as it amounts to saying that the self is not the self. It is the nature of the self to know itself as ‘I’. If release means the self free from the notion of ‘I’, then that would be nothing short of destroying the self itself, in which case, mokṣa will cease to be a desired end. One assiduously pursues all that is prescribed in scriptures with a view to attain release under the hope, “I will get removed of all the traces of pain and enjoy infinite bliss in mokṣa”. But if the ‘I’ itself were to be destroyed in mokṣa, then it will no longer be a cherished end at all.

\begin{quote}
\textit{nirastākhiladuhkhho ‘ham anantarāndabhāk svarāt bhaveyamiti mokṣārthī śravanādau pravartate ahamarthavināśaścet mokṣa ityadhyavasyati apasarpedasaumokṣakaṭḥāprasthāvagandhatah}\textsuperscript{83}.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{82} cf., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp.354-355
\textsuperscript{83} Š.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) p.148
GLEANINGS FROM THE ŚRĪBHĀSYA

Whereas the Advaitin maintains a sharp division between the knowing subject and the object known, holding that one cannot become the other, Rāmānuja feels that it should be the other way round. The subject, without first knowing itself, cannot know something else. In fact, the notion of svayamprakāśatva starts with the self. The self is said to be svayamprakāśa, because it knows itself as I. And this aspect of the self is called pratyaktva, as opposed to parāktva in the case of external objects. Pratyaktva is defined as being revealed to oneself - svasmai bhūsamānatvam pratyaktvam. And it is this characteristic that distinguishes the self from the not-self, which certainly is not due to any false identification.

The Advaita too, though holds the self to be svayamprakāśa, yet does not hold that it knows itself. But, on the other hand, it defines svayamprakāśatva as “revelation without any aid”. But according to Rāmānuja, it is meaningless to say that self-luminosity means revelation without any aid as that would need further explanation. Is it something that is revealed or the self itself?

And to whom does this revelation occur? If the term revelation is conceived in the ordinary parlance of the term, then being a relative term, it would necessarily involve an object and subject, for that is how it is found in common parlance. If on the other hand, it is conceived in any special sense, then, that is not warranted because, there is no vedic or classical usage to support that view.

\[ \text{prakāśatvādeva kasyacideva bhavet} \]
\[ \text{dipādipraķāśatva ... samvidanubhūti-} \]
\[ \text{jñānādiśabdāḥ sambandhi śabdāḥ iti} \]

84. Ś.P. on Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) p.147
85. cf., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p.343.

68
NATURE OF REALITY

śabdārtavidah. na hi lokavedayoh jānātyāder
akarmakasya akartṛkasya ca prayogo
dṛśṭacarāḥ.  

Hence to be the subject and the object of cognition (in the case of the I-cognition) is no contradiction at all, and it does not split the self into two, as consciousness and antahkaraṇa.

The next argument is that if the self knows itself; then it will become a knower, and as knowership essentially involves change, it cannot be intrinsic to the unchanging Ātman. Hence this jñāntva which is illusory, rightly belongs to the changing antahkaraṇa, which feature is falsely superimposed upon the self. Further, if knowership, being a form of agency (i.e., kartrtvā, in the act of knowing) belongs to the self, then it will only be similar to the body and in that case, the self would lose its self-hood itself.

To Rāmānuja, however, it is just the opposite. That is jñāntva is something special to a sentient being and to postulate it to an insentient antahkaraṇa goes against all logic. He says “cetana asādhāranadharmatvāt jñāntvasya”  

If jñāntva cannot be admitted to the self on the ground that it involves change, then it is all the more impossible to admit it to the antahkaraṇa on several other grounds. The antahkaraṇa is similar to the body in many respects like being insentient, being an effect of prakṛti, being parāk, etc., and how could something (jñāntva, in the present instance) which is not possible to the body, become possible to the antahkaraṇa either?

In fact, all the reasoning that preclude knowership with respect to the body, hold equally good in respect of an

86. Ś.B., i.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) p.125
87. ibid., p.158
analogous antahkaraṇa, and hence antahkaraṇa could never be a knower.

\[
yathā dehādiḥ dṛṣyatvaparāktvādihetubhiḥ
tatpratyantika draśtrtvapratyaktvāder vivicyate
evam antahkaraṇa-rūpa-ahaṅkaro 'pi
taddravyatvādeva taireva hetubhiḥ
tasmādvivicyate iti^{88}.
\]

2.3.12. Jñātṛtvā EXPLAINED

The chief objection of Advaita against the self being viewed as a jñāta is that jñātṛtvā would involve change. But, according to Rāmānuja, it is not so. Jñātṛtvā means to be endowed with knowledge (jñātṛtvam hi jñānagunāsrayatvam^{89}).

That is, the self, which is eternal, is ever endowed with the quality called knowledge. It is a unique dharma of the self, which (dharma) in its natural state will be all pervasive. But while the self is in bodily existence, this knowledge, called the dharma-bhūtajñāna is subject to contraction and expansion due to karma. That is, while the self is confined to the body, the dharma-bhūtajñāna operates through the sense-organs, and consequently there is expansion and contraction due to which, it is said, knowledge has arisen or knowledge is destroyed. And during such states, jñātṛtvā involves change, as dharma-bhūtajñāna expands and contracts. Such change however is not inadmissible, as it is in accordance with scriptural declarations.

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88. Loc.cit.
89. ibid., p. 159.
Sudarśana Sūri observes here

\[ \text{tādṛśavikriyātmakatvāṁ prāmaṇīkatvāt} \]
\[ \text{iṣṭamityarthah; acetanavat pariṇāmo} \]
\[ \text{hi anabhyupagataḥ}^{90}. \]

Still the dharmi remains changeless and hence there is no conflict with the sruti-s which declare the self to be changeless. It is on the basis of scriptural declarations that the nature of self, and of other factors are determined, and they are verified later when there actually occurs realization of the self at the state of mokṣa. And it is seen that scriptures declare the self not only as jñāna, but also as jñāta and the author of the sūtra-s expressly confirms the view in the aphorism jñāta eva\(^{91}\). Hence knowership is intrinsic to the self. Still at the state of release, the dharmabhūtajñāna expands to the maximum, and thus there is no change in it also at that state. Thus the nirvikāratva\-sruti-s can be taken to declare the self to be changeless at that state.

It may be noted here that when it is said that the dharmajñāna knows itself as ‘I’, it does not know itself like an object, pot, etc. But on the other hand, it is the nature of the self to be manifesting at all times as ‘I’. Hence, in the case of dharmi there is no question of change at all.

Thus jñātrtva, according to Rāmānuja is an essential feature of the self.

But some Advaitins hold that jñātrtva is not possible either to the changeless ātman or the insentient antahkaraṇa. But a unity of the two brings about it. In this connection Prof. Hiriyanna writes:

\[ \text{---} \]

90. Ś.P. on Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I) p.160
91: B.S., II. iii. 19.
“Thus it is only the unity of the passive sāksin and the active antahkaraṇa that is real for all practical purposes. That is what knows feels and wills”\textsuperscript{92}

But still the question remains how jñātṛtva which is absent in either could arise through a union of the two. It is no argument to say that due to the association of consciousness, belonging to the self, the antahkaraṇa partakes of the nature of a knower, on the analogy of an iron-rod, which by itself could not burn, but burns due to the association with heat. This is because, what is present in fire, namely, heat, could be transferred to iron; but in the case of the self, jñātṛtva being not present in it could not be transferred to the antahkaraṇa.

atha agnisamparkāt ayahpiṇḍa auṣṇyavat citsamparkāt jñātṛtvopalabdhirīti; naitat; samvidi vāstava jñātṛtva anabhypagamādeva na tattsamparkāt ahaṅkāre jñātṛtvam tadupalabdhir vā\textsuperscript{93}.

The third argument advanced by the Advaitin to prove that the I-cognition does not belong to the self, is that it is not found in deep-sleep and after release.

Actually deep-sleep seems to be a very mysterious state in man’s life. It occurs almost daily and universally to all, but still little is known about it. It is characterized by the cessation of all knowledge, and the sense-organs including the mind cease to function during that state. Now Advaita contends that there is the experience of pure unsullied bliss devoid of all characterizations including even the notion of ‘I’ at that state, based on subsequent recollections in the form sukhamaham avāpsam (I slept happily) etāvantam kālam na kīcicidaham aṭṭāsiṣam

\textsuperscript{92} Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p.343.
\textsuperscript{93} S.B. I.i.1. Vol.1 (Part I) p.161
(All this time (during sleep) I did not know anything) and
māmapyahāṃ na.jñātavān (I did not know even myself)94.

According to Advaita, these are adequate proofs to
show that the notion of ‘I’ does not continue during deep-
sleep, and that knowership is quite extraneous to the self,
and there is the experience of pure unsullied bliss at that
state.

But Rāmānuja proves precisely on the basis of these
recollections that, the self ever remains cognized as ‘I’
which continues even during deep-sleep, and that
knowership is an essential characteristic of the self.

According to him, every living species is aware of
itself at all times as ‘I’. During deep-sleep, which is caused
due to the influence of the tamoguṇa, there is no experience
of external objects as all the sense-organs cease to function,
and dharma-bhūtajñāna which gets greatly contracted
remains as a mere potency to know. Nevertheless, there
continues the uniform experience of ‘I’, as that is how the
self knows itself. In fact, the manifestation of the self
itself is of the form of ‘I’. But during deep-sleep, as there
is no experience of anything else to contrast it from the I-
cognition, the ahampratyaya is rather unclear, but still there
never occurs its total cessation.

tamoguṇa abhibhavāt parāgātha anubhava
abhāvāc ca ahamarthaśya viviktaspūtā
pratibhāsa abhāve pi āprabodhāt ahāmityekā-
kāreṇa atmanāḥ sphuraṇāt susūptāvapi na
ahāmbhāvavigamahā95.

The Advaitic contention is that there is the experience
of nirviśeṣcaitanya during deep-sleep. But there is no

94. Panca-pādika, pp. 96-97
95. Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), p.166
recolletion of such an experience, and in the absence of any other evidence to that effect, it is not proper to hold that there is such an experience. Another incompatibility is that there is no experient to experience such an experience, and if nobody has experienced it, there is no proof that it had actually been there. In fact, the subsequent recollection cited proves the contrary.

The recollection is of the form sukham aham asvāpsam. This goes only to prove that Ātman; by nature is blissful and is an experient. As it is impossible for the self to recollect something which it had not experienced earlier, the said recollection only proves the actual experience of bliss at that state, by the self, which would not have been possible had there been the cessation of ahampratyaya.

If the notion of ‘I’ does not continue in the state of deep-sleep, then there is no possibility on the part of one to continue one’s activity left unfinished before one had gone for sleep nor is it possible to have the recollection of objects experienced prior to sleep.

Another proof set forth by the Advaitin, to establish the absence of knowership in the state of deep-sleep is recollection of the form etāvantam kālaṁ na kiṁcit aham ajñāsisam. According to Rāmānuja, this recollection proves exactly the opposite view, namely, that the notion of ‘I’ persists throughout. It does not prove the absence of ahampratyaya; on the other hand, it only shows the absence of experience of any external objects. It may be said that the recollection involving reference to na kiṁcit shows the absence of every experience. But it is not correct. It is because, in that case, it would refer to the absence of nirviśeṣcaitanya too96.

96. ibid., p.168

74
The Advaitic contention is that there is the experience of bare consciousness and absence of the notion of ‘I’. But the recollection cited “I did not know anything”, proves exactly the opposite. There is the continuation of the self (as I) and negation of all knowledge.

Yet another proof cited is the recollection of the form, māmapyaham na jñātavān. This apparently negates the continuation of the self during sleep. But, Rāmānuja is of the view that, though the self too seems to be negated by the word mām, yet the one who negates is the ‘I’ (aham), which however is involved in the recollection. In fact, the meanings of the two terms, mām and aham, need to be distinguished clearly.

The self, throughout the waking state, knows itself as associated with body and its characteristics such as the stage and class of life. This forms the content of the negation māmapyaham na jñātavān. And the word aham represents the experience, altogether, of one’s own self during deep-sleep, though in an unclear form.

The point to be noted here is that, those factors alone which are not experienced due to the absence of the sense-organs are negated by the negation. That which needs no external aid for its manifestation, or, in other words, that which is self, cannot be and is never negated.

Thus ātman is necessarily a knower and is always the substratum of the I-cognition. And knowership, which is innate to it, remains latent during deep-sleep and is not totally effaced out at that time.

Ātman is accepted to be self-manifest and that is possible only when it manifests itself as ‘I’. And this manifestation continues even during deep-sleep.

97. Loc.cit.
ātmane svayam avabhāsamānaḥ aham ityeva
avabhāsāta iti svāpādyavasthāsvapi ātmā
prakāśamānoḥamītyeva avabhāsāta iti
siddham.\(^{98}\)

Again, according to Advaita, release from bondage
means release from the notion of ‘I’ too. In fact it is the
basic axiom of Advaita, that agency, enjoyership and
knowership (kartṛtvā, bhokṭṛtvā and pramāṇṛtvā) cannot
be intrinsic to Ātman. These are sources of misery, and
getting rid of them constitutes liberation.

But, according to Rāmānuja, it is not correct to hold
that the ahampratīyaya is a characteristic of the self, so
that it could be segregated from it. It is the essential nature
(svarūpa) of the self, enabling the latter to feel itself as
‘I’, and hence if this were to be lost in mokṣa, it is
tantamount to accepting the destruction of the soul itself.

yattu mokṣadāsāyām ahamartho nānuvartate iti
tadapeśalam. tathāsati ātmanāṇā eva apavargah
prakāśantarēṇa pratijñātaḥ syāt, na cāharmartha
dharmamātram yena tadvigame’pi
avidyānivṛttāviva svarūpam avatiṣṭheta; pratyuta
svarūpameva ahamartho ātmanah.\(^{99}\)

The schism between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita lies
in regard to the explanation of the self-luminosity of the
self. The Advaitin holds that self-luminosity consists in
mere revelation, which according to Rāmānuja, makes no
sense. If the self is said to be svaprapakṣā, it must be held
to know itself as ‘I’, in accordance with what is observed
during waking state. In ordinary experience, one finds
that whoever knows oneself, knows one’s self as ‘I’, and

\(^{98}\) ibid., p.169.
\(^{99}\) ibid., p.170
objects like pot etc., are not considered to be *svapra\k{s}a* as they do not know themselves. And as released souls are accepted to be *svapra\k{s}a*, it goes without saying that they are aware of themselves as ‘I’. The *Upani\s\ad*-s too emphasize the view set forth now.

The sage, V\=amadeva, who had had direct realization, had not shed the notion of ‘I’.

\[\text{\textit{taddhaitat pas\textunderscore \textit{\=y}an r\textit{s}ir v\=amade\=vah pratipede}}\]
\[\textit{aham manurabhavam s\=urya\=sca\ldots,}^{100}\]

According to *Advaita*, at the state of *pra\=laya*, there exists Brahman alone without a second, which is called *sat*, on the basis of the *Ch\=andogy\=a* text, *sadeva sonya idamagre \=asit ekamevadvit\=iyam*. But even the *vyavah\=ara* of this non-dual Brahman involves *aham* even at that state, as evidenced by the *\=sruti* texts,

\[\text{\textit{hanta aham im\=astisro devata\=h}}^{101}\]
\[\textit{bahu sy\=am pra\=jayeya}^{102}\]

\[\textit{sa ik\=sate lok\=annu \=srijai iti}^{103}\]

Again, Lord Kri\=sha too, makes references to himself as *aham* even in his transcendental state:

\[\text{\textit{yasm\=at k\=saram at\=ito aham aksar\=adapicottama\=h}}\]
\[\textit{ato asmi loke vede ca prathita\=h puru\=sottama\=h}^{104}\]

\[\textit{aham \=atma gu\=d\=ake\=sa}^{105}\]

\[\textit{aham kri\=stnasya jagata\=h prabhava\=h pralay\textunderscore sth\=a}^{106}\]

etc.

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100. *B\=r. Up.*, III.iv.10
102. ibid., VI. ii.3.
104. *B.G.*, XV.18,
105. ibid., X.20.
106. ibid., VII.6.
GLEANINGS FROM THE ŚRĪBHĀṢYA

Thus on the basis of the triple evidence of perception, yukti and scriptures, it emerges that the self is essentially a knower, and knows itself as 'I', which Śrī Yāmunācārya succinctly summarizes as:

\begin{quote}
ataḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvāt uktanyāyāgamānayāt avidyāyogatascātmā jñātahamiti bhāsate\textsuperscript{107}.
\end{quote}

In fact, to deny knowership at the highest state of liberation is only counter-productive and detrimental in as much as one does not even have the realization of such a liberation. In the words of Prof. G.P. Bhatt,

"If in the transcendental state, which is the realization of the highest and most cherished end of life, and which comes after the most strenuous efforts of innumerable births, and for whose sake the common pleasures of mundane life are denied by the self to itself, even the contentment of realizedness is not experienced, then any attempt to achieve this state defeats its own end. If such a state is achieved at all, the self is a loser rather than a gainer"\textsuperscript{108}.

2.4. NATURE OF REALITY

2.4.1 THE RĀMĀNUJA VIEW

One of the most difficult problems encountered in the scriptures is the problem of one and many because of existence of two types of śruti-s the bhedaśruti-s and the abhedaśruti-s. According to Advaita, it is logically impossible that both could be compatible at one place. Hence in the scheme of Advaita, the problem of one and many is solved, as we saw, by treating the many as illusory and upholding the one as supremely real.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Ātmasiddhi, verse-14.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} The Basic Ways of knowing, p.12.
\end{itemize}
In the words of Prof. S.R. Bhatt\textsuperscript{109} 

"It (Advaita) finds no room for many in the unity of pure non-differentiated Brahman. To it unity defies logically all differences. Thus failing to reconcile the unity with multiplicity, it negates the latter to posit the former".

And this view of Advaita has led it to hold that Brahman is devoid of qualities too.

But Rāmānuja could never think of an ‘oneness’ in the absolute sense. What he emphasizes is that scriptures could never teach such a concept, not only because it is logically untenable but also because it runs counter to the spirit of the scriptures, taken as a whole.

Thus, according to Rāmānuja, the identity propounded in the scriptures has to be interpreted in the wake of difference expounded therein and not to its detriment. He could not accept that the abhedāsṛuti-s are more powerful than the bhedaśruti-s. In fact, he is totally against making a discrimination within the śruti texts that some are more powerful and others, less powerful.

And especially when both could be interpreted without any conflict to either, it is not proper to relegate one of them (the bhedaśruti-s) to a lower position. Hence the right perspective would be to treat all the śruti-s on an equal footing and yet resolve the apparent conflicts\textsuperscript{110}.

This could be done only by accepting Brahman as the all - embodying principle, which, according to Rāmānuja, is the mode shown by śruti itself\textsuperscript{111}. That is, Brahman is one, because there is no second to it like itself.

\textsuperscript{109} Studies in Rāmānuja Vedanta, p.21.
\textsuperscript{110} Vedārthasaṅgraha, p.179.
\textsuperscript{111} Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part II), p.79
GLEANINGS FROM THE ŚRĪBHĀŚYA

But it contains the jīva-s and the world within itself as its prakāra-s. Thus the soul and the sentient matter have separate identities for themselves but not separate existence. They are realities in their own right but are always dependent upon Brahman and remain as its bodies. Brahman remains as their inner soul and controller.

Thus as Brahman is associated at all times with jīva and prakṛti (the world), the three are seen as one, keeping in view their inseparability. But the essential nature of the three are never the same and this difference, which is maintained all through, is brought out by bhedaśrutī-s. In fact an analysis of some of the instances which portray identity seem to suggest that they do not lend credence to the Advaitic view of absolute identity.

For instance, the Chāndogya text, sarvam khalu idam brahma\textsuperscript{112} says “All this (world) is Brahman”, and the complement of the sentence gives the reason why the two are said to be the same as tajjalān iti. It means that the “world originates from, is sustained by and lapses back into Brahman”. Thus as the world has Brahman as the only cause, it is said to be Brahman itself.

Now the Advaitin seeks to interpret this text on the basis of an illustrative example thus: due to defective eyesight, etc., one mistakes a post for a man. Subsequently when the illusion is dispelled and it is found that there is nothing but the post, there results the expression sthanuḥ puruṣah, which literally means “the post is a man”. Here the post is said to be a man, not in the sense that both are one and the same, but in the sense that there is the absence of the characteristic of being a post in man.

Similarly, when the śruti says, “All this (world) is Brahman” it seeks to convey the absence of the world in

\textsuperscript{112} Ch.Up., III.xiv.1
NATURE OF REALITY

Brahman and not to posit any actual identity. Now it is to be noted that there is a marked difference between the supposed analogy and the analogue. When śruti says, “All this (world) is Brahman”, it adds, “because Brahman is its cause”.

In the case of sthāṇuḥ puruṣāḥ, however, no such reason is given, nor is needed, to show the identity. This is because it goes without saying that one of them is illusory, and in a stricter sense there is no identity at all between the two.

An examination of some other instances in the scriptures also confirms the above view. For instance, when identity is proposed between the jīva and Brahman as in tatvamasi, the Upaniṣad adds a reason as sanmulāssomya imāssarvāh prajāh sadāyatanāh satpratisthāḥ (Oh Somya! All these beings originate from, lapse back into and are sustained by that sat - Brahman) aitadātmyam idam sarvaṁ tatsatyam sa ātmā tattvamasi (All this world (cit and acit) has that (sat) as its ātman and hence is real and that is the (inner) soul; That thou art).

Again when enlightened souls speak from their supreme state of consciousness they fully identify themselves with Brahman, as Brahman who pervades everywhere remains within them also. They have the vision of God and they fully identify themselves with Brahman, in spite of their radical distinction (from Brahman).

For instance Prahlāda observes:

\[ mattassarvam aham sarvam mayi sarvam sanātane \]

113. V.P., I.xix.85.
(Everything originates from me, I remain as everything and everything lapses back into me) for which he adduces the reason

'sarvagatvāt anantasya sa eva ahamavasthitah'\textsuperscript{114}.

(As the Lord has pervaded everywhere, He Himself remains as me too.)

The Mahābhārata declares that the soul and the Supreme Being are two distinct entities and yet are viewed as one, because one remains within the other (as its soul).

\textit{anyāśca rājan sa paraḥ anyāśca pañcavimsakāḥ
tatsthatvāt anupasyanti hyeka eva iti sādhavaḥ}\textsuperscript{115}.

{Oh King! that Supreme Being and the twenty fifth one (the soul) are quite different. Yet the enlightened see the two as one, as the one (paramātman) dwells within the other (the jīva).}

Thus it could be seen that the instances which portray oneness in the scriptures could not be equated to instances like śīhānurpuruṣah, etc. The fact of their citing a reason for viewing the world or the soul as being one with Brahman shows that they do not intend to convey the illusoriness of the world nor the absolute non-difference of the soul from Brahman.

On the other hand, an analysis of the scriptures shows that the ekatva contemplated in the scriptures, can be broadly brought under two divisions:

(i) \textit{ekatva due to sarīrātmabhāva (identity due to body-soul relation)};
and

(ii) **ekatva** due to **kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva**

(Identity due to cause-effect relation)

In the system of Rāmānuja, these two are the most fundamental harmonising concepts. It is a fact that the *ṣarīrātmabhāva* is rightly acknowledged as the *pradhānapratitiyāntṛārtha* (sui generis) of the system, but yet both of them are so intertwined that each involves reference to the other and it is strictly not possible to segregate the two individually. As both are harmonising concepts, enabling us to maintain the oneness of Brahman, in spite of the existence of the multifarious world, both are dealt with under one head - conception of oneness.

### 2.4.2. CONCEPTION OF ONENESS

Earlier it was observed that there are two types of *ṣruti*-s, the *bheda-ṣruti*-s and the *abheda-ṣruti*-s. But Rāmānuja identifies a third type of *ṣruti* called the *ghaṭaka-ṣruti*, which resolves the apparent contradiction between the *bhedā* and the *abheda-ṣruti*-s. For instance, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, as well as the *Subālopāṇiṣad*-s declare the entire sentient matter and the sentient soul as forming the body of the Lord.

He who dwelling in all things;  
Yet is other than all things;  
Whom all things do not know:  
Whose body, all things are;  
Who controls all things from within;  
He is your soul, the inner-controller;  
The impeccable

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116. *infra* p. 78

cf. also *Sub.Up.*, VII
GLEANINGS FROM THE ŚRĪBHĀṢYA

In the case of body and soul, they always exist as one, though their essential natures are different. This is a unique case where there are two entities and yet both exist as one and are referred to as one only. In fact, it is seen that words used to denote bodies, do also refer to souls. For instance, when it is said, “It is a cow” (iyam gauḥ), the word cow refers not only to the body, but also to the soul inside. However, dual number is not used, in spite of the fact that the word denotes two entities, because the two are always associated and are treated as one only, and by referring to one (the body), the other (the soul) is invariably referred to, unless otherwise intended.

Thus in ordinary experience, it is noticed that words denotative of bodies do not cease to function by merely denoting them, but also have the power to denote the corresponding souls as well. And this power is called the aparyavasānavṛtti or unexhausted power. Now śruti teaches Brahman as the inner soul of every animate and inanimate being. Hence by the same aparyavasānavṛtti, words denote the self of the souls - namely, Brahman also.

That is, words, which by their very nature, are indicative of the prakāra-s have the power to indicate the viśeṣya-s as well, as their power is not exhausted merely by conveying the prakāra-s, as observed in the worldly usages. But the fact remains that Brahman is a paramaviśeṣya, and the power of words also remains unexhausted till Brahman is indicated. But as Brahman could not be known through our ordinary sources of knowledge, like pratyakṣa or anumāna, laymen do not know the fullest potency of words. Ignorant, as they are, they limit the power of words to that extent that could be known through their normal faculties of knowing because they do not have the knowledge of Vedānta.

118. Ś.B., II.iii.17. cf also Vedārtasāṅgraha, pp.41-44
NATURE OF REALITY

It is only through the study of Vedānta, that one comes to ascertain the fullest power of words, and their knowledge about words, and their denotative power is completed only then\textsuperscript{119}.

In fact, according to Rāmānuja, the entire process of creating the objects of the world, and naming them is done in such a way that the names ultimately indicate the Paramātman. This is dealt with in the Tejo’dhikaraṇa of the Brahmasūtra-s\textsuperscript{120}.

2.4.3 CREATION OF FORMS AND NAMES - THE TEJO’DHIKARAṆA

This adhikaraṇa is devoted to dispelling the prima facie view that Brahman is not the cause of elements like prthivi, ap, tejas, etc., as these are spoken in the Āruti-s as originating only from their immediately preceding elements, and not from Brahman. This is rejected on the ground that, Brahman which remains in the form of each element, creates the subsequent elements, and it pervades all the elements. In a way, it could be said that, Brahman creates itself, and it is declared in Āruti passages like

\begin{quote}
\textit{tadātmānaṁ svayamakuruta}\textsuperscript{121}.
\end{quote}

(It \textit{created} itself)

And the author of the śūtra-s too, declares Brahman to be the material cause of the world,

\begin{quote}
\textit{prakṛtiśca pratijñā dṛśtāntānuparodhāt}\textsuperscript{122}.
\end{quote}

In fact, this is one of the difficulties encountered in the scriptures. Brahman is declared to be the abode of all

\textsuperscript{119.} Vedārthasaṅgraha, p.44  
\textsuperscript{120.} B.S., II.iii.2.  
\textsuperscript{121.} Tai-Ānand. VII.1  
\textsuperscript{122.} B.S., I.iv.23.
perfections and free from any change; at the same time, it is said that it becomes both the sentiment and the insentient world, meaning thereby that it is the material cause of the world. However, there is no incompatibility, according to Rāmānuja. This is because Brahman is all-pervasive, and it remains immanent in all things, due to which it could said to be identical with all things, as well as different.

It could be said to be one with all things, in as much as it pervades all things so thoroughly, that it remains within and without everything,

\[ \text{yacca kīṇcit jagatyasmin dṛṣyate ōrūyate'pi vā antar bahiśca tatsarvaṁ vyāpya nārāyaṇas sthitah} \]

But it is different at the same time, because, its essential nature is declared to be transcendental.

Thus Brahman is unique in that, it is in all, through all, and yet above all. Due to its immanence, it is one with all; and due to its transcendence, it is different from all. This is what seems to be the general spirit of the Upaniṣad-s as is evident from numerous passages, which speak of Brahman as being one with and at the same time different from the world.

That is why, creating of elements does not mean creation of something apart from Brahman, but means a change of state of a part of its body, for reality according to the Upaniṣad-s, is ultimately to be conceived as a triad fused into one. The three forming the triad are disparate due to their inherent characteristics, and yet one due to their inseparableness. In other words, the sentient soul and the insentient matter are so very subservient to and

inseparable from Brahman, that they could be likened to qualities qualifying a substance.

Thus Brahman is said to be the material cause, though the change occurs only in the prakāra-s and the svartūpa remains unaffected. The view is very well brought out by Erie J. Lott as follows:

“In other words, it is just because the Universe is God’s body, that God, in His substantial, though not essential being, is able to form the material cause of the Universe”\textsuperscript{124}.

That is why, the creation of each subsequent element is preceded by the specific resolve, “Let me multiply myself”, by each element. The insentient elements, indeed, are incapable of thinking. This itself is a clear indication, according to the author of the sūtra-s, that it is not the mere elements that create the subsequent ones, but the Paramātman Himself, who dwells within them, as their inner soul.

\textit{tadabhidhyānādeva tu tallingāt saḥ}\textsuperscript{125}.
\textit{abhidhyopadesāccha}\textsuperscript{126}.

That is, when it is said that \textit{tejas} created the waters. (\textit{ap}), it is preceded by a statement that speaks of deliberation on the part of \textit{tejas}, in order to create the waters.

\textit{tatteja aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti}\textsuperscript{127}.

which again is repeated in the next creation as

\textit{ta āpa aikṣanta bahvyah syāma prajāyemahūtī}\textsuperscript{128}.

\textsuperscript{124} God and Universe in the Vedāntic theology of Rāmānuja, p.43
\textsuperscript{125} B.S., II.iii.14
\textsuperscript{126} ibid., I.iv.24
\textsuperscript{127} Ch. Up., VI.ii.3
\textsuperscript{128} ibid., VI.ii.4
This kind of creation could not be attributed to mere insentient objects like tejas etc., as they cannot have the functions like deliberation, etc. Hence it has to be accepted as belonging to Brahman, which is declared to be the indweller of every entity in the śruti texts such as

yah prthivyāṁ tiṣṭhan.... yo'apsu tiṣṭhan ...
yastejasi tiṣṭhan... yo vāyau tiṣṭhan ...
yā ākāse tiṣṭhan.....\(^{129}\), etc.

The close resemblance of this with the primordial creation as declared in the earlier passage -

sadeva somya idam agre āsīt ekameva advitiyam; tadaiksata bahusyāṁ prajāyeyeti tattejo asṛjata\(^ {130}\)

confirms the view that Brahman indeed is the cause of each subsequent effect. But as Brahman takes the names of the subsequent tattva-s, it is referred to by those names themselves and not by the name “Brahman”, as every term indeed refers to Brahman only in the ultimate analysis, through the aparyavasānavyṛtti referred to earlier\(^ {131}\).

Now an objection suggests itself: if all names are said to refer to Brahman only, then the relation of words to their respective meanings, known in our ordinary experience will be totally stultified. To this objection the author of the sūtra-s replies

carācaravyaḥpāśrayastu syāt tadvyapadeso ’bhāktaḥ
tadbhāvabhāvītvā\(^ {132}\).

\(^{129}\) Br. Up., V.viii.7.
\(^{130}\) Ch. Up., VI.ii.1.
\(^{131}\) infra. p.84
\(^{132}\) B.S. II.iii. 17
The names that are employed to denote specific objects in the world, function only partially in respect of those objects and their function would be exhausted only when they denote the soul of the objects. Thus words have potencies to refer not only to the prakāra-s, but also to viṣeṣya-s as well. But since paramātmān is not known through the means of knowledge like perception and anumāna the unenlightened do not know that It is the ultimate viṣeṣya of every entity. Their knowledge about the power of words is not complete. They thus use words without understanding their full significative function, breaking them mid-way, only with reference to a part of their meanings. It is only a serious study of Vedānta that enables one to have the knowledge of the fullest significative power of words. There will be no stultification of worldly usages in respect of their ordinary meanings; but there will only be addition of new knowledge of the significative relation of words, to the self or the soul or the prakārin.

The point that is of importance here is: Brahman creates the world of names and forms. Now the Upaniṣadic view is not merely that Brahman remains as the Creator and Controller of the Universe from above, but is a principle that in-dwells and pervades it and controls it from within.

The process of creation expounded in the Upaniṣad-s is something unique. It does not say that “Brahman creates the world”. On the other hand it states that “Brahman becomes the world”. The texts

\[ \text{tadaikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti} \]

(It reflected - let Me become manifold and procreate Myself)

89
GLEANINGS FROM THE ŚRĪBHĀṢYA

tadātmānam svayamakuruta\textsuperscript{133}.
[ It created itself (as the world) ]

tatsrṣṭvā tadanuprāvīṣat tadanupravīṣya sacca tyaccābhava\textsuperscript{134}.

(Having created the world, and having entered into it, It became the living and the on-living beings)

confirm the above view.

And the same Upaniṣad-s declare Brahman to be changeless and undefiled by any of the imperfections of the world. Herein lies the clue to the Upaniṣadic conception of Reality, according to Rāmānuja. The resolve on the part of Brahman in the form ‘Let Me become many’ would be fully significant only when we view that Brahman itself is the world of sentient and insentient entities. Again unless Brahman is essentially different from the world, it cannot remain undefiled by the imperfections of the world. And difference and identity could be maintained, according to Rāmānuja, only by accepting the body-soul relation between Brahman on the one hand, and cit and acit on the other - the relation which is emphasised in the Upaniṣad-s themselves.

Thus Brahman becomes the upādānakāraṇa of the world, in its substantial form by being associated with matter and soul (which are in their subtle forms) and remains untainted by the evils or defects of the world in its essential form:

In fact, according to Śrī Vedānta Deśika, the causality as well as the oneness of Brahman could be maintained only in a complex form by every Vedantin and never in an

\textsuperscript{133} Tai. Ānand., VII.1.
\textsuperscript{134} ibid., VI.2,3

90
absolute form. It is because, it is a fact that śruti declares Brahman alone as being existent at the state of dissolution and that alone as the sole cause of the universe, without any external nimittakāraṇa. But yet every Vedāntin upholds the oneness of Brahman in its causal state in a complex form only as being associated with either māyā (according to Śaṅkara) or upādhi (according to Yādavaprabhāṣa) or sakti (according to Bhāskara) or cit and acit in their subtle forms (according to Rāmānuja). Hence, in a sense everybody is only a Viśiṣṭādvaitin and nobody can maintain an absolute oneness.

māyopadhisvāsaktivyatikaritapararamoyamulah prapañcaḥ
yeṣām te'pyadvitiyāśrutiṃ avitathayantyaṃatra
 tattadvīśiṣte
aprādhānyāt tatha nah prakṛtipuruṣayoh
antarātmapradhāne
vākye 'smin sthūlaśūksmānvaya iti jagato'
nānyabhāvopapattīḥ.¹³⁵

(Those who hold that the world has for its cause Brahman, as associated with māyā or upādhi or sakti interpret those śruti texts that declare nonduality (of the cause) only by disregarding the particular viśeṣana-s associated with Brahman (considering Brahman alone as of utmost importance). The same course is open to us also. Those passages that speak of the oneness of Brahman signify Brahman who is the inner soul of cit and acit entities. Thus declarations of the oneness of the world with Brahman is justified, for, cit and acit are always associated with Brahman in their subtle or gross forms).

¹³⁵. Adhikaraṇasārāvali,166. cf. also Tattvamuktākalāpa,III.27
To sum up: according to Rāmānuja, the śārīrtātmabhāva and the kāryakāraṇabhāva are two fundamental harmonising concepts, which account for unity in the wake of diversity. While kāryakāraṇa-bhāva accounts for the material causality of Brahman towards the world, thus maintaining the identity of the two, the śārīrtāma-bhāva reconciles the changelessness of Brahman in spite of its being the material cause. It also explains how the world and the soul could be viewed as one with Brahman in spite of the specific differentiations that characterize the three.

We shall now see the interpretation of the specific scriptural passages by Rāmānuja, the general spirit of which has been dealt with above. Rāmānuja pays particular attention to those passages that are said to have Advaitic leanings and holds that no passage can ever refer to an attributeless Brahman including passages like nirguṇam, nīskriyam, etc., which was referred to in the earlier section 136.

2:4.4. INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURAL PASSAGES

Rāmānuja's foremost conviction is that no pramāṇa, by virtue of being a pramāṇa is capable of conveying anything as free from any property 137. And it is all the more impossible that scriptures, which come under the sābdapramāṇa, wherein every unit (like the base and suffix) makes reference to some property (that characterises the object indicated) could ever convey an

136. infra. pp. 78-79
137. infra. p.46
138. Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), p.117
attributeless Brahman\textsuperscript{138}. This is the general nature of \textit{sabdapramāṇa}. An examination of the individual passages too, strengthens this view, according to Rāmānuja.

The \textit{Chāndogya} passage, \textit{sadeva somya idamagra āsīt ekameva advitiyam} is of particular significance, according to the Advaitin, in as much as it negates all the three kinds of distinctions in Brahman - \textit{sajātiyabheda}, \textit{vijātiyabheda} and \textit{svagatabheda}, and thus establishes it as attributeless. But the passage, on the contrary, conveys just the opposite, according to Rāmānuja.

The passage cannot be held to negate distinctions in Brahman, for then it would be improper to say \textit{agre} which means \textit{before} (that is, at the time of dissolution).

Brahman, according to \textit{Advaita}, is distinctionless, not at a particular point of time but at all times. And basically, in order to account for the diversity of the pleasures and pains in the world, \textit{Advaita} too accepts the \textit{karma}-theory, accepting the \textit{jīva}-s and their \textit{karma}-s as \textit{anādi}-s, which would show that Brahman could not have been absolutely distinctionless at any time in the past. It is no argument to say that all these seeming diversities are only illusory and hence cause no harm to the non-dual character of Brahman, which remains distinctionless at the time of \textit{pralaya}.

Hence, from the text - \textit{sadeva somya idam agre āsīt ekameva advitiyam}, it is known that there existed the factor time which is a \textit{vijātiyabheda}, the \textit{jīva}-s, which constitute \textit{sajātiyabheda} and factors like \textit{omniscience}, omnipotence, etc., that are necessary for the creation of the universe which constitute the \textit{svagatabheda} in Brahman.

Thus this passage, which is designated as a \textit{kāraṇavākya}, cannot be said to negate distinctions, as the
context does not warrant it.

The term *sat* means, “that which is capable of being known through a *pramāṇa*” and it denotes here Brahman, which remains so\(^2\).

Though it denotes Brahman, yet as It (Brahman) happens to be portrayed as the cause of the world, the word(*sat*) conveys Brahman with all its associated factors like *prakṛti*, *jīva* and *kāla* that constitute Its body, through whose association, It becomes the cause.

The term *eva*, which has a definitive sense, could negate only that which is opposed to the meaning of the word with which it is associated. Hence *sādeva* eliminates only *asattva* and does not negate *vijātiyabheda*. Though *asattva* is a *vijātiyabheda*, yet, what is to be negated is only *asattva* in its specific sense and not as *vijātiyabheda*, in a general sense. For instance, when it is said that “He is definitely a scholar”, what is negated is the fact of his being an illiterate. The word definitely does not negate such things as his being a man, etc., too. Hence *sādeva* conveys Brahman with all the associated factors like *prakṛti*, etc.

The word *ekameva* conveys Brahman in Its undifferentiated condition, not differentiated into names and forms. This is because the *ekatva* spoken here speaks of oneness as opposed to the multitude referred to subsequently as *bahu syām*. This is also corroborated by the illustration cited, which says *ekena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvam mṛtramayam*. And the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* specifically states the conditions of *pralaya* and *srṣṭi* as undifferentiated and differentiated states respectively.

\(^{139}\) Ṣ.P. on Ṣ.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), P.185.
\(^{140}\) *Br.Up.*, III.iv.7
vyākriyata\textsuperscript{140}.

(It existed at that time of pralaya as being undifferentiated and it was differentiated by names and forms at the time of srṣṭi.)

Thus the above establishes the material causality of Brahman, for material cause is that which undergoes a change of state and becomes the effect.

bhāvi avasthā-visēṣavataḥ prāgavasthāyoho hi upādānatvam\textsuperscript{141}.

The term advitiya negates any other nimittakāraṇa, because, when there is mention of upādānakāraṇa, what immediately strikes the mind is the nimittakāraṇa. And the term precludes anything else other than Brahman itself as the nimittakāraṇa. What follows also confirms the same view.

The term ekameva speaks of an undifferentiated condition as opposed to the differentiated condition, stated in the complement of the text as bahu syām. So also the subsequent passage tadaiksata... tattejo 'srjata (It reflects ......it·created tejas) indicates that the previous term advitiya negates only some other auxiliary cause, as Brahman itself is spoken of as the creator.

The term tadaiksata, speaks of the omniscience of Brahman, asrjata conveys that It Itself was the nimittakāraṇa, bahu syām conveys Its upādānatva and the passage anena jīvena atmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāni speaks of His indwelling character.

Thus the passage sadeva somya, etc., could be seen to convey the causality of Brahman and Its peculiar nature of being both types of causes, which again implies Its

\textsuperscript{141} Š.P. on Š.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), p.185.
infinite prowess, knowledge, etc., needed for being such a type of cause, and it is simply not possible to hold it as negating all distinctions.

Again the text satyaṁ jñānam anantam brahma was interpreted by the Advaitin in a secondary sense, involving a negative way of interpretation. Accordingly, the terms satyam, etc., convey what Brahman is not, rather than what it is. It is satya not because it is constant, but because it is changeless, jñāna, not because it is sentient but because it is not inert (jāda) and is infinite (ananta) not because it is so but because it is not finite. The advantage of interpreting this way is that Brahman is portrayed only in a negative way, thus avoiding the possibility of being viewed as being associated with any positive attributes. Another advantage is that Brahman is spoken of and yet its unspeakability is maintained. It is spoken of as what it is not and not spoken of as what it is.

But, according to Rāmānuja, it is rather strange to interpret the śruti text this way. He sees no reason why negative ways should be resorted to when the text itself is abundantly positive in its tenor. And what is more, the negative method of interpreting does not yield the desired result either, for what is not jāda cannot be the same as what is not finite, and what is not finite cannot be the same as what is changeless. Each should necessarily become a distinct property and their negative character cannot strip them off of their characterisation. If that is not so then ultimately no meaning would have been conveyed by each.\textsuperscript{142}

Further by adopting negative ways of interpreting, it has been tacitly admitted that interpreting the text in a positive way would entail the acceptance of these as

\textsuperscript{142} Š.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), pp.143-144
positive qualities. Now the fact that negative denials are no different from positive affirmations, shows that they very much exist as properties and the text cannot simply establish an attributeless Brahman.

The text, again it was argued, through the employment of \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya}, conveys identity. While it is true that \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya} conveys identity, it never does so, in the Advaitic sense. It is more a harmonising concept, and Rāmānuja makes immense use of the concept on several counts.

It consists in the words conveying an identical sense through different grounds. It is thus: the grounds for the use of the various words in respect of their senses are different. Yet the entity conveyed is one. And the words which carry out this function are said to be having coordinate relation or \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya}.

\begin{quote}
\textit{bhinnapravṛttinimittānāṁ sabdānāṁ ekasmin arthe vṛttiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ}^{143}.
\end{quote}

Thus \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya} establishes the identity of one object associated with several aspects. Hence while it is true that identity is its spirit, difference is nonetheless impregnated in the concept. To deny all sorts of difference and to establish an absolute identity in the name of \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya} would finally result in giving up the concept of \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya} itself.

Hence \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya} rather emphasises \textit{satya, jñāna}, etc., as positive aspects of Brahman and establishes Brahman as the one that possesses these qualities. This is the significance of the concept, and it would be meaningful.

\footnotesize

143. ibid., p.191.
only in the above sense.

Another contention referred earlier is that the term ananta, denies every type of limitation caused in the case of Brahman and it includes the limitation caused due to objects too, which is known as vastuparicchedarāhitya. That is, Brahman is said to be infinite or unlimited, and if there is an object other than Brahman, then Brahman will have to be limited to that extent. As Brahman is stated to be unlimited, there can be no limitation caused by objects. And this means that the objects of the world do not really exist, but only appear to be so.

But, to Rāmānuja, this vastuparicchedarāhitya is another concept that further adds to the glory of Brahman, while the Advaitic interpretation is simply mars the spirit of the entire concept.

That is, even according to Advaita, desaparicchedarāhitya is interpreted as spatial unlimitedness and kālaparicchedarāhitya as temporal unlimitedness. That is, Brahman is unlimited spatially as well as temporally which means that Brahman is all-pervasive and eternal. In these cases, they would not mean that space and time themselves are illusory but would only mean that Brahman is not subject to the limits caused by these two. In the same way, the interpretation of the concept of vastuparicchedarāhitya will have to fall in line with the interpretation of the concepts of deśa and kālaparicchedarāhitya, in which case alone the greatness of Brahman would be fully brought out. That is, vastuparicchedarāhitya means that Brahman is not limited by the objects of the world in spite of their real nature.

Further, to say that Brahman would be limited to that extent to which an object is present, would in fact come under deśapariccheda, and hence vastupariccheda has to
be something different. It is thus; each object of the world possesses a specific configuration and one object does not become another. That is, a pot is a pot and not a cloth and also vice-versa. But in the case of Brahma this is not the case, for Brahma has become every object of the world as has been set forth earlier\(^{144}\). And words indicative of every object indicate Brahma also, which pervades the universe both from within and without\(^{145}\).

Thus Brahma is not limited by the objects of the world, as it remains as every object pervading each one; and this is what is known as vastuparicchedarāhitya. Hence, this concept, contrary to proving the illusoriness of objects, establishes their reality more firmly.

According Rāmānuja, the texts that express negate all guna-s like nirguna, nirañjanam, nīskalam, nīskriyam, sāntam, etc., too, are incapable of establishing an attributeless Brahma. This is because it is simply not possible that there could exist a thing without properties and the proposition goes counter to many other passages which extol the glories of Brahma stating them to be natural to it:

\[ \text{pārasya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāviki} \]
\[ \text{jñānabhālakriyā ca}^{146}. \]

Now there is an apparent contradiction between the two texts (i.e., nirguna and saguna) and it is this contradiction that leads us, according to Advaita, to uphold those texts that deny qualities as more powerful and the others as less powerful, thus being over-ruled by the former.

\(^{144}\) infra. pp. 89-90  
\(^{145}\) Tai.Nār, XI.5.  
\(^{146}\) Śvet.Up., VI.8.  
\(^{147}\) B.S.S.B., III.ii.14
The sagunāsṛuti-s refer to Brahman with qualities, and they are intended for meditative worship\(^\text{147}\), while the nirguṇa texts have no function other than negating all characteristics. Further, the nirguṇaśruti-s in order to negate qualities in Brahman necessarily stand in need of sagunāsṛuti-s, as they alone provide qualities in respect of Brahman. Hence the sagunāsṛuti-s operate prior to the nirguṇaśruti-s. The latter being subsequent (para) are powerful on the basis of apacchedanyāya\(^\text{148}\).

According to Ramanuja, however, there is absolutely no conflict between the two types of texts, as the content of each one is different. While the nirgunasṛuti-s negate all those that are inauspicious and imperfect in the case Brahman, the sagunāsṛuti-s speak of all the auspicious and perfect qualities in It and as such there is no conflict between them. This type of reconciliation is shown by the text

\[
\text{apahatapāpamā vijaro vimṛtyuh... satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ},
\]

which negates all empirical qualities and specifies the presence of extra-empirical qualities like satyakāmatva and satyasaṅkalapatva with respect to Brahman.

Further, there is a maxim that a general rule becomes inapplicable when there is a specific one; and this is known as the utsarga-apavāda-nyāya.

For example, the śruti text - nahimsyāt sārva bhūtāni prohibits the act of causing injury to any being. This is a general rule. And the text - vāyavyam śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ prescribes the offering of a sacrificial animal at a sacrifice. Now the general rule is superseded by the specific one, and hence the former must be understood in

\(^{148}\)  infra. p. 31
\(^{149}\)  Ch. Up., VIII.i.5
a restricted sense, namely, that, one should not cause injury to any being excepting in the case of sacrifice.

On the basis of application of this maxim, we have to conclude that the nirgunaśruti-s which refer to the negation of guṇa-s without exception must be viewed as negating only those guṇa-s which are different from those that are specified in the śruti itself\(^\text{150}\).

The Advaitin seeks to interpret the nirguna and the sagunaśruti-s on the basis of apacchedanyāya, referred to earlier\(^\text{151}\). But, according to Rāmānuja, this maxim will not be applicable here on the following ground: apacchedanyāya is applicable only in those cases where the relation of antecedence and subsequence between two senses conveyed by two different texts is not a fixed one. In the example cited earlier, it is not fixed that the udgātā shall let loose the waist-cloth of the one in front, prior to the pratihartā doing so. There the text that prescribes expiation for that which occurs accidentally later becomes powerful. Here in the case of saguna and nirguna texts the relation of antecedence and subsequence is unalterably fixed and so the apacchedanyāya cannot be applied.

Thus the apacchedanyāya cannot find application here, as conditions prevailing at the present instance are quite different from the place at which the maxim is derived, and as such it cannot be invoked to settle disputes of the present sort\(^\text{152}\).

Hence as shown above, the nirguna texts have to be taken to negate all guṇa-s other than those specifically

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151. infra. pp.29-31
ordained with respect to Brahman; on the basis of utsargāpavādanyāya.

It emerges from the foregoing discussion that the nirgunaśrutī-s are to be understood as negating the qualities other than those mentioned by the saguṇaśrutī-s in respect of Brahman by applying the utsargāpavādanyāya.

2.4.4.1. PASSAGES THAT NEGATE DUALITY – EXEGESIS OF SUDARŚANA SŪRI

According to Advaita, the texts that speak of identity of the jīva with Brahman, and those that negate duality, and also the texts that convey that perception of duality would lead to incessant bondage force us to hold Brahman as free from duality of every form.

The texts like -

*neha nānāsti kiñcana; mṛtyossamṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati*\(^{153}\).

*yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paśyati yatra tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūt tatkena kaḥ paśyet*\(^{154}\).

are clear enough in themselves and leave one in no doubt regarding the fact that Brahman is free from difference of every kind.

Rāmānuja, holds that it is a fact that the scriptures negate duality. But it should not be supposed that they negate everything apart from Brahman. On the other hand, the negative texts convey this much that there is no entity which is not an effect of Brahman or which does not have

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154. *ibid.*, VI.v.15.
Brahman as its self.

The following are the points that need to be carefully considered, according to Śrī Sudarśana Sūri:

śruti sets forth Brahman as devoid of all despicable qualities and as a repository of all virtues and auspicious attributes. Hence there can be no identity of Brahman of this nature with the world which is insentient and is associated with evil. It may be argued that the world is only illusory and so when it is said that the world is identical with Brahman, it only means that the world has no independent existence apart from Brahman. But the question remains whether the world is to be got rid of or not. If not, then all the texts that prescribe the means of getting rid of the world will be rendered futile. If it has to be got rid of, then its association with Brahman has to be admitted, and, this would militate against the passages that declare Brahman to be free from all imperfections.

Further the creation of the world is said to proceed according to the will be Brahman in the text - bahu syām. Now this would amount to Brahman acquiring all the evils of the world through its own will, and, this a sarvajñā would certainly avoid.

And Brahman is declared as sarvajñā in texts like yah sarvajñah sarvavīti\textsuperscript{155} etc. It is no argument to say that this omniscience itself is a product of avidyā and as such it is possible even for a sarvajñā to create illusorily a world, with all the attendant evils, because knowledge, etc., of Brahman are declared to be natural - svābhāviki, and also as real, as \textquoteright tā ime satyāh kāmāh\textsuperscript{156}. Hence sarvajñatva cannot be said to be a product of avidyā and it is not possible for a sarvajñā to create a world full of miseries,

\textsuperscript{155} Munḍ. Up., I.i.10
\textsuperscript{156} Ch. Up., VIII.iii.1

103
as it would result in Brahman itself getting associated with evil. Further, it is stated by the Advaitin that *avidyā* which is the root-cause of all evil, gets itself associated with Brahman. Even granting that, it must be possible for the omnipotent Brahman whose will according to the *Upaniṣad*-s would never remain unfulfilled, to get itself rid of *avidyā*. The *śruti* emphatically declares Him to be all-powerful, that too inherently, as in the text -

\[ \text{parā asya śaktiḥ vividhaiva śṛṣṭyate svābhāviki}^{157}. \]

(His supreme power, which is "natural" to Him is said to be of numerous forms).

Hence it will be contradictory to say that Brahman is inherently omniscient and omnipotent, and yet becomes "ignorant" and remains in association with *avidyā*, which needs to be got rid of.

If it is maintained that there is no such contradiction, for both are accepted on the authority of *śruti* texts, then, on the same lines it could be argued that there is no contradiction between texts that speak of eternity as well as non-eternity of the soul, of ākāśa, etc.

That is, one text of the *Upaniṣad* states *jīva* to be subject to origination and destruction:

\[ \text{viśṇanaghana eva etebhyaḥ bhūtebhyah samutthāya tānyevanuvināṣyati}^{158}. \]

(The *jīva* called *viśṇanaghana* arises from the elements and gets destroyed along with them)

Another passage declares him to be uncreated and

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158. *Br.UP.*, IV.iv.12
indestructible.

na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścit\textsuperscript{159}.
(The soul neither gets born nor dies).

Similarly ākāśa is declared to be eternal at one place as

vāyuśca antarikṣam caitadamṛtam\textsuperscript{160}.
(vāyu and ākāśa are immortal)

and at another, it is said to be originated from Brahman, referred to as Ātman as in

ātmana ākāśas sambhūtah\textsuperscript{161}
(the ākāśa originates from the Ātman)

Now, in instances like these it could be seen that śruti speaks in the most conflicting terms and yet, since both aspects are conveyed by śruti itself, one has to accept that there is no contradiction between them.

The result will be that, if everything is accepted as declared in the śruti, then there need be no inquiry into the import of the Upaniṣad-s at all\textsuperscript{162}.

In the light of the above discussions, both difference and non-difference can also be accepted as being without any contradiction.

It is to remove the apparent contradiction that one is accepted as illusory and another real by the Advaitin. But since it has been proved that there is no contradiction, such

\textsuperscript{159} Br.Up., IV.iii.3.
\textsuperscript{160} Tai. Ānand., I.1.
\textsuperscript{161} S.P. on Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), p.203.
a division need not be accepted, with the result that difference too will have to be viewed as real.

It is the above difficulties that forces one to accept that there does exist contradiction among the śruti texts. The following also are instances where there is contradiction: that is, the text

\[ \text{mṛtyoṣsa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati}^{163} \]

(one who sees duality, as it were, is eternally riveted to bondage)

declares the notion of difference as the cause of bondage. Some other texts such as

\[ \text{prthagāmānāṁ preritāraṁ ca matvā juśṭaṣṭateṣṭena amṛtatvam eti}^{164}. \]

(knowing the soul and its controller to be distinct, the soul pleases the supreme self and thus attains immortality), and

\[ \text{juśṭaṁ yadā paśyatanyamīśam asya mahimānamiti vītāśokah}^{165} \]

(when the soul meditates upon God who is gratified by the performance of karma, then it becomes free from misery and becomes God-like)

speak of the cognition of difference to be the means to release.

It cannot be said that these are only re-statements of what is already known in our worldly experience; for, the distinction between the soul and the supreme Brahma is not something that could be known is ordinary

experience.

It may be said that though such a distinction could not be known in ordinary experience, yet difference as a concept is well known in the world, which is re-stated in order that it may be negated. But in that case, non-difference also is known in our worldly experience itself as in instances like so \( yam \) devadatta, etc. Hence the Upaniṣadic texts that speak of non-difference also will have to be admitted as re-statements. If it is said that such a non-difference is known, but non-difference between the soul and Brahman is not known is our worldly experience then this argument would be equally applicable in the case of difference between soul and Brahman also.

Another objection could be that \( śruti \) teaches difference only for purposes of meditation and it is not to be taken as a statement of fact. But this cannot be maintained; for, those very passages declare the notion of difference as a means to liberation. It is only true knowledge that could bring about liberation and not false knowledge. And so knowledge of difference cannot be false.

It is also not proper to hold that just because difference is taught for the purpose of meditation, it is false, for even non-difference has been taught for the purpose of meditation as in

\[
\text{atha yo'nyāṁ devatāṁ upāste anyo 'sau anyo 'hamasmīti na sa ṛṣe, ātmetyeva upāsita}^{166}
\]

(one who meditates upon the deity considering oneself as different from that, does not know the truth; meditate (upon it) as one’s own self.)

Hence by the same logic non-difference will have to

166. \( Br.\text{Up.}, \) III.iv.10
be accepted as false, in which case difference will become real.

It may be contended that scriptures teach non-difference like assertive propositions without there being any injunction to meditate so, and hence it cannot be held to be false. But the same explanation will be applicable in the case of difference also.

The texts like -

\[ \text{kṣaraṁ pradhānam amṛtākṣaram harah} \]
\[ \text{kṣarātmanau isate deva ekaḥ}^{167} \]
\[ \text{jñājñau dvau ajau iṣanīṣau}^{168} \]

etc., teach difference as a matter of fact and not with an injunction to meditate so. Hence that also is valid and hence is not false.

It may still be contended that non-difference alone in real, as liberation is stated to be non-difference between the true nature of jīva from Brahman. But it must be noticed that difference too is taught at the state of liberation and so that too must be taken as real.

Hence it is not proper to hold that difference is false by virtue of its being enjoined for purposes of meditation.

It is thus clear that the negation of duality is not meant in a general sense, but it is exclusively related to that duality which is opposed to non-difference that is enjoined. That which is specifically taught, cannot be negated.

As explained earlier, śruti sets forth the non-difference of the universe from Brahman through cause-effect relation and body-soul relation. Hence Rāmānuja states that negation of duality refers only to duality that is opposed

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167. Śvet. Up., I.10
168. ibid., I.9
NATURE OF REALITY

to such non-difference.

$kṛṣṇasya$ jagato brahmakāryatāṁ
tadantaryāmikatāṁ ca tadātmakatvena aikayāt
tatpratyāṅka nānātvam pratiṣṭhāyate. na
punah bahusyāṁ prajāyeya iti
bahubhavanaśaṅkalpapūrvakam brahmaṇo
nānātvam āṅṛitisiddham pratiṣṭhāyata iti\(^{169}\).

The purport of the negation of duality, according to
Rāmānuja, is this: the objects of the world are taken to be
independent. But it is not so. Being the effects of Brahman,
they are dependent upon it. A cause and its effect are not
two different entities; on the other hand, the effect is the
same as the cause with a different configuration. The world
is said to be one with Brahman, in the sense that it depends
upon Brahman - its sole cause. So the notion that the objects
of the world are independent and self-sustained is false
knowledge, and this is negated in passages like neha
nānā'sti kīrćana, etc. These texts are, therefore, not meant
to negate the manifoldness in Brahman which is said to
proceed after Brahman's resolve to become many as
"bahusyāṁ".

To admit the illusoriness of such a creation on the
ground that duality is negated, defies all logic, for śruti,
after teaching something totally unknown through any
other source, cannot itself stultify that\(^{170}\).

To sum up: the negation of duality in the scriptures
refers to views that hold the world consisting of matter
and souls to be independent and self-sustained and not
difference in general. This is because the distinction
between God, soul and matter which is clearly expounded
in the śruti itself cannot be stultified.

\(^{169}\) Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), pp. 204-206.
\(^{170}\) ibid., p.206.
God, soul and matter are distinct and fundamental realities. Ultimate Reality cannot be divided into higher and lower Brahman, nor can the Ultimate of philosophy be viewed as different from the God of Religion.

Though the three are distinct in themselves, yet as matter and soul remain as totally inseparable from and dependent upon Brahman, the three are viewed as one. Thus

"Rāmānuja solves the problem of one and many not by denying many and affirming one nor by denying one and affirming many, but by making many the predicate of one. As a matter of fact, one and many had never posed any problem to him, because he starts with the position that one by its very nature or immanent necessity, is impregnated with the many."\(^{171}\)

In the final analysis, as observed by Prof. S.R. Bhatt,

"Rāmānuja is as emphatic as the Advaitin in declaring that there is nothing other than Brahman, but adds that by 'other' he means heterogeneous differences only and not the internal ones. The absolute of Rāmānuja is a synthesis, which does not deny differentiations but expresses itself through them only. It is a whole that does not deny its parts, a substance that does not oust its attributes, a ground that does not negate its consequent, an integrity that does not shut itself of fullness" \(^{172}\).

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171. Studies in Rāmānuja Vedānta, p.25.
172. Loc.cit.
CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF THE SOUL

3.0 INTRODUCTION

Barring the ārvaɪa school, every school of Indian thought is oriented towards mokṣa, which is defined as a state free from the trammels of samsāra, or trans-migratory existence. It is in this context that the discussion regarding the nature of jīva or the soul becomes significant as the concept of mokṣa is relevant only in the case of jīva. The schools that are oriented towards mokṣa admit that the suffering experienced in the state of transmigration is not natural to the soul but is due only to external factors; and every soul is capable of completely liberating itself forever from all the evils of worldly existence. Thus while the systems barring the ārvaɪa agree that there exists a soul apart from the physical body, they differ in regard to the essential nature of the soul.

Rāmānuja's view of the soul proceeds on the basis of the refutation of the views of other systems which may be summarised as follows:

3.1 THE SĀṆKHYA VIEW

There are only two categories according to the Sāṅkhya school - the prakṛti, which is the cause of the world and the souls called puruṣa-s. The soul is many in number and is all-pervasive. It is without parts and qualities and of the form of consciousness. It does not have any inherent agency though it is an enjoyer. Agency
belongs to the buddhitattva, which is an evolute of prakṛti. Though the soul is of the form of knowledge, it is not a knower. Knowership belongs to buddhi. It is because of the non-discrimination between the buddhitattva and the soul, the characteristics of buddhi appear in the soul and sentience which is the essential nature of the soul appears in buddhi. As a result, there arises the false knowledge of the form “I am a knower”, “I am an agent”, etc. It is due to this false knowledge that the soul undergoes bondage, as it were. And the sole means to liberation is the knowledge of discrimination between prakṛti in its unevolved and evolved states and of puruṣa.

3.1.1 REFUTATION OF THE SĀNKHYA VIEW

The Sāṅkhya view is not sound, as according to it, the puruṣa is said to possess conflicting features. It is said to be a witness, a knower and an enjoyer. It is admitted at the same time to be changeless, free from agency and free from miseries - kevala. But it is not possible to be a knower without involving change. Further agency and enjoyership always go together, and it is not possible to be an experient without being an agent. Again, the Sāṅkhya-s state that the prakṛti acts in order to liberate the puruṣa.

puruṣavimokṣanimittm tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya

But they admit that the puruṣa never undergoes bondage and it is only prakṛti which is in bondage and is also liberated:

1. S.K., 2
2. ibid., 17,19
3. ibid., 19.
4. ibid., 57
the nature of the soul

\[ tasmānna \text{badhyate}'ddhā na mucyate nāpi saṁsaratī kāścit saṁsaratī \text{badhyate mucyate} ca nānāṣrayā prakṛtīḥ \]

Further they state that there occurs false identification of the features of prakṛti in the puruṣa and also vice versa. But this is not possible. It must be ascertained as to whom does this false identification occur. It cannot occur in the case of prakṛti, because it is sentient, and false identification is a sentient act. And it cannot occur to puruṣa either, for he is said to be changeless. Moreover, false identification is said to occur merely because of the proximity (sannidhi) of prakṛti to puruṣa. But as both are admitted to be eternal and also all-pervasive, proximity between them also is eternal, with the result that there will never be release for puruṣa

3.2 THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṆIKA VIEW

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s, like the Śāṅkhyā-s, admit the soul to be many in number and also all-pervasive in size. They, however, differ from the Śāṅkhyā-s in admitting the soul to be essentially sentient but as acquiring sentience adventitiously. The soul, according to them, is all-pervasive. It is because, out of the three possible alternatives, this alone seems to be the most satisfactory one. The three alternatives are: the soul should be either atomic or of intermediate size or of infinite size (vibhu). Of these, the first alternative is not possible, for in that case it will not be possible to account for the feelings of pleasure and pain experienced by the soul throughout the body. That is, if the soul is atomic in size it will be located in one place in the body. In that case, it will not be possible

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5. ibid., 62
to account for the feeling of pain caused due to the pricking of a thorn in the leg and of pleasure derived from the smearing of sandal paste in the chest, at the same time. The body itself, being insentient cannot have the feelings. Hence the first alternative cannot be adopted.

The second alternative too is logically untenable. That is, if the soul is accepted to be of limited size, that is, neither atomic nor all pervasive, then two alternatives present themselves. It can be of fixed size or of variable size. If it is of fixed size as of the size of a sheep (say), then when it happens to abide in the body of an elephant in its next birth in accordance with its karma-s, then it cannot have the feelings of pleasure and pain in those parts of the body which it does not pervade. On the other hand, if its size is that of an elephant and if it is associated with the body of an ant, then a large part of it will remain outside the body and this will rather be a strange position. These difficulties suggest that the soul cannot be viewed as having a limited but fixed size. The other alternative is that the soul has a limited but a variable size. This, in fact, is the view of the Jaina-s. This position, of course, obviates the above difficulties. It is because the soul, being variable, can expand or contract and adjust itself to whichever body it is associated with, in each birth. But the difficulty in regard to this position relates to the factor of change, which the soul is said to undergo. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s’ objection against this view is that if the soul is subject to change, then it will be subject to destruction as well, for change and eternity cannot go together. And acceptance of the soul as one subject to destruction would render moral and ethical values and also philosophical pursuits, futile. Thus,

6. Š.B., II.ii.9.
7. ibid., II.ii.32
as the soul cannot be of either atomic size or of some finite size, it has to be accepted as infinite.

The above view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s has forced them to admit that the soul cannot be inherently a knower. This is because, if the soul were inherently a knower, then being all-pervasive it will have to know all things that happen at all places even without the aid of sense-organs. But this is not found in experience. The fact that the soul is not inherently a knower is advocated by the scriptures too. The soul is declared to be without any sentience during deep-sleep and at the state of liberation. The following text states that deep-sleep is characterised by absence of knowledge:

\[ nāha khalvayamevam saṃpratyātmānam jānāti; no eva imāni bhūtāni^{8} \]

(The soul in the state of sleep does not have knowledge of itself, of the form "I exist now", nor does it know other things.)

And the text, \textit{na pretya saṁjñā'sti}^{9} conveys the sense that there is no consciousness in the soul after the fall of the body, immediately preceding liberation^{10}.

Thus it is concluded that the soul is insentient by itself and is infinite in size. Sentience is only adventitious. \textit{Mokṣa} constitutes release from all bondage when there is cessation of all knowledge, and, the soul, then remains in its natural state of insentience.

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8. \textit{Ch. Up.}, VIII.xi.2
3.2.1. REFUTATION OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW

Rāmānuja holds that the view that the soul is inherently insentient is opposed to experience as well as scriptures. The nature of the soul is such that it is always manifest to itself as 'I', which itself is a form of knowledge, and hence it can never be said to be without sentience.

It is undisputable that the soul is always aware of itself during the waking state. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s, however, have sought to justify the view that the soul is insentient, as they hold that consciousness does not inhere in it during deep-sleep and in the state of liberation.

It has already been pointed out that the soul remains conscious even during deep-sleep\(^{11}\). Hence the inherently conscious nature of the soul cannot be denied on the basis of deep-sleep.

Further the fundamental position of the author of Brahmasūtra-s is the satkāryavāda, according to which, what is not already existent could not be newly created. Hence even during deep-sleep the soul does remain associated with consciousness which, however is in a latent form. And the passage nāha khalvayam etc., referred to earlier states this much only, namely, knowledge in the state of deep sleep is contracted so much that it can as well be said that it does not exist. This text does not state that knowledge is lost in that stage. We have to interpret this passage in that light only, as the text such as

\[ \text{vijñātāram are kena vijñāniyāt}^{12} \]
\[ \text{eṣa hi draṣṭa śrotā ... vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ}^{13} \]

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11. infra pp. 73-75  
and the like affirm that the characteristic of being a knower is the essential nature of soul. Hence there is no reason to hold that knowledge ceases to exist during the state of deep-sleep.

The passage, *na pretya samijnä asti*, which has been cited as an authority in respect of the view that there is cessation of knowledge in the state of liberation, does not at all state that there is no knowledge in the state of liberation. It only aims at contrasting the state of the soul at the time of the release with the state of bondage set forth in the previous passage -

*etebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tānyevānvinaśyati*  

This passage refers to the false knowledge which consists in mistaking the body for the soul and which results in viewing the soul to be subject to birth and death that are related to body only. And the succeeding text, *na pretya samijnä asti*, states that in the state of liberation the soul does not have the false cognition of the body as the soul.

And this text does not at all state the absence of knowledge at the state of release. This view is reconfirmed in the *Chāndogya* passage -

*na paśyo mṛtyum paśyati na roganā nota duḥkhatām sarvaṁ ha paśyah paśyati sarvam āpnoti sarvaśaḥ*  

(The released soul no more “sees” (suffers) death, disease or misery. It “sees” (enjoys) all and attains anything from any where)

It is evident from the above passage that there is knowledge at the state of liberation and also absence of

15. *Ch. Up.* VII.xxvi.2.
false knowledge that characterizes bondage. Thus, the passage na pretya samjñāasti, refers only to the absence of false knowledge at the state of liberation and not knowledge in general.

Further the Nyāya view that the souls are many in number and also all-pervasive leads to several difficulties. In the first place, the Nyāya school has defined all-pervasiveness as contact with all mūrtā padāratha-s. According to this definition a soul could be all-pervasive only when it is in contact with every body and every mind. And this would result in the experience by one particular soul, of pleasures and pains that are present in other souls too. It might be said that the experience of pleasures and pains is exclusively related to a particular soul based upon the merits and demerits of that soul. So the argument that there would result the experience by one particular soul of pleasures and pains that are present in other souls, too is not correct.

The above contention does not hold good. It is because merits and demerits could be acquired by a soul only by performance of prescribed deeds and by the avoidance of interdicted actions. The latter can be carried out only when there is interaction of mind with the soul. And there cannot be any exclusive relation between one mind and one soul. It is because the all-pervasiveness of the soul implies its relation to every mind. As such, any action performed or avoided by a soul with the interaction of the mind would give forth merits and demerits, and these would be common to every soul. Hence there would be the contingency of the experience by one particular soul of pleasure and pain that are present in other souls too. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that the souls are all-pervasive is not sound.  

16. S.B., II.iii. 32.
3.3 THE ADVAITA VIEW

The basic tenet of Advaita is the absolute oneness of the Ultimate Reality. The scriptures coupled with reasoning show that Reality cannot be manifold. Accordingly the manifold souls, as revealed in our ordinary experience, cannot be real as such, but are only appearances of Brahman - the only Reality. It is due to the association of avidyā, which is indeterminable either as real or as an absolute nothing, that the partless Brahman appears as bound souls; and the state of being a soul is decidedly false. Hence the jīva-s are ultimately none but Brahman even in their conditioned state and are not different from it; nor are they independent realities in themselves.

An analysis of some of the Upaniṣadic texts and also reasoning go to confirm the above piosition. The soul has to be either different or non-different from Brahman. The other alternative (i.e., being different and also non-different, simultaneously) is not possible because that would involve contradiction\(^\text{17}\). Of these two, the first alternative is not possible on the following grounds:

The passages such as

\[
\begin{align*}
sadeva somya idamagra āsit^{18}. \\
atmaivedāṁ sarvam^{19} \\
bhṛmaivedāṁ sarvam^{20} . \\
idaṁ sarvaṁ yadayamātmā^{21} . \\
nānyo 'to 'sti draśṭā^{22} \\
nānyo 'to 'sti draśṭṛ^{23}
\end{align*}
\]
and the like, declare the identity between the soul and Brahman.

And other passages like

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{anyo'śāvanyo'hamasmīti, na sa} & \quad \text{iṁhā} \\
paśuh\textsuperscript{24} \\
mṛtyoh sa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva \\
paśyati\textsuperscript{25}.
\end{align*}
\]

etc., disapprove of the vision of duality.

Hence it has to be admitted that according to the \textit{Upaniṣad-s}, \textit{jīva-s} and Brahman are essentially one, or more strictly, non-different from each other.

Further if we subscribe to the view that the soul is different from Brahman, then we would be forced to admit that liberation is non-eternal\textsuperscript{26}. It is because if difference is admitted between the two, then \textit{mokṣa} will have to be admitted as being attained through the performance of some activity by the \textit{jīva}, which will render it non-eternal. So it is not possible to hold \textit{jīva} to be different from Brahman. As has already been pointed out, there cannot be difference - cum - non-difference between the two. Hence the two must necessarily be viewed as one and the same in their essential nature.

The seeming difference between the two and the infinite number of souls that come within the range of one's experience are due to Brahman's association with the indeterminable \textit{avidyā}. It is because of the latter, that Brahman sees multiplicity within itself and attains to the state of innumerable bound souls.

\textsuperscript{24} ibid., III.iv.10
\textsuperscript{25} ibid., VI.iv.19
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{B.S.S.B.}, I.iv.22

120
THE NATURE OF THE SOUL

Thus the soul in its true nature is pure consciousness, though its state of being a soul (that is, jīvatva) is only superimposed due to avidyā. And jīvatva is, therefore, illusory.

The soul, thus, in the ultimate analysis, is not a single indivisible whole, but a complex entity, that is, a blend of pure consciousness and antahkaraṇa, a product of avidyā. And this view provides the basis for reconciling some of the seeming contradictions found in the śruti as well as in experience.

The śruti declares the soul to be eternal at some places and non-eternal at others. The Mūndakopanisad for instance, states that the souls are subject to creation and destruction just like sparks of fire emanating from a fireball.

\[
yathā āsūrīptāt pāvakāt visphulingaḥ sahasrasaḥ prabhavate sarūpah
tathākṣarāt vividhāḥ somya bhāvāḥ prajāyante tatra caivāpiyanti.\]

But some others texts, like

\[
  sa va eṣa mahānaṁjātmā jaroṁrtoṁbhayo brahma.
\]

\[
  na jāyate mṛiyate vā vipāscit
\]

etc., state that it is neither created nor destroyed but is eternal. Now the fact that jīva consists of two components—the non-eternal antahkaraṇa and the eternal consciousness—explains both the above declarations. It is

\[\text{27. cf., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp.342-343.}\]
\[\text{28. Mūnd.Up.,II.i.1.}\]
\[\text{29. Br.Up.,VI.iv.25}\]
\[\text{30. Kaṭh.Up.,II.18}\]
said to be non-eternal and subject to creation and
destruction, on the basis of the non-eternal nature of one
of its components, namely, the antahkarana\textsuperscript{31}. And it is
declared to be eternal because it is non-different from
Brahman and the difference is due to avidya\textsuperscript{a}.

Further our experience shows all the objects of the
world as objects known and the souls as knowers. Thus in
all instances of knowing the soul remains as the subject as
in “I know the pot” etc. But in the instance of the soul
knowing itself as “I know myself” it remains as the subject
as well as the object in the act of knowing, and this is a
seeming contradiction. The contradiction, however, can
be reconciled if we adopt the above view on the nature of
the soul. The soul being Brahman, is of the form of pure
knowledge and hence could never become the object of
another knowledge. Hence what is known as ‘I’ in the
‘I-cognition’ is the insentient component, namely, the
antahkarana\textsuperscript{32}. In fact being a subject is also not natural
to the soul; for, being pure Brahman, it cannot be a knower
either. And the absence of the notion of ‘I’ during deep-
sleep and liberation shows that the characteristic of being
a knower is not natural to it.

Again, the agency of the soul, according to the
Advaitin is only illusory. Śaṅkara proves in the
kartradhikaran	extsuperscript{a} that the soul is an agent. But subsequently
under the sūtra - yathā ca takṣobhayathā, he argues that
the agency of the soul is not natural to it but only caused
due to the association of buddhi. If it were natural to the
soul, then there can never be release from it. And as agency
always involves misery it cannot be said to be present at
the state of release. Hence just as a carpenter becomes an
agent when associated with his tools and remains a non-

\textsuperscript{31} B.S.S.B., II.iii..17
\textsuperscript{32} Pañcapādika, pp.85-86
agent when dissociated from them, so the soul becomes an agent when associated with the instrument, namely, buddhi or antahkaraṇa and remains as a non-agent when dissociated from it. Hence, in effect, the agency of the soul is only adventitiously presented in it.

Further the soul, being Brahman itself, is all pervasive in size. But yet, it is declared in the scriptures to be atomic in size. This again is because the characteristic of antahkaraṇa, namely, atomicity, is attributed to the soul, though it (the soul) is, by itself, all-pervasive.

To sum up: the soul is a blend of pure consciousness and antahkaraṇa. The characteristics of the soul such as agency, enjoyership, knowerership and atomicity are adventitiously presented in it and not natural to it. This itself is bondage and liberation constitutes release from these attributed qualities and remaining in its natural state as Brahman.

3.3.1. REFUTATION OF THE ADVAITA VIEW

Rāmānuja directs a severe criticism on the Advaitic view of the soul and declares that the soul is a reality according to every pramāṇa and not a fictitious appearance. It is a complete whole in itself and does not consist of sentient and insentient components. It is the substratum of knowledge, a natural agent and an enjoyer. These constitute the essential attributes of the soul and it is impossible to conceive of the soul without any of these qualities. In fact, divested of these, there can be no difference between the soul and insentient matter.

Agency, enjoyership and knowerership are the characteristic features of a sentient being and it is rather

33. B.S.S.B., II.iii.40.
34. ibid., II.iii.29.
strange that these are admitted to be present in the insentient antahkaraṇa by the Advaitin.

Śaṅkara rejects the Sāṅkhyā view on the ground that knowership and agency are the characteristics of a sentient being and are not attributable to an insentient prakṛti. But the same criticism is equally applicable to his own view, if an insentient antahkaraṇa is admitted to be endowed with the characteristics of agency and knowership.

According to Rāmānuja, the instance cited above does not involve any contradiction at all. It is because, the essential nature of the soul is to become aware of itself as ‘I’, which is called pratyaktva. In this notion, the soul, no doubt becomes the subject as well as the object of knowledge. Nevertheless there is no contradiction here as held by the Advaitin. It is because the soul as a precondition to knowing objects external to itself, first knows itself which is its very nature. This has been discussed in the previous chapter.

Another defect pointed out earlier is that agency always leads to misery due to which it cannot be admitted as natural to the soul. But it is not observed so in all cases. For instance, smearing of sandal-paste generates delight and does not lead to misery. On the contrary, non-activity, in respect of scriptural injunctions leads to hell, which is full of misery. Hence it is not agency or its absence that leads to misery, but only performance or non-performance of prohibited or prescribed actions.

35    ibid., I.iv.5, II.ii.1
36    infra. p. 68
3.4 RĀMĀNUJA’S VIEW

The soul according to Rāmānuja is real and not an illusory appearance caused by avidyā. It is a complete whole in itself and the content of the cognition of “I”.

The statements of oneness between the soul and Brahman in the Upanisad-s do not mean absolute oneness as construed by the Advaitins. They only emphasize the inseparableness of the two.

The statements of oneness are not found exclusively with regard to the soul and Brahman, but also are found in respect of insentient matter and Brahman. Just as the latter cannot be taken in their literal sense, so the former also cannot be taken literally. This is because the nature of Brahman has been declared to be essentially different from insentient matter and also from the soul. And the author of the Brahmasūtra-s not only states repeatedly the clear distinction between the soul and Brahman, but also affirms the superior nature of Brahman as in the aphorism - adhikām tu bhedanirdeśāṁ 38 etc.

The conception of oneness between the soul and Brahman has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter 39.

Accordingly, the oneness between the soul and Brahman, and also between the world and Brahman, is in the sense of inseparability and not in an absolute sense. We shall now see in some detail the relation of the soul to Brahman.

38. B.S., II.i.22.
3.4.1. THE SOUL IN RELATION TO BRAHMAN

The author of the Brahmasūtra-s declares that the soul is an amśa (mode) of Brahman:

\[ \text{amśo nānāvyapadesāt anyathā cāpi} \]
\[ \text{dāśakitavāditvam adhiyata eke}^{40}. \]

And the reason he states is that scriptures speak of it as different from and also one with Brahman. Thus the conception of the relation between the soul and Brahman according to Bādarāyaṇa, is not one of difference-cum-non-difference, in the sense in which Bhāskara or Yādavaprakāśa understands. Nor is it in the sense of oneness as held by Śaṅkara. On the other hand, it is one of mode and substantive - amśa and amśi.

What is significant here is that Bādarāyaṇa does not take the declarations of difference and non-difference to propound a theory of difference-cum-non-difference, but holds them as a clue to view that the soul is an amśa. And he settles the issue on the basis of Upaniṣadic and other sūrti passages which explicitly speak of the soul as an amśa. For example,

\[ \text{pādo 'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripodāsyaāmrtaṁ divi}^{41} \]
\[ \text{mamaivāmśo jīvaloke jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ}^{42}. \]

Thus on the authority of the author of Brahmasūtra-s, Rāmānuja concludes that the soul is an amśa of Brahman.

Though the soul is said to be an amśa, it does not form a part of the essential nature of Brahman, as the essential nature of Brahman is partless. The soul remains at all times inseparably one with Brahman, but yet is not

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40. B.S., II.iii.42.
41. Tait.Ār. Pur.Sū, III.xii.3
42. B.G., XV.7.
altogether one with it. And the relation does not have any worldly analogy. It is in this sense that it is declared that the state of jīva being an amśa could be known only from the scriptures and which is to be realized later directly in the ripened state of meditation or at the state of liberation.

Thus in the system of Rāmānuja, the soul and Brahman are essentially different and yet are inseparably one. It is, therefore, viewed as an amśa of Brahman in a very special sense so that it forms neither a part of Brahman’s essential nature nor remains totally separated from it. This is what is signified by the term amśa in the aphorism. Thus the declarations of both oneness as well as difference between the soul and Brahman in the scriptures are valid in their primary senses. In the words of Rāmānuja,

\[
evam jīvaparayoh višeṣaṇavišeṣyatva-kṛtam svabhāva-vailakṣanyam āśritya bhedanirdeśāḥ pravartante abhedanirdeśāstu prthaksiddhyanarha višeṣaṇanām višeṣya paryantatvam āśritya mukhyatvenopapadyante^{43}.
\]

3.4.2. THE SOUL AS ETERNAL

The soul according to Rāmānuja is eternal and is a reality in itself. It is eternal in the sense that it does not undergo any change in its essential nature unlike insentient matter, which constantly undergoes change. In other words, it is immutable and remains the same at all times. There occurs change in its attributive consciousness; but this, however, does not affect the eternal character of the soul because of its immutable nature.

43. S.B., II.iii.45.
The Upaniṣadic texts that speak of creation and destruction refer to the association and disassociation of the soul from the body.

3.4.3: THE ATOMIC NATURE OF THE SELF

Rāmānuja further maintains that the soul is atomic in size, neither all-pervasive nor of intermediate size. It cannot be of a limited size; for in that case it has to be admitted that it either undergoes change or does not. To either of the alternatives there are difficulties. If it is admitted to be not undergoing any change, then the difficulties that were pointed our earlier⁴⁴, while dealing with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view would arise. On the other hand, if it is accepted as subject to change then there would arise conflict with the Upaniṣadic teaching that it does not undergo any change in its essential nature. It comes to this that the soul cannot be of an intermediate size.

That the soul cannot be all-pervasive is clear from the Upaniṣad-s which speak of the ascent of the soul from the body, to the other world and its return. These texts would be rendered meaningless if the soul were all-pervasive. Further the scriptures expressly declare the soul to be atomic in size, and also seek to reiterate the minute size through illustrations. The text -

\[\textit{eśo} \textit{nurātmam cetasa veditavyāḥ}⁴⁵\]

states that the soul, which is atomic has to be perceived through a cleansed mind. And the text

\[\textit{vālāgrāṣatābhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasya ca bhāgo jīvāḥ sa vijnēyāḥ}⁴⁶\]

⁴⁴ infra. p.114
⁴⁵ \textit{Mund. Up.}, III.i.9
⁴⁶ \textit{Śvet. Up.}, V.9.
states that if one cuts the tip of a hair into a hundred pieces and one part of it into another hundred pieces, then one part of the latter is the size of the jīva.

Further the soul cannot be admitted to be all pervasive on the ground that it will not only go against the spirit of the scriptures, but also will involve logical contradictions. If the soul is all-pervasive, what then, it may be asked, is the cause for the rise and the destruction of knowledge in it. If the soul itself is admitted to be the cause then there should either be knowledge at all times or no knowledge at all. If, on the other hand, knowledge is admitted to arise as a result of the contact of the soul with mind or other instruments of knowledge such as the sense-organs, even then there should be knowledge at all times; for, being eternal and omnipresent, the soul is eternally in contact with them. Moreover, the position that a particular soul has knowledge of a particular object at a given time cannot be maintained, as every soul is in contact with every instrument of cognition at all times. On these grounds, it cannot be held that the soul is all-pervasive.

To sum up: the soul, according to Rāmānuja, is atomic in size; yet, it does pervade the entire body through its attributive consciousness and hence is capable of experiencing the feelings throughout the body. The scriptures which speak of the soul as infinite must be taken to refer only to the all-pervasive nature of the attributive consciousness; and not to its substratum, namely, the jīva.

The view of Rāmānuja thus accounts for all the declarations of the scriptures without involving any contradiction. It is, therefore, in accordance with the teachings of the scriptures and the Brahmāsūtra-s.

47. Ś.B., II.iii.32.
3.4.4. THE SOUL AS A KNOWER

According to Rāmānuja, knowledge is the distinctive feature of the soul. It is this that distinguishes the soul from insentient matter.

The soul is self-manifest and always remains revealed to itself as ‘I’. The ‘I’-cognition or the ahaṁ pratyaya is not illusory; it forms the essence of the soul. The chief characteristic of the soul is its ability to know itself; and this characteristic abides in the soul, always enabling the latter to remain as the knower of its own self.

The soul is not just pure-consciousness as maintained by the schools of Advaita and the Sāṅkhya; it is also the substratum of consciousness. In the Upaniṣad-s the soul is refered to as of the form-knowledge (vijñānaghanaḥ)⁴⁸ and also as a knower(vijñatā)⁴⁹.

The soul is said to be pure consciousness because it is self-manifest. But it is not only consciousness, but also a conscious being as it is aware not only of itself, but also of objects external to itself. Thus it is knowledge in itself as well as a knower. In a way, the nature of the soul, can be said to be analogous to a lamp, which is luminous by itself and also illuminates objects external to it.

3.4.5. THE SOUL AS AN AGENT

The soul is essentially an agent according to Rāmānuja. The Sāṅkhya and the Advaita schools do not subscribe to the view that the soul is essentially an agent.

Scriptures too deny agency in respect of the soul at some places, and posit it to the guṇa-s or to prakṛti.

⁴⁸ Br. Up., IV.iv
⁴⁹ ibid. IV.iv.14
For instance, the Bhagavadgītā passage -

prakṛteh kriyamānāni guṇaiḥ karmāni sarvaśaḥ
ahaṅkāravimūḍhātmā kartāhamiti manyate\textsuperscript{50}.

declares that everything is carried out by the guṇa-s of prakṛti and to think that the soul is an agent is nothing but delusion.

And another passage,

kāryakāraṇakartṛtve hetuḥ prakṛtirucyate\textsuperscript{51}

states that it is the prakṛti that is the cause for carrying out all actions.

Rāmacūdāra, however, rejects the above view on the ground that the scriptures themselves can become meaningful only if the soul is inherently an agent and not otherwise. According to him, the agency of the soul is clearly imbedded in the karma theory, according to which, every soul reaps the fruits of its actions.

Further Rāmacūdāra observes that scriptures never intend to deny the agency of the soul as is sought to be made out. The reason why agency is apparently denied to the soul in some texts and attributed to the guṇa-s is due to the fact that as long as the soul is in bondage, its agency is influenced by the three guṇa-s of prakṛti. It is due to this that it is rather metaphorically stated that the guṇa-s themselves or the prakṛti is the agent\textsuperscript{52}.

In fact, the agency of the soul is recognised in the Bhagavadgītā itself. The text,

adhisthānāṁ tathā kartā\textsuperscript{53}.

\textsuperscript{50} B.G., III. 27
\textsuperscript{51} ibid., XIII.20.
\textsuperscript{52} S.B., II.iii.33
\textsuperscript{53} B.G., XVIII.14
makes specific reference to the soul as an agent. But agency is spoken of with reference to the guna-s first, to show the influence of the guna-s upon the soul as long as the soul is in bodily existence.

Thus according to Râmānuja, the agency of the soul is natural to it and not illusorily superimposed.

3.4.6 AGENCY OF THE SOUL - DEPENDENT UPON GOD

Râmānuja further declares that the agency of the soul is dependent upon God. And the view is purely based upon the scriptural texts which declare God as the indweller and the inner-controller of every soul. The Brhadāraṇyaka text -

\[ \text{ya ātmani tisṭhan \ldots \ ya ātmānamantaro yamayati}^{54} \]

states that God dwells in the soul and controls it from within\(^{55}\).

3.4.6.1. FREE WILL AND FATALISM.

The fact that the soul is under the control of God does not mean the soul has no freedom at all. God is the controller, in the sense that, for every act of the soul, His direction or consent is necessary as without that, the soul cannot act. Yet God does not dictate or force the soul to act as He wishes. It is thus: the soul, according to Râmānuja, is at perfect liberty to act as it wishes, at the first instance of every act. At that time, God remains

\[ \text{Br. Up., V.vii.26} \]

\[ \text{S.B., II.iii.40} \]
merely as an onlooker. In the second instance He directs the soul to function further according to its initial desire. As it is not possible for the soul to proceed according to its wish without the direction or consent of God, it is said to be under the control of God.

Yet as the soul has got absolute freedom at the first instance wherein it can exercise its discretion, without any external interference whatsoever, it becomes the subject of scriptural injunctions.

3.4.6.2. AN OBJECTION

Now the following question arises: from the above discussion it is known that the soul could perform any act, only with the consent of God. And this is true even when the soul acts in an evil way. But when the soul proceeds in an evil path, God could prevent it effortlessly merely by withholding His consent, and prevent the souls from committing sins, thus saving them from the attendant evils. The failure on His part to do so shows only His cruelty or mercilessness towards the souls.

But, according to Rāmānuja, there is no room for the above objection in view of the following facts: the souls have been provided with the capacity to know (jñātṛtya), the power to act (kārtrtya) and the right to enjoy the fruits of the action (bhoktrtya), by God. It comes to this that, the souls are essentially different from the insentient matter, which is devoid of any of these features.

It must be noted that although both matter and souls are under the absolute control of God, yet He does not treat the souls on par with the insentient matter. The latter

56. ibid., II.iii.41
by itself is incapable either to act or to refrain from acting, and is made to act or otherwise by the will of a sentient being.

The soul, unlike matter, has been given the ability to think and act by itself, and also it has free will either to act or not to. If God interferes and makes the soul act or refrain from acting according to His will, then there will be no distinction between the sentient soul and the insentient matter. Hence He never interferes with the freedom of souls. This is evidenced in the Bhagavadgītā. In the entire Gītā, the Lord declares clearly and repeatedly that He is the indweller and the absolute controller of all the souls. This being the case, it will not be totally impossible for Him to make Arjuna fight the battle by His mere will. On the other hand, throughout the Gītā, He only tries to infuse knowledge and ultimately leaves it to Arjuna to choose his way.

\[ vimṛśyaitadāseṣena yathecchasi tathā kuru \]

(Think over all that I have said, and act according to your wish).

From the above it would be clear that, though the soul is under the absolute control of God, He never imposes His will upon it. Nevertheless He does not remain totally indifferent. As the soul has been provided with the ability to know, think and act, God has shown through the śāstra-s, the right and the wrong, and has indirectly forbidden the soul from committing interdicted actions by pointing out the evils that would ensue thereby. In spite of this, if the soul deliberately commits sinful acts persistently not caring about the resultant fruits, then God

57. B.G., XVIII.63.
simply allows it to proceed in its way which itself is a sort of punishment:

anumatiḥ phaladānamubhayamapi dantaṃprakāra eva

But still it may be contended that when the soul proceeds on detrimental paths, God remains indifferent or grants His assent, there will remain the charge that He is merciless (nirdaya).

Rāmānuja, however, is of the view that the above criticism cannot be levelled upon God. He states that “mercy is defined as one’s unbearable state at seeing another’s suffering. It is a spontaneous feeling which expects nothing in return.” But such a mercy, which is misplaced in one who is deliberately bent upon transgressing all śaśtric injunctions will not be a virtue, but will mean only an abject impotence. What is required in such places is only a firm action (against the wrong-doers) which alone will be a virtue:

dayā hi nāma svārthanirapekṣā paraduḥkha asahiṣṇutā. sā ca svaśasana ativṛtti vyavasāyīny api vartamānā na guṇayāvakalpate. pratyuta apuṃstvamevāvahatī. tannigraha eva tatra guṇah

From this, it should not be thought that God ceases to be merciful. He forgives all the innumerable heinous sins that the jīva has continuously accumulated all through the ages, the moment it withdraws the will to commit those sins. Thereafter God Himself takes every effort to bring

58. Ṣ.P. on Ṣ.B., II.ii.1
59. Ṣ.B., II.ii.1.
the well-being to the jīva, leading ultimately to its final emancipation:

svaśāsana-ativṛtti-vyavasāyanivṛttimātreṇa-
anadi-anantakalpa upacita durviṣaḥa-ananta-
aparadha-anāṅgīkāreṇa niratiṣayasyaūkha-
saṁvyṛddhayesa. svayameva prayatate

Thus, according to Rāmānuja, God is abundantly and uniformly merciful, towards all the jīva-s. But as the jīva-s are provided with a free will and power to know and act themselves, He does not thrust His will upon them when they tread a wrong path, inspite of His absolute control over them, which is fully in consonance with his Godly nature. He merely looks for a positive attitude from the jīva, to eschew all evil, and a will to submit to śāstric injunctions, which is predominantly a mental disposition rather than any physical act. From then on, He takes it upon Himself as His bounden duty to protect the jīva, enhancing more and more, the natural inner urge of the jīva for attaining spiritual bliss culminating ultimately in a union with Himself, whereafter the jīva enjoys infinite bliss in the company of God, forever.

3.4.6.3. A FURTHER OBJECTION

The above discussion shows that the jīva has an absolute free-will and that it acts only at its own discretion, not being influenced by God. But the Kauṭitaki Upaniṣad seems to express a contrary view thus:

60. Lot. cit
esā hyeva sādhukarma kārayati tam yamebhyo
lokebhya unninīṣati; esā evasādhukarma
kārayati tam yamadhoninīṣati\textsuperscript{61}.

(God Himself makes the jīva do the right thing, whom He wants to elevate from the lower worlds; and He Himself makes that jīva do the wrong things, whom he wants to punish).

Thus it seems that the jīva does not have a free will as is sought to be made out.

Rāmānuja replies that the said passage is not a general statement, but concerns itself with very special cases.

The word \textit{tam} in the passage cited above specifically refers to a particular individual soul who has been consistently pursuing the path of devotion along with the path of \textit{karma} relating to his stage and class of life. This word, therefore, is not be taken as referring to souls in general. The import of the passage therefore would be: God is gratified by the conduct of a particular soul and takes pleasure in seeing that he carries out his religious duties in an unswerving manner and thereby enables him to attain the supreme human-end - that is, liberation. And for another who persistently and deliberately acts in an extremely deplorable manner (by transgressing all scriptural injunctions), God Himself in order to castigate him, arouses a desire in such acts that will take him away from Himself to a very low state\textsuperscript{62}.

Rāmānuja substantiates this view by making reference to the \textit{Gītā} text which declares that God Himself destroys the darkness of ignorance and bestows the light of knowledge with utmost compassion, on those who worship

\textsuperscript{61.} \textit{Kau. Up.}, III.65.
\textsuperscript{62.} \textit{Ś.B.}, II.iii.41.
Him, yearning for His company at all times.

tėśāṁ satatayuktānāṁ bhajatāṁ pritipūrvvakam
dadāmi buddhiyogam tām yena māṁ upayanti te
tēśamevānukampārtham ahamajñānajam tamaḥ
nāsayāmyātmabhāvastho jñānadīpena bhāsvatā
t=Rāmānuja further observes that He Himself throws
them into demonic and inauspicious births again and
again, those who are cruel and highly debased and who
harbour a deep hatred for God and abjure that the world is
devoid of God:

asatyam apratiṣṭham te jagadāhuranīśvaram
māmātmaparadeheṣu pradviṣantobhyasyākāḥ
tānāhām dviṣataḥ krūrāṃ samsāreṣu ṇarādhamān
kṣipāmyajasram aśubhān āsurīśveva yoniṣhu

The above view that God Himself throws the soul into
inauspicious births and makes him do evil act, again leads
us to the original quesion of mercilessness on the part of
God. Sudarśana Sūri, raising the above objection,observes
that it is not a rule that mercy is always a virtue and its
absence is always a defect, for it is the duty of the
protector to punish the wicked and protect the virtuous.

dayācedguṇah nigrahścaddoṣa iti na niyamo 'sti.
loke asthānadayāyāḥ sthānanigrahasya ca
guṇatvadoṣatva darśanābhāvāt.

63. B.G., X 11.
64. ibid., XVI. 18.
65. ibid., XVI. 18.
66. ibid., XVI. 19.
67. S.P. on S.B., II. ii. 1.
THE NATURE OF THE SOUL.

Further the chastisement meted out to the jīva also is only for its own ultimate good, for it purifies and makes it eligible to pursue the path to liberation. But God allowing the soul to do evil and then punishing them does not show His mercilessness, but only His Godly nature, as explained earlier. In this connection, Prof. Raghavachar’s observations are worth recording:

“Divine grace involves no violence to individual personality. It does not operate in the direction of securing the sumnum bonum when that direction of its operation is not desired by the individual. That too is a fundamental law of the Supreme working of Divine grace. All good is a gift of God. But no gift is thrust on unwilling and undesiring individuals. This is neither a limitation nor a denial of the compassion or omnipotence of God. The vision of God is a fulfilment of individual personality and not a suppression of it. It will not be such a fulfilment, when it is inflicted upon loveless souls. Its very quality as the Supreme good demands individual aspiration and longing for it. God, as Vedāntadeśika puts it, gives evil when evil is desired, though it is evil, because it is His fundamental nature to fulfil the desires of the individual. Thus love for perfection is a fundamental pre-supposition of perfection. This does not make God’s grace conditional. That aspiration must receive fulfilment is itself a law that is an expression of the unconditional grace of God. This dependence on aspiration is for rendering the fulfilment a real joy and substantial self-realization. It is out of sheer grace that divine grace awaits the birth of aspiration; otherwise it would be a violation of personality. Grace despotic would be less of grace, than grace responsive to and demanding human longing for grace.”68

68. Introduction to Vedārthasaṅgraha, p. 110.
3.5 IS ŚAŃKARA’S VIEW FAVOURED IN THE BRAHMASŪTRA-S? - A REVIEW.

On the issue of knowership, Śaṅkara’s view does not seem to be in conformity with the spirit of the sūtra-s. He insists that knowership cannot be inherent to the soul on the ground that it involves change. And hence he holds that the soul is only pure consciousness and not a conscious being.

Rāmānuja accepts the view that the soul is pure consciousness; but he does not subscribe to the view that it is not a conscious being. This he does both on the basis of experience and on the authority of the express statements of knowership in the scriptures. He further holds that knowership does not involve change in the strict sense of the term and this has been dealt with in the previous chapter\textsuperscript{69}.

The author of the Brahmasūtra-s defines the soul as jñā, which Śaṅkara altogether arbitrarily construes as pure knowledge. Sudarśana Sūri points out that the word actually means only a knower as this is how it is grammatically derived and used in language. And the lexical recording goes as dhīro maniṣi jñāḥ prajñāḥ\textsuperscript{70}. Thus the interpretation of the word as pure knowledge is only a forced one\textsuperscript{71}.

The aphorism jñāṇo 'ta eva\textsuperscript{72} is directed in fact, not only against the Vaiśeṣika-s who hold the soul to be an insentient principle but also against those like the Śāṅkhya-s, who hold it to be of the form of pure knowledge, and not a knower. Hence the criticism is equally applicable to Sankara who shares the Śāṅkhya view in this regard.

\textsuperscript{69} infra. pp.70-71
\textsuperscript{70} Amarakośa, I Kānda, Brahmavarga.
\textsuperscript{71} Ś.P. on S.B., II.iii.32.
\textsuperscript{72} B.S., II.iii.19.
Rāmānuja’s interpretation, whereas, is natural and in tune with the spirit of the sūtra. Śaṅkara’s interpretation further, fails to account for those śruti passages that speak of the soul as a knower and those that make a clear distinction between the substantive and the attributive consciousness.

In the Brahmasūtra-s, the issue that follows, concerns with the size of the soul. The discussion regarding the soul centres around the concept of knowership. That is, there arises the objection that if the soul is admitted to be inherently a knower, there will arise the contingency that it will have to know all things that happen at all places, because it is all-pervasive (vibhu). The author of the sūtra-s rejects this objection on the ground that the soul is only atomic and not all pervasive.

Now, Śaṅkara determines the size of the soul as all-pervasive in the utkṛṇtyadhihkarana. According to him, the prima facie view is that the soul is atomic. And the ground on which he seeks to establish the soul as all-pervasive is that it is none other than Brahman in its essential nature. Hence statements of atomicity in respect of the soul are only figurative, as the atomicity of antahkaraṇa is attributed to the soul. In other words, according to Śaṅkara, the size of the antahkaraṇa is spoken of as that of the soul, by courtesy, though the soul is only all-pervasive.  

Sudarśana Sūri, however, finds the view unsatisfactory on the following grounds: according to him, since the discussion concerns with the soul it is not appropriate to state its atomicity as the prima facie view, for then it will stultify those texts that state the soul as atomic. It cannot be said that those texts speak of the conditioned state of jīva, the state which is caused adventitiously, and not of the

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73. B.S.S.B, II.iii.17.
natural state, of jīva. It is because the view that the atomic size is only adventitiously presented does not stand logical scrutiny. In the first place, there will arise the question whether the atomicity that is caused adventitiously lasts as long as the soul lasts or not. If it is held to last as long as the soul, then it cannot be said to be adventitious. On the other hand, if it does not last as long as the soul lasts, then it amounts to saying that the soul does not last till mokṣa. This is because according to Advaita, mokṣa constitutes removal of jīva-hood, which is attained just by the removal of the upādhi even before attaining mokṣa. And this certainly is an unwelcome position.

Further Śaṅkara is not justified in holding that it is only because of its association with an upādhi that the soul becomes atomic. It is thus: Upaniṣadic texts no doubt declare that the soul is atomic in size. But they do not offer any explanation as to why it is to be viewed as atomic in size. From this we can deduce that the atomic size that pertains to the soul is quite natural to it. This would become clear when we compare the texts that speak of the soul as of atomic size, with those that speak of Brahman too as atomic in size. The latter, after stating that Brahman is atomic in size offer an explanation as to why Brahman is referred to be so. The explanation offered is that Brahman is referred to as of atomic in size with a view to facilitate its concentered meditation in the heart of the upāsaka. From this it is evident that only all-pervasiveness is natural to Brahman while the atomic size is only an attribution to it for the purpose of meditation. Since no such explanation is offered in the Upaniṣad-s for viewing the soul to be atomic in size, it has to be taken that atomic size is natural to the soul. The Advaitin’s contention that it is only caused adventitiously, therefore, is not correct.

75. ibid., p. 368
Further the text-

tena pradyotena eṣa ātmā niṣkrāmati "6.

states that Ātman or the soul departs from the body to the other world. The Advaitin holds that ātman or the soul is all-pervasive as it is identical with Brahmaṇ; but owing to its association with mind it appears to be atomic in size and this enables the soul to depart from the body. Rāmānuja points out that atomic size being natural to it, there is no necessity to assume that it is adventitious. Further the primary significance of the term - ātman is the soul as such. The Advaitin's concept of the soul as consciousness associated with the upādhi, that is mind, involves the adoption of secondary signification in the case of the word -ātman. But when primary signification holds good, there is no reason why it should be abandoned and secondary signification adopted.

Yet another reason as to why the word ātman referred to in the Upaniṣad cited above should not be viewed as one associated with the limiting condition, namely, the mind is this: the Upaniṣad-s in some of their texts speak of the departure of the limiting conditions such as mind, etc. If, according to the Advaitin, mind forms a part of the soul, then the reference to the departure of the soul itself would involve the departure of the mind too. And so there is no need for specific reference to the departure of mind. From this it would be clear that the soul does not consist within itself the limiting condition - mind. It is naturally atomic in size. And this enables it to depart from the body.

Further the Upaniṣadic text

eṣonurātmā cetasā veditavyah "

\[77.\] Munḍ. Up., III.i.9.
specifically refers to the soul as atomic in size. This text does not refer to either of the states - bondage or release in relation to the soul. This, therefore, is a stronger evidence to hold that the soul is atomic in size naturally.\(^{78}\)

To sum up this part of the discussion: atomic size is natural to the soul. Hence it is inappropriate to assume that all-pervasiveness characterizes the soul and then explain that atomic size spoken of with reference to it as adventitiously present.

The kartradhikarana consists of seven aphorisms. The theme of this section is agency on the part of the soul. Rāmānuja in his commentary observes that agency is natural to the soul. After that he refers to an objection that if agency is natural to the soul, then there will be no cessation to it and states that this objection is removed by the author of the sūtra-s by stating that just as a carpenter does his work when he wishes to and remains quiet when he does not wish to, in the same way, the soul would perform activities when it wishes to and would remain quiet when it does not wish to. Further, the carpenter does not cease to be an agent when he remains quiet. In the same way, the soul does not cease to be an agent when it remains quiet. This view is expressed in the Sūtra -

\[yathā ca taksobhayathā.\]^{79}\]

which is the last one in the kartradhikarana.

Śaṅkara, however, treats the above sūtra as constituting a separate section and states that this aphorism discusses the question whether agency on the part of the soul is real or indeterminable and concludes by saying that on the analogy, of the carpenter who ceases to be an agent

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\(^{78}\) Ś.P. on Ś.B., III,ii.32, VoHI, p.368.

\(^{79}\) B.S., III. iii. 39.
THE NATURE OF THE SOUL

when he does not utilize his instruments, the soul also ceases to be an agent in the state of deep-sleep, etc. Agency, therefore, is indeterminable on the part of the soul.

Rāmānuja is of the view that there is no basis for treating the aphorism - yathā ca taksobhayathā, as constituting a separate adhikaraṇa. On the other hand, there is stronger reason to treat it as a part of the kartradhikaraṇa itself. It is because the latter proves the characteristic of agency on the part of the soul after a thorough examination of the Sāṅkhya theory that the characteristic of agency pertains only to the buddhi-tattva. There could arise a doubt as to whether the characteristic of agency belongs to the buddhi-tattva or not. And it is precisely this doubt that is sought to be dispelled in this adhikaraṇa. There is no ground for the rise of the doubt as to whether agency on the part of the soul is real or indeterminable. As such there arises no occasion or need to dispel such a doubt. This leads one to conclude that there is no need to treat the aphorism - yathā ca taksobhayath as a distinct one and to hold that it is intended to dispel the doubt regarding the inherent nature of agency on the part of the soul.

Further the section kartradhikaraṇa excluding the aphorism - yathā ca taksobhayatha. is, according to Śaṅkara, intended to refute the Sāṅkhya view that buddhi-tattva is the agent and the puruṣa or the self is only an experient. A careful study of the Sāṅkhya view along with that of Advaita shows that there is practically no difference between the two schools in so far as the nature of agency is concerned. The Sāṅkhya too admits that the buddhi-tattva is the agent and the agency that belongs to it is transfered to the soul. The Advaitin too advocates practically the same view. It comes to this that the kartradhikaraṇa rejects the Sāṅkhya view that agency of
the buddhi-tattva is falsely presented in the soul. When such is the case, if the aphorism - yathā ca takṣobhayathā is interpreted as establishing indeterminable agency on the part of the soul, then there would be the defect of inconsistency.

It cannot be maintained that the kartradhikarana just seeks to establish the agency of the soul, without concerning about whether it is natural or illusory. This is because there arises no doubt in this matter at all.

Śaṅkara is of the view that agency cannot be natural to the soul on two grounds. One is that liberation is characterised by the cessation of agency and another is that agency leads always to misery.

Regarding the first one, Sudarśana Sūri points out that from scriptural passages it is clear that the soul remains as an agent even at the state of liberation. This is evidenced by passages like jakṣat krīḍan ramamāṇah, etc. And he rejects the second ground by saying that it is not noticed that agency invariably leads to misery. For example, agency in regard to acts like smearing of sandalpaste, etc., over the body is seen to give rise to delight and not misery. It is only one’s past karma that is responsible for misery and not agency.80

That the author of the aphorisms views the soul as an inherent agent is proved on another ground too. In the subsequent adhikarana called parāyattādhisthikarana, the author of the sūtra-s declares that the agency of the soul is derived from Brahman. If the agency of the soul were only superimposed as thought by Śaṅkara, then there would not arise any question as to whether it is dependent upon Brahman or independent. Thus it follows that the view of Bādarāyaṇa is that agency is only natural to the soul and not illusory.

THE NATURE OF THE SOUL

Regarding the question of the relation between the soul and Brahman also, Śaṅkara’s view, observes Sudarśana Sūri, does not find favour with the aphorisms. Bādarāyana declares the soul as an aṁśa of Brahman, which expression Śaṅkara altogether arbitrarily interprets as aṁśa iva aṁśah. Sudarśana Sūri points out that, according to Advaita, there is no possibility of the relation of aṁśa-aṁśi-bhāva at all. It is thus: the soul can be said to be an aṁśa neither of Brahman nor of Īśvara. As Brahman is admitted to be partless, the soul cannot be admitted to be Its aṁśa. It cannot be admitted to be an aṁśa of Īśvara too; for, both the soul and Īśvara are mere appearances of Brahman and as such there cannot be any relation of aṁśa-aṁśi between the two.\(^8\)

From the foregoing discussions it would have become clear that Bādarāyana determines the nature of the soul as atomic in size, a knower, an agent, a dependent agent and an aṁśa of Brahman. Śaṅkara, while he accepts all these views, adds that these are only caused illusory and are not natural to the soul, for which, however, there is no evidence in the sūtra-s.

Further throughout the Brahmāsūtra-s, the soul is treated as a separate entity in itself, and there is not even a slight suggestion that it is composed of two components wherein one of the components is illusory.

The Brahmāsūtra-s are clearly dualistic in character and they bring out a clear distinction between the soul and Brahman. In spite of this Śaṅkara is keen to emphasize the non-difference between the two. He seeks to explain the references to difference between the soul and Brahman in each adhikarana as belonging to the vyāhārika state and not to the pāramārthika state. But the division of

\(^8\) Ibid., p.385
reality into vyāvahārika and pāramārthika seems not to be corroborated by the sūtra-s. Further, there is convincing evidence to show a clear distinction between the soul and God.

Bādarāyaṇa, at the outset defines Brahman as the cause of the world and devotes the major part of the first chapter to show that the definition is not over-applicable in the case of the soul or pradhāna. And again while concluding he specifically states that the said definition is not applicable even in the case of the released soul as the characteristic of being the cause of the world is an exclusive feature of Brahman.

It can therefore be concluded that the Brahmasūtra-s besides emphasizing the distinction between the soul and Brahman affirm that agency is natural to the soul and not adventitious.

To sum up: Rāmānuja, following the author of the sūtra-s affirms that the soul is atomic in size and is an ainśa of Brahman. It is an agent, and agency, unlike in the system of Advaita, is real and it is dependent upon Brahman. Again, unlike in Advaita, there is difference between the soul and Brahman.
CHAPTER IV
THE NATURE OF THE WORLD

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The view set forth in the Upaniṣad-s that Brahman is a Unitary Principle without a second, implies, according to the Advaitin, that the world given in perception is indeterminable or mithyā. An analysis of the cause-effect relation noticed in ordinary experience, the Advaitin contends, confirms the view that the world is indeterminable. The promissory statement in the Upaniṣad-s that by the knowledge of Brahman everything else would become known, substantiates the above view, he claims. It is thus: in the Chāndogya, the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Muṇḍakopaniṣad-s there occurs a promissory statement that by the knowledge of Brahman, everything else will become known. The question as to how could there arise the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of Brahman, the Chāndogya text answers by citing the illustrative example of the knowledge of the effects such as pot, etc., that results from the knowledge of clay, the cause. The nature of effects is set forth in the Chāndogya text-

vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam
myṛtiketyeva satyam

This text, as understood by the Advaitin, means that the effect is merely referred to by name (vācārambhaṇam). It has no reality. And the verbal usage that one is the cause and another is an effect is devoid of any content (nāmadheyem).

1. Ch. Up., VI.i.4.
Having interpreted the text thus, the Advaitin argues that when it is said that the knowledge of Brahman leads to the knowledge of every effect, what is meant is that it leads to the knowledge of the true nature of every effect. That is, there would arise the knowledge that no effect has independent reality apart from Brahman. And every effect is illusory.

The Advaitin contends that the theory of illusoriness of the world results due to the defects in the theories of causation advocated by the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya schools.

4.2 THE NYĀYA THEORY OF CAUSATION

It is noticed in ordinary experience that an effect, in order to come into existence requires two factors - the material cause and the efficient cause. The Nyāya school holds that an effect is totally non-existent prior to its production and is newly brought into existence due to causal operation in the material cause, which is technically termed inherent cause or the samavāyikārana. The cause and the effect thereafter continue to exist in the same substratum. The point that is of significance here is that the samavāyikārana does not get transformed into the effect but remains as the substratum in which the effect is produced. This is called the ārambhavāda or the ‘theory of de novo creation’ or the asatkāryavāda or the theory that the effect which was totally non-existent in the cause is newly produced in it.

The theory of causation advocated by the Nyāya school is not sound on the ground that if an effect could come into existence from its prior non-existence, then since its prior non-existence is present in every object it could come into existence from any source and not necessarily from a specific entity.
4.3 THE SĀＮKHYA THEORY OF CAUSATION

The Sāṅkhya school advocates the theory known as satkāryavāda, according to which, the effect pre-exists in its cause in a latent form. This accounts for the fact of one seeking an appropriate material for achieving a specific effect. And the causal operation is needed to manifest the effects that are in a latent form.

This view, however, does not stand to reason because the exact nature of manifestation cannot be explained. It is noticed that many kinds of effects like pots, jars, etc., evolve from a single cause, namely, clay. Now the basic position of the Sāṅkhya is that all effects are existent in their respective causes in latent forms and are manifested by causal operation. In that case, causal operation, being a manifesting factor, shall manifest not only pot but also jar and other objects; for all of them are equally existent in their latent forms in clay. This fact is noticed in the case of other manifesting factors, like a lamp. A lamp that is lit in order to manifest a pot, manifests not only a pot, but also other objects that are present there.

If causal operation is admitted to be a manifesting factor, then it would manifest all objects such as pot, jar and the like, simultaneously, which are present in clay. This, however, is not the case. It follows from this that satkāryavāda, cannot be maintained\(^2\).

The difficulties pointed out above in regard to the theories of asatkāryavāda and satkāryavāda, show, according to the Advaitin, that causation itself is illusory.

\(^2\) S.B., II.i.6, Vol.2, pp.234-235.
The *Upaniṣad*-s, however declare that Brahman is the cause and the world is its effect. The Advaitin, in order to account for that, propounds "a unique theory of causation called *vivartavāda*, which at once accepts and denies causation. In fact it is more a denial than an acceptance."

### 4.4. THE ADVAITA THEORY OF CAUSATION

According to *Advaita*, Brahman, is a transcendental entity, beyond all transformation, division, activity, etc., and is the cause of the world. The world is not a creation, but is only an appearance of Brahman. And the appearance is only through *prakṛti*, which is called *māyā*; and Brahman which is associated with it is called *māyi*. It is *māyā* that is the material cause of the world, and it gets transformed into the world. And Brahman is spoken of as the cause of the world by being the locus of *māyā*. *Māyā*, which gets transformed into the world is called the transformative material cause (*parinamyupādāna*); and, Brahman which serves as the locus of the transformation is called the transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna*).

Thus it is only through courtesy that the *Upaniṣad*-s speak of Brahman as the cause of the world. Brahman remains as the substratum of the illusion of the world, due to which it is said to be the cause of the world, although in reality it cannot become the cause in its essential nature. The world, therefore, is only an illusory appearance and not a reality in itself.

An objection may arise as follows: the *Upaniṣad*-s speak of the order of creation, etc., of the world in detail. If it is held that the world

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is only an illusory appearance, then there is no need to refer to the order of creation, etc., of the world.

Śaṅkara, however, meets the above objection by stating that the process of creation stated in the Upaniṣad-s cannot be taken as a proof for its reality, as the order of creation mentioned in different Upaniṣad-s is not uniform in nature. This shows that it must be presumed that the Upaniṣad-s themselves are not in favour of the theory of creation of the world. Further no fruit is noticed to ensue from the knowledge of the creation of the world.

bhavedapi kāryasya vigītatvam apratipādyatvāt; na hyayam śrṣṭyadi prapaṇcaḥ pratipipādayiṣitaḥ; na hi tatpratibaddaḥ kaścit puruṣārthaḥ dṛṣyate srūyate vā1.

It follows that, according to Śaṅkara, the reference to the creation of the world in the Upaniṣad-s cannot be taken as a confirmation of the reality of the world. The dream objects too are stated in the Upaniṣad-s as creation of God. They, however, cannot be taken as real on the only ground that their creation too is mentioned in the Upaniṣad-s. They are only illusory as is evident from the Brahma-sūtra -

māyāmatram tu kārtsnyena anabhivyakta-svarūpatvāt5.

4.  B.B.S.B., I.iv.4
5.  B.S., III.ii.3.
wherein the author of the sūtra-s describes them as māyāmātra or illusory. Like the world of dream which is a short-lived one, the world of the waking state too is illusory. It is only a prolonged dream.

To sum up this part of the discussion:

(1) Brahman is stated to be the cause of the world, only in the sense that it serves as the substratum for the appearance of the world-illusion and does not literally constitute its material cause;

(2) the world is not a real entity in the sense of unsublatedness in the three divisions of time but is only an illusory appearance, like dream appearance, or the appearance of a shell in silver;

(3) no logically satisfactory theory of causation can be established;

(4) the statements of creation, etc., of the world in the Upaniṣad-s cannot be cited as ground to uphold the reality of the world; for, there are divergent views in the Upaniṣad-s themselves in regard to the order of creation. Further dream objects which are stated to be created in the Upaniṣad-s are only illusory; and,

(5) liberation consists in the soul remaining in its natural state as Brahman free from the experience of the world. The sole means of liberation is knowledge which removes ignorance and through that, the experience of the world too. This confirms the view that the world is only illusory.

So far the Advaitin’s view.
4.5 Rāmānuja’s View

Rāmānuja holds that the theory of causation cannot be held to be illusory, for its validity is not only a matter of experience; but also is testified to by the scriptures. The fact that Brahman is stated as the cause of the world is accepted by the Advaitin, but he holds it to be provisional and not final. This is because, to accept causality in respect of Brahman is to attribute some feature to it which would impair its non-dual character.

Rāmānuja, however, points out that the Upaniṣad-s propound the causality of Brahman in respect of the world and expound also the identity between the Brahman and the world by an analysis of cause-effect relation. In the Brahmasūtra-s, the first two chapters are devoted to proving that Brahman is the cause and the world is its effect. And the author of the aphorisms seeks to refute all the objections against this view and never once does he pronounce the world to be illusory. When this is the case there is no valid ground to maintain the theory of causation to be illusory.

The Advaitin rejects the theory of causation on the ground of logical difficulties noticed in the asatkāryavāda of the Naiyāyika-s and the satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya-s.

Rāmānuja argues that whereas it is true that the asatkāryavāda is fraught with difficulties and is also disapproved by the scriptures, the same is not the case with the satkāryavāda. Hence the Advaitin is not justified in rejecting the satkāryavāda.

155
According to Rāmānuja, satkāryāvāda is not something, as contemplated by the Sāṅkhya. Whereas the Sāṅkhya is correct in holding that the effect is existent in its cause, prior to its origination, he goes wrong in holding that the effect exists as effect itself in its cause.

To explain: the Sāṅkhya school holds that the effect is existent prior to its production and it is existent both in regard to its form and substance. Pot exists as pot itself in its cause which is manifested by causal operation. This school illustrates this by making reference to the limbs of a turtle which remain hidden and explicit at different times\(^6\). They are not newly produced. The effect, therefore, remains as effect itself in its cause prior to its production. If this position is not admitted, then one would have to accept the theory that an effect is a de novo creation which is the asatkāryāvāda of the Naiyāyika-s.

Rāmānuja, feels that the Sāṅkhya-s have precisely gone wrong in admitting that an effect exists as such in its cause prior to its production. It is true that the substance (dravya) of the cause and of the effect are one and the same, and hence the matter of the effect is always existent. But it is not true that the form (avasthā) of the effect also in existe nt prior to its production. In fact cause and effect are said to be one and the same only because the same material goes into the making of both. But they are different, in as much as they

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6. S.T.K. on S.K., 9
have different forms. That is, effect is nothing but the cause having different disposition of parts. This view, Rāmānuja feels, would meet all the objections raised by the opponents of the *satkāryavāda*.

It was pointed out earlier that if the effect is already existent, the causal operation (*kārakavyāpāra*), would be rendered futile. But according to Rāmānuja this is not so. It is because the effect is said to be the attainment of a different form from that of the cause. And in order to bring about this the causal operation is essential. Since the theory of manifestation itself is not accepted, the criticisms levelled against that theory are of no consequence.

Now a plausible objection against the view of Rāmānuja is that if the form of the effect is accepted to be newly originated, then it amounts to accepting the Nyāya view of the *asatkāryavāda* in respect of the form of the effect.

Rāmānuja points out that the *asatkāryavāda* is not a defect in its entirety. It is a defect only in respect of the origination of a *dravya* and not in respect of the origination of *avasthā*. It is the nature of *dravya*-s to take newer and newer forms due to which alone something is called an effect.

Further the *Naiyāyika* is not justified in holding that an *avasthā* is newly created. This is because there will arise the question even in his own system whether the so-called creation (*utpatti*) itself is created or not. The former alternative will lead

7. Ś.B., II.1.15.
8. ibid.
us to infinite regress and the latter will amount to accepting satkāryavāda in respect of utpatti.

In fact the Naiyāyika overlooks an elementary confusion when he raises the objection whether avasthā is subject to creation or not. It is because avasthā is a property (dharma) of a substance. And to raise a question whether it is subject to creation or not, is to predicate a dharma to another dharma which constitutes the defect called nityasamā9

Hence the question whether avasthā is subject to utpatti or not does not arise. The fact remains, however, that both (avasthā and utpatti) are, in effect, one and the same10. This leads us to another important question as to what constitutes creation and destruction, according to Rāmānuja. This we shall deal with now.

4.5.1 CREATION IS DESTRUCTION.
DESTRUCTION IS CREATION

The notions of creation and destruction are well brought out, according to Rāmānuja, in the Bhagavadgītā verse:

jātasaya hi dhruvo mṛtyuh dhruvaṁ janma mṛtasya ca11.

Very freely translated, this verse would mean that what is created is destined to get destroyed and what is destroyed is bound to be created again12.

9. Nyāysūtra. V.i.35.
10, Ś.P. on Ś.B., II.i.15.
11. B.G., II.27
12. T.C. on B.G.. II.27

158
But Rāmānuja is of the view that this is not the import of the verse. Vedānta Deśika remarks that if the verse is taken in its literal sense then one need not take treatment for one’s disease and need not grieve over the bereavement of one’s own son, for what is created is destined to be destroyed and what is destroyed in bound to be created again. Hence this verse only means that creation and destruction are not two different things, but are one and the same. What is destruction for one form is creation for another form. A pot may be said to by destroyed, but that is the creation for pot-sherds, and destruction of pot-shreads will mean creation for pieces, and this goes on infinitely. In all these, matter stands conserved, according to the law of conservation of mass, and forms go on changing. And the Viṣṇupūrṇa substantiates the same idea in the text.

\[ \text{mahī-ghaṭatvam ghaṭatah kapālikā} \\
\text{kapālikā-cūrṇa-rajastato ’nuh}^{13} \]

Thus, Rāmānuja observes that creation and destruction are none but the same substance attaining different forms or states. When the substance attains a particular form, it is said to be created, and when it attains a newer form, it is called destruction of the previous form, in which the matter is not totally annihilated, but exists in a different form. And the destruction of one is the creation of another.

\[ \text{uptatti-vināśādayāḥ sato dravyasya} \\
\text{avasthāviśeṣāḥ. utpatyākhyām avasthām} \]

---

13 \( V.P., \) II. xii.42
upayātasya dravyasya tadvirodhi-avasthāntara prāptih vināśa ityucyāte. mṛddrayasya piṇḍātva-ghaṭatva-kapālatva-cūrṇatvādivat pariṇāmidravyasya pariṇama-paramparā avarjanīyā. tatra pūrvavathasya dravyasya uttaraavasthā prāptih vināśaḥ. saiva tadavasthasya ca utpattiḥ\textsuperscript{14}.

The above position of Rāmānuja leads us to another vital question. The view that the destruction of a substance means only the destruction of its form and that matter continues to exist in some other form, implies that there is no place for total non-existence in respect of matter, in the scheme of Rāmānuja. If that be the case there arises the question regarding the nature of existence (sattva) and non-existence (asattva).

4.5.2. DEFINITIONS OF SATTVA AND ASATTVA

According to Rāmānuja, sattva and asattva are two characteristics of the same substance. The Nyāya school holds that when something is said to be created it was totally non-existent prior to its creation and when it is destroyed, it is totally annihilated leaving out not even a trace of it, which is called nirānvayavināśa.

According to Rāmānuja, however, it is not possible to bring forth anew what is totally non-existent; or to annihilate totally what is existent\textsuperscript{15}. As discussed earlier, creation and destruction constitute only the change of state in the same

\textsuperscript{14} B.G.B.R., II.27
\textsuperscript{15} Š.B., II.ii.21
THE NATURE OF THE WORLD

substance. Thus existence of something means existence of it in a particular form. And non-existence means destruction of that form. For instance, a pot is said to be existent when clay is made to have a disposition of parts such as a wide, round-natured bottom and a narrow neck. and when that form is destroyed, the pot is said to be non-existent. Thus when a pot attains to the state of pot-sherds, it is said that pot has been destroyed, but even there it is never noticed that there is something as the non-existence of pot, apart from the pot-sherds. Thus existence (sattva) and non-existence (asattva) are just two features of the same thing.

*sattvāsattve hi dravyadharmāvityuktam. tatra sattvadharmāt arthāntaram asattvam... mṛddravyasya prthubudhna udarākāra-yogo ghaṭo'sti iti vyavahara-hetuḥ, tasyaiva tadvirodhi avasthāntara-yogo ghaṭo nāstiti vyavahara hetuḥ; tatra kapālādi avasthāyāh tadvirodhitvena saiva ghaṭāvasthasya nāstīti vyavahāra hetuḥ; na ca tadvyatirikto ghaṭābhāvo nāma kaścit upalabhyaṁ*\(^{16}\).

Thus, according to Rāmānuja, total non-existence is an impossibility. Non-existence merely means the non-existence of an object in a particular form. Thus when Upaniṣad-s declare the world to be asat as

\[
asadeva idamagra āsīt\(^{17}\)
\[
asadvā idamagra āsīt\(^{18}\)
\]

16. ibid., II.i 18.
etc., they do not mean that the world was totally non-existent (during dissolution). On the other hand, they only mean that the world was not existent in the form in which it exists during the state of evolution. This view is confirmed by the author of the sūtra-s in the aphorism -

\[
\text{asadvyapadeśannetī cenna dharmāntareṇa}
\]

\[
vākyasēṣat yuktē śabdāntarācca}^{19}.
\]

Rāmānuja is of the view that, to say that the world is existent (sat) means that it is associated with names and forms and to say that it is non-existent (asat) means that it exists in a state free from names and forms. That is, when the world exists in a subtle form without being differentiated into names and forms, it is said to be non-existent and when it is differentiated into names and forms it is said to be existent.

\[
\text{idam śabda nirdiṣṭasya jagataḥ satvadharmo}
\]

\[
nāmrūpe; asattva-dharmastu tadvirodhinī}
\]

\[
sūkṣmāvasthā. ato jagato nāmarūpayuktasya
tadvirodhi sukuṣmādāsāpatthā asattvam.}^{20}
\]

And it is in this vein that it is declared in the Visnupurana that whatever “is” is Viṣṇu and whatever ‘is not’ also is Viṣṇu:

\[
\text{jyotīṃsi viṣṇuh bhuvanāni viṣṇuh}
\]

\[
\text{vanāni viṣṇuh girayō diśāśca}
\]

\[
nadyah samudrāśca sa eva sarvaṁ
yadasti yannāsti ca vipravarya}^{21}
\]

In this verse the expression \text{sa eva sarvaṁ}

\[
yadasti yannāsti ca} is the most significant. This
\]

19. B.S., II.i.18.
20. Ś.B. II.i.18
21. V.P., II.ii.38.
verse names every entity and declares it to be one with Viṣṇu, for everything is 'only His body' and it ultimately concludes that everything that 'is' and 'is not' also is Viṣṇu.

Herein it is said that what is non-existent also is the body of Viṣṇu. This confirms the view of Rāmānuja that non-existence means only a state that is opposed to the state of existence.

From the foregoing discussion it would have became clear that every object is existent at all times in one form or another. As pointed out earlier, the cause and the effect are the same object existing in its antecedent and subsequent states. Rāmānuja upholds the view that Brahman is the cause of the world and this has already been dealt with. The Nyāya-Vaisesika-s hold that atoms are the cause and the Sāṅkhya-s hold that pradhāna is the cause. Rāmānuja refutes their views and establishes the causality of Brahman. We shall now set forth in some detail, Rāmānuja’s refutation of the Nyāya and Sāṅkhya views and his views on Brahman’s causality in respect of the world.

4.5.3. CAUSE OF THE WORLD-
RĀMĀNUJA’S REFUTATION OF
OTHERS’ VIEWS

The basic view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is that the world is made up of atoms. This is

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22 The view that everything is the body of Brahman is expressed in the Viṣṇupurāṇa itself at places like I.xxii.38, I.xxii.86 etc.
23 infra pp 85-88
because when matter is split again and again it reaches a stage of not admitting any split further. And the particle that is reached ultimately is called an atom. Thus, it is the atom that forms the basis of the world. This is the principal argument advanced by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s to prove that the ultimate causal substance is the atom. Another argument is also advanced to prove the above view. There are several big objects in the world, one thing being bigger than the other. And the ultimate limit is found in the sky. Likewise if we seek smaller and smaller objects, the process must come to an end and the size-smallness must culminate somewhere and this is the atom.

The Sāṅkhya-s, on the other hand, hold that pradhāna is the cause of the world. Their argument in favour of this view is that the world is made up of objects that are of the form of pleasure, pain or delusion. Hence it follows that their causal substance also must be made up of the same factors. And the cause is pradhāna, which is constituted of the three dravyas called sattva, rajas and tamas which respectively represent pleasure, pain and delusion. All the three dravya-s constantly undergo transformation, and are in a state of dynamic equilibrium at the state of dissolution. When the equipoise is disturbed, the pradhāna functions to put forth its evolutes and there begins the evolution of the world. This, in brief, is the Sāṅkhya theory of creation. The view is based upon the Sāṅkhya smṛti of Sage Kapila who propounded the Sāṅkhya system.

24. Muktāvali, p. 68.
25. Loc. cit.
Rāmānuja criticises both the above views on the ground that they are opposed to both scriptures and reasoning.

The Sāṅkhya view stands discredited by its denial of an efficient cause. According to it, the world is created out of pradhāna without the direction of any sentient being. And it is totally unintelligible. Never indeed is it observed in common parlance that an insentient matter acts of its own accord, to produce particular effects without being directed by a sentient being. Timber does not become a chariot of its own without the agency of a sentient being. On the contrary, it is seen that an insentient matter does produce its effects only when fashioned by workmen having intelligence. Another defect in the Sāṅkhya view is that sattva, etc., can never become the causes of the world, as they are known to be only qualities and not substances. And the Sāṅkhya is not justified in holding a contrary view without any valid basis.26

Moreover the Sāṅkhya system itself is fraught with several internal contradictions. It is declared that an inexplicable adhyāsa between prakṛti and puruṣa is responsible for the world-process. But the nature of both the prakṛti and the puruṣa is accepted to be such that there is absolutely no possibility of the occurrence of adhyāsa between the two. In the first place, it is not possible in the case of prakṛti because it is insentient and hence incapable of functioning. And puruṣa in the system is said to be changeless, free from agency and of the form

26. Ś.B. II.ii.1.
of knowledge. Hence an *adhyāsa* is not possible in its case too. Hence the *Saṅkhya* view that the cause of the world is *pradhāna* is not sound.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*-s argue that the atoms constitute the cause of the world. And their arguments in favour of this view have been referred to already.

The basic view of Rāmānuja and also of all the *Vedāntin*-s is that Brahman is the cause, although they differ from one another in regard to the method of elucidating this theory. But all of them agree in rejecting the theory that atoms constitute the cause of the world, on several grounds.

Rāmānuja refutes the atomic theory on the following lines in the *Mahaddīrghādhirakaraṇa*²⁷: the objects of the world are constructed out of the combination of parts of their casual elements. That is how smaller objects could give rise to bigger ones. So also atoms must produce the binary compounds (*dvyaṅuka*-s) only by combining through their parts. But the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*-s admit that the atom is partless. If that be the case, the combination of any number of atoms cannot produce something bigger in size than a single atom, for everything will coalesce into a single atom. To get over this difficulty if parts are admitted in respect of atoms, then it will not only go against the basic *Nyāya* position that atoms are partless, but also will lead to infinite regress. That is, if parts are admitted in the case of atoms, then it will mean that the parts have combined to form

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²⁷ ibid., II.i.2
the atom. And the parts themselves should be admitted either as partless or being endowed with parts. If the former alternative were held, then the same defect that any number of parts cannot produce a bigger entity, will remain. And the admission of the latter alternative would give rise to the same objections pointed out above leading to infinite regress.

It may be argued that the distinction between a mountain and a mustard seed is due to the number of parts that they contain. If it is shown through arguments like the above that there would result infinite parts for each atom, then there will cease to be any distinction between the two, namely, mountain and mustard seed, as each will contain infinite parts. Hence in order to account for what is observed it must be accepted that the two are made of larger and smaller number of parts respectively. And that part which is the smallest of all, is the atom.

Rāmānuja replies that if atoms are accepted to be partless, then it will first be not possible to create a mountain or a mustard seed at all, out of it. Hence the view that atoms are the causal elements is not tenable28.

4.5.4. THE CAUSE ACCORDING TO RĀMĀNUJA

According to Rāmānuja, the world is not created out of atoms. In fact the world does not consist of individually analizable parts which combine to form bigger ones. On the other hand,

28. ibid., II.ii.10.
the whole world forms a single continuum without any part of it remaining isolated. The question is not one of a ‘small’ giving rise to a ‘big’ but the other way around. It is the ‘big’ that creates the ‘small’. In the Śrutapratikāśika it is stated:

\[\text{nahi alpena vipulasya utpattih. daśaguṇam brhato brahmaṇaḥ kāraṇādulpasya kāryatvam hi pratipadyate}\]

The world in its primordial state is called prakṛti. Though it is a material substance the scriptures speak of it as a power of Brahman. It forms the body of Brahman and remains in an undifferentiated condition at the state of pralaya. Therein it remains in such a subtle form in Brahman that it could as well be said that it does not exist.

\[..... \text{atyanta sūksmatayā asatkalpa svalīlopakaraṇa cidacid-vastu-śarīratayā tanmayah paramātmā} .....\]

It is called by the name tāmas then. And when Brahman wills, there takes place creation, during which process, Brahman, greatly expands this miniscule tāmas to a gigantic size which then puts forth its evolutes. Thus creation is nothing but making the subtle into gross form and undifferentiated into differentiated.

Thus the universe is created not from atoms but from prakṛti which forms the body of Brahman, due to which it always remains inseparable from it.

29. Ś.P. on S.B., II.ii.10.
30. S.B., I.i.1, Vol.1, p.218
31. ibid., I.IV.27
THE NATURE OF THE WORLD

Now there arises the following question: from the above, it would become clear that Rāmānuja accepts prakṛti as the cause of the world. And the position is very much akin to the Sāṅkhya view:

Rāmānuja observes that there is a marked difference between the two views. The Sāṅkhya accepts prakṛti as totally independent of puruṣa; while Rāmānuja holds it to be fully dependent upon Brahman, forming the body of the latter. Thus according to Ramanuja prakṛti as such, is not denied; what is denied is only its independence by not having Brahman as its inner-self.

yadi bhūtasūkṣmam avyākṛtam
abhyaupagamyate, kāpila satkāraṇa-siddhānta
upādāne kao pradvēsaḥ? tatāpi hi
bhūtakāraṇameva avyaktam ityucyate.
tatrocyaṭe ... na vayam avyaktam
tatpariṇāma-viśeṣāṁśca svarūpeṇa
anabhyaupagacchāmaḥ api tu
paramapuruṣa-sarīratayā tadātmakatva
viraheṇa32.

It is, therefore, fully justifiable according to Rāmānuja to say that Brahman is the material cause. This is because Brahman does not create the world by remaining outside the prakṛti. On the other hand, It remains immanent in prakṛti as its in-dweller and inner-controller, always pervading it. This has been discussed earlier33.

32. ibid., I.iv.3.
33. infra. pp. 85-88
It is with this in view that the *Upaniṣad*-s instead of declaring that Brahmān creates the world, declare that "Brahman creates Itself".

\[ \text{tadātmānāṁ svayamakuruta}^{34}. \]

It may now be objected that if Brahmān is admitted to be the material cause, there must be admitted some transformation in it, without which it is not possible to uphold its material causality. But the *Upaniṣad*-s clearly declare that Brahmān is free from any change whatsoever. Further if Brahmān is accepted to be the material cause of the world, then it will be subject to all the defects found in the world.

Rāmānuja observes that there is no room for these above objections. The *Upaniṣad*-s declare Brahmān to be of a unique nature endowed with infinite powers and perfections which are incomprehensible by the human intellect. And it is the very nature of Brahmān to be the material cause of the world and yet to remain unsullied by any of its defects. Further the author of the *Brahmasūtra*-s advocates the theory of transformation in the aphorism *parināmāt*^{35}. Rāmānuja explains that the transformation that is spoken of here does not involve any defect to Brahmān but only adds to its glory. This is because, it is a unique type of transformation wherein there is actual change only in the mode and not in the substantive. And the *Upaniṣad* seeks to illustrate this through the instance of the spider spinning its cob-web. The spider secretes

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35. *B.S.*, I.iv. 27.
and absorbs its thread from its body without itself undergoing any change. The change here is confined only to the thread. Likewise when Brahman creates the world, the transformation is confined to its mode, which constitutes prakṛti in its undifferentiated form.

Vedānta Deśika explains the view in the Adhikaraṇasārāvali thus:

mṛtpiṇḍādeḥ kulalaprabhṛtirihapṛthak
tadvadevādikartā
nopādānam vikārairvirahita iti
na dvāramātre. vikārāt

mṛddṛṣṭāntādimātrānnaca vikṛtirasau
syāt parasya svarūpe
dehadvāroṇanābhiprabhṛti

vikṛtvad vyāprterdarśitavāt36.

(It is found in the world that potter, weaver and others who are the efficient causes for pot, cloth, etc., are seen to be different from the respective material causes - clay, threads, etc. So also Brahman which is said to be the primordial cause can only become the efficient cause and not the material cause, for It is declared to be free from transformation. But this objection does not hold good in the case of Brahman, because though there is transformation, it is limited only to the mode. Again just because the Upaniṣad-s cite the instances like clay, etc., which are transformed

36. A.S., 144
into pot, etc., it cannot be construed that there is transformation in the essential nature of Brahman, for the exact status of Brahman is explained in the example of a spider spinning its cob-web without itself undergoing any change whatsoever.)

The order of dissolution spoken of in the Upaniṣad-s also clearly precludes any transformation in the essential nature of Brahman, according to Rāmānuja. The Subālopaniṣad, for instance, speaks of laya in the following way:

prthivyapsu pralīyate āpastejasi līyante
tejo vayau līyate .... bhūtadīr mahati
līyate., mahān avyakte līyate. avyaktam
aksare līyate. aksaram tamasi līyate. tamaḥ
pare deve ekībhavati

Here every entity is said to undergo laya in its antecedent entity, starting from prthivi upto tamas. But tamas is said to become ‘one’ with Brahman (ekībhavati) and there it is not said to be laya. And Rāmānuja makes a pointed reference to the distinction in the use of the words laya and ekībhāva in the Upaniṣad. When prthivi completely leaves its form and becomes ap then it is laya and such a laya goes on for each entity upto tamas. But tamas is not said to undergo laya in Brahman but is only said to become one with It meaning thereby that it becomes indistinguishable from Brahman and is not totally dissolved in it. And Rāmānuja observes that the author of the aphorisms makes it clear that though at the state

37. Sub. Up. II.
38. S.B., I.iv.27.
of dissolution, when both \textit{cit} and \textit{acit} entities become one with Brahman, they still remain in their subtle forms indistinguishable from Brahman, wherein the \textit{jīva-s} remain associated with all their \textit{karma-s}. The aphorism is:

\begin{quote}
na \textit{karma avibhāgād iticenna anāditvāt upapadyate cāpyupalabhyate ca}^{39}.
\end{quote}

Thus though the author of the \textit{Brahmasūtra-s} advocates the \textit{parināmavāda}, yet it is not analagous to worldly instances like clay, etc., but is something unique where there is change, only in the mode, and not in the substantive.

Thus, according to Rāmānuja, Brahman is the \textit{upadānakārana}, but yet it does not involve any change in its essential nature.

Brahman, in fact, is not only the material cause but also the efficient cause which is another unique feature about It. In fact, the \textit{Upaniṣad-s} consistently maintain the view that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world and yet remains unaffected by the defects of the world- its effect.

Rāmānuja quotes extensively from the \textit{Mahābhārata}, the \textit{Bhagavadgītā}, the \textit{Viṣṇupurāṇa} and \textit{smṛtis} like \textit{Manusmṛti}, in support of this view. All these texts uniformly convey that there is body-soul relation between the world and Brahman and that Brahman is the material, as well as the efficient cause of the world without losing its changeless character\textsuperscript{40}.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{B.S.}, II. i. 35.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{S.B.} I.iv.27, II.i.1, II.i. 28.
Thus, in the view of Rāmānuja, Brahman associated with cit and acit in their subtle forms is the cause and Brahman associated with cit and acit in their gross forms is the effect. It is thus that the promissory statement 'by knowing everything becomes known' becomes meaningful, for, the cause and the effect are the same entity in their two different dispositions. The implication of the statement is that by knowing the cause the effect becomes known.

4.5.5. CAN CAUSALITY OF BRAHMAN BE REPUDIATED

The author of the Brahmāsūtra-s devotes the first pada of the second adhyāya to the elucidation of the position that the Brahmakāraṇavāda established in the first adhyāya cannot be repudiated. He meets several objections that could be anticipated or actually raised by the opponents.

Among the objections, three stand out to be important. One is: there cannot be cause-effect relation between two entities which have entirely different natures. Brahman is said to be the cause of the world. It is of the form of consciousness and bliss, while the world is insentient and the source of all miseries. And there cannot be cause-effect relation between the entities possessing mutually contrary natures.

The second objection is: the nature of Brahman as has been enunciated in the scriptures does not admit of material causality without involving contradiction.
And the third one is related to the purpose of creation. We shall now discuss these questions in some detail:

4.5.5.1 CAN CAUSE AND EFFECT BE ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT?

The above question is raised by the Sāṅkhya-s. The basis of the objection is that it is observed in the world that although the cause and effect are different in regard to their specific dispositions, yet they are identical in so far as their material is concerned. The siddhāntin argues that cause and effect are the same dravya with different disposition of parts. The implication of this argument is: it is noticed in ordinary experience that clay is the material cause for pot, and gold is the material cause for ornament. Though, for practical purposes clay and pot or gold and a bangle made out of it may be viewed as different, yet the basic substance remains the same in both the cause and the effect. In other words, that aspect, goldness (say), which distinguishes gold from the other things, continues to exist very much in the effect, namely, bangle too. And this is called similarity of natures (sālakṣṇya) between the cause and the effect which is noticed in the cases of clay and pot, etc.

yena svabhāvena kāraṇabhūtam vastu vastvantarāt vyāvṛtttam tasya svabhāvasya tatkarye'pi anuvṛttih karye kāraṇa sālakṣṇyam

41. ibid., II.i.4.
However if Brahman is accepted to be the cause of the world, the rule is found to be violated, since the characteristics of the two are distinct. On the other hand, if pradhāna is accepted to be the cause, there is no violation of the rule. Hence the causality of Brahman cannot be accepted, for there is no ground to accept a violation of the said rule.

If Brahman - the Sentient Being were accepted to be the cause of the world - the insentient one, then the rule that the cause and the effect must share the same characteristics, would stand violated. If, however pradhāna were held to be the cause of the world, then there is no violation of the said rule, as both pradhāna-the cause, and the world -the effect, have the common feature of insentience.

From this it emerges that Brahman cannot be accepted to be the cause of the world without violating the above rule. Now the question arises as to whether there could be a violation of this rule at all.

The author of the aphorisms sets aside the objection on two grounds. The first one is that the rule deduced above is not universally applicable and exceptions are found even in worldly instances. The second one is that there is actually no violation of the rule in so far as the view that Brahman is the cause of the world, is concerned.

To be explicit: it is observed in ordinary experience that totally new effects spring from causes that do not share any distinctly common features with them. For instance, scorpions are seen to be created from cow-dung and certain
insects are created from the bodies of flies. In these cases the said rule is found to be violated.

It may be contended that cow-dung is not the cause for the sentience of the scorpion but only for its insentient body and similarly the material body of the fly alone is the cause for the material body of the insect. Still there is clear violation of the rule. That is, whatever feature that exclusively characterises cow-dung or a fly is not seen to pervade the scorpion or the insect. Hence it cannot be laid down as a rule that there should be similarity of characteristics between the cause and the effect. On this basis Brahman's causality towards the world could well be explained.

Nevertheless, Bādarāyaṇa adds that this is not the case. There is indeed no violation of the said rule which is well-framed on the following ground:

Brahman - the Pure Being is not said to be the cause, but it is Brahman associated with cit and acit in their subtle forms that is said to be the cause. And the effect again is Brahman in association with the same cit and acit in their gross forms. In the ultimate analysis the similarity of characteristics between cause and effect is well maintained and hence the objection does not arise at all.

Instances of exceptions were pointed out just to show that the rule is not universally applicable and it does not mean that the rule is violated when Brahman is accepted to be the cause of the world.

42. ibid., II.i.6.
43. B.S., II.i.7.
4.5.5.2 DOES MATERIAL CAUSALITY OF BRAHMAN INVOLVE CONTRADICTION?

The second objection is: how could Brahman become the material cause of the world. A material cause is that which undergoes transformation in its essential nature. If the same is to be applicable in the case of Brahman, then two alternatives suggest themselves and both of them are riddled with difficulties. That is, Brahman has to be accepted either as partless or as endowd with parts. If the former is accepted, then being the material cause, Brahman in its entirety should become the world. To get over this, if it is admitted that only a part of Brahman changes in the form of the world, then it would result in admitting Brahman as endowed with parts; and, this would force us to give up the Upaniṣadic view that Brahman is partless. Thus to either of the views there are difficulties. It may, however, be contended that Brahman is accepted to be the cause only as associated with cit and acit entities in their subtle forms and hence there would arise no difficulty. It is because though Brahman remains as the material cause, it is said to be changeless as change is exclusively related to the attributes and not to the substantive which remains changeless. Nevertheless, the objection is against the alleged changelessness itself, of the substantive. That is, though Brahman is said to be the cause in its substantial form, yet, as Brahman in its totality is accepted to become the effect, it cannot logically leave out the substantive due to which it cannot be maintained to be changeless⁴⁴.

⁴⁴. Ś.B., II.i: 26.
BADARAYANA, however, replies that the said objection could not arise because of the transcendental nature of Brahman. It is a concept to be known exclusively through scriptures, which declare it as defying all logic and as endowed with unimaginable powers\textsuperscript{45}.

The \textit{Vis\u0101pur\u0101na}, for instance, raises the same objection and replies that Brahman is something which is simply beyond the realm of human intellect where there is no room for mundane logic.

\begin{quote}
\textit{nirgu\u0101nas\u0101prameyasya} \\
\textit{suddhasy\u0101pyamal\u0101tmana\u0101h}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{katham sarg\u0101dikart\u0101tvam brahma\u0101no'} \\
\textit{bhuyupagamyate}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{saktayah sarvabh\u0101v\u0101n\u0101m acintya} \\
\textit{j\u0101nagocar\u0101h}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{yato' to brahma\u0101 nast\u0101stu sarg\u0101dy\u0101} \\
\textit{bh\u0101vasaktayah}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{bhavanti tapat\u0101m \u0101re\u0101tha p\u0101vakasya} \\
\textit{yatho\u0101nata\u0101}\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

(Maitreya enquires:) Brahman is free from any of the characteristics that could account for its being viewed as a cause. It is incomprehensible, pure and unsullied (that is, free from \textit{karma}-s). How could Brahman of such nature, be the cause of the creation, etc., of the world?

(Parasara replies:) Every entity is endowed with unique powers in regard to which there is no scope

\textsuperscript{45} B.S., II.i.27.  
\textsuperscript{46} V.P., I.iii.1,2
for reasoning. They have to be known exclusively through the pramāṇa-s that comprehend them. For instance, fire has the capacity to burn; and in regard to this there cannot arise any question as to how it could burn by being a “dravya” etc. It is simply the nature of fire to burn. Likewise it is the unique power of Brahman to be the cause of creation, etc., of the world, (without undergoing any change).

It may still be contended that even scriptures cannot teach something which is contrary to perception such as, “Drench with fire”. But the reply is that the causality of Brahman cannot be equated with instances like the above. In the above instance there is direct contradiction observed through another pramāṇa - perception. But in the case of Brahman, it is a concept, to be known purely through scriptures and It never comes within the range of any other pramāṇa. When that is the case it is only but proper that Its nature is admitted as enunciated in the sruti.

srutesu śabdamūltvāt⁴⁷.

What the author of the sutra-s conveys in this aphorism and in another one
tarkāpratiṣṭhānadapi⁴⁸

is of profound significance. It must first clearly be laid down whether philosophical speculation is based purely on reasoning or on any other source of knowledge, as for instance, śabda as in the present case. If it is the former, then it has to

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⁴⁷. B.S., II.i.27
⁴⁸. ibid., i.11
be carried on to its fullest extent, without any concern for contradiction with any other pramāṇa, in which case it could be seen that it will land us nowhere. If on the other hand, any other pramāṇa is accepted as the basis, then it means at once that a compromise is made with reasoning. In that case it should not be stressed too much that the other pramāṇa which professedly concerns itself with trans-empirical things should conform to our mode of reasoning. It should rather be that reasoning should conform and adapt itself to the other pramāṇa. And it is observed in this vein by Manu also as

ārṣam dharmopadeśaṁ ca vedāśāstra
avirodhinā
yastarkeṇānusandhatte sa dahrmaṁ veda
netarḥ

In other words, there is no denying of the fact that philosophical thought, whatever its source of knowledge is, should be necessarily corroborated by reasoning. But it should be utilised only to that extent so as to build a satisfactory system without any internal contradictions. And it is not proper to accept a part from some other means of knowledge and then employ exclusive reasoning to point out contradictions. In other words what is trans-logical need not be illogical.

49. M.S., XII.106.
4.5.5.3 CAN THERE BE A PURPOSE FOR BRAHMAN CREATING THE WORLD?

The third objection raised concerns with whether Brahman is motivated by some purpose in the creation of the world or not. It cannot be said that there is no purpose for creation, for purposeless action cannot be attributed to any meaningful being. But in the case of Brahman it cannot also be said that It is motivated by some purpose. This is because the purpose should be either for Its own self or for some others (the jīva-s). The former alternative is not possible because Brahman is said to be one which has no unfulfilled desires; It is avāptasamastakāma.

And it cannot be for the purpose of the jīva-s also. This is because the world is full of miseries and no compassionate being will create a world consisting of misery for the purpose of others. If at all it is for others’ purpose, it should have been created as a pleasurable world, free from misery.

The reply, however, is that creation is the sport of Brahman. In the case of those like princes, who have no desire that is yet to be fulfilled, it is seen that they do indulge in sportive activities for which there is no apparent purpose other than enjoying the pleasure of playing. Similarly creation, etc., are the mere sportful activities of Brahman. But yet it is carried out with due regard for moral justice.

That is, though creation is a mere sportful activity for Brahman, it is not done in a capricious manner. The world is created in such a way that the jīva-s could perform deeds and reap their fruits.
Hence Brahman creates the world only according to the merits and demerits of jīva-s. Hence the miseries of the world are only the fruits of the past deeds of jīva-s, because Brahman creates the world only as guided by their karma-s. Hence one cannot express an unfavourable judgement that Brahman has positive pleasure in creating the world with misery, as the latter is only the result of the actions of the soul.

Śrī Maṇvālamāmuni, however suggests in his gloss on the Tattvārthasaṃgraha of Śrī Pillailokācārya that release of the souls from bondage also is a purpose of creation. But līla or sport is suggested only because, that is more predominant. It is like this: Brahman, being omnipotent could simply liberate all the souls by Its mere will. Still Brahman creates the world and expects the souls to attain liberation in the way shown in the śāstra-s, only because of Its desire for the sport. It is because of this that creation is suggested as a mere sport, though it does have the purpose of releasing the souls also. In the language of Dr. Radhakrishnan, 'samsāra is a succession of spiritual opportunities'.

4.6 IS THE WORLD A MERE ILLUSION?

From the foregoing discussion, it emerges that the world according to Rāmānuja is not a mere illusion but a reality in itself.

But the Advaitin has advanced several arguments to show that the world is only an

50. Tattvārthasaṃgraha-Īśvaraparicchedā, sūtra-21, p.144.
illusory appearance in Brahman and not a reality. According to him it is the product of avidyā or māyā, which is not determinable either as sat or as asat. It could be removed through right knowledge, which again confirms the view that it is only illusory. What is opposed to knowledge could only be absence of knowledge or illusion and not some real object.

According to Rāmānuja, however, the world could not be proved to be illusory. He points out several defects in the arguments of the Advaitin and proves that they cannot prove the illusoriness of the world.

The Advaitin has argued that the process of of creation set forth in the Upaniṣad-s is not uniform which shows that Upaniṣad-s do not really favour creation itself. This is because everything, excepting Brahman is illusory\(^{51}\).

But according to Rāmānuja, there is no discrepancy at all. It is true that the Taittarīya declares the creation of ākāśa first, whereas the Chāndogya declares the creation of tejas first, leaving off the creation of ākāśa and vāyu. But that is not a discrepancy. The Chāndogya starts with the creation of the mūrtadravya, namely, tejas which has a material shape, while the Taittarīya from amūrtadravya, namely, ākāśa which does not have any material shape. The omission of the creation of ākāśa in the Chāndogya text could thus be accounted for. And in the Chāndogya itself it is declared that it is sat that is the cause of all entities, which does not leave off ākāśa. And

\(^{51}\) *infra.* pp. 152-154
the promissory statement in the Chāndogya itself - *ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* presupposes the fact that ākāśa too is created from Brahman.

Moreover, it can be said that there is discrepancy only if the order itself is changed in one particular Upaniṣad. That is, if it is declared that *tejas* is created and then *akasa* is created from that, then it can be said to be a clear discrepancy. But in the instance pointed out, the order of creation is very much maintained and there is mere omission of one or two entities, which cannot be said to be a discrepancy at all.

Thus we see that there is no discrepancy and so the argument that the order of creation mentioned in different Upaniṣad-s is not uniform, cannot prove that creation is only illusory.

Another argument advanced is that even dream objects, which are illusory, are stated to be created. Hence, just merely because the Upaniṣad-s state the world to be created, it cannot be held to be real\(^52\).

Rāmānuja points out here that the dream objects themselves are not illusory. He argues that the fact of their being declared as created by Brahman, is itself an adequate proof of their reality. The difference between the views of the Advaitin and Rāmānuja lies in this: the Advaitin presupposes the illusoriness of the objects of dream and argues that reference to the creation of the latter in Upaniṣad-s is not a valid evidence for the reality of the created objects. But Rāmānuja

\(^{52}\) *Loc.cit*
takes the statement of ‘creation’ as a valid evidence to show the reality of the dream objects.

The Advaitin, however, contends that the author of the Brahmasūtra-s has termed the objects of dream as māyā in the aphorism

\[ māyāmātram tu kārtsnyena anabhivyakta \]
\[ svarūpatvāt^{53} \]

and hence they are only illusory.

Rāmānuja observes that it is true that the author of the Brahmasūtra-s refers to the dream objects as māyāmātram, but it does not mean them to be illusory. It is because the term māyā does not convey the sense of illusoriness. An analysis of the sandhyādhikaraṇa where the term māyā is used in respect of dream objects and also the usage of the term māyā found elsewhere shows that the term does not signify illusoriness. This we shall now discuss in some detail.

4.6.1 ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM MĀYĀ: THE SANDHYĀDHIKARANĀ

This adhikaraṇa occurs in the second pāda of the third adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra-s. The adhikaraṇa discusses the Brhadāraṇyaka passage wherein dream objects are said to be created. The passage under discussion is:

\[ na tatra rathāḥ na rathayogāḥ na panthāno bhavanti. atha rathān rathayogān pathah srjate. na tatra ānandā mudah pramudo bhavanti, atha ānandān mudah pramudah srjate..... sa hi kartā^{54} \]

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53. B.S., III.ii.3.
54. Br.Up., VI. iii.10
Here the question arises, whether the soul is to be viewed as the creator, or God.

The purvapakṣin holds that it is the soul, since it that which is referred to in the passage as sa hi karta. The passage speaks about creation of the objects of the dream-world and it is that which is referred to here.

The siddhāntin, however holds that it is only God who creates the dream objects, and that is declared in the aphorism -

\[ \text{māyāmatrām tu kārtsnyena anabhivyakta svarūptvāt} \]

(dream objects are created by God, because of their wondrous nature; and the wonder lies in the fact of their not being open to be experienced by all)

Here the author of the aphorism declares the objects of dream as māyāmatra which means that they are wondrous - āścaryarūpa. It is precisely on this ground they are stated to be created by God.

And the wonder lies in the fact that they have been so created that their enjoyment is confined to the particular time of dreaming and is exclusive to the particular soul who dreams and not to others - kārtsnyena anabhivyakta-svarūptvāt. Thus the term māyāmatra is cited as the reason to prove that the dream-world is a creation of God. Hence the term māyā is used here only in the sense of a “wondrous power” - āścaryakara and not in the sense of illusoriness. Just like the world experienced during waking state is “wondrous” and
hence is the creation of God, so also, the dream-world is surpassing and hence it must be a creation of God. Infact the Upaniṣadic passage na tatra rathāh, etc., itself is meant to elucidate the wondrous nature. It first states that there are no chariots, or horses or the roads and then observes, “He creates all these”. Here it is obvious that the chariots, etc., are not there at the time of dreaming and hence it need not be stated by the passage. Still, it has been stated in order to convey something else. Actually, the order of the passages has to be changed in order to arrive at its exact significance. The purport is that “all objects of dream like chariot etc., are created and yet they are not there”. And that precisely constitutes the wonder about dreams. They have been created and yet they are not there, means that they do not exist in such a way as to be enjoyed by one and all and even by the person who dreams, after waking up.

And this is the significance of the term māyā used by the author of the sūtra-s. The latter then offers the explanation by stating kārtsnyena anabhivyakta-svarūpatvāt.

Further it could be seen clearly that the Advaitin’s interpretation of the adhikaraṇa could not be justified. According to Śaṅkara, this adhikaraṇa discusses whether the creations during the dream-world are real like the waking state or just illusory.

kim prabodha iva svapne'pi pāramārthikī
sṛṣṭīḥ āhosvinmāyāmayītī

55. B.S.S.B., III.ii.1.
And he concludes that they are only illusory (māyā) and not real, like the objects of the waking state.

But the problem lies in the fact that even the world experienced during the waking state is also māyā, according to Advaita and hence there can be no distinction between the two. It may, however, be contended that the dream-objects are intended to be proved as prātibhāsīka, which are different from the empirically real (vyāvahārika) world during the waking state. This will be possible only if the term māyā has the sense of prātibhāsīka which is not accepted by the Advaitin too. If that is accepted, there will be no distinction between the waking and dream states.

Further more, the term māyā is found to be used only in the sense of “wondrous power” or knowledge in both the vedic and the classical literature and not in the sense of illusoriness or anirvacaniyatva.

For instance in the mantra-s of the Rgveda, the term māyā is interpreted as “knowledge” or “power”. The word māyā in the passage

astabhānmāyāyā ṛyāmavastraśah

Śayana interprets as prājñāyā upāyena iti.

Again while interpreting the mantra -
daśānāmindro māyayā

57. Rgveda, IV. xvii.5.
Sāyana gives the meaning of the expression māyayā, as svakīyayā śaktīyā.

And Śaṅkara himself, while commenting on the passage indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate⁵⁹, initially interprets the term māyābhiḥ as prajñābhiḥ.

The Nirukta again records the meaning of the term māyā as knowledge - māyā vayunam abhikhyā⁶⁰.

The Rāmāyana while describing the beauty of Sītā uses the term māyā and it is in the sense of “wondrous power”.

janakasya kule jātā devamāyeyeva nirmitā⁶¹.

(Born in the family of Janaka, she (Sītā) seems as though created out of the wondrous power of God),

In the Viṣṇupurāṇa too, it is used in an identical sense

tenamāyāsahasram tacchambarasyāśugāminā

bālasya rakṣtā deham ekaikaśyena sūditam⁶².

(The innumerable powers directed by Śambara against Prahlāda, were shattered into several pieces by the swift-moving disc - Sudarśana employed to keep Prahlada secure from the attack.)

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58. ibid., IV.xxx.21
59. Br.Up., IV.v.19
61. Rāmāyana, Bāla Kāṇḍa, I.16
62. V.P. I.xix.20
THE NATURE OF THE WORLD

In these instances it is evident that the term māyā cannot have the sense of illusoriness.

Thus the word is often-times used only in the sense of "knowledge" or "wondrous power" and not in the sense of illusoriness. That being the case, the world cannot be termed to be illusory on the basis of the usage of the term māyā in certain scriptural passages.

To sum up the whole discussion: the world is real; dream objects too are real. They are referred to by the term - māyā and the significance of the term is only wondrous power. The world, therefore, is not an indeterminable entity as the Advaitin thinks. It is the body of Brahman. In the state of dissolution it remains in a latent form, namely, prakṛti in Brahman and at the time of creation it gets itself transformed in the form of the world. The jīva too is the body of Brahman. At the time of creation it comes to be associated with a specific body. The ghaṭaka-śruti-s declare that the world and the jīva-s constitute the body of Brahman and the latter is the self of the two. This is a stronger ground on the basis of which Rāmānuja concludes that the world being the body of Brahman is real.
CHAPTER V

THE NATURE AND MEANS
OF LIBERATION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of philosophical enquiry as far as the Indian tradition is concerned, is to achieve the highest goal of human endeavour, namely mokṣa, which is liberation from the trammels of saṃsara. According to some schools, like the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika etc., mokṣa constitutes just the cessation of all sufferings. The Upaniṣad-s, however, speak about mokṣa, as a state which is characterized by the enjoyment of positive bliss. But within the Upaniṣadic tradition, there are differences of opinion regarding what exactly constitutes mokṣa and also the means of attaining it.

According to Śaṅkara, mokṣa constitutes the removal of the illusory avidyā and the soul remaining in its natural state as Brahman. And the means to attain this, is right knowledge, that arises from the mahāvākya-s of the Upaniṣad-s.
Rāmānuja, however, is of the opinion that scriptures do not favour an idealistic view, which holds the world to be an illusory appearance, and the soul to be non-different from Brahman. On the other hand, according to him, scriptures speak of Brahman as radically different from the soul. And his view has already been discussed in detail, while discussing the Nature of Reality. Accordingly mokṣa in his view is, the soul becoming free from the influence of karma-s, regaining its Godly qualities, which were remaining concealed due to karma-s, and enjoying supreme bliss in the company of God after attaining His world.

And the means of attaining the same is upāsanā or meditation, carried on with a sense of loving devotion to God, who finally bestows the fruit of mokṣa, being pleased with the aspirant. In this chapter, we shall deal with the nature and means of liberation according to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.
5.2 ŚAṆKARA’S VIEW

5.2.1 THE NATURE OF LIBERATION

Liberation, according to Śaṅkara consists in the soul shedding all its false notions and remaining in its natural state as Brahman. The false notions are kartrtva, bhokrtva and paramātrtva, by being associated with which, the soul suffers bondage, as it were. And to get liberated is to get freed from these factors.

It can be ascertained from the Upaniṣad-s that the above is the concept of liberation. The Upaniṣad-s declare liberation as the soul remaining as Brahman itself. They further state that it is not something to be attained at a different place and time, but is one that is attained here and now.

It is obvious that if two entities are totally different, one cannot become the other. Hence the declaration ‘brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’ cannot be taken to mean that the soul becomes Brahman. When read along with passages such as tattvamasi, ayamātma brahma and the like which state that the ‘soul is Brahman’, the above passage also means that that the ‘soul remains as Brahman’. And the declarations that ‘the soul attains liberation here itself’ emphasises the above fact.

Further the scriptures declare knowledge as the instrument that brings about liberation. The function of knowledge is to remove ignorance.

2. Ch. Up., VI.viii.7.

194
Thus it is clear that liberation lies in the removal of ignorance. Nothing need be performed over and above this to effectuate mokṣa. When a gem has lost its glitter due to the gathering of dust, it is sufficient to cleanse it by removing the dust. It would then shine forth in its natural state, of its own accord. In the same way when ignorance is removed from the soul, the latter would manifest in its own true nature as Brahma; and this is liberation.

Thus liberation is not something to be attained in a hereafter but is one which is attained here and now, since it is only becoming aware of what is already existent.

5.2.2 THE CONCEPT OF JĪVANMUKTI

As a corollary of the above position, it follows that mokṣa is something which could be effectuated immediately even when one is in this bodily existence, which is called Jīvanmukti. Since shedding of false ideas and notions is what counts, it does not matter even if the physical body continues. As far as the particular jīva is concerned, he is liberated, the moment, he has a profound inward realisation about his true nature as Brahman⁴. The Upaniṣad declares that the moment when there occurs the realisation, the knot of the heart is untied, all the lingering doubts are dispelled and all the karma-s are destroyed⁵.

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4: na brahmajīnānamātram sāṁsārikadharma
nivṛttikāraṇam; api tu sāksātkāraṇaparyantam
- Bhāmati, I.i.4.

GLEANINGS FROM THE ŚRĪBHĀṢYA

Samśāra or transmigratory existence is only the superimposition of the characteristics such as agency, enjoyership and knowership upon the soul. These are only illusory and hence are removable by knowledge. Once these are removed through knowledge, bondage comes to an end for the particular soul. Still the physical body continues by the force of the prārabdha-karma-s, which however do not have the efficacy to bind the soul any more. It is like a wheel continuing to rotate even after the force applied to it has been stopped. It will continue for some time and come to a natural halt when the power of the force ceases. So also, in the case of an enlightened being, he is practically liberated (mukta) in as much as, he has shed the false notion of bodily existence itself and as such he cannot be said to be embodied. So he is called a jīvanmukta.

6. na avagata brahmātmabhāvasya yathāpūrvvam saśrīrātvam śakyam kalpayaśītvā, vedapramaṇajanita brahmātmabhāva-virodhāt, śarīre patite asārīrātvam syāt na jīvata iti cenna, saśrīrātvasya mithyājñānanimittavāt. nahi ātmanah śaśrīrātmābhimaṇalaksanam mithyājñānam muktva anyathā saśrīrātvam śakyam kalpayitum. nityam asārīrātvam akarmanimittavāt ityavocāma.

- B.S.S.B., I.i.4.

yadi vāstavam saśrīrātvam bhavet na jīvatastannivarteta, mithyājñānanimittam tu tat. tacco utpanna tattvajñānena jīvatapi śakyam nivartayitum.

- Bhāmati I.i.4.
5.2.3 MEANS OF LIBERATION

5.2.3.1 KNOWLEDGE - THE SOLE MEANS TO LIBERATION

According to the Mīmāṃsā school, mokṣa is attained through the performance of karma-s ordained in the scriptures. But according to Advaita, though performance of śāstric karma-s and practice of upāsanā may help one to purify one's mind, it is only knowledge that ultimately removes avidyā and thus becomes the direct means. According to some philosophers like Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, a union of karma and jñāna constitutes the means of liberation. But Advaita altogether repudiates the theory on several grounds.

Karma according to Advaita, is inherently incapable of removing ignorance, since it involves difference in its very nature and as such it is opposed to the liberating knowledge.

The liberating knowledge is not the mere textual knowledge but one which culminates in a direct realisation of one's non-difference with Brahman. But this could not be acheived, so long as the impressions of difference are not completely destroyed. Performance of karma, however, works just against this end, as it generates more and more impressions of difference. Due to this direct conflict there cannot be any association between jñāna and karma.

Again the fruits of karma-s are declared to be non-eternal whereas that of jñāna is said to be eternal. This also shows that there can be no association between the two.
Further the accessories prescribed for the liberating knowledge also preclude any possible association between jñāna and karma. The accessories are śama, dama, etc. All these involve restraint and control of senses, which will be totally lost if one performs karma-s.

The scriptures also proclaim knowledge as the sole means.

\[\text{tamevan vidvān amṛta iha bhavati; nānyah panthā ayanāya vidyate}^7\].

Hence jñāna is exclusively the means and not jñāna in association the karma.

Due to similar considerations, even dhyāna or upāsanā also cannot be said to be a means along with jñāna. The declaration that jñāna alone is the means precludes not only karma but also upāsanā as the means.

Further the passage brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati\(^8\) expresses the immediacy of the occurrence of liberation as soon as there arises the right knowledge. It thus does not allow any intervening factor between the two. The above declaration is similar to the statement, 'He stands and sings' (tiṣṭhan gāyati), wherein there is no act in-between the two acts of standing and signing. If upāsanā were to be the means, there should first be knowledge, then there should be the practice of upsanā, based on it, which will ultimately lead to the fruit of liberation. But this, however, cannot be the case since jñāna alone has been declared to be the direct means.

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7. Tai. Ār., III.xii.17.
Śaṅkara draws a clear line of distinction between jñāna and upāsanā, although both are only mental functions. That is, upāsanā is a form of mental activity which could be done or not done, or done in different ways, depending upon the will of the person who does it. Hence it is called puruṣatantra. In the case of knowledge, however, the case is entirely different. Its rise is not under the control of a person, nor is it a mental activity.

When the sense-organ is functional, the mind is alert and when all other conditions for the rise of knowledge are fully satisfied, it shall arise irrespective of whether one wishes to have it or not; and this also cannot be had in a distorted fashion at one’s will. It is therefore called vastutantra. Thus, though jñāna and upāsanā are mental functions, yet the two are markedly different.9

Hence if upāsanā were admitted to be the direct means of liberation, it will tantamount to relegating the texts that speak of knowledge as the direct means of liberation, to a secondary position, which is not warranted. Hence knowledge is the exclusive means of liberation.

The above position, however, does not mean that there is no place for karma and upāsanā in the scheme of practical discipline in Advaita. They are very much needed as preliminaries to prepare the mind of the aspirant.

According to Advaita, it is the direct realization of the identity between the soul and Brahman, which arises from the mahāvākha-s like tattvamasi

9. B.S.S.B., I.i.4.
etc., that removes bondage. The said knowledge does not arise by a mere textual reading. This is because, bondage is beginningless, and the impressions of difference which are innumerable, remain deeply ingrained in every soul. Hence, till all the impressions of duality are wiped off, the aspirant’s mind will not be in a position to receive that the instruction of non-duality between the soul and Brahman is valid.

*Karma* and *upāsanā* are thus ordained in the scriptures as factors conducive to achieve this end. *Karma*-s which are performed without any attachment for their fruits, destory sins and thus bring about purity of mind. After that, the performance of meditation upon the non-difference between the soul and Brahman along with the practice of *śama*, *dama* etc., destroys the impressions of duality, at which stage the mind will be in a state, eligible to take the instruction of the final truth as valid. The process may take even several births. But once the purity of mind is achieved and the seeds of duality are annihilated, the instruction of the non-difference between the soul and Brahman, from a qualified *guru*, through the *mahāvākyas*, removes at once, the veil of *avidyā*, thus giving rise to an inner realization of one’s true nature as Brahman, which is liberation\(^\text{10}\).

Hence it is *jñāna* that is the direct means of liberation. But *karma* also serves as the remote means, and *upāsanā* as the proximate means in achieving this end\(^\text{11}\). Hence, the *Advaita* view that *jñāna* is the sole means to liberation does not mean

\(^{10}\) *Ś.B.*, I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), p.47.

\(^{11}\) *B.S.S.B.*, III.vi. 27.
that there is absolutely no scope for *karma* and *upasana*. They are also needed initially, in order to prepare the mind, by purifying it and ridding it completely off the *vāsana*-s of difference. Still they themselves are not efficacious in removing *avidyā*; and, it is ultimately knowledge that removes it. It is with this view that *jñāna* alone is said to be the direct means of liberation.

In view of the above position, there is no room for the objection that, knowledge is not seen to effectuate liberation in ordinary parlance and that bondage is seen to continue as before, even after the rise of knowledge. As has been pointed out, *jñāna* does not stand here for the mere understanding of the meaning of textual passages but means an inner realization. That is why, unless there occurs the said realization, one cannot be said to have had an understanding of the text also, clarifies Śaṅkara.

\[ \text{nanu śrutabhrahmano'pi yathāpūrvam sāṁśāritva -darśanat na rajjusvārūpakathāna vārat arthavatvam ityuktam. atrocyate na avagatabrahmātma-bhāvyasya yathāpūrvam sāṁśāritvam sākyam darśayitum vedapramāṇajanita brahmātma-bhāvavirodhāt}^{12} \]

Hence the continuance of bondage even after the knowledge of non-difference between the soul and Brahman, only means that there has never arisen knowledge at all.

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12. *ibid.*, I.i.4.
GLEANINGS FROM THE ŚRĪBHĀṢYA

The above objection can be met in another way also. For one who sees the moon as two moons due to a defect in the eye, the instruction by a reliable person that there is actually only one moon, does produce the knowledge that there is really only one moon. Nevertheless, there still continues the knowledge of two moons due to some defect. So also the continuance of bondage even after the rise of knowledge can be accounted for, on the basis of the continuance of traces of bheda vāsana-s, which have not been destroyed completely. Still, they do not have the efficacy to bind the person as the root-cause, namely avidyā, has been destroyed, through knowledge. It is thus: a burnt cloth continues to appear in the same folded condition, as it was kept before burning, but yet it cannot be adapted to practical needs of life, afterwards. So also, the bheda vāsana-s continue even after the destruction, like a burnt cloth; it is called badhitānuvṛtti. But they do not have the potency to bind the soul any more.

5.2.3.2. THE ROLE OF KARMA

According to Advaita, performance of karma-s plays a significant role in achieving the fruits of liberation. Though knowledge is accepted to be the direct means of liberation, karma plays a predominant role as a remote means to knowledge.

An earnest performance of karma, without any attachment towards its fruits produces unseen merit, which cleanses one’s mind. When the mind is thus purified, there arises a desire to know Brahman, which is known as vividisā.
The text,

tametam vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇaṁ
vividīṣanti yajñena...\textsuperscript{13}

states that karma-s are needed only for generating the desire to know. The term vividīṣanti signifies that study of one’s veda, etc., serve as the means for generating the desire to know and not for knowledge itself, and much less for the final fruit - liberation.

Once the desire for the knowledge of Brahman has arisen, the aspirant seeks a qualified guru who is himself a realized soul, and takes instructions from him in the form that the Upaniṣadic texts convey only the non-difference between the soul and Brahman. This is called śravaṇa. The next stage is manana. In this stage, the aspirant convinces within himself that the truth of the Upaniṣad-s that was instructed to him could not be stultified by counter-arguments.

When there has arisen a firm conviction in the aspirant that there does not exist any difference in reality, he gets freed from the obligation to perform karma-s any more. Thus the function of karma comes to an end, with bringing about the purity of mind through destroying sins and generating the desire for Brahman-knowledge, after giving rise to the conviction that difference is only illusory.

At this stage 'sama, dama, etc., which are of the form of control of senses, become the proximate means for attaining Brahman-realization.

\textsuperscript{13} Br. Up., VI.iv.22.
The next major impediment for inward realization of Brahman is only the bhedavāsana-s which have to be destroyed totally. And this is achieved through upāsanā, which is referred to as nididhyāsana. A constant practice of meditation on the identity between the soul and Brahman, removes the impressions of difference. Hence nididhyāsana should be pursued along with all proximate means - šama, dama, uparati, titikṣā, samādhāna and śraddha, until all the bhedavāsana-s are removed.

At this stage, when the mahāvākyas are contemplated, there arises the immediate realization of Brahman-Ātman, which at once annihilates avidyā. Thus it is ultimately knowledge (arising from the mahāvākyas) that serves as the direct means of liberation.14

In sum, according to Advaita, knowledge is the exclusive means of liberation. Karma and upāsanā, however, serve as aids in preparing the ground for the rise of this knowledge.

5.3 RĀMĀNUJA’S VIEW

5.3.1 THE NATURE OF LIBERATION

According to Rāmānuja, liberation consists in the soul getting freed from the influence of karma-s, in regaining the qualities that are natural to it - the qualities that remained concealed due to karma-s, and its attaining supreme bliss by enjoying the sublime qualities of God and the enchanting beauty of His form.

Bondage, according to Rāmānuja, constitutes the soul undergoing suffering due to its past \textit{karma}-s. Due to its \textit{karma}-s which are in the form of merits and demerits, the soul attains several bodies and thus several names and forms, and this is \textit{samsāra}.

\textit{punyāpuṇyaṁyanibandhana acitsaṁsargaprayukta nānārupabhāktvameva hi samsāraḥ}^{15}

Thus \textit{karma}-s give rise to suffering by imprisoning the soul in insentient matter, due to which the true nature of the soul is concealed^{16}. Hence \textit{mokṣa}, consists in getting released from the shackles of \textit{karma}-s. And removal of \textit{karma}-s coincides with the manifestation of all the divine qualities, which remain concealed due to the power of \textit{karma}-s, while it is in bondge. Once it is liberated, it attains the abode of God - Lord Nārāyana, and sheds even its subtle body and gets purified. Then it shines in its natural radiance with all the divine qualities manifested. At that time, its knowledge, which remained contracted all the time, expands to the maximum and thus the soul becomes literally all-pervasive, through its \textit{dharma-bhūtajñana}.

The soul in its natural state is free from sin (\textit{apahatapāpmā}), old-age (\textit{vijaraḥ}), death (\textit{vimṛtyuḥ}), grief (\textit{viśokaḥ}), hunger (\textit{vijighatsaḥ}) and thirst (\textit{apipāsaḥ}).

The \textit{Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa} states: A gem shines froth in its natural light when the dust covering it is removed; the light is not newly

\begin{footnotes}
15. \textit{ibid.}, II.iii.2.
16. \textit{ibid.}, III.ii.5.
\end{footnotes}
created therein. The act of digging of a well does not create water anew, but only brings out what already exists there. In the same way, the qualities such as (unlimited) consciousness, etc., which are innate to the soul, shine forth when the *karma*-s are removed.

\[ \text{yathā na kriyate jyotṣṇā ā malaprakṣālanānmaṅgeḥ} \]
\[ \text{doṣa prahāṇānna jñānam ātmanaḥ kriyate tathā.} \]
\[ \text{yathodapāna karṇāt kriyate na jalāmbaram} \]
\[ \text{sadeva nīyate vyaktim asataḥ sambhavah kutah} \]
\[ \text{tathā heyauguṇadhvamsād avabodhādayo guṇāḥ} \]
\[ \text{prakāśyante na janyante nitya evātmano hi te}^{17} \]

Thus the soul gets liberated from the influence of *karma*-s, when the latter are removed. Thereby, it regains its original nature. And the expression *svarāṭ* used with reference to a liberated soul becomes significant, as the latter manifests in its pristine nature.

Again the soul, by itself is of a blissful nature and its essence is identical with that of God, the only difference being that it is atomic in size, while that of God, is infinite. It is as pure as that of God^{18}.

Hence at the state of liberation, the soul enjoys its own self too, but enjoys it only in conjunction with God as *aham brahmaāsmi*. It thus enjoys not only the splendour of God but also of its own self, of course with the awareness that it is only a mode of God and never independent from Him^{19}.

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17. Quoted in Š.B., IV.iv.3.
18. Š.B., IV.iv.4.
19. Loc. cit
THE NATURE AND MEANS OF LIBERATION

The soul again, is at liberty to take one or several bodies or not to take any body at all, while enjoying the bliss of liberation. If it takes one, it does so by its mere will. And the bodies are not made of empirical elements, but of extra-empirical ones, that characterize the abode of God (called Vaikunṭha). Or if it does not take a body of its own, it may choose to take one, provided by God and enjoy the pleasures in that world.\(^{20}\)

It may be said that the view that the released soul takes a body is wrong because, to be in bodily existence innately leads to misery, and scriptures declare that, one ceases to be afflicted by pleasure and pain, only when one is dissociated from the body.

\[
na \ ha \ vai \ saśarīrasya \ satah \ priyāpriyayoh \ apahatirasti \ aśarīram \ vā \ va \ santam \ na \ priyāpriye \ sprśatah,\(^{21}\)
\]

Rāmānuja, however, clarifies that the cause of misery is not the mere association with a body, but association with a body, that is caused due to karma-s. In the case of a liberated soul it takes a single body or several bodies by its own resolve, and hence they are not caused by any karma. Further, it has perfect liberty to give them up at will. Hence, the body is not a source of misery. On the other hand, it is only a source of immense pleasure. And the Upaniṣad itself declares that the soul takes several bodies at will.

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21. Ch. Up., VIII.xii.1
sa ekadhā bhavati tridhā bhavati pañcadhā saptadhā...

Now there may arise the doubt as to how the soul, which is atomic in size, could take several bodies simultaneously. Rāmānuja clarifies that it is through the dharmabhūtajñāna that the soul takes several bodies. It is similar to the light of the sun, or of a lamp, pervading places far away from them, and illuminating them. That is, Rāmānuja is of the view that the liberated soul, out of its own will, takes many bodies: and its attributive consciousness of dharmabhūtajñāna having expanded to the maximum pervades the other bodies too. In the case of the bound soul, however, its dharmabhūtajñāna is concealed by karma-s, and so it could pervade only its own body, and not other bodies. It has already been observed that the knowledge of the soul becomes infinite at the state of liberation, which is stated by the Śvetāśvatara passage:

vālāgraśataḥbhūgasya satadhā kalpitasya ca bhago jīvaḥ sa vijñeyah sa cānanyāya kalpate

Thus according to Rāmānuja, the liberated soul, in effect, becomes almost similar to God Himself, attaining all His divine qualities such as infinite knowledge and bliss, freedom from karma, and the consequent freedom from imperfections. It also remains at the abode of God having resolves and desires that never go unfulfilled. Though the soul

22. ibid., VII.xxvi.2.
23. Ś. B., IV.iv.15
24. Śvet. Up., V.9
thus becomes God-like in almost all aspects, it never attains the ability of controlling the entire universe, which includes the latter's creation, sustenance and destruction (jagadvyāpāra)\textsuperscript{25}.

These features constitute, according to the scriptures, the specific characteristic of God, and this characteristic can never be attained by any finite soul.

From the above it would be clear that God is the Ultimate Master of the Universe which means that even at the state of liberation, the soul remains under His control. Hence liberation, according to Rāmānuja, means only liberation from the influence of karma and it does not mean that the soul becomes free from the control of God also. This accordingly to Sudarśana Śūri is the significance of the aphorism.

\textit{ata eva ca ananyādhipatiḥ}\textsuperscript{26}

Here the author of the sūtra-s, while referring to the liberated soul, states that the soul is no more subject to the injunctive and prohibitive ordinations of the śāstra-s, since it comes to be endowed with a will that never fails (satyasāṅkalpaḥ).

And this again is because the soul is no more under the control of karma-s which were responsible for the concealment of the divine qualities, such as satya-saṅkalpatva and the like in it.

The soul at the state of liberation is under the control of God alone and not karma-s, unlike in

\textsuperscript{25} B.S., IV.iv.17.  
\textsuperscript{26} ibid., IV.iv.9.
the state of bondage, when it is under the control of \textit{karma} also. This Bādarāyaṇa emphasizes by using the expression, \textit{ananyādhīpatiḥ} with reference to the liberated soul. This expression means that the soul has none other than God, as its controller at the state of liberation. He has not used the expression, \textit{anādhipatiḥ}, which would mean, that it has no controller whatsoever. It comes to this that the soul at the state of liberation remains by being controlled by God alone, and not by any other factor, since it is the very nature of the soul to be always under the control of God, as stated by Sudarśana Sūri.

\textit{atra anādhipatiriṇi noktam. kintu ananyādhipatiḥ iti. atra ayam abhiprāyah: svabhāvikaseṣināḥ paramapurūṣād anyah nādhipatiḥ muktasyeti. anyathā hi anādhipatiriṇi etāvatā’lam}\textsuperscript{27}

It must, however, be noted that, to be under the control of God, does not come in the way of the freedom of the soul, which is perfectly maintained.

Thus, the soul, according to Rāmānuja, is so constituted that, it is always under the control of God. This is also evidenced by the passages of the \textit{upaniṣad}-s that declare that God is the controller of the soul:

\textit{yasya ātmā śarīram ...yamātmānānamantaro yamayati}\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{antah praviṣṭah śāsta janānām sarvātmā \textsuperscript{29}, etc.}

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ś.P. on Ś.B., IV.iv.9.}
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Br. Up., V.vii.26}
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Tai. Ār., III.xi.3.}
THE NATURE AND MEANS OF LIBERATION

It may be noted here that the passages declare that the soul is under the control of God, irrespective of whether it is in bondage or liberation. Again in the section entitled jagadvyāpara-varjādhiḥkarana, it is stated that the liberated soul does not have the authority to carry out the functions of the creation of the world of sentient and insentient beings, and having absolute control over its existence and activity.

And this implies that even the liberated soul is under the control of God. Hence liberation constitutes only liberation from the forces of karma and not from the control of God.

There may now arise the following objection: according to Rāmānuja the soul is always under the control of God and is absolutely dependent upon Him, even at the state of liberation. But this view would go against the very concept of liberation. It is because, liberation means freedom from all subjugations. And as this end is not achieved in the state of liberation, the latter will not be sought after by anybody. It has been declared by Manu that dependence involves sorrow while independence, happiness.

Rāmānuja rejects this objection in his Vedārtha-saṅgrahāḥ, by clarifying the essential natures of the soul and God. The soul, remains adjectival to God and is always subservient to Him. Divested of this association, the soul has no existence; and such a state is not possible at all. The soul, therefore, cannot be viewed as independent of God, who is its absolute Master,

30. Vedārtha-saṅgrahāḥ, pp 347-353

211
to whom it owes everything. And *samsāra* or bondage is a consequence of the soul losing sight of this fact, and thereby becoming a slave to the insentient matter. A non-recognition of the fact that God is the inner self of the soul, results in the slavery towards materialistic ends, which in turn binds the soul, in *samsāra*, due to which arise the consequent sufferings. And to become enlightened, is to realise one’s true nature as absolutely dependent (*śeṣa*) upon God. To know oneself therefore means, to know oneself as an adjectival to God, or as a mode of God.

The object of One’s pursuit (*puruṣārtha*) has specific relation to the nature of the soul in bondage. The soul in bondage, always identifies itself with the body in which it abides, and seeks things appropriate to the body with which it is associated. But the fact remains that the soul has lost sight of its true nature of being knowledge, and being subservient to God, and so, it does not seek that which should be sought after, namely, service to God.

By pursuing service to God, the soul derives supreme delight and satisfaction of doing what one should do. Being subordinate to, and a *prākāra* of God, the soul is irresistibility attracted toward God because of His transcendental qualities, and worships Him with a loving devotion.

Service extended to God, unlike the one extended to ordinary beings does not give forth sorrow or grief. On the other hand, God gratified by the loving devotion of the soul grants the latter the divine vision to perceive His true form.
The soul then loses itself in rapturous joy beyond description and feels irresistible urge to serve at His feet which is a fruit in itself (ananyaprayojana). The experience of God, unlike mundane pleasures is unlimited and everlasting. It brings at once to the soul immense joy, which is pure and unalloyed. It is of the most intense form and absolute and includes within itself all sorts of other pleasures. To have it, is to get dissolved into divine bliss. As a result the soul gets prompted naturally, to serve at God's feet, which again is a source of immense pleasure, since it is a worthy service (prāptasevā).

To sum up: liberation according to Rāmānuja consists in the removal of karma, the manifestation of the divine qualities of the soul and the blissful vision of God, which culminates in the soul losing itself in service of God, which is the summum bonum.

5.3.2 MEANS OF LIBERATION

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja, the final import of the Upaniṣad-s is God, who is the final goal of every individual soul. And the means to attain Him is also He Himself. Rāmānuja thus lays great emphasis on the all-important position of God.

Liberation, thus is ultimately to be attained only through the grace of God and not through any human effort, however prodigious it may be. This, however, does not mean that human effort is to be dispensed with altogether. It is required not as a means to liberation, but as a condition
to earn the grace of God. It is in this sense that human efforts like performance of karma, meditation, etc., are said to be the means, though in the ultimate analysis, God's grace alone is the means. A basic principle to which all philosophers of the Vedāntic tradition subscribe to, is that, that which is insentient is incapable to do or undo things by itself. It is only a sentient principle that could act or refrain from acting.

The Mīmāṁsaka-s consider that fruits of karma-s are brought about by an unseen principle called apūrva\(^\text{31}\), which acts as an intermediary between the karma and its fruits. They thus consider God as a redundant principle. The reason why they hold that it is apūrva that brings about the desired fruit and not the karma-s themselves directly is that, karma-s are momentary and not enduring. And there is a long interval between the actual performance of karma at a given point of time and attainment of the fruit of heaven at a distant future. Hence there is required an enduring principle called the apūrva which results from the performance of sacrifice.

According to the Vedaṭins, however, the view of the Mīmāṁsaka-s is wrong. The first objection against the view is that there is no proof (pramāṇa) in respect of the so-called apūrva. In fact its admission involves the defect of dispensing with God, who is declared to be the dispenser of the fruits of action and also the defect of assuming a new principle called apūrva, for which no proof can be adduced. The second objection is that even

\(^{31}\text{B.S., III.ii.39}\)
the assumed *apūrva*, being insentient is not efficacious to give rise to the fruits, by itself. Hence it must be held that it is only God, who grants the fruit\(^{32}\) and not the mere act, nor a non-existent *apūrva*.

Although God grants the fruit of liberation, He does not thrust it upon souls who do not long for it. Liberation could not be attained at the mere fall of the human body nor just by one’s wish. It requires a deep yearning and a sincere effort on the part of the soul to attain it.

The nature of liberation was outlined in the previous section. It consists in the removal of *karma*-s which are in the form of merits and demerits and attaining the divine vision of God. And in order to achieve even the former, human capabilities are too inadequate. And it is in this sense that it is held that God is the ultimate means, since human effort, however, prodigious it may be, is not capable of annihilating *karma*-s whose extent or degree cannot be determined.

Nevertheless, human effort is needed. It is needed not as a means, as observed earlier, not even just to gain divine grace, but to prepare the soul to enjoy the bliss of liberation. Just as a person affected by jaundice cannot enjoy sweet milk, so also a person who does not desire the fruit of liberation cannot enjoy it.

The first step towards liberation is a deep dissatisfaction with worldly fruits. But that should not be one, which arises out of a frustration caused by the inability to attain them, but, should be a

\(^{32}\) ibid., III.ii.37
genuine one, arisen out of a due reflection about the inherent imperfections of the worldly fruits, such as their limitedness, impermanence, involvement of pain at the time of attaining and also at the time of enjoying them, and also of the possibilities of evil effects that may ensue from them.

Men who desire worldly fruits cannot enjoy divine bliss. Indifference to worldly pleasures, which is a precondition to the path of salvation, could be achieved only when one is fully convinced about the existence of a higher pleasure and of the possibility of attaining it. One should also become aware of the defects involved in the ephemeral pleasures, to which the soul has been inclined to, for ages\textsuperscript{33}.

And it is with this view that Rāmānuja in the first quarter of the third chapter of the Brahmasūtra-s, called the vairāgyapāda, deals elaborately with the defects of the soul at every state of its existence such as waking, dreaming, deep-sleep, etc., that continue ceaselessly as long as the soul is in bondage. And in the second quarter of the same chapter entitled ubhayaliṅgpāda, he dwells upon the sublime qualities of God, in order to generate a desire to attain Him.

Thus love towards God and detachment towards the objects of the world are the essential prerequisites of an aspirant. Liberation, which consists in the experience of God in all His beauty and perfections, demands by its very nature the

\textsuperscript{33} Š.B., III.i.1
soul’s longing for it. And this longing should develop into an intense form called bhakti or dhyāna or nididhyāsana which are synonymous with meditation or ‘constant thinking’. But Rāmānuja adds that it is not just meditation, intellectual in nature, but is one suffused with love. It is called bhakti which is defined as ‘meditation with love’.

prītipūrvam anudhyānam bhaktirityabhidīyate

And bhakti or dhyāna, according to Rāmānuja is a form of knowledge. That there is distinction between perceptual knowledge and dhyāna may be admitted. But it cannot be said that the former alone is knowledge and not the latter. That is another form of knowledge. Knowledge or jñāna is a broad category which is classified into various kinds, such as perception, inference, verbal testimony, memory, meditation, reflection, etc. And one form of knowledge is essentially different form another. Yet the term jñāna is equally applicable to all, and just because there is difference between two forms of knowledge, one does not cease to be knowledge. For instance, perception is vastutantra and anumāna is puruṣatantra. That is, when all the conditions for the rise of knowledge are satisfied, there shall arise knowledge which is the characteristic of perception. And it is also true that it cannot be had in a distorted fashion according to the will of a person, and hence is vastutantra. In the case of anumāna, however, it can be had, or not had, or can be had in different ways in accordance with the will of a person, and hence is puruṣatantra. On this ground, anumāna cannot be said to be different from jñāna. So also
dhyaṇa or upāsanā is a form of jñāna. In fact it is this alone which has been enjoined as the means of release in the Upaniṣad-s and not jñāna in the form of understanding the verbal meaning of the mahāvākyā-s, as the Advaitin thinks. We shall now examine the Advaita view that the knowledge of the import of the mahāvākyā-s serves as the only means of liberation.

5.3.3. SENTENCE MEANING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE MEANS TO LIBERATION

Rāmānuja is of the view that the Upaniṣad-s no doubt declare knowledge as the sole means to liberation. But the significance of the Upaniṣadic statements must clearly be understood. A mere understanding of the import of the texts like tat tvam asi, is not intended to be the means to liberation, for it is not possible to enjoin knowledge of the import of the texts, as it is attained just by a formal reading of the texts.

It is admitted by the Advaitin that the removal of the indeterminable avidyā constitutes liberation. Avidyā has for its content, pure consciousness which is only the identity of the true nature of the soul, which is atman, and the true nature of God, which is termed Brahman. In order that avidyā may be removed, we required knowledge - a direct one, involving the identity of atman and Brahman, and such a knowledge could arise only from the mahāvākyā-s, and not from anything else.

34. ibid., I.i.1, Vol.1 (part I), p.49
35. ibid., pp.49-50
Hence the Upaniṣadic declaration that jñāna is the means implies only such knowledge and not anything else, such as upāsanā or dhyāna, since the indeterminable avidyā could be removed only by knowledge and not by meditation.

The above argument, however, is not in accordance with ordinary experience. If bondage, being a product of avidyā, were illusory and if knowledge were to be its removing factor, then it must be held that avidyā is removed in the case of those who have attained knowledge. This, however, is not noticed. Hence it must be held that bondage is real.

The Advaitin might argue that the non-removal of bondage is not because of the fact that it is not illusory, but because of the fact that knowledge had not arisen at all. This is because, knowledge that leads to liberation is the knowledge of identity which cannot arise until the latent impressions of difference (bheda-vāsanā-ś) are totally annihilated. Hence it is not proper to say that avidyā has not been removed even after the rise of knowledge, for being impeded by bheda-vāsanā-ś, knowledge has not dawned to all.

Yet another way of meeting the objection suggested by the Advaitin is: knowledge which has arisen, is not efficacious in removing avidyā, because knowledge is impeded by traces of bheda-vāsanā-ś. To account for the bheda-vāsanā-ś the continuance of avidyā must be admitted. It is just like the continuance of the vision of two moons, due to some optical defect even after the rise of the right knowledge that there is really only one moon.
Accoding to Rāmānuja, neither of the above replies is sustainable. In the first place, it is not possible to maintain that bhedavāsanā-s impede the rise of knowledge. It is because, the vāsanā-s, by being themselves illusroy, are subject to removal by knowledge; and so what are to be removed by knowledge cannot impede the rise of knowledge.\(^{36}\)

It cannot also be said that the illusory cognition of duality continues to exist, even after the rise of right knowledge, on the basis of bhedavāsanā-s. The analogy of the continuance of the cognition of two moons, even after the rise of the right knowledge that there is only one moon, cannot be cited to substantiate this view. It is because the knowledge that there is only one moon does not involve reference to that factor which causes the cognition of two moons. Moreover the defect is real. Hence in spite of one having the cognition that there is only one moon, the continuance of the cognition of two moons is possible. In the case of the analogue, however, the right knowledge referring to the identity of the true nature of the soul with that of God, which removes avidyā should remove the bhedavāsanā-s too, which being the products of avidyā are illusory. If it is maintained that the bhedavāsanā-s exist even after the rise of right knowledge, then there would arise the unwelcome result of the bhedavāsanā-s not being removed by any factor whatsoever. Liberation would then be an impossibility.

\(^{36}\) S.P. on Ś.B., I.i.1, Vol.1 (Part I), p.51
5.3.4. CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF JīVANMUKTI

From the foregoing discussion, it would have become clear that there cannot be illusion, after the rise of knowledge, nor can knowledge be impeded by an illusion, which itself is removable through knowledge. It is in this context, that Rāmānuja points out that the concept of jīvanmukti as admitted by the Advaitin, could not be explained satisfactorily.

According to Advaita, the physical body, the kārma-s etc., are all illusory and hence removable by knowledge and no other factor is accepted to bring about their removal. This being the case, when there arises knowledge, all these illusions should at once be removed and there should strictly be no continuance of these. If traces of kārma remain and if the physical body persists even after the rise of knowledge, then it must be held that they are not removable through knowledge.

To quote Prof. Raghavchar, "If empirical life persists after enlightenment, that cannot be due to avidyā. If it does not persist, there is mukti pure and simple and no adjectives or qualifications of it are justified".

Thus it must be noted that Rāmānuja criticises from the standpoint of Advaita itself, the concept of jīvānůkṭi as one, which does not fit in with its basic premise.

37. Introduction to Vedārthasangrahaḥ, p.100

221
According to Rāmānuja, it is only dhyāna or upāsanā, that constitutes the means to liberation. Jñāna, pure and simple, cannot be viewed to be so. It was however contended, earlier, that there is no intervening factor between the liberating knowledge and release, and jñāna is the exclusive means of liberation, implying thereby that dhyāna is not the means. Hence it is necessary to discuss whether scriptures advocate jñāna, different from dhyāna as the means of liberation.

5.3.5. DO UPANIṢAD-S ADVOCATE JÑĀNA AS DIFFERENT FROM DHYĀNA?

Rāmānuja points out that the Upaniṣad-s repeatedly and specifically ordain dhyāna or upāsanā as the means in texts such as

omityeva ātmanam dhyāyata
nicayya tam mṛtyumukhātpramucyate

dhyānanirmathanābhyāsāt devam paśyet nīгуdḥavat

and the like. It must however, be admitted that the Upaniṣad-s do speak of jñāna or vedanā as the means. But these terms are general in nature, and they refer only to the specific meaning of dhyāna and not a mere verbal understanding.

The above will be clear from Upaniṣad-s themselves, which use words such as jñāna, vedanā, etc., interchangeably in the sense of

39. Kath., Up., iii.15
40. Muṇḍ., Up., II.ii.5
upāsanā, dhyāna, etc. For instance, the Chāndogyopanisad commences with the statement, “One should meditate (upāsīta) upon mind as Brahman”\(^{41}\) and concludes by saying “He who knows (veda) thus, shines and glows with fame, greatness and spiritual lustre”\(^{42}\)

The Brhadāranyakopanisad too, uses the two words jñāna and upāsanā, interchangeably. In the text, ‘If one meditates (upāste) upon empirical things consisting of names and forms, one cannot know (veda); one would remain incomplete; (hence) one shall meditate (upāsīta) upon the self\(^{43}\), the word upāsanā and jñāna or vedanā are exchanged.

Yet another section of the Chāndogya commences with the statement “Raikva who knows (veda) and Brahman, the object of his knowledge are both explained to you by me”\(^{44}\), and ends by saying “Impart me the knowledge of that deity whom you meditate upon (upāste)”\(^{45}\). It would be evident that in passages like these, the Upaniṣad-s use the word vedanā synonymously with the terms upāsanā. This shows that the general terms like vedanā, etc. in the Upaniṣad-s must be understood in the special sense of upāsanā; and not in the sense of mere understanding of the sentence-meaning.

Rāmānuja further draws attention to usages such as anuvidyā vijñāti\(^{46}\) and viññāya prajñām

\(^{41}\) Ch. Up., III.xviii.1
\(^{42}\) ibid., III.xviii.5
\(^{43}\) Br. Up., III.iv.7
\(^{44}\) Ch.Up.IV.i.4
\(^{45}\) ibid., IV.ii.2
\(^{46}\) ibid., VIII.xii.6.
kurvīta⁴⁷, which enjoin one to practice knowledge after knowing. It is obvious that, the literal meaning is not intended in these passages. On the other hand, they seek to ordain dhyāna or meditation. Dhyāna could be pursued only after the initial understanding of the sentence-meaning, which is first referred to by the terms anuvidyā and vijñāya. Subsequent to this, dhyāna is ordained and this is evident from the expressions vijñānti and praJayām kurvīta⁴⁸. Hence these passages confirm again that dhyāna alone is intended as the means. And other passages such as omityevatmanam dhyāyata⁴⁹, nicāyya tam mṛtyumukhāt pramucyate⁵⁰, etc., specifically enjoin meditation as the means to liberation.

It is therefore clear that the Upaniṣad-s prescribe dhyāna or meditation as the means, and not mere knowledge in the form of the understanding of the texts of the Upaniṣad-s.

The author of the Brahmaśūtra-s too has determined that it is not mere jñāna in the form of understanding the import of the texts that leads to liberation, but one in the form of practising the remembrance of God, steadily.

āvṛttirasakṛdudapeśāt⁵¹.

⁴⁹ Mṛṇḍ. Up., II.ii.6.
⁵⁰ Kaṭh. Up., 1.iii.15.
⁵¹ B.S., IV.v.1.
And further he states that it has to be pursued till the soul departs from the body:

āprayāṇat\[^{52}\]

Thus, according to Rāmānuja, scriptures prescribe only dhyāna or upāsanā, as the sole means of liberation.

5.3.6 THE ROLE OF KARMA

The said dhyāna, again, is aided by the performance of karma-s; it is not divested of them. karma serves as a subsidiary (āṅga) to dhyāna or upāsanā, and without it, it is impossible to complete the upāsanā itself. As declared by the author of the sūtra-s, upāsanā depends upon all the karma-s pertaining to the specific stage and class of life (varna and āśrama) of the aspirant.

sarvāpeksā ca yajñādiśruterasvavat\[^{53}\]

Just like the riding of a horse needs its accessories such as a saddle, rein, etc., upāsanā needs all its accessories, for its fruition - the accessories, which are in the form of the specific karma-s. Thus, according to Rāmānuja, karma-s serve as the means of liberation by being the subsidiaries of upāsanā, and hence they are to be pursued necessarily, till the fall of the body. The upāsanā too is pursued till the end of one’s life.

The Advaitin, however, contends that performance of karma-s is opposed to the liberating knowledge. It thus cannot be carried on till the

\[^{52}\] ibid., IV.i.6
end, but has to be given up once the purity of mind is achieved. And he adduces several reasons to show that \textit{karma} and \textit{jñāna} are opposed to each other. The liberating knowledge is the knowledge of identity, while \textit{karma} by its very nature involves difference. On this ground \textit{karma} and \textit{jñāna} are opposed to each other. Again the fruits of \textit{karma} are declared to be non-eternal while that of \textit{jñāna} is said to be eternal, and this shows that there is direct opposition between the two. Further, several accessories like \textit{sāma}, \textit{dama}, etc., which are prescribed for an aspirant, cannot be pursued if \textit{karma}-s were to be performed. It follows that \textit{karma} cannot go together with knowledge. And the scriptures declare knowledge as the means, to the exclusion of everything else. It is hence obvious that \textit{karma} cannot be a means along with \textit{jñāna}. Thus the scope of \textit{karma} is restricted to generating purity of mind after which it has to be abandoned.

The above view of the \textit{Advaitin} is a result of his basic view that the world is only illusory and that knowledge of identity alone leads to liberation. Neither of the two positions, as has been explained earlier, can be satisfactorily explained.

It has further been shown that the scriptures prescribe only \textit{upāsanā} as the means and not \textit{jñāna} in the sense as understood by \textit{Advaitin}. And on this ground, the view that \textit{karma} and \textit{jñāna} are opposed to each other, loses its significance. Since \textit{jñāna} in the form of \textit{upāsanā} is the means advocated, \textit{karma} is not only unopposed to it, but is an auxiliary to it too.
The other arguments of the Advaitin are met, on the following lines: It was contended that jñāna and karma are opposed to each other, as their fruits differ vastly. The fruits of karma are declared to be non-eternal, while that of knowledge is eternal. But this argument, Rāmānuja states, is also not sound. This is because, karma produces fruits that are non-eternal, only if one is attached to the fruits and performs them with a desire for the fruit. But the same karma-s, when performed with a sense of detachment, that is, as an offering to God, do not produce fruits that are non-eternal, but instead aid the growth of upāsanā, by producing purity of mind.

The Advaitin does agree in respect of the fact that karma-s performed with a sense of detachment produce purity of mind. But he feels that, it should be stopped once that is attained. But according to Rāmānuja, it is not enough if purity of mind is attained once, but it has to be maintained throughout, for which performance of karma-s is to be carried on upto the end. Hence if karma is abandoned after some time, there is every likelihood of the mind getting polluted again. And to avoid this, one must perform karma, with a sense of detachment. Further, it has been determined by the author of the aphorisms that karma is an accessory (aṅga) for upāsanā, and so it has to be performed as long as upāsanā itself (which is the aṅgi) is continued.

Thus there is no pramāṇa for the abandonment of karma. It has rather been mentioned in the scriptures that karma-s have never been abandoned

54. ibid., III.iv.33
but have been performed with diligence, by those who were practicing brahmavidyā (that is, upāsanā).

iyāja so'pi subahun yajñān jñānavyapāśrayaḥ brahmavidyāmadhiśtyāya tartum mṛtyum avidyayā\

Hence there is no stage in one’s life where karma-s could be dispensed with.

It was again pointed out that scriptures declare knowledge as the sole means, to the exclusion of everything else including karma. But Rāmānuja points out that these texts mean only that kārma-s by themselves do not become an independent means to liberation and that they do not totally deny any role for karma-s. Karma-s are needed very much as accessories for the upāsanā. According to Rāmānuja, it is only upāsanā aided by karma-s, which is the means to liberation, and not upāsanā unaided by the performance of karma-s. Thus the Upāniṣadic declaration that jñāna alone is the means to liberation, means only that karma-s do not become an independent means, which does not, however, preclude any role for karma-s. Further, it has already been proved that the Upāniṣadic declaration that jñāna is the means refers only to jñāna in its special sense known as upāsanā, and not a mere verbal understanding of the mahāvākyā-s.

In regard to the view that the performance of karma would impede the pursuit of śama, etc. which have been prescribed as accessories to jñāna, Rāmānuja states that scriptures ordain śama, dama,

55. V.P., VI.vi.12

228
etc., that is control of senses and of mind only in respect of those acts which are prohibited (pratīṣṭiddha) and those that are neither prescribed nor prohibited (avihita-apratīṣṭiddha), and not in respect of those that have been specifically ordained to be performed. Further performance of karma is not a counteracting factor for the pursuit of śama, etc.

It was also contended by the Advaitin that karma has been declared as a means only for the rise of desire for the knowledge of Brahman and not as a means for knowledge itself or for mokṣa. This view in effect means that one takes to the performance of karma-s such as sacrifices, etc., only in order to attain a desire for knowledge. But unless there is desire already in knowledge, there could not arise a desire toward its means, namely, performance of karma etc. Hence the text yajñena, etc., is similar to the expression asina jighamsati. This expression does not mean that the sword is the means for attaining the desire to kill; on the other hand, it means that it is the means for killing. In the same way, the text, yajñena, etc., means that performance of karma is the means for attaining knowledge, and not for attaining the desire for knowledge.

Thus, according to Rāmānuja, knowledge in the form to upāsanā or mediation, constitutes the means of liberation. It consists in maintaining the remembrance of God continuously, with loving devotion, in an intense manner. It would then ripen

56. Ś.B., I.i.1., Vol.1 (Part I), p.69.
57. ibid., III.iv. 26
to such a level as to lead to the vision that would comprehend God in His full glory and splendour, which would be similar to direct perception. And thereafter the aspirant remains in such a state that he cannot sustain himself without having such a vision of God even for a moment; and even a momentary loss of such a vision would trouble his heart to a great extent. It is declared thus in the Garuḍapurāṇa:

yanmuhūrtam kṣaṇam vāpi vāsudevo na
cintyate
sā hānistanmahacchiddram sā bhrāntih
sā ca vikriyā

It is to be noted, however, that the vision of God, is certainly not a fruit of one's own effort but a 'gift' of God. God immensely pleased with the deep devotion of the devotee, grants Him His vision. But He does not do so to those who do not aspire for it.

It is in this context that the Upaniṣadic view that 'God choses that soul for liberation' becomes significant. Rāmānuja elucidates the points on the basis of the Bhagavadgītā. God chooses, no doubt but it is not a random choice. He chooses only those who are choice-worthy. And the worth in the soul to be chosen is its loving devotion. The Lord makes it clear in the Bhagavadgītā that He cannot be attained by the study of vedā-s, not by willingly undergoing bodily sufferings (tapas), not by

58. Garuḍapurāṇa. 222.22.
munificence and not even by sacrifices. It is only through pure bhakti that one can attain Him, for He is of such nature\(^{60}\). He further declares that He grants the b.uddhiyoga, that is, His divine vision, with utmost compassion to those who long for His company at all times\(^{61}\).

Rāmānuja concludes that from such passages it is clear that God chooses those who are immensely devoted to Him and who submit themselves with unflinching devotion towards Him.

5.3.7. IS LIBERATION POSSIBLE HERE?

It may now be objected as follows: there are passages such as

\[
\text{atra brahma samaśnute}^{62} \\
\text{tamevam vidvān amṛta iha bhavati}^{63}
\]

which declare that liberation is attained here and now. But the view of Rāmānuja is that liberation is something attained in an other world and not here\(^{64}\). Thus his view runs into direct conflict with the passages, cited above: But, according to Rāmānuja there is no conflict at all, when viewed in the light of the discussion of all these passages by Bādarāyaṇa in the Asṛtyupakramādhikaraṇa\(^{65}\).

As observed earlier, liberation consists in the removal of avidyā, that is karma, and having the

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60. B.G., XI.53.
61. ibid., X.10.
63. Tai. Ār., III. xii.17.
64. infra. p.205
65. B.S., IV.ii.5.
direct vision of God, that brings forth with it supreme bliss. Hence liberation, while one is alive, must be understood in the sense that the soul is liberated from the shackles of karma. It is thus: as the aspirant proceeds in the path of liberation and practices intense meditation with unflinching devotion, it ripens to such a level that he gets a vision of God, which is almost similar to perception. And this constitutes a stage in the process of meditation. When there arises, such a vision, all the saṅcita karma-s, or the accumulated merits and demerits, of the upāsaka, which have not yet started yielding forth their fruits are destroyed; and, the merits or demerits, which the aspirant may acquire unintentionally after attaining such a vision, do not cling to him. But the aspirant has to exhaust the prārabdha karma-s, or the merits and demerits which have started yielding forth their result in the form of the present body, only by experiencing their fruits in one or more births.

As has been pointed out earlier, liberation constitutes the removal of karma-s and experiencing bliss ensuing out of the vision of God. Now even while the upāsaka continues the practice of the upāsanā, he attains both these fruits, though only partially. And this state, where there is the removal of karma and the experience of God, is almost similar to this state of mokṣa or liberation. And it is this state, that is referred to in passages such

66. infra., p. 213
67. Ś.B., IV.i.13.
as *atra brahma samaśnute* and the like\textsuperscript{68}, cited above. The final emancipation, however, occurs only after the fall of the body, and after attaining the abode of God, called *Vaikuṇṭha*.

Nevertheless, the reason why some passages speak of liberation here itself is because, the vision of God that the aspirant attains here is something unique, which is granted by God, who is immensely pleased by the loving devotion of the aspirant. Once that is attained there is nothing that needs to be attained, for that itself brings along with it, transcendental bliss which can be termed almost *mokṣa*, itself. And this is the reason why some passages, apparently, refer to this itself as *mokṣa*, though it is not the final release.

And the author of the aphorisms too, refers to such a state of liberation, as one which is attained before the fall of the physical body - *amṛtatvam ca anuposya*\textsuperscript{69}.

Thus *mokṣa*, in its final form, is one which will be attained only at the abode of God. This is also confirmed by other passages which speak about the path, which is called the *devayāna* or the *arcirādimārga*, through which the soul travels and attains final release. The travel through this path never again brings the soul back to this mundane existence\textsuperscript{70}.

The very fact that the *Upaniṣad*-s and the author of the *sūtra*-s describe the path through

\textsuperscript{68} ibid., IV.ii.12.
\textsuperscript{69} B.S., IV.ii.12.
\textsuperscript{70} ibid., IV.ii.22.
which the soul reaches the world of God, proves that liberation is to be attained in a hereafter and not here.

To sum up: liberation consists in attaining the world of God. The sole means of liberation is jñāna or upāsanā, which is meditation upon God with loving devotion, aided by the performance of duties relating to one’s stage and class of life. The soul, with a view to attain liberation, pursues meditation upon God in an intense manner, and at this stage it attains the vision of God, which is more or less similar to direct cognition, experiences the bliss that ensues from it and becomes free from the shackles of karma. And this stage is almost similar to liberation. Libration, in the strict sense of the term, is attained only after the final fall of the body, and after reaching the world of God.
EPILOGUE

Having dealt with in detail the views of the Advaita school and that of Rāmānuja, a few remarks, by way of an epilogue may not be out of place.

To begin with it has to be stated that both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja were essentially traditionalists and both offer themselves only as the spokesmen of their respective traditions and do not claim to be the originators of their system. And it also could be justly vouched that both their schools had their roots in the basic Vedantic texts.

But this apart, a critical study of the bhāṣya-s of both the ācārya-s shows that they had their own unique conceptions of Reality. Though scriptures were held to be the ultimate authorities by both, though they adopted similar approaches towards them, still if they arrived at entirely different results claiming the same scriptures as their soruce texts, it was due to the uniqueness of thier basic conceptions. We can say that these were almost axiomatic in the development of their philosophies. Throughout their bhāṣya-s, we can see that these axioms run as undercurrents and play a major role in the formulation of their philosophies. An in-depth study shows that their notions varied, their conceptions differed and their values conflicted.
Śaṅkara was anxious to see that Reality, which is Brahman, transcends all our commonplace notions, ideas and imaginations. It is a perfection beyond our comprehension. And such a Reality, he thought, should necessarily be one, where none of our worldly conceptions found their way in. That is why, it does not look odd to him to conceive of Brahman beyond any properties whatsoever, though, he seeks to establish such a quality-less Brahman entirely on the basis of the Upaniṣad-s in spite of their clear description of Brahman as repository of all virtues, at numerous places.

A basic guiding principle, according to Śaṅkara is that scriptures are meant to teach what could not be known through any other source of knowledge. That is why, when scriptures declare Brahman as endowed with countless excellences and also as devoid of any quality, for Śaṅkara the latter set of passages become more powerful than the former. They teach something which could not be known through any other pramāṇa, and this bestows upon them a special claim to be ‘more powerful’. The other set of passages, though belonging to the same pramāṇa, namely, the scripture, are to be understood a ‘concession to the ordinary human beings’ who could not elevate themselves to the level of thinking of a nirguna brahman.

The scriptures, according to Śaṅkara, emphasize in the ultimate analysis, that Reality is a unitary principle, negating all sorts of differences in it. Hence, even if difference is spoken of by them, that is meant only to be discarded, in the ultimate
EPILOGUE

analysis, for oneness and difference cannot go together.

Rāmānuja, on the other hand, adopts a synthetic approach. He expressly sets it as his aim to integrate all sorts of apparently contradictory texts, resolving the contradictions, without at the same time divesting any passage of its primary connotation or resorting to secondary signification.

The individual soul, in his system, does not get dissolved in the sea of Brahman, losing its own identity in the process, but retains its individuality and finds fulfilment and enrichment in the company of God.

Rāmānuja does not offer a philosophy in which objects of the world, which are validly known through perception, are rendered to be an 'apparent divergence' of Brahman and which shall cease to exist with the final awakening, a philosophy which fails to carry conviction.

He does not bifurcate Reality into the Brahman of philosophy and God of Religion. Reality is one, and according to him, the Absolute of philosophy cannot be different from God of religion.

He lays great emphasis on bhakti as the means to liberation and following the author of Brahmaśūtra-s, he demonstrates with great acumen that it is only a form of knowledge. - The view is not totally unknown to Śaṅkara as is evidenced by his interpretation of the first sūtra of the fourth chapter of the Brahmaśūtra-s; but he is forced to maintain a difference between the two because of his basic philosophic position.
GLEANINGS FROM THE ŚRĪBHĀṢYA

Again, Rāmānuja too, does subscribe to the principle that scriptures are meant to teach something not knowable from any other pramāṇa. But on that score he is not prepared to accept that scripture could invalidate other pramāṇa-s or that within the scripture itself one set of passages could reign over other supposedly less powerful passages. He accepts that scriptures would not teach about a cow as a cow, which is known through perception. But they will not teach it to be a stone either. In other words, scriptures do not teach about something which could be known through other pramāṇa-s nor do they contradict what is validly known through other pramāṇa-s. On the other hand, they teach something new, over and above what is already known through other pramāṇa-s; as for instance, that Brahman is the indwelling spirit (antrayāmin) of both the cow and the stone.

Rāmānuja, again, does not compromise with the Advaita contemplated in the scriptures. But on that count he does not do away with difference altogether, for that also is taught by the scriptures. Difference, according to him, need not be abandoned in order to uphold unity, but instead could be included or subsumed in it. Difference need not scare us as opposed to identity. If it is said that a flower is one as well as many, then it is contradictory. If, on the other hand, it is said, 'it is a single flower with many petals', then there is no contradiction. Thus, according to Rāmānuja, singularity, by itself is not opposed to manifoldness and his elucidation of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita is an ample demonstration of this idea.
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242


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|| अनुबन्ध: ||

|| प्रमाणानुक्रमणिका ||

पु. २३ तत्त्र ननारूपान्त्रं वाक्यानामिरोऽधृतं मुख्यार्थीपित्यागमच्छ यथा सम्भवति तथैव वर्णनीयं वर्णितस्वच्छ।

(वेदार्थसिद्धान्त: पु. १.३४)

पु. २३ न स्थानातोऽपि परस्योभयविलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि।

(ब्र.वृ. २.३.११)

पु. २३ न होकं वस्तु स्वतं एव रूपादिविशेषोपेऽतं तद्विपरीतं चेत्यवधारायितुं शक्यं, विरोधात्।

(ब्र.शु.शा. मा ३.२.१)

पु. २३ सदेव सोम्येद्वं ग्रं आसीदे समवाद्विश्वविभूत्यम्।

(सात. ६.२.२)

पु. २४ नेह ननार्थित किल्ला, मृत्योस्स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पवित्रित।

(ब्र.वृ. ६.६.९)

पु. २४ यंत्र हि ब्रैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पवित्रितं; यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमभावमूल्यं तत्केन कं पवित्रेत् तत्केन कं विज्ञानीयात्।

(ब्र. ४.४.१४)

पु. २४ ज्ञानस्वरूपन्तत्त्वान्तर्निर्मलं परमार्थितं।

तमेवार्थस्वरूपेण भ्रान्तिदर्शनितं स्थितं।(ब्र.पु. १.२.६)

परमार्थस्वरूपवेदः कन्नो नन्योड्यसितं जगत्ते पते(ब्र.पु. १.४.३८)

तत्स्वात्मपरस्तेः सतोद्वधेकम् न हि यत्।

विज्ञानं परमार्थो हि ब्रैतिनोऽत्थ्यदारशिहः।(ब्र.पु. २.१४.३४)

247
गोरवें भा च तवं स च सर्वेभणि
आत्मरूपं त्यज मेदमोऽहम।

क्षेत्रग्रं चापि मा विद्ध सर्वक्षेत्रं पुरुषं भारत।
(म.मी. ३.२)

निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवं निर्तनम्।
(सर्ग. ६.३५)

सत्यं ज्ञानमनंत्र ब्रह्म।
(स.आ. १.३)

अनूतेन हि प्रत्यूढः।
(सर्ग. ८.२६)

मायां तु प्रकृति विद्यामाखिं तु महेश्वरम्।
(सर्ग. ४.१०)

इन्द्रो मायाभि: पुरुःकृप ईयते।
(सर्ग. १५९.२)

अनादिमायया सुभो यदा जीवः प्रवृद्ध्यते।
(म.का. २.२१)

अज्ञानेनावृत्तं ज्ञानं तेन मुहानितं जन्तं।
(म.मी. ५.७४)

न पुनर्मृत्युवं तदेकं पश्यति
न पश्यों मृत्युं पश्यति।
(छ. ५.२६.२)

यदा हेमेष् एतत्रमन्वदस्येनात्मयेनिन्ध्येन
अभयं प्रतिष्ठा विन्द्वते अथ सोऽभयङ्गः भवति।
(स.आ. ३.३)

ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मेव भवति।
(सर्ग. ३.२९)

तमेव विद्यवासितमृत्युमेति
नान्याः पन्था: अयनाय विबधते।
(सर्ग. ३.८)

पौर्वपिरं फूर्दौर्स्यम् प्रकृतिवाच।
(वा. ६.५.५४)

यदुद्धातातसपविच्छेष्टे, अदक्षिणं स यज्ञं संस्थाप्य
तेन पुनर्जेत; अथ प्रतित्तत्त्रा, सर्ववेदसं दशात।
यानुभूतिः जाभेयाः नन्तानन्तोविग्रहता।
महदादिजगन्नाया छिट्ट्रामितिः नमामि नाम॥

(एकार्याणां महाजनांक।)

पु.४१ यज्ञानाभूतं तदनुत्पन्नं न दृश्यम्। अपि तूत्तपतिमेव दृश्यम्।
(पु.प्र. प्र. मं(प्र. मा)पू. २०४)

पु.४१ न च स्वतर्दिश्वस्त्रय प्रागभावादयः स्वतीसन्यते वा रिस्थ्रृवन्ति। अतोस्या नान्येशपि भावविकारः।
जन्मादित्वाते कर्षम्। चेत्यानां च न चिद्धर्ममेत्रं रुपार्थिवः। अतोस्ये। नार्या मेयोधर्म्मध्यस्तीत्यर्थः।
अतोनन्त्वां। अन्तस्यापि मेयोवेस्तद्धर्म्मवातः।
अमेयेत्वेशपि अन्नयेत्वाच तद्व्रता चितः। कालः।
ताबदानन्त्यं सिद्धं। जन्माभावाः। अत एव देशातो
वस्तुतोस्पि। अन्यथा घटादिवत जन्मप्रसंहातः।
न ह्वार्यं विभावमिति...जन्माभावे नान्येशपि भावविकारः।
स्युः। अतः कूटस्थं सदैवरूपं वस्तु स्वतः सिद्धमिति।
(श्र्स्टिर्मुः पू. १)

पु.४२ अहमिति तावतप्रथमोध्यायः। (प्रभायाकिता पू. ३१)

पु.४६ आनन्दो विषयानुभावो नित्यवाविमित सन्ति धर्मः।
अपृथक्क्लेशपि चैतन्यात्युपाधिवावभासते। (प्रभायाकिता पू. ४९)

पु.४१ निर्विकल्पकमेकजातीयद्रव्येशु प्रथमपिण्डग्रहणम्।
(पु.प्र.पृ.सं(प्र. मा)पू. १९८)

पु.४१ द्वितीयादिपिण्डग्रहणं सविकल्पकमित्युच्यते।
(पु.प्र. प्र.सं(प्र. मा)पू. १९८)

२४९
पु. ५४ \nगर्तुगतम्वभाविविविदापि: तदेव वरस्तु निर्विशंप्रमित \nबदन जननी वन्यात्व प्रतिज्ञायामिव स्ववाविरोधमापि \nन जानाति।

(श्री. मा. १.२.२, पु. २२३)

पु. ५५ \nसंस्थानातिरितिरेणोजनेकेषु एकाकारवेशनेत्रथ्वाधार्ष्यनात्।

(श्री. मा. १.२.१, प्र. सं.(प्र. मा.)पु. २२६)

पु. ५६ \nअतिरेकवादेषपि संस्थानर्य समप्रतिपचात्वाच \nसंस्थानेव जाति:।

(श्री. मा. १.२.२, प्र. सं.(प्र. मा.)पु. २२६)

पु. ५६ \nसंस्थानं नाम स्वासाधारणं रूपमिति याथायरस्तु \nsंस्थानमनुसरिण्यम्। (श्री. मा. १.२.१, प्र. सं.(प्र. मा.)पु. १२६-१२७)

पु. ५९ \nप्रतियो गिरिशरणकृत्वलम्बे सत्यपिन ज्ञानस्य \nयावत्कार्यसिद्धि स्विश्वरथं कल्यमं; तथापि प्रतियोभि \nनिरपेक्षजात्यादेभमदत्तेन एकक्षणविरिण्येषपि प्रत्यक्षस्य, \nमेदस्य सुग्रहस्वाृहीरोत्सारितस्मिति भावः। (पु. १२३)

पु. ६३ \nयतु ज्ञानस्य स्वयं प्रकाशात्मस्तुं तद्विषणप्रकाशान्वेलायां \nझातुरात्मनस्तथैव; न तु सर्वेऽं सर्वदा तथैवेयित \nनियमोदित।

(श्री. मा. १.२.१, प्र. सं.(प्र. मा.)पु. ६३४)

पु. ६३ \nअनुभूतित्वं नाम वर्तमानन्दायां स्वसत्तयेव स्वाभं \nप्रतिप्रकाशामानत्वं स्वसत्तयेव स्वविषयसाधनत्वं \nवा।

(श्री. मा. १.२.२, प्र. सं.(प्र. मा.)पु. १२४)

पु. ६६ \nअविद्याया आत्मन:परमार्थितो विभागाभावे सति \nवर्तुतो ह्यविचैव स्यादात्मा। (श्री. मा. १.२.२, प्र. सं.(प्र. मा.)पु. १४२)

पु. ६७ \nनिरस्तारिखलु:खोहमन्तान्तनान्दभाक्स्वराद। \nभवेयमिति मोक्षार्थिन श्रवणादि प्रवर्तते॥

(पु. २५०)
अहमर्थिविनाशनेर्मोक्षसिद्धवर्ययति।
अपसर्पेद समोक्षकथा प्रस्तावगन्धतः।

(श्री.महा.१.१.१.प्र.सं(प्र.मा)पु.१४८)

पु.६८ प्रत्यक्षकल्याणेव कस्यचिदेव भवेत् दीपादिद्र प्रकाशावतः।
संविदं भूतित्ज्ञानादिशाब्दः सम्बन्धवशं िति हि
शब्दार्थविदः निन्हि लोकवेदयो र्यांत्यादिकर्मक्षया-
कर्तृक्षयच प्रयोगो ट्ट्चरः। (श्री.महा.१.१.१.प्र.सं(प्र.मा)पु.१२५)

पु.७० यथा देहादिदृश्यत्वं-पराक्षविदहेतुभि: तत्प्रत्ययनीक-
द्रश्यत्व-प्रत्यक्षवादेवीविचयसे, एवमन्त्वकरण-
रुपाहस्तकारो सि तथव्यत्वादेव तैवे यहेतुभिमस्तस्मा-
द्विविचयते ितः।

(श्री.महा.प्र.सं(प्र.मा)पु.१२५)

पु.७२ तांतिसारिनिशाचारसहिन्यं त्राभावनिकत्वादिशार्थः; 
अचेततपत्तपरिमामी हन्म्युपगतः। (श्री.प्र.न.सं(प्र.मा)पु.१६०)

पु.७२ अथागुणिसम्पकादियं: पिण्डोण्यवत् चित्सम्प्रकरति-
झ्यांत्वोपलाधिधारित। नैति। संविदा वास्तव 
झ्यांत्वात्मन्युपगमादेव न तत्सम्पकादीहक्कारे झ्यांत्वादत
तदुपलाधिधव। (श्री.महा.१.१.१.प्र.सं(प्र.मा)पु.१६१)

पु.७३ तमोगुणाभिमभवात् परागर्थानुभवाभावाचाहर्मणिस्य 
विविक्तर्पुष्पत्र प्रतिभासामावेदिप्र आप्रोधात्
अहिमित्येकारारणात्म: स्पुरणात सुषुसावपि 
नाहम्भावाविगमः।

(श्री.महा.१.१.१.प्र.सं(प्र.मा)पु.१६६)
पु. ७६ आत्मने स्वयमवभासामान: अहिमित्येवावभासत
इति स्वापाचवयस्यम्ययत्मा प्रकाशमानोहिमित्येवावभासत
इति सिद्धम्।
(अष्टि. मा. १.१.१.प्र.मा)पु. ७६६)
पु. ७६ यतु मोक्षद्वायमहमर्थं नानुवर्तत इति तदपेशालम् तथा
सत्यात्मनाशा एवापर्गं: प्रकारान्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातं: स्थात्।
नचाहमथेन धर्ममान्त्रं, येन तद्विगमेऽप्यविद्यानिवृत्ताविव
स्वरूपमविविधेत; प्रत्युत्स्वरूपमेवाहमर्थावतमः।
(अष्टि. मा. १.१.१.प्र.मा) पु. ७७०)
पु. ७७ तद्वैतप्रवयन् ऋषिवामदेव: प्रतिपेदेः हंमनुर्मभवं
सूर्यश्रेष्ठ ।
(पु. ४.२०)
पु. ७७ हंताहिममासितस्त्रो देवता: ।
बहु स्यां प्रजायेय 
(छं. ५.२.२)
स ईक्षत लोकाधू सूर्या इति ।
(छं. ५.२.२)
पु. ७७ यस्मात्क्षरमन्तीतोहमक्षरादीपः चोतमः।
अतोर्द्धम लोके वेदे च प्रश्नित: पुरेशमः।
अहमात्मा गुडाकेश ।
(सू. ५.२०)
अहं कृतस्य जगात: प्रभव: प्रत्यर्थस्तथा।
पु. ७८ अत: प्रत्यक्षसिद्धवत्तावुदंकन्यायांगमान्यवात।
अविद्यायोगंतश्चात्मा ज्ञाताहिमस्वमास्ते।
(आलमसिद्धि: १४)
पु. ७८ मत: सर्वमेव सर्व मायं सर्व सनातने।
(चितु. १.१६.८५)
पु. ७८ सर्वगत्वादनन्तस्य स एवाहमवास्थितः।
(चितु. १.९.८५)
पु.८२ अन्यश्रेष्ठ राजन् स परः अन्यश्रेष्ठ पद्धविन्दकः
तत्स्थत्वादनुपर्ययत्र हेक प्रेमित साधवः।
(महाभारतम् मोक्षभागम् ३५२.३३)

पु.८५ तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत्।
(तै.आ. ७.१)

पु.८५ प्रकृतिश्रेष्ठ प्रतिज्ञादश्यान्तानुपरोधात्।
(ब्र.सू. १.४.२३)

पु.८६ यथाकिंत्रिष्णं जगत्यस्मिन् दृढ्यते श्रूहयेिति वा।
अन्तर्भिषेष्ठ तत्सर्व व्याप्य नारायणः स्थितः॥
(तै.न. १४.१६)

पु.८७ तदीय्यश्याननादेव तु तांश्चा सः।
अभिध्योपदेशाचा॥
(ब्र.सू. २.२.१६)

पु.८७ ततेजः ऐक्षतः बहु स्यां प्रजायेिति।
(छा. ६.२.३)

पु.८७ ता आप ऐक्षतः बहुः स्याम प्रजायेिमहीिति।
(छा. ६.२.४)

पु.८८ यः पृथिव्यां तिष्थन....योऽपि तिष्ठन....यस्तेजसि
तिष्ठन.... यो वायः तिष्ठन....य अक्षायो तिष्ठन...
(पु. ५.३.७)

पु.८८ सदेव सोम्येदमग् आसीदेकमेवाब्द्रितियम्;
तदाक्षतः बहु स्यां प्रजायेिति; ततेजःसुरुजात।
(छा. ६.२.४)

पु.८८ चराचरणयपाश्रयस्तु स्यातद्वयपदेशोभावः
तद्भावमाविवात।
(ब्र.सू. २.२.१७)

पु.८९ तदाक्षतः बहु स्यां प्रजायेिति।
(छा. ६.२.३)

पु.९० तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत।
(तै.आ. ७.१)

253
 пу.९० तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशात् तदनुप्रविष्य
 सच स्त्राभाभवात्। (भ.आ. ६.२.३)

 пу.९१ मायोपाधिक्षेत्रित्वतेत्तत्त्वितथितमीति वर्णवर्च्या तत्त्वोऽविशे
 येषां तेंदुपदितीयश्रुति‌मवितथयतन्त्र तत्त्वविशे।
 अप्राधान्यातथा न: प्रकृति पुरुषयोरन्तरतमप्रधाने
 वाच्येद्विसमस्यूलसुसूक्ष्मान्यवेदी जगातोऽन्यभावोपपत्ति:॥

 (अ. सा १६६)

 пу.९४ तल्लेवं तदेवोवाकृतभासीत्वां तवालमुपपाव्यः व्याक्रियत॥

 (भ.३.४.७)

 пу.९५ मायोवासोविश्रेष्ठत्वते: प्रागवस्थायोगो हुपादानत्वम्

 (भू.प्र.१.१.१.प्र.सं. (प्र.भा)पु.१८५)

 пу.९७ भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तां शब्दनामैकसमस्मर्थी बुद्धि:
 समानाधिकरण्यम्। (श्री. मा.१.२.२.प्र.सं. (प्र.भा)पु.१९३)

 пу.९९ परार्जियारूकितिविविधीव शृयते
 स्वभाविकी ज्ञानबलोक्र्या च।

 (ब्र. ६.८)

 пу.१०० अपहतपापमा विजो विमृत्यु:....सत्यकाम: सत्यसंस्कृतः

 (छा.८.१.५)

 пу.१०२ नेन नानास्ति किच्चन; मृत्यो: स मृत्युमाप्नोति
 य इह नानेव पश्यति।

 (ब्रु.६.४.१६)

 यत्र हि वैतमिवभवति तदिति इतरं पश्यति
 यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्रेवाभूत तत्त्वेन कं पश्येत्।(ब्रु.६.४.१६)

 пу.१०४ परार्जियारूकितिविविधीव शृयते स्वभाविकीः (ब्र.६.८)

 २५४
पु. १०५ विज्ञानधन एव एतम्यो भूतेम्य: समुत्थाय तान्येवानु
विनश्यति।
(पु. ४.५.२)  
पु. १०५ न जायते प्रियते वा विपश्चित।
(तृ. २.५.१)  
पु. १०५ वायुश्वान्तरिक्षश्रेष्ठतमृतम्।
(पु. ४.३.३)  
पु. १०५ आत्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः।
(३.३.४)  
पु. १०६ मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यते।
(३.३.६)  
पु. १०६ पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितार्घ्म मत्वा जुहस्तस्तस्ततामृत्त्वमैति।
(श्री. १.६)  
पु. १०६ जुष्ठ यदा पश्यत्यन्यमिषामस्य महिमानिमिति
वीतशोकः।
(पु. २.१.२)  
पु. १०७ अथ योधन्यां देवतामुपपस्तेन्योः सावन्योः सहमस्मिति
न स वेद आत्मेयोपासित।
(२.४.३)  
पु. १०८ क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः
क्षरात्मानावीशात् देव एकः।।
(श्री. १.२)  
झालौ द्वारावीशात् देव एकः।।
(श्री. १.९)  
पु. १०९ कृत्सनस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यतया तदन्तन्त्रामिकतया
च तदन्तन्त्रकर्त्तेनेक्यात्त्रतत्प्रत्यनिन्नानात्मां प्रातिष्ठयते।
न पुनः बहु स्या नायेयेति बहुभवन सड़क्कल्पपूर्वंक
ब्रह्माणो नानात्मां श्रुतिसिद्धः प्रातिष्ठयत इति।
(श्री. दा. १.१.४.प्र.ल. (प्र. दा) पु. १०५-२०६)  
पु. ११२ पुरुषशीवमोक्षीनिमितं तथा प्रृृति: प्रधानस्य।
(सा. दा. ५१)  
पु. ११३ तस्मात्बध्यतेद्वा न मुच्यते नापि संसर्गित
कृति। संसर्गित बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया
प्रृृति:।
(सा. का. ५२)  
255
पु. १४५ नाह खल्वयमेवं समप्रत्यात्मानं जानाति
 नो एवेमानि भूतानि।
(छा. ८.४.१२)

पु. १४६ विज्ञातार्मरे केन विजानीयात्।
 एष हि द्रष्टा श्रोता....विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः।
(पृ. ६.५.३१)

पु. १४७ एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनिद्यात्।
(पृ. ४.७.२२)

पु. १४७ न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम।
 सर्वं ह पश्यं पश्यति सर्वमात्मोति सर्वशं।
(छा. ३.२६.२)

पु. १४९ सदेव सोम्येदं समग्र आसीत्।
 आत्मेदं सर्वम्।
(छा. ६.२.१)

पु. १४९ व्रह्मेदं सर्वम्।
(छा. ७.२.१)

पु. १४९ इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा।
(पृ. ६.५.३)

पु. १४९ नान्योस्तोस्स्तितः द्रष्टा।
(पृ. ५.७.२३)

पु. १४९ नान्योस्तोस्स्तितः द्रष्टः।
(पृ. ५.८.१०)

पु. १४० अन्योस्सावन्योस्सहस्मीति न स वेदं यथा पुद्धः।
(पृ. ३.५.१०)

पु. १४१ मृत्युः स मृत्युमात्मोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ह।
(पृ. ६.५.१९)

पु. १४१ यथा सुदीतः पावकात् विस्फूरिलिङ्गः।
 सहखशा: प्रभवन्ते सरद्वा।
(पृ. २.१.१)

तथाझ्स्थ्रार्पिविष्ठा सोम्य भावा:
 प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापिनयन्ति।
(पृ. २.२.१)

पु. १४१ स वा एष महान्ज आत्माः जरोस्मरोस्मृतोसभयो
 ब्रह्मः।
(पृ. ६.५.२७)

२५६
पु. १२१ न जायते प्रियते वा विपश्चितः
पु. १२६ अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादितवम्
अधीयत एके ।
पु. १२६ पादोस्य विश्वाभूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि।
(तै. आ। पु. ३.१२.१)
ममेवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातन।।
(म. मी. ६.५)
पु. १२७ एवं जीवपर्यो निधोषणाविशेषवश्चकृतं स्वभाववैविलक्षणयम्
आश्रितय भेदनिर्देशः प्रवर्तन्ते; अभेदनिर्देशास्तु
प्रथक्षिकाध्यक्षनिश्वेषणाना विशेष्यपर्यक्तस्यत्वामाश्रितय
मुख्यत्वेनोपपदन्ते।
(श्री. मा. २.३.५)
पु. १२८ एण्णुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितवयः।
(पु. ३.१.५)
पु. १२८ वालाग्रहशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पतस्य च
भागो जीवः स विज्ञेयः।
( अ. ५. ६)
पु. १३२ प्रकृते: क्रियमाणानि गुणे: कर्मणि सर्वषः।
अहंकार विमूढात्मा कर्तन्हीमिति मन्यते।।
(म. मी. ३.२६)
पु. १३२ कार्यकरणकृत्वेहतु: प्रकृतिरुच्यते ।
(म. मी. १.३.२०)
पु. १३२ अधिष्ठानां तथा कर्ता।
(म. मी. १.८.१)
पु. १३२ य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्दुः... य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति
(पु. ५.६.२६)
पु. १३३ विमृष्यैतदश्रोपेण यथेवच्छसि तथा कुरू
(म. मी. १.८.६३)
पु. १३५ अनुमाति: फलदानममभयमपि दण्डप्रकार एव
(पु. ३.२.२)
पु.१३५ दया हि नाम स्वार्थिनिरपेक्षा परदुःखासहिष्णुता ।
सः च स्वाशासनात्वृत्तिव्यवसायिन्यापि वर्तमाना
न गुणायावकल्पते । प्रत्युतापुस्त्वमेवावहित ।
तत्तिग्रह एव तत्र गुणः । (श्री.मा.२.२.१)

पु.१३६ र्वाशासनात्वृत्तिव्यवसाय-निवृत्तिमात्रेणाणाधनत
कत्योपचित-दुरविष्णुन्ततापराधानज्ञीकरेण निरतिरश्य-
सुखसंबृद्धे श्वयमेव प्रयतते। (श्री.मा.२.२.१)

पु.१३७ एष ह्रोव साधुकर्म कार्यित तं यमेभ्यो लोके भय
उचिनीषित। एष एवासाधुकर्म कार्यित तं
यमधोनिनीषित। (श्री.३.६.७)

पु.१३८ तेषां सततयुक्तानं भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।
ददामि बुद्धियोऽग्न तं येन मामुपवानि ते ॥
तेषामेवानुकम्पार्थमहमझानजं तमः ।
नाशयाम्यातभावस्यो ज्ञानदीपेन भास्वता॥ (भ.मी.१०.११)

पु.१३८ असत्यमप्रतिष्ठेते जगदाहुस्नीवरम् । (भ.मी.२६.८)
मामात्मपरेद्यर्थु प्रविशिन्तोध्वसुव्यक्ता॥ (भ.मी.२६.८)
तानहं द्विषितः क्रूरान संसारेशु नराध्मान्तः
क्षिपाभ्यौजस्मशुभानासुरीष्वेव योनिः॥ (भ.मी.२६.१९)

पु.१३८ दया चेदुणो निग्रहस्वेद्वेष इति न नियमोस्तितः
लोके स्थानदयाया: स्थाननिग्रहस्य च गुणत्व
दोषत्वदर्शनाभावात् ।

(स्यु.प्र.२.२.१)
पु. १४३ तेन प्रदौतोते नेष आत्मा निष्क्रामिता। (पु. ३.१.४२)
पु. १४४ रेषोणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः। (पु. ३.२.४७)
पु. १४४ यथा च तक्षोभयथा। (प्र. पु. ३.३.३६)
पु. १४५ वाचारम्भं विकारो नामवेयं मृत्तिकेष्वेय सत्यम्। (प्र. पु. ६.१.४)
पु. १४५ मन्देदिशे कार्यस्य विगीततल्मप्रति पादत्वात्। न ह्यं सृष्ट्यादि-प्रपञ्चः प्रतिपिपादयिष्टः। न हि तत्प्रतिवद्वः कश्चित्तपुःशाया हस्यते भूस्यते वा। (पु. पु. ६.१.४)
पु. १४५ मायामात्रं तु काल्स्यैनानस्मित्यकतस्वरूपत्वात्। (पु. पु. ६.३.३)
पु. १४५ जातस्य हि धृत्रं मृत्युः। धृत्रं जनम मृत्स्य च। (पु. पु. ६.२.७)
पु. १४६ वृहींघतवः घटत: कमालिका कमालिका-चूर्णरजस्ततो। (पु. पु. ६.२.६२)
पु. १४६ उत्पतिविवाशार्यः सतो द्रव्यस्यावस्थाविशेषः। उत्पः श्लोकमवस्थाम् उपवातस्य द्रव्यस्य
तत्तीवर्धुवस्थान्तरप्रतिः: विनाशा इत्युच्यते। मृद्ध-√
वस्य पिण्डतवकपालत्वपूर्वकाविदवतः परिणामिद्रव्यस्य
परिणामपरम्परारस्वर्पजीयः। तत्र पूर्ववस्थस्य
द्रव्यस्योत्तरवस्था प्राप्तिविवाशः। सौंभ तदर्शस्य
चोज्यते। (भ. पु. ६.२.३)
पु. १४६ सत्त्वातं व हि द्रव्यधम्मविविद्युत्तमः। तत्र सत्त्वधम्मद्वित्तिन्तरम् असत्त्वम्।।।
मृद्धवस्य
पृथवुभुधोदराकावर्यस्योऽयो घटोस्तीति व्यवहारहेतुः।
तत्रैव तत्तीव्रधद्वस्थान्तरयोऽघो नास्तीति
व्यवहारहेतुः। न च तत्द्वच्यतिरिक्ते घटाभावो

नाम कथितुपुलभ्यते।

(भगवदगीता 2.1.4)

पु.161 असदेवेदमग्र आसीत।
असंग्र इदमग्र आसीत।

(पुराण 5.2.4)

पु.162 असदव्यान्वदेशांचे चेतन धर्मान्तरेण वायव्योषातुः
युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच।

(वैद्यु.2.1.8)

पु.162 इदं शब्दनिर्दिष्ट्यम जगतः सल्लत्वधर्मी नामरूपे ;
असल्लत्वधर्मस्तु तद्विरोधिनी सूक्ष्मावस्था। अतो
जगतो नामरूपयुक्तस्य तद्विरोध सूक्ष्मदशापित्तरसृत्यम्।

(श्री.मा.2.1.8)

पु.162 ज्योतीकेश विष्णुः भुवनानि विष्णुः
वनानि विष्णुः गिरयो दिशानि।
नाभः समुद्राशः स एव सर्वं
यदर्शित् यथास्थितं च विप्रवर्य॥

(वि.पु.2.2.10)

पु.168 न हृल्पेन विपुलख्योत्त्पति।। दशगुणं वृहतो ब्रह्मणः
कारणादधिपत्य कार्यवें हि प्रतिपद्वे।।

(पु.2.2.10)

पु.168 ...अत्यन्तसूक्ष्मतत्त्व सत्तकलपस्वलीलोकरण-
चिदचिदचिदसुर्वारि तत्त्व रमात्मा ...。

(श्री.मा.1.1.27)

पु.169 यदि भूतसूक्ष्मममवय्याकृमतमभूषणमय्ये, कापिलतत्त्व
सिद्धान्तभूषणमेव कः प्रदेशेः। तत्रापि हि भूतकारणमेव
अव्यतिकंत्युष्ट्ये। तत्रोत्त्ये ...। न वयमव्यत्तं
तत्परिनामविशेषांश्र स्वरूपेणान्मयुपगच्छामः; अपि
तु परमपूर्वशरीरितया तदात्मकक्तवात्विरहेन। (श्री. या. १२. ६)

पु. १७० तदात्मानं स्वयमकुलत।

(तै. आ. ०. ०)

पु. १७१ मृत्युपछादारे: कुलाल प्रभृतिरिह पृथक कदवेदवादिकर्ता
नोपादानं विकारे विशिष्ट इति न द्वारवात्रे विकारात्।
मृत्युर्द्वान्तादित्वावश्च विकृतिरसौ स्पृतेऽपर वरस्त्रकर्षणे 
देहाद्वारोणान्मित्रप्रभृतिविकृतिवक्रमापूर्तेदीर्घत्तत्वत्॥

(अ.सा. १४४)

पु. १७२ पृथ्विय्यप्पु प्रलीयते, आपस्तेजसी लीयन्ते तेजो
बायो लीयते.... भूतादिर महिहित लीयते; महानव्यते
लीयते; अव्यक्तमक्षे पीयते; अक्षरं तमसळीयते; 
तम: परे देव एकी भवति।

(पु. २)

पु. १७३ न कर्माविभागादिति चेचनादित्वादुपमपीते
चाप्युपलम्यते च।

(ब्र.पु. २. २. ३)

पु. १७५ येन स्वभावेन कारणभूतं वस्तु वस्त्वन्तराद्व्यावृत्तं
तस्य स्वभावस्य तत्कार्यैः प्रयनुवृत्ति: कार्य
कारणसालक्षेप्यम्।

(श्री. या. २. १. ४)

पु. १७९ निर्गुणस्याप्रमेयस्य शुद्धस्याप्यमलात्मः
कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्त्वं ब्रह्मानोभ्युपगम्यते॥
शास्त्रं: सर्वभाबानामविचित्याज्ञानगोचरा:।
यतो शास्त्रं ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु सर्गाधातावशक्तयः 
भवन्ति तपतं श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोषणता॥

(ब्र.पु. १११. ६. २)

261
पृ.१८० श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वातः ।
पृ.१८० तक्षप्रतिष्ठानादिपि।
पृ.१८१ आर्य धर्मोपदेशांच वेदशास्त्रविरोधिना।
यस्तक्रेणानुसन्धनं स धर्म वेद नेतरः ।। (मु.१२.२.१०६)
पृ.१८६ मायामात्रं तु कालस्तर्याननिभव्यक्षस्वरूपत्वातः।
पृ.१८६ न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्ति।
अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते । न तत्र आनन्दः
मुदः प्रमुद्रे भवन्ति । अथा SSनन्दान्
मुदः प्रमुदः सृजते...... स हि कर्ता (पृ.६.२.१०)
पृ.१८७ मायामात्रं तु कालस्तर्याननिभव्यक्षस्वरूपत्वातः।
पृ.१८८ किं प्रबोध इव स्वप्नेषोपि पारमार्थिकी सृष्टिः
आहोरिस्वनमायामयीति। (ब्र.सू. सा. मा. ३.३.१)
पृ.१८९ अस्तभनान् मायया चामवस्ससः। (अम्बेद.: २.५.७.५)
पृ.१८९ दासानामिन्द्रो मायया। (अम्बेद.: ४.३.२४)
पृ.१९० जनकस्य कुले जाता देवमायेव निर्मिता। (रामायणम् बा.१.१६)
पृ.१९० तेन मायासहस्रं तच्चम्बरस्यायुगमिना।
बालस्य रक्षता देहमेकैक्षयेन सूर्दितम्। (प्र.पृ.१.१९.२०)
पृ.१९५ न ब्रह्मज्ञानमात्रं सांसारिकधर्मनिवृत्तिकारणम्
आपितु साक्षात्कार्पर्यन्ततमः। (भाम्म.१.६.४)
पृ.१९६ नावगतब्रह्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं सशारीरतं शाक्यं
कल्यायितं वेदप्रमाणजनितं ब्रह्मान्तमाविरोधात।
शारीरि पापपिर सारीरि व्यया जीवन इति चेंच,
सारीरित्वस्य मिध्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वान्। न व्यातमनः
शारीरात्माभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानं मुक्त्वस्यतः
सारीरित्वं श्यथं कल्पयितम्। नित्यमार्शारित्वम्
अकर्मनित्तित्वादित्यवो चाम।

पु.१९६ यदि वास्तवं सारीरित्वं भवेत् न जीवतस्तत्चिन्तवर्ततः,
मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं तु तत्। तत्चोपत्यज्ञाननेन
जीवतापि श्यथं निवर्तित्यतुम्।

पु.१९८ तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति; नान्यः पश्चा अयनात्
विचते।

पु.२०१ नं श्रुतब्रह्मणो पि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्श्नाननं
रज्जुस्वरूपकथनवदर्श्वस्यमित्त्वमित्त्वकम्। अत्रोच्यने
नावगतब्रह्मात्ममभावस्य यथापूर्वं संगारित्वं श्यथं
दर्शियतुं, वेदप्रमाणज्ञनित्वब्रह्मात्ममभावविरोधाणा।

पु.२०३ तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्रह्मणं विद्विदिपिन्त यजौः।

पु.२०५ पुण्यापुण्य निबन्धनानाचित्सरसरप्रीयतं नानारूपमाबवक्षेत
हि संसारः।

पु.२०६ यथा न क्रियते ज्योतस्ना मलप्रक्षालाणांमणे।
दोष प्रहाणवच्चानात्मम्: क्रियते तथा।।
यथोद्यानकर्मातिक्रयते न जलाम्बरम्।
सदेव नीयते व्यक्तिमसत्: सम्भव: कृतः।।

263
तथा हैयगुण्ध्रवसादवरोभादवो गुणा:
प्रकाशन्ते न जन्मन्ते नित्या एवात्मनो हि नै॥
पु. २०७ न है वै सर्वरस्तो सत: प्रियाप्रिययोरपहिततिरस्तः
अर्शरीरं वा व सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः॥ (१. ८. २२. २)

पु. २०८ स एकधा महति त्रिधा महति पञ्चधा सचधा... (१. ८. २६. २)

पु. २०८ वालाध्रशतभागस्य शत्धा कल्पतत्त्वो चा
भागो जीवः स विकृयः स चानन्त्यापकल्पते॥ (२. २. ६)

पु. २०९ अत् एव चानन्त्याधिपति:।
(ब्र. नु. ४. ५. ६)

पु. २१० अत्नान्त्याधिपतिरिति नोक्तम्; किन्तुनन्यान्त्याधिपतिरिति
अत्तामधिभिराय: - स्वाभिविकथिषिण: परमप्रुढ़ादन्य:
नान्त्याधिपतिमृतस्येति। अन्यथा हनन्त्याधिपतिरित्वेत्तावतः॥ (१. ८. २)

पु. २१० यस्यात्मा तत्... यमात्मानमन्तरो यमात्मा। (ब्र. नु. ५. ३. ६)

अन्तः प्रविष्ठः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा। (१. आर. ३. ६. ३)

पु. २१७ प्रीतपूर्वमुनुध्यायं भक्तिरित्यभिक्षिते॥

पु. २२२ ओमित्येवात्मां ध्यायत॥
(ब्र. २. २. ६)

निचायतं मृत्युमुखात्रप्रभुच्चते॥ (कठ. १. ३. ३५)
ध्यानन्मथनाभ्यासाहें पत्र्येचिरमुक्तवत्॥ (ब्र. २. २. ६)

पु. २२४ आवृत्तिसकृदु: पदेशात॥
(ब्र. नु. ४४. ४)

पु. २२५ आप्रयाणात॥
(ब्र. नु. ४४. ६)

पु. २२५ सर्वपिक्षा च यज्ञादिष्ठुतेश्वतरश्वत॥
(ब्र. नु. ३. ४. ३६)

264
पु.२२८ इयाज सोरिण सुबहून यज्ञान ज्ञानव्यपात्र:।
ब्रह्मविद्यामधिष्ठाय तर्तु मृत्युमविद्या॥ (वि.पु.६.६.१२)
पु.२३० यन्मुहूर्तो क्षणो वापि वासुदेवो न चिन्त्यते।
सा हानिस्तनमहच्छद्रं सा भ्रष्टि: सा च विक्रिया॥
(पु.२२२.२२)
पु.२३१ अत्र ब्रह्म समस्तते।
तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति॥ (कठ.२.३.१४)
(प्र.आर.१२.१७)
असा - अधिकरणसारावलि:
ऐ. - ऐतरेयोपनिषद्
कठ. - कठोपनिषद्
कौ. - कौषितकयुपनिषद्
छा. -छान्दोग्योपनिषद्
जै.सू - जैमिनिसूत्रम्
तै. - तैत्तर्योपनिषद्
तै.आ. - तैत्तरीय आनन्दवल्ली
तै.आर. - तैत्तरीय आरण्यकम्
तै.आ.पु.सू - तैत्तरीय आरण्यके पुरुषसूत्रकम्
तै.ना. - तैत्तरीय नारायणानुवाकः
नृ.ता. - नृसिंहतापनीयोपनिषद्
पु. - पुरस्वत्या
प्र. - प्रश्नोपनिषद्
प्र.सं.(प्र.भा) - प्रथमसम्पूते (प्रथमो भागः)
बृ. - बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्
ब्र.सू. - ब्रह्मसूत्राणि
ब्र.सू.शा.भा. - ब्रह्मसूत्रशास्त्रभाष्यम्
भ.गी. - भगवद्गीता
भ.गी.रा.भा. - भगवद्गीतारामानुजभाष्यम्
मनु. - मनुस्मृति:
मा.का. - माण्डूक्यकारिका
मु. - मुण्डकोपनिषद्
वि.पु. - विष्णुपुराणम्
श्री.भा. - श्रीभाष्यम्
श्रु.प्र. - श्रुतप्रकाशिका
श्वे. - श्रेवेतार्म्बतरोपनिषद्
सा.का. - साम्यकारिका
सु. - सुबालोपनिषद्